II. Regarding the Formation of Dogmatics
§27. All propositions that claim a locus within a body1 of Evangelical doctrine must gain warranty, in part, by appeal to Evangelical confessional documents and, where these are found wanting, to Scriptures of the New Testament.2 In part, they must do this by showing how these propositions belong together with other doctrinal propositions to which recognition has already been given.3
1. It could seem strange that here the Evangelical church’s confessional documents as a whole are assigned their place, as it were, before the New Testament Scriptures themselves. In no way, however, can this procedure provide any ground for giving those documents precedence. To do this would indeed be self-contradictory, since they everywhere appeal to Scripture. Thus, it is rather the case that indirectly an appeal to Scripture always lies already in the assigned appeal to those confessional documents as a whole. Using direct reference to Scripture, however, it can always be demonstrated only that a posited doctrinal statement is Christian, whereas, with few exceptions, the distinctively Protestant content of such a statement continues to reside where it could be demonstrated that the Catholic church has sanctioned a different use of the same scriptural passages. Thus, for the Protestant content only the two modes of evidence4 mentioned above remain, and between these two modes the requirement generally set for dogmatics, namely, that it has to present a doctrine that has currency in the church, secures the initial spot for evidence from the confessional document.5 The reason is that these writings obviously comprise the first Protestant documents held in common. Moreover, the totality of Protestant congregations have grown together to form the Evangelical church primarily by subscribing to these confessions. Accordingly, every structured presentation of doctrine6 that would declare itself to be Protestant must endeavor to attach itself to this history. Indeed, this requirement applies no less to its distinctive features than to those it holds in common, except that for the first kind it naturally suffices to show indirectly that propositions of this kind can be compatible with statements in those symbols.7
Thus, immediate appeal to Scripture is then necessary only for two kinds of instance. The first kind of instance arises when the use that the confessions make of the books of the New Testament cannot be sanctioned. Even then, one must at least entertain the possibility that in particular cases all the testimonies cited in evidence, though not falsely applied, can still be unsatisfactory, since other scriptural passages would need to be adduced as means of evidence. The second kind of instance arises when propositions contained in the confessions themselves do not appear to be sufficiently scriptural or Protestant, thus are obsolete and are to be replaced by other expressions that would then surely find all the more entrée as it could be demonstrated that Scripture shows overwhelming support for them or perhaps even postulates them.
Hence, in every area of doctrine this method of referring first to the confessional writings has, at the same time, the advantage that the relationship of every proposition to the church is thereby at once made clear. Consequently, the significance of the entire presentation for the further development of the church’s body of doctrine is also made much easier to recognize.
It already follows from these considerations that if one is looking at particular propositions, giving warranty to a proposition by explaining its relation to other propositions that have already been given warranty in some other way is but a subordinate matter. Moreover, such a procedure is appropriate only for second-order propositions, which are those that are neither immediately present in the symbols nor in some way distinctly represented in Scripture. Yet, on the other hand, whenever such a reference to the aforementioned original warranty is added to that subordinate warranty at any given point, only then is the appropriateness of the way a given structured presentation of doctrine is arranged placed in the right light, as is true of the system of terminology that prevails within it.
2. Now, in that we here embrace all the confessions of the Evangelical church in its two main branches as equally entitled, for us there is not a single confession that would have proceeded from the entire Evangelical church or would indeed even have been simply recognized by this entire church. Therewith, moreover, all distinction between a greater and more general authority of some confessions and a more doubtful and lesser authority of others disappears, being viewed as entirely meaningless. Indeed, since it must be said, at least regarding the confessions at the second stage of their formation, that Reformed modes of presentation were directed against Lutheran ones, and vice versa, it must be granted right at the outset, then, that within these confessions only that wherein they collectively agree can be really essential to Protestantism. Indeed, it must also be granted that for the totality of the Evangelical church the right to have differing notions in all nonessential points has itself already gained symbolic status, as it were, by means of this disagreement between particular confessions, each taking sides8 against the other. Further, it is not to be denied that in a certain sense all of our symbols are but occasional writings,9 some more than others. Hence, much within them is stated only with reference to the time and place, precisely in this way and not otherwise, and one has no cause to assume that the authors themselves have intended to offer an expression they chose as the only and completely right one. At this juncture, another closely related point is that the writers themselves were repudiating opinions held to be heretical at that time and that in all points of doctrine that had not yet exactly become controversial, they were testifying to their agreement with doctrine that was prevalent at the time. Certainly these actions were entirely in conformity with their convictions at that time, but since the writers were still in the throes of inquiry into these matters, their actions were too overly hasty to have the character of a confessional document. That is, such judgments of condemnation10 can have befallen many a divergent view that had arisen from the same spirit as the Reformation itself did, except that this spirit itself, in turn, could not yet be immediately recognized. Likewise, many an older doctrinal opinion could have been carried over along with other opinions, and people simply did not yet notice how even these doctrinal opinions would not conform with the nature of Protestantism. It then follows from these observations that if referring back to the symbols is not to hinder healthy further development of doctrine, two things must be done. In part, greater attention must be paid to the spirit of these symbols than to clinging onto their letter. In part, attention must also be paid to the fact that the letter itself likewise requires application of the art of interpretation if the correct use of it is to be made.
3. Here only the New Testament writings are included, not the entire Bible. Accordingly, this decision is, in part, already prefaced in what was said above11 about the relationship of Christianity to Judaism. In part, anyone must also surely grant that if a doctrinal proposition would find neither indirect nor immediate warranty in the New Testament but would find it only in the Old Testament, then no one could summon up the proper courage to hold it to be a genuinely Christian doctrine. On the other hand, if a proposition is given warranty by means of the New Testament, no one would then raise an objection on the basis that nothing whatsoever concerning that proposition is found in the Old Testament. Consequently, it would appear that for dogmatics the Old Testament is only a superfluous authority. Now, admittedly, even by means of New Testament passages only the Christian character of a proposition can be exposed. Yet, it is already proper form for a Protestant doctrine to refer back to Scripture itself in regard to every faith-doctrine and to draw upon additional human remarks only insofar as they are warranted by Scripture—for these remarks, however, permitting to each person free use of the art of interpretation as it is grounded in linguistic science.12 However, use of Scripture is itself naturally quite varied in accordance with the varied makeup of propositions. Where the original tendency toward purification of the church prevails, being in accord with Scripture must be so exact that Scripture can also be used polemically against what has been set forth by the Roman church. Where the concern is focused more on the distinctive character of Protestantism, it suffices to demonstrate that this more distinct formation of doctrine is contained among things that Scripture says without one’s needing to show that the definition one offers is the only one that is compatible with Scripture. Likewise, as for what is set forth as something distinctive, it need be possible only to claim with surety that nothing in it can be shown to be contrary to Scripture, whereas what is held in common must definitely be tied to Scripture.
In no way, however, are these different approaches to be understood as if biblical language usage were to be taken up into the actual structural presentation of doctrine. That is to say, the New Testament has a didactic form only in part, but it is never actually systematic in form. Thus, in most cases an expression that is completely appropriate there would nevertheless only very incompletely suit the demands that are made on a structured presentation of doctrine. Furthermore, the didactic portions of Scripture are mostly occasional discourses and writings, and, on that account, they are suffused with special references that would, in any case, have to evoke only confusion within a dogmatic presentation. Hence, to pursue our task by citing particular passages of Scripture under each proposition would then suit only very incompletely. Rather, in manifold ways this procedure has become disadvantageous to dogmatics, on the one hand, and to interpretation of Scripture, on the other hand. Hence, the relation of particular passages of Scripture to particular dogmatic propositions can never be more than an indirect one, such that it would be shown that the same religious stirring underlies a given passage that a given dogmatic proposition presents, also such that the expressions used markedly differ only as the various contexts in which they come up entail those differences. These different phenomena, however, can be got at only by elucidating each context. Thus, in our discipline of dogmatics there should be an increasing use of Scripture in larger wholes. Thereby one would not be bent on applying individual passages torn out of context but on taking stock of larger, particularly fruitful sections so as to reveal, in the course of thought taken by the writers of Scripture, the same combinations of thought on which dogmatic results also rest. Meanwhile, such an application of Scripture must always be merely alluded to in the actual structured presentation of doctrine, and the success of this procedure rests entirely on agreement as to hermeneutical principles and methods. Accordingly, in this aspect dogmatics can complete its task only as the theory regarding interpretation of Scripture reaches completeness alongside it.
4. There is ample room for diversity in this aspect of dogmatics too. As a result, structured presentations of doctrine that are Protestant can bear a very different stamp without losing anything of their ecclesial character. For example, appeal to the confessions and to analogy could be comparatively quite recessive in a given dogmatics, whereas reference to Scripture is generally dominant. Thus, I might call this a scriptural dogmatics,13 in large part. How such a dogmatics is arranged would be its least notable feature, but this dogmatics would be completely ecclesial in nature unless (1) what is recognized to be Protestant in common happens to be sacrificed to what is only local and temporary in Scripture or, worse, sacrificed to a deviant interpretation of Scripture, or unless (2) it happens to abandon dialectical comparison of alternative notions in referring back to the often indefinite and multivocal language usage of the Bible. In contrast, I would term it a scientific dogmatics, in large part, if, in proceeding from certain well-recognized main points of doctrine, it were to shed light, based on the logic of its ordering, on parallelism that exists among its constituent parts and on the common bond that exists among its particular propositions in relation to each other, wherewith proof from Scripture and applying the symbols would recede of themselves. Naturally, those main points of doctrine in a scientific dogmatics would still have to be nothing other than the basic facts of religious self-consciousness, set forth in the Protestant spirit. This is the case, for if they were speculative in nature, then the structured presentation of doctrine could indeed be very scientific, but it would not be a presentation of Christian faith-doctrine at all. Finally, suppose that a given dogmatics is principally tied only to the confessions and is satisfied to demonstrate everything based on what they say and to make every part dependent on them, without referring any details to Scripture or without binding everything together in a more exact manner by means of a strict ordering of its doctrine. The work of this kind would be a dogmatics of commentary on creedal documents.14 To be sure, in this kind of dogmatics a certain approximation to Roman Catholic dogmatics is not to be denied, since it lays all value on every detail’s being recognized by the church. However, its Protestant character would not be endangered unless it were, on the one hand, to set forth as a principle the assertion that interpretation of Scripture stands under an authority and, on the other hand, it were simply to assign a value to its propositions independent of their expressing the inner experience of anyone. However, the farther any one of these forms of dogmatics distances itself from another form, the closer that form will come to its distinctive danger. Likewise, it would indeed appear that the aim of all these forms of dogmatics must be that each form would distance itself from the others as little as possible.
Postscript.15 Now, our proposition is totally silent regarding the very widespread custom in structured dogmatic presentation of doctrine of also appealing to the statements of other teachers of faith-doctrine, from the church fathers right up to the most recent. Thus, thereby our proposition does indeed declare this custom to be something nonessential. That admission notwithstanding, these allusions could also bear some value, though not generally of the same rank as the two sources we have considered here. To the extent that certain contents of our confessions that are established also pass over to a given structured presentation of doctrine, quotations from what later dogmaticians said cannot augment one’s conviction as to the ecclesial status of propositions. They have value, moreover, only in compendia, for the purpose of indicating the finest among further comments made. In this case, patristic citations can be of use only in apologetic or polemical arguments16 forged in the church’s relationship to the Roman church. The situation changes, however, where there are deviations from the creedal symbols, whether this is then a matter only of denotation or of actual content. This is so, for a proposition has all the more claim to gain currency in the church the more it has already been heard in various sectors. In particular, however, when a structured presentation of doctrine decidedly adheres to one of the three forms of dogmatics indicated here, it enlarges its effectiveness the more it places itself in close association with those that have likewise strongly borne the stamp of one of the other forms.
1. Inbegriff. Ed. note: Thomas Aquinas called his presentation of such a body or collocation of doctrine a summa. The 1580 Lutheran summary of its Book of Concord, itself containing its main confessions, was called an epitome, while the differing titles of Melanchthon’s three organized presentations all began with the word loci, referring to a succession of points of doctrine, also a medieval custom. In the post-Reformation’s “scholastic” period, others somewhat systematically gathered together the various points of doctrine, called “dogmas,” or generally acknowledged teachings, into works that some then referred to either as doctrina fidei or as “dogmatics.” Following this latter custom, which by his own time was prominent in the German Evangelical church, Schleiermacher then placed both Christian ethical doctrine and Christian faith-doctrine within one integrated but two-part discipline, which he too called “dogmatics.”
2. Ed. note: See also §§8.P.S.2, 33.P.S., 108.5, and 131. Consistently, Schleiermacher holds that any use of creedal documents must be derived from the biblical testimony to what occurs in the process of redemption in Christ, including what comes to be presupposed regarding divine attributes in Part One. Thus, the only way to ascertain the full meaning of these principles is to examine how they are employed throughout this work. On the requirement that clergy strictly adhere to creedal statements, see Schleiermacher’s critique in OR IV, supplemental notes 12 and 15.
3. Ed. note: In a marginal note here, Schleiermacher indicates that for the purpose of shaping such a work, the first twofold task required offers an “indirect” (indirekte) contribution toward showing “the interconnected structure of propositions,” while the second task offers an “immediate” (unmittlebare) contribution to that same end (Thönes, 1873).
4. Beweisarten. Ed. note: Since the proposition indicates that reference to confessional and biblical writings serves to give “warranty” to dogmatic propositions, Schleiermacher’s opposition to use of proof texts (see §27.3 below, also §§128 and 131.2; cf. Brief Outline §§209–10) is already secured here. What is produced in evidence does not of itself necessarily provide a proof positive.
5. Bekenntnisschriften. Ed. note: Ordinarily to be translated with the word “confessions,” other words more clearly indicate their role as written “documents” recording positions taken or simply as pieces of “writing,” just as the Scriptures literally are. All three uses are illustrated at this point. By 1831 Schleiermacher was politically free to propose openly that all true Protestants, such as the Brethren and other Anabaptist, nonconfessional churches, should be welcome in the Evangelical church, and did so.
6. Lehrgebäude.
7. Ed. note: It is clear from marginal notes at this place (Thönes, 1873) that the confessions are included among the “symbols.” Elsewhere Schleiermacher sometimes restricts the term “symbol” to the early ecumenical creeds, as is done in the Lutheran Book of Concord.
8. Ed. note: The word is partiell, which points to being a respecter only of one’s own position, or being partial to it, rather than to being only partially, i.e., less fully, developed.
9. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher sharpens this point by saying “affected by certain occasions” (Thönes, 1873).
10. Verdamnungsurteil. Ed. note: This term refers especially to what were then called “anathemas.” See Schleiermacher’s Oct. 10, 1830, sermon that opposes such practices (ET Reformed but Ever Reforming, 1997).
12. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, exegesis of the Bible, which has no special rules of its own, must follow only the general rules of the art of interpretation (Auslegungskunst), both aspects of which—the more hermeneutical and the more philologically critical—are, in turn, grounded in the general work and procedures of linguistics (Sprachwissenschaft). See his Academy addresses (1813, 1829–1830, KGA I/11) on translation, hermeneutics, and criticism. See also Brief Outline §126 on translation; see index there for discussions on hermeneutics and criticism elsewhere in that work. His lectures Hermeneutics and Criticism include some examples of biblical interpretation in the translation available and more in the German edition.
13. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “In another sense, biblical dogmatics” (Thönes, 1873).
14. Ed. note: symbolischen Dogmatik. See §27n7 above. Such a “symbolic” treatment refers only to creeds or symbolic documents such as the Nicene Creed. Elsewhere here, to keep the distinction clear, “creedal symbols” translates Symbol. See Schleiermacher’s related essays in Friedrich Schleiermacher on Creeds, Confessions, and Church Union (2004).
15. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Use of dogmaticians themselves in a dogmatics: In order perchance to provide an overview of the symbolic or the progressive stance, the overview itself would have to be done in a comprehensive fashion” (Thönes, 1873).
16. Ed. note: These materials would be borrowed, then, from the two parts of philosophical theology and, by the same token, from the history of doctrine.
§28. The dialectical character of its language and its systematic arrangement give dogmatics the scientific status that is essential to it.
Cf. §13. P.S., also §§16 and 18.
1. Here too the term dialectical is taken entirely in the ancient sense. The dialectical character of language, therefore, simply consists in its being formed in a skillful manner so as to be used in any exchange for communication and rectification pertaining to knowledge. Those functions cannot then be commended either for poetic or for rhetorical expression or even for presentational-didactic expression, which latter has actually stemmed from those two modes of expression and is not purely cut off from them. The expressions with which a presentation of faith-doctrine is occupied thus form, inasmuch as they refer back to religious feeling, a special domain of language of the didactic-religious type—that is, they form the most rigorous region within that domain. Yet, insofar as that domain of language through which religious feeling is reproduced and to which religious feeling refers infringes on the territory of what is psychological, ethical, and metaphysical, genuinely dogmatic language is definitely distinguished from didactic-religious language in general by its affinity with the scientific terminology of those domains. This terminology is as eagerly sought in dogmatic communication of religious consciousness as it is assiduously avoided in homiletical and poetic communication of religious consciousness.
Hence, given the great variation of outlooks and thus also of their expressions in all of these philosophical domains,1 the appropriate handling of language in dogmatic presentation is one of its most difficult tasks. Yet, the main outlooks that are not fit to be utilized in dogmatic language are simply those that are totally unable to keep the concepts “God” and “world” separate from each other in any way, that do not permit any contrast between what is humanly good and evil, and that thus also do not definitely distinguish what is spiritual from what is sense-oriented2 in human beings. The reason these distinctions are so important is that they are the primary presuppositions of religious self-consciousness, because without them even a self-consciousness expanded to the point of world-consciousness could not be set over against God-consciousness.3 Just as little, moreover, could there be any talk of a distinction between free and bound higher self-consciousness, consequently of a distinction between being in need of redemption and redemption itself.4
Now, the more often philosophical systems shift within these boundaries, the more often do marked transformations in dogmatic language appear. To be sure, these transformations are unavoidable only when a given system has become antiquated5—that is, when thinking in the discipline no longer accords with the typus of that system. Ordinarily, however, those changes have begun to arise even earlier through the more forceful zeal of theologians gripped by a freshly surfacing system, hoping that this new system will be more suited than any previous one to make an end of all divisions and misunderstandings in the domain of faith-doctrine. Now, if over against these theologians, others, on the basis of this very zeal, create concern lest a distinctly philosophical system might presume to be lord and judge in matters of theology, as a rule this concern turns out to be as unfounded as was that hope. The hope is illusory, because misunderstandings that bear some weight have always been present already, before an expression concerning a given point in contention has risen to strictly dogmatic status. Consequently, in and of itself, a revision that results from the influence of a different system does not touch upon the origin of these errors, unless the language used gains a higher degree of clarity and definiteness thereby. The same thing is true regarding the concern. That is to say, in the first place, the sole dominance of a system tends not to last long enough, at least not in our day. Second, however, even in general terms, as long as interest in that Christian piety which calls forth dogmatic presentation is really present, those errors can never turn against that interest, despite all else. Rather, such a danger can emerge only if its whole mode of proceeding would not arise from this interest but some alien interest would have supplanted it.
In addition, one hears two other contrasting complaints6 about the language faith-doctrine makes use of in relation to its connection with philosophy. More frequently, one hears the complaint that its language is too abstract and is too far removed from immediate religious communication, despite the fact that dogmatics actually exists only for the sake of that communication. One hears the other complaint less frequently—namely, that the language itself does not disclose from what philosophical system the dogmatician is proceeding. Both complaints seem to be unfounded, for the following reasons. As to the first complaint, within the community of our church it is only scientifically educated people who are expected to orient themselves to the domain of popular religious communication by means of dogmatics, and they would not lack in keys for this purpose. As to the second complaint,7 if the language is but rightly and cohesively formed, an acquaintance with whatever philosophical system a dogmatician might adhere to would be neither necessary nor even useful for understanding it. In all the sciences, the schools do more or less depart from their specialized language to adopt the more generally cultured language of the world; yet, always inherent in sticking with specialized language is the desire, nevertheless, to distinguish itself from that other language. The more a dogmatician then adheres to the strictest scholastic language, the more such a person will give occasion for the first complaint, whereas the more the dogmatician makes use of features taken up into the cultured language of the world, the more such a person will give occasion for the second complaint. To be sure, a colloquy of components derived from various times and systems would have remained within this broader language, long enough to be troublesome. However, an entirely suitable linguistic whole for dogmatic use can be formed from these components with skillful selection and by means of proper discussion. Thereby, the danger of an influence deleterious to the very substance of Christian piety can vanish altogether, and a certain balance can be maintained by the interweaving of different contemporaneous systems.
2. Suppose, however, that dogmatics is actually to fulfill its own destiny, namely, in part, to dissolve those confusions that tend repeatedly to arise in the collective arena of communications based on immediate Christian religious consciousness and, in part, also to ward off as much confusion as might appear in this arena by the norm that dogmatics sets forth. Thus, in that dogmatics sets forth the church’s body of doctrine, a most rigorous possible systematic arrangement of doctrine is indispensable, this quite apart from any dialectically formed language it might employ. Such is the case, for the less definitely and less completely formed language that is to be found in any fragmentary communication can be properly appraised only in comparison with what is fully definite and organized within a self-contained body of doctrine, and this language can be rectified only once that evaluative comparison is done. This is true, in that even the most well-defined notion and the most purely formed proposition would lose all their unstable qualities only if they are placed, at the same time, within a tight, absolutely interconnected whole,8 because the sense of any given proposition is fully given only within such a context.
Now, it is simply the nature of systematic arrangement that, by comprehensive coordination and exhaustive subordination, every proposition is placed within a fully defined relationship along with every other proposition. A structured dogmatic presentation of doctrine, however, is capable of such an arrangement only to the extent that its subject matter forms a self-contained whole. That is, it is capable of such an arrangement only inasmuch as two conditions obtain. On the one hand, all Christian religious stirrings that are in accordance with the Protestant typus, from wherever they might appear, would have to permit of being presented within a complex of formulations that belong together. On the other hand, facts of consciousness that could be subsumed within these formulations would not be derived from outside this community. Now, in this sense the Evangelical church is, to be sure, not so completely self-contained that it should not offer doctrinal propositions that the Roman church declares as well. Likewise, on the other hand, the Evangelical church is not so self-contained that, for the most part, its doctrinal propositions should not be found in anti-Roman communities that also do not, nevertheless, form one whole with it. The latter condition, however, is simply grounded in the fact that external unity does not depend on doctrine alone; rather, as concerns these doctrines, for us those small communities actually comprise one whole with the Evangelical church. In contrast, the first condition would be resolved, in turn, if the doctrinal propositions were considered not of themselves alone but in their interconnection, and if a presentation of Evangelical faith-doctrine could thus also set itself the task of undertaking to dissolve this apparent difference at suitable places.
The arrangement of a dogmatic presentation, however, can bear no similarity with that arrangement in any science which sets forth a principle that can be explicated based on the science itself, also no similarity with any science that encompasses a distinct domain of external sense perception and that is thus in this sense historical9 in nature. Rather, instead of such a self-engendered principle the arrangement of dogmatic presentation has before it only the internal basic fact of Christian piety, which it postulates. Moreover, what it has before it to put in order are simply the various ways in which this fact appears as modified in its diverse relationships to the other facts of consciousness.10 Thus, the task of arrangement11 in dogmatics is simply that of combining and separating out those diverse relationships in such a way that the various modifications themselves can appear as a complete whole. Consequently, by means of the totality of doctrinal formulations, the unending multiplicity of details will be presented synoptically in some distinctly plural fashion.
However, these two features, dialectical language and systematic arrangement, both require each other and advance each other. Dialectical language is too sharply defined for any other mode of religious communication. Apart from a fully structured presentation of doctrine itself, moreover, it is admissible only in explanations that are elaborated portions or outflows from such presentations. In contrast, a systematic arrangement would never stand out so clearly, and would all the less be able to gain recognition, if it did not use a language that did not permit of a procedure so precise as to be calculus-like for the purpose of trying out and testing every nexus12 of thoughts. No further explanation is required, however, for one to see how greatly the systematic arrangement is facilitated when every particular is already present within a uniformly executed dialectical language and likewise to see how the most precise expression for each particular is the more readily found when a sharply discriminating and highly binding schematic arrangement13 is already available for the purpose.14
3. Given all that has already been said on the matter thus far, it would seem superfluous to elaborate on or demonstrate further that no connection between Christian faith-doctrine and speculative philosophy would hold that is different from the one exhibited here. This is all the more the case inasmuch as in any treatment of faith-doctrine that is developed in the sense expounded above, scarcely any spot would remain through which speculation could squeeze its way into any presentation of faith-doctrine. Rather, it would appear that in carrying out this treatment, all traces of scholastic modes of treatment would most easily vanish away. To be sure, ever since Christianity had spread out and as philosophy was transformed by Christianity, it is not rare that by the use of scholastic modes of treatment both philosophy and actual Christian faith-doctrine have been mixed together in the same work. Only one further point might still be brought up here. That is, the very same members of the Christian community by whom the scientific form of faith-doctrine has arisen and persists have also been those in whom speculative consciousness has awakened.15 Now, just as speculative consciousness is the supreme objective function of the human spirit, in contrast religious self-consciousness is its supreme subjective function, so too a conflict between the two functions would run up against the very nature of human beings, and thus a conflict between them can never be anything but a misunderstanding.
Now, on the one hand, it is indeed not enough that such a conflict would simply not exist. Rather, for one who has an aim to know,16 the task arises of coming to be positively aware of any harmony between speculative consciousness and religious self-consciousness.17 Presentation of faith-doctrine, however, has no more to do with this process than it would be necessary, given a selfsame religious position, to adopt a different procedure for every different way of philosophizing.18 Then suppose, on the other hand, that such a conflict has indeed arisen and that in this instance someone or other either rightly or wrongly finds the source of the misunderstanding to lie on the religious side of it. When this happens, it can, to be sure, lead to one’s giving up piety altogether, or at least Christian piety. Moving, in turn, from the side of religion, to secure against this occurrence—other than by taking care not to occasion such misunderstanding by offering unconsidered formulations—is not the concern of faith-doctrine, which also has nothing to do with those who do not admit to its basic fact. It is, rather, the business of apologetics.19
Postscript. Those modes of treating Christian doctrine that have been in fashion for some while and have gone under the name of “practical dogmatics” or “popular dogmatics” certainly do dispense, in part, with dialectical language and, in part, with systematic arrangement. However, they also lie outside the circle for which we adopted the name “dogmatics.” In some cases they are something intermediate between a structured presentation of doctrine and a catechism; in other cases, they are adaptations of dogmatics for homiletical purposes.20 Indeed, the first kind largely bears the aim of communicating the results of dogmatic explications, in a certain interconnected form, even to people who would not be able to follow a scientific course of presentation with any ease. Yet, since the aim is itself rather arbitrary, it would seem that the undertaking would arouse more confusion and lead to greater superficiality than achieve any true benefit. The second kind would be completely supplanted if the necessary prescriptions, both those concerning the content of religious communication and those concerning its form, were brought to the fore in practical theology.21
1. Ed. note: Just as the PhD (doctorate of philosophy) had been customarily awarded in many fields (or “domains”) of scholarship, so too “philosophy” stood for both breadth and depth of learning. Here Schleiermacher singles out especially psychology (regarding selves), ethics (regarding the broad human domain of social interactions vs. physical science), and metaphysics (including discourses about “God”). Correspondingly, all of his dogmatic propositional structures chiefly touch (or “infringe”) on matters of “self,” “world,” or “God.” See §30 above.
2. Geistiges und Sinnliches. Ed. note: See §§6–7 above.
3. §8.2.
4. §11.2.
5. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here: “Split into parties for and against philosophical monarchy, beginning with Christian Wolff (1679–1754). The rise of a shared feeling [Gemeingefühl] against scholasticism” (Thönes, 1873). Wolff, drawing heavily on Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), also held closely to a scholastic method. His views gradually gained dominance in the eighteenth century but were also hotly contested from the very outset. His student Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) came to emphasize and radically revise the critical aspect of Wolff ‘s philosophy. At Berlin, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), whom Schleiermacher himself brought to Berlin in 1818, had been attempting to accomplish a similar hegemony there. A major adherent of Hegel’s thought at the time was Philipp Konrad Marheineke (1780–1846), from 1811 Lutheran copastor with Schleiermacher at the Dreifaltigkeitskirche and his colleague at the university. His own speculative dogmatics had already appeared in two editions (1819, 1827), before each edition of Schleiermacher’s own dogmatics.
6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873) referred to these as complaints of Unpopularität and Inkonstanz (failure to fit together in a logical or meaningful way).
7. Ed. note: See KGA I/10, 378–82 notes for the entire passage in Fries (1828). OG 80–83 and notes at 126–27 provide both Schleiermacher’s discussion in 1829 and Fries’s immediate response in a periodical dated 1828 but appearing in the following year. In a marginal note here (Thönes, 1873), Schleiermacher recalls a reference to detecting the influences of philosophical systems. This appeared in Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843), Bemerkungen über das Aristoteles Religionsphilosophie (1828; see the KGA passage for the lengthy quotation), where he uses philosophical schools related to Wolff, Kant, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) as recent examples. Reared among the Herrnhuter Brethren, like Schleiermacher, Fries came to reject the more speculative aspects of these philosophers’ systems, also those of Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1743–1819) and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854), and to focus instead on a descriptive empirical psychology emphasizing positive functions of feeling, presentiment, and faith as well as both immediate (“intuitive”) and reflective knowing (Wissen). Ironically, this Jena philosopher came to establish a long-lasting school of his own, a feat Schleiermacher studiously avoided. Although on the surface their philosophies seem similar, they also diverge at critical points. Both men won the conservative scorn of Hegel and of the Prussian royal family.
8. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, the phrase in einen absoluten Zusammenhang betokens a whole well-organized context of discourse, with tightly interconnected indications of meaning. This he attempts to provide in Christian Faith, with a strict minimum of aids contributed from even his own philosophical views. These views, he indicates here and in the next three propositions, are meant to serve merely preliminary, methodological, organizational purposes, which he announces chiefly in this Introduction, for they are not intended to comprise theological content, i.e., actual doctrine, at all. In a marginal note here (Thönes, 1873), he refers to this placement within a “tight, absolutely interconnected whole” as “full constraint” or, literally, “complete boundedness” (vollkommene Gebundenheit).
9. Ed. note: That is, historisch only in the sense of being oriented to the sensory consciousness of human beings within certain well-marked-out domains of experience. “Sense perception” translates Wahrnehmung.
10. §10.3. Ed. note: The locales of these other facts of consciousness are outlined in §§29–31.
11. Anordnung. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads: “Accordingly, the explication [Entwicklung] of the whole takes place partly in ethics [Ethik]” (Thönes, 1873). Elsewhere he refers to the ethics vs. physics side of philosophical and scientific investigation as itself “the science of the principles of history [Geschichte]” (Brief Outline, §§29 and 35).
12. Verknüpfungen. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “Calculus: exact definition and reducibility of signs” (Thönes, 1873). This is a definition of computation in general terms, not specifically of differential or integral calculus, yet not excluding them either.
13. Schematismus.
14. Ed. note: Hence, in the present systematic presentation the factor of “reducibility of signs” mentioned in §28n12 refers to the reduction of everything to the redemption that the creator God accomplishes in Jesus of Nazareth (§11). This is not seen to be a diminishment of perspective but rather makes possible an inclusive, broadening vision of relationships among God, human beings, and the world as a whole, as is outlined in §§29–31.
15. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher points to a twofold function of theology (doppelte Funktion der Theologie) (Thönes, 1873). As he shows here, as in numerous other places, this seeming “conflict” (Widerspruch) is certainly to be taken seriously in beings that are historically limited and as long as what their spirits can grasp is still under development. For examples, see here §6, also the 1811 Dialectic (Tice, 1996), 16n and 19, where the two functions are called “correlates,” and On Religion (1821) II, the passages just before and after the indication of supplemental note 3. However, the accompanying misunderstandings to which he refers are not all to be dealt with in dogmatics; nor is the seeming conflict itself to be treated as if it were incapable of any degree of resolution now but would have either to be denied, avoided, simply left unexamined, or inappropriately restated and then resynthesized (for the latter notion, cf. Hegel’s dialectic).
16. Ed. note: The phrase für den Wissenden refers to anyone who uses dialectic, viewed as one who has the aim of knowing, wherever this aim and procedure might be directed. Thus, such a person is philosophically minded and might also operate in one or more of the sciences.
17. Ed. note: “This task is an unexceptionably personal one” (schlechthin persönliche), says Schleiermacher in his marginal note (Thönes, 1873). Cf. the Introduction to Brief Outline (1830), §§1–30. Throughout that work, emphasis is placed on (a) the individual freedom of every religiously committed theological inquirer, who must also be working within a mutually serving communal and collegial context, and (b) the responsibility of each individual to work on the tasks of theology for oneself, not depending solely on any one tradition (note esp. §19 there). Within the section on the faith-doctrine aspect of dogmatics in BO (§§213–22), see esp. §213; see also §§67, 89, 202–3, 251, and 332 in that work. What he says of individuals, he also applies to churches and congregations.
18. Ed. note: This phrase is Schleiermacher’s way of defining what “dialectic” is about (cf. his 1811 Dialectic, 1996). The “art” (Kunst) of doing philosophy does not necessitate a different “way” (Art) of doing it in every system.
19. Ed. note: Cf. Brief Outline (1830), §§39 and 43–53.
20. Ed. note: “They are rising toward dogmatics or descending from it,” states Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873).
21. Ed. note: Schleiermacher himself reserves considerable room for this task in his lectures on practical theology (SW I.13). See also Brief Outline (1830), §§267–69 and 280–85.
§29. We will have exhausted the entire compass of Christian doctrine once we have examined the facts of religious self-consciousness: in the first place, just as these facts are already presupposed by the contrast that is expressed in the concept “redemption,” but then also just as they are defined in terms of that contrast.
1. First of all, it is clear that the contrast between the lack of any capacity for engraining1 the feeling of absolute dependence in every element of one’s life and the capacity for having this feeling communicated to us by the Redeemer already presupposes that very feeling and a knowing of it.2 This is the case, for since that feeling is never present in us other than as in a human being, we can also never know of it except inasmuch as it is present in ourselves; and without knowing of it, we could know neither of a lack of capacity for it nor even of a distinction between the Redeemer and ourselves. Thus, the condition that precedes the communicated capacity for having this feeling can be neither an absolute forgetfulness of God3 nor a sheer, contentless striving after God-consciousness. Rather, God-consciousness must be present in self-consciousness in some fashion. Yet, someone could say that such facts of religious self-consciousness as precede having community with the Redeemer could not have any place within Christian faith-doctrine but would belong only in some sort of general faith-doctrine or only in and of whatever religious community there might have been from which something of it can have passed over into Christianity. To this suggestion the rejoinder is to be made that, nevertheless, these earlier religious states of mind and heart4 would not disappear when one’s mind and heart will have been grasped in a Christian way. Rather, they would be mitigated and fostered precisely proportionate to that very capacity which will have been communicated. Thus, they would, to be sure, also belong to Christian religious consciousness, and they also could have been designated as states of mind and heart that are not defined in terms of that contrast but that rather remain unaltered at every stage of that same contrast. Yet, those facts which are themselves defined in terms of that contrast would also have to be different, in accordance with their content, when the lack of capacity is predominant and when the communicated capacity has the preponderance. However, just as those facts would continue to remain as they were, unaltered within the domain of Christian piety, they would never alone fill a religious element of life. Rather, they would be only a component of such an element.5 Moreover, the expression used in the proposition has been advanced precisely because, on account of their different makeup, as compared with facts defined by the contrast,6 we still have to consider them in and of themselves.
2. Let us suppose, then, that this first portion of our proposition also belongs to Christian piety, because it is necessarily present in combination with the second portion. Then we will also need to assert that the entire domain of Christian piety is encompassed in these two parts taken together. This becomes clear, for even if we assume that the lack of capacity that we have discussed would gradually disappear completely, at that point, then, no new modifications of religious self-consciousness would arise. Rather, reality will simply be approached more closely by those formulations which convey the state of Christian religious consciousness in its purity. Thus, it will simply be incumbent on us to survey exactly and thoroughly the territory covered by each part, so as to gain surety regarding what the complete status of the whole consists of.
To be sure, however, the two parts will have to relate to each other in such a way that Part One contains those doctrinal propositions the possibility of which has already been granted in general terms and in which what is distinctively Christian is less strongly manifested, thus the expression of which can more readily coincide with other modes of faith. Even so, however, those doctrinal propositions are in no way components of some general or so-called natural theology. Rather, they are not only in every instance declarations concerning religious self-consciousness— thus, genuinely dogmatic propositions—but are also distinctly Christian by means of their reference to what is distinctively Christian, something that lies in the arrangement of the whole presentation of doctrine and that is repeatable in every single proposition.
Suppose that someone wanted to disregard these last stipulations. Then that person would indeed be able to say—particularly in that what belongs within the domain of Christian ethics would remain excluded—that some dogmatic propositions would simply be expressive of monotheism in general, quite apart from whether they adhere to a teleological or an aesthetic outlook. Hence, the necessity arises that if general allusions to Christian ethics are not given in a presentation of faith-doctrine, one would still always have to keep one’s eye on the fact that to any presentation of Christian faith-doctrine, however it may be formed, there also essentially belongs a Christian ethics that is developing in agreement with it.
3. Now, suppose that these two things are of comparable value in the sense indicated: facts that are already presupposed with respect to the contrast that we have identified and facts that remain unaltered over the entire development of this contrast. Suppose, moreover, that it is further asserted that these two sets of facts, joined together with the facts that are determined by this contrast, encompass the entirety of Christian doctrine. Strictly taken, then, it follows that nothing belonging exclusively to a time preceding the Christian explication of that contrast can be taken up within the scope of Christian doctrine in its proper sense, no more than would be the case with anything belonging to a time that should begin only once the lack of capacity mentioned here will have come to be totally vanquished and nonexistent. Instead, only inasmuch as something stands in a definite and demonstrable association with the religious states of mind and heart existing within this contrast would it belong there. Now, since all Christian piety rests on the appearance of the Redeemer, the same thing goes for the following, namely, that nothing touching upon the Redeemer can be set forth as genuine doctrine that is not tied to his redemptive causality and that does not permit of being traced back to the original and distinctive impression that his actual existence made. Thus, whatever steps are taken outside these bounds must either actually belong to some other locale or can claim a place within them only for the sake of a particularly demonstrable, if more remote, relation of some kind.
1. Ed. note: This phrase translates der Unfähigkeit … einzubilden.
2. Ed. note: ein Wissen um dasselbe.
3. Ed. note: absolute Gottesvergessenheit.
4. Ed. note: diese frommen Gemüthszustände.
5. Ed. note: For example, based on this tie between a distinctly Christian experience and Scripture, BO contains the sharpest summary regarding exclusion of the Old Testament from the Christian canon of Scripture especially in §115, in the context set by BO §§103–24. Accordingly, both editions of Christian Faith have little to say about the Hebrew Bible. Indeed, what is conveyed through depictions of Christ as the Redeemer becomes the all-determining “canon within the New Testament canon.” On this focal canon on which dogmatics rests, see also CF §§11, 96.1, 97.2–4, and 99.1. On his response to critics of his excluding the Old Testament, see OG 65–68.
6. Ed. note: That is, as compared with those facts immediately presented in Part Two, which are not simply presupposed. The division between predominance of the lack of capacity communicated by Christ (which is the state of sin) and the preponderance of the capacity that is actually communicated by him (the state of grace) comprises the two main sections of Part Two.
§30. Without exception, propositions that are to be set forth in Christian faith-doctrine can be presented either as descriptions of situations in human life or as concepts regarding divine attributes and modes of action or as assertions regarding the constitution of the world. All these three forms, moreover, have continually existed alongside each other.1
1. Even in the domain of redemption, the feeling of absolute dependence always comes into appearance—that is, becomes an instance of self-consciousness actually filling an element in time—only insofar as it is stirred by some other determination of self-consciousness, thereby becoming one with that other determination.2 Thus, every formulation treating of such an instance of that feeling is a formulation treating of a distinct state of mind and heart.3 Consequently, all propositions of faith-doctrine must also be capable of being set forth as formulations expressing such a state. Yet, every such sensory determination of self-consciousness refers, at the same time, to something that is determinative4 from outside self-consciousness.
Now, this determining factor, on account of that general interconnectedness which is always already postulated in every instance of human consciousness, also constantly makes its appearance as a part of that interconnected whole. Thus, every single modification of the feeling of absolute dependence that has arisen in this fashion can also come to be known if that determining factor within the totality of being5 on which a given state of consciousness rests is described. Consequently, when conceived in that way dogmatic propositions become utterances concerning the constitution of the world. They are so, that is, only with respect to the feeling of absolute dependence and in reference to that feeling.
In the last analysis, however, not only is the feeling of absolute dependence in and of itself a copositing of God in self-consciousness but also the totality of being, from which all determinations of self-consciousness proceed, in accordance with the subject’s6 place within it, is comprehended under that feeling of dependence. Thus, all modifications of higher self-consciousness can also be presented in this way, in that God is designated as the one grounding this interconnected being in all its diverse parts.
2. If we compare these three possible forms with each other, the following becomes clear. First, descriptions of human states of mind and heart containing any of this content can be drawn only from the domain of inner experience. Second, under this form nothing alien can infiltrate Christian faith-doctrine. In contrast, admittedly, utterances regarding whatever constitutes the world can be in accord with natural science, and concepts regarding divine modes of action can be purely metaphysical. At that point, moreover, both of these expressions spring from the soil of science, thus belonging to objective consciousness and to whatever basically conditions it; but they are independent of that inner experience of which we just spoke and of the facts of higher self-consciousness. Thus, in and of themselves, these two forms, regarding the world and God, thus offer no guarantee of surety that all propositions crafted in either fashion are genuinely dogmatic propositions. It is also true that under the other form, mentioned first, propositions that bear a generally anthropological content also naturally belong.7 Hence, we must declare the description of human states to be the basic dogmatic form, whereas the second and third forms are permissible only to the extent that they can be explicated on the basis of propositions of the first form. This is so, for only under this condition can they count as expressions of religious stirrings of mind and heart8 with any surety.
3. Let us then suppose that all propositions that belong to Christian faith-doctrine could be expressed in that basic form, without dispute; let us also suppose that any speaking of the attributes of God and of constituent elements of the world would have first to be referred back to that basic form if one’s aim is to stand secure in face of any insinuation of assertions that are of an alien, purely scientific kind. It would seem, then, that Christian faith-doctrine would have consistently carried out only that basic form for the purpose of completing its analysis of Christian piety. It would also seem, however, that the two other forms could be entirely shunted aside, being viewed as superfluous. However, suppose that anyone should want to treat Christian faith-doctrine in this way at the present time. In that case, such a work would stand isolated in its being without any historical orientation, and it would not only lack in an actually ecclesial character but would not fulfill the actual purpose of all dogmatics, no matter how completely accurate it might always be in reproducing the content of Christian doctrine. The reason is that since dogmatic language has been formed only gradually out of language that has prevailed in public religious9 communications, the rhetorical and hymnic features contained in these communications especially had to foster the forming of concepts for the divine attributes. Indeed, these features came to be necessary for the purpose of bringing those expressions into their proper scale. Partly on the basis of those expressions and partly on the basis of the need to establish the relationship between the reign of God and the world, utterances likewise then arose concerning the constitution of the world. Moreover, both sorts of proposition were augmented by similar statements of alien provenance as adaptations from metaphysics were taking the upper hand in conjunction with dogmatics, whereas the basic form faded naturally into the background and found its place almost exclusively in less scientific presentations. Hence, a fashioning of dogmatics that would intend to restrict itself entirely to the actual basic form would not attach itself at all to previous formulations but, precisely on that account, would also be of little use either to purify faith-doctrine of alien components or clearly and properly to preserve any oratorical or poetic communication.10
1. Ed. note: The three successive terms Beschreibungen, Begriffe, and Aussagen refer to the primary aims of those three forms of dogmatic propositions and to their corresponding content. Any other content is meant to be only auxiliary.
3. Gemütszustand.
4. Ed. note: ein Bestimmendes. That is, something from outside gives the feeling of absolute dependence a distinct referent and a distinct—or definite, or more or less welldefined—shape, filling an element of life in time. What may have been mysterious also becomes real.
5. Gesamtsein.
6. Subjekts.
7. Ed. note: This sentence was a parenthetical expression within the previous sentence, as such seeming to admit that statements regarding human beings could also be inappropriately imported from alien sources such as science, perhaps sometimes unavoidably so (natürlich).
8. Gemütserregungen.
9. Ed. note: Here not frommen but religiösen, i.e., religious in the broadest sense, not necessarily immediately expressive of piety.
10. Ed. note: Since so many of his critics had misunderstood what he was doing in the Introduction, Schleiermacher considered reversing the order and presenting core doctrine first. Instead, he kept the original order and tried to make the whole work even more precise and clear. See his report on this process of reconsideration in OG 55–62.
§31. Thus, the structural feature1 just outlined will be accomplished in full in accordance with these three forms of reflection2 on religious states of mind and heart. Indeed, this must be done in such a way that, in every instance, basis for this structure lies in the direct description of these states of mind and heart themselves.
1. The various features of dogmatics have been formed in a fragmentary fashion, and thereafter the discipline itself has been more externally pasted together, drawing from these fragmentary features, than organically engendered. Accordingly, it is easy to see that, for the most part, propositions of all three forms have been combined without distinction, but that none of them has been conveyed in a complete and clearly arranged manner. In no way, however, does such a situation in any science satisfy the requirement that can be rightly assigned to it. Moreover, even though it is not possible to stick with the basic form alone, it is still necessary to adopt the standards of completeness indicated in our proposition, for the present need can be met only by means of these standards.
Now, the general description of Christian piety set forth above3 provides the basis for this entire presentation of doctrine in such a way that its very structure relates to that description. Accordingly, a similar general description will be placed at the head of each individual portion, to which the further organization of that presentation will likewise relate. Moreover, in each portion those ecclesial doctrines which belong to that same area will be affixed to it: first those which come closest to being an unmediated exposition of the state of mind and heart addressed there and then those which speak of that same state of mind and heart under the form4 regarding divine attributes and that regarding ways in which the world is constituted.5
2. It does indeed follow from these considerations that the doctrine of God, to the extent that it is presented in the totality of divine attributes, would not be completed until such time as the whole set of these attributes is completed. This is why they are ordinarily offered without their being broken up and before all the other points of doctrine. However, the diverse placement6 of these attributes intended here can hardly be regarded as a disadvantage. That is to say, in general it is undeniable that the usual arrangement is particularly adept at hiding the relationship of these doctrines both to the feeling of absolute dependence overall as well as to the basic facts of Christian piety. Furthermore, the usual arrangement is particularly adept at supporting the illusion that these doctrines could be a speculative theory wholly independent of these factors. One can see this quite apart from the fact that those divine attributes and modes of action which relate exclusively to the explication of human states—which can be said of all the so-called moral attributes of God—could not possibly be understood without prior acquaintance with these human states. Contrary to customary practice, then, our method not only places this interconnection in the clearest light but also places closer together features that can be understood only in and through each other.
Postscript. Further comparisons of the schematic arrangement set forth here with the more customary ones to be found in our books on doctrine and systems of doctrine, both old and new, would overstep the boundaries of this Introduction, since it has no call to polemicize at all and since vindication of the method used here also cannot be provided other than through the actual execution of it.