Section 32-61

Explication of Religious Self-Consciousness as It Is Always Already Presupposed by, but also Always Contained in, Every Christian Religious Stirring of Mind and Heart¹

§32. Without exception, in every occurrence of Christian religious self-consciousness the process of finding-oneself-to-be-absolutely-dependent in immediate self-consciousness is already presupposed, and is thus also contained therein, as the only way, in general terms, that one’s own being and the infinite being of God can unite in self-consciousness.

1.² That in this proposition the entirety of Christian religious self-consciousness is assumed in advance is wholly without risk. That is to say, the assertion is entirely without reference to the particular content of any distinct Christian stirring of mind and heart, and what is stated is posited as not determined by any differences among these stirrings whatsoever. Thus, nothing of any kind can be deduced from our proposition for or against any dogmatic presentation of such particular content. Moreover, only if someone wanted to claim that Christian religious elements could exist in which the being of God could not be coposited in this way at all—that is, that would contain no God-consciousness 3 in self-consciousness at all —would our proposition exclude that person’s claim from the domain of Christian faith to be further described in this work.

On this account, the present proposition appeals to Christian religious self-consciousness against such a claim. It appeals to that self-consciousness as it is everywhere present and recognized in the Evangelical church. That is, it appeals to the fact that in every stirring of mind and heart there, however much particular contents might be predominant therein, God-consciousness would nonetheless be coposited there and could not be cancelled out by anything else, with the result that there could be no relation to Christ that would not be a relation to God as well. It is also asserted, at the same time, however, that this God-consciousness, as it is described in this work, does not constitute a really religious element in and of itself alone. Rather, it is present only in combination with other more specific determinants. As a result, this identical feature, present in all the phenomena of Christian piety, is related to particular elements of that piety only as everywhere in life each individual’s positing of an “I”⁴ occurs in relation to the particular elements of one’s existence. Hence, in no way does the claim that in every Christian religious stirring there would also have to be some relation to Christ stand in contradiction to our proposition.

Suppose, on the contrary, that in some real element of one’s life religious feeling is distinctly marked as pleasure or the lack of pleasure.⁵ In this case, however, within any given mode of Christian faith one’s posited incapacity, lodged in a religious lack of pleasure, is to be ascribed to a deficiency in one’s community with the Redeemer; and, in contrast, one’s posited readiness to realize religious feeling—a readiness lodged in religious pleasure—is to be regarded as a communication that has occurred within us based on that community with the Redeemer. Thus, it is patent that within Christian community there is no element of piety in which a relation to Christ is not also coposited.

2.6 There is also a nonreligious explanation of this process of finding-oneself-to-be-absolutely-dependent, namely, as if it would actually declare only the dependence of finite beings on the entirety and totality of all that is finite and, consequently, would affirm that what is coposited therein, as well as what is referred to, would be not God but the world. However, we cannot regard this explanation as anything but a misunderstanding. That is, we do also have acquaintance with a way the world is coposited⁷ in our self-consciousness, but this factor is something different from the way God is coposited⁸ in that same self-consciousness. This is so, for even if one posits the world as a unity, this is nevertheless a unity divided and split apart within itself—a unity that is, at the same time, the totality of all contrasts and differences—and everything that is determined by it is something multifaceted. Every human being is also a unity within that manifold and participates in all those contrasts.⁹

Thus, being at one¹⁰ with the world in self-consciousness is nothing other than our being conscious of ourselves as a living part that coexists within that whole,¹¹ and this cannot possibly be a consciousness of absolute dependence. Rather, since all coexisting, living parts are in a state of reciprocal action among themselves, in every such part this being-one-with-the-whole essentially bears a twofold character. It contains a feeling of dependence, to be sure, inasmuch as the other parts bear an effect on oneself out of their own self-initiated activity, but it likewise contains a feeling of freedom, inasmuch as one also bears an effect on other parts out of one’s own self-initiated activity. The two factors, moreover, are not to be separated from each other. Thus, the feeling of absolute dependence is not to be explained as a way the world is coposited but is to be explained only as a way God is coposited, viewing God as the absolute¹² undivided unity. That is to say, in relation to God there is no immediate feeling of freedom, nor can there be even the slightest feeling of dependence in relation to God such that a feeling of freedom could be attached to it as its counterpart. Rather, even at the highest level of Christian piety and given the clearest consciousness of having the most unhampered self-initiated activity, the absoluteness 13 of the feeling of dependence would still remain undiminished in relation to God. Moreover, this expression is meant to designate the fact that the process of finding-oneself-to-be-absolutely-dependent would be the sole manner in which God and “I” could be together in anyone’s self-consciousness.

Thus, if someone wanted to abolish this distinction and mistake self-consciousness that refers to God as if it could be nothing other than that self-consciousness which refers to the world, then in the latter mode of self-consciousness one would also have to challenge the reality¹⁴ contained in the feeling of freedom. In consequence, one would have to abolish entirely that mode of self-consciousness which refers to the feeling of freedom. This is so, since no self-conscious element of life exists in which we do not also posit ourselves to be at one with the world. In any case, moreover, even this nonreligious explanation, which rejects as an illusion the distinctiveness of religious self-consciousness that is claimed here, comes, in part, from those who also declare all feeling of freedom to be an illusion and, to be sure, it comes, in part, also from those who reject all efforts to keep separate from each other all ideas regarding “God” and “world,” in that they claim that nothing would exist on which we could feel ourselves to be absolutely dependent.¹⁵

3. Now, in this Part One we are definitely not moving outside the domain of Christian piety any longer. Thus, it is self-evident that we are also not concerning ourselves with the not yet thoroughly developed and differentiated religious feeling that constitutes polytheistic modes of faith. This is the case, for only what is monotheistic can be coposited in Christian piety. Suppose that someone objects, on the other hand, that what is set forth in our proposition does not belong here, because it is not only not distinctively Christian but also refers only to what is commonly held among monotheistic modes of faith. Then the answer has to be that there is no such thing as a purely monotheistic piety, in which God-consciousness, in and of itself, would have to be the content of religious elements of life from the very outset on. Rather, just as a relation to Christ is always present with God-consciousness in Christian piety,16 so too a relation to the Lawgiver¹⁷ is always present in Jewish piety and a relation to revelation by the Prophet is always present in Muhammadan piety. On this account, in our Holy Scriptures “God” constantly bears the surname “Father of our Lord Jesus Christ,” and Christ’s own declaration concerning himself¹⁸ also implies that every relation to Christ also contains God-consciousness within itself.

1. Ed. note: In OG, Schleiermacher describes Part One as “only a portal and entrance hall” (57) and “an external work” compared to the wholly Evangelical Christian propositions of Part Two (59). See also CF §29.2.

2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “§32. The feeling of absolute dependence, viewed as a general foundation. §33. The absolute surety [Gewißheit] of that feeling in its general reference [Allgemeinheit]. §34. The coexistence of that feeling with world-consciousness. §35. The extension of that feeling by means of the three forms.” That is, in all three forms of dogmatic proposition (cf. §30). “The three initial propositions were already discussed in the Introduction. Here they are presented chiefly in their relationship to what is distinctively Christian” (Thönes, 1873).

The reference seems to be to the entire Introduction, but cf. esp. §§6–14, 19, and 30–31. Notes to the Introduction and elsewhere in this work have sought to clarify the meanings of key terms also featured in Part One. The index provides indications of where these clarifications appear.

3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “That is, no God-consciousness whatsoever, or God-consciousness that does not include absolute dependence. In contrast, here we have assuredly grounded this absolute dependence in God alone” (Thönes, 1873).

4. Ichsetzen. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher indicates that “positing God [Gottsetzen] operates like [wie] positing an ‘I’” (Thönes, 1873). The word “like” implies only a similarity of process, not a similarity or an identity of “God” and oneself, a point to which Schleiermacher consistently holds. He maintains the same point regarding world-consciousness in relation to immediate religious self-consciousness (again, cf. §30 and the analyses of self-conscious process that precede it).

5. Cf. §5. Ed. note: In this sentence, as usual, “religious” translates fromme, referring to the rootedness of all piety, thus of every genuinely religious experience, in feeling, lodged particularly in a lack of pleasure (Unlust) due to sin and one’s need for redemption and in pleasure (Lust) on account of one’s redemption. In Part One the general distinction between Unlust and Lust is “presupposed” as pointing to the admixture of the two aspects in “religious” (religiöses) life. In any authentically Christian context, then, both aspects are experienced in community of faith with Christ and of life with Christ.

6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads: “2. Improper confusion of a positing of God [Gottsetzen] with a positing of the world [Weltsetzen]” (Thönes, 1873).

7. Mitgesetztsein der Welt.

8. Mitgesetztsein Gottes.

9. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note further explains: “If I posit myself to be dependent on the entire world, in doing this I posit myself as, in part, dependent on myself—that is, to be, in part, free. Hence, if I were to remain dependent [on the world as a whole], at that point my feeling of freedom would have to be dissolved [aufgehoben]” (Thönes, 1873).

10. Das Einsein.

11. Ed. note: eines in diesem Ganzen mitlebenden Teiles.

12. Ed. note: absoluten, not schlechthinigen, the latter of which suggests being bound in some fashion. That is, God is to be taken as indissolubly one, both in God’s being as Supreme Being, and in God’s be-ing, as active in the world, not participating, as human beings do, in those organic contrasts and differences by which the world can alone be defined and described, and therefore not dependent on or bound to the world in any way. By implication, God is sovereign over the world and free in relation to the world.

13. Schlechthinigkeit.

14. Realität.

15. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher adds to what is presented at this juncture in his argument: “The aim is also to show that this [nonreligious explanation] does not comport with Christian piety, partly because Christian piety has a basis in the feeling of freedom and partly because there is no incapacity in that world-consciousness discussed here, except for [that which could be accomplished] by a lack of development” (Thönes, 1873).

16. Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) I (“On God”): “In all knowing and invoking of God our minds seek to behold Christ,” and so forth. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; Latin CR 21:612; cf. Manschreck’s rather different translation from the 1555 German edition (1965), 5. See the bibliography for a note on the various editions. There is no English edition of the Latin texts of 1543–1559. In references through §71.1, general comparisons with the Manschreck edition are given, but not thereafter.

17. Gesetzgeber. Ed. note: According to the general understanding of Jewish religion in Schleiermacher’s time, Moses was taken to be the original lawgiver, having received from God the Ten Commandments and the Pentateuch (first five books in the Hebrew Bible, still called “The Books of Moses” in German Bibles). Moses was viewed as the prototype of all subsequent lawgivers.

18. John 14: 7, 9. Ed. note: There Jesus says: “If you had known me, you would have known my Father also,” and anyone “who has seen me has seen the Father.” See Schleiermacher’s expository sermon on John 14:7–17, May 21, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 428–42.

§33. Doctrines of faith carry the recognition that this feeling of absolute dependence, in that therein our self-consciousness acts as a surrogate for recognizing¹ the finitude of our being in general terms (cf. §8.2), is not something accidental or even something that varies from person to person but is a general feature of life. This recognition completely supplants all the so-called proofs for the existence of God.²

(1) Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560), Loci praecipui theologici (1543–1559) I (On God): “It is the nature of God to command obedience in accordance with the distinction between what is upright and what is unseemly that is engraved upon human minds.”³

(3) Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150—ca. 215), Stromateis (n.d.) VII.10: “Faith is an internal good and, without searching for God, confesses his existence and glorifies him as existent. Whence by starting from this faith and being developed by it through the grace of God, the knowledge respecting him is to be acquired as far as possible.”⁵

1.⁶ One cannot admit to the self-consciousness postulated here in its described content and want to assert, nonetheless, that it is something nonessential—that is, that it could be present in any given human existence, or even that it could not be present, in each case according to whether one met with this or that circumstance over the course of one’s life. That is to say, in no way does the emergence of this mode of self-consciousness depend on any sort of distinct factor being externally given to a subject⁷ who has developed to the extent described, indicated in our proposition; rather, it depends only on one’s sensory self-consciousness having been stimulated, in some fashion, from outside oneself. What is presupposed internally, however, is simply intelligence⁸ in its subjective function, on which function a tendency toward having God-consciousness is bestowed, and this is something absolutely held in common among all these⁹ persons.

Now, suppose that, in any case, a differentiation between completeness and incompleteness is granted herewith, in accordance with the criterion of greater or lesser development. Then this distinction would rest on the fact that the appearance of this feeling of absolute dependence also depends on something further: that a contrast would be taken up into consciousness, to the effect that a given lack in development would lie precisely in distinct functions remaining undifferentiated.¹¹ That is to say, consciousness would, as yet, be nowhere actually developed as human consciousness now if consciousness that holds objects in mind¹² and self-consciousness were not yet definitely separated out from each other, in such a way that they could also be related to each other; moreover, the development that we have been considering would not yet be completed if sensory self-consciousness and higher self-consciousness were not likewise separated from each other and capable of being related to each other.

The second lack of a godly state is sensory in nature.15 That is, it occurs when a feeling of absolute dependence does indeed appear, and yet what is coposited in it is, nevertheless, such that there can be no absolute dependence on what is thus coposited, for there can be no absolute dependence on something that is envisaged to be capable of having an impassioned state, because some self-initiated activity of bearing an influence on it is then possible. Faced with this contradiction, at that point one can be doubtful as to whether the tendency toward having God-consciousness has, in fact, been operative, the semblance of it having been itself distorted by some contorted mirror-reflection of it, or whether the reflection is compatible with an original internal fact, which, as such, would not actually belong to the domain of piety. However, a comparison with the way in which God-consciousness always actually first manifests itself in childhood clearly shows that, in any case, within the domain of piety the tendency toward having God-consciousness is operative, and it clearly shows that only on account of some incomplete development of self-consciousness can this process not be carried through to that end unalloyed. Patently, this state is akin to that in polytheistic piety.¹⁶ This is so, for the same kernel of multiplicity also exists here, except that it is suppressed by countervailing developments, and even this anthropopathic¹⁷ conception is sometimes of a more purified and spiritual sort, and sometimes it borders on fetishism.

Finally, the third kind of lack of a godly state is actually the so-called denial of God: atheism. This kind is propounded as a speculative theory right in the midst of Christians and at the complete stage of religious development, indeed at the highest stages of culture. Atheism is then twofold in nature. On the one hand, atheism is a wanton dread of any strictness 18 that can attach to God-consciousness. Moreover, at that point, even though lucid intervals may be interposed, atheism is clearly produced by a lack of restraint; thus, it is then a disease of the psyche, usually a disease accompanied by contempt for all that belongs to use of one’s intellect. In this form, one can quite fittingly assert that atheism is nihilistic,¹⁹ because it is entirely lacking in inner truth. On the other hand, it is actually but a reasoning²⁰ opposition to prevalent, more or less improper depictions of religious consciousness.

For the most part, even the atheism of the eighteenth century was simply a battle against petrified, anthropopathic notions in presentations of faith-doctrine, a battle provoked by ecclesial tyranny. Nevertheless, supposing that beyond such lacks in doctrinal presentation the inner facts of self-consciousness itself would also have come to be completely misconstrued, this deep misapprehension would still be simply a sickness of people’s understanding. From time to time, this sickness can indeed be sporadically revived but, even then, never engender anything lasting, historically speaking. Hence, even this fact can be no detriment to our claim that the feeling of absolute dependence on which we have expounded and the God-consciousness that comes with it comprise an essential element of human life.²¹

3. Let us suppose that someone could dispute the general nature of this essential element of human life. Even so, no obligation for a presentation of faith-doctrine to prove the existence of God would emerge from such a challenge. Rather, trying to do that would be a wholly superfluous effort. This is the case, for inasmuch as even in the Christian churchGod-consciousness is first to be developed among its youth,22 even if these young people were in a position to grasp proofs, those proofs could still bring forth only an objective consciousness, which is not at all our aim here. In no way, moreover, would piety automatically arise from such an objective consciousness. The question as to whether there would be such proofs or not, if God is not an immediate surety for us, does not belong here at all. The subsequent question, as to whether such an immediate surety, on the basis of which God’s existence could actually be proved, would not have to be God, does not belong here either. Rather, what belongs here is simply the realization that these proofs can never be a component of a presentation of faith-doctrine, which is directed only to those who possess the inner surety regarding God already described, a surety of which they are able to become immediately conscious at any moment.

Now, in accordance with our explanation of Christian faith-doctrine, it would not be at all necessary to carry on this discussion in particular if it did not seem necessary to protest, nevertheless, against the general practice of furnishing dogmatics with such proofs at this juncture, or at least of appealing to them as something well-known from other sciences. By now, it is self-evident that this appeal is completely useless for the purposes of dogmatics. That is to say, neither in catechesis nor in homiletic communication nor in missionary work is any sort of use to be made of such proofs; moreover, experience also shows how little is accomplished by doing battle with theoretical atheism, as it was described above. Thus, in every part dogmatics must presuppose a condition of immediate surety, faith; and, accordingly, as concerns God-consciousness in general, its task is not to effect recognition of God-consciousness but simply to explicate its content.

Already, that proofs of this sort are not at all pertinent to dogmatics also springs from the fact that it is impossible to give these proofs a dogmatic form. This is shown, in that in offering them one cannot refer back to Scripture or to symbolic books at all, because they do not themselves provide any proof whatsoever but only provide assertions, and a person for whom such assertions are already an authority requires no proof.

The prevailing method of inflating presentations of Christian faith-doctrine with such proofs from reason and with accompanying judgments is based on the practice of mistaking philosophy and dogmatics for each other,²³ which practice has been continually affecting people from the patristic age on. Very much akin to this confusion, thus also something to be specified here, is the likewise erroneous view that Christian theology—to which dogmatics does indeed also belong—is also distinguished from Christian religion by its epistemic ground.24 Namely, what is held is that religion would draw from Scripture alone, whereas theology would also draw from the Fathers and from reason and philosophy. This view, however, cannot apply to Christian theology, since theology draws directly from Scripture, and Scripture itself first arose through Christian religion, but what draws on reason and philosophy cannot be Christian theology. It is surely a great gain, here and elsewhere, to banish all materials of this kind from the domain of Christian faith-doctrine. This is so, because only by this means is any uniformity of procedure to be put in place. Moreover, it is not the business of anyone presenting faith-doctrine to discharge the difficult task of choosing between moral proofs, geometric proofs, and probable proofs,²⁵ not even simply for one’s own satisfaction.

Postscript. At this spot, it might well not be improper to notice the following, even though it lies entirely outside the scope of our present procedure: that just such a copositing of God can be present in objective consciousness, even if it does not appear, in and of itself, in the form of a consciousness that takes place over time but can be similarly awakened and brought to light through sense perception. Moreover, this copositing of God can be seen to underlie all scientific construction, both in the domain of nature and in the domain of history. However, just as it could only do injury to science if one wanted to appeal to the pronouncements of religious self-consciousness for the sake of scientific construction or to admix into science anything from that other domain, likewise it could only be a disadvantage to faith and to faith-doctrine if one were to riddle the latter with scientific statements or wanted to make it dependent on foundational principles of science. That is to say, faith-doctrine immediately has as little to do with objective consciousness as pure science has to do with subjective consciousness.

1. Ed. note: The phrase “acts as a surrogate for recognizing” translates vertritt. As is shown in §8.2 and here, the two expressions have the same referent, though they function somewhat differently, thus cannot be simply substituted for each other.

2. Dasein Gottes. Ed. note: That is, proofs that purport rationally to demonstrate by argument that God as such—as an entity in itself—really “is there” versus God’s revealing something of who God is in history, notably in Christ. Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates what is recognized here as “the absolute surety [schlechthinige Gewißheit] of that feeling of absolute dependence in its general character [Allgemeinheit]” (Thönes, 1873).

3. Ed. note: ET Kienzles/Tice; cf. Manschreck’s quite different translation from the 1555 German text (1965); Latin: CR 21:607. See §32n16.

4. Ed. note: ET Jackson and Heller (1981), 62; Latin: CR 90:643. In the margin here, Schleiermacher notes that quid sit (in “as to what God is”) “is not entirely the same wording [as “the nature of God”] but is easily to be applied to it” (Thönes, 1873).

5. Ed. note: ET Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2 (1885), 538; Migne Gr. 9:477; part of this passage is quoted in KGA I/7.3, 116. In his marginal note, Schleiermacher places emphasis on “an internal good” and indicates that the direction one takes here is “only from faith (πίστις) to knowledge (γνῶσις)” (Thönes, 1873).

6. Ed. note: On the margin, Schleiermacher notes: “It cannot be anything accidental. In that case, one’s lack of capacity [to have the feeling of absolute dependence] would also simply be an arbitrary factor, to which every person would have to learn how to resign oneself. (This is not the kind of situation I have in mind here [Nicht mein genre])” (Thönes, 1873). Here “accidental” translates zufälliges, or arbitrary versus a general and unvarying, i.e., “essential,” feature of human life.

7. Subjekt. Ed. note: That is, a human being is capable of consciously registering external stimuli.

8. Intelligenz. Ed. note: That is, mental functioning that possesses both objective and subjective characteristics that are developed to the extent indicated here and that are fully intact to that extent.

9. Ed. note: Here “these” is permissibly added to point back to those among the “our” mentioned in the proposition who give “recognition” to the finitude of all that exists and thereby identify their “feeling of absolute dependence” on God with that fact. In Schleiermacher’s view, the feeling of absolute dependence on God cannot come to be fully present to a person until the stage of monotheism is reached. Before that happens, a person’s feelings can emerge and grow only in the direction of that orientation. This is why he refers back to §8 here.

10. Modifikation. Ed. note: That is, in any alteration made in the very “nature” (Wesen) of human existence.

11. Ungesondertsein der Funktionen.

12. Ed. note: The word here is gegenständliches—that is, a consciousness distinctly directed to and containing in itself any observable “object.” Schleiermacher sometimes uses objektive for this function, versus subjektive, a distinction that can easily be misleading. Thus, in using gegenständliches he apparently wants to be as clear as possible at this juncture.

13. Gottlosigkeit. Ed. note: This state does not imply an absence of God, only a complete or partial lack of God-consciousness. Hence, the customary translation, “ungodliness,” can easily be misleading in that respect or suggest some resistance to God or godly influence in every case. On the other hand, here “godly” means not that one becomes divine in the sense of actually being God or a part of God, but that one lives in a conscious relationship of communion with God.

14. Individuum. Ed. note: In the human domain, Schleiermacher tends to use this term for a distinctive person, one who bears some capacity for development, not simply for a mere particular specimen of the species.

15. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “Special emphasis must be placed on this sensory kind, viewed as an actual lack of a godly state. Herein redemption would be taken to be the appeasement [Stillung, or “staunching”] of an impassioned state aroused in God or of an involuntary righteous reaction [Gerechtigkeit] aroused in God, in which God is viewed as acting in love [Liebe]” (Thönes, 1873).

16. See §8.2.

17. Ed. note: That is, attributing human affective states, or sensory-oriented stirrings, to God, just as “anthropomorphism,” in general, attributes various sorts of human change to God.

18. Strenge. Ed. note: This word can refer to “strict requirements” of God-consciousness, either at its deeply religious roots or in its various expressions. Thus, it also would refer to “stringency” of religious life and to “rigor” of one’s use of intellect for understanding and then of one’s presenting one’s faith in words.

19. Ed. note: The term is nicht, of or pertaining to nothing, destructive to the point of total negation.

20. Ed. note: raisonierende—that is, reasoning out what is more or less true or more or less in error. See his 1811 Dialectic (1996), 78, 55–62, and 73n, on this relation between truth and error.

21. Ed. note: ein wesentliches menschliches Lebensmoment. As Schleiermacher has indicated once again here, this means not that this feeling and this God-consciousness are in evidence at every stage of development. Rather, it means that the natural tendency toward them will reach its “essential” goal, especially within the context of Christian community of life with Christ, if it comes to be relatively unimpeded. By and large, according to his account, impediments to the perfection that lies ahead are not likely to be totally removed for any Christian in every moment of one’s mature life—certainly not at the present point in history. A person can still be redeemed and live a new, regenerate life, however, quite short of attaining that goal. To show what this means comprises most of the task of Part Two.

22. Jugend. Ed. note: That is, not fully developed among younger children.

23. Augustine (354–430), Of True Religion (ca. 388–395), 8: “So it is taught and believed as a chief point in man’s salvation that philosophy, i.e., the pursuit of wisdom, cannot be quite divorced from religion.” Ed. note: ET Of True Religion (1966), 10; Migne Lat. 34:126.

24. Erkenntnisgrund.

25. Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753–1821), Dogmatik (1818), §7, 50ff., and §50, 91ff. Ed. note: Appropriately, Redeker quotes especially the following: “1. Religion and theology are different from each other and indeed (a) as to the authority of their epistemic basis. Religion draws strictly from Scripture. In contrast, theology draws for assistance from philosophy, history, writings of the church fathers, acts of councils, confessional writings of various religious bodies, antiquities, etc. and therefore requires an apparatus reflecting very broad scholarship.” (20) “The proofs for the existence of God that are adduced in natural theology are indeed very diverse, but precisely for that reason they are also of very different value. In general terms, these proofs can be divided into three kinds: geometric, probable, and moral. The geometric proofs are either a priori, based on concepts of the most perfect being, or a posteriori, based on the fortuitousness of the world. Both sorts of proof are subject to great difficulties and are purely for learned persons, because they presuppose acquaintance with the entire compass of philosophy. The probable proofs are, again, of various sorts. Especially notable are proofs that are derived from an inborn sense and knowledge of God, from concord among all peoples in this conviction, and finally from the final causes or designs of the world. … Finally, the moral proof is based on the moral law that resides in the nature of reason and deduces from that law the necessary requirement of presupposing the existence of a highest intelligence and of believing in it” (92f.) [ET Tice].

§34. The feeling of absolute dependence is contained in every Christian religious stirring. It is so contained to the extent that within that stirring, by means of that whereby the stirring is codetermined, we come to the consciousness that we are placed within a general interconnected process of nature. The feeling of absolute dependence is so contained, that is, to the extent that, within that stirring, we are conscious of ourselves as part of the world.

1. Being-conscious-of-oneself-as-part-of-the-world is one and the same thing as finding-oneself-placed-in-a-general-interconnectedness-of-nature. Either our being’s being-related to what is set over against it or our comprehension of our both being and having is present in every real state of being self-conscious.¹ Of course, what appears to us as set over against us must decrease the more we extend our self-consciousness. If we extend self-consciousness to a being conscious of the human species or if we are absolutely conscious of ourselves as finite spirit,² then nothing more is set over against us, in that respect, than simply what our spirit does not have. Now, this particular extension of spirit takes place,³ however, only by virtue of a partial identity,⁴ this by virtue of a given interconnectedness of nature. Thus, in every such operation we find ourselves to be placed within an interconnectedness of nature by means of our spiritual being.

2. To be sure, frequently one does come upon the view that the more prominent the interconnectedness of nature would become in self-consciousness, the more the feeling of absolute dependence would recede and then, inversely, that when the feeling of absolute dependence would arise most strongly, something that suspends the interconnectedness of nature would be in place—that is, something miraculous.¹² However, we are able to designate this view as simply an error. It is rather the case that we most suspend the interconnectedness of nature when we posit either a dead mechanism therein or something that is a matter of accident and mere chance. In both instances, moreover, God-consciousness also recedes at that point, and this clearly goes to show that God-consciousness is not in an inverse relation with consciousness regarding the interconnectedness of nature. In contrast, obviously what is miraculous actually presupposes the interconnectedness of nature, for any general spread of mere chance events would exclude all miraculous activity.

Thus, if what is miraculous really served chiefly to arouse God-consciousness, the reason for this eventuality could be sought only in the fact that many people have come to be conscious of a rule only by way of its exception. Yet, in and of itself, this claim would provide warranty toward the conclusion that this general consciousness of God would emerge far more strongly and frequently in the religious stirrings present in the Roman church than in our own church. It would do so, that is, because there virtually everyone is constantly immersed in miraculous activity and can expect it at any moment. The relationship between the feeling of absolute dependence and the interconnectedness of nature, however, is rather the reverse of that advanced in the view we have just examined.

The only thing on which we would still have to focus our attention is the following: that as to its content this component of the religious elements of our lives is the same thing at all stages of Christian development. To be sure, it will occur more frequently when a given mind and heart that is in community with Christ will already have gained a very great facility in the unfolding of one’s God-consciousness, and this will happen very little in a mind and heart in which the sensory drive passes so quickly from one element of life to another that such an unfolding can result only in rare instances. Yet, the content always remains the same, because it does not depend on any distinct sort of relationship or condition; rather, each individual¹⁴ takes one’s absolute dependence to be exactly the same as that of any other finite being.

Thus, in Part One of our presentation we have the task of describing, to the best of our ability, nothing but this religious feeling for nature, viewed in general terms. This describing we do quite apart from any particularly Christian content, to which this religious feeling for nature is, nonetheless, attached in every instance.

1. Selbstbewußtsein. Ed. note: An unpacking of the concept of “being [sein] self-conscious”—that is, of self-consciousness—is occurring here, conceived as a state of being, which, in turn, gives rise to the question Being within what? The answer varies as our state of being within some larger category can come to be identified over a scale extending in sizes including very particular circumstances, family, the society, or state, all that the earth is comprised of itself, including its atmosphere, and the entire universe. Between each such category regarding the interconnected processes of nature are many other possible categories, e.g., between the first three just mentioned, categories such as friends, intimate social circles where “sociality” (Geselligkeit) takes place, educational schools and programs, and church. These particular categories are all often used in Schleiermacher’s writings. What one “has” in one’s self-consciousness is to be determined in terms of such extensions as these.

2. Ed. note: endicher Geist. “Spirit” encompasses “mind” or “soul” (Seele) as distinguished from “body.” In Schleiermacher’s psychology, however, the human spirit is always in connection with, not strictly separable from, body. It is an embodied self (selbst).

3. Ed. note: The word here is stattfinden—that is, “taking place” is envisaged as a “finding” of a placement, as in the first sentences.

4. Identität. Ed. note: That is, between self and other, in this case as being with and within an interconnectedness of nature (Naturzusammenhang)—within a content called “nature,” including human nature.

5. Organization. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this term automatically implies the existence of something intricately “organic”—that is, variously organized in process and extent—in relation to one’s finite self. He regularly refers to what is organic as an “entanglement” (Verwirrung) in that to which human senses are oriented (in sensory self-consciousness), with that to which higher levels of self-consciousness are oriented, up to the level of nearly pure religious immediate self-consciousness.

6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher regularly, consistently recognizes this “interconnection” to be not static but a process. Thus, in this work the same term is often translated “interconnected process of nature.” Accordingly, both “first of all” and “originally” translate ursprünglich, referring to something temporally primary in our consciousness. Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note summarizes the main point as follows: “The relationship of intellect [Intelligenz] to organism [Organismus] posits interconnectedness of nature” (Thönes, 1873).

7. Ed. note: Usually, mitgesezt is translated “coposited” in this work, with the same meaning as “together contained.”

8. Ed. note: This last word, unentwickelt (“unexplicated”), is the same word that carries the meaning “undeveloped.” The root meaning these uses have in common is at once “untwisted,” “unrolled,” and “unwrapped.”

9. Ed. note: For clarity’s sake, here the words “on which the species exists” are added, because this sentence begins a series of extensions from the interconnectedness of the human species in itself to a further, external interconnectedness to which it belongs within the earth, and onward.

10. Ed. note: Also for clarity’s sake, “external” is interjected here, “the entire earth” having set over against it an additional, external interconnectedness popularly referred to, successively, as “the atmosphere,” “the sky,” and “the heavens,” and, finally, “the entire universe.” In all the editions of On Religion (1799, 1806, 1821, and the virtually unchanged edition of 1831), the term Schleiermacher uses for the latter, including all the other increments, is Universum.

11. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note succinctly reiterates this point: “The being that is situated in being self-conscious as objective consciousness” (Thönes, 1873).

12. Ed. note: See the further development of this point in §47 below.

13. Betrachtung. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, the same word serves for observation, consideration, and contemplation as well. In sermons, lectures, or writings he invites his hearers or readers to engage in this activity with him.

14. Einzelne.

2.3 To be sure, however, that danger of overstepping the proper domain of dogmatics does exist in the other two forms of dogmatic proposition. This is the case, for those two forms no longer immediately render religious self-consciousness in which only the contrast and relation between what is set over against oneself, each to the other, is posited. Rather, in that the one form makes God and the other form makes the world the subject of its propositions, it is necessary to be meticulously attentive lest each form might declare regarding its subject something that tends to supersede the immediate content of that self-consciousness.

Now, the second form of dogmatic proposition, which expounds divine attributes, is most closely grounded in poetic and rhetorical expressions that are present in hymnic and homiletic presentations. Moreover, in that these expressions are not sufficiently assimilated to dialectical language usage, the second form of dogmatic proposition can very easily assert something regarding infinite being that would no longer conform to the contrast between world and God that is contained in self-consciousness but that would make what is infinite itself appear to be dependent on something finite, even though in self-consciousness all finitude was posited to be absolutely dependent on what is infinite. Thus, at that point, these expressions would no longer correspond to religious self-consciousness, of which they were, nevertheless, supposed to be expressive.⁴

3. Now, if propositions of these other two forms will have come to over-step the domain of dogmatics in this way and if they will have gained the upperweight in practice, it will then come to be all too natural for propositions of the first form to be accommodated more and more to those two forms and, in this manner, to partake of deviations that would, for the most part, have remained alien to them, in and of themselves.

The following presentation will show to what extent such hazardous intrusions have occurred in the development of dogmatics to date.

1. Cf. §30.

2. Ed. note: jenem Selbstbewußtsein. As in all the propositions beginning with §32, “that self-consciousness” refers to Christian immediate religious self-consciousness in particular.

3. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher indicates, first, the “advantage of the first form over the two others,” then proposes that “in order to guard against this danger [of overstepping the boundaries of the proper domain of dogmatics] it must be handled ex professo” (Thönes, 1873). The discussion that follows indicates what this means—namely, that one should constantly and carefully examine how faith is actually professed, from its very roots up.

4. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here is more specific. It states: “Otherwise, it could also easily come to the point of dishing out something quite different—namely, metaphysics” (Thönes, 1873).

5. Ed. note: In his marginal note, Schleiermacher provides an example of what he is referring to: “Hence, the natural philosophical theologizing by Böhm and others like him” (Thönes, 1873).

§36. In ecclesial doctrine the original expression of this relationship, namely, that the world exists only in absolute dependence on God, is divided into two propositions: that the world is created by God and that God preserves the world.

(1) “I believe in God the governor of all” is also the oldest simple expression of the Roman Symbol.¹

(2) Confession of the Bohemian Brethren (1535), Art. III: “They teach … that God … must always be worshiped … as the Lord of all and the highest king reigning over all time, and all things depend on him alone. He holds all things under his hand and power.”²

(3) Calvin’s Geneva Catechism (1541) III: “has all things under his power and will.”³

Considered in and of itself, the statement that “God preserves⁶ the world” is wholly the same as the “original expression” indicated in our proposition, that “the world exists only in absolute dependence on God.” It only slightly seems to have acquired a different and lesser set of contents by the fact that, even though we are accustomed to thinking of the activities of “preserving” and “creating” together, the very beginning of the process remains excluded from the scope covered by the concept “preservation.” On the other hand, the statement that “God created the world,” considered in and of itself, does indeed also imply absolute dependence, but it does so only with respect to the very beginning, excluding creation’s continuing to endure. Now, whether the very beginning of the world’s creation is supposed to have occurred all at once or successively, part by part, it is nonetheless something that is not at all given immediately in our self-consciousness. Thus, this second statement would seem to be a dogmatic statement simply inasmuch as “creation” is a supplement to the concept “preservation,” provided in order to regain the sense of unconditional, all-encompassing dependence.7

2. Thus, if this hard and fast distinction were also to be taken into a presentation of faith-doctrine, there would be no sufficient reason for retaining this split instead of using the “original expression” indicated in our proposition, which is so obviously fitting, and there could have been no correct reason for a fresh introduction of it into a presentation of faith-doctrine, other than the following. For some while, this split had already been widely used in religious communication, and the suitability of these expressions could be watched over all the better, as well as the criteria for their use set forth, over time. That is the correct reason. Accordingly, at the outset this split did not arise along a purely dogmatic pathway.⁸ Not only is this true, but this split is also not the product of pure religious interest, which would have to find full satisfaction only in the simple original expression given here. Thus, left to itself, religious interest, in turn, would bring the split between “creation” and “preservation” into oblivion.

Yet, given an only somewhat awakened human power of imagination, the very beginning of all spatial and temporal being is a topic that faith-doctrine cannot ignore. As a consequence, even the treatment of any issue regarding this beginning goes back to a time before the separated emergence of scientific speculation and belongs already to the time in which myths were being produced.

In the end, even for us the topic is attached to the Mosaic story of creation. Yet, by itself that story can no more have become a purely religious feature, especially a Christian feature, than have other things in those same Five Books of Moses that have been delivered in the same mythical fashion, coming from prepatriarchal, prehistorical times. Rather, for a long time, that presentation regarding creation had to submit to being used, even for purposes of speculation and natural science, and, indeed, to substantiate the most contrasted views or even to have such views derived from it.

1. Ed. note: The Roman Symbol was developed and adopted in the early 700s as the received text of the Apostles’ Creed, in content exactly as it has been known in modern times. Schleiermacher’s text most accurately reflects the Creed of Marcellus (340), but the Greek text is contained in the Interrogatory translation of Hippolytus (ca. 215). Hippolytus might have drawn from an earlier, briefer form in a late second-century Roman creed, no longer extant in writing: “Do you believe in God the Father, governor of all?” See the text in Leith (1982), 23, which uses the term pantocrator, and Leith’s discussion on 20–26. ET also in Book of Concord (2000), 21f.; Latin and German, Bek. Luth. (1930), 21f.

2. Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 789. The quite different version of 1609 is in Müller (1903), 453–99.

3. Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. Torrance (1959), 8, whose conflation of several phrases reads: “He disposes all things by His Providence, governs the world by His will, ruling all as it seems good to Him.” Latin: Niemeyer, 128.

4. Ed. note: Here Besinnung (usually to be translated “consciousness,” as here, or to mean any form of “mentation”) refers to being fully awake, able to exercise one’s mind, i.e., to be fully awake and thus able to contemplate, for any given purpose, what is going on in or through oneself.

5. Ed. note: Here it is of critical importance to recall that unless Schleiermacher is explicitly referring to “us human beings in general,” the “us” or “we” or “ourselves” whom he was addressing or mentioning in this entire book are Christians—in fact, more specifically persons of faith then within the Evangelical church in Germany—as is the case here. Likewise, the ascription “general” or “whole” that he applies here is attached to them. At the same time, logically he does not have to deny that such references might apply to other human beings, given whatever qualifications he offers. Here the most pertinent qualification is that the feeling of absolute dependence is at most potentially, inchoately present, as a general “end” of human existence, at lower stages of development, though not actually present. Wherever it is actually present, it is always the same, even if it is registered, felt, or expressed somewhat differently from person to person.

6. Ed. note: The verb erhalten can mean either “to preserve” or “to sustain.” Since Schleiermacher conceives erhalten to be a process, it seems to be almost a matter of indifference which shade of meaning is chosen as long as one does not suppose that God is not just keeping the world in stasis, i.e., simply and exactly as it once was.

7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “Nota bene: Suppose that someone raises the objection that parts of the world’s creation arose, then that process stopped but was meant to have occurred in connection with the world’s continuing to endure. In that case, ‘creation’ would also entirely include in itself what was claimed in the original statement” (Thönes, 1873).

8. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “‘Purely dogmatic’ means: using a ‘presentational-didactic procedure’” (Thönes, 1873).

(1) Augsburg Confession (1530) I: “… one … creator and preserver of all things, visible and invisible.” XIX (on sin): “… although almighty God has created and preserves all of nature,” etc.²

(2) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) III: “We believe … in God … creator of all things, both visible and invisible, … quickening and preserving all things.”³

(3) Gallican Confession (1559) VII: “We believe that God, in three coworking persons, … created all things, not only the heavens and the earth and all that in them is but also invisible spirits.”⁴

(4) Anglican Articles of Religion (1562, 1571) I: “There is but one living and true God, … the maker and preserver of all things both visible, and invisible.”⁵

(5) Scots Confession (1560) I: “… one God … by whom we confess and believe all things in heaven and earth, both visible and invisible, to have been created, to be retained in their being,” etc.⁶

1. The placements of “creation” and “preservation” side by side in these confessional statements all stem from the Roman Symbol’s later additions to the simple original Greek expression cited above⁸ and expanded during the fourth century in the Constantinopolitan symbol.⁹ Now, since nothing is definite in these statements concerning the way in which God brought forth everything, nothing is to be noted as to this division of creation and preservation except the intention that nothing—no point in space and no point in time—is to be excluded from that sovereignty over all.¹⁰

Even the expressions related to the triune God¹¹ are not peculiar to the Gallican Confession, nor do they first belong to this era. Rather, the same expressions are also present in the Augsburg Confession, in that there the subject to which “Creator” and “Preserver” refer is the triune God, and they already had their origin in the Symbolum Quicunque vult,¹² where omnipotens (omnipotence) and dominus (lord) were predicated of all three persons, which obviously amounts to the same meaning. Yet, since the doctrine of the triune God¹³ is in no way presupposed, or even simply contained, in every Christian religious stirring of mind and heart, these definitions in no way belong to our present reflection.

2. It already follows from this disposition of the matter¹⁷ that in the Evangelical church not only do we have very wide latitude for working out this point of doctrine in manifold ways, but we are also bidden to make use of it.

That is to say, in that we are returning to the first source, we are not only freed to comply more with the oldest and simplest expression and to explicate this expression, as far as the purpose for presenting faith-doctrine requires, without any split between creation and preservation. It is also the case, however, that in the Evangelical church, even when employing the form of a split between the two points of doctrine, everything must be able to have currency, viewed as a range of free opinion, simply to the degree that, along with the rather wide-ranging and indefinite expressions of the various confessions, it can be traced back to the simple expression of our basic feeling.

3. Now, in this respect the norm set forth for treatment of this doctrine seems to be not only appropriate for that purpose but also sufficient. The reason is as follows. Suppose that the purpose of dogmatics indisputably calls for explicating the simple expression of this doctrine to such an extent that the language usage of popular religious communication concerning the basic relationship of the world to God can be both regulated and protected. Then it would still be appropriate for present purposes to consider a separation of “creation” from “preservation. The danger that arises in doing so, however, is that of losing ourselves in alien territory and of moving beyond the actual religious domain into speculation. This danger would not be more securely averted than by constantly referring all the particular propositions regarding the doctrine, however they might be arrived at, to that “simple expression”¹⁹ which renders our immediate religious self-consciousness most reliably.

However, suppose that each of these two points of doctrine were completely to devolve into that “original expression,” with the result that just as what is essential is present in that expression, it would also be present in each of them, in the doctrine of creation equally as in the doctrine of preservation and vice versa. Then, at any time that point is reached, one or the other of the two doctrines would be superfluous. Thus, at that juncture either one would have to present the total content of that “basic feeling” two times over, or one would have to arrange the two doctrines in such a way that only in combination with each other would they bring into account what the “original expression” would contain if it were left unexplicated. The latter option, then, is much to be preferred.

1. Ed. note: The “original expression” has been given twice, in two slightly different forms: in §32 and in the first sentence of §36.1. Here Schleiermacher’s note adds: “Either taken together, or each of the two doctrines in its entirety and then once more in twofold form [doppelt]” (Thönes, 1873). The tactic he has taken in §§40–49 is the latter one, accompanied in each case by this “twofold” enfolding of the other of the two doctrines into each other, culminating in the view that “preservation” is the more accurate and all-encompassing doctrine and by far the less problematic. On this last point, see esp. §46, then §§48.1–2 and 49.1–2, also the climactic pulling together of all his subsequent uses of this doctrine in §164.

2. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 37 and 52; Latin and German, Bek. Luth. (1963), 50 and 72.

3. Ed. note: This confession is also titled Confessio et expositio simplex orthodoxae fidei. ET cf. Cochrane (1972), 228; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 249f. Schleiermacher regularly refers to this work as Confessio simplex from its opening words. The full title is Confessio et expositio simplex orthodoxae fidei, et dogmatum catholicorum syncerae religionis christianae. The author is Henry Bullinger (1504–1575).

4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 363, also Cochrane (1972), 146; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 331.

5. Ed. note: The quote is from the 1562 Latin edition. ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 487, containing also the original Latin edition (1562) quoted by Schleiermacher and the American version of the original English text (1571) adopted by the Protestant Episcopal Church in the U.S.A. (1801).

6. Ed. note: Quoted in Latin. ET drawn from the original English and Latin versions in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 439, also Cochrane (1972), 166; cf. an inferior Latin version in Niemeyer (1840), 341, and a closely related ET by Bulloch (1960). This is the first Scots Confession, written by John Knox (ca. 1513–1572) and three other persons; the second appeared in 1581.

7. Ed. note: ET Tice; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 542.

8. Roman Symbol (so-called Apostles’ Creed, 8th cent.): “… in God, the Father [εἰςθεὸν πατέρα] Almighty [παντοκράτορα or “governor of all”], maker of heaven and earth [ποιτὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς].” Ed. note: For further information, see §36n1 and §37n12 just below. In his note here, Schleiermacher simply gives the several centuries earlier, original Greek, as transcribed here. He does not use the Latin of the Roman Symbol, which was borrowed from the original Greek and is often cited by its initial words, Quicunque vult.

9. Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (325, 381): “… Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible [ὁρατῶν τε πάντων καὶ ἀοράτων],” etc. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher cites the original Greek of the last phrase, as is transcribed here. ET Book of Concord (2000), 22; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 26.

10. Allherrschaft.

11. Ed. note: An alternative expression in German, as in the name of the church Schleiermacher long served as pastor in Berlin, is Dreifaltigkeit, literally, “the threefolded God.” The English word “Trinity” simply emphasizes God’s “threeness” (Dreiheit), at most pre-supposing God’s “oneness” or “singularity” (Einheit).

12. Ed. note: This is the so-called Creed of Athanasius or Roman Symbol (ca. 5th cent. version), originally in Latin. For further explanation of the major versions that had evolved from the early third century onward to the early eighth century, cf. §37n8 just above, also Book of Concord (2000), 28; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 28.

13. Dreieinigkeitslehre. Ed. note: This word spells out “three-in-one,” as Trinitätslehre does not.

14. Ed. note: See the Bohemian Confession, §36n2.

15. Ed. note: The rough succession, not necessarily direct borrowing, is as follows: The first line, using the “original expression,” is found in (1) Hippolytus (ca. 215) and in a late second-century Roman creed (cf. §36n1); (2) Bohemian (1535), cf. §36n2; and (3) Scots (1560). Then the second line is found in (1) Augsburg (1530); (2) Second Helvetic (1566), first drafted in 1562; and (3) Gallican (1559), at the most extreme point.

16. Verhältnisbegriffe.

17. Cf. §27.2.

18. Ed. note: realen Wissenschaften—that is, according to Schleiermacher’s account of “science,” those areas of study that deal especially with “real,” empirically accessible phenomena, not so directly with speculation, however valuable a degree of speculative investigation might be for theory formation.

19. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note at this point offers this simple heading: “The advantage accruing to reduction [Reduktion]” (Thönes, 1873).

(1) John Calvin (1509–1564), Institutes (1559) I.16.1: “We must differ from profane men especially in that we see the presence of divine power, shining as much in the continuing state of the universe as in its inception.”²

(2) Nemesius of Emesa (4th cent.), On Human Nature (ca. 390): “For if anyone contends that it is out of accordance with its original genesis that a thing progresses through a succession of stages, this is not different from saying that providence and creation go together hand in hand. For, if what was created makes progress through its own successive stages, it is clear that providence, also, originated at the creation, [thereafter] to continue its work. … The inference to be drawn is simply this, that the maker of all things is, at the same time, their providence.”³

1. Let us suppose that, with the expressions used in the creedal symbols, which collectively speak not of one All but of all things, we relate the concept of “creation” chiefly to particular things. Then whatever comes to our consciousness that is seen to be the emergence of these particular things would always be seen to be nothing other than the preservation of species that is conditioned by the reemergence⁴ of particular things.⁵ Suppose, then, that the referent of our underlying self-consciousness here in this context acts as a surrogate for the entirety of finite being. In that same way, then, our species-consciousness would also lie just as close to us as consciousness of an individual life, because in our self-consciousness we always posit ourselves to be human beings. Consequently, the expression that “continuing renewals of things⁶ persist by God” would also just as completely correspond to the content of that self-consciousness, as concerns the object called “self,” as does the expression that “particular things emerge by God.”7

Now, suppose also that, in accordance with our expanded acquaintance with the world, we would be able to regard the heavenly bodies,⁸ with any life that might have developed on them, also as particular things, which would not all necessarily emerge at the same time. Then it would be obvious, nonetheless, that their successive emergence would also be regarded as the effective continuance of formative forces that would have to be emplaced within finite being. In this way too, only as far as our consciousness reaches, we would find nothing the emergence of which could not be bought under the concept “preservation.” As a result, the doctrine of creation would be entirely merged into the doctrine of preservation.

Suppose likewise, however, that we regard particular things as created and then move on down from there. Then preservation of those things would still be just as much the changing stream of alterations and movements in which those things would run their course. However, in that these alterations and movements would always more or less form homogenous series, something new would be put in place with every beginning of a series of activities or effects proceeding from the same subject, something new that was not present beforehand in the same individual entity. In consequence, this would be a new emergence. Moreover, it could be regarded as a creation, all the more surely so, the more such a beginning appears as a significant node of development. However, the “more” and “less” in this process could not make for a distinct section of our treatment here. Now, since in itself every particular activity forms, in turn, a series, and since its very beginning actually comprises an emergence, so, only as far as our consciousness can reach, all that we customarily regard to be an object of divine preservation also falls under the concept “creation.” Thus, this concept, taken in its entire compass, makes the concept “preservation” superfluous, exactly in the same way as we have seen previously the other way around. This outcome occurs precisely for the reason that whatever will not have been absorbed into one or the other of the two doctrines would not be given for us in the other doctrine either.

Hence, popular religious communication cannot be held to blame for holding on to this freedom and observing this set of occurrences as new creation at one time and as regular, law-oriented preservation at another time. Devout reflection, moreover, would hardly agree to establishment of a rank-order between them, as if one of the two doctrines were to correspond to the feeling of absolute dependence more completely or in a higher style than the other doctrine would.

1. Ed. note: See §32 and §36.1 first sentence for his full statement of the original expression.

2. Ed. note: ET Battles (1960), 197; Latin: Opera selecta 3 (1957), 187, and CR 30:144.

3. Ed. note: ET Library of Christian Classics, vol. 4 (1955), 428; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 40:787–88.

4. Wiederentstehen.

5. This is also how Nemesius of Emesa puts it: “How, then, is it that … each kind of plant grows from its own particular seed, and from no other, in the absence of any providence?” Ed. note: ET Library of Christian Classics, vol. 4 (1955), 428; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 40:787–88.

6. Ed. note: The term Erneuerungen suggests a continuing process of renewal, which could also carry the connotations of continual preservation and, in turn, revival, resumption, replacement, repair, restoration, and renovation.

7. Ed. note: These phrases are derived, if not in the exact same form, from Calvin and Nemesius of Emesa, quoted at the outset.

8. Weltkörper.

§39. The doctrine of creation is to be explicated, first and foremost, with a view to warding off anything of an alien sort, so that nothing of the way in which the question of how the world has emerged is answered elsewhere will slip into our domain and stand in contradiction to the pure expression of the feeling of absolute dependence. In contrast, the doctrine of preservation is to be explicated, first and foremost, so as fully to present that basic feeling itself.

1. Our self-consciousness, in the general way in which both points of doctrine relate to it, can represent finite being overall only inasmuch as finite being is of an enduring nature. This is so, because we find ourselves to be of such a nature, but we have no self-consciousness of a beginning of being. Hence, as we have seen above,¹ it would indeed not be impossible to explicate the beginning of being predominately or exclusively in the form of a doctrine of creation, but great difficulties would underlie the effort nonetheless. Such an attempt, moreover, would be just as arbitrary as it would be unsuitable for the purpose of dogmatics, since even in popular religious² communication the doctrine of preservation bears a much greater meaning. Furthermore, generally inquiry into the beginning of all finite being arises not in the interest of piety but in that of curiosity and thus can be answered only by such means as curiosity offers. Hence, piety too can show only an indirect³ interest in the question, for two reasons. First, piety would not give recognition to any answer that would bring a given religious person into contradiction with one’s basic feeling. Second, the doctrine of creation itself has such a contradictory position wherever it appears, both in the New Testament and in all proper confessional documents as well. In contrast, the Old Testament fundament for this doctrine lies in the beginnings of a history book, the contents of which beginning thus preponderantly serves the interest of curiosity.

2. In considering the doctrine of creation we then have, above all, to guard against anything of an alien nature slipping into it from the domain of knowing.4 To be sure, the opposite danger is then also to be held in view—namely, that the explication of our religious self-consciousness would be formed in such a way that a person motivated by curiosity would be placed in contradiction with the principles of the person’s own investigation within the domains of nature or of history.⁵ However, self-consciousness, which is to be reflected on here, already includes within itself that we are placed within an interconnectedness of nature. Thus, the doctrine of preservation, which can immediately proceed on this basis, would find no occasion within its pure explication of this self-consciousness for wanting to wipe out that presupposition. Even mistakenly, this is all the less likely to occur, moreover, if treatment of the doctrine of creation, as it was specified above, will already have preceded it.

3. Now, it has been established here that the immediate higher self-consciousness that is to be presented in the two points of doctrine here is simply one and the same in both. The task of presenting Christian faith-doctrine, however, is twofold. On the one hand, its task is to recapitulate in a clear and standard fashion,⁶ and in accord with their essential context, presentations in the diverse areas of religious⁷ communication that have currency within our church. On the other hand, its task is to set forth safeguards so as to avoid anything’s slipping into any given context unawares that could contradict what genuinely belongs to it. Then, taken together, the two points of doctrine would exhaust the dogmatic presentation regarding the absolute feeling of dependence that underlies them here, provided that in the doctrine of creation we chiefly produce precautionary rules and in the doctrine of preservation, however, we predominantly hold its positive explication in view.

1. Ed. note: See §38.

2. Ed. note: The word for such popular communication—in the broader public domain, not just among persons of mature piety or faith—is religiösen.

3. Ed. note: Here “indirect” translates mittelbares, the little-used negative of “immediate” (unmittelbares). In keeping with mittelbares, then, one could say that this interest is only “moderate,” in that it is only “indirect.”

4. Ed. note: des Wissens. For Schleiermacher, “the domain of knowing” is formed by the rules of dialectic, which he defines, in turn, as serving any “aim of knowing.” See his 1811 notes on Dialectic (1996). Within carefully defined limits, the “science” of dogmatics is also to rely on such rules (§§17–19).

5. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s division of the sciences, the more physical side deals with “nature,” including human nature, as such; ethics, in a very broad sense, provides “the principles of history” (see Dialectic, 37n).

6. Ed. note: anschaulich und normal zusammenzufassen. That is, to combine and summarize the material to be described in such a way that the matter can be plainly perceived and grasped in a properly regularized, consistent fashion.

7. Ed. note: religiösen—that is, covering all areas of piety within the church, including direct expressions of the basic feeling that arises in relation to God and indirect expression in thought and action (see esp. §§1–19; see also Brief Outline §21 and then §§55–57, where some preliminary weeding out of weak or diseased materials is indicated, and, finally, §§168–83).