Fourth Point of Doctrine
	God Is Omniscient

§55. Divine “omniscience” is to be understood as the absolute spirituality of divine omnipotence.

1. This definition is entirely commensurate with the way in which we arrived at the concept “omniscience” above.1 Yet, it is, nevertheless, still to be especially prefaced that wherever it is used in the present work, the main purpose of this concept points in the following direction: namely, that divine causality would be thought of as absolutely “living,” far more than that a similarity between God and what we designate as “spirit” in the being afforded us would be established in some distinct fashion. Divine causality, viewed as absolutely living, is an essential property of the concept omniscience,² if the feeling of absolute dependence, or piety, is to be considered veracious and genuine. That is to say, a lifeless and blind necessity would not, in fact, be something with which we could stand in relation. Moreover, such a necessity, if viewed to be equal in extent to all finite causality but also to exist over against the whole of finite causality, would actually mean simply to posit the latter alone. Thus, it would also mean to declare a feeling of absolute dependence to be something fictitious, because as self-causal beings we are indeed not absolutely dependent on finite causality.

In contrast, to desire to define similarity between God and what is spiritual within finite being is a task surely to be accompanied only by an unending approximation.³ This is the case, in that unavoidably, on account of the admixture, be it only unconsciously, of receptivity and passivity⁴ in every such term—which admixture is ever-present to some degree in this context—we do coposit something, which, in turn, will have to be supplanted by yet another term.

Now, suppose at this point—where we are reflecting on the feeling of absolute dependence only in accordance with its nature and thus also have to do with divine causality only in accordance with its own nature—that spirituality is designated by the function of knowing. Then, accordingly, our first canon⁵ must be to exclude everything from the spirituality of God’s nature that would necessarily contain in itself any receptivity or passivity.⁶ Thus, God’s will may no more be thought of as a capacity for desire than God’s omniscience may be thought of as a becoming aware or an experiencing, a coming to think alike or coming to see alike.7

Again, consider the following: We are acquainted with no knowing other than that wherein self-initiated activity and receptivity are comingled,⁸ except that this happens in differing degrees, in each case in accordance with how much one of the two capacities predominates, so that we distinguish between something more formative within ourselves and something more received from outside ourselves. Also consider, more importantly, that the largest portion of our thinking presupposes being as its object and refers comparatively little to what we ourselves generate within being—that is, we distinguish between, first, the intentional activity of thinking, after which activity a generating activity follows, and, second, the reflective activity that refers to something already present to us. Given these considerations, however, this last distinction, above all, is not applicable to God at all,⁹ because for God no objects of reflection exist unless they continue to exist by God’s will; rather, all divine knowing¹⁰ is simply knowing concerning what is willed and generated by God, not a knowing to which any object could be given from some other source.¹¹ Indeed, since for God there can be no succession from willing to generation, so too one can never say that God’s intentionally formative activity of thought precedes God’s activity of willing.12 Moreover, in consequence of the above considerations, in God a distinction cannot take place even between resolving and executing what is being resolved—by virtue of which distinction purposive concepts themselves remain merely ideal for us, either entirely or partially. This claim about God is so, in that otherwise God’s omnipotence would not fully present itself in finite being.¹³ In contrast, just as little may anything be somehow attached to God’s thinking with the aim that its object would become genuinely real: neither any sort of activities that are more analogous to bodily activities nor anything material.¹⁴ Thus, God’s thinking is entirely the same as God’s willing, and omnipotence and omniscience are of one sort. Further, it is a given that no discrepancy between word and thought is to be found in God—indeed, the very expression “word” can mean simply the effective action of thought directed outward. Accordingly, precisely the statement just made about God’s thinking and willing being the same and about omnipotence and omniscience being of one sort is pronounced in all formulations of this matter that present God’s word as itself creating and preserving. Moreover, as has also been said in multiple ways, it is completely correct to aver that everything exists by God’s speaking or thinking it.¹⁵

Now, in the way just shown, God’s knowing is recognized to be identical with God’s very productivity, viewed as both creating and preserving.16 Accordingly, it follows, first of all, that it is this wholly the same divine knowing which constitutes God’s omniscience and God’s wisdom.¹⁷ If these two attributes were split off from each other, then something from our own being would be transferred to God. Even if one were to posit that this something is also infinite, it could, nevertheless, connote an imperfection in God.¹⁸ This is the case, for since the tiniest portion in the being that surrounds us issues from our own activity, admittedly any cognition¹⁹ we might have regarding our own activity that would be independent of our actual influence on things might, to be sure, be something good and perfect in our view.

Suppose, however, that in thought we were to bracket out the domain of our forming and bringing forth, however diminutive it might be, in and of itself. Accordingly, it would always bear evidence of some flaw²⁰ if subsequent knowledge held by a given artist regarding the totality of the artist’s works were to contain something other than what was in the artist’s plan.²¹ This would be so, whether it were the prototype or the figurative activity that was flawed, or whether the domain in which it was composed were not so self-contained that nothing alien could have gained any influence on the artist’s works.

Now, however, the world, being viewed as the entire body of God’s process of forming and bringing forth, is so self-contained that nothing exists outside it that could gain any influence on it. Thus, in accordance with their content, any distinguishing between God’s wisdom and omniscience would have to presuppose some flaw in God. Yet, even in accordance with their form, a distinction between the two attributes could hardly be granted. This is the case, for two reasons. First, neither of the two can have more of an internal origin and the other more of an external origin, and, second, neither of the two can be more closely tied to God’s willing and the other less so. Rather, if God’s omniscience is already nothing other than the absolute living character22 of God’s omnipotence, this is just as true of God’s wisdom, if it is, nonetheless, to be the whole body of what God intends.

Hence, it could only be a particular mode of reflection for the sake of which wisdom would still be posited as a particular attribute of God. To what extent this would be so will be discussed elsewhere.²³ At this point, however, it also follows, further, that finite being must be just as completely encompassed in God’s knowing as in God’s omnipotence and that God’s knowing also presents itself just as entirely within finite being as does God’s omnipotence. This happens in such a way that when these two attributes are placed side by side, nothing remains in God’s knowing for which there is not something corresponding to it in finite being or which would stand in some other relationship to being. As a result, God’s omnipotence would already have to be presupposed so that God’s knowing could be posited. Or, to put the matter briefly: God knows everything that exists, and everything that God knows exists, and these two claims are of one sort, not of two sorts, because God’s knowing and God’s omnipotent willing are one and the same.

2.²⁴ Now, further definitions concerning God’s omniscience, mostly advanced later on, must be adjudged in accordance with what has been said thus far. Regarding these definitions it is, to be sure, possible to say, in general, that they transfer to God human activities conceived in such a way that they already contain imperfection within themselves, the result being that the imperfection is in no way eliminated by a procedure of limitation. Now, this procedure pertains, first and foremost, when perception, memory, and prescience are distinguished in God’s knowing about being.²⁵ At that point, moreover, God’s omniscience, viewed as the very most complete knowledge of things, would be assembled from these three factors.26 This would be the case, first, since the same thing that is present now is past hereafter, just as it was future previously. Thus, in God either these three kinds of knowledge would have to be simultaneous, even as regards the same object, but at that point the distinctions would have to be entirely neutralized in their simultaneity; or, if they were to remain different, nevertheless, and be apart from each other, then the three kinds of knowledge would have to fall into successive order in God too every time the things known would pass over from the future into the past, whereby a difference would be brought into divine knowing—contrary to the canon that there is no change in God.²⁷

Now, suppose the following. First, suppose that we simply say—just as we have already frequently sought to present what is divine by summarily examining contrasts to show that what is divine is placed above and beyond all contrasts—that perfect knowing concerning the being-in-and-of-itself of a given thing would be the same as knowing concerning the inner law of its development. Second, suppose, too, that perfect knowing concerning the placement of a given thing within the domain of the general interactive flux of things would be of one sort with knowing regarding the influence of all other things on this thing. Third, suppose, however, that in God both modes of perfect knowing would be one and the same knowing, which is nontemporally defining²⁸ the being of each object, whereas, for us the two modes, because they are flawed, would hence also become a differentiated, temporally bound knowing, and this would be true because our knowing does not define the being of things but is defined by the being of things instead. In taking that route we have at least an indication of how we might avoid, as much as possible, that excessive tendency to anthropomorphize God’s knowing.29

Now, it brings no improvement to contrive a division between divine knowing that is free or perspicuous³⁰ and some necessary knowing or pure thinking.³¹ This is the case, for the first member of the contrast embraces all three modes of knowing just considered, whereas the second member embraces divine knowing, which is supposed to have both God and all that is possible as its object.³² Here it must strike anyone as irksomely peculiar to hear that both God’s knowing about Godself and God’s knowing about all that is merely possible would be embraced under a single name. That is to say, whether by “possible” one were thinking only of what would never become real or even of what would come into existence but quite apart from whether it is real, God would always remain the most veritable and most original of all, whereas what is merely possible would be the most shadow-like and most inconsequential of all. As a result, to hold to such a combination would come close to presupposing that God would also know about Godself only through some abstract, shadow-like notion.³³ Consequently, in addition one would have to assume a divine self-consciousness that is inherent in perspicacious knowledge and similar to it. Perspicacious knowledge in God would be the living consciousness of God in God’s efficacious action, but God’s self-consciousness would be a quiescent and, as it were, passive consciousness of God’s being.34 However, by common consent, all would claim that God’s being and God’s attributes, consequently even the active ones, would be one and the same. Thus, this differentiation too, consequently this latter aspect of pure thinking in God as well, would come to nothing. Furthermore, suppose that the one designation were also to appear to be formed very much as, among us, the indefinite notion of something merely possible has to have an immediate sense-impression attached to it if that notion is to pass over into consciousness of an object, viewed as something real. Then suppose that, in any case, perspicacious knowledge would be richer in content than pure thinking, since some being would, nevertheless, correspond to perspicacious knowledge, but not to pure thinking. Finally, suppose that finite being does, nonetheless, depend on God’s thinking. Then the following question is not to be dismissed, namely: Why would God, who must surely will to place the maximum of knowledge within Godself, know only a certain kind of possibility—namely, a possibility, eventuating in perspicacious knowledge, whenever that possibility is somehow coming to be real—and not all possibilities? Moreover, if one would not want to resort to sheer arbitrariness—which in thinking would, nevertheless, also unexceptionably be a flaw, and consequently would be a self-diminution of God—there can hardly be any answer to this question other than this: that there is a certain possibility that, nevertheless, would lack in the possibility of coexisting with the rest. That kind of possibility, however, the being of which would conflict with the being of all the rest, is also contradictory within itself. Thus, no divine knowing of it could exist, even in accordance with the traditional explanation of God’s omniscience handed down to us. This is the case, because what is self-contradictory is not a thing nor is it knowable.

Suppose, however, that we reflect on the subject more from the view-point of the other designation, considering that perspicuous knowledge is the free kind and that the other kind is necessary knowledge. Then, because the free kind is different from the necessary kind, God would be placed under this contrast. Moreover, necessity, by virtue of which something nonfree would exist in God, would not be something within God, otherwise necessity would be God’s very freedom. Rather, it would be something outside and over God, which would be in conflict with the concept of God as Supreme Being.

Now, based on what we have considered thus far, it would be very easy to conclude what is to be held regarding the so-called intermediate knowledge35 of God. By virtue of that knowledge God is supposed to know precisely what would have resulted if something had happened that did not happen. Intermediate knowledge entirely rests on the presupposition of something being possible outside what is real, a presupposition that we have already put aside. Accordingly, as soon as we then express this presupposition in such a way that God would know what would have followed if, at any point or other, something impossible would really have come into being, then this whole kind of knowledge would dissolve into nothing. This would be so, because what would rest only on the becoming real of what is impossible would itself be impossible. Suppose, however, that, quite apart from this finding, it were also the case that, in general terms, for God too, something would be possible outside what is real and thus it would follow that at every point there would also be an infinite number of possibilities. Suppose, as well, that since each point would be codetermining for all the rest. Then, in every case a different world would arise from each point.

Given this result, the infinite-times-infinite many worlds would be forming, infinitely often, so that the real world would be lost within them, viewed as infinitesimally small. If one considers that necessary knowledge would already, in and of itself, contain an infinite quantity of worlds that are originally different from the real world, worlds for each of which there is likewise an intermediate knowledge just as abundant as that which relates to the real world, all these worlds would thus be the object of this intermediate knowledge, which would itself still be multiplied into infinity. Thus, measured in this way, in God’s omniscience itself the works of God’s omnipotence would appear to be something infinitesimally small in comparison with what the latter does not bring into reality. Consequently, in God there would appear to be, eternally and imperishably, a mass of rejected thoughts. Moreover, if we assume God’s intermediate knowledge, then the human artist’s imperfection—because the human artist’s formative capacity is something fluctuating and unsure, and in various ways, the artist thinks out particular parts of the artist’s work differently than the artist forms them later on—would be transferred over to God, viewed as something infinite thus freed from all limitation.

Considered in and of itself, this entire apparatus of rejected thoughts is simply a knowledge of nothing. It could obtain a meaning, moreover, only if one could assume that God too decides and brings forth by choice and deliberation, a position to which, from of old, every doctrine that is at all consistent has, however, declared itself to be opposed.36 Hence, were someone still to proceed based on human behavior, it would have been far safer to transfer over to God the surety of the consummate artist, albeit complete and shorn of limitation. Such an artist, in a state of inspired discovery, would think of nothing else, nor would anything else be offered, than what this artist is actually bringing forth. This procedure also comports very well with the ancient story of creation, which recognizes nothing of any intervening deliberation and decisive choice, rather putting off reflection entirely to the story’s end. There it comes out simply as absolute approval,³⁷ without ascribing to God any reflection regarding anything he did not do or any comparison of the real world with those so-called possible worlds.

Suppose, however, that special attention is drawn to the edifying and reassuring effect contained in that notion of such an intermediate knowledge held by God.³⁸ Essentially, what that claim would, in fact, lead to is the following. If, given the lack of pleasure over dashed expectations, we elevate ourselves to the level of religious consciousness, we would be obliged to think that our wishes too would have been in the thought of God but among those rejected. Yet, truly religious surrender would surely not require that God would have had our foolish thoughts as God’s own. Rather, such surrender would be satisfied to see, based on the ensuing result, that what we had planned was not included in that aforementioned original, or rather eternal, approval uttered by God.

However, the name “intermediate knowledge”—a name that can only refer to what the other two forms of knowledge are named—does, nevertheless, still call forth some special consideration. If that knowledge were simply to refer to an intermediate knowledge between necessary and free knowledge, then God would be more constrained, as it were, in thinking out what is possible from a given point than in thinking out what is real, despite the latter activity’s presenting, nonetheless, the largest constraint of all—namely, the whole interconnected process of nature. Alternatively, suppose, nonetheless, that God’s free knowledge were, at the same time, God’s bringing-forth kind of knowledge. Then, through God’s intermediate knowledge, a transition would be provided from productivity to the idle, ineffectual activity of pure thinking. Thus, God’s intermediate knowledge, viewed as a diminishing process of bringing-forth, would be, as it were, God’s preservation and cooperation. These divine activities would themselves be self-restrained in all directions, just as, within us, the ever-vivid and ever-moving notion of what is real actually shades off into the also still vividly colored notion of what is probable. This notion regarding what is probable moves us by hope and by fear. Thereafter it loses itself in indiscriminate, shadowy images of what is merely possible.

However, it is surely reasonable for one to hold back from transferring such notions from ourselves to God. Yet, if this kind of knowledge is to be that which is intermediate between perspicuous knowledge and pure thought, and if, thus positioned, it is to mediate the transition from the free to the necessary kind of knowledge in God, which transition is not to be imagined without some diminution of God’s living activity,39 then, here too, the final result that arises from these considerations is this: that what is possible outside what is real cannot be an object of God’s cognitive activity.

3. Now, suppose that someone adds to this result the claim that undeniably God’s cognitive activity includes at least a strong semblance of having such an object, as if, on the one hand, a twofold self-consciousness should also be attributed to God—an original self-consciousness and a reflective self-consciousness⁴⁰—and, on the other hand, as if a knowing of isolated bits and pieces were to be presupposed in God. If this were true, then the result would be that the previously prevailing theory regarding these divine attributes would transfer all the lack of completeness to be found in our consciousness over to Supreme Being.

The first mistake, attributing the semblance of a twofold self-consciousness to God, springs from the following supposition. That supposition holds, first, that God’s entire knowing concerning Godself, which is taken to be of the same sort as God’s knowing concerning all that is possible, can be thought of only as an objective knowing, since it would then also remain entirely separate from God’s activity, and indeed it can be thought of only after the manner of our own most abstract knowing. Second, however, the supposition holds that, as such, reflective knowing cannot possibly be the only kind; rather, an original knowing would then necessarily attend it.41 Indeed, this original knowing did not emerge from scholastic language directly, but it did emerge indirectly, nevertheless, and it was everywhere presupposed, specifically where stirrings of an affective kind⁴² attributed to God in popular religious communication of a rhetorical and poetic sort are treated for dogmatic purposes. In those instances, Supreme Being’s being similarly affected⁴³ is all too easily slipped in, one that is destructive of the basic relationship that belongs to absolute dependence.

As for the second mistake, such a being-stirred on God’s part also pre-supposes in every case the other lack of completeness pointed out here, one that remains to be tested for ourselves: namely, the isolated knowing of bits and pieces in God. The following considerations lay out this task. First, we notice that only the working of a distinct element in our lives by which we feel ourselves to be evoked serves to arouse affect and serves in such a way that something has to occur in relation to that element. Second, as a result, to obtain a proper theory regarding this transaction between God and other being, nothing remains to be added but the formulation that God relates to the object involved in an eternal and omnipresent fashion, whereas in us any stirring of affect relates to a transitory impression. Third, at that juncture no further factor would have to be brought into account—neither the contrast we have been examining between an original and a reflective self-consciousness in God, nor between God’s self-consciousness itself in any contrast with objective consciousness. Fourth, the formulation already set forth above⁴⁴ serves to avoid the latter contrast, whereas the other claim—namely, regarding God’s knowing isolated bits and pieces—is still peculiarly hidden in treatments of the question as to whether even what some might take to be negligible would be an object of divine knowing. That is to say, this question could not have been raised if one had proceeded based on the already given formulation that just as God knows every single thing within the whole, so too God knows the whole in every single thing—a formulation that fully abolishes the contrast between great and small and that is, nonetheless, justified solely by the idea of a stable interconnected process of nature. This understanding, however, already follows from taking the customary path of limitation, for we do indeed also take a human consciousness to be all the more complete the more comes to be present to it in each instance.

In addition, this understanding offers a further occasion to consider, from the point of view of this divine attribute, a matter that is actually to be viewed as already covered45—namely, whether God’s knowing concerning the free actions of human beings can exist alongside this freedom. Surely, most commentators—perhaps even the Socinians—would have felt ashamed to answer this question in the negative, indeed even simply to raise it, if they had taken into account that at that point not only could there be no further discussion regarding any eternal divine decree concerning redemption but also that, from that point on, in every instance history would be something that God would experience only gradually and, in consequence, the concept of providence would have to be wholly given up.⁴⁶

Now, suppose that the stimulus for answering the question in the negative, as well as the need to raise it, were grounded in the interest of preserving human freedom. Then one would have to take into consideration that people’s foreknowledge regarding their own free actions and their foreknowledge of others’ free actions would be still more destructive of human freedom than God’s foreknowledge would be. Also suppose, nevertheless, that we regard a person to be precisely the least free who is not even in general able to have foreknowledge of the person’s own actions—that is, the person is not conscious of taking any distinct course of action. Such persons, however, are in this state, wherein any special foreknowledge is missing, only because foreknowledge is missing regarding pertinent external conditions and regarding the especially pertinent internal conditions that are brought forth by what is external. Suppose, furthermore, that we likewise gauge the exact closeness of relationship two persons have in terms of the foreknowledge each has regarding each other’s actions, without believing that either one’s freedom is endangered by either one. If all these conditions are met regarding God’s relationship to the world, then God’s foreknowledge could not endanger any freedom.

1. §51.2. Ed. note: Clemen aptly corrected this reference from §50.2. Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “In practical and popular discourse, similarity with what is human dominates overall. In the present context, the main content is this: that God has no need to experience some one thing in particular [etwas]” (Thönes, 1873).

2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “This analogy has the following against it, that for didactic use the main protest against it [Hauptprotestation] lies in its employing the contrast between spontaneity [Spontaneität] and receptivity [Rezeptivität]” (Thönes, 1873).

3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here states: “Perhaps this claim goes too far. Surely, it is correct only inasmuch as something remains, over and over, to be eliminated” (Thönes, 1873). That is, something within the admixture mentioned here.

4. Empfänglichkeit und Leidentlichkeit.

5. Kanon. Ed. note: Cf. §54n38.

6. Ed. note: That is, God’s “spirituality” or spiritual nature (Geistigkeit), thus reflected on or contemplated, would not necessarily bear any “receptivity or passivity” (Empfänglichkeit oder Leidentlichkeit) in it.

7. Ed. note: ein Vernehmen oder Erfahren, ein Zusammendenken oder Zusammenschauen. All of these verbal nouns refer to a process of change within a person’s mind, in the last two characteristics mentioned a process undergone with one or more other persons.

8. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here: “No contrast applies between something self-formative from within a priori and something that comes from without a posteriori, between intentional formation [Zweckbildung] and reflection [Betrachtung]” (Thönes, 1873). Betrachtung refers to observing, reflective, and contemplative activity— here all at once.

9. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates here: “With reference to the claim that nothing is something that should first come into being only by God, we can simply say that God’s knowing [Wissen] is [identical with] God’s productivity [Produktivität] but never with what is generated—or even in a roundabout fashion [wie umstehend]” (Thönes, 1873). Grimm indicates that this usage of umstehend had, at that time, umschweifend (“using circumlocution” or “digressively”) as a close synonym.

10. Ed. note: Wissen (knowing). In Schleiermacher’s usage, the verb wissen always indicates an active process, whereas Erkennen refers to “cognition” and Erkenntnis alone refers to “knowledge,” viewed as a product of this knowing and cognition. Of course, for him any of these three things can be expected to be faulty or in error, thus capable of either change or improvement. See his Brief Outline and his Dialectic, passim.

11. (1) John Calvin (1509–1564) holds this view in Institutes (1559) 3.23.6: “Since he foresees future events only by reason of the fact that they take place, they vainly raise a quarrel over foreknowledge, when it is clear that all things take place rather by his determination and bidding.” Here only the “fore” is somewhat awkward. (2) Hence a better formulation is that of John Scotus Erigena (ca. 810–ca. 877), in De praedestinatione (851): “Therefore he sees the things that he willed to do, and he does not see anything but those that he did.” Ed. note: (1) ET Battles (1960), 954f.; Latin: Opera selecta 4 (1959), 401, CR 30:704. (2) ET Kienzles; Latin: cf. Migne Lat. 122:347ff. Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “In using the verb videre (to see) one must be thinking first and foremost of some inner seeing [Sehen]” (Thönes, 1873).

12. Erigena, John Scotus (ca. 810–ca. 877), De praedestinatione (851): “For in God vision [visio] does not precede work [operatio], because work is coeternal with vision [visioni operatio].” Ed. note: ET Kienzles; Latin: cf. CR 122:347ff.

Schleiermacher’s marginal note directly adds: “Nor, however, does work precede vision [operatio visionem]” (Thönes, 1873).

13. Cf. §54.2.

14. Cf. Anselm, Monologion (1076) 11: “The creating substance’s inward [internal] utterance of the work he is going to make differs from that of the craftsman in this respect: the Creator’s utterance was not collected from or assisted by some other source; rather, as the first and sole cause it was sufficient for its Artisan to bring his work to completion.” Ed. note: ET Williams (1996), 24; English and Latin: Hopkins (1986), 88–89; Latin only: Migne Lat. 158:159f.

15. (1) Hilary of Poitiers (ca. 315–367), in Psalms 118, sec. 4, states: “Therefore, all from which or in which the body of the whole world was created takes its origin from what was said and begins to subsist in that which issues from the word of God.” (2) Anselm writes in Monologion (1076) 12: “that (a) whatever the Supreme Substance made, it made through no other than through itself and that (b) whatever it made, it made through its own inmost expression (whether by uttering different things with different words or else by uttering all things at once with a single word).” Ed. note: (1) ET Kienzles; Latin: Migne Lat. 9:565. (2) ET and Latin: Hopkins (1986), 88–91; cf. ET only: Williams (1996), 26; Latin only: Migne Lat. 158:160. Schleiermacher’s marginal note here, drawing from Anselm’s Proslogion, adds: “The quotations from Anselm [in §55n14 and n15] are scarcely to be cut off from each other. God’s internal utterance [interna locutio] suffices to bring God’s work to completion” (Thönes, 1873). Nevertheless, Anselm does grant that “as the first cause, sovereign in himself, God fashions the whole creation by his very utterance—by way of a prelude, as it were.”

16. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note provides this history and explanation: “Identity [Identität] of divine omniscience and wisdom. Usually the two attributes are distinguished from each other. This practice, however, presents no obstacle to treating wisdom in a special way” (Thönes, 1873). In §§168–69 on creation by God’s word, wisdom is indeed treated in a way not separated from divine omniscience yet in a special way. See also §41.1–2 and P.S.

17. Augustine (354–430), On Diverse Questions to Simplicianus (ca. 395–397), book 2.3: “Nonetheless, when it comes to human beings themselves, it is customary to distinguish knowledge from wisdom. … In God, however, the two are indubitably not different from each other but are one and the same.” Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. Latin and German in An Simplicianus (1991), 158–59; Latin only: Migne Lat. 40:140. Fathers of the Church translates only Book 1.

18. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “(a) In God nothing regarding God’s influence on things can be independent of God’s cognition [Erkennen]. This cognition, however, is [what is usually defined as] wisdom. (b) The same is to be said in relation to God’s will” (Thönes, 1873). In this context, the note marked “(b)” was placed where the next paragraph begins.

19. Erkennen.

20. Unvollkommenheit. Ed. note: or imperfection.

21. Ed. note: Zweckbegriff (plan, or intentional concept)—that is, by implication the total intention that the artist, if it were God, had put into the entire process, in the case of God the artist’s creation and preservation of the world.

22. Ed. note: absolute Lebendigkeit.

23. Ed. note: See §55n16.

24. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873): “2. Kritik.” Frequently, after an initial introductory subsection, the next subsection, or more, is devoted to exercise of some critical art in service of some specific constructive purpose. Here the purpose is announced: to use analysis of one prominent contrast to show that God is above and beyond all contrast.

25. Anschauung, Erinnerung, und Vorherwissen. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note emphasizes his negative conclusions from this critical investigation: “[God’s knowing is] not composed of temporal dimensions” (Thönes, 1873). The three dimensions laid out in the text as examples are present, past, and future, respectively.

26. Thus Reinhard, Dogmatik (1818), §35, 110f., where he states: “The divine omniscience is an attribute wherein knowledge of all things contains the most perfect extension (habet longe perfectissimam).” However, this superlative expression already includes a comparative element and thus posits divine knowledge that is like that of finite being, consequently is temporal. All three of Reinhard’s notions—praescientia, visio, and reminiscentia—appear accordingly. Redeker note: Cf. §35, 112: “Now, since existing things can be divided successively into past, present, and future, God’s free knowledge [scientia libera], is either reminiscentia, by which God optimally recalls things of the past, visio, by which God perceives things in the present, or praescientia, by which God has foreknowledge, knowing things of the future in advance.” [ET Tice]

27. Augustine (354–430), On Diverse Questions to Simplicianus (ca. 395–397) 2.2: “What else is foreknowledge if not knowledge of the future? Yet, what is that future for God, who surpasses all times? That is to say, if God’s knowledge has things in themselves, then they are present for God, not future. It follows from this that one can no longer speak of foreknowledge but only of knowledge. If, however, for God too, as in the ordering of temporal creation, future things do not yet exist, but he simply anticipates them by his knowledge, he thus perceives them in a twofold manner. In the one way he does so in accordance with his foreknowledge of things yet to be, in the other way in accordance with his knowledge of things present. Therefore, in the course of time something comes to be accrued to God’s knowledge that is nevertheless completely absurd and false.” Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Latin and German in An Simplicianus (1991), 152–55; Latin only: Migne Lat. 40:138f.

28. Ed. note: In this immediate context the verb bestimmen is always translated “define,” though here too it bears the additional meaning of “determine.”

29. Augustine, An Simplicianus 2.3: “If I remove from human knowledge the mutability and inevitable transitoriness of thoughts to thoughts … and so by frequent acts of memory jump from one fragment to another … and retain solely the vital power of sure and unshakable truth, which embraces all that is spiritual in a single and eternal reflection—or rather do not retain, for indeed human knowing is incapable of that, but simply have a notion of such powers, then in some fashion I can infer from this a knowledge held by God. In any case, on this basis the term ‘knowledge’ can be used for both sorts in common.” Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Latin and German in An Simplicianus (1991), 156–59; Latin only: Migne Lat. 40:140. Schleiermacher’s marginal note summarizes what he is doing here: “To obviate against [bringing any difference (Differenz) into God’s knowing] by identifying [Identifikation] it with anything manifesting difference within ourselves. Here points already shown are surveyed in clearer fashion” (Thönes, 1873).

30. Ed. note: Here anschaulich (perspicuous, or clear-seeing) seems to connote the presence of something to be looked at and contemplated, or when God is said to have looked at the world God had created and pronounced it to be good.

31. Scientia libera or visionis and scientia necessaria or simplicis intelligentiae. Ed. note: Here libera (free) connotes discretionary, visio (visionary) connotes looking at, with perfect clarity. The second phrase was translated into bloß Denken (pure thinking or thinking pure and simple).

32. Cf. Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764) 1, 148n. Ed. note: See also §47n21, and §55n33 just below.

33. This is but very little softened by an expression like this one by Thomas Aquinas: “God sees himself in himself, because he sees himself through his essence; and he sees other things, not in themselves, but in himself, inasmuch as his essence contains the likeness of things other than himself.” This is so, for the reference here is more to what is real, and the assertion is actually that God knows concerning finite being as he does concerning himself without reference to what is possible. Ed. note: Schleiermacher cites the statement by Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274) from Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1625, ed. 1764) 1, 148n. It comes from Summa theologica (1274) 1, q.14, a.5. ET in Pegis (1948), 135.

34. Ed. note: des göttlichen Wesens, as in the expression “Supreme Being” (das höchste Wesen).

35. Scientia media also futuribilium or de futuro conditionato. Ed. note: As Schleiermacher goes on to explain, this so-called knowledge, which he rejects, is of something that has not yet come to pass, thus is “intermediate,” referring to some supposed future condition.

36. John of Damascus (ca. 675–749), An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (743–) 2.22: “One should note that, while we speak of wishing in God, in the strict sense we do not speak of choice. For God does not deliberate, because deliberation is due to ignorance. No one deliberates about what he knows.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1959), 250; Greek: Migne Gr. 94:945.

37. Ed. note: Here again Schleiermacher uses absolute, not schlechthinig, to indicate a characteristic or action, of “absolute” approval in this case.

38. Reinhard, Dogmatics (1818), 112. Redeker note: On p. 112 Reinhard states: “Very reassuring consequences also flow from this, for it is certain that what God causes to happen has to be the wisest and best among all that could happen, because otherwise by virtue of the nature of God’s omniscience God would indisputably have arranged something differently.” [ET Tice]

39. Lebendigkeit. Ed. note: Here this special term directly refers to Schleiermacher’s support for the concept “the living God.”

40. Ed. note: “Original” translates ursprüngliches and “reflective” translates reflektiertes. The second kind would be contingent on transitory factors in the world of which God would have had no immediate consciousness in Godself.

41. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note here succinctly states the point: “This original knowing is that which would underlie stirrings of mind and heart [Gemütsbewegungen], which would likewise be ascribed to God” (Thönes, 1873). As is indicated just below, in Schleiermacher’s view these inner stirrings include those of a largely sensory kind (Affekt), on up the emotive scale of feelings and perceptions. See On Religion (1821) for other representations of these latter two paired categories, notably in passages retained through all three editions (1799, 1806, 1821) and in those added in 1821. See also his psychology lectures.

42. Ed. note: “Stirrings of an affective kind” translates affektartigen Erregungen, a concept reserved for the more sensory content of one’s mental state and language meant to convey it.

43. Affiziertsein. Ed. note: Here use of this term seems to refer to a large range of ways in which God would be affected, as human beings are, not only by the more strictly sensory aspects of discourse. Cf. prayers affixed to many of Schleiermacher’s sermons and §§146–47 on prayer.

44. In §54.4. Ed. note: See the main text paragraphs there containing notes 28 and 29, themselves citing Wegscheider and Mosheim.

45. §49.

46. Yet, in its entire application the Socinian rule seems actually to include this consequence within it. People would place over against it, as the counterposing formulations: (1) Augustine’s statement in The City of God (413–426) 5.9: “… from the fact that to God the order of all causes is certain there is no logical deduction that there is no power in the choice of our will.” (2) Faustus Socinus (1539–1604), Praelectiones theologicae 8, 545: “For nonentities there are no qualities; rather, the things that neither were nor are and certainly will not be in no way exist, and thus they cannot be present for God. … The voluntary actions of human beings are of this sort, and they have not yet truly existed.” Ed. note: (1) ET Fathers of the Church 8 (1950), 259; Latin: Migne Lat. 44:150. (2) ET Kienzles/Tice; KGA I/7.3, 624, presents the full context for this quotation.

Appendix to Section Two
	Regarding Some Other Divine Attributes

§56. Among the divine attributes customarily adduced, the oneness, infinity, and simplicity of God would be particularly pertinent here, though they bear no relation to the aforementioned contrast that takes place in the stirrings of religious consciousness. They cannot, however, be regarded as divine attributes in the same sense as those treated thus far.

1. In contrast to those attributes which will show up in Part Two of this presentation of faith-doctrine, the three attributes just named—oneness, infinity, and simplicity—do not refer to the ease or difficulty with which God-consciousness develops within us in its various elements, and to this extent they would belong in this Part One if each and all of them bore dogmatic content. This content is lacking in them, however, because, unlike the four that we have presented, they have not arisen from the relationship that exists between the feeling of absolute dependence and sense-stirred self-consciousness and because they are not utterances concerning that relationship. However, these three incidentally treated concepts attributed to God do also stand in close relationship with those four, at least insofar as they deny any similarity between divine and finite causality, although only in a figurative manner. Yet, even such a locus as this cannot be afforded them within a presentation of faith-doctrine. Thus, what arises is simply the question as to whether we are to banish these expressions entirely from our domain and, by some chance, to return them to purely speculative discourse about God or whether some sort of significance is to be gained from them that would serve the purposes of dogmatics. However, since we cannot claim in advance that in this respect the matter stands the same in each of these concepts, each has to be examined separately.

2. Now, first as concerns the oneness of God: strictly taken, it can never be the attribute of a thing that it is present only in a specific number. For example, it is not the attribute of a hand to be two-handed but only of human beings to be so, whereas simians have four hands. Likewise, for only one God to have dominion over the world could also be an attribute of the world, but it would not be an attribute for God to be simply one. Hence, if “oneness” is supposed to be a divine attribute, we would have to abandon its being a sheer number and then stand by the more general assertion that God has no equal.1 To be sure, our language can express this concept more discriminately by the word “singularity.”² Now, suppose that a number of things that are the same are deemed to be of the same kind, or species, and then the individual members are taken to present the existence of the species, whereas the species presents the nature of its individual members. Inasmuch as this is the case, one would be able to say that the oneness or singularity of God would be that attribute by virtue of which no distinction would exist in God between God’s “nature” and God’s “existence.”³ Now, this argument, viewed in and of itself, would belong only to purely speculative theology.

Suppose, on the other hand, that what “attribute” is strictly to mean is taken out of account and we consider that stirrings of religious consciousness are particular elements but that in those stirrings what we feel ourselves to be absolutely dependent on is not present to us as objects would be. Then the following would be expressed by the term “oneness”: that all of those stirrings would be meant, and would be conceived of, as indications of one God and not of a plurality of gods. Indeed, if we then go back to the earlier clarification concerning the original meaning of the term “God,”⁴ what is pronounced in the expression “oneness of God” is that this homogeneous connection among these religious stirrings is present with the same surety as these stirrings have themselves.⁵

Now, the concept “divine attribute” could be developed only on the presupposition of this homogeneous connection based on contemplation⁶ of the contents of religious elements. Thus, this expression, “oneness of God,” points less to a particular attribute than to the monotheistic canon.7 This canon has always underlaid all investigation concerning divine attributes, and it can no more be proved, in any fashion, than can the very being of God. Indeed, any attempt to discuss this oneness of God further or to prove it could hardly completely evade making a distinction between the concept “God” and the concept “Supreme Being.” Every time this attempt is made, it is also found to be in some struggle against polytheism,⁸ and it is, nevertheless, based on the presupposition that the same concept actually underlies both positions. This presupposition, however, we have already renounced from the very beginning.

The term infinity⁹ is likewise too negative to be a proper concept for an attribute. Moreover, when it has been used as if it were a proper concept, it has been treated in very diverse ways. The customary definition,¹⁰ “negation of limits,” is extremely indefinite, a feature to be explained as follows. Suppose, first, that a prior description of Supreme Being were already available. Then there would have to be no occasion whatsoever of being able to speak as if it were possible to envisage Supreme Being to be bound by anything.¹¹ Second, suppose, however, that this description of Supreme Being were to be formed by means of the term “infinity.” That term would then also be simply a precautionary rule for formation of concepts regarding divine attributes—namely, that concepts must not be ascribed to God that do not permit of being thought of as without limits. At that point, infinity would come to be an attribute of all divine attributes. Hence, every discussion regarding infinity would lead from there to other attributes of God that partake of infinity.12 Third, it would simply be a sign that even this canon, which has the purpose of forming divine attributes, is not being properly applied if, instead of presenting omnipotence as the infinity of God’s productivity and omniscience as the infinity of God’s power of thought,¹³ one would rather distinguish between an infinity of substance and an infinity of existence.¹⁴ In this way, moreover, a distinction that simply comes down to something finite is made to underlie one’s description of God’s nature. This is the case, for infinity is, nevertheless, not actually to be “what is without end” but “what is placed over against whatever is finite”—that is, “over against whatever is codetermined by anything else.” Furthermore, if set forth in this manner, the term “infinity” proves to be in the most exact connection with the aforementioned basic monotheistic canon, and, under the form of a protective predicate, pronounces the marked difference¹⁵ of divine causality from all that bears a finite character. That is to say, more often than not, it has repeatedly been shown how this formulation only leads to confusion¹⁶ if it is treated as a directive for transferring over to God, using a procedure of limitation, attributes that essentially attach only to what is finite.

Despite its not being viewed linguistically as a negative concept, even the concept simplicity¹⁷ is, nonetheless, treated as a negative concept. This is the case whether what is of a material nature is also to be removed from God therewith or whether anything that suggests partition or composition is to be excluded.18 As regards the first option, it is surely clear, in and of itself, that if God and world were only to be distinguished from each other in some fashion, then all that is of a material nature would have to belong to the world. Strictly taken, however, simplicity excludes not only materiality but also excludes taking part in everything that we designate as “finite spirit.” In the strict sense of the word, finite spirit also cannot be called simple¹⁹ but must belong to the world just as much as what is of a material nature does. This is so, for a relative separation of functions already conflicts with simplicity.²⁰ Moreover, each temporal element of spiritual manifestation²¹ is just as much a result of their being intertwined in what is in relative contrast as, in this same sense, we also declare whatever is of a material nature to be composite only insofar as we are able to explicate contrasts that we find within it.

Hence, on the one hand, just as infinity is an attribute of all the attributes of God, so simplicity is only the nonseparated and inseparable being-intertwined of all divine attributes and of all divine activities, just as they are being presented here, both in general and each in particular. In addition, on the other hand, just as infinity is to ensure that nothing is to be ascribed to God that can be thought of only as limiting God in some way, so simplicity is to ensure that nothing would be included that essentially belongs to the domain of contrasts.

Postscript to this Second Section:²² The entire sphere of divine attributes dealt with here purely bears in itself the character of this Part One of our presentation of doctrine regarding Christian faith. That is, it bears the character of being derived from religious self-consciousness, just as the whole of what it proposes is taken to be presupposed already in every element of Christian religious life. This arrangement is still further illuminated based on the following considerations, among others. First, given the teleological character of Christianity, we can think of no completely formed religious element in it that is not either itself to pass over into something active or to bear influence on activities at hand in some distinct fashion and to combine with these activities. It would have to be possible, however, for every such element to be described under the form of this second section just as well as under the form of the first or third sections.23 Thus, suppose that a particular one among these attributes, or all of them combined, were to condition a single distinct religious element. Then it would have to be possible to derive from this element either a disposition or a so-called duty toward God or at least a mode of action required by this God-consciousness, in general or in relation to other modes of action.

Second, none of this latter set of maneuvers is the case, however. Moreover, no proposition of Christian Ethics can be grounded on the attributes treated in this section, not singly nor combined. Rather, there would always be still other factors that belong among them.

Hence, third, even these concepts regarding attributes, however completely they may also be synoptically presented and related to each other, would in no way pass for a description of God’s nature.²⁴ Here, however, it would be well to establish in advance that whatever divine attributes might also arise in treatments to follow, those described here will always have to be in mind with them. As a result, an activity that does not admit of being thought of under the form of eternal omnipotence must not be posited as a divine activity.

1. Johannes Laurentius Mosheim (1694–1755), Elementa theologiae dogmaticae (1764), 241: “Therefore, when we say that there is one God, we affirm that God has no equal [socium].” Ed. note: See context in KGA I/7.3, 457; ET Kienzles/Tice. The German concept chosen is nicht seinesgleichen, which could also be conveyed as “none like God” or, more loosely, by the assertion “There is none like God, who is distinctly different, one of a kind,” as it were.

2. Ed. note: Einzigkeit—“singularity” versus Einheit (oneness).

3. Ed. note: Here “nature” translates Wesen and “existence” translates Dasein (literally, “being there”). Schleiermacher’s marginal note here states: “This acknowledgement is a purely speculative one, by which, properly understood, it would also be established that God is not a thing [Ding]” (Thönes, 1873).

4. See §4.4.

5. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “This comprises the actual dogmatic nature [Wesen] of the concept” (Thönes, 1873).

6. Betrachtung. Ed. note: “Contemplation” would seem to capture the contemplative, inward-searching character of Schleiermacher’s dogmatic enterprise better than either “observation” (as if simply of objects) or “reflection” (which usually connotes a more rationalistic exercise, though it need not do so). This mode of seeing is the defining characteristic of a focally contemplative treatment of Christian faith and life. The fact that Schleiermacher’s approach invites a person at the same time (1) to consider God to be Supreme Being, not a thing, an object, or a being, and (2) to look inward for homogeneous stirrings from that infinite and eternal source, a process that does not entail that God is unreal—a figment of imagination—or that God lacks externality, or otherness—or that God does not act, creatively and redemptively, within the world in ways that we can experience. In sum, it cannot reasonably lead to the conclusion that what we contemplate must be purely “subjective,” a claim often lodged against him. Nor does it entail a “mysticism” that excludes a really experienced communicative objective “word” between God and human beings. This is indeed a key passage on the matter, but its outlook and understanding suffuses the entire work, as it does his companion writings on “Christian Ethics.”

7. In his Commentary on the Apostles’ Creed (regarding the Roman Symbol, ca. 307–309), Rufinus has correctly stated this definition, as follows: “We say that God is one not numerically but absolutely [universitate].” Ed. note: ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 2, vol. 3 (1892), 545; Latin: Migne Lat. 21:343. In Schleiermacher’s sentence “homogeneous connection” translates Zusammengehörigkeit. This term carries with it both a close bondedness among those stirrings and a common source (“one”) to which the stirrings refer.

8. Lactantius (ca. 240–ca. 320), Divine Institutes (ca. 304–311) 1.3: “The nature of power … is to be perfect in that in which it resides as a whole. … God, then, if God is perfect, … cannot be unless God is one, that everything might be in God.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 49, (1964), 22; Latin: Migne Lat. 6:123.

9. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note explains: “Infinity: It is a salutary canon that all attributes that are ascribed to God in order to express God’s infinity must have a character different from what they are when they refer to something finite: namely, that attributes must not be ascribed to God that do not permit of being thought of as without limits” (Thönes, 1873).

10. Mosheim, op. cit., 1, 246: “Thus, infinity, so absolute, is nothing other than the absence of limits [finium] in God.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. See context in KGA I/7.3, 457.

11. Ed. note: umschränkt—that is, versus being either circumscribed or limited by anything else, spatially or temporally or, possibly, as if against God’s infinite and eternal will. On the relation of human freedom to such seemingly deterministic claims, see §§4–6.

12. See Mosheim, op. cit. (1764), and Reinhard, op. cit. (1818) §33.3. Redecker note: Cf. Mosheim (1764), 219: “Infinity of space and dimension is termed immensity. Infinity of time is called eternity in Holy Scripture by theologians.” Ed. note: ET Kienzles. See KGA I/7.3, 458, for the general context; this statement does not exactly correspond to that in Mosheim. For Reinhard’s view, cf. §53n20 and §56n18.

13. Produktivität … Denkkraft.

14. Substanz … Existenz. Ed. note: As immediately explained, this distinction contrasts what could be discerned of God’s infinity within finite conditions (Existenz) with what could be claimed of “God’s nature” (Substanz) in this respect.

15. Differenz. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this word, which does presuppose qualifications, expresses a “marked difference,” without any significant qualification, in contrast to Verschiedenheit, which does presuppose qualifications.

16. Ed. note: Here “confusion” translates Verwirrung, which, for Schleiermacher, also normally carries the root connotation of “entanglement” in contrasting factors or features of organic life (hence, on some occasions, “getting confused”). Thus, the English word ordinarily used is “entanglement.”

17. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note is “Simplicity. The main subject here is [God’s] indivisibility in [God’s] nature [Wesen] and attributes” (Thönes, 1873).

18. The first position is held by Reinhard, op. cit. (1818), §33.2, 102f., the latter by Mosheim, op. cit. (1764), 240. Redeker note: In his Dogmatik (1818), Reinhard states 102f.: “To be sure, we are not in a position to indicate in a positive way how God’s substance would be constituted and what its simplicity would be. However, reason and Scripture teach this much, that nothing that is of a material nature, no corporeal properties, no extension, no composition, form, etc. can occur in God.” Mosheim, 240, states: “Everything among the multiplicity of things is subject to causation at some time, and everything alike requires causation as to its composition or substance. In contrast, God’s existence has no cause; thus, any thought of multiplicity or composition in God ought to be rejected” [ET Tice]. Ed. note: See KGA I/7.3, 471, for the Reinhard quote in context and 453 for the Mosheim quote in context.

19. This “simplicity” the ancients called μονοειδές (of one kind) and ἀμερές (undivided).

20. Hence the Socinians are not wrong when they assert that in general a composition exists wherever there is a conjoining or uniting of functions. (See Conradus Vorstius [1569–1622], Parasceve [1612], 50). They are wrong only in their separating the nature and will of God.

21. Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John (416–417) 23.9: “God is not a mutable spirit. … For where thou findest alternation, there a kind of death has taken place.” Ed. note: ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 1, 7:305–6; Latin: Corpus Christianorum 36, 238.

22. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “Now, this postscript leads to an understanding that this section [Teil] could have formed the conclusion to Part One—all the more as its entire course comports with the corresponding section of Part Two, just as the abstract divine attributes brought to the close of this section comport with those that preceded them” (Thönes, 1873). This note appears to contain Schleiermacher’s typical affirmation that the chosen structure of the work is so intertwined as to be far from sacrosanct. The corresponding section in Part Two is actually its third and last section, concluding with treatment of the two summative divine attributes: love and wisdom. There the final statements have to do with Supreme Being’s providing an orderly world as the “theater for redemption,” the Holy Spirit as the final “world-shaping power,” and pointing directly to the basic grounds for Christian Ethics, itself the other indispensable aspect of dogmatic work.

23. Ed. note: In Part One, the first section describes religious self-consciousness, the second section describes divine attributes, and the third section describes the world.

24. Ed. note: des göttlichen Wesens. Or “the divine being,” as in the concept des höchsten Wesens (Supreme Being).

SECTION THREE

Regarding the Constitution of the World That Is Indicated in Religious Self-Consciousness inasmuch as It Expresses the General Relationship between God and the World

Introduction to Section Three

§57. In its general character the feeling of absolute dependence implies faith¹ in an original perfection of the world.

1. Here perfection of the world is not at all to be understood to mean anything other than what we have to use that name for in the interest of religious self-consciousness. That is, the totality of finite being as it influences us—including human influences on the rest of being that arise from our position within it as well—harmonizes in such a way as to make possible² the continuity of religious self-consciousness within that totality.

That is to say, first, this religious self-consciousness can fill an element of human life only in union with a stirring of sensory self-consciousness, and each such stirring is an impression of the world on persons. Thus, second, the claim that God-consciousness could be united with every sensory determination of self-consciousness3 would be null and void unless all impressions of the world on persons—and these are indeed simply expressions for the relationship of all the rest of finite being to the being of a person—were to harmonize in such a way that the turning of a person’s spirit to God-consciousness would be compossible with them. Third, the same thing also applies to the other aspect of the relationship of all the rest of finite being to the being of a person—namely, the capacity of the being that is given to us for determining occasions by means of our own self-initiated activity. This is the case, because in every instance this very self-initiated activity is always accompanied by a self-consciousness that has the capacity to receive that stimulus.

We have also posited, however, that the feeling of absolute dependence does not decrease, still less does it stop, when we also extend our self-consciousness to self-consciousness of the entire world⁴—thus, inasmuch as we represent⁵ finite nature in general in this self-consciousness. In that we do this, two implications then follow: first, that all the various gradations of being are comprehended in this feeling of absolute dependence and, consequently, that no more nearly exact definition of this feeling abrogates that coexistence of God-consciousness with world-consciousness and, with it, the process of being stirred by God-consciousness through world-consciousness.

In the present context, use of the term original, however, is to be understood, in a prefatory way, as not referring to some sort of distinct original condition of the world, not even such a condition of human beings or of God-consciousness in human beings. All of these three referents would have a perfection that will have come into being and that would permit of their having more or less of what moves toward that end. Rather, here the term “original” refers to a perfection that both remains the same and precedes all temporal development and that is grounded in the internal relations of whatever finite being is referred to. Thus, what our proposition asserts is perfection in the aforementioned sense—that is, the expression “original perfection” posits that inasmuch as all finite being codetermines our self-consciousness, this process can be traced back to eternal omnipotent causality. Moreover, all impressions from the world that we receive, as well as all those ways and means that are placed in human nature and by which any tendency toward God-consciousness comes to be realized, would include in themselves the possibility that God-consciousness will be formed into a being at one with every given impression received from the world within whatever element of our lives is involved.6 This process is implicit in the surety that is immediately connected with God-consciousness, for if God-consciousness were not grounded in such an internal manner, it would be something incidental; consequently, it would be something arbitrary and lacking in surety.

What these considerations yield, at the same time, is an understanding of how this faith that is grounded in an internal manner naturally and necessarily coheres with faith in the eternally omnipresent and living omnipotence of God. This is so, in that both modes of faith are related in entirely the same way to our basic presupposition,⁷ and for the following reasons. First, on the one hand, the faith grounded in an internal manner attests to the fact that in all stirrings of religious consciousness, God-consciousness, viewed as at one⁸ with world-consciousness, has one as its referent.⁹ On the other hand, in every such stirring of religious consciousness, the faith in God’s eternal omnipresence and living omnipotence likewise attests to the fact that world-consciousness, viewed as at one with God-consciousness, has all as its referent.

Thus, at the same time, on the one hand, the recognition that the world comprises the entire revelation of God’s eternal omnipotence is implied in faith that is directed to God’s eternal omnipotence. Therefore, on the other hand, the following is likewise implied, at the same time, in faith that is directed to the original perfection of the world. That is, by means of the feeling of absolute dependence, divine omnipotence is revealed, in its entire living character, as eternal, omnipresent, and omniscient throughout the entire world. This revelation occurs without any distinction of more or less and without any contrast whatsoever that might be taken to exist between one part and another with respect to their dependence on God.

2.¹⁰ Now, let us suppose that the terms selected for this discussion are meant to be taken in the sense just given. It already follows of itself that in this context any content of an actual element of life11 that is defined in terms of some distinct impression of the world should be left out of the account. This is the case, since here we have to do only with the original, inner will-to-enter¹² of lower and higher self-consciousness, which will is ever advancing and enduring in the same way, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, with the constitution of all being that is given to us,¹³ viewed as the ever-advancing effective cause of the world’s impressions that codetermine that very tendency toward being at one.

Accordingly, what is immediately dealt with in this context is not any one temporal situation whatsoever that is in the world and among human beings—in particular, not any situation that is past or present or that is deemed to be future. Rather, the only topic to be directly dealt with regards those circumstances that uniformly underlie the entire unfolding of what is temporal and that remain ever the same while this unfolding is occurring.¹⁴ Regarding what we call “perfection” or “imperfection” in the domain of experience,15 “perfection” is simply that which has already come to be so by virtue of original perfection, whereas “imperfection” is that which has not yet become so by virtue of original perfection. The two combined, however, comprise that which is on the way to being perfect. Hence, we can say that, for every given element of life, original perfection would be in whatever, viewed as pure finite causality, underlies it, but definitive perfection would be within the totality of all effects within finite causality which is an advancing unfolding of perfection, itself thought of as contained within that element of life.

Now, what underlies every element of life, viewed as finite causality, however, is nothing other than the totality of all enduring forms of being and of all contrasted functions of being. In consequence, original perfection is the cohering of all these forms and functions of being by virtue of which they have the same compass as divine causality and, on account of the presence of contrast, call forth consciousness of that divine causality.

The primal expression of this faith, though in a different form, is the divine approbation of the world.¹⁶ This approbation, which is referred to the act of creation, as such, has for its object no temporal situation, which would have arisen from something that had come into being earlier. Rather, it is referred only to the origination of finite being, though, admittedly, this source would have been viewed as that of all temporal development. Hence, just as this divine approbation cannot be abrogated by anything temporal, no more can the truth of our proposition be impaired by various contents inherent in temporal elements of life. It matters not whether they are viewed, at one time, more as displaying perfection that has come into being and then, at another time, as imperfection in process of improvement.

Yet, let us recognize, on the one hand, that what is customarily dealt with precisely under this title in faith-doctrine¹⁷ is historical elements of life—that is, a state of paradise in the world and a state of moral perfection in human beings, both of which would have lasted for some period. It is clear, then, that such a doctrine could not occupy the same locus of doctrine as that set forth here. This is so, for a real situation—thus, one that is, in any case, subject to change—cannot refer to divine omnipotence in the same way as that in finite being which underlies the whole succession of situations. Least of all can a situation that is supposed to have disappeared altogether refer to divine omnipotence. This is so, because at that point divine omnipotence too could no longer have remained what it was. On the other hand, suppose that we ourselves were to take up into the concept of original perfection something that, on closer scrutiny, was shown to be variable in nature. This case would involve only an oversight, itself resting on an improper subsumption,18 which, as soon as it would be discovered, could be corrected without anything’s being changed in a given doctrine. To be sure, the course of our presentation has definitely not led us to include in it anything of the sort. However, this feature of an actual perfection occurring in history, viewed as placed at the very beginning, has at times been included in presentations of faith-doctrine. Thus, it is incumbent on us to investigate where there is any locus for such a doctrine or whether it simply rests on a misunderstanding wherever it appears.

1. Glauben. Ed. note: This is another way of saying that the feeling of absolute dependence, as defined in a Christian context, may be seen to “presuppose” what can only be conceived as an original perfection of the world. The task of the next five propositions is to articulate and explain what it can mean to claim that Christian faith is held, first of all, in the Christian religious self-consciousness of persons who exist in community with Christ (have “faith”) and is held also in their feeling concerning God’s relationship with the whole world, including the interactively human part of it. As throughout this work, “faith,” rather than “belief,” translates Glaube, because the feeling of absolute dependence, which is oriented to God, carries within it faith regarding God’s activity in the world, viewed as its referent, shape, and context. Naturally, as he has been stating and explaining all along, this faith is an experience that can be conceptualized—that is, interpretively expressed by using concepts, i.e., put into the form of beliefs, including what Schleiermacher calls “presuppositions,” but what is being expressed in this way is the experience itself. Within the domain of history, moreover, anything human, including feelings, can change, thus whatever beliefs used to express their meaning can too, as will be seen. The world in which we live can change as well, but, as presupposed in this presentation of Christian faith, God is constituted in what God wills and does. In general, God can be counted on not to change in relationship to God’s own world, even though in some particular circumstances God might, mistakenly, seem to change. Use the index to see how he accommodates his position to human freedom (use of free will). Although we are accustomed to thinking in terms of real changes on both sides of a relationship, Schleiermacher interprets God’s steady holiness and justice, love, and wisdom to be infinite, inalterable, and unchanging. Regarding the creation as a whole, he has also attempted to show, earlier in Part One, that this exquisitely interconnected, continually changing process can also be counted on, since God preserves it (§§36–49).

2. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “Without this possibility, the claim that follows could not be set forth” (Thönes, 1873). The claim contains several successive points.

3. See §5.5.

4. See §8.2.

5. Ed. note: repräsentieren: that is, in our self-consciousness to re-present, to have “finite nature in general” stand in for “the entire world,” not simply envisage or imagine or have a notion of such (vorstellen).

6. Ed. note: daß sich mit jedem Welteindruck das Gottesbewuβtsein zur Einheit des Momentes bilde. That is, in every instant and location where this “being at one,” or combination, takes place, it occurs within some particular element (Moment) of human life. Just below, Schleiermacher calls this juxtaposition “inner faith.”

7. Ed. note: See §§50–51 for a statement and initial account of this “basic presupposition,” which Schleiermacher deems to have been derived historically not from “a dogmatic interest” but from the communal experiences of Christian communities of faith over time.

8. Ed. note: Here “at one” translates geeinigt.

9. Ed. note: Here “one as its referent” stands for the term Einen.

10. Ed. note: In his marginal note here, Schleiermacher marks the first of three subheads: “2. Relationship to temporal perfection. (a) [The feeling is] immediate; [we are] not affected [affiziert] by it,” i.e., by temporal perfection, which would involve some impression from the world (Thönes, 1873).

11. Ed. note: Here “of an actual element of life” translates eines wirklichen Lebensmomentes, referring to any constituent part of life, no matter how large or small. In Schleiermacher’s usage, out of these constituent parts are formed every general (allgemeines) distinctive (eigentliches) feature (Element) and every larger part, segment, or portion (Teil) of life. Almost always, when he uses the term Moment by itself, he is referring to an “element of life.”

12. Eintretenwollen. Redeker note: In the first edition (1821), p. 319, Einswerdenwollen. Cf. An Lücke (1829), SW I.2 (1836), 583: “What I call the conjoining [Einswerden] of sensory and higher self-consciousness.” Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. OG 37. Schäfer prints Eintretenwollen but shares with Redeker the conjecture that Einswerdenwollen is intended. The original handwritten manuscript and published text of this second edition (1830) changed Einswerdenwollen (1821) to Eintretenwollen (1830), apparently so as to obviate the much-embattled term used in 1821. In OG 37 Schleiermacher had explained Einswerden (to be at one) by asserting that in CG1 (1821) §16.3 he had already shown that the much-different, approaching-complete, identity of sensory and higher consciousness is a defining characteristic of the “Mohamedan” conception of monotheism, which he calls aesthetic, not teleological. The nearest counterpart to that 1821 passage in the present 1830 text is §9.2, where Einswerden is no longer used. See also §8.4.

13. Ed. note: Here “all being that is given to us” translates alles uns gegebenen Seins, a familiar ambiguous concept that also means “all that can ever be present to or exist for humans to observe or understand,” in this case including all that might be hidden from observation and understanding at any given time or place but that is yet to be revealed. Consistent with this observation is Schleiermacher’s affirmation that God is one. What God reveals ever occurs “originally” by this one God in what he refers to in On Religion and some other places as both Universum and Weltall.

14. Ed. note: Here “circumstances” translates Verhältnisse, as usual; however, in Schleiermacher’s usage it normally refers much more to relationships among elements, features, or parts, all somehow interconnected, rather than simply to the surrounds of something. A Verhältnis is a relation or, more particularly, a relationship.

Also, in this context, to obviate any false impression that Schleiermacher is presupposing a notion of steady progress, “unfolding” is chosen to translate Entwicklung, which is usually rendered by “development,” as in the more neutral phrase “as things develop, or unfold.” This choice is not intended to detract from his teleological understanding of a potential development of human beings toward a more nearly “complete,” or “perfect,” end (τέλος, Vollendung).

At this point, Schleiermacher’s marginal note continues that in §57n10 above: “Here the temporal differences [Differenzen] between perfection [or completeness, Vollkommenheit] and the lack of perfection [or being flawed, or lack of completeness, Unvollkommenheit] are neutralized [neutralisiert]” (Thönes, 1873).

15. Erfahrung.

16. Gen. 1:31: “And God saw everything that God had made, and behold; it was very good.” Ed. note: The word Schleiermacher uses for this pronouncement by God is Billigung (approbation).

17. Glaubenslehre. Ed. note: In this work Schleiermacher presupposes this term but rarely uses it. It is a historical term for more or less systematic, constructive presentations of faith-doctrine, especially for the more strictly doctrinal half of Schleiermacher’s own dogmatics. It is a term that he himself used especially in that he had chosen, for practical reasons, to separate this presentation from the other half, that of Sittenlehre (Christian ethics). The two halves together present an understanding of Christian faith and an account of its active expression in all aspects of Christian life, communal and individual, in the community of faith and on the rest of the world.

18. Subsumtion. Ed. note: This is a term largely familiar only in logic—a minor premise in a syllogism that is used in a more general way to indicate something that is placed under a category of some kind. More broadly, the act of subsumption is any placement of something under some larger name, as in labeling. In Schleiermacher’s case, he is referring to an act that is done mistakenly.

§58. The faith described is to be presented in two points of doctrine. One deals with the perfection of the rest of the world in relation to human beings. The other deals with the perfection of the human being as such.

1. The faith described in this proposition is nothing other than testimony concerning something that is commonly featured among the religious stirrings involved. This testimony refers only to certain finite factors that codetermine these stirrings, namely, to impressions that we have received from the world, though even this set of factors is contemplated only in its general character. Thus, the division into the two parts follows entirely of itself. This is so, for, on the one hand, God-consciousness could not be aroused through these impressions from the world if they were constituted in a manner at variance with God-consciousness. On the other hand, this could not happen unless human beings were so constituted that these impressions would likewise reach up to the level of their higher consciousness and unless human beings were so constituted that the relation of lower and higher self-consciousness to each other, by which the entire process of God-consciousness being stirred occurs, were also constantly present in them. This is how the two conditions to be dealt with here come into consideration, each in and of itself.

To be sure, it could be said that, given this constitution of human beings, they are themselves an integral part of the world and that only by virtue of this constitution are they the integral part that they are, consequently that the original perfection of humankind is already included in the original perfection of the world. This observation is also entirely proper. Moreover, in a purely scientific procedure, wherein perception of finite being in itself1 would be dealt with, such a division would be permissible only inasmuch as other divisions were contrived, and the concept “perfection of the world” were to be divided into the perfection of its various constituent parts and into the perfection of their relationships with each other. The case is different within the dogmatic domain, however. There the original subject addressed is not objective consciousness at all but self-consciousness. Moreover, in this domain the subject is self-consciousness especially insofar as a human being places oneself over against the world and stands in a relationship of interaction with the rest of being.

2. For the same reason, here too there can be no talk of an original perfection of the world in itself and with respect to the concept of finite being. Rather, there can be talk only of original perfection of the world in relation to humankind. Suppose that, at the same time, it were also claimed that there would be no other perfection of the world and that this one perfection would thus be considered entirely teleologically, in the usual sense of the word. This claim would then require a more exact explanation, so as to avoid any appearance as if humankind were to be presented as the center of all finite being, in relation to which alone would all else have any perfection. This explanation would also not be difficult to offer. This would be the case, because, on the presupposition of an organic composition of the whole, all could just as well be for the purpose of each part, just as each part could be so for all. Consequently, this could be true, nonetheless, even of the remotest part. That is, just as its arrangement would interconnect with the totality of its mediate and immediate relationships,2 so too it would not only stand in relation with humankind but also, given a full insight into the matter, precisely this set of relations³ could become the expression used for the distinctiveness of that remote part’s own existence. We need not get mixed up in such explanations, however, because we do not at all have to set forth an exhaustive doctrine regarding the perfection⁴ of the world, as if it were a cosmological task. Rather, the faith to be expounded here is not to extend farther than that domain containing stirrings of a religious sort⁵ in which only relationships of the world to humankind are of decisive influence. However, in that we are referring back to the overall ground of these relationships, it is posited, at the same time, that no further, forthcoming development of these relationships could ever contain anything that would cancel out this faith.

Now, as concerns the perfection of humankind, it would not have been appropriate to this subject if one were to add that it is likewise to be understood only with respect to the world. Instead, the original perfection of humankind means, first and foremost, in its relation⁶ to God. That is, the concept relates to the placement of God-consciousness in humankind. Moreover, humankind’s natural inclinations in relation to the world belong in this connection only to the extent that they also serve toward the awakening of God-consciousness. To be sure, the whole position of this proposition does, however, include the recognition that all of those natural inclinations, by virtue of which humankind is this distinct integral part of the world, belong in it along with the rest. The proposition itself will become an important canon in the domain of Christian ethics, for the purpose of setting aside a great many misunderstandings.

3. Without further ado, these considerations shed light on how natural it is that doctrine regarding the distinctive, original perfection of humankind is far more abundantly elaborated in dogmatics than is that regarding perfection of the world with respect to humankind. When the latter is entirely lacking, however, this lack not only certainly cannot redound to the advantage of the former treatment, but also, not seldom at that point, doctrine that is treated under the title of “divine providence,” or that considers what otherwise comes up in treatment of how perfection has come into being, also goes amiss. This happens because a proper concept of original perfection has not been established first. Yet, it does make sense to have as an introduction the less urgent, hence also less elaborated matter—the original perfection of the world—precede the matter that is more important and more fully composed—the original perfection of humankind.

1. Ed. note: Here “perception of finite being in itself “ translates Anschauung des endlichen Seins an sich—that is, without consideration of God or of the relationship of any part of the world, even humans, to God, its creator. In contrast, in all editions of On Religion the phrase Anschauung des Universums (perception, or vision, of the universe) stands for a religious mode of beholding all of finite being in its relation to God. Dogmatics, or the field of inquiry that considers this relationship in Christian faith and life in the form of an integrally ordered, scientific presentation to serve religious interest, is thus a different subject from that of strictly natural science in that respect. See §§27–31 above and Brief Outline throughout, especially on the comparative valence of religious interest and of the scientific spirit in §§9–13, 146–48, 193, 205f., 247f., 258, 262, 270, 313n, and 329–31.

2. Verhältnisse. Ed. note: “relationships” or “circumstances.”

3. Ed. note: diese Beziehung.

4. Ed. note: All along “perfection” seems to be the most suitable word for Vollkommenheit. However, given that Schleiermacher has shown by now that the word is not meant to refer to a primeval condition of the world or of humankind, nor is it meant to refer to some ideal end point (τέλοἰ) in either one, this word could easily be replaced everywhere in closer accordance with the root meaning of Vollkommenheit, namely, “completeness” or even “completed reality.” In contrast, the other German word commonly used for “completeness,” Vollständigkeit, bears the connotation of something’s either having come to its fullest state or being viewed with regard to that state and enduring in it as a whole, if only for a time. In his “prophetic doctrine” (§§157–63), in referring to “consummation” (Vollendung) of the church, Schleiermacher indicates a necessarily vague, imagined attainment of the church’s ultimate ideal state (τέλοἰ). Christianity, in turn, is a “teleological” religion, not because its adherents could now properly imagine precisely how that final condition of the church would look, but because humankind has already been reaching its original, divinely intended, and ordained state in and through Jesus the Redeemer, manifested in the Christian church’s faith and life (cf. §§11 and 91).

5. Ed. note: “The domain containing stirrings of a religious sort” translates das Gebiet der religiösen Erregungen. This unusual wording apparently appears here because in large part these stirrings would be shared by adherents of other monotheistic religions. Otherwise, Schleiermacher uses fromm for “religious stirrings” and “experiences” (Erfahrungen) that are distinctively Christian—that is, in accordance with the roots of Christian piety (Frömmigkeit).

6. Beziehung.