Section 62-169a

Explication of the Facts of Religious Self-Consciousness as They Are Defined in Terms of Contrasting Features

§62. The God-consciousness described thus far occurs as an actual filling of an element under the general form of self-consciousness, namely, under the contrast between pleasure and the lack thereof.

1. One can have a notion of the tendency for God-consciousness as something constantly coming to be established, but established only by value-increments that are infinitesimally small. As a result, the transition from this tendency to a definite factor perceptible by the senses would indeed always remain conditioned by some other fact¹ of consciousness. Now, suppose that this transition in self-consciousness were to occur detached from the form of contrast, viewed accordingly neither as advancement of God-consciousness nor as hindrance to it. Thus, this process could occur only if it were unbrokenly constant and uniform. This situation would be conceivable if God-consciousness were noticeably to rise above that infinitesimally small presence from being no fact of consciousness at all. Moreover, this transitional process would amount to a continuous suppression, to an unresponsively dull uniformity of God-consciousness within an existence in which any lively exchange of place above a very low sector of life would be contributed only by aspects coming from other facts of consciousness. However, a constant uniformity of God-consciousness would also be conceivable in an existence that could be distinguished by an absolute facility for evoking God-consciousness in its absolute strength, evoking that God-consciousness based on any other fact of consciousness, and this would comprise the blessed uniformity of a continuous supremacy of God-consciousness. Patently, however, our religious self-consciousness is such that no simple more or less would be posited of it. Rather, our religious self-consciousness wavers within the space between those two extremes. It does so in that it participates in the disparities that belong to our temporal life.

However, in this domain as well, the two factors of pleasure and the lack thereof are in no way to be thought of as so separate from each other that, strictly speaking, the one would exist without the other anywhere or at any time, because there is no absolute blessedness and no absolute absence of God-consciousness anywhere.

Now, suppose that the determining force of God-consciousness were sensed to be limited. Then, the lack of pleasure would also be coposited, thus would be coposited even in the greatest pleasure. However, suppose that this consciousness were hampered, as a lack of pleasure. Then, God-consciousness would be desired as such a force, nevertheless, and consequently, it would, in and of itself, be an object of pleasure.

3. Thus, in the religious consciousness of a Christian everything that relates to the Redeemer belongs to the distinctively Christian expression of the contrast that comes up for discussion here. Moreover, already above we have prefaced the point that none of those propositions which describe the feeling of absolute dependence without regard to this contrast are descriptions of the total content of a religious element, in that in each such element that feeling occurs only as a being relatively turned away from God or a being relatively turned toward God. In consequence of this point, we likewise have to maintain no less that all those propositions which describe only the situation of an individual life with respect to this contrast are also not descriptions of the total content of a religious element. This is the case, in that in each such religious element the situation described must be manifested in a coming forth of the feeling of absolute dependence. Thus, in the reality of Christian life the two cases are always one, each being implied in the other. No general God-consciousness without a reference to Christ would be coposited, but no relationship to the Redeemer would also be coposited without its being related to general God-consciousness. Accordingly, the following two positions are incorrect. First, regarding the propositions of the First Part here, because what is distinctively Christian came out less immediately, they are often treated as original and generally valid natural theology, and as such they are overrated by those who themselves are less permeated by the distinctiveness of Christianity. Second, in contrast, others place little value on those propositions as such, at which one could also arrive from outside Christianity, and they want to let only the propositions that express a relation to the Redeemer have currency as distinctively Christian propositions. These two positions are incorrect, for the first kind of propositions are in no way the reflection of paltry, purely monotheistic God-consciousness but are abstracted from what has developed through communion with the Redeemer. As to propositions of the second kind, moreover, likewise all propositions that express a relation to Christ are truly Christian propositions only insofar as they acknowledge no criterion for the relationship to the Redeemer other than the extent to which the constancy of that very God-consciousness is engendered thereby. Accordingly, a relationship to Christ by which God-consciousness would be placed in the background—or, as it were, would be antiquated, in that what were coposited in self-consciousness would be Christ alone and not God as well—could, indeed, be very intimate but, strictly speaking, it would not belong in the domain of piety.

1. Ed. note: Every fact (Tatsache), in this case, is something, formal or material, that is present in someone, even if not consciously. The fact becomes a factor as it comes out at some level of mental activity, and is captured by perception, hence rises to consciousness.

2. Ed. note: Here most noticeably Schleiermacher’s continual use of mathematical imagery can best be accessed by visualizing spatially the various dimensions and relations he is reporting. For example: God-consciousness’s being conceived as in a state of being so infinitesimally small as to play no part in one’s consciousness and growing, if at all, in increments as small as to be imperceptible even by the senses; then, among Christians these increments would become quite apparent advances (“more”) and diminishments (“less”) of God-consciousness (hence, the word “fluctuating”).

3. §29.

4. §49.

5. Ed. note: Here “communion” with God could also be rendered “community,” the more familiar translation of Gemeinschaft. Schleiermacher frequently uses this word. It means virtually the same thing when characterizing Christians’ relationship with the divine Spirit—that is, with God in any fashion—with Christ, and with other human beings. When this communion/community appears among Christians, its spirit is constituted by “Holy Spirit.” Further, Christians join in this same spiritual fashion with other members of the species in communion/community perhaps—albeit differently, but certainly holistically—with the entire world/universe. In the latter, broadest sense, what he termed Anschauung des Universums in On Religion and Abhangigkeitsgefühl in Christian Faith both refer to a conscious interconnectedness with God (Gottesbewußtsein) in and through the world (Naturzusammenhang). See index. See also §8.2 and §36.1–2 and On Religion (1821) I, supplemental note 4, where he advances a nonpantheistic view of God as “One in All,” and II, supplemental notes 2, 3, and 19. Finally, see OR (1821) III, supplemental note 5 (and Christian Faith §9), on contemplation of self and world in relation to God.

6. Ed. note: Here the immediate context and the formulation Glaube an (in) indicate that this noun now means “belief,” not “faith.”

§63. In general terms, we are then able to trace the way in which Godconsciousness takes shape in and with stirred self-consciousness only to the deed of an individual. Thus, what is distinctive in Christian piety consists in the following. We are conscious that whatever turning away from God might exist in the situations of our lives is a deed originating in ourselves, and we call this sin. However, we are conscious that whatever communion with God might exist there rests upon a communication¹ from the Redeemer, and we call this grace.²

2. In Christian piety, as it is described here, we do not first have to overcome this difficulty. Rather, the description given here is entirely the same as the general explanation set forth above.⁵ This is the case, for if the feeling of absolute dependence that was previously bound tight came to be free only through redemption,⁶ then the easiness with which we are able to think God-consciousness to be linked with the various sensory stirrings of self-consciousness also has its ground in the facts of redemption, and it is thus a communicated easiness. Moreover, the having been tightly bound by the feeling of absolute dependence would not have entailed its actual nullity, since certainly, in this case, there also could not be such a deed as sin is described to be here. Thus, in each part of life that can be considered to comprise a whole in and of itself, God-consciousness would also have been something—even if only something infinitesimally small—and thus, as often as such a part of life would have come to a close, a deed with respect to God-consciousness would also have taken place. However, it would not have been a deed whereby God-consciousness would be posited as codetermining the given element of life. Thus, it would not have been a turning toward God, from which, viewed in and of itself, a communion with God would always arise, but a turning away from God.⁷ The result would be that given an acceptance of such a redemptive process, a looking back at sin as something that existed earlier would always be linked to it.

Now, the claim that here communion with God rests on an act external to humans 8 in no way hinders the subsumption of Christianity under the common character of teleological modes of faith. This is so, for, on the one hand, communication and deed do not exclude each other, since then, for the most part, deeds done in common have their beginning in one individual, but for that reason they are also a deed performed on the other individuals involved; on the other hand, the appropriation of redemption is presented everywhere as a deed, as an embracing of Christ, and presented in similar ways.⁹

In reverse order, however, suppose that a given religious consciousness were to posit disturbances as coming from elsewhere but to posit communion with God, when those disturbances are not introduced, as arising from the spiritual force of life in an individual. Then, only what would stop the external sources for disturbances could be called redemption, and in a very subordinate sense indeed.¹⁰ In that case, however, redemption accomplished in Jesus has never been thought of in this way. Moreover, if one proceeds further in this sense, then the more a lack of communion with God were posited to be merely accidental, the less would sin and grace be viewed as definitely apart from each other, both in and of themselves and also as what has occurred earlier versus what has occurred later, and the more would the concept of redemption recede to a point where all three results would disappear in concert. This disappearance enters into the picture when one assumes that a unity of sensory and higher self-consciousness is the natural basic state of every individual, wherewith absence of God-consciousness in any particular element of life would remain something that is merely accidental and that would have to be quickly smoothed out in a given community, inasmuch as not all would be suffering from the same accident at the same time. Strictly speaking, this outlook comprises that specifically non-Christian notion which recognizes no need for redemption, for within Christianity sin and grace take place only by means of redemption and on the presupposition that redemption is appropriated.

3.11 Furthermore, the proposition cannot be understood as if in an immediate Christian self-consciousness sin and grace would be referred to different elements of life and would be kept entirely apart, viewed as incompatible with each other. Rather, the energy¹² of God-consciousness is never at its absolutely greatest point, no more than its formation within the stirrings of sensory self-consciousness is at an absolutely constant state. Thus, a limiting weakness of God-consciousness is also coposited. This lack of force is certainly sinful. Just as little, however, can the interconnection with redemption be fully at the null point in an actually Christian consciousness, because otherwise it would be a non-Christian consciousness until the interconnection were restored, contrary to the presupposition we hold. Moreover, since this interconnection originally proceeds from the Redeemer, its communicated act is also coposited everywhere. Hence, here the discussion is simply about these two contrasted features, which are combined, however, only in varied measure within each element that belongs to Christian religious life.¹³

1. Mitteilung.

2. Ed. note: An outline is provided in Schleiermacher’s marginal note : “Referring to ‘deed’ [Tat], one’s own deed is sin, whereas the communicated deed [Tat] is grace. 1. How difficult it is when both [sin and grace] are to be explained on the same grounds. 2. How this fluctuation exists only outside Christianity (the Pelagian extreme)” (Thönes, 1873). Actually, what is communicated by God, Schleiermacher usually calls an “act” (Akt).

Cf. OR (1821) II, supplemental note 17, which distinguishes two aspects of “the operations of grace”: (1) inspiration, emphasizing productivity and effectiveness in grace and (2) revelatory, emphasizing receptivity in its operation. It also indicates something of how the two aspects complement each other in a Christian context, interpreted in a purely nonspeculative manner. Grace is the main subject of Part Two, though the term itself is used only occasionally. Instead, focus is placed on how God is at work in the redemptive process, effecting what, where, and why. See esp. §§86–90, in particular §§87 and 89 (in connection with §137 on grace and blessedness), also §§108.2, 11, 120.P.S. (preparatory grace—see index), and §125. In BO see §§213–14, 219, 223–31 (grace in the two halves of dogmatics: Christian Faith and Christian Ethics), and §286 (on its social aspects).

3. See §9. Ed. note: Among monotheist modes of faith, Schleiermacher terms the Muslim an “aesthetic” mode, which places it more in the domain of the senses. In contrast, Judaic and Christian modes of faith he terms “teleological,” quite differently placed—that is, more in the ethical domain and defined by ideal aims.

4. Ed. note: Here what is in question is whether Christianity, as a monotheistic mode of faith, would have to explain shifts of direction within an individual in a way different from, say, Judaism or “Muhammadanism.” In the next subsection, the need and necessity of redemption in Christianity explains why hindrances to God-consciousness and taking hold of what Christ offers both occur within an individual and yet refer to two different sources, oneself, viewed as a human being who is a sinner, and Christ, who, sinless and by divine grace, freed one from sin.

5. See §11.2–3.

6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “The teleological character [of a mode of faith] exists only if God-consciousness is not posited to be a nullity. As something [really existing], God-consciousness can also be a cooperative deed [Mittat]” (Thönes, 1873).

7. Cf. Rom. 3:23; Augsburg Confession (1530) 19: “Their will turned away from God.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 53; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 72. Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “In Rom. 3:23 the phrase ‘fallen short of the glory’ is not to be taken literally but is tied to the word ‘sinned’” (Thönes, 1873).

8. Ed. note: Here fremden Tat is taken to refer to an act done not by humans but by God, viewed as wholly Other (fremd).

9. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) 20: “On that account Paul intends that people have to take hold of God’s promise through faith.” (2) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) (On the Term Faith): “If faith [fides] is not reliance [fiducia] on Christ, … we do not partake of his benefits in beholding him.”—“The pious mind … understands that this mercy must be embraced by faith, that is, by trust [fiducia].” Ed. note: (1) ET from a German version in Bek. Luth. (1963), 83; cf. Book of Concord (2000), 52–57. (2) ET Tice; Latin CR 21:749 and 890; cf. Manschreck’s somewhat different translation of the 1555 German text (1965), 159. See §32n16.

10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “An effort to advance redemption by stopping external disturbance is always pursued in a non-Christian sense” (Thönes, 1873).

11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note offers this heading and affirmation: “3. [On the] relationship between sin and grace. Hence, by sin [we mean] equally so, [whether] earlier or later. However, there is no such thing as pre-Christian grace” (Thönes, 1873).

12. Energie. Ed. note: Kraft (force) is usually the term used with God-consciousness. For Schleiermacher, strength in that consciousness of God’s gracious presence in the corresponding relationship with human beings is shown by a shift of energy stirred up within. This divine activity thus becomes a distinctly greater force within.

13. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage and, with very rare exceptions, throughout the present work, Moment means “element.” In some exceptions it might mean “moment” of time, for which the strictly temporal meaning Augenblick is used more often. In German mathematical terminology, Moment is also occasionally used, along with Faktor (factor), which terms, in turn, can be applied in the ordinary language usages of both words for something that is codetermining. Next, the chemical periodic table of elements (Momenten) did not begin to get formed until late in the nineteenth century, yet it represents the best example of Moment’s meaning “element.” This meaning (1) stands for a long-term prior use in mathematics and (2) marks an at least imaginably quantifiable, real placeholder (thus a “marker”) within a spatial and/or temporal series or scale, etc. As in this immediate context, Element is always translated “feature.” Element also has several other meanings, which are more nearly parallel to those in English. For example, the word indicates environmental elements, being in one’s element, elementary (level), relative weakness. In the adjectival form, elemental, it can also refer to some original capacity to hold sway (Urelementalgewalt)—that is, to have power in one’s reason. Here, to keep meanings straight and clear, the translation for Element is always “feature,” partly also to reserve for the term Charakter (characteristic or character) its own use for an allied but somewhat different array of meaning. Finally, although Schleiermacher does not employ the word Faktor, occasionally it is implied and is thus used in translation: “factor,” as referring to an ingredient in the making of a product, a making, for example, that factories do.

1.1 In our proposition all genuine doctrines of faith have to be based on Christian religious self-consciousness or, in other words, taken from the experience of Christians. Now, every Christian is indeed conscious of sin and of grace as well, but never in separation, rather always in relation to and along with each other. Thus, doubt could well arise as to what would warrant their ever being treated apart—because if either one were described in and of itself, this would be no description of any Christian consciousness whatsoever. Rather, for us a consciousness of sin viewed as excluding grace and also described as solely comprising a particular aspect of life, would be simply a historical² depiction, the correctness of which would have to be demonstrated somehow but could not find its verification in Christian consciousness itself. That is, it could not be a doctrine of faith at all. Likewise, a description of a fully efficacious strength of God-consciousness, one by its very nature absolute and stable, would simply be a presentiment. However, no one could trace such a state to its being in itself alone wrought by redemption; consequently, this state too could not comprise doctrine of faith at all.

Now, having granted both points, inasmuch as in each case the negative feature especially attached to it is to be entirely excluded, it is still necessary to divide the two accounts in our presentation, except that we would have to be aware that this division is not given in any Christian consciousness; rather, the division is made arbitrarily and only for the sake of achieving tidier reflection³ on each matter. That is, we recognize, first of all, that our dogmatic propositions, taken as a whole, do present only doctrine that has currency in this period within the Evangelical church.4 Nevertheless, it is Christian self-consciousness for which they are intended to provide the most accurate possible expression for our time. Moreover, this Christian self-consciousness is not, as it were, simply that of a distinct stretch in time; rather, it includes whatever generally remains self-identical and everywhere the same within the Christian church—that is, to the extent that dogmatic propositions would not refer to differences among communities of the Christian church. The latter situation of difference is not the case wherever the contrast between sin and grace would be the topic being addressed. Thus, we must describe Christian consciousness with reference to its persisting contents, which are themselves based on these two contrasting features. We must also do this in such a way that it is possible to combine with and under our description the initial element by which this Christian consciousness would have arisen and everything within later elements that represent this first element.⁵

2.7 Accordingly then, in our presentation we are going to separate consciousness of sin and consciousness of grace from each other. Thus, we first describe separately that feature of Christian self-consciousness which is increasingly to disappear by means of the other feature. The first feature is thus identified as having its basis in the collective condition of human-kind before the redemptive process enters into it and, at the same time, represents that condition. At that point, moreover, the second feature, which is thereafter still separable and which is to be limited less and less by the first feature, is identified as having its basis in the redemptive process. It is identified as representing, at the same time, the whole force of this redemptive process. Separation of these two features common to all Christian states of mind and heart, in which the contrast between them has been presumed to exist, is of itself already depicted as possible. By the same token, without that separation relations of each to the other could hardly be fully exhibited.⁸ It is still harder, however, to demonstrate that and how this separation can also be carried out in the other two forms of dogmatic propositions without detriment to their content.

Now, in order to find out what these various statements stand for, it is indeed by no means necessary to split the two members of our contrast apart.10 Nevertheless, a proper and perhaps, on account of what has been worked out just above, also an excellent method for describing that divine efficacious activity by which God-consciousness attains dominance, might be to do the following. First, we would ask: What sort of divine attribute would give itself to be known in the condition of sin but, to be sure, to be known only inasmuch as redemption were expected and prepared for therein? Then, the other way around: “What sort of divine attribute would refer back to the growth of God-consciousness toward dominance as it would be formed by the process of redemption, which moves away from the condition of sin?

Even though these questions might then lead only to abstractions—notwithstanding which this would yield a result less true regarding the second question than of the first one. At any rate, as viewed in tandem they would provide a lively vision of the Christian life. Indeed, they would do so in the same way that the interwoven character of those two features shape what is true of the Christian life. Moreover, if we were to view them together with the divine attributes set forth in Part One, then, upon our doing so, the depiction of our God-consciousness would have to be fully accomplished under this form.

1. Ed. note: There being few footnotes by Schleiermacher in the next five propositions, his marginal notes prove especially helpful. The following ones cover the first subsection: “1. Demonstration: (a) Sin and grace are conjoined in self-consciousness. (i) By itself, sin would be simply historical [historisch]. (ii) Grace, by itself, would be simply prophetic. (b) For the presentation given here, their separation is necessary. It is already necessary, because … our discourse is about God” (Thönes, 1873).

2. Ed. note: In contrast to the marginal note, “historical” renders geschichtliche here, hence Schleiermacher either corrected it later in the margin or took it to mean the same thing in this context. The second option is adopted at this point. The word “depiction” (Schilderung) indicates that it would be only a representation once removed, not directly derived from a Christian experience of faith.

3. Ed. note: That is, Schleiermacher chooses to treat each relatively by itself for expedience’s sake, in order to observe each otherwise inseparable part—first, on the need for redemption by grace alone on account of sin and, second, on redemption by grace alone because of sin. As he soon indicates, sin is dealt with first only by convention, grace actually having prior status throughout. The sole purpose is clarity of exposition, giving each aspect clearer focus—each largely, not totally, cleaned of overly complicating references to the other. This enables a neater, purer, thus “tidier” process of observation and further “reflection” (reineren Betrachtung). The expedients taken are thus rather like outlining a sermon. A sermon he often calls a mutually observing, contemplative “reflection.” Both activities are alike in the design of their actually inseparable components rather than either like cleaning up one’s act or like whittling down to the bare essentials.

4. Ed. note: See the subtitle for this entire work, which also includes the restrictive phrase “in Germany.”

5. Ed. note: Lest they be forgotten, these two “elements” (Momenten) are sin and grace. In Schleiermacher’s views, temporally speaking, sin is that social evil which, once consciousness of divine grace arises in the form of redemption, arouses a need for redemption from sin. This happens whether sin is viewed chiefly as “original”—i.e., originating as habits or influences within contexts of human interaction—as by an individual’s “actual” sin effected, at least in part, by oneself and then either wholly of oneself or on one’s own. See other propositions on sin for such details.

6. Ed. note: “Christendom” always translates Christenheit, which refers to a large sociopolitical domain that is mostly held to be under “Christian” control. “Christianity” always translates Christentum, which refers to a shared faith and life, sometimes including all its various permutations.

7. Ed. note: Here are Schleiermacher’s marginal notes for this subsection: “2. Relationship of both [sin and grace] to each other. (a) [Either each] in and of itself or in [its] primary form [Grundform]. (b) Other forms in the two of them. (i) Constitution of the world. [Then:] Conception of the world and influence on the world. (ii) Divine attributes: [They] do not permit of being derived from sin as viewed in itself alone.”

8. Ed. note: Here the final phrase reads: schwerlich … vollständig könnten zur Anschauung kommen. In Schleiermacher’s usage, for something to be fully exhibited means for it to rise from merely sensory imagination and sense perception to the level of unconfused, plain, and clear perception to one’s “mind and heart” (Gemüth). Thus, on occasion coming to have an insight can be called a “beholding” and its result a “vision.” This is not the same function as would be proposed as an intuitive form of knowledge (Kant) that would register within oneself as a level of knowing. In contrast, Schleiermacher’s account of perceptual experience is chiefly allied with a form of feeling, not with a form of intellect, as such, though it does appear to contain at least a dim cognitive frame, as would be true of every feeling. The closer the feeling function and the knowing function seem to be, the more difficult it might be to discriminate between the two. Hence, an interpretive conflict has arisen as to whether “perception” or “intuition” is typically operating in Schleiermacher’s discourse. It is definitely important to try to differentiate between these two levels of meaning, if one can. He tries to make his usage clear, using “perception” (Anschauung) for a function that more nearly pairs with “feeling” (Gefühl) than Kant’s use of Anschauung. Schleiermacher almost never used the then current but vague Latin term Intuition, which Kant often used in his philosophy but only to qualify which form of several types of Anschauung he was assigning a specific meaning to. See Rudolf Eisler, Kant Lexikon (1930), 15–35. In that the two men brought different presuppositions to their psychological and epistemological concepts, Eisler demonstrates in his lexical account of Kant’s usage of Anschauung, that it would be very different from Schleiermacher’s. Kant’s main meaning Schleiermacher would call a “notion” (Vorstellung) but, unlike Kant, not an “intuition” or a mere “notion,” which is indeed indispensably attached to “sensory consciousness,” as Schleiermacher would also claim. Yet, for Kant an “intuition” that is a “notion” is also on a path of adding further characteristics of knowing on the way to being a viable “concept.” In contrast, for Schleiermacher, at this level of the knowing functions an Anschauung is not a mere notion, though it can eventually take a similar path, e.g., in contributing to one’s formation of a “worldview” (itself first present in the elemental form of Anschauung des Universums, then greatly filled in and ultimately expressible in a fully knowledgeable Weltanschauung). Rather, Anschauung has a definite and solid functioning of its own, one that is not merely transitional and that is both quite distinguishable from notions and independent of them as well. Such pains are taken seriously, because the choice of terms greatly matters in theology, where spiritual components of faith can, as in Schleiermacher’s work, go very deep. For Schleiermacher, the pair Anschauung (perception) and Gefühl (feeling) function at the same deep level as one’s internal relationship with God in “faith,” and they are major contributors to how he sees that basic faith function. See also §61n16 and index.

9. Ed. note: The phrase “a fuller definition and a more vivid perspicuity” translates völliger Bestimmtheit und lebendiger Anschaulichkeit. The two nouns could as well be rendered “definiteness” and “perceptual clarity.” However, Schleiermacher has already indicated that (a) the definitions of the three sets of divine attributes given in this work are all expressions inadequate to convey who God is in se and, by themselves at least, are perhaps about the best that can be done, thus far, to offer conceptually the nature of God’s activity in the world, and (b) these definitions of the three sets build on each other, though not strictly deductively, right up to the summative conceptions of divine love and wisdom. With the latter indication in view, he here designates the initial set in Part One to be comparatively “notions” (Vorstellungen). Moreover, because this same set depicts more nearly generalized characteristics of monotheism, they are to be seen as only approximations on the way to the final set of definitions to the extent that they do not so directly convey the process of redemption in relation to sin given in Part Two.

The Conclusion, then, examines the doctrine of the Trinity, a traditional doctrine that cannot be conveyed in Christian religious immediate self-conscious but that is already roughly presented in all that accompanies the three sets of divine attributes, successively, regarding a Christian experience of God, of self, and of world in each of the three portions. They, in turn, present the Threeness of the divine, at work in this world first, but worshiped and followed as One, also as Creator/Preserver, as Redemptive, and as Spirit, especially where communities of faith receive God and act appropriately by and in accordance with that Spirit. The problem with triune doctrine, for him, arises as soon as the “three” are perceived as both separate entities and as a single entity, both of which he tries to avoid—also, to some extent, tries not to embrace insofar as scholars try to peer into what God is beyond the universe itself. Throughout the work, he stays within the limits of human existence within the finite world and God’s entrance into the world. In a deeply felt and perceived relationship with God, however, he views God’s activities in the world to be infinite and eternal, from beyond yet within conditions and processes of the world itself. Each portion of this systematic treatise contributes more to the vision that he holds on behalf of the church, including this portion concerning sin.

10. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher adds: “But [it is necessary] to separate off [the condition of ] sin inasmuch as redemption would be expected or prepared for therewith” (Thönes, 1873).

11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note for this subsection reads: “3. Concerning arrangement [of what follows, in Part Two]. The arrangement not taken would be too greatly disjointed. The various forms to [be treated] do shed light on each other; therefore [it is] good also to place together what belongs together in accordance with their contents” (Thönes, 1873).

12. Ed. note: “Faith-doctrine” translates Glaubenslehre, which is the German translation of the Latin doctrina fidei. Glaubenslehre has also become a shorthand title for the present work.