III. Presentation of Christianity in Accordance with Its Distinctive Nature:¹ Propositions Borrowed from Apologetics²

§11. Christianity is a monotheistic mode of faith³ belonging to the teleological bent of religion. It is distinguished essentially from other such modes of faith in that within Christianity everything is referred to the redemption accomplished through Jesus of Nazareth.⁴

1. The task of finding out what is distinctive about a given mode of faith and, as much as possible, to bring that result to a formulation is to be properly resolved only in the following way. One must demonstrate what is the same within the same community, even in the most varied religious states of mind and heart,5 whereas that same feature is lacking in analogous states within other communities. Now, the less it is to be expected that precisely this distinctiveness is marked with equal strength among all the various religious stirrings⁶ one finds, the more readily can one err in this attempt and ultimately arrive at the opinion that no firm internal difference exists but only the external difference determined by time and space. It is possible to infer with reasonable surety from what was said just above,⁷ however, that one will least miss what is distinctive when one also chiefly holds to what most exactly interconnects with the basic fact of a mode of faith, and this procedure also underlies the formulation of the proposition set forth here.

Christianity offers particular difficulties, however, already in the fact that it is more multiply formed than other modes of faith and is split into a multiplicity of smaller ecclesial communities. In consequence, a twofold task has to be posed: first, to discover the distinctive nature of Christianity overall, collectively held in common among these different ecclesial communities, but then also to discover the distinctive nature of each particular ecclesial community, the justification for which is to be demonstrated or its doctrine of faith is to be set forth. Still greater difficulty, however, lies in the fact that in each individual ecclesial community almost every doctrine arises, in different times and locales, with the most multiply varied deviations possible. Therein it constantly occurs that even when there is not such a great multiplicity in religious states of mind and heart themselves, a great difference does nevertheless underlie at least the way they are conceived and appraised. Indeed, the worst thing is that by virtue of these deviations the very compass of the Christian domain itself comes to be disputed among Christians themselves. This happens in that one party asserts regarding a given form of doctrine that it has indeed been engendered within Christianity, and another party asserts the same thing regarding another form of doctrine, but each is nonetheless actually non-Christian in its content.

Now, suppose that someone who intends to perform this task is oneself entrenched in one of these parties and firmly establishes at the outset that only what is present in the domain of one of these views need be taken into account in the process of sorting out what is decisive in Christianity. In that case, one is presupposing in advance that matters in dispute are already decided, for which decision one simply wants to find the right supportive conditions. That is to say, only when the distinctive nature of Christianity is sorted out can a decision be made as to the degree to which this or that thing is compatible with it or not. Suppose, in contrast, that someone can lay all preference aside and, precisely for that reason, takes everything into account, even what is most in opposition, insofar as it merely purports to be Christian. In that case, one stands in danger in the other direction—that is, one confronts the danger of reaching a result far more meager and colorless in its contents, consequently a result also less appropriate for what the task aims to achieve. This contrast demarks the present situation and is not to be obfuscated.

Now, every person, the more religious one is, will, to that degree, ordinarily bring along one’s own individually marked piety to this investigation as well. Thus, the number of those who form their notion of the distinctive nature of Christianity in accordance with the interest of their party is greater by far than the number of those who do not. Contrary to this tendency, it seems more advisable in the interest of both apologetics and of faith-doctrine to be satisfied with a less ambitious result at the beginning stage and to expect fulfillment of the task to come as one proceeds further, rather than to start off with a narrowly defined and exclusive formulation. Such a formulation is bound to have at least one contrary formulation or even several of them set over against it, over which another controversy will be forthcoming sooner or later. So, the formulation contained in the present proposition is set forth with this process in mind.

2. Now, indisputably, all Christians refer the community to which they belong back to Christ. Thus, it is presupposed here that the expression “redemption”8 is also of a kind with which all Christians confess their faith—and indeed not merely in such a way that they all actually use it, though each perhaps does so in a somewhat different sense, but in such a way that there is also something held in common that all have in mind, though each more closely defines it in a somewhat different manner. In this domain, the expression itself is only figurative and in general signifies a crossing over9 from a wretched state, which is depicted as constrained, into a better state, and this is the passive aspect of it; but then it also depicts help¹⁰ rendered by another, and this is the active aspect of it. In the ordinary use of the word, it is not an essential component that a better state must already have preceded the more wretched state, so that the better state that follows would essentially be only a restoration; rather, provisionally, this possibility can remain entirely undecided. Now, if the expression is to be applied to the domain of piety, then, the teleological bent of piety being already presupposed, the wretched state could consist only in the fact that the vitality of higher self-consciousness is blocked or snuffed out, with the result that unification of that higher self-consciousness with various determinations of sensory self-consciousness, and thus actual elements of religious life, would come into being very little or not at all. If we should then want to designate this wretched state at its most extreme level with the expression “ungodliness”¹¹ or, better, “obliviousness as to God,”¹² at that point we still must not consider this state as one in which a vitalization of God-consciousness is not a total impossibility. That is to say, when a person is in that state it is possible, on the one hand, that the lack of something that lies outside nature would not be felt to be such a bad thing; on the other hand, it might be thought that in order to overcome this lack one would have to be transformed into another being,¹³ in the literal sense, and this notion is not contained in the concept “redemption.” This possibility is likewise held as a proviso in instances where a wretched state of actual God-consciousness is portrayed in darkest shades of color.14

Hence, all that remains is to designate this wretched state as not having available the readiness to introduce and establish God-consciousness into the interconnected process of the real elements of life.¹⁵ Accordingly, it surely does seem as if the two states, that which exists before redemption and that which comes into effect through redemption, could be distinguished only as a less and more of something, thus distinguished in an indeterminate manner. Moreover, if the concept of redemption is to be at all firmly established, the task arises of referring that indeterminate distinction back to some contrast that pertains to it. That contrast, however, is lodged in the formulations that follow.¹⁶ That is, assuming an activity of sensory self-consciousness for the purpose of filling a given element of life and of attaching itself to another element, the exponent¹⁷ of that activity will then be greater than the exponent of higher self-consciousness for the purpose of uniting with that given element; and, assuming an activity of higher self-consciousness for the purpose of filling a given element of life through its unification with a determination of sensory self-consciousness, the exponent of higher self-consciousness will be smaller than that of the activity of sensory self-consciousness for the purpose of completing that element of life for its own sake alone. Under these conditions, satisfaction of the bent toward God-consciousness would not be possible. Thus, if a bent toward God-consciousness is to be activated, an intervening redemption will be necessary, in that the state just described is nothing other than a constraining18 of the feeling of absolute dependence. These formulations, however, do not imply that in all elements of life determined by that constrained state either God-consciousness or the feeling of absolute dependence would be reduced to nothing. Rather, the formulations imply only that, in one relation or another, neither of these two states would dominate a given element of life and that, to the extent that this is the case, the above-mentioned designations of “ungodliness” or of “being oblivious of God” would also apply to that given element of life.

3. Undeniably, the recognition of such a state is to be found in all religious communities, for all expiations and purifications bear the aim of removing the consciousness of this state or of directly removing the state itself. In our proposition, however, two markers are set forth as those whereby Christianity is distinguished from all other religious communities in this respect. In the first place, in Christianity neither of these two factors, people’s incapacity and their redemption, viewed in correlation each with the other, simply happens to be a particular factor of a religious sort as a number of other factors would also be; rather, all other religious stirrings are referred to these twofold factors, and they are thus what is coposited in all other religious stirrings. They are coposited in such a way that thereby all these religious stirrings become especially, distinctively Christian. Second, however, redemption is posited as something generally and completely accomplished through Jesus of Nazareth. Moreover, these twofold factors are not to be divorced from each other but are each essentially correlated with each other.¹⁹ By no means do these factors operate as if one could say that Christian piety would still have to be ascribed to every individual who might be conscious of being caught up in redemption in all the religious elements of one’s life, even if that individual would not refer to Jesus’ person at all or were not aware of anything about him—which, to be sure, would never come to be the case. No more than this do these factors operate as if one could say that a human being’s piety would be Christian if one referred it back to Jesus, positing, however, that even this individual would not be conscious therewith of being oneself caught up in redemption at all—a situation that, to be sure, would then also not come up. Rather, reference to redemption exists in every Christian religious consciousness only because the one who originated the Christian community is the Redeemer; and Jesus is the founder of a religious community only as those who are members of that community are becoming conscious of redemption through him.

The foregoing explanation already ensures against someone’s understanding this situation as if all Christian religious consciousness could have no content other than simply “Jesus” and “redemption.” Rather, the situation is simply that all these religious elements are posited, to the extent that the feeling of absolute dependence is freely expressed in them, as having come about through that redemption; and, insofar as this feeling appears to be as yet constrained in them, all these elements are thus posited as reflecting one’s need of that redemption. Likewise, it is also understood that these two factors of incapacity and redemption, which are coposited overall, can and will also be coposited in varying degrees of strength or weakness within various religious elements of life without losing their Christian character thereby. It would indeed follow from what has been said here, however, that if we were to imagine elements that are of a religious nature in which all reference to redemption would be blotted out and the picture of the Redeemer would be altogether absent in it, one would have to say of these elements of life that they do not belong any more closely to Christianity than they do to any other monotheistic mode of faith.

4. A more exact explication of this proposition, showing how redemption is effected through Jesus and comes into consciousness within the Christian community, devolves to faith-doctrine itself. It is in place here, however, to discuss further, with reference to what was said earlier20 in general terms, the relationship of Christianity to the other chiefly monotheistic religious communities. That is, each of these communities is also referred back to a founder of its own. Moreover, just as it is the case that if the differentiation in founders would be the sole difference, then this would be a sheer external matter, the same would be true if every religious community were to posit its founder as redeemer in the same way and were likewise to refer everything to redemption. This is so, for in that case the purely religious elements of life would have the same contents in all these communities, except that the personal existence of each redeemer would be different. This is emphatically not the case, however. Rather, we have to say that only through Jesus, and thus only in Christianity, has redemption become the focal point of piety. For example, when individual religious communities have ordered those expiations and purifications mentioned just above for particular purposes and when these observances take up only particular areas of their doctrine and polity, the working of redemption does not appear to be their main occupation but seems much more to be only something of a derivative nature. Their main occupation consists of founding the community on a distinct doctrine and under a distinct form. Yet, if a significant difference in the free unfolding of God-consciousness does persist in the community, then there are some, in whom that consciousness is most constrained, who are more in need of redemption, and there are others, in whom that consciousness is freer, who are more ready for21 the workings of redemption. Thus, there does follow from the influence of those more ready some approximation to redemption in the lives of those more needy, but this is so only up to the point where the distinction between the two is somewhat evened out for the simple reason that some community does persist there.

In contrast, in Christianity the redemptive influence of its founder is what is originative, and the community persists only under this presupposition and only as communication and spreading of that redemptive activity takes place. Hence, within Christianity these two features also constantly exist proportionately in relationship to each other. That is, on the one hand, the redemptive efficacious action of Christ is seen to be preeminent, and considerable value is placed on what is distinctive about Christian piety. Correspondingly, on the other hand, Christianity itself is viewed only as a means of advancing and propagating piety in general, in which process its distinctiveness is only incidental and subordinate, Christ is viewed particularly as teacher and organizer of a community, and redemptive activity fades into the background.

Hence, within Christianity the relationship of the founder to members of the community is also entirely different from the relationship that obtains in those other monotheistic religious communities. This is the case, for their founders are depicted as having been elevated out of the crowd of equal or less different human beings, arbitrarily as it were, and what they have received as divine teaching and rule for life is received no less for themselves than it is received for others. Furthermore, even one who professes those modes of faith will not easily deny that God could just as well have delivered the law through someone else as through Moses and that revelation could just as well have been transmitted through another as through Muhammad. In contrast, within Christianity all other persons stand in contrast to Christ, viewed as the sole Redeemer and as the Redeemer for all and as one who is not thought to have been in need of redemption in any way, at any time. Hence, as general opinion has it, he was originally different from all other human beings and was supplied with redemptive power from his birth on.

It is not as if we would want here to exclude from Christian community in advance all those who deviate from this depiction—itself already capable of manifold gradations—even going so far as to have Christ supplied with redemptive power only later, as long as this power is taken to be something different from a mere communication of teaching and a way of ordering life.

In contrast, if someone were to think of Christ wholly on an analogy with other founders of religion, at that point the distinctiveness of Christianity could be established only on the basis of the content of its teaching and its rule of life,22 and the three monotheistic modes of faith would simply remain divorced from each other inasmuch as each would hold unswervingly fast to what it has received. Then suppose, however, that all of the monotheistic modes of faith were together still capable of improvement and were themselves, sooner or later, also very likely able to discover the improved teachings and rules of life belonging to Christianity. At that point, the internal distinction among the three modes of faith would then be entirely overcome. Finally, suppose that even the Christian church were likewise to move beyond what it received from Christ. Then nothing would remain regarding Christ than that he would be regarded as an outstanding point in development, yet only such that there would be just as much a redemption from him as a redemption through him.²³ Moreover, since in these cases the only principle of improvement can be that of reason, and inasmuch as reason is supposed to be uniform across all instances, every distinction between what is by way of advancement in Christianity and what is by way of advancement in the other monotheistic religions would gradually disappear, and, all of them being taken together, only a limited currency24 would be applied to them in their distinctiveness, and only for a distinct period.

In taking this route,²⁵ a distinction can be determined between two vastly different conceptions of Christianity. At the same time, however, transitions from each conception to the other also become evident. Suppose that the view we have just been tracing should ever appear as a collectively held doctrine. Then a community sharing the doctrine would itself perhaps separate from the remaining Christian communities, but it could still be recognized as a Christian community unless it had already gone so far as really to declare itself not to be in need of any adherence to Christ in order to be redeemed. Much less would individuals who entertain such a view be denied participation in Christian community as long as they would desire to maintain themselves in the liveliness of God-consciousness with and through this community.

5. Hopefully, the explication of this series of moves will serve to corroborate what has been set forth here for the purpose of determining what is decisive about Christianity. What we have done, by way of experiment, as it were, is to seek to draw out of all that is found to be held in common in Christian piety that whereby Christianity is, at the same time, externally abstracted from other religions in the most distinct way. In using this process, we have been led by the necessity of viewing its internal distinctiveness and its external boundaries interconnectedly. Perhaps it would be possible in a general philosophy of religion to present the internal character of Christianity in and of itself in such a way that thereby Christianity’s special domain within the religious world would be secured. Then, if that discipline were given proper recognition, apologetics could appeal to this finding. In that case, it would meanwhile have belonged to that discipline to systematize all the main elements of religious consciousness and, based on their interrelationship, to show which elements among them are such that other elements can be referred to them and they can themselves be coposited in all the other elements. Suppose that what we designate by the term “redemption” were to become such an element as soon as a fact liberating it would enter into a region wherein God-consciousness is constrained. Then Christianity would have a secure place as a distinctive form of faith and in a certain sense would be construed as such. This status, however, would not itself be termed a proof of Christianity, in that even philosophy of religion could not set forth any compelling reason to acknowledge that a given distinct fact is redemptive or even really to accord to a given element that can be centrally positioned as this central place in a person’s own consciousness. Still less can what is offered in the present account claim to invite any such proof, since in accordance with the process we have proposed, and given that we could proceed only on the basis of historical observation, it has been necessary to foreswear even doing as much as could occur in a thoroughgoing philosophy of religion.26 It is clear in and of itself that an adherent of some faith strange to Christianity could perhaps be completely convinced by the above presentation that what was set forth here would therefore be the distinctive nature of Christianity without its thereby accruing truth for this person, with the result that this person would find oneself drawn to accept it. Rather, just as everything in the present context relates to dogmatics and this is meant only for Christians, so this presentation too is meant only for those who live within the bounds of Christianity. Moreover, it is to be offered strictly as a preliminary introduction.²⁷ Its purpose has been simply to distinguish things that are said concerning any given religious consciousness as to whether these things are Christian or not and as to whether what is Christian is either strongly and clearly or more unreliably expressed in them. Accordingly, here we totally renounce any so-called proof for the truth or necessity of Christianity; and, before one gets involved with any investigation of this sort, we counter it with the presupposition that any Christian already bears within oneself the surety that one’s piety can take on no shape other than that of Christianity.

1. Eigentümlichen Wesen. Ed. note: One task of the apologetic aspect of philosophical theology is to get clear on what the distinctive nature of Christianity is, in comparison with other modes of faith. Correspondingly, the task of the polemical aspect is to detect what is diseased within it. On the general characteristics of philosophical theology, see esp. CF §2 and Brief Outline §§32–40 and 63–68; on apologetics and polemics, see esp. BO §§41–42, 63–64, 222, and 253.

2. Ed. note: In this proposition, Christian “higher self-consciousness” is first introduced in terms by which what is “distinctive” about it is to be compared with other modes of faith (in §11.1–2), then initially explicated in relation to Jesus the Redeemer (in §11.3–5). In §§12–14 the original historical setting and activity of the Redeemer and his continuing efficacious action in the community of Christians are further clarified, also in general terms. Thus, in a marginal note at this spot Schleiermacher indicates the following headings for this account, in succession: “§11. What Is Characteristic of Christianity in Its Individual Nature [Individuelle Charakteristik]. §12. Christianity’s Relationship to Judaism. §13. The Relationship of Its Basic Fact to Historicity in General. §14. How Christianity Is Spread.” He then adds the intention to discuss “Apologetics in ancient times and in the present” (Thönes, 1873).

3. Glaubensweise.

4. Ed. note: Occasionally, especially when he is not simply placing Christianity among other religions or marking in which “stage” (Stufe) it appears, Schleiermacher refers to a “living Christianity,” as in OG 66: “Living Christianity and its progress do not need any support from Judaism.” He also indicates there that Judaism had still not progressed far enough to offer such support. Nearly two hundred years of scholarship on the Old Testament and on early Christianity as well as Judaic-Christian relations might well cause him to qualify or even somewhat alter his opinion on this matter. No doubt he would now consider values from other religions contributive to its core clarity, if not necessary to support it.

5. Frommen Gemütszuständen. Ed. note: Frömmigkeit refers to piety. For Schleiermacher, piety as a whole is comprised of both religious stirrings within persons and their expression in thought and action, within and through a community of faith. Taken together, all these features comprise the nature of a religion. This way of identifying a religion is laid out in all five discourses of On Religion. It is defined as a general and specific historical-critical task in Brief Outline §32 and §§43–53, and this account is summed up in CF §§11–14.

6. Erregungen. Ed. note: Stimuli produce stirrings. Thus, Gemütserregungen would be stirrings of mind and heart, not “emotions” in the usual sense, though an affective component is to be presupposed in one’s registering or taking in any such stimulus.

7. §10.P.S. Ed. note: Formally, the lengthy discussion there can be boiled down to the following features. A relative “truth” (vs. error) is to be found within the internal and external aspects of “identity” in any given form of religious community. Its “revealed” nature (via God’s “relation to us” in and through the world) and its “positive” nature (its communal shape) are thus determined in terms of what can be found to be “distinctive” at its very beginning and in the form religious stirrings take within its common life. In the individual these original events and subsequent stirrings are registered in self-consciousness. See also §11n2 and §11n5.

8. Erlösung. Ed. note: Accordingly, Schleiermacher everywhere refers to Jesus as “the Redeemer” (Erlöser), or as the “Christ,” through whom God brings redemption to the world. See also §11n23. His usage of the term refers literally to being released, liberated, or delivered, in this case given God’s response to the need for it. The term does not refer to any particular view of “atonement” on the cross. See §§100–105.

9. Übergang. Ed. note: This word itself bears several other connotations: a passage, a transition, or a conversion (for the last of which the word Bekehrung is ordinarily used in a Christian context, though it too suggests several ways of “turning”).

10. Hülfe. Ed. note: Now usually spelled Hilfe, this word too bears several other connotations: aid, succor, relief, support, or assistance, any of which a person of faith could have in mind in repeating, “God is … an ever-present help in time of trouble” (Ps. 46:1 NIV) or “my help comes from the Lord” (Ps. 121:2 RSV). It also immediately suggests certain allied concepts: deliverance, release, salvation, strength, mercy, grace.

11. Gottlosigkeit. Ed. note: Literally, “being without God,” “godlessness.”

12. Gottvergessenheit. Ed. note: This word could be rendered literally as “Godforgetfulness,” but in German Vergessenheit means “oblivion,” i.e., left completely out of mind. Something simply “forgotten” (vergessen) would have to have been somehow in mind, somehow consciously noticed and acknowledged, in the first place. This is not a requirement here. Nor is it required that the person in this wretched state would thereby, because of it, be without God, which would place an unnecessary, perhaps even implausible, limit on God.

13. Umschaffung. Ed. note: Literally, a transcreation, in contrast to the biblical image of a “new creation” or re-creation (Neuschöpfung, Neuerschaffene).

14. Rom. 1:19ff. Ed. note: Already referred to twice (§7.3 and §10.P.S.), Rom. 1:19–22 links with Paul’s speech at the Areopagus in Athens, reported in Acts 17:27–30. Rom. 1:18 already speaks broadly of “ungodliness” and “wickedness.” Then 1:21 refers to “senseless minds” being “darkened,” 1:25 of having “exchanged the truth about God for a lie.” In subsequent verses the depiction gets still more graphically detailed, whether regarding Jews or Greeks. The premise is that “from the creation of the world … God’s invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made” (RSV). In §10.P.S., however, Schleiermacher argues against presupposing any “natural theology.”

15. Wirklichen Lebensmomente. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, ordinarily Momente refers to “elements” of life within a process, not specifically to brief moments (Augenblicke), regularly translated “instants” in time. In contrast, Elemente ordinarily refers to factors (or functions, features, components) in any process, though not always to quite basic elements, or rudiments, in a process. Such usage is reflected throughout this work as well.

16. Ed. note: The formulation that directly follows is mathematical in form. The two basic elements, or constant factors, operative in Christians’ God-consciousness are one’s incapacity, or need for redemption, on the one hand, and redemption itself, on the other hand.

17. Ed. note: On a scale of more and less, an “exponent” rises or falls in its relative weight with any tipping of the scale in favor of (in this case) sensory self-consciousness relative to higher self-consciousness, which is then “constrained.” On a sliding scale, where “a” is a “factor” representing either the higher consciousness or sensory consciousness, an “exponent” of “2” or more, for example, could be added along this line to show a comparatively greater amount. This exponential progression could be infinite, never arriving either at a final absolute amount or at zero, in either approach taken in Schleiermacher’s illustration. At no point, then, is either sensory self-consciousness or higher self-consciousness at zero.

18. Gebundenheit. Ed. note: Here, then, redemption is presented as a release or freeing from this constraining influence, from this condition of bondage.

19. Wesentlich zusammengehörig. Ed. note: That is, in their operation they mutually condition each other.

20. In §10.

21. Erlösungsfähiger. Ed. note: This language could mislead, as if some persons would have better qualifications or credentials for receiving redemption. Rather, here and consistently elsewhere in Schleiermacher’s discourse, the issue is the degree of one’s readiness to attend to the proclamation of redemption, given by word and deed, and to be open to receiving, using, and growing in its gifts, fruits, or benefits. In the more general perspective intended here, some persons are more ready, having a greater capacity for receiving the workings of redemption. On a sliding scale, others are less so, are in greater need of its gifts, fruits, or benefits, especially if they have experienced them very little or not at all. In this way, Christianity could present a model for other communities of faith. However, as he states repeatedly, Schleiermacher does not presume to prove that Christianity is either necessary or superior. Dogmatics is addressed only to those who are inquiring into their own Christian faith.

22. Ed. note: Thus, presumably, theology itself would then be simply a direct purveying of that teaching about what is to be believed and how one is to live, no matter how well ordered it might be.

23. Ed. note: Again, at its root Erlösung (redemption) does not mean payment or exchange so much as release (becoming freed or loosed from) in contrast to the typical meaning of the English word. Both denotations are used prominently in the Latin redemptio. Although both meanings are frequently used in the Old Testament, the second meaning is carried in the eleven occurrences of ἀπολύτρωσις in the New Testament (notably, Luke 21:28; Rom. 3:24; 1 Cor. 1:30; Col. 1:14), though there are a few other instances where variations of the verb λυτρόω are used, including suggestions of a blood atonement.

24. Gültigkeit. Ed. note: “Limited currency,” in contrast to a final validity. See §19n1.

25. Ed. note: In a marginal note, Schleiermacher identifies this route and the resultant conceptions as “rationalist” (Thönes, 1873).

26. Ed. note: Since religious studies were not at that time as yet broken down into numerous subspecialties, mirroring the later customary structure of academic disciplines, this “thoroughgoing” philosophy would for Schleiermacher encompass a great many of those historical, empirical, and analytical-theoretical concerns, including psychology of religion, sociology of religion, and comparative studies.

27. Anleitung. Ed. note: Or “propaedeutic,” leading into but not comprising the actual doctrines of dogmatics, as was initially explained in §§1–2.

§12. Christianity does indeed stand in a special historical interconnection with the Jewish mode of faith. Yet, as to its historical existence¹ and its aim, the way it is related to Judaism and heathen modes of faith is the same.²

1. Here “Judaism” will be understood, first and foremost, to refer to the Mosaic institutions, viewed as preparation for Judaism, but also all that had already been operative in earlier times that then fostered detachment of this people from other peoples. Now, Christianity was historically interconnected with Judaism by Jesus’ being born among the Jewish people, since a redeemer of all humanity could not then very well spring from any other than from a monotheistic people once such a people had arisen. However, one should not envisage even that historical interconnection too exclusively. The reason is that at the time of Christ’s appearance the religious turn of mind among this people was already no longer based exclusively on Moses and the prophets but was multiply transformed by non-Jewish features that it had adopted during and after the Babylonian diaspora. Accordingly, Hellenic and Roman heathenism was also monotheistically prepared in manifold ways, and there too expectation of a new formation was extremely intense, just as, conversely, the messianic promises had come to be, in part, given up and, in part, misunderstood among the Jews. As a result, if all the historical circumstances of that period were comprehended, the distinction between Jesus and heathens would turn out to be much less pronounced than appears at first glance. Further, Christ’s being of Jewish descent is considerably offset, on the one hand, by the fact that so many more heathens than Jews went over to Christianity and, on the other hand, also by the fact that Christianity would not have had this reception from among the Jews at all had they not been permeated by those alien features to which we have alluded.

2.3 Rather, Christianity is related equally to Judaism and to heathen modes of faith,⁴ inasmuch as there was to have been a passing over to Christianity from both modes of faith just as there might be to any other. To be sure, the leap actually made appears to be greater from heathen modes of faith, to the extent that they would first have had to become monotheistic in order to become Christian. However, these two processes were, nevertheless, not divorced from each other; rather, monotheism was eventually offered directly to heathens in the shape of Christianity as it had earlier been offered to them in the shape of Judaism. On the other hand, the demand placed on the Jews that they not rely on the law and that they understand the Abrahamic promises differently was also not any more modest. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to assume that as Christian piety took shape right at the outset, it is not to be conceived as based on Jewish piety at that time or at any earlier time. Thus, Christianity is also not to be regarded, in any way, either as a modification of Judaism or as a reforming continuation of Judaism. Indeed, Paul does view Abraham’s faith as the prototype of Christian faith, and he does depict the Mosaic law simply as something inserted in between.5 Thus, to be sure, one could conclude from these statements that he wanted to present Christianity as a renewal of that original, pure Abrahamic Judaism. Yet, his view was also simply that Abraham’s faith would have related to the promise given to him, just as our faith relates to the ultimate fulfillment of that promise. In no way, however, did he believe that the promise would have meant exactly the same thing to Abraham as its fulfillment does to us. Rather, when he expressly spoke of the relationship of Jews and heathens to Christ, he also presented that relationship as exactly the same.⁶ He presented Christ as the same for both and both as equally quite alienated from God and thus equally in need of Christ.

Now, if Christianity relates equally to Judaism as to heathenism, then it can no more be viewed as a continuation of Judaism than as a continuation of heathenism. Rather, if one should come to Christianity from the one mode of faith or from the other, as far as one’s piety is concerned one becomes a new person.⁷ However, the promise to Abraham, inasmuch as it has been fulfilled in Christ, would nevertheless be presented simply as having had its own reference to Christ solely in the divine decree,⁸ not in the religious self-consciousness of Abraham or of his people. Moreover, since we are able to recognize the selfsameness of a religious community only where this consciousness is uniformly shaped, we can also no more recognize an identity between Christianity and Abrahamic Judaism than between Christianity and later Judaism or heathenism. Furthermore, one cannot say that that so-called purer, original Judaism would have borne the seed of Christianity within it in such a way that it would have unfolded from that seed by naturally progressive steps without the introduction of anything new in between, nor even that Christ himself would lie in this progression, so that a new common life and existence9 would not have been able to begin with him.

3.¹⁰ The widespread assumption of a single church of God, existing from the very beginning of the human race until its end, contradicts our proposition more in appearance than in actuality. This is the case, for if the Mosaic law also belongs within this one interconnection with the divine order of salvation, then it is necessary, in accordance with ancient and trusted Christian teachers,¹¹ likewise to count within this one interconnection the Hellenic wisdom of the world,¹² especially that wisdom which strove toward monotheism. And yet, one cannot assert, without entirely abrogating the distinctiveness of Christianity, that the teaching of Christianity forms one whole with the heathen wisdom of the world. If, on the one hand, this doctrine of the one church were especially to intend to articulate the unlimited effective relation of Christ to everything human, even in the past, this would be an aim concerning which no judgment can as yet be made here, though our proposition comports with it very well.¹³ In this respect, moreover, prophecy has also already attributed to the new covenant a character different from that of the old covenant,¹⁴ just as precisely this contrast between the two covenants expresses their internal split most decisively. Hence, two rules are to be set forth: first, that for Christian usage almost everything else in the Old Testament is but a shell around this particular prophecy, and second, that what has the least value for this purpose is what is most definitely Jewish. As a consequence, in Old Testament passages we are able to find reproduced, with any exactness, only those among our own religious stirrings that are of a more general nature and that are not formulated in a very distinctively Christian fashion. Even for stirrings that are distinctively Christian, however, Old Testament sayings would provide no proper expression unless we were to disregard some things in them and add other things into them. Taking this possibility into account, moreover, among utterances from heathenism of a nobler and purer sort, we would certainly also meet with echoes equally as close and congruent, just as more ancient apologists were, in their time, no less glad to cite messianic prophecies that they took to be heathen, thus recognizing a striving of human nature toward Christianity there as well.

1. Ed. note: geschichtliches Dasein. In contrast, Existenz (being) refers to an entity (a Sein or being anywhere or an individual Existenz in this world, e.g., Jesus), one that is really existing (seiende) “there” in this finite world (Da-sein). Sein can simply identify a being (anything up to Supreme Being); or it can be active in its meaning (Sein meaning seiendes, be-ing, e.g., God’s be-ing in Jesus, in relation to his self-consciousness).

2. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher supplies the concept “indifference [Indifferenz] of Christianity regarding the relative status of Judaism and heathenism [Heidentum].” He also registers the intention to show “how Judaism’s advantage” in relation to Christianity is limited (sich … begrenzt) (Thönes, 1873).

3. Ed. note: On Schleiermacher’s view of the Old Testament and the basic relationship of Judaism to Christianity, see §§8–9, 11.4, and 14. See also OG 65f and BO index. This is all Schleiermacher thought he would need for introductory purposes: How Jesus has accomplished redemption, and still does so, has to do rather with his impact as a perfect and blessed person, chosen and sent by God, and possessed of his own distinctive gifts for that purpose, than with any marks that identify him specifically as a Jew. Yet, he certainly was a Jew, and the “Old Covenant” of God with that people was in certain respects closer to what he offered as “Christianity” than other religions were. However, at the “highest stage” of religion in its own most complete state, guaranteed by actual conversion and participation in community with God in Christ and others in the reign of God, persons are seen to be in a continually developing process of renewal toward the ideal goal that God has decreed for all of humanity. Humanity would still hold to much of its great diversity at any consummatory point that can be prophetically imagined. Apart from Jesus’ person and what that inspires by the “divine Spirit,” there can be no Evangelical doctrine regarding Judaism or the Old Testament writings, as such, or those of any other religion. Careful, critically guided use of them for purposes of religious discipline is a matter for practical theology, still best guided by further comparative study. None of these more advanced studies, however, are necessary for one to become an Evangelical Christian. All of these points are elucidated within his writings on faith-doctrine and Christian ethics, taken as a whole.

4. Christentum … Judentum … Heidentum. Ed. note: It happens, perhaps not entirely by happenstance, that these words have different endings in English. For Schleiermacher, the emphasis is placed on modes of faith in all three social contexts in which these religious phenomena have appeared, so that, strictly speaking, none of them is, as such, an “ism,” and the heathens (Gentiles, pagans) are not treated as if they were wholly nonreligious or without any faith. See On Religion, discourse V.

5. Gal. 3:9, 14, 23–25.

6. Rom. 2:11–12; 3:21–24; 2 Cor. 5:16–17; and Eph. 2:13–18. Ed. note: Sermon on 2 Cor. 5:17–18, Oct. 24, 1830, with respect to the Augsburg Confession, SW II.2 (1834), 725–38. ET Nicol (1997), 141–54.

7. Ed. note: Find “a new man” in Eph. 2:15; “a new creation” in 2 Cor. 5:17 and Gal. 6:15; “a new nature” in Col. 3:10.

8. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher anticipates his later arguments regarding the one eternal divine decree. See §§90.2, 109.3, 117.4, 120.4, and 164.2.

9. Dasein.

10. Ed. note: On Christ as Redeemer but not a progression from Judaism or from heathen sources, see OG 46f. and 62–65.

11. Clement of Alexandria (ca. 150–ca. 215), Stromateis (n.d.) 6: “To the Jews belonged the law and to the Greeks philosophy, until the Advent; and after that came the universal calling to be a peculiar people of righteousness.” Ed. note: ET Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2 (1903), 517–18; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 9:391–92.

12. Weltweisheit. Ed. note: In some quarters, this word is used as a synonym for “philosophy,” but for Schleiermacher it would seem to have had a cultural extension beyond teachers of philosophy.

13. Ed. note: See the discussion on “prophetic doctrine,” §§157–63.

14. Jer. 31:31–34.

§13. As divine revelation,¹ the appearance of the Redeemer in history is neither something absolutely supernatural nor something absolutely superrational.²

1. As concerns revelation, it was already granted above³ that no starting point of a distinctively formed way of existing and, still more, of a community, especially of a religious community, is ever to be explained based on the condition of the circle in which it arose and progressed, in that it would then be no starting point but would be simply the product of some intellectual surrounding. Now, although the actual existence of the starting point surpasses the nature of that surrounding, nothing gets in the way of our assuming, nevertheless, that the emergence of such a life would be the effect of the force for development⁴ that indwells our nature as a species. This force, even if hidden from us, is expressed, in accordance with divinely ordained laws, at particular points in individual human beings for the purpose of advancing the rest further through those individuals. Actually, if no such assumption were made, no progress of the human race would be conceivable, either in part or in the whole.5 Every outstanding endowment of an individual through whom any sort of spiritual accomplishment takes a new shape within a distinct circle is such a starting point.⁶ It is simply the case, moreover, that the more expressions of this kind are spatially and temporally limited in their effects, even if they are not explicable in terms of present circumstances, the more they also appear to be conditioned by those circumstances. Hence, suppose that all of these specially endowed individuals, each in the individual’s own sphere of influence, were designated as “heroes” and that a higher inspiration is ascribed to them. Then precisely the following would be intimated of them: first, that they are made fruitful⁷ from the general wellspring of life and for the benefit of that distinct circle in which they appear; second, that we have to regard the fact that such individuals do appear from time to time to be a natural occurrence,⁸ if we want, without exception, to stick with human nature in its higher meaning.

Accordingly, all such individuals present analogues to the concept “revelation,” which concept is especially applicable only to the domain of higher self-consciousness.⁹ Probably no one would refuse to assume such an endowment in all founders of religion, even in those who are seen to be founding religions at subordinate stages, but with the condition that the teachings and communities that proceed from them would have to bear something distinctive and original. However, if this assumption is to be applied to Christ in the same sense, it would have to be said, first and foremost, that in comparison with him everything that could otherwise be taken to be revelation would have to lose this characteristic, in turn. This is so, because everything else is limited to distinct times and places, also because all that proceeds from such points of origin is, nevertheless, already destined in advance to be submerged, in turn, in Christ. Thus, in relation to Christ himself, each one of these things is not yet the being that is destined to be but is, in that respect, nonbeing,10 and only Christ is in a position gradually to enliven the entire human race to its higher state. The reason is that a person who does not accept Christ as divine revelation in this generally extended sense also cannot intend Christianity to be a permanent phenomenon.

Quite apart from this assumption, however, it would have to be asserted, nonetheless, that even the most rigorous view of the distinction between Christ and all other human beings presents no obstacle to one’s saying that his appearance, even as the becoming human¹¹ of the Son of God, would be something natural.¹² This is so, nevertheless, for two reasons. In the first place, given that Christ was certainly a man, even in human nature there must lie the possibility of taking up what is divine into oneself, as has happened precisely in Christ. In consequence, also in this regard the notion that divine revelation in Christ would have to be something absolutely supernatural does not stand the test at all. Rather, even the so-called proto evangelium,13 in that it does indeed tie prophecy regarding Christ directly to the fall, declares itself wholly against the notion that human nature would somehow be incapable of taking up into itself what is restoratively divine and that the capacity in human nature for doing this would first have to be built into it. In contrast, suppose that even the simple possibility for doing this should lie in human nature. Consequently, the actual implanting of what is divine within human nature would have to be a divine act alone, thus an eternal one.¹⁴ Nevertheless, in the second place, even the very emergence of this act in time and within a distinct individual person¹⁵ has to be regarded, at the same time, as a deed grounded in the original equipment of human nature and as a deed of human nature prepared by all that had preceded it,¹⁶ and therewith as the highest development of its spiritual power. It is also posited that we could never penetrate so deeply into these innermost mysteries of spiritual life in general that we would be able to unfold this general conviction to the point of having a clearly defined perception of them.¹⁷ That is to say, if it were otherwise, the fact that what is restoratively divine has made its appearance in Jesus and in no other would always have to be explained simply as an instance of divine arbitrariness. To assume divine arbitrariness in particular instances, however, always manifests an anthropathic¹⁸ outlook, for which even Scripture does not declare itself. Scripture seems instead to indicate the conditionality set forth here.¹⁹

2.²⁰ Now, however, as concerns what is “superrational,”²¹ in no way could Christ stand over against the totality of human beings as their Redeemer if those elements of his life by which he accomplishes redemption were to be explained based on reason that uniformly indwells all other human beings. This is the case, because then these states would have to be present in the others too, and they could thus effect redemption as well. Now, suppose that states of mind and heart would likewise also be positioned in the redeemed, but only as they are conditioned by Christ’s communication or influence, and suppose that without this conditioning one could not say that any redemption would have been accomplished in them. Consequently, in that case even these states would not be explicable only on the basis of reason that was indwelling them from their birth onward, though such reason absolutely indispensably belongs to such states, in that they could never exist in a soul bereft of reason.

Accordingly, something superrational is, to be sure, posited as present in the Redeemer and the redeemed, consequently in the entire compass of Christianity. Moreover, anyone who would not want to acknowledge this characteristic in any fashion also would not be able to understand what redemption is in its proper sense and would take Christianity to be validated simply as an institution, enduring only until a better one should come along, one that serves the purpose of transmitting the influences of human reason but that is stirred especially in the form of self-consciousness. Almost without exception, this superrationality is also acknowledged in the declarations of those who confess Christ. Moreover, it is expressed by them, in various forms, as an indwelling of God or of the λόγος22 in Christ—both of these as an original indwelling of God, or as a persisting indwelling of God that entered his life later, or as an indwelling of God restricted to a single element of his life—and as the redeemed’s being moved by the Holy Spirit.

Supposing, however, that we posit the greatest possible difference between this superrational state and whatever reason human beings might have in common, this superrational state can never be set forth as absolutely so without falling into self-contradiction. This is so, for the supreme goal that is posited regarding these workings of redemption is, nevertheless, always a human state that would contain not only the fullest acknowledgment of human reason but would also be a state in which what the divine Spirit effects and what human reason effects cannot be distinguished overall, even in the same individual.23 Thus, in that after reaching that point reason would be entirely at one with the divine Spirit, the divine Spirit could itself be conceived of as the greatest height to be reached by human reason, and the difference between the two could be conceived of as overcome.

Likewise, however, already at the very beginning, everything exists that runs counter to the movements of the divine Spirit, also everything that conflicts with human reason. This is the case, in that if it were otherwise, a consciousness of the need for redemption could not even have arisen within a human being before those workings of the divine Spirit had entered in—and indeed a consciousness such that the need would be satisfied by those same workings of the divine Spirit.²⁴ Thus, if, in a certain fashion, what is to be brought forth by the divine Spirit is already present within human reason itself, then, in at least this respect,²⁵ the divine Spirit does not go beyond human reason.

Now, what applies to those who are redeemed is likewise to be said of the Redeemer as well. This is the case, in that even those who do not accept any sort of divine indwelling in the Redeemer do nonetheless extol, from where they stand, the very same activities, notions, and rules for living that others explain in terms of that divine indwelling in him, viewing them to be supremely reasonable. Thus, with their human reason they apprehend these things approvingly; and, in turn, that apprehension does not find fault with or reject divine indwelling. Instead, they likewise acknowledge it approvingly.

Postscript.26 In consequence of the underlying outlook on piety presented here, the distinctive being of the Redeemer, and of the redeemed in their interconnection with him, is the original site of that issue regarding what is supernatural and superrational in Christianity. As a result, there is no ground whatsoever for tolerating anything supernatural or superrational that would have no interconnection with the Redeemer’s appearing but would be a different originative factor in and of itself. Ordinarily, this issue is treated, in part, with reference to particular facts for which a supernatural character is especially claimed. At this point we cannot yet deal with these cases. In part, this issue is ordinarily treated with reference to Christian doctrines, which for us include nothing other than what is said concerning that self-consciousness which we have indicated above²⁷ and its interconnection with the Redeemer’s appearing.

Suppose, however, that what is superrational in Christian self-consciousness consists in the impossibility of its being generated, given the way it is, by the activity of reason. If this is so, it does not at all imply that what is said about this self-consciousness would also have to be superrational. The reason is that nature as a whole is also superrational in the same sense as Christian self-consciousness is so; and yet, we likewise do not call what is said about nature as a whole superrational. Instead, we call it purely rational.²⁸ On the other hand, the whole procedure for taking up what is said about our religious self-consciousness is just as much a purely rational one as is that for taking up what is said about nature as a whole. Moreover, the difference between those two procedures simply lies in the fact that “objective consciousness” is given originatively only to one who is affected by nature, whereas Christian religious self-consciousness is given only to one who is affected by the Redeemer in the manner distinctive to those who profess faith in him.29

Now, this account plainly indicates of itself what is to be retained in the current prevailing view, as if Christian doctrine would consist, in part, of rational propositions and, in part, of superrational propositions. It is indeed already self-evident, first, that this could be only a side-by-side arrangement at best, yet second, that the two kinds of propositions could not form a whole in any fashion whatsoever, for no effort to combine them in a tight interconnection could hold up.

One also sees the truth of this observation rather clearly in all those treatments of Christian doctrine which are divided into two parts, consisting of a natural theology, purporting to be valid purely rationally and to be so not only within Christianity but also outside it, and a positive superrational theology that is supposed to be valid only within Christianity, for on that basis the two parts would be totally divorced from each other and would remain so. Hence, although it may appear as if such a union would be possible, this deceptive appearance arises from the fact that propositions of a Christian sort do indeed exist, in which what is distinctively Christian significantly fades into the background, with the result that they could also be taken to be purely rational in comparison with other propositions that count as superrational. Yet, if that distinctively Christian factor were altogether absent from these propositions, obviously they too would not be Christian propositions at all. Hence, what truth there is regarding this matter is the following: that all propositions of a Christian sort are superrational in one respect, whereas in another respect they are all also rational. However, they are superrational in the very same respect in which all that is experientially based is also superrational, since all of them are also traceable to an internal experience—namely, that they rest on a given—and without what is given,³⁰ propositions of a Christian sort could not have arisen by deduction or synthesis from generally recognized and communicable propositions. If this were not so, then it would indeed also have to be possible to instruct and demonstrate every person into being a Christian, apart from that person’s having encountered and received anything experientially.³¹ Hence, also inherent in this superrationality is the fact that a true appropriation of propositions of a Christian sort cannot be the result of using scientific means; thus, this appropriation lies beyond the use of reason in any case. Instead, this appropriation occurs only inasmuch as each individual has actually wanted to have the experience involved, just as everything of an individual and distinctive character can indeed be apprehended only through a love that wants to perceive it.32 Thus, in this particular sense the entirety of Christian doctrine is superrational.

Accordingly, suppose, however, that the question arises as to whether those propositions which express Christian states of mind and heart and their interconnectedness were not subject to the same laws governing concept-formation and the combination of concepts that apply to all spoken discourse.³³ In consequence thereof, the more fully a person would fulfill these laws in such a presentation of doctrine, the more it would also be incumbent on the person rightly to conceive what is thought and meant—this even though one would not be able to gain a conviction of the truth of the matter because one is lacking in the related basic inner experience of it. If such were the case, then in this particular sense everything in Christian doctrine would have to be rational through and through.

Given this account, the superrationality of all particular Christian doctrinal propositions is the criterion by which one can adjudge whether they also manage to express what is distinctively Christian; and, vice versa, their being in accordance with reason is the test of the degree to which this undertaking of translating internal stirrings of mind and heart into thought has succeeded or not. In contrast, the claim that it could not be required for one to present what goes beyond reason rationally would appear to be a mere evasion by which to cloak whatever defects might be present in the procedure used. Likewise, the reverse claim, that in Christian doctrine everything, in every sense, would have to be grounded in reason, would simply convey the intention of covering up a deficit in one’s own basic experience.

The customary formulation, to the effect that it is not necessary that what is superrational in Christianity should run counter to reason, seems intended to mean the same thing as our proposition does. That is to say, it implies recognition of what is superrational, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it implies the task of demonstrating what does not run counter to reason therein, something that can be achieved only by means of rationality in the presentation.34

1. Ed. note: See §§4.4, 6.2, 10.5, 168.2, and index. See also OR (1821) V, supplemental note 11.

2. Ed. note: Despite custom, it might be clearer to say “supra” (above and beyond) rather than “super” (which could mean “heightened”). Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads: “Relationship of the basic facts of divine revelation to factuality in general. Nota bene: Discuss Twesten’s explanation of the revelatory expression of divine grace for the salvation of human beings in its original effect on human knowledge.—Nitzsch (System, 47) also ascribes an originative character to revelation (namely, that it makes a new beginning in the life of human beings) but holds that in my definition this is as much blurred as recognized. He misunderstands me, however, when he claims that I directly find revelation in Christ only as he is a cognizing person. Actually, I refer not to that particular function but to the whole Christ” (Thönes, 1873).

August Detler Christian Twesten and Karl Immanuel Nitzsch were two younger friends of Schleiermacher. Contrary to his introductory discussion of revelation in the first edition (1821), both were mistaking his concept of revelation in Christ as if it pointed to a purely cognitive event. Nitzsch also mistook the concept as if it were not only strictly philosophical, and therefore nonbiblical, but also as if it were full and final, and therefore not simply preliminary in either that introductory discussion or the present one.

3. §10.P.S.

4. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here elaborates on this point: “This is the case, just as a single human existence [Existenz] can be far more closely observed in this way, but as a single particular activity cannot possibly be viewed in this same way. Beyond all particular activity, that single existence, in turn, comes to be human nature and nothing but that nature. Human nature itself is thought of as something self-developing, consequently as a force, not as an abstraction. That a still higher stage is not to be expected is attested by the predicates applied to Christ. Christ has his company of followers [Gemeinde] in his own self-consciousness, viewing that company as fully satisfactory as it is” (Thönes, 1873).

5. Ed. note: On differences of meaning for the words “naturalism” and “naturalist,” see OR (1821) V, supplemental note 5. See also the closing pages of OG, 85–89. On “naturalism,” see CF §74.4; on “supernaturalism,” §22.P.S. and index. Schleiermacher affirms “supernatural” for the being of God and God’s activities in nature, but not “absolute super-naturalism” (§13; cf. §92.4).

6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher refers to this specific individual agency, which could be more spiritual or more intellectual in nature (i.e., geistig in both cases), as a specific “existence” or way of existing (Existenz). Hence, his marginal note here states: “These subordinate cases too would be traceable to a beginning in some distinct mode of existence [Existenz]” (Thönes, 1873).

7. Ed. note: The verb is befruchtet, the basic image of which is to be made fertile, as in the biblical phrase “Be fruitful and multiply.”

8. Gesetzmäβiges. Ed. note: That is, not a supernatural occurrence, as such, not itself outside the natural order, even if the wellspring of life (Lebensquell) is deemed to be super-natural (cf. Prov. 18:4 and the allied expression “dayspring from on high” in Luke 1:78).

9. Ed. note: Cf. §10.P.S.

10. Ed. note: This highly abbreviated segment reads: kein Sein ist, sondern ein Nichtsein.

11. Menschwerden. Ed. note: Not once, in either edition of this work, does Schleiermacher use the Latinate term Inkarnation; he discusses a historical reference to incarnatio only in a note appended to §119 in the 1821 edition, where Menschwerdung itself is actually used only twice (§§17.1 and 20.1), both times presenting the notion of “the becoming human of the Son of God.” In the present edition, he first uses it in §10.2, where he says that the concept Menschwerdung can also be applied in some other modes of faith. As in the passage here, all the other uses refer to Christ; §110.3 states that from the very beginning on, it was naturgemäβ (“natural,” or “in accordance with nature”), as he does here; elsewhere in this edition it is related to “the new creation” in Christ (§109.3), thence is discussed in “parallel” to “emergence of the divine life in us” (§108.6), i.e., as corresponding to “rebirth,” or “regeneration” (Wiedergeburt) of individuals and of the entire human race (cf. §§113.3, 116.2, 118.1), as the beginning of the whole process of reunion with God in justification (§120.2), and as conditioning the new, also originative “outpouring of the Holy Spirit” (§124.2), as well as in discussions of the nature of Christ (§§96.3, 99.P.S., and 105.P.S.) and in discussions of divine election relating to it as God’s “good pleasure” relates to “the divine government of the world” (§120.3).

12. Ed. note: The outline in Schleiermacher’s marginal note here reads, “Christ as Revelation: (a) in relationship to other revelations; (b) nevertheless, not absolutely supernatural, without any preceding (supernatural) determination of nature, [thus] presented as going forth from nature [again, cf. §10.P.S.; also §§54.4 and 92.4]; (c) also in accordance with reality, naturally conditioned” (Thönes, 1873).

13. Ed. note: The claim had been that a provisional statement of the gospel, the proto evangelium, appears in the Old Testament, or Hebrew Bible, including the poem in Gen. 3:14–19, in which God proclaims an accursed existence for Adam and Eve because they followed the serpent’s temptation to eat of forbidden fruit in the garden of Eden. Schleiermacher’s marginal note here indicates that “the christological interpretation” of this material “is not to be vouched for by that Old Testament account” (Thönes, 1873).

14. Ed. note: ewiger Akt. That is, one beyond temporal constraints.

15. Ed. note: Here Person is used, indicating that what was termed an Existenz earlier in his account is in Christ an actual human being, thus both one who has a distinctive “personal existence” (Personlichkeit; cf. §§92–99) and also one who represents the “original” and final “completion” (or “perfection”) of human nature (cf. §§60–61).

16. Ed. note: Regarding this “equipment” (Einrichtung), cf. §§57–61. Eventually, the “preparatory grace,” to be seen especially in and through the church in its “community with Christ” (see index), is also seen to be operative in the world at large, particularly in light of “the divine government of the world” (cf. §§164–69).

17. Ed. note: bestimmten Anschauung.

18. Ed. note: anthropopathische. That is, as an expression of human will or desire (thus, πάθος), an aspect of what is usually called “anthropomorphic.”

19. Gal. 4:4. Ed. note: See a sermon on this verse, Dec. 25, 1790, SW II.7 (1836), 54–64. Gal. 4:4–5 RSV reads: “When the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman, born under the law, to release those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons.”

20. Ed. note: The original text incorrectly identifies this as “3.”

21. Ed. note: See also §§47.1 and 89.4 on divine revelation in Christ in relation to human rationality, and §83.1 on conscience itself as revelatory. Against common usage in his day (perhaps in ours too for some), “naturalism” or nonpersonalist and polytheist “nature worship” is very different from “naturalism,” the latter sense often being distortedly used as a synonym for “rationalism” over against supernaturalism. See his explanation in OR (1821) V, supplemental note 5. There he states: “There is some point in opposing reason and revelation. … But there is really no pretext at all for opposing nature and revelation.” On natural and supernatural, see OG 64f. and index, also “supernatural become natural” there.

22. Ed. note: The key locus for traditional discussions of the “word” (λόγος) in Christ appears in the prologue to the Gospel of John, especially including the issue over whether the λόγος in Christ was a preexisting entity, as Christ, before Jesus’ appearance on earth, which Schleiermacher denies. John 1:14 RSV states: “And the Word [λόγος] became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father.” In §96.3, he explains: “The ‘word’ is the activity of God expressed in the form of consciousness, and ‘flesh’ is the general designation for what is organic.” In §103.4 he states that having faith in Christ, thus described, is “based only on the immediate impression made by his person.” These are the only places in this work that use λόγος or “word” with reference to Christ. Note too that the noun λόγος is never capitalized in a Greek text, whereas, as a noun, Wort is always capitalized in German, so that any distinction between a lowercase and an uppercase for this particular word is made in translation only. In English, a “logos Christology” tends to treat “word” as an honorific title. Schleiermacher nowhere subscribes to such a Christology. He regards the “word” to be the Redeemer’s communication of divine grace through the Redeemer’s words and deeds, not to be a preexisting “Word,” though he also regards him to be the quintessential expression of God’s “one eternal divine decree” in relation to redemption (see esp. §§90.2, 109.3, 117.4, 120.4, and 164.2), i.e., of God’s love (§§166–67).

23. Individuum.

24. Ed. note: The “very beginning” mentioned is apparently that of the life of faith in community with Christ (cf. §14.1, also §71.3–4 and §83). Schleiermacher’s discussion in §§91 and 108 establishes that consciousness of the need for redemption always follows upon awakenings stirred by workings of divine grace.

25. Ed. note: Here “this respect” refers to that which reason, in its own rigorous and orderly fashion, can potentially and ideally think about concerning redemption, as in dogmatics. It does not refer to the full activity and reach of the divine Spirit. Nor is he claiming that what reason produces can ever be equivalent to faith or to its roots in feeling. Cf. §§3–4 and 14–19. See the index for other discussions regarding both “reason” and “the divine Spirit.”

26. Ed. note: “The anti-improvising nature [Das Antiphantastische] of Christianity” is the heading that Schleiermacher once indicated here. What is opposed is any practice of deciding issues based on mere whim or on sheer fantasy or on pure speculation, which could be tantamount to assuming absolutely nonnatural or absolutely nonrational divine acts.

27. Ed. note: This “higher self-consciousness,” to which reference was made in §13.1, was introduced in §§3–6 and is to be used or implied throughout the Introduction and in all the remaining propositions of CF.

28. Ed. note: Cf. §§40–41, which, like all of Part One, presents doctrines that are “presupposed” in Christian religious self-consciousness. God’s creation of the world is taken to be superrational, but the natural order is rational; that is, in principle, human reason potentially has access to that entire order in its ongoing process.

29. Bekennern. Ed. note: Implied in this concept of professing faith, for Schleiermacher, is a redeemed, regenerated person’s experience of faith in community with Christ and by being immediately “affected” by Christ’s continuing influence. The concept does not point to a nominal confession of belief. This orientation will become more directly apparent in the rest of the present postscript. This point, only anticipated at this juncture, is further explained in §§107–9. The verb here is affiziert.

30. Ed. note: auf dem Gegebenen. In “the experience involved,” God’s efficacious redemptive activity is the given, revelatory of God’s love. See §56.2 and other propositions on divine attributes as they are experienced in divine-human encounter.

31. Ed. note: ohne daβ ihm irgendetwas begegnet sei. To make the dynamic, interactive concept begegnet (“encountered”) clear in this context, the words “and received” have been added in the translation. In Schleiermacher’s meaning, what a Christian is encountered by today is Christ, opening and sustaining a new relationship with God by the Holy Spirit. As he indicates in many places (notably, in §11, to begin with), the entire system of doctrine is constructed so as to show what this divine-human encounter both requires and signifies.

32. Ed. note: In an equally dynamic fashion, this phrase reads durch die anschauenwollende Liebe, which form of love literally implies an attentive reaching out in one’s love both outwardly to behold some “other” and inwardly to experience what that “other” has to bring into one’s life. Cf. §13n30 just above.

33. Ed. note: Regarding these “laws,” or technical rules, see Schleiermacher’s 1811 Dialectic (1996).

34. On rationalists in relation to Christianity and philosophical systems, see OG 68–73, 76–85, also 85–87 on the relation of religion to philosophy and CF §89 on relations between rationalism and absolute supernaturalism.

§14. There is no way to obtain participation in Christian community other than by faith in¹ Jesus, viewed as the Redeemer.²

1. To have “participation in Christian community” means to seek in what Christ instituted an approximation to the state of absolute ease and constancy of religious stirrings described above,³ for no one can want to be in the Christian church for any reason other than this. Now, it is also true, however, that a person can enter into the Christian church only by means of one’s own free resolve. Since this is the case, for any given person this act must be preceded by one’s surety⁴ that through the influence⁵ of Christ the state of being in need of redemption is overcome and that other state of ease and constancy, just mentioned, is produced; and this surety is precisely what “faith in Christ” is.6 That is, everywhere in our domain this expression designates only that surety which accompanies a state of higher self-consciousness, and this is different from but, precisely on that account, is also no less than that surety which accompanies objective consciousness. Already above,⁷ talk of “faith in God” was meant in the same sense. This faith in God was nothing other than surety concerning the feeling of absolute dependence as such—that is, referring to nothing other than our being conditioned by a being⁸ positioned outside ourselves and expressing our relationship to that same being. The faith that we are talking of here, however, consists of a purely factual surety, yet it is a surety regarding a completely internalized fact. That is, it cannot exist in an individual until, through an impression that one has received from Christ, a beginning, a real presentiment⁹ of one’s being released from the state of being in need of redemption is in place, even if only an infinitesimally small one. However, here “faith in Christ” consists of the relation of one’s state, viewed as effect, to Christ, viewed as cause, as did “faith in God” in the other context.¹⁰

This is how John also describes it. In this way, from the very beginning onward, only those persons were attached to Christ, within his newly created community, whose religious self-consciousness had been stamped by the state of being in need of redemption and who had now become assured among themselves of Christ’s redeeming power.11 As a result, the more strongly these two features of religious self-consciousness emerged in anyone, the more that person could also help to call forth that same inner experience¹² in others by declaring that internalized fact, to which the portrayal of Christ and of his efficacious action belonged as components. Those within whom this process then occurred would become persons of faith,¹³ whereas others would not.¹⁴

Now, also since that time the nature of all direct Christian proclamation has always consisted in this process. Such proclamation can never be formed otherwise than as witness¹⁵—witness regarding what one has oneself experienced, which witness should arouse in others the desire also to have that same experience. Yet, the impression that all subsequent persons would obtain from what was effected through Christ—that is, would obtain from the common spirit communicated through Christ and from the entire community of Christians, supported by the historical presentation¹⁶ of Christ’s life and work—would be precisely the same impression that his contemporaries directly received from him. Hence, those who have continued not to be persons of Christian faith were complained of not because they would not let themselves be moved by reasons, as it were, but solely on account of their deficiency in self-knowledge. This deficiency has to be the underlying factor wherever there is exhibited an inability to recognize the Redeemer as the Redeemer, once he has been truly and properly presented. However, Christ himself already presented this deficiency in self-knowledge—that is, in the consciousness of one’s being in need of redemption—as constituting the boundary beyond which his own efficacy does not go. Accordingly, at all times the basis for not having faith is the same, just as the basis for faith is also the same.

2. That it is impossible to demonstrate the necessity for redemption to anyone is probably clear in and of itself. Moreover, on that account, one is not required to cite the many attempts to do so, which are always undertaken in vain. Rather, anyone who is able to obtain consolation17 through one’s own effort will also always find a way to sidestep such attempts. Furthermore, once one’s self-consciousness has been awakened in this regard, there can be no more possibility of demonstrating afterward that Christ is the only one who can bring about redemption than there was before that awakening. Rather, just as in his own times many people did hold a belief¹⁸ in an impending redemption, but they still did not accept Christ, so even when a more proper notion is available as to what is to be aspired after, it is impossible to grasp how it could then be proven that a given individual is in a position to achieve the desired effect. This is the case, since at this juncture everything depends on the magnitude of spiritual force, which we have no way to compute; and even if such a way existed, some other quantity would have to exist in terms of which such a calculation would be applied.¹⁹ Indeed, it cannot be proved, even in general terms, that such redemption would have to come, even if there were some common knowledge not only of how human beings exist but also of how God exists. Rather, no matter what the view of what God’s end for human beings might be, every sophistical method would have the fullest possible room to draw counterarguments from the very same stipulations.

Now, suppose, however, that we have to stick with the mode of surety that has just been described, and also suppose that faith is nothing other than the incipient experience of the stilling of one’s spiritual need for redemption by Christ’s agency. Then there could still be various ways in which that need and its succor could be experienced, and they would all constitute faith nonetheless. It is also possible, moreover, both that often consciousness of this need could already be present, even a long time in advance, and also that often it could be fully awakened only by means of the contrast that Christ’s perfection forms to one’s own state. Furthermore, the most elevated consciousness of the need and the onset of its being gratified could thus both have emerged at the same time.

3. Now, in Scripture itself lines of demonstrative argument are, nevertheless, repeatedly mentioned that witnesses to the gospel have made use of.20 Yet, it is never claimed there that faith would have arisen based on a line of demonstrative argument. Rather, the claim is that proclamation has given rise to faith. Those proofs were never employed except with Jews,²¹ in relation to notions of a promised Messiah that were present among them and in order either to rebuff opposition that had arisen from those notions, against witness to the gospel, or to forestall such opposition. This line of defense was indispensable to those witnessing to Christ among the Jews and in their encounter with Jews.

Now, suppose that these witnesses liked to claim that they had always expected no redemption other than one such as this, or, alternatively, that their expectations would have been transformed by the appearance and influence of Christ. In that case, they would have had either to renounce Judaism in its entirety, for which they had borne no indication of doing, or to demonstrate that prophetic depictions were applicable to this Jesus, viewed as the Redeemer. Suppose that we were to take a different view of the matter. Then the faith of Gentile Christians would not have been the same as that of Jewish Christians, and, accordingly, the two could also not have become truly one. Rather, the Gentiles would have had to become Jews first so that they could then be brought to Christianity under the authority of the prophets.

Postscript.²² In that our proposition says nothing further about any mediation between faith and participation in Christian community, accordingly the proposition also intends to be regarded as immediately combining the two and to do so in such a way that, of itself, that participation is also given along with faith. This twofold process is seen to occur, not only to the extent that it depends on the self-initiated activity of one who will have become a person of faith, but also to the extent that it depends on the self-initiated activity of the community, viewed as that from which witness has indeed proceeded so as to awaken faith. However, in closing any supposed gap between these two points, at which witness is given and has its effect, as a whole our proposition intends, at the same time, to exclude anything in the form of demonstration that might customarily be brought to the aid of witness or be intended as a substitute for it.23

Now, what is to be excluded, then, is chiefly of the following three modes of demonstration: wanting to induce recognition of Christ (1) by pointing to the miracles he performed, or (2) by referring to the prophecies that proclaimed him in advance, or (3) by indicating the special attribute of witnesses that were originally set forth concerning him—namely, that they are taken to be works of divine inspiration. Accompanying all these attempts, however, the illusion seems more or less to prevail that somehow or other the efficacy of these occasions always presupposes an already existing faith and thus cannot engender it.

(1) Now, first of all, as concerns miracle, suppose that we take that word in the narrower sense, in such a way that prophecy and inspiration do not belong within this category, thus as phenomena that are in the domain of physical nature but that are not thought to have been brought about in a natural manner. These miraculous phenomena cannot engender a recognition of Jesus as the Christ at all, whether we then stick with miracles that Jesus himself performed or also add to them miracles that occurred in relation to him. This is so, for, on the one hand, given that in Scripture miracles reported in flawed sources are never adduced for the purpose, we are acquainted with these miracles only from those same Holy Scriptures that also report similar miracles performed by persons who did not adhere to Christianity at all but are rather to be numbered among its opponents. We noted this phenomenon quite apart from the fact that Scripture does not give even the slightest indication of how probative miracles would be distinguishable from nonprobative ones. Yet, on the other hand, Scripture does attest, first, that faith had been wrought without miracles and, second, that miracles were performed that did not produce faith. Based on these reports, it can be inferred that even when faith arose in some association with miracles, it was wrought not by miracles but in that originative way of which we have spoken. Thus, if miracles had had the purpose of producing faith, God would have broken through the natural order ineffectually. Hence, it is also the case that many have sought the purpose of miracles simply in their drawing attention to Christ. Yet, this notion, in turn, is countered by Christ’s frequently reiterated prohibition against casting notice of miracles more broadly, at least inasmuch as their efficacy would have to be limited to immediate eyewitnesses, with the result that even this efficacy would no longer apply today.

Finally, however, one cannot fail to notice the question of what the following distinction is then based on. Consider that outside all connection with such a domain of faith we are continually encountering so much that we are not able to explain naturally, we do not think of miracles at all there but simply think of the explanation as deferred until we have more exact information both about the dubious fact and about the laws of nature. Why is it, then, that where such a phenomenon occurs in connection with some domain of faith that is to be established people do indeed immediately think of miracles, yet, nonetheless, they actually claim a given miracle only for their own domain of faith, but they declare the others to be false? Now, this question hardly permits of any answer other than this: that, in general, we assume a connection between miracles and the formation of a new domain of faith, perhaps even so exclusively that we admit miracles only for this kind of case, but that the state of each person’s faith itself determines one’s judgment concerning whatever is declared to be miracle and that miracle thus does not actually bring forth a person’s faith. In contrast, the general connection seems to have the following character, namely, that where a new point of development in spiritual life—and indeed an original, new point of development within self-consciousness—is assumed, new phenomena in physical nature, as it were, could also be expected, phenomena that are mediated by self-manifesting spiritual power. This interconnectedness would obtain precisely because both observing24 states and spiritual states that have their effect externally always proceed from self-consciousness and are determined by its stimuli. Thus, once Christ would be recognized to be the Redeemer, consequently to be the beginning of the highest development of human nature in the domain of self-consciousness, it would be natural to presuppose that precisely because at points where such an existence25 is communicated most strongly, spiritual states would also arise that cannot be explained on the basis of earlier being²⁶ of which we were previously aware. By virtue of the general interconnectedness of all nature, the very same person who would exercise such a distinctive efficacious action toward the rest of human nature would work a distinctive power on the physical aspect of human nature and on external nature. That is, it would be natural also to expect miracles from any person who is taken to be the supreme divine revelation. Suppose, too, that, without exception, such events could, nonetheless, also be called “miracles” only in a relative sense. This is the case, since our notions both regarding the susceptibility of physical nature to the influences of spirit and regarding the causal efficacy of will on physical nature are no more settled than are our notions of the physical forces of nature themselves, and they are just as capable of being continually expanded through new experiences.

Now, in their interconnection with divine revelation in Christ phenomena did appear that could be brought under the concept “miracle.” Thus, it was natural that these phenomena would also actually be placed in this perspective and would be adduced as confirmation that at this juncture a new point of development was coming to pass. This confirmation would also have gained efficacy, however, only inasmuch as a beginning of faith was already in existence. Otherwise, claims of miraculous events would have been declared to be false, or understanding them would have been postponed to some future time when they could be explained naturally. Still less, however, could it be proved from the miracles that accompanied Christianity that it would be the supreme revelation. This would be the case, in that, on the same basis, something similar would have to be expected in connection with subordinate modes of faith as well, yet miracles themselves do not, as such, permit of being divided into lower and higher forms. Indeed, the claim that similar phenomena can show up that would also exist without any connection with the religious domain remains unsettled, whether they would accompany developments of another sort or are alleged to be deeper stirrings within physical nature itself. In contrast, it likewise seems to be self-evident that supernatural phenomena of the sort that accompany revelation fade away, in turn, in the same degree as the new development itself breaks away from its starting point in external appearance, has got organized and, in this way, has become nature.

(2) The situation is no different with prophecies, if someone should want to attribute to them a power greater than what has already been granted above. That is to say, suppose that we stick with prophecies among the Jewish prophets regarding Christ, just as in a later period Gentile prophecies were generally laid aside. Suppose, too, that at this point the prophecies of Christ and of the apostles could not be of primary interest, and that we would want to assign a stronger use of these prophetic utterances to the Jews themselves. Then we might very well imagine that a given Jew could have become a Christian precisely because this Jew attained to the insight that those prophecies are to be related to Jesus. Despite this insight, if perchance this Jew thought something quite different about the matter, in that he or she still did not entertain any need for redemption whatsoever, this Jew would not have had properly Christian faith and consequently true participation in Christian community. Suppose, in contrast, that these prophecies were generally held up to persons not of Christian faith, so as to effect in them the desire to enter into community with Christ. At that point, it might already have been agreed in advance that all of those prophecies are to be regarded as belonging in a single package and that all of them have one individual entity in view and, indeed, one and the same subject.27 This agreement might be made, for otherwise the supposed fulfillment of them all in one and the same person²⁸ would actually not be a fulfillment of them. Further, it might already have been agreed in advance that they all gained fulfillment in Christ and indeed each one as it was meant to be—not perchance the prophecies meant figuratively in a literal sense and those meant figuratively in a symbolic sense—for that would also not be a fulfillment. The matter always comes down to this: It is to be assumed that Jesus would be the Redeemer because the Redeemer would have been foretold in terms of defining properties that were actually to be found in him. Already presupposed in this assumption, however, is indeed a faith in the ones who prophesied as such, and it is impossible to conceive how a person not of faith who comes from outside Judaism should come to such a faith in this way, except inasmuch as the inspiration of those prophets would first have been proven to that person, a subject matter to be discussed just below. Without such a faith, the compilation of prophecies and their fulfillment would be a sheer memorandum, which could contain an inducement to seek community with Christ only for those in whom some need for redemption would already be present. Indeed, this would be the case only to the extent that the need expressed in the prophecies would be analogous to their own but, at the same time, what is prophesied would stand in a perceivable association with their need.29 That is, this association would apply only to the extent that each one could also have made the same prophecy regarding redemption out of one’s own need for it. However, the inducement could, nonetheless, only intend having the experience itself,³⁰ and faith would then occur only once this seeking had succeeded. Today, moreover, when deeds speak with such a vibrant voice, this inducement can, in any case, certainly be given far more strongly and surely in ways other than use of prophecies.

This latter point becomes abundantly clear when we consider how things actually stand, given the presuppositions that were set forth just above—namely, that it will never be possible to demonstrate that those ancient prophets had foreseen Christ exactly as he really was and the messianic reign even less as it has really developed in the form of Christianity. Once one realizes this point, one must concede that it is impossible to establish proof that Christ is the Redeemer based on these prophecies. In particular, moreover, the zeal for serving this purpose by seeking out prophecies or prototypes that might relate to incidental, secondary situations in the story of Christ must take on the appearance of mere blundering. Hence, one might very well have to distinguish between apologetic use of prophecies that the apostles made in their relationship to Jews and a general use that people wanted to make of them as means of proof. In contrast, when faith in the Redeemer is already present, we can dwell with great good pleasure on all expressions of a longing for redemption that has been awakened by earlier revelations that were in themselves insufficient. Furthermore, this is the actual significance—to be sure, also the fortifying and confirming significance—of the messianic prophecies, wherever they may be registered and in however dim a presentiment they may be shrouded: that they disclose to us a striving of human nature after Christianity. At the same time, moreover, when these prophecies are viewed as declaring the confession of the most advanced and inspired from among earlier religious communities, their significance lies in their being regarded as accouterments of those communities that are simply preliminary and transitory.

Now, suppose that the discussion is turned to prophecies in Christianity itself. In that regard, it is indeed natural that as a new mode of existence begins to unfold, people’s glance would be very much directed toward the future—that is, toward its consummation. The disciples’ questions can be understood in this way, questions to which answers could not entirely be denied them; and afterward they made further predictions of their own on the basis of these answers. However, Christ’s prophecies in these answers cannot, in any case, serve as proof of his wholly distinctive dignity or of his exclusive destiny as the Redeemer, because others besides Christ are recognized also to have prophesied, nevertheless, and even earlier than he did. It is likewise natural that the more the new order of salvation31 came to be established as a historical phenomenon, the more interest in the future would dwindle and prophecy fade away.

From all these considerations, it further follows that if faith in the revelation of God in Christ and in redemption through him had not already arisen on the originative path through experience, viewed as the demonstration of the Spirit and of power,³² neither miracles nor prophecies could have engendered it. Indeed, it also follows that this faith would be just as unshakable even if Christianity were to have neither miracles nor prophecies to show for it. This is so, for the lack of these things could never refute that demonstration of the Spirit and of power, and experience of need that is stilled in community with Christ would dispel any charge of illusion. Rather, from the lack of miracles and prophecies nothing would follow other than that those natural presuppositions just referred to would not always be corroborated. Rather, precisely the origination of the most complete formation of religious self-consciousness would have appeared more suddenly and would have borne an effect more strictly contained within its immediate domain.

(3) Finally, regarding inspiration, in Christianity this concept bears a thoroughly subordinate meaning. This is the case, for reference of the concept to Christ finds no place in Christianity at all, in that divine revelation through him, however it might be conceived, is always taken to be identical with his entire existence,³³ not as appearing in a fragmentary manner in scattered instances. What the Spirit gave to the apostles, however, Christ himself spoke of as derived entirely from his own instruction. Moreover, those who became persons of faith through the apostolic witness did not become so because this witness had arisen through inspiration, for they knew nothing of that. Hence, the concept relates only, on the one hand, to the prophets of the old covenant and, on the other hand, to how the holy Scripture of the New Testament was written.34 Thus, at this point we have to deal with the concept, moreover, only to the extent that people want to exact³⁵ faith in a demonstrable fashion by using Holy Scripture once they have come to assume that it is inspired. In contrast, as far as the Old Testament is concerned, prophecy recorded there is not to be understood of itself, apart from history and the law. Yet, taken as a whole, the Old Testament is so theocratic throughout that two consequences result. First, we can indeed distinguish two poles within it, of which the one pole draws us to the New Testament and the other pole repels us from it. Second, however, if, apart from the New Testament, making prophetic inspiration credible to a person were successful—which, however, could scarcely be accomplished other than by the prophets’ own testimony that the word of God had happened to them—nevertheless, no faith in Christ, viewed as the end of the law, could have developed on this basis alone. Much more accurately, we would speak the whole truth, in turn, only if we were to say that we have faith in prophetic inspiration only on account of what use Christ and the apostles made of the prophetic sayings.

As for the New Testament, however, faith had been communicated over the length of two centuries before any agreement was set forth as to its distinctive currency.³⁶ Moreover, in the meanwhile this communication of faith was not actually carried out, as did indeed happen, in such a way that faith would have been mediated everywhere by people’s having faith in the Old Testament.³⁷ Among the great mass of Gentiles who went over to Christianity without having been Judaized beforehand, this mediation was in no way the case. Even today, however, and provided that inspiration of the New Testament writings were provable by statements made within the writings themselves, this move would, nevertheless, presuppose the most nearly complete understanding of these writings possible. As a result, on the one hand, we would, nevertheless, need yet another way for faith to arise, because this understanding would be possible only for a few, and thus we would have a twofold faith. On the other hand, it would also remain ever difficult to realize how such an objective conviction could be an impetus38 exerted on self-consciousness in such a way that this assertion would instantly obtain some inner truth for anyone, based on the mere knowledge39 that those persons were inspired who asserted that human beings are in need of redemption and that Christ is their Redeemer. Instead, all that this sort of conviction can do, in any case, is give a nudge toward the awakening of a more filled-out self-consciousness and toward one’s acquiring a total impression from Christ,⁴⁰ and only once this process has occurred will faith then emerge.⁴¹

1. The words “faith in” (Glaube an) literally mean “faith directed toward.” This “inner experience” can come to be expressed as a “belief that” Jesus is the Redeemer, but that belief would be an outcropping from the root, not the root itself. Accordingly, this work of dogmatics (Glaubenslehre, doctrine regarding faith) critically articulates—as “description,” “presentation,” and “explanation”—what this inner shared faith means, according to particular “principles” held within the Evangelical church. In this respect, it produces “propositions,” with further explications, critiques, and arguments, but it does not seek to bind the roots themselves or presume to be the same thing. In this light, §14 is a prolepsis of, or prelude to, the entire system of doctrine, and it serves the same, limited purpose for the ethical half of dogmatics as well. Here, moreover, as through the entire system, the inner experience of Christian faith is a process, which begins not from inside but from outside. Faith is transmitted through others—proclaimed by word and deed. Consequently, it is a gift of God that occurs in and through community among persons of faith. Dogmatics, on the other hand, can set more or less firmly defined expectations for that transmission—in Schleiermacher’s view, leaving open considerable space for diverse exercise of “free discretionary power” (see the index for Brief Outline).

2. Ed. note: In OG 67, Schleiermacher indicates that even if he had reversed the present ordering of his system of doctrine, he would have started with the “doctrine of Scripture and the proper ground of faith.”

3. §5.4.

4. Gewiβheit. Ed. note: This word can mean “certainty,” but in Schleiermacher’s usage it refers to a relatively firm and sure feeling, stirring, or conviction, not to a bedrock cognitive certainty. Thus, it is always subject to further self-examination, renewal, and accruals of growth. It thereby is a firmly based, if ever developing, surety approaching that utter, unexceptionable “ease and constancy” just mentioned. It is closer to the certainty accompanying trust within a relationship than it is to the certainty accompanying cognitive knowledge.

5. Einwirkung. Ed. note: In contrast to the English word “influence” (literally, an “inflowing affect” on oneself from outside), in Schleiermacher’s usage Christ’s “operation-toward-and-within” cannot imply that it is a “mere” influence. Rather, it denotes a strong, irremovable cause-and-effect situation. In itself, this state, created in this way, would not be possible if it were thought to be necessarily admixed with other factors, even though other influences can be present on account of sin. This state, which he calls “faith,” is the working or effect (Wirkung) of what God does in Christ. In the language of tradition, Christ’s working is the sole ground, reason, basis, or foundation (Grund) of one’s being a Christian. “Inspiration” (Eingebung) also represents that process. “Inspiration” means marking of God’s Spirit, not human inspiration (Begeisterung), a term not used in CF. See §§3.4, 111.1, 128.2, and 130.1–2. See OR (1821) III, supplemental note 1. There he states: “The truth of Christ’s words [in saying, ‘You did not choose me, but I chose you,’ in John 15:16 RSV] rather lies chiefly in the fact that the inspiration originally existed in him alone. In them there was only the receptiveness to being awakened by him.” See also OR (1821) V, supplemental note 8.

6. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher cites Twesten, Vorlesungen (1829—cf. §13n2), 21, where he accurately takes Twesten to define faith as “the determination of our notions and cognitions that religious feeling immediately produces” (Thönes, 1873). To expand on his note: In general, for Twesten faith is indeed a kind of belief (Fürwahrhalten), one that is based on feeling. In Schleiermacher’s own usage, Fürwahrhalten tends not to be employed, for it can suggest outright belief, as if religious feeling would not be authentic, distinctive, or reliable unless it were strengthened and clarified by the activity of intellect (as it was for Twesten). This is not to deny either that the various aspects of Gemüth interact or that piety can be expressed in and filled out by both belief and action. See also On Religion, discourse II and its essential connection with discourses III–V in his describing the complete religious life.

7. §4.4.

8. Wesen.

9. Ahndung. Ed. note: Apparently Ahnung was intended here, for at that time Ahndung generally referred to a foreboding presentiment.

10. Ed. note: See §4, to which Schleiermacher has already referred in §14n7.

11. John 1:45–46 and 6:68–69; Matt. 16:15–18.

12. Ed. note: innere Erfahrung. Thus, the vollkommen innerlichen Tatsache (“completely internalized fact”) that that evocation produces, the “purely actual surety” of religious faith indicated in the previous paragraph, is a distinctly internal event although it has external components—two of which are singled out here as the continuing influence of Christ’s person and work. It is comprised of an interactive process undergone in relation to a community among persons of faith and with Christ.

13. Ed. note: wurden gläubig. Even though the same word (Gläubiger) is sometimes (perhaps mistakenly) translated “believers,” even in translation of Scripture, Schleiermacher plainly does not intend this meaning here. Thus, the translation is “person of faith” in this work. Faith, for him, is neither a rationally grounded belief nor a mere opinion; rather, its surety is based on an experience in relation to God that is first processed and held inside a person, then expressed and shared, in turn, both within and beyond a community of faith. Cf. §14n1 above.

14. Acts 2:37, 41. Ed. note: Sermon on Acts 2:41–42, June 10, 1821, Festpredigten (1826), SW II.2 (1834), 216–30.

15. Zeugnis. Ed. note: For Schleiermacher, Christian proclamation (Verkündigung) is always by word and/or deed, as Christ’s was, whether directly expressed as immediate testimony or example, or indirectly expressed. All preaching (predigen) is supposed to be such proclamation, but not all proclamation is done through preaching, not by far.

16. Darstellung.

17. Ed. note: The direct reference is to an anodyne for assuaging pain. It seems also to allude to The Consolation of Philosophy, written during a period of great duress in prison and the best known of many works by the Roman philosopher Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (ca. 480–525). Like Schleiermacher, Boethius was a well-versed, prolific translator of Greek philosophy—into Latin in his case—especially Aristotle’s Oraganon and several of his works on logic. A Neoplatonic thinker, Boethius included an account of the apparent incompatibility of God’s foreknowledge and human free will among the themes of his Consolation. Overall, Boethius’s translations and commentaries on Porphery’s (ca. 232–304) Isagoge and on works attributed to Aristotle bore a marked influence on philosophy and theology in the medieval Latin West, particularly on its terminology.

18. Ed. note: The only word Schleiermacher could use here is glauben, at this point meaning to believe or hold a belief.

19. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher seems to be alluding, for example, to definitions of “God” that use no such comparative measure but refer to qualities in God “greater than which there is no other.” Such language, he is claiming, can offer no proof, notably, of God’s omnipotence, but refer only to God’s incommensurability, by definition. Thus, it cannot prove anything of importance by reference to “miracle,” “prophecy,” or “inspiration” either (see §14.P.S.).

20. Acts 6:9–10 and 9:20–22; also 18:27–28.

21. Ed. note: Cf. §27.3.

22. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here states: “Nitzsch and Twesten also present miracles only as an aid to proof of the Spirit and of its power” (Thönes, 1873). To trace Schleiermacher’s account of miracles, see §§34.2, 47.1, 76.2, 93.3, 99.2, 103.1, 103.4, 108.5, 117.2, 123.2, 124.3, and 130.4. In OG 61 he refers to stories about miracles as belonging to “fable” and states that they cannot retain any status as a subject for faith-doctrine much longer. See also OR (1821) II, supplemental note 16, for his further explanation of the miraculous character of every natural event.

23. Ed. note: Also particularly noteworthy in the present context is that God’s grace is always deemed to be temporally prior. Thus, temporally speaking, consciousness of “the need for redemption” is at best second, as Schleiermacher indicates repeatedly (cf. esp. §§62–64, which introduce Part Two). Hence, in this book Schleiermacher begins Part Two with sin, because sin points to a state of being in need of redemption that predates one’s being conscious of God’s grace in Christ, if only in an infinitesimally small fashion, as he says here, and only then, and to that extent, does one come to have an actual consciousness of being in need of redemption. Therefore, if the two features of Christians’ faith and life mentioned here—namely, sin and grace in “contrast” to each other—are to be regarded as phases, they are so in reverse order: consciousness of grace and consciousness of sin comprise the conversion process (cf. §108), then the two continue as intermingled thereafter. It has indeed proved to be misleading to have the introduction to Part Two and the doctrine of sin in volume 1, a decision with which Schleiermacher appears to have concurred only so as to make the two volumes more nearly equal in size.

Likewise, the monotheistically oriented “faith in God or directed toward God” presented in Part One is taken to be only conceptually prior for Christians—i.e., “presupposed”—though some Christians, like early Jewish converts, may have started out holding monotheistic beliefs of some other kind. Hence, Schleiermacher does not conceive Part One to be a natural theology of any kind, i.e., a phase of theology different from what is, in terms of God’s decisive activity, supernaturally grounded.

24. Ed. note: Here the word betrachtende does service for all levels of observation, directly correlated to the various kinds, levels, or degrees of self-consciousness. These range from the most strictly sensory operations of mind to the purest states of contemplation, including any organic admixtures that may arise in between. Likewise, in Schleiermacher’s frequent use of the verb betrachten and the noun Betrachtung in his sermons, only the context can reveal what shorter range is meant within this scale. Often his religious discourse stems from, and invites, the more nearly supreme levels of contemplation.

25. Dasein.

26. Ed. note: aus dem früherem Sein.

27. Subjekt. Ed. note: In general, and particularly in Schleiermacher’s usage, this term refers to a person, not to some subject matter, and, for him, ordinarily but not necessarily an individual person, though he does also refer occasionally to a social entity as a Person—as some of those prophecies might seem to do.

28. Person.

29. In this sense, the prophecy quoted in Matt. 12:19–20 is perhaps the most fraught with meaning. Ed. note: The quote in Matt. 12 is from a “servant” passage, Isa. 42:3–4.

30. John 1:41, 46.

31. Heilsordnung. Ed. note: That is, God’s arranging the means and conditions for accomplishment of salvation, notably in the form of redemption and reconciliation (§§100–101), but also more broadly in view of God’s “one eternal divine decree” (cf. §§117–20, also his 1819 essay On the Doctrine of Election, ET Nicol and Jorgenson, 2009).

32. Ed. note: “The demonstration [Beweis, or “proof “] … power” is a direct quote from 1 Cor. 2:4.

33. Existenz. Ed. note: Whereas Dasein is the term used for “existence” (literally, being-there), earlier in the Introduction (cf. §13n4, n6, and n15), as elsewhere here. Existenz is the term used for Christ’s entire existence (his “being-there” in its entirety). Schleiermacher takes Christ, and also Christianity as well, to be a new existence in this second sense. The phrase that follows, “not as appearing … in scattered instances,” is of key importance, not to be hurriedly passed over. In his Christology, Schleiermacher views the entire “life of Jesus” and what he must accomplish in this light.

34. Ed. note: On the New Testament canon, see CF index and OG 66f., also BO index.

35. Ed. note: “Exact” translates erzwingen, a meaning in currency at the time and still used to convey situations such as exacting a confessional agreement and the like. All the word’s meanings contain an image of forcible action: In this case, Schleiermacher is describing a position that he opposed, wherein it is assumed that if certain conditions are met, listed here, faith should follow from one’s demonstrating those conditions, as if this “faith” were rational assent, or belief.

36. Gültigkeit. Ed. note: That is, as an agreed-upon set of writings that would have general currency for the churches represented in the decision making. This observation is not to exclude authoritative, canonical validity (another, stricter sense of Gültigkeit) for versions of certain writings here or there. In Schleiermacher’s view, establishment of the “canon” (i.e., the exact and properly authoritative) text and shape of the New Testament writings is still ongoing through critical work both historical and philological, already taking now-familiar shape during his own lifetime. See Brief Outline, where he singles out this particular task as one for a relatively “higher” criticism (§§110–24).

37. Ed. note: Writing in response to Karl Heinrich Sack’s monograph Von Worte Gottes: Eine christliche Verständigung (1825), in a letter of April 9, 1825, to Sack, Schleiermacher said the following in dissent: “Of necessity, however, faith could not have arisen from Scripture, because no faith would have existed over the span of two centuries on that basis, and because as a result, faith could also have arisen over and over again without Scripture.” He continued: “Text set down in pen and ink is too inessential. In and of itself, Scripture is nothing, but it is something continually present for people to view, as in a painting of Christ, who bears witness to himself in Scripture as he does orally, and his witness is true.” (Cf. Rev. 22:6.) Dilthey, Aus Schleiermacher’s Leben, 334.

Schleiermacher then mentioned a point in Braniss’s critique of Christian Faith in a book (Über Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre, 1824) to which Sack had referred. Schleiermacher had not yet carefully read the book, but he intended to do so. The point affirms something “objective” versus merely “being affected” (Affection). His response was “If being affected were a dream …, it could have no objective truth. Actually, however, being affected refers precisely to the impact [Wirkung] upon us of what is divine in Christ, and indeed what is objective. The word spoken in John 1:14, ‘We have seen his glory,’ etc., is the kernel of all dogma, and this word presents itself from nothing other than the state of being affected that is transmitted in the discourse. Indeed, even what Christ said regarding himself would not have become Christian truth if it had not forthwith proved itself to be so through this being affected by him. Thus, for me this being affected is what is originative in Christianity. All else is simply derived from it and remains so.”

Affekt and Affection have had a range of meanings in German usage. Schleiermacher rarely uses these words, or other forms of their root, replacing them instead with Gefühl (feeling). When he uses Affekt it refers to a sensory impact. Like the English word with the same spelling, Affection can convey a fondness for or attachment to another on account of certain qualities—a feeling no doubt included in people’s response to Jesus as their Redeemer. Here it is taken to refer predominately to an overall feeling (i.e., affective state) prominent in the first disciples’ encounter with Christ, eventually passed down to others through the ages. In this continuing encounter, people are affected by Christ’s impetus within and thus his presence with them. In faith, they feel that impetus, registered as an impulse within them, and thereby they sense his presence with them in and through Christ’s community of faith.

38. Impuls. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s psychological understanding, an Impuls (impetus from without or impulse registered within) arises within a person, whatever external components might impact that process from without. Thus, any process of being convinced that is strictly objective, as in a demonstrative argument or attempt to prove that is, by definition, directed solely to intellect, would produce only a reasoned agreement, thus an “objective conviction.” In contrast, the impetus that engenders an impulse in self-consciousness, as he has emphasized in his introductory presentation thus far, is “faith,” not “belief “ (cf. §13.P.S.n26). The outcome that is belief requires a pure process of reasoning, one not alloyed with or swayable by nonrational factors. The source that impacts faith is clearly external and in that sense implies an originating objective reality (here God in Christ, viewed as the historical existence named Jesus), but it is not strictly the objective process called a “proof.”

39. Erkenntnis. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, Erkenntnis is the strongest cognitive result one can have. He regularly uses other words for other gradations, e.g., Kenntnis and Kennen for information, mere cognition, or acquaintance with (vs. knowing that it is the case that), Erkennen (any process of cognition), and Wissen (a knowing, or moving toward a more nearly exact, consummate knowledge). Wissenschaft, or “science,” is defined as that last process in his writings and lectures on “dialectic.” There are many other gradations of consciousness (Bewußtsein) besides these.

40. Totaleindruck. Ed. note: Some ambiguity may well lie in this word, which refers to an overall immediate impression, not to the fullest possible impression. Even the disciples would not have received the latter totality, yet others’ impressions from and of Christ that were acquired from much less direct contact with him were sufficient for faith. “Total” is retained here, however, because in the present discussion Schleiermacher has attempted to obviate one’s trying to draw one’s faith from fragmentary instances. Rather, one seeks a broader, overall impression from (von) and of or regarding (von) him. (On reason and the divine Spirit, cf. §13n25, n26, and §13.P.S.).

41. Ed. note: This section (§11–§14), borrowed from the apologetic aspect of philosophical theology, is itself quite systematically interwoven. In particular, §14.P.S. carries forward the examination of these concepts—miracle, prophecy, and inspiration—already introduced in §13. Together, the four propositions serve not only to define and place Christianity in comparison with all other religions but also seek to clear out much excess baggage and, if carefully examined, can provide an outlined anticipation, or prolepsis, for the entire system of actual doctrine. The discussion of even these three only partially serviceable concepts here is far from finished, however (see also Brief Outline §45 for reference to all three). The elaborate treatment of miracle, which sets the stage for consideration of “prophecy” and “inspiration,” can be fruitfully traced from §§13–14, through esp.§34.2–3, the whole of §47, then §§76.2, 93.3, 99.2, 103.1 and 4, 108.5, 117.2, 123.2, 124.3, and 130.4. His view that miracles cannot be accurately conceived as “absolutely supernatural,” isolated events bears significant ramifications throughout, as do his eventually articulated views that in one sense every natural event is a miracle and, in the sense of the supernatural’s breaking into the natural order and becoming natural, that Jesus’ becoming the Redeemer and establishing the new, redeeming reign of God in humanity is the only true miracle.

This entire account is meant to show that “the basis of faith must be for us the same as for the first Christians” (§128.2)—namely, not by any rational, demonstrated proof but by experiencing the immediate indwelling power of Christ himself through the proclamation, by word and deed, of “Christ’s own word” (§108.5). Prophecy, in the predictive sense, is consistently treated in the same way, even in the domain of Christianity. (Above, see §13n11, n12, n20, and n21, certain anticipations of a presentation regarding Christ’s roles in the “new creation,” later treated in §§102–5 as Christ’s three offices, analogous to those of prophet, high priest, and king among the ancient Jews; see also §§159–63 on “prophetic doctrine” and BO §§45–46.) Certain claims of “inspiration” are likewise treated consistently in the same way, this in relation not only to Scripture (cf. §§127–32, esp. §130.3–4, and also Brief Outline §134) but also in relation to everything else that is authentically Christian. In order fully to grasp Schleiermacher’s understanding of this concept, however, one cannot stop short of realizing what he meant by divine “revelation” (only tangentially referred to in §14), why he conjoined the doctrine of election to aspects of his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, what constitutes the basis of his ecclesiology, which presents still further aspects of that doctrine throughout, and how he conceived “the divine government of the world” by what he calls “the divine Spirit.”