Rains recently have been very intense. Very intense. Without comparison, like nothing seen before. . . . We don’t want to leave our land. Here are our past, our memories, our ancestors. We don’t want to move to other parts. We don’t know what to do there. We will turn into delinquents. We’d enter into a cycle of poverty which happens in the cities.
Octavio Rodriguez, Las Caracuchas, Sucre, Colombia
Immigration crises are already at our doorstep and have been for years. Women and children are fleeing Central America by the tens of thousands, overwhelming border security. Many children are alone. Many are forced to turn back. Others stay, only to face racism and hostility, yet remain in the United States because it is better than the alternative.
The challenges of securing the border and providing care and social services to immigrants and refugees from our southern Americas are extensive enough to fill books themselves. This book discusses the broad-ranging environmental factors that are pushing people to flee and forcing migration and that will inevitably exacerbate the refugee crisis. Immigration is largely discussed in the public arena in the context of border security, but soon the conversation surrounding Latin American refugees may have to turn to climate change.
The land and people in Latin America and the Caribbean are among the world’s most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and severe weather. Every region faces its own unique threat and harsh environment; many face more than one. In Central America, drought reigns supreme, leading to water shortages and food crises. In the same region, the short-lived rainy seasons bring a great amount of destruction. Water shortages and food crises are as common as flash floods and landslides. In the nearby coastal countries and Caribbean islands, hurricanes rip through on a consistent basis. In South America, clear-cutting of the Amazon rain forest is resulting in parched lands and fewer rains. Harsh conditions are driving people from agricultural communities into the cities, where, combined with the continent’s drought, they face severe water shortages.
Figure 5.1: Drivers of displacement in Latin America. Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Bulletin: Latin America and Caribbean,” vol. 21 (January–April 2015).
In the first three months of 2015 alone, four and a half million people in Latin America and the Caribbean were impacted by environmental disasters—mostly from floods and storms but a near equivalent amount from drought and food insecurity (see fig. 5.1). In an attempt to respond, the governments have been placing massive restrictions on water usage, handing out seed packets, and calling for foreign aid. However, these are short-term Band-Aids, not long-term solutions.
Meanwhile, the region faces one of the world’s highest rates of violence, forcing parents to send their children to flee on solo journeys to escape potential injury or even death.1 As more land turns unlivable and climate change accelerates, even more people will flee the region, turning Latin America into one of the world’s greatest sources of environmental refugees.
Drought in Latin America is unquestionably worsening as the planet warms. Extreme drought runs rampant even in the tropical region of Central America, a place that often conjures images of lush, wet rain forests. But while patches of tropical cloud forests are scattered throughout Central America, an arid region stretches throughout the land, known as the “Dry Corridor,” or “Corredor Seco.” Panama, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic all have land in this region, which has been bearing the brunt of severe drought in recent years. The Dry Corridor is cut off from ocean humidity by mountain ranges in the Caribbean, which create a rain shadow. The region experiences dry seasons that last longer than those in surrounding areas and is vulnerable to drought when its already short rainy season is reduced by El Niño—or by climate change.2
In 2014 Guatemala’s government declared a state of emergency, prompting drastic water restrictions and increased funding for aid. In August 2015 both Panama and Honduras followed suit, declaring states of emergency.3 The Dry Corridor is at a unique risk of drought, and therefore food insecurity and hunger, which has triggered migration away from the region and through Mexico to the United States. Many of the immigrants who arrive in the States are running from hunger or from violent conflicts that arise from such resource scarcity.
Throughout 2014 and 2015, long-lasting drought ran through the Dry Corridor, killing a huge amount of crops and affecting millions of people in the region. In total, 3.5 million people were affected, according to the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). As of October 2015, two million were in dire need of food, health care, and other assistance.4 Without enough resources, many were at risk of dengue and malnutrition, especially children under five years old. A Salvadoran coffee picker by the name of Esperanza said, “We’ve seen severe changes in the children here. Children are malnourished. Some severely. We have also seen the elderly growing more tired because of the lack of food.”5
The crisis highlighted the extreme vulnerability of the region’s residents: subsistence farmers, laborers, and low-income families who live in the Dry Corridor rely on consistent rains to keep their way of life. When rainfall patterns change sharply in either direction, this leads to crop failures and harms food supplies, threatening the livelihoods of these farming communities. And the drought of 2014–2015 was costly: nearly $100 million in crops were destroyed in El Salvador alone, affecting over one hundred thousand farmers. The country’s Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock had to step in and distribute hundreds of thousands of seed packets so that farmers could replant their corn and bean crops, which are staples for Salvadorans.6
Droughts, and correspondingly hunger crises, are not uncommon in the Dry Corridor. But in recent decades they have worsened. The United Nations reported that nearly half of Guatemalan children under five years old “suffer from stunting as a result of chronic under-nutrition.”7 As recently as 2009, drought and high food prices led to a severe hunger crisis in Guatemala, prompting a state of emergency. The executive director of the United Nations’ World Food Programme said of the situation, “Women and children have been caught in the vortex of this hunger crisis and are in a desperate struggle for survival.”8
Yet the 2014 drought was even worse. That year, the Dry Corridor saw its most prolonged drought in four decades. The severity highlighted the region’s unique vulnerability to drought and rainfall: the land is largely unirrigated, relying solely on rainfall instead.9 The area also has the highest levels of food insecurity in Central America, according to the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office.
The region’s dry period has historically lasted between January and April, but recently it has stretched until June or July. And in El Niño years, which occur every two to seven years, the dry period often lasts even longer. During the years of extreme drought, the dry season lasted until even October.10 The total land area of the Dry Corridor may also be expanding. In Honduras, José Antonio Velásquez, director of international cooperation for Honduras’s emergency relief agency, told Fusion.net his country’s Dry Corridor has nearly tripled in size over the past three decades. “The dry corridor now covers almost 45 percent of national territory,” he said, when it used to be “limited to the extreme south of the country, near the Nicaraguan border.”11 As the globe warms, the Dry Corridor’s climate will become harsher and life more difficult.
The rainy season isn’t always a saving grace, even in the Dry Corridor. Floods and storms can be just as devastating—or worse—to the region as droughts. All told, OCHA determined that floods and storms were the greatest threat to Latin Americans in the first three months of 2015, affecting two and a half million people.12
The Dry Corridor is extremely dependent on its rainy seasons to replenish the land. But when the dry season lasts longer than it is supposed to, and the earth gets sucked dry, the rains can prove to be a curse rather than a blessing. The rain comes in torrents, leading to flash floods, washing away the arable land. Tropical storms—and superstorms and hurricanes—destroy more than they heal.
As a case in point, 2009 saw extreme drought in the Dry Corridor, followed by a tropical storm that left thousands of victims. Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua all experienced great losses in food production during a drought and were subsequently hammered by Tropical Storm Ida. The storm affected forty thousand people in Nicaragua, leaving thirteen thousand homeless.13
In 2010, tropical rains battered Central America, with total precipitation well above the yearly average.14 The heavy rains resulted in flooding and landslides and deteriorated agricultural production, which is vital for the region’s food supply. One storm, Tropical Storm Agatha, destroyed thirty-five hundred houses and killed ninety-nine people, including thirteen from one landslide in Guatemala.15
Elsewhere in Central America in 2009, Tropical Storm Ida led to record rains in El Salvador—up to seventeen inches of rain were dumped within two days—and prompted landslides that destroyed scores of homes. At least 190 people were killed and ten thousand were displaced, forced into shelters.16
In 2011, landslides in Central America killed at least eighty people in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The BBC reported: “International highways have been washed out, villages isolated and thousands of families have lost homes and crops.”17
In October 2014, landslides killed more than thirty people in Nicaragua and surrounding countries.18 Eight hundred and ninety Nicaraguan homes were flooded and twenty-four were destroyed in the landslides.19
Flood-induced landslides are a result of extreme rainfall on parched land. Both of those factors are expected to get worse with climate change—some predict they already have. Since 1970, global temperatures have increased nearly two-tenths of a degree centigrade each decade.20 Meanwhile, while the average amount of precipitation has not increased, “rainfall events are intensifying and the contribution of wet and very wet days are growing,” according to a study from the agriculture research organization Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research.21
Of course, there are natural factors at hand in Central America’s climatic variations. If you do an Internet search for the phrase “What caused Central American drought?” the answer you will most certainly get is “El Niño,” a natural phenomenon that has been going on for thousands of years. However, there is evidence to show that climate change has a hand in making El Niño conditions worse.
El Niño Southern Oscillation, or ENSO, is a term for a meteorological phenomenon that occurs in the Pacific Ocean once every several years and affects weather in many regions of the planet. The worst dry seasons, thereby the worst droughts, happen during ENSO years. The phenomenon was named in the 1800s by Peruvian fishermen who noticed a warm current appearing around Christmastime every few years.
Here’s how ENSO works. Normally, trade winds blow from east to west over the Pacific Ocean, from the western coast of South America to the eastern coast of Asia. The winds bring warm ocean waters heated by the sun to Southeast Asia that then sink down to the bottom of the ocean and are transported back along the ocean floor to South America, due to the lack of pressure in ocean water there. The water cools down as it is transported back, and when it reaches South America, it rises up, bringing nutrients from the ocean floor and cooling the atmosphere. During ENSO years this pattern is disrupted. Westerly winds push back on the eastern trade winds, and the warm waters come back to South America’s eastern shores. The result is twofold: on the Pacific coast, Central America experiences warmer temperatures, leading to hotter days and prolonged drought in the dry season; conversely, on the Caribbean coast, South and Central America experience heavier rain and flooding, as the warmer atmosphere holds more moisture.
The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization has previously attributed Latin America’s major crop losses to ENSO.22 In 2015 the Central American Agricultural Council, which is headed by agriculture ministers in the region, declared a state of alert after “hundreds of thousands of subsistence farmers have suffered the partial or total loss of their crops planted for the main grain season that runs from May to September,” according to the FAO. But FAO economist Felix Baquedano noted that 2015’s ENSO conditions were worse than they had been in the past, due in part to the “intensifying dry weather” experienced in the two previous years. As a result, Baquedano said, “It’s critical that we support farmers to recuperate some of their losses by helping them achieve stronger yields in the second season.”23
Multiple studies show that climate change could lead to more frequent “extreme” or “super” El Niños—like El Niño, but on steroids.24 These super El Niños are particularly strong, leading to hotter, drier conditions and more storm-filled weather patterns in Central America (as noted above, whether a location will be drier or will experience more severe storms with El Niño depends on the particular region). Previous super El Niños that have occurred led to landslides in Peru, wildfires in Indonesia, and decimation of South America’s anchovy fishery. They have cost up to $45 billion in damage and twenty-three thousand deaths worldwide.25
As climate change intensifies, such super El Niños may happen twice as often as they do now, according to climate researchers at Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation.26 Extreme El Niño events have historically occurred once every twenty years; with climate change the likelihood increases to once every ten years. Other studies predict a smaller increase in extreme ENSO events.27 But 2015, the warmest year on record, experienced the strongest El Niño in recorded history.28 The El Niño that took place in the final months of 2015 and beginning of 2016 was a monster, in no less accurate terms. NASA scientist William Patzert said it could become a “Godzilla” El Niño.29 In addition to the drought in Central America, Chile and northern Brazil face drought-worsening conditions with El Niño.30
In Central America, no stranger to drought-induced states of emergency, residents and experts have pointed to the droughts as a reason for migration from the region northward to Mexico and the United States. In the wake of a 2014 drought, Guatemalan agricultural engineer Bayron Medina of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Cooperation predicted: “If the drought is not over in two months, there will be famine and people will leave for the U.S. Eventually, the drought did end. But Medina vocalized a common train of thought in such a region. He added that droughts in Guatemala had been “intensifying and accelerating” over the previous decade.31 Migration as a form of adaptation is becoming commonplace.
There are conflicting sentiments as to how poverty comes into play concerning drought-induced migration. To some, migration is considered a luxury, a privilege given to those who can afford it. “The poor can’t migrate,” said Manuel Orozco of the think tank Inter-American Dialogue; “that’s not how migration works.” Orozco said the drought could increase immigration, but “people who migrate are those who can afford to get out.”32 Others attribute migration directly to poverty, like Leoncio Vasquez, executive director of the Binational Center for the Development of Oaxacan Indigenous Communities. When asked about the 120,000 people who have moved from Mexico to the United States in recent years because of drought, Vasquez responded, “Really, it’s 100 percent because of poverty.” But, he added, “A lot of that poverty is coming because of the drought. If you can’t farm you can’t eat, and people start doing other things like cutting down trees for wood to sell. And then that starts a downward spiral where things just keep getting worse. . . . All these people—people like me—all we want to do is to make a living for ourselves, but it gets to the point that it’s impossible and you have to pick up and leave.”33
The connection between drought and migration is still being examined. Several studies find a direct link between drought and forced migration, such as in some regions of Mexico and sub-Saharan Africa. Others find no such link, suggesting that drought-induced migration is dependent on the context.34 But it is becoming increasingly accepted that severe drought can result in migration and has already done so. As droughts worsen, migration will become ever more visible.
While the link between drought and migration may be up for dispute, the connection between food security and migration is stronger. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP) teamed together to review the research on this very topic. A 2015 report of their findings details how migration induced by food insecurity plays out in three Central American countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.35 In those countries they found that hunger, violence, and migration are intertwined, especially when the region is “suffering the effects of prolonged dry spells or droughts for the second consecutive year.” The report definitely found what had been commonly assumed: food insecurity leads to migration.36
Despite the fact that the connection between food insecurity and migration is clear—when one takes the time to look into it—this connection is rarely discussed. The WFP/IOM report found that food security is “generally absent from the current debate on migration and development,” while the issue itself “is primarily seen as an issue affecting the rural poor, who are in no way representative of the whole range of migrants.”37
Perhaps discussing the two issues together is necessary for the public to understand the connection between climate change and refugees. After all, the link between climate change and food security is understood and is thoroughly documented by several international organizations.38 The ramifications of food insecurity reach far and wide. The 2014 Central American drought led to a food crisis that left nearly three million people struggling to feed themselves, according to the WFP.39 In Guatemala, 70 percent of the land was impacted by the drought, resulting in the suffering of half of its population. Chronic malnutrition among children became rampant.40 To make matters worse, global warming will hamper efforts to fight hunger. The charitable organization Oxfam has detailed how a changed climate can set back efforts to eradicate hunger by decades.41 Several efforts are needed to protect food systems.
So global warming wipes out food supplies and increases food insecurity while also hampering efforts to address food security and hunger—yet another vicious cycle of climate change that will inevitably result in forced migration. There may be one or two steps to take to get from global warming to refugees, but the connection is very real.
With one meter of sea level rise expected by the end of the century, many Caribbean islands will experience catastrophic consequences.42 As discussed in chapter 3, however, many studies indicate sea level rise will be much greater than that. In the Caribbean region, at least, the literature shows sea levels experiencing a rise of anywhere from one to two meters over the twenty-first century. Even the low end of that estimate will have severe ramifications on countries in the Caribbean community (CARICOM). A report from the United Nations detailed what that seemingly insignificant rise will mean for CARICOM. Just one meter—the low end of the spectrum—will “permanently inundate” 1 percent of the total land area, but this 1 percent is a significant portion, representing some of the region’s most valuable land. The Bahamas will be particularly vulnerable, with 5 percent of its land permanently flooded, and Antigua and Barbuda with 2 percent. Subsequently, 5 and 3 percent of their respective populations will be displaced.43
This is the number of people who live in areas that will be permanently submerged into the ocean, but far more will be affected by persistent flooding and storm surge. In the Bahamas, for instance, 22 percent of the population is at risk of flooding due to sea level rise and storm surge. Such events will cost the country up to $2 billion a year before century’s end. All told, at least 110,000 people will be displaced from their homes in the Caribbean states. This flooding is also expected to cost the area’s economy billions of dollars each year, but they will have only limited resources to help their population adapt.44 These are just the consequences of climate change that have already been locked in, as a one-meter sea level rise is all but inevitable.45 It will be even worse if sea levels rise two meters, with double the number of displaced people.46
Yet even as sea levels rise, the Caribbean countries face extreme drought, bringing to mind the phrase “Water, water, everywhere, but not a drop to drink.” In the summer of 2015, the worst drought in five years spread through the region.47 In Haiti 50 percent of crops were lost, and the Dominican Republic was expected to lose 30 percent of its crops. The drought particularly impacted Puerto Rico, where over half the country was in severe drought.48 Under imposed water restrictions, tens of thousands of residents received water only one every three days.49 This level of severe water rationing, in some areas, leads to civilian unrest. Between the drought, the sea level rise, and intensified hurricanes, the Caribbean has, in the words of Florida reporter Tim Padgett, “begun to feel like a climate-change doormat.”50
The interplay between sea level rise and drought is also present in Central America, which, as discussed previously, is vulnerable to drought. United Nations climate reports have highlighted the region’s vulnerability to sea level rise, particularly that of the “isthmus countries”—Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. The regions rely on flat coastal plains for agriculture and economic activities. Sea level rise will exacerbate coastal erosion in the region, stressing countries that are already stressed by agricultural problems. Furthermore, as a result of sea level rise, ocean saltwater will infiltrate coastal aquifers, further threatening the region’s water supply.51
Hurricanes, bringing winds that blow at multiple hundreds of miles per hour and surging waves, leveling houses, flooding streets, are much more frightening, and immediate, than the long-standing issues of drought, soil erosion, and sea level rise. They are the final battering ram of global warming that hits islands that are already vulnerable to climate change. In the past, migration that has resulted from hurricanes has been temporary and has resulted in only internal migration. But as the impacts of global warming worsen, if a community is ravaged by drought and food scarcity, having a home destroyed by a hurricane may be the final straw that forces residents to leave the country.52
Hurricanes have a history of displacing Central American people by the thousands, even millions. One historical hurricane exemplified this. In 1998 Hurricane Mitch ravaged the region. With wind speeds of 180 miles per hour and ten-foot storm surges, the strongest storm of the season killed as many as 18,000—the highest death toll since 1780.53 The storm displaced millions of people from Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador, many of them permanently. In Honduras international emigration rates increased by 300 percent.54
The Council on Hemispheric Affairs has characterized this situation as a warning for the rest of the world, calling it “an illustration of the normally low capacity of response present in areas of Latin America.”55 The organization notes that disaster prevention and relief responses, as they are, currently leave hundreds of thousands of people homeless during the hurricane season.
In 2004 Hurricane Ivan wreaked the Caribbean Basin; 2005 saw a record hurricane season; and in 2010 Tropical Storm Matthew damaged Venezuela. Of great concern is that hurricanes are expected to get stronger in coming decades, because as much of the global warming is being absorbed by the oceans, warmer ocean waters fuel stronger storms.56
In Central America the multipronged ramifications of climate change are clear. Being vulnerable to severe weather events from all sides, it is no wonder why the region is one of the world’s most vulnerable to climate change. Migration between Central America and South America, and between South America and the United States via Central America, will be an important issue in the years to come.
Climate change–induced displacement doesn’t always require someone registering as a refugee or even leaving their own country. Rather, climate change effects can lead people to migrate away from rural areas—where their pastoral, agricultural lifestyles are vulnerable to intense droughts or floods—into cities.
The urbanization trend is massive and predicted to increase across the globe. Yet Latin America is on the forefront of this trend, in recent decades becoming the most urbanized continent. In 1950 just 40 percent of the Latin American population was living in cities. In 1990 that proportion was 70 percent. And currently about 80 percent of Latin Americans are city dwellers.57 This proportion is far greater than that of any other continent.58 But the rest of the world is evolving in a similar fashion; by 2050, 70 percent of the global population will be living in cities.59 The problems Latin America faces as a result of rapid urbanization can be warning signs—or lessons—for other regions. Policies responding to urbanization can provide equitable governance and long-term economic solutions, or they can fail to prevent shocks to the economic system, placing stresses on resources such as food, water, and medical services, and in some cases, as seen in Brazil, erupt in violence.
For those facing extreme drought and crop failure in the countryside, migration into the cities may seem like a promising alternative. But urban populations also face unique risks when it comes to climate change. For one thing, urban dwellers are the most vulnerable to the extreme heat events that will happen with increased frequency as the globe warms. This is partially due to the urban “heat island effect.” By clearing away forests and the natural environment and replacing it with concrete sidewalks and tall dark buildings, the built environment in cities absorb and amplify hot temperatures. The heat island effect can be deadly; in cities in northern Mexico, heat waves have resulted in increased mortality rates,60 and in Buenos Aires, 10 percent of deaths in the summer are due to heat stress.61 Despite the risks, the city remains a mecca for impoverished farmers, and the rate of urbanization will continue to increase in Latin America, as well as around the world. By 2050, 90 percent of the Latin American population will be living in cities.62 To see how this results in serious problems—water scarcity, paucity of infrastructure, poverty, and strife—one may look to Brazil.
Figure 5.2: Urbanization and population growth, past and future. Source: United Nations World Urbanization Prospects, the 2014 revision. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/cd-rom
In Brazil drought in the agricultural rural regions have spurred migration into its rapidly growing coastal cities. Agriculture has particularly suffered in northeastern Brazil, so farmers have left for the cities on the coast and in the south.63 The increase in urbanization is mostly coming from surrounding agricultural areas that previously supported a huge portion of the country’s labor.64 As temperatures increase, Brazil’s rural areas are expected to continue to depopulate.
The living standards for these new migrants are less than ideal. One hundred eleven million Latin Americans live in shanty towns (nearly one-fifth of the population of the continent) that sprawl from the country’s huge urban centers.65 Brazil is now host of three “megacities” with populations over ten million: Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Belo Horizonte.66 Just as in Puerto Rico, São Paulo has faced extreme water restrictions due to both drought and increased demand. The city’s residents have struggled with receiving water for just a few hours each day. Several thousands have had their water shut off for several days at a time. This has led to apartment building managers seeing vicious arguments and threatened violence—even in the beginning of the water crisis, in February 2015.67
It worsened later that year. In March the drastic water shortages led to public uprisings. Hundreds of citizens protested in the streets of São Paulo, chanting, “Water is a resource that must be preserved.”68 Igor Silva, who led the chants, said they were “demanding equitable distribution of water in all the cities in São Paulo state.” The Brazilian government wasn’t admitting it was rationing water, according to Silva.69
Unable to deal with the drought and water shortages, many people have actually started moving away from São Paulo, unable to deal with the drought. An unidentified manager drilling for water reserves told NPR he moved his family to the countryside after his building went under water rationing; he called himself a “water refugee.”70
In response to the civil unrest, Brazilian officials considered turning to military intervention to keep the peace. At a conference between government officials, academics, and military employees, some predicted the city would run out of water. Others predicted that water would be shut off for five days at a time.71
Paolo Massato, engineer at the state’s water company working to bring water to São Paulo, told Telesur a worst-case scenario would be “terrible. No [sic] would be no food, no [sic] would be no electricity. . . . It would be a scene from the end of the world. There [would be] thousands of people, and it could cause social chaos. It would not only be a problem of water shortage, it would be much more than that.”72 Brazil has not (as of 2016) turned to police intervention, but the mere fact that such actions have even been discussed does not bode well.
Moreover, this threat is not limited to São Paulo. One year before, the city of Itu—one hundred kilometers away from São Paulo—water shutoffs led to fighting in water queues, looting, and theft from water trucks.73 One can only imagine that water shutoffs in other megacities will lead to similar cases of unrest, sparking violence and creating a bad situation that will force others to leave.
The Amazon rainforest is not only full of ecological treasures, beauty, and culture; it is also an important environmental safeguard for both South America and the world as a whole. It is the lifeblood for much of the continent. And not only is it getting cleared away by the minute, but it is also expected to decrease in size even further because of climate change.
The clear-cutting of the Amazon rain forest has had huge ramifications for the rest of the continent’s economy, culture, and climate. In the short term it has had a hand in amplifying the region’s ongoing drought.74 Antonio Nobre, one of Brazil’s leading scientists, has warned that the degradation of the Amazon has reduced moisture in the atmosphere and lengthened dry seasons, contributing to the drought that led to such unrest in São Paulo.75
Conversely, deforestation is contributing to massive flooding in the lower region. Deforestation leads to increased erosion and water runoff, so the land is much less resistant to protecting itself from floods. At the same time that São Paulo was facing severe drought, the Bolivian Amazon region experienced floods that displaced thousands of people.76 In February 2015 more than four thousand people were forced from their homes in a northern Bolivian town called Cobija.77 However, this was minor compared to the impacts of the 2014 floods and resulting landslides, which killed at least fifty-six people and affected over fifty thousand families.78 Bolivia has long had a problem with people displaced from floods, but the floods of 2014 were the worst in twenty-five-years, with up to four hundred thousand people affected.79 Bolivian officials are adamant that the floods have gotten worse in recent years, citing climate change.80 This was affirmed in 2007 by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which stated that there was an 80 percent probability that global warming had worsened Bolivian flooding.81
The Amazon River is essential for regulating the region’s water and climate. An amazing phenomenon that comes from the Amazon is its “rivers in the sky” or “flying rivers.” The rain forest trees essentially act as one giant water pump, absorbing moisture from the soil and pumping it out as water vapor, a process called transpiration. This process produces a vast amount of moisture, so much so that there is more vapor discharged into the sky than the Amazon discharges into the ocean. In one day, while the Amazon River discharges seventeen million tons of water into the Atlantic Ocean, the Amazon rain forest evaporates twenty billion tons of vapor.82 This process is hugely important for bringing water to nearby countries. The clouds move across Latin America and fall as rain, nourishing agricultural economies. More than two-thirds of the rain in southeastern Brazil comes from these sky rivers.83
The hydrological system of the Amazon is at a dangerous tipping point. In the past two decades, an area twice the size of Germany has been removed. The destruction of the Amazon will lead to more extreme drought and other severe weather events, according to Nobre’s review of the scientific literature on the topic. He warns that the “vegetation-climate equilibrium is teetering on the brink of the abyss.”84
Nobre and many others concerned about the state of the Amazon are calling for a halt in deforestation practices and for replanting projects. Brazil’s current president, Dilma Rousseff, has loosened efforts to protect the Amazon.85 In the past two years the deforestation rate has increased.86 This is due in large part to illegal logging, but some activists blame the government for poor oversight on illegal operations. If the current rate of deforestation keeps up, according to senior researcher Rita Mesquita, with Brazil’s National Institute for Research in the Amazon, the rainforest “could be gone in 30 or 40 years.”87
While illegal logging is contributing to climate change, climate change in turn is contributing to the destruction of the Amazon. Global warming is going to cause extreme damage to the forests. Higher temperatures will reduce rainfall in the region and subsequently less “homegrown” rainfall provided by the forests, drying out the land.88 The rain forest tree species are not meant to grow in dry soil; their roots collapse and the trees fall.
Currently the Amazon rain forest’s dry season is three weeks longer than it was thirty years ago. The IPCC predicts it will continue to increase up to ten days longer by 2100. The dry season is the “most important climate condition controlling the rain forest,” according to University of Texas climate scientist Rong Fu.89
The UK’s national weather service, the Met Office, predicted in 2009 that global warming could result in dieback rates up to 40 percent.90 It has since figured that this would be the worst-case scenario, yet it is a scenario to prepare for nevertheless.91
The destruction of the Amazon forest is one of the processes that provides “positive feedback” to global warming; it will increase the rate of global warming, thus speeding up the process of rain forest degradation and so on. As one of the world’s major carbon sinks, the Amazon rain forest could be invaluable for fighting global warming. Replanting will be of utmost necessity. Yet currently deforestation rates have more than compensated for any positive efforts taken to protect the region.92
Meanwhile, tree die-off in the Amazon is yet another major source of greenhouse gas emissions. During the 2005 and 2010 droughts, the Amazon rain forest unleashed huge quantities of emissions; in 2005 it released more than the annual emissions of Europe and Japan combined, and though the quantity of emissions released during the 2010 drought was not calculated, its effects were even more severe.93 As if that’s not enough, there is one more addition to the deforestation/emission/climate-change cycle: the greater amount of carbon dioxide in the air can actually speed up the trees’ life cycles, making them die sooner.94 Thus the cycle repeats—tree die-off fuels drought, and the emissions from the dying trees raise temperatures, killing more trees—it builds on itself, and repeats again.
Latin America is a land of much beauty and history. It also faces multiple threats from global warming in nearly every region, threatening the way of life for people who have lived there for thousands of years. While extreme weather events have created massive migration movements, these movements have largely been contained within the continent, though they are no less life-threatening. However, it is only a matter of time before the climate migrants fleeing this continent have global ramifications, through immigration to the United States and elsewhere. Efforts to make the land more resilient in the face of climate change have been initiated, but at a certain point, reality must be faced and a solution made for the inevitable migration to come.
Alex Randall, “Moving Stories: Latin America,” January 28, 2014, Climate and Migration Coalition, http://climatemigration.org.uk/moving-stories-latin-america/1. “Violence Is Causing Children to Flee Central America,” Center for American Progress, August 12, 2014.
2. Hugo G. Hidalgo, “Hydroclimatological Processes in the ‘Central America Dry Corridor,’” http://envsci.rutgers.edu/~lintner/eftswg/Hidalgo_CorredorSeco.pdf.
3. “Central America; Drought—2014–2015,” ReliefWeb, accessed October 27, 2015, http://reliefweb.int/disaster/dr-2014–000132-hnd.
4. Ibid.
5. “Worst Drought in 40 Years Puts More Than 2 Million People in Central America at Risk,” European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office,” October 11, 2014, http://updates4696.rssing.com/chan-13436333/all_p513.html.
6. “Drought Causes $100 Million in Crop Losses in El Salvador,” Phys.org, August 10, 2015, http://phys.org/news/2015–08-drought-million-crop-losses-el.html#nRlv.
7. “Worst Drought in Guatemala in Decades Affecting 2.5 Million People, UN Reports,” UN News Centre, September 18, 2009, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=32109#.WBo_kMlcj5M.
8. “Hunger Crisis in Guatemala Draws Mounting Concern from UN Food Agency,” United Nations News Centre, September 11, 2009, https://desertification.wordpress.com/2009/09/12/guatemala-hunger-crisis-unnews/.
9. “Worst Drought in 40 Years.”
10. Jan-Albert Hootsen, “As Climate Changes, Central America Lags on Improving Food Security,” World Politics Review, October 30, 2014, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14313/as-climate-changes-central-america-lags-on-improving-food-security.
11. Tim Rogers, “Will Climate Change Hasten Central American Migration to US?” Fusion, August 14, 2014, http://fusion.net/story/6288/will-climate-change-hasten-central-american-migration-to-us/.
12. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Bulletin: Latin America and Caribbean,” vol. 21, (January–April 2015).
13. “Hurricane ‘Ida’ Leaves at Least 40,000 Victims in Nicaragua,” Agence France-Presse, November 6, 2009; “Nicaragua: Storm ‘Ida’ Gains Hurricane Status,” Agence France-Presse, November 8, 2009.
14. “State of the Climate: Global Analysis For 2010,” NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information, published online January 2011, retrieved on November 10, 2016 from http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/201013.
15. Juan Carlos Llorca, “First Tropical Storm of 2010 Kills 99 in Central America,” Associated Press, May 30, 2010, http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/first-tropical-storm-of-2010-kills-99-in-central-america/.
16. “Global Hazards—November 2009,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/hazards/200911#flooding.
17. “Central America Floods and Landslides ‘Leave 80 Dead,’” BBC News, October 18, 2011.
18. Adonai, “Days of Heavy Rain, Floods, and Deadly Landslides across Central America,” The Watchers, October 20, 2014, http://thewatchers.adorraeli.com/2014/10/20/days-of-heavy-rain-floods-and-deadly-landslides-across-central-america.
19. “Record Rains Flood Homes, Touch off Landslides in Nicaragua,” Associated Press, October 10, 2014, http://globalnes.ca/news/1608751/record-rains-flood-homes-touch-off-landslides-in-nicaragua/.
20. LuAnn Dahlman, “Climate Change: Global Temperature,” National Climatic Data Center, January 1, 2015, accessed at http://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-temperature.
21. Marengo JA, Chou SC, Torres RR, Giarolla A, Alves LM, Lyra A. 2014. Climate change in Central and South America: Recent trends, future projections, and impacts on regional agriculture. CCAFS Working Paper no. 73, https://cgspace.cgiar.org/rest/bitstreams/33625/retrieve.
22. “Central America Faces Major Crop Losses Due to El Niño, Warns UN Agency,” http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2015/09/central-america-faces-major-crop-losses-due-to-el-nino-warns-un-agency/.
23. “Major Crop Losses in Central America due to El Niño,” Food and Agriculture Organization, September 14, 2015, http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/328614/icode/.
24. “Global Warming-El Niño Link Stronger but Still Not Proven,” Climate Central, January 3, 2013, http://www.climatecentral.org/news/global-warming-el-nino-link-stronger-but-still-not-proven-15427; Jeff Tollefson, “Frequency of Extreme El Niños to Double as Globe Warms,” Nature, January 19, 2014, http://www.nature.com/news/frequency-of-extreme-el-ni%C3%B10s-to-double-as-globe-warms-1.14546, doi:10.1038 /nature.2014.14546.
25. Brian Kahn, “Climate Change Could Double Likelihood of Super El Niños,” Climate Central, January 19, 2014.
26. Wenju Cai, Simon Borlace, Matthieu Lengaigne et al., “Increasing Frequency of Extreme El Niño Events Due to Greenhouse Warming,” Nature Climate Change, January 19, 2014, http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v4/n2/full/nclimate2100.html.
27. “Global Warming–El Niño Link Stronger but Still Not Proven,” Climate Central, January 3, 2013.
28. Hunter Cutting, “El Niño + Climate Change = Godzilla?” Huffington Post, November 17, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hunter-cutting/el-nino-climate-change-go_b_8578956.html
29. Rong-Gong Lin II, “Latest Forecast Suggests ‘Godzilla El Niño’ May Be Coming to California,” Los Angeles Times, August 13, 2015.
30. Eric Leister, “South America Summer Forecast: El Niño to Bring Flooding Rain to Argentina, Uruguay, and Southeast Brazil,” Accuweather, October 31, 2015.
31. Tim Rogers, “Will Climate Change Hasten Central American Migration to US?” Fusion, August 14, 2014, http://fusion.net/story/6288/will-climate-change-hasten-central-american-migration-to-us/.
32. Ibid.
33. Daniel Rivero, “UN Summit to Address a New Category of Refugees: People Fleeing the Effects of Climate Change,” Fusion, December 11, 2014, http://fusion.net/story/33163/un-summit-to-address-a-new-category-of-refugees-people-fleeing-the-effects-of-climate-change/.
34. Étienne Piguet and Antoine Pécoud, “Migration and Climate Change: An Overview,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 30, no. 3 (2011): 8.
35. “Hunger without Borders: The Hidden Links between Food Insecurity, Violence, and Migration in the Northern Triangle of Central America,” United Nations World Food Programme and the International Organization for Migration, 2016, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wfp277544.pdf.
36. “New Study Highlights Food Insecurity as Driver of Migration in Central America,” World Food Programme, September 17, 2015, https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/new-study-highlights-food-insecurity-driver-migration-central-america.
37. “Hunger without Borders,” 9.
38. “Climate Change and Food Security: A Framework Document,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Rome, 2008; Gerald C. Nelson, Mark W. Rosegrant, Amanda Palazzo et al., “Food Security, Farming, and Climate Change to 2050; Scenarios, Results, Policy Options,” International Food Policy Research Institute, 2010.
39. Gustavo Palencia, “Drought Leaves up to 2.81 Million Hungry in Central America: U.N.,” Reuters, September 4, 2014.
40. Cynthia Flores Mora, “Record Drought in Central America: Four Countries, 40 Days without Rain, Two Million Facing Hunger,” World Bank, September 10, 2014.
41. “How Will Climate Change Affect What We Eat?” Oxfam America, March 24, 2014.
42. Andrew Freedman, “Zeroing In on IPCC’s Sea Level Rise & Warming ‘Hiatus,’’” Climate Central, September 27, 2013, http://www.climatecentral.org/news/zeroing-in-on-ipccs-sea-level-rise-warming-hiatus-16532.
43. “Quantification and Magnitude of Losses and Damages Resulting from the Impacts of Climate Change: Modelling the Transformational Impacts and Costs of Sea Level Rise in the Caribbean,” United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2010, http://ckan.c-read.net:8000/dataset/quantification-and-magnitude-of-losses-and-damages-resulting-from-the-impacts-of-climate-changef0bb9.
44. Ibid.
45. “Warning for Caribbean Countries as Sea Level Continues to Rise,” Jamaica Observer, July 14, 2014.
46. “Quantification and Magnitude of Losses.”
47. “Puerto Rico Expands Water Rationing Measures amid Drought,” Associated Press, June 25, 2015, https://www.yahoo.com/news/puerto-rico-expands-water-rationing-measures-amid-drought-171018832.html?ref=gs.
48. Danica Coto, “Caribbean Braces for Worsening Drought as Dry Season Approaches,” Associated Press, September 22, 2015, https://www.yahoo.com/news/caribbean-braces-worsening-drought-dry-season-nears-190402750.html?ref=gs.
49. “Puerto Rico Expands Water Rationing.”
50. Tim Padgett, “Danny and the Drought: How El Niño Left the Caribbean Parched,” WLRN, August 25, 2015, http://wlrn.org/post/danny-and-drought-how-el-ni-o-left-caribbean-parched.
51. Grant Ferguson and Tom Gleeson, “Vulnerability of Coastal Aquifers to Groundwater Use and Climate Change,” Nature Climate Change, February 19, 2012; “The Regional Impacts of Climate Change.”
52. ECLAC, “International Migration and Development in the Americas,” Symposium on International Migration in the Americas, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), San Jose, Costa Rica, 2001.
53. “Hurricane Mitch, Facts & Summary,” History.com, http://www.history.com/topics/hurricane-mitch.
54. M. Glantz and D. Jamieson (2000). “Societal Response to Hurricane Mitch and the Intra- versus Intergenerational Equity Issues: Whose Norms Should Apply?” Risk Analysis 20, no. 6 (2000): 869–82, http://environment.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1192/societalresponses.pdf; R. McLeman and L. Hunter, “Migration in the Context of Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change: Insights from Analogues,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 1, no. 3 (2011): 450–61 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3183747/; “Turn Down the Heat: Confronting the New Climate Normal,” World Bank, 2014, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/317301468242098870/pdf/927040v20WP0000u110Report000English.pdf.
55. “Climate Migration in Latin America: A Future ‘Flood of Refugees’ to the North?” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, February 22, 2010,.
56. Ker Than, “Warmer Seas Creating Stronger Hurricanes, Study Confirms,” Live Science, March 16, 2006, http://www.livescience.com/642-warmer-seas-creating-stronger-hurricanes-study-confirms.html.
57. “Urbanization in Latin America,” Atlantic Council, February 5, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/articles/urbanization-in-latin-america.
58. “Urbanization in Latin America and the Caribbean: Trends and Challenges,” USAID, April 13, 2010.
59. “Urbanization in Latin America,” Atlantic Council.
60. L. J. Mata and C. Nobre, “Impacts, Vulnerability, and Adaptation to Climate Change in Latin America,” background paper, UNFCCC, Lima (2006), https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/adverse_effects_and_response_measures_art_48/application/pdf/200609_background_latin_american_wkshp.pdf.
61. A. De Garin and R. Bejaran, R., “Mortality Rate and Relative Strain Index in Buenos Aires City,” International Journal of Biometeorology 48 (2003): 31–36.
62. “Urbanization in Latin America,” Atlantic Council.
63. J. J. Bogardi, “Impact of Gradual Environmental Change on Migration: A Global Perspective,” Expert Seminar: Migration and Environment, International Organization for Migration, 2008.
64. S.A.F. Barbieri, E. Domingues, B. L. Queiroz et al., “Climate Change and Population Migration in Brazil’s Northeast: Scenarios for 2025–2050.” Population and Environment 31, no. 5 (2010): 344–70.
65. Paulo A. Paranagua, “Latin America Struggles to Cope with Record Urban Growth,” Guardian, September 11, 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/11/latin-america-urbanisation-city-growth.
66. Elizabeth Warn and Susan B. Adamo, “The Impact of Climate Change: Migration and Cities in South America,” World Meteorological Organization Bulletin 63, no. 2 (2014), http://public.wmo.int/en/resources/bulletin/impact-of-climate-change-migration-and-cities-south-america.
67. Claire Rigby, “São Paulo—Anatomy of a Failing Megacity: Residents Struggle as Water Taps Run Dry,” Guardian, February 25, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/feb/25/sao-paulo-brazil-failing-megacity-water-crisis-rationing.
68. Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, “Sao Paulo’s Drought Pits Water Prospectors against Wildcatters,” NPR, Morning Edition, March 10, 2015, http://www.npr.org/2015/03/10/392014833/sao-paulo-s-drought-pits-legitimate-prospectors-against-wildcatters.
69. Catherine Olson, “São Paulo Residents Demand Their City Take a New Attitude about Water,” Public Radio International, The World, March 13, 2015, http://www.pri.org/stories/2015–03–13/s-o-paulo-residents-demand-their-city-take-new-attitude-about-water.
70. Lourdes Garcia-Navarro, “São Paulo’s Drought”
71. “Military Could Step in Over Brazil Drought Chaos,” teleSUR, May 6, 2015, http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Military-Could-Step-in-Over-Brazil-Drought-Chaos-20150506–0040.html
72. “Military Could Step In.”
73. Rigby, “São Paulo.”
74. Jonathan Watts, “Amazon Rainforest Losing Ability to Regulate Climate, Scientist Warns,” Guardian, October 31, 2014.
75. Ibid.
76. Sandra Postel, “Lessons from São Paulo’s Water Shortage,” National Geographic, March 13, 2015, http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/13/lessons-from-sao-paulos-water-shortage/.
77. “Bolivia Flooding Displaces Thousands in Pando Province,” BBC News, February 25, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-31620668
78. Richard Davids, “Thousands Displaced by Floods in Northern Bolivia,” Flood-list, February 26, 2015, http://floodlist.com/america/thousands-displaced-by-floods-in-northern-bolivia.
79. Sabine Dolan, “Bolivia’s Worst Floods in Decades Displace Families and Disrupt Children’s Lives,” UNICEF, March 12, 2007, http://www.unicef.org/emergencies/bolivia_39044.html.
80. Sam Jones, “Bolivia after the Floods: ‘The Climate Is Changing; We Are Living That Change,’” Guardian, December 8, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/dec/08/bolivia-floods-climate-change-indigenous-people; Eduardo Garcia, “Bolivia Blames Rich World Pollution for Floods,” Reuters, March 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/dcbrights-bolivia-floods-dc-idUSN0245951820070304.
81. Sasha Chavkin, “Cash for Thunder: Bolivia Demands ‘Climate Reparations,’” Mother Jones, November–December 2009, http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2009/11/bolivia-paying-rain.
82. Jan Rocha, “Drought Takes Hold as Amazon’s ‘Flying Rivers’ Dry Up,” Climate Central, September 28, 2014.
83. “Tree-Cutting Impairs Amazon’s Rain-Giving ‘Sky Rivers’: Study,” Associated Press, December 4, 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/tree-cutting-impairs-amazons-rain-giving-sky-rivers-study-n261686.
84. Watts, “Amazon Rainforest Losing Ability.”
85. Ibid.
86. Richard Schiffman, “Brazil’s Deforestation Rates Are on the Rise Again,” Newsweek, March 22, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/2015/04/03/brazils-deforestation-rates-are-rise-again-315648.html.
87. Ibid.
88. Roheeni Saxena, “Climate Change Will Make the Amazon Rainforest Less Rainy,” Ars Technica, June 10, 2015, http://arstechnica.com/science/2015/06/climate-change-will-make-the-amazon-rainforest-less-rainy/.
89. Becky Oskin, “Global Warming Forecast for Amazon Rain Forest: Dry and Dying,” Live Science, October 21, 2013, http://www.livescience.com/40573-amazon-rainforest-drying-out.html.
90. David Adam, “Amazon Could Shrink By 85% Due to Climate Change, Scientists Say,” Guardian, March 11, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/mar/11/amazon-global-warming-trees.
91. Met Office, “Understanding Climate Change Impacts on the Amazon Rainforest,” January 2013, http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/news/amazon-dieback.
92. Jonathan Watts, “Amazon Deforestation Report Is Major Setback for Brazil ahead of Climate Talks,” Guardian, November 27, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/27/amazon-deforestation-report-brazil-paris-climate-talks.
93. Chelsea Harvey, “Climate Change Could Triple Amazon Drought, Study Finds,” Washington Post, October 12, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2015/10/12/climate-change-could-triple-amazon-drought-study-finds/.
94. R.J.W. Brienen, O. L. Phillips, T. R. Feldpausch et al., “Long-Term Decline of the Amazon Carbon Sink,” Nature 519, 344–48, March 19, 2015.
