INTRODUCTION

[Explanation]

§1. The sole purpose of this Introduction is twofold: in part, to set forth the definition of dogmatics that underlies the work itself and, in part, to give preliminary notice of the method and arrangement followed within it.

1. To begin the treatment of a discipline¹ with a definition of it can be superfluous only if complete agreement on that definition is already reliably presupposed. Such an agreement, in turn, obtains only when no controversy has ever arisen as to how the discipline is to be put to use or when it belongs to a larger scientific whole that is delimited and subdivided in the same fashion throughout.²

Now, as concerns the first of these two conditions, we surely can proceed from the fact that in most Christian ecclesial communities use has been made of dogmatics³ in what they pass on internally and in their external dealings with other such communities. Only with difficulty, however, might people gain agreement on what then actually makes statements that have Christian religious content into dogmatic propositions. As pertains to the second condition, dogmatics might well be placed within the domain generally designated by the term “theological sciences.” Yet, one need compare only the most highly respected among the encyclopedic overviews of this field, the theological sciences, to see how variously it is subdivided and how differently authors conceive, interrelate, and assess the individual disciplines—and this is true of dogmatics to a preeminent degree. It would indeed be natural to use the definition of dogmatics that appears in my own overview4 as the basis of that to be offered here; however, that work is too brief and aphoristic not to necessitate supplementing what is stated there with some further elucidations.

The very title of the present work, wherein the name “dogmatics” has been avoided, contains features that serve toward a definition, but, in part, they lack in completeness and, in part, the particular components given there are not beyond all need of clarification. Hence, this first part of the Introduction will take its own independent course, and only as its explication advances, step by step, will the reader be referred to pertinent passages in Brief Outline. After all, since what precedes a science⁵ by way of defining it cannot belong to the science itself, it self-evidently follows that none of the propositions that will appear here can themselves also be dogmatic propositions.

2. To be sure, the method of a work and its arrangement are best justified by their outcome—that is, to the extent that the nature of the subject matter permits of variations in method and arrangement. To a high degree, moreover, this is the case in dogmatics, as the very matter it addresses shows. Yet, the most favorable outcome can be reached only if readers are acquainted with both the method and the arrangement of a work in advance. This is so, for by this means readers are enabled to command a view of each proposition directly and in its manifold relations. Further, under this condition it can also be instructive to compare particular sections of a work with sections that have the same content in works that are similar but are differently organized, a process that would simply have to be confusing otherwise.

The greatest variations in arrangement and method would indeed be those that interconnect with a distinct way of grasping the concept “dogmatics,” such that they could no longer find room within a dogmatics that has a different way of grasping that concept. In addition, however, lesser variations also exist that one can choose among even if one is proceeding from the same definition.

1. Disciplin. Ed. note: Schleiermacher uses this term for the subdivisions of a field of study, in this case theology. In 1829, OG 56, Schleiermacher described this Introduction as only “preliminary”; cf. §15. It refers to dogmatic contents but contains none, unlike most traditional introductions.

2. Ed. note: In typical German usage, theology is such a whole, as are the academic fields of psychology, economics, education, and law. Schleiermacher had developed a systematic account of “science” (Wissenschaft) that explains what the sciences have in common and in what respects they may be divided into two parts: physical and ethical sciences. His meaning is much tighter than “field of scholarship,” which is often used as a synonym. His usage, however, includes the humanities and “positive” professional fields (theology, medicine, and law, in his time) as well as the natural and social sciences. See §§17 and 9.

3. Dogmatik. Ed. note: As will be seen, this discipline is itself divided into two theoretically inseparable parts: faith-doctrine (Glaubenslehre) and ethics (Sittenlehre).

4. Brief Outline (1811), §3. Ed. note: See Brief Outline (2011), under §195 (1830), at note 145, for the 1811 definition: “§3. That theological discipline which is known under the name of thetic or dogmatic theology has to do with the systematic presentation of the whole body of doctrine that now has currency in the church.” In §195 (1830) the corresponding phrase reads: “Here we have to do with dogmatic theology (see §§94–97), as the knowledge of doctrine that now has currency in the Evangelical church, and with church statistics, as information regarding the existing social condition in all the different parts of the Christian church.” See also Brief Outline, introduction, §§1–31. The lectures on “Church Geography and Statistics” are in KGA II/16 (2005).

5. Ed. note: Here “science” chiefly refers to the presentation of known content. This usage lies in contrast to its general designation as a science of a particular kind that uses method, in part, general to science and, in part, both delimited and ordered in accordance with its subject matter.

Chapter One
	Toward a Definition of Dogmatics

Introduction to Chapter One

§2. Since dogmatics is a theological discipline and its reference is thus solely to the Christian church, one can also define what it is only if one has come to a clear understanding of the concept “Christian church.”¹

Cf. Brief Outline (1811), Intro. §§1, 2, 5, 22–23; Part I, Intro. §§1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and Section I, §§1 and 3. See also Karl Heinrich Sack (1789–1875), Christliche Apologetik (1829), Intro. §§1–5.²

1. Here the expression “theological discipline” is taken in the sense explicated in the first passage cited.3 It already follows from that account that this presentation of faith-doctrine wholly dissociates itself from the task of setting forth a doctrine of God⁴—or even an anthropology and an eschatology—that is based on general principles from which use is to be made in the Christian church, despite their not having distinctively arisen within it,5 or in which propositions regarding Christian faith are to be demonstrated by means of reason.⁶ That is to say, what can be stated on these subjects by reason, viewed in and of itself, can stand in no closer relation to the Christian church than it does to any other community of faith or life.

2. Thus, here we have to start off with a concept of the Christian church suitable for defining, in accord with that concept, what dogmatics is to be and to accomplish within it. Consequently, the concept itself will be attained correctly only by means of a general concept of “church” that is applicable anywhere, and this is conjoined with a proper conception of what makes the Christian church distinctive.⁷ Now, if there is really to be a general concept of “church,” it must be drawn from ethics above all, since in any case a church is a community that arises only through free human actions and that can continue only by means of such actions. What is distinctive about the Christian church cannot be grasped or deduced in a purely scientific manner, nor can it be conceived in a merely empirical manner.⁸ This is so, for no science can reach or produce what is of an individual nature by means of pure thought; rather, science must always stop at reaching or producing something general. Just as all so-called a priori constructions in the historical domain have proved unavailing in the effort to show that what is somehow deduced from a higher standpoint would then really appear as the same thing as what is given historically, the same is undeniably the case in this context too. A strictly empirical apprehension, on the other hand, has no criterion nor any formulation for distinguishing what is essential, and in itself it remains ever the same from what is changeable and contingent.

Now, let us suppose, however, that ethics is going to set forth the concept of “church.” Then, to be sure, it would also have the capability of separating what is everywhere the same in the basis for these communities called “church” from whatever is related to each one as a changeable quantity. By producing a classification of the entire domain in this way, it would be possible to determine on what spots the particular formations of church could be placed as soon as they are located historically. Further, in this manner it would be possible to present the totality of all ecclesial communities that are separated from each other by the distinctive difference in their bases as one self-contained whole that exhausts the concept, communities classified according to their affinities and levels of development. This would be the occupation of a particular branch of scientific research providing historical information, which should be designated exclusively by the name “philosophy of religion.” Likewise, the name “philosophy of law”9 would perhaps best be reserved for an analogous critical discipline that, with respect to the general concept of “state” explicated in ethics, would have to accomplish the same thing regarding the various particular formations of civil unions.

To be sure, quite varied efforts have been made to fulfill the special task of philosophy of religion, but these have not tended to rest on a generally valid scientific procedure, nor on one balanced in its speculative and historical work, such that we could appeal to these efforts in our theological disciplines as something recognized to be sufficient. Most directly, apologetics would have to incorporate these results from philosophy of religion as bases for serving its purpose of describing the distinctive nature of Christianity and its relationship to other churches.

Now, if in fact apologetics were to be properly recognized as a theological discipline, one that is to be reshaped for our own time, it would not be advisable to suspend its appearance until a satisfactory development of philosophy of religion had occurred. Rather, in the meantime, it would have to strike an abridged procedural pathway for itself. It would then have the same point of departure as philosophy of religion does and would also strike the same path, but it would lay aside, untended, everything that does not directly contribute to sorting out what constitutes Christianity.¹⁰ However, since this discipline is only just now beginning to be revived, the explication that follows will have to perform this service itself.

3. Thus, this first part of our Introduction has simply to compile and utilize only lemmas¹¹—that is, borrowed propositions that belong to other scientific disciplines, and indeed they are propositions from ethics, philosophy of religion and apologetics, respectively.12 Naturally, the outcome of an investigation pieced together from such components also cannot lay claim to any general acknowledgment, except in instances where the formation of ethics and of philosophy of religion that underlies those investigations would also bear recognition of this sort. This situation makes it clear how already here, at the very beginnings of our exposition, there are plenty of occasions for quite diverse definitions and conceptions of dogmatics to appear. Each of these can be viewed simply as preparatory work for some future dogmatics, at such time as the scientific disciplines to which reference must be made are more firmly established, even though Christianity will meanwhile have remained wholly the same.

Postscript 1. In no way, however, is it to be claimed thereby that these propositions would have to take the same shape in some independent treatment of the sciences to which they belong as that in which they are set forth here. Rather, their having the same shape would be unlikely, since in this place everything is missing that would have preceded their formation there.

Postscript 2. Here “ethics” is taken to mean the speculative presentation of reason over the entire compass of its efficacious action, parallel to that of natural science. “Philosophy of religion” is taken to mean a critical presentation of the various given forms of religious¹³ communities to the extent that in their totality they comprise the complete appearance of piety in human nature.

The term “apologetics” is defined in Brief Outline (1811) Part I, §14.¹⁴

1. Ed. note: On separations in the church, see §152. On the nature and origin of sects, see OR (1821) V, supplemental note 3. The only direct reference to sects or sectarians is at one point in the first edition of CG¹ (1821), §5.1 there. Cf. his relevant conceptual language in BO, §§57–62, 251–56. Such passages contain preference for directing processes, hence, “separation” versus actual “schism” in polity and “heterodoxy” vs. “heresy” in doctrine. In his usage, sects are smaller Protestant communities most of which derive their ecclesial existence from separation.

Schleiermacher recognizes a place for some aspects of speculation in religious studies and in theology, as he does for largely empirical work. See OR (1821) I, supplemental note 1, and BO §§5n, 32, 55, 180, 209n, 226, and 255–56. In the CG Introduction see also §9.5.

2. Ed. note: ET of these 1811 Kurze Darstellung propositions are placed in footnotes in Brief Outline (2011) under §§1–2 and 21–22, 32 and 35, and 43 and 48, respectively (all from the 1830 edition). The ideas are more fully stated in the 1830 propositions, which were published just before the first volume of the second edition of Christian Faith was that year. Further explanations were also attached to the 1830 propositions. These 1811 propositions read as follows:

§1. Theology is a positive science, the parts of which join into a cohesive whole only through their common relation to a distinct mode of faith, that is, a distinct formation of God-consciousness. Thus the various parts of Christian theology belong together only by virtue of their relation to Christianity. This is the sense in which the word “theology” will always be used here. [The explanatory paragraph also contrasts this definition with that of “rational” (speculative, natural) theology; see also CF §§3.4 and 10.P.S., and compare Brief Outline §226.]

§2. Whether any distinct mode of faith will give shape to a definite theology depends on the degree to which it is communicated by means of ideas rather than symbolic actions, and at the same time on the degree to which it attains historical importance and autonomy. Theologies, moreover, may differ for every mode of faith, in that they correspond to the distinctiveness of each both in content and in form. [See also On Religion IV, note 14.] …

§21. If one tries to make do with a merely empirical apprehension of Christianity, one cannot really know it. Instead, one’s task is to endeavor both to understand the nature of Christianity in contradistinction to other churches and other modes of faith and to understand the nature of piety and of religious communities in relation to all the other activities of the human spirit. [Wesen is a necessarily ambiguous term in that one seeks out the essence of something in order to determine what its overall nature is; thus, all five discourses in On Religion are about the Wesen of religion, not only the second discourse.]

§22. Unless religious communities are to be regarded as mere aberrations, it must be possible to show that the existence of such associations is a necessary element for the development of the human spirit. [In CF §§2–6, ethics retains this role, as in Brief Outline §§23–24, 29, and 35. In large part, On Religion, though written in popular style, represents an application of “ethics” (as the human sciences) to the concerns of religion and theology (cf. Brief Outline §169n). In the sense defined in Brief Outline §23, “philosophy of religion” could be strictly applied only to the fifth discourse of OR on religion in the religions.] …

§32. The distinctive nature [eigenthümliche Wesen] of Christianity no more allows of its being construed purely scientifically than of its being apprehended in a strictly empirical fashion. Thus, it admits only of being defined critically (compare BO §23), by comparing what is historically given in Christianity with those contrasts by virtue of which various kinds of religious communities can be different from each other. [On “criticism” in this sense, see also Brief Outline §§35–37, 59, and 255–56. In Brief Outline §23 the latter task is said to be pursued in philosophy of religion. CF §§7–9 “borrow” findings from that discipline.] …

§35. It should be made clear that ethics, as the science of the principles of history, can also present the manner in which a historical whole has come into existence only in a general way. Likewise, it is only critically, by comparing the general differences exposed in ethics with what is historically given, that it is possible to discover what within the development of Christianity is a pure expression of its idea and what, on the contrary, must be regarded as a deviation from it, consequently as a diseased condition. …

§43. The concept of religious communities, or of church, is realized solely in a body of historical phenomena existing side by side and before and after each other, which phenomena possess some unity in that concept but display differences among themselves. Thus, it must also be demonstrated, by setting forth both that unity and those differences, that Christianity belongs within this compass. This is accomplished by advancing and employing the correlative concepts of “natural” and “positive.” …

§48. The concept “church” is admitted into a scientific context only in connection with the common life of all other organizations developing out of the concept “humanity” (compare §22). Thus, it must be demonstrated that, in accordance with its distinctive nature, the Christian church is able to exist along with all these other organizations; and this must result from a correct exposition of the concepts “hierarchy” and “church authority.” [Sack’s somewhat different statements in the Introduction to his 1829 work, §§1–5, are quoted both by Redeker (1960) and by Schäfer in KGA I/13.1 (2003), 14n.]

3. Ed. note: That is, Brief Outline §1.

4. Gotteslehre.

5. Ed. note: Cf. Brief Outline §2, quoted in §2n2 here.

6. Ed. note: The term is Vernunftmässig, the process claimed by what was then called a “rational theology,” which is lacking in its not referencing what is contained in the actual experience of faith.

7. Ed. note: For what follows, cf. Brief Outline §§21–22, 32, 35, 43, and 48, quoted in §2n2.

8. Cf. Brief Outline (1811), Intro. §22, and Philos. Theol. §1. Ed. note: ET (1) Intro. §22, see §2n2 above; (2) Philos. Theol. §1 (1811) appears under §32 (1830; ET 2011). It reads: “The distinctive nature of Christianity no more allows of its being derived purely scientifically out of its idea alone than of its being apprehended in a strictly empirical fashion.” The portion italicized here was omitted in 1830; “idea” (Idee) referred to the general nature of concepts, whereas empirical investigation focuses only on what is given by sense perceptions (Wahrnehmungen).

9. Rechtsphilosophie. Ed. note: Recht refers multivocally to “rights,” “justice,” “laws,” and processes of government; in the latter case, it refers to “politics” (i.e., rules for governing a civil society, such as a city [polis] or a state [civitas]).

10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher lays down principles regarding several key problems that can arise in relations between church and state in OR (1821) IV, supplemental note 18. He also devoted numerous lectures and essays to such political problems and adverts to them less directly in some sermons.

11. Ed. note: In mathematics, lemmas are preliminary or auxiliary propositions taken to be true and borrowed in the process of demonstrating one or more other propositions. As used by analogy here, lemmas do not themselves bear the truth, meaning, or import of other propositions. Thus, there they do not belong to the substance of dogmatics itself. They simply serve, in a preliminary way, to carve out what the territory of dogmatics is. Among the three disciplines borrowed from, only apologetics is a theological discipline, on a par with biblical exegesis, church statistics, practical theology, and dogmatics, but not a part of dogmatics per se.

12. Ed. note: See also CF §11.5 and OR II, supplementary note 13, regarding the many points of contact between On Religion and main features of philosophy of religion, e.g., the distinction between aesthetic and teleological types of monotheism and aspects of any self-conscious observation. Furthermore, all this, viewed as involving either nature or historical life, might affect “actual disposition of our spirit.” Thus, he indicates that the special focus of Christian Faith does not require the broader treatment of “religious emotions” necessarily offered in On Religion.

13. Ed. note: Here, as elsewhere in this work, fromm is translated “religious.” In his entire critical, comparative analysis of religion in On Religion, as here, Schleiermacher intends to focus on “piety” (Frömmigkeit) over its entire range, extending from its presence in individual experience (perception and feeling, or faith), thence to its development historically and in persons, thence to its expression in thought and action in and through communal life (church), and therefrom out to its varied manifestations among the religions.

14. Ed. note: See under §39 (1830) in Brief Outline. There §14 (1811) reads: “An individual’s being vitally active in church government also consists in the effort to gain external recognition of its internal validity or to defend it.” §39 (1830) itself reads, more fully: “Every person is really a part of the Church community to which one belongs only by virtue of one’s conviction of the truth of the mode of faith propagated there. Thus, that aspect of church leadership by which the vitality of the community is maintained must have as its aim to communicate this conviction so that it can be clearly recognized. The foundation for this task is formed by investigations concerning the distinctive nature of Christianity, and likewise of Protestantism; and these constitute the apologetical side of philosophical theology. The one set of investigations relates to the general Christian philosophical theology, and the other to the special philosophical theology of Protestantism.” A lengthy explanation from Schleiermacher’s 1831/32 lectures is appended in Brief Outline at §39, showing that apologetics has arisen historically not as a defense of religion in general but as self-defense against attacks on Christianity or on particular Christian communities by other religious communities. In this respect, the term apologia has derived from legal praxis, referring to pleading a case in defense. Its purpose “is not to make people into Christians” or even to serve as “an introduction to dogmatics” but “to bring others to the point where they can let Christianity run its course.”

I. Toward the Concept “Church”: Propositions Borrowed from Ethics

§3. The piety¹ that constitutes the basis of all ecclesial communities, regarded purely in and of itself, is neither a knowing nor a doing but a distinct formation of feeling, or of immediate self-consciousness.

Cf. On Religion (1821), discourse II.A. Initial Clarifications.²

1. For us Evangelical Christians, it is posited well beyond all doubt that the church is nothing other than a community in relation to piety. This is the case, since we reckon a church to be well-nigh degenerate when it chooses to occupy itself with something else, whether it is then the concerns of science or of external organization. Likewise, we also constantly struggle against actions of leaders in the state or in scientific institutions when, at the same time, they also want to direct the concerns of piety. In contrast, we would not wish to guard against these leaders in science acting from their own standpoint to observe and appraise either piety itself or the community that relates itself to piety and to determine their proper place within the whole arena of human life, inasmuch as both piety and church also present matters for knowing. Rather, in this very place we ourselves are engaging in such activity. Similarly, we also do not guard against leaders in the state who establish certain external circumstances of religious communities according to the principles of civil order, with the proviso that they do not in any way imply that such a community proceeds from the state or is a component of the state.

Yet, not only we, but also ecclesial communities that do not so exactly hold to separation of church and state or to ecclesial and scientific community as we do, will still have to assent to our definition. This is so, for they can nonetheless only indirectly assign an influence of the church on either of these other communities, just as they can also regard the essential occupation of the church to be simply that of preserving, ordering, and furthering piety.3

2. If “feeling” and “self-consciousness” are placed side by side in this proposition as equally acceptable, the aim in doing this is not to introduce a language usage in which the two terms are in general absolutely equal one to the other. In the speech of ordinary life the term “feeling” has long been customarily used in our domain. However, for scientific language it requires a more specific determination, and this determination is to be afforded by the other word, “self-consciousness.”

So, suppose that someone takes the term “feeling” in such a broad sense that it also includes unconscious states. Then the other term used here will serve as a reminder that unconscious states are to be excluded from this usage. In turn, when the qualifier “immediate”⁴ is to be attached to the expression “self-consciousness,” no one would think of this as referring to anything but feeling. That is, if one were also to use “self-consciousness” for a consciousness of oneself, this phenomenon would be more like an objective consciousness, and it would be a notion regarding oneself, which, as such, would be mediated by observation of oneself. If such a notion of ourselves as we find ourselves at a particular element—thinking, for example, or choosing—were to come quite close to or even flash through the particular features of a given state, then this self-consciousness would actually appear as something that accompanies the state itself. In contrast, one would not ever consider that other, actually unmediated self-consciousness—which is not a notion but is feeling, in the proper sense—to be a mere accompaniment, in any way. Rather, in this regard a twofold experience is to be expected of each person. In the first place, our experience tells us that there are elements in which all thinking and willing retreat behind a given self-consciousness, however it may be determined. In the second place, however, our experience indicates that on occasion the same determination of self-consciousness persists unchanged during a whole series of diverse acts of thinking and willing, consequently not referring to them and thus, in the proper sense, not accompanying them either. Accordingly, joy and sorrow, two important features in the religious domain throughout, are states of feeling, corresponding to the first meaning. On the other hand, self-approval and self-reproach—apart from their passing into joy and sorrow later on—belong, in and of themselves, more to objective consciousness of oneself, in that they are outcomes of some analyzing reflection. These two forms of self-consciousness perhaps never do come closer to each other than in this example; precisely for this reason, however, this juxtaposition of the two puts their difference in the clearest light.5

3. The proposition might appear to presuppose that there would not be any fourth element in addition to knowing, doing and feeling. Still, it lays these three out not with the intention of carrying out an apagogic proof;⁶ rather, it simply places the first two forms next to the third one, feeling, in order, at the same time, to take up and deal with other explanations that diverge from this one. In consequence, we could entirely set aside the question as to whether such a fourth form would exist in the human psyche were it not necessary, in part, to convince ourselves as to whether yet another location presents itself to which piety could be assigned. In part, we must also set about conceiving with clarity the relationship that obtains between Christian piety, viewed in itself, and both Christian doing and Christian “faith,” to the extent that the latter word can be applied to the form of knowing.

Now, if the relationship of those three forms with each other were somewhere exposited in a generally recognized fashion, we would need only to refer to that account. Here, however, we must say only what is necessary for our purpose, and what we say, in turn, is to be viewed only as something borrowed from psychology.⁷ Moreover, it would be well to notice that the truth of the matter, namely, that piety is⁸ feeling, remains wholly independent of the accuracy of the discussion to follow.

Life is to be conceived as an interchange between a subject’s remaining-within-oneself and stepping-out-of-oneself. Both forms of consciousness we have just mentioned constitute the subject’s remaining-within-oneself, whereas actual doing consists in stepping-out-of-oneself. Thus, to that extent, knowing and feeling stand together over against doing. Yet, although knowing, viewed as being-cognizant-of something, is a remaining-within-oneself of a subject, nevertheless, when it is viewed as a cognizing process it really comes into being through the subject’s stepping-out-of-oneself, and to that extent it is a doing. In contrast, feeling is not only a remaining-within-oneself in its duration as a having-been-stimulated, but also in its being-stimulated it is not effected by the subject but comes to pass only in the subject, and thus, in that it belongs to receptivity in every respect whatsoever, it is also entirely a remaining-within-oneself. Moreover, to that extent it stands alone, over against those other two forms, knowing and doing.9

Now, suppose that the question arises as to whether there is some fourth form in addition to those three—feeling, knowing, and doing—or a third form in addition to remaining-within-oneself and stepping-out-of-oneself. In neither contrast, however, can anyone pose such a third or fourth form, respectively, given how the first member or members of the two sets are in themselves. Rather, in each set the stated unity of the first member or members comprises the very nature of the subject itself, which nature announces itself in these very forms that exist over against each other. Thus, if one may say so also in this particular connection, this unity of the subject is the common ground of all these forms. Likewise, on the other hand, every real element of life is, in accordance with its total content, something comprised of those sets of two or three forms, even though the second form or forms in each set will always be present only as a trace or seed. For a third set of forms to exist, however, wherein the one side would be further divided in two, is hardly possible.

4. So, if in positing these three forms—feeling, knowing, and doing—the already oft-repeated claim is once more set forth here that of these three forms feeling belongs to piety, it is also true, as already follows from what was said above, that this claim is not at all meant to exclude piety from all connection with knowing and doing. Suppose instead that, in general, immediate self-consciousness always functions as a mediating factor in the transition between instances wherein knowing is predominant and those in which doing is predominant. For example, consider instances when the very same bit of knowing also engenders a different doing in one person than in another person whenever a different determination of self-consciousness enters in. In such a way, piety too will enter into the picture, arousing knowing and doing as well. Moreover, every instance in which piety stands out preponderantly will include either both or one of the two as a seed or seeds within itself. Precisely herein lies the truth of our proposition, however; it is in no way an objection against it. This is so, for if it were not so, religious elements could not combine with the other elements to form one life; rather, piety would exist as something wholly of itself, lacking all influence on the other functions of mental life.

Our proposition, however, enters into this very truth, for by this proposition the distinctive domain of piety is secured for it in connection with all the other functions. In doing this, our proposition is contrary to claims issuing from other places, to the effect that piety is a knowing or a doing or both, or is a state that is some mixture of feeling, knowing, and doing. Having seen this polemical relation, moreover, we are now in a position to consider our proposition more closely.

Now, suppose that piety should consist in knowing. Then it would surely have to be precisely that knowing in its entirety or in its essence which would be set forth as the content of faith-doctrine, and so we would be completely mistaken here in our searching out the essence of piety as something separate from knowing for the purpose of forming faith-doctrine. If piety is then comprised of this knowing, then the quantity of this knowing in a human being must also be the criterion for the amount of one’s piety. This would be the case, for whatever in the rising and falling of a given object is the criterion of its degree of reaching toward perfection cannot fail to constitute the very essence of that object; accordingly, given the presupposition posed here, the best master of Christian faith-doctrine would, at the same time, also unexceptionably be the most pious Christian. Moreover, even if we should directly add the premise that this best master would simply be the one who also holds most to what is essential, not forgetful of this in being occupied with incidental and external matters,10 still, no one would accede to this position. Rather, one would hold that, given the same degree of perfection in that knowing, very different degrees of piety could obtain and that, given the same degree of perfection in piety, very different degrees of knowing could accompany it.

Yet, someone could perhaps object that the claim that piety is comprised of knowing actually does not refer to the content of that knowing but to the surety attendant upon the notions themselves, so that the information provided in faith-doctrines would be piety only on account of the surety that accompanies them and thus on account of the strength of one’s conviction. In contrast, mere awareness of such information without conviction would not constitute piety at all. Thus, at that point, strength of conviction would be the criterion of piety, and this is surely what people also especially have in mind who would quite happily substitute “holding firm to one’s convictions” for the word “faith.” In all other more proper areas of knowing, however, conviction itself bears no other criterion than clarity and integrity of thinking itself. Now, suppose that the situation with this particular conviction were the same. Then we would nonetheless revert to the aforementioned claim, that the person who thinks out religious propositions with greatest clarity and integrity, both individually and in their interconnectedness, would have to be the most pious as well. If this claim is then still rejected but the presupposition focusing on conviction is nonetheless to be retained, here “conviction” would have to be something else and would have to have a different criterion. However closely piety may then be interconnected with this state of surety, it cannot on this account cohere with that knowing11 in the same fashion. If the knowing that forms faith-doctrine is still to be related to piety, however, then this knowing can be explicated most naturally in such a way that piety is, to be sure, the object of that knowing, but this knowing can be explicated only insofar as a degree of surety indwells the determinations of self-consciousness.¹²

Suppose, on the other hand, that piety should consist in doing. Then it is obvious that the doing constituting it cannot be determined by its content. That is to say, experience teaches that alongside the finest also the most foul, alongside the most abundant and profound also the most inane and meaningless things are done in the name of piety¹³ and out of piety. Thus, we must resort only to the form or manner in which doing comes about. This form or manner, however, can be grasped only at the two extreme points in the process of doing: at the impetus14 that underlies action, viewed as its starting point, and at the expected outcome of action, viewed as the point that is its goal. No one, however, would then term an action more or less pious on account of the greater or lesser degree of perfection with which its expected outcome is reached. That fact, however, leaves us with no other option than to consider the role of impetus. It is obvious that a determination of self-consciousness underlies every impetus for action, whether it is then pleasure or the lack of pleasure, and that it is on the basis of this determination of self-consciousness that any given single impetus to action is most clearly distinguished from another one. Accordingly, a particular doing will be pious to the degree that the determination of self-consciousness—namely feeling, which will have become affect¹⁵ and will have passed over into being an impetus to action—is a pious one.

So, the two supposed positions we have been examining both lead to the same point: that there does exist a knowing and a doing that pertains to piety but that neither one constitutes the essence of piety. Rather, they pertain to piety only insofar as an aroused feeling then comes to rest in some thinking that focuses on it and, after that, flows forth in some action that gives expression to it.

Finally, no one will deny that there are feeling states, such as repentance, remorse, trust, and joy in God, that we term pious, or religious, in and of themselves, without reference to any knowing and doing that emerges from them. To be sure, we do expect, however, that these feeling states would continue to operate in actions otherwise called for and also that the drive to reflect¹⁶ would be directed toward them.

5. How the other claim is to be judged—namely, that piety is a state in which knowing, feeling, and doing are combined—doubtless already follows from what we have said up to now. Naturally, we would reject this claim if it means that feeling is to be derived from knowing or that doing is to be derived from feeling. However, if it is not meant to imply any subordinate relation whatsoever, then it might as well be the description of any other entirely clear and living moment as of a pious one. This is explained as follows. First, even though the aim of a given action already precedes the action itself, it still accompanies the action right along, and the relationship between the two is expressed in self-consciousness at the same time through a greater or lesser degree of satisfaction and confidence. In consequence, here too all three are combined within the content of that state taken as a whole. Second, in a similar manner, the same situation obtains with respect to knowing. That is to say, as an operation of thinking activity that is brought to a successful close, knowing expresses itself in self-consciousness as a confident surety. Yet, at the same time, it also becomes an effort to combine the truth thus recognized with other truths or to seek out cases where they can be applied, and this effort is the ever simultaneously present onset of a doing, which doing then fully unfolds at the first opportunity that arises. Consequently, here too we find knowing, feeling, and doing collected together in the same state. Now, third, we notice that just as the first-described state, the combination notwithstanding, is still essentially a doing and the second state is essentially a knowing, so too, in all its various expressions, piety remains essentially a state of feeling.

Accordingly, this state of feeling is also taken up into thinking, but in this case only in the measure as a given person who is determined by piety within oneself is inclined toward thinking and practices it. Moreover, only in the same manner and by the same measure, this same inner determination of the person also issues forth in lively movement and presentational action.17 The present account has already made it clear that “feeling” does not mean something confused or something nonactive, since, on the one hand, it is most strongly present in one’s most lively elements and directly or indirectly underlies all the expressions of one’s will and, on the other hand, can also be stirred up by reflection, and what it is can itself be thought about.

Suppose, however, that certain other persons want to exclude feeling from our domain altogether and, on that account, want simply to describe piety as a knowing that engenders actions or as a doing that is generated from some sort of knowing. It would then be incumbent on these persons not only first to settle among themselves whether piety is then to consist essentially in knowing or in doing, but they would then also have to point out to us how a certain doing can arise out of some sort of knowing without an intervening determination of self-consciousness. Moreover, if they finally have to concede the presence of this latter feature in the process, then, as a result of the foregoing account, they will have been convinced that when such an interweaving of features bears the character of piety in itself, knowing within it is not yet piety and doing within it is no longer piety regarded in and of itself. Rather, piety is precisely the intervening determination of self-consciousness. The situation just outlined, however, can always be regarded in the reverse direction as well, in such a way that doing is not yet piety in all those cases in which a determinate self-consciousness is yet to ensue from what has been done, and knowing is no longer piety in and of itself when it has no more content than that determination of self-consciousness which has been taken up in thinking.18

1. Frömmigkeit.

2. Ed. note: The reference is to some initial clarifications within the second discourse. See On Religion (1821) II, 67–176, especially 77–90, 94f., 130–33, and 156–62. To summarize, using Schleiermacher’s own words there in the Tice 1969 translation (with some revisions):

For understanding my whole view, no recommendation to the reader could be more important than to suggest that one compare these discourses with my other book, Christian Faith. In form the two are quite different. Their points of departure lie far apart. In overall content, however, they can be completely assimilated. (161)

At the very outset, religion waives all claims to anything belonging to the two domains of science and morality. It would return all that has been either found or pressed upon it from these sources. … Religion is essentially contemplative, to be sure. … The contemplation of religious persons is simply the immediate consciousness of the universal being of all finite things in and through the infinite, of all temporal things in and through the eternal. To seek and to find this infinite and eternal factor in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all action and passion, and to have and to know life itself only in immediate feeling—that is religion. Where this awareness is found, religion is satisfied; where this awareness is hidden, religion experiences frustration and anguish, emptiness and death. And so religion is, indeed, a life in the infinite nature of the whole, in the one and all, in God—a having and possessing of all in God and of God in all. Knowledge and knowing, however, it is not, either of the world or of God; it simply acknowledges these things without being either. For religion, science is also a movement and revelation of the infinite in the finite. Religion, however, further sees this movement and revelation in God, and God sees it in religion. (77–78)

Although piety dwells with pleasure on every activity by which the infinite is revealed in the finite, it is nevertheless not identical with this activity. It maintains its own domain and character only by steering clear of science and praxis as such. Only insofar as piety takes its place beside them both, moreover, will the field they hold in common be completely filled out and this aspect of human nature be fulfilled. Piety presents itself to you as the necessary and indispensable third to science and morality, as their natural counterpart, one no less endowed with that dignity and excellence which you attribute to them. … True science is perception truly achieved; true praxis is art and culture created of oneself; true religion is sense and taste for the infinite. (79–80, 82)

Try to enter with me into the innermost sanctuary of life. There perhaps we can find our way to common ground. Only there will you find the fundamental relation of feeling and perception by which their sameness and difference is to be understood. I must ask you, however, to look at yourselves, at your own apprehension of this vital aspect of human experiences. You must understand it by listening to yourselves, as it were, in the presence of your own consciousness—or at least you must be able to reconstruct this state of experience for yourselves out of what consciousness you have. What are you to notice? The coming into being of your own consciousness. (85)

Yet, what if you cannot do this? Try to indicate, then, what every act of life is as an act, without specific distinction from all the other acts. Ponder this in the most general and strictly fundamental way. What is an act, considered just as a simple act or element of life—as nothing else? It has the same character as the whole of your life has. It is a coming into being of its own and a coming of a being into some whole—both together; it is a striving to return to the whole and a striving to stand on its own—both together. Isn’t it? These are the links out of which the entire chain of being is fashioned, because your whole life is a being separately existing within the whole of being.

But then, by what means do you have your existence within the whole? By your capacity for sense, I should hope you would say, because in order to exist in the whole you must have possession of your senses. And by what means do you have your existence on your own? Surely it is through the unity of your own self-consciousness. This identity of awareness you have, first of all, in your capacity for sentience, in your discrimination of comparative degrees in experience. It is easy to see how each factor can only arise together with the other, if both together form every act of life. In this case, you become the contributor of sense, and the whole becomes your object. This intermingling and unifying of sense and object—before each returns to its place and the object as torn loose from sense becomes attached to perception and you as torn loose from the object become identified with feeling—this prior element of experience is what I am referring to. You are always experiencing this element, yet you never thoroughly experience it because the phenomenon of your life is only the result of its constant fading and returning. This element of experience passes so swiftly that it is scarcely in time at all. It is so little observable that it can scarcely be described. … This is how each new element comes to belong within your life’s domain. Out of such a beginning, moreover, arises every religious stirring. (85–87)

The penetration of existence within this immediate union ceases as soon as it reaches consciousness. Then a vivid and clear perception arises before you …, or feeling works its way out from deep within you and spreads over your whole being. … Now, the same sort of relation that exists between perception and feeling also holds between knowledge, as something that deals with both, and conduct. Through the constant interplay of these two contrasting factors, your life stretches out in time and gains its distinct positioning. From the very outset, both knowledge and conduct represent your will to become one with the universe through an object. If the power of objects holds sway over you, pressing you into the circle of their existence by entering into you through perception or feeling, some sort of knowledge always emerges. If the predominate force is on your part, so that you give objects the impress of your existence and reflect yourselves in them, then there arises what you call conduct in the narrower sense: external effect. … Only in the interchange between knowledge and conduct, only in their mutual stimulus, can your life endure. …

Here, then, you have these three things… : knowing, feeling, and conduct. And now you understand what I mean by asserting that they are not identical and are yet inseparable. If you will simply gather all that belongs to each grouping together and consider each one by itself, you will discover that all those elements in which you exercise power over things and place your stamp upon them make up what you call the practical life—or in a narrower sense the moral life. In contrast, you will no doubt call those more or less frequent elements of observation, in which things generate their existence within you through perception your scientific life. … And what name will you give to this third category having to do with feeling? What sort of life is this to form in relation to knowing and conduct? The religious life, in my view. … This is the distinctive domain which I would assign to religion, alone and in its entirety. Your feeling is your piety, with two qualifications: first, insofar as that feeling expresses the being and life common to you and the universe in the way described and, second, insofar as the particular elements of that feeling come to you as an operation of God within you mediated through the operation of the world upon you. The details that make up this category consist neither of your knowledge nor of its objects, neither of your works and deeds nor of the various spheres of conduct. They consist simply of your experiences of receptivity and the influences upon you of all that lives and moves around you accompanying and conditioning those experiences. These and only these are the exclusive feature of religion—all of them. (86–90)

Elsewhere in On Religion II and in the rest of that book, as in Christian Faith, Schleiermacher makes clear that insofar as basic religious perception and feeling are genuinely expressed in knowing and acting, the life of piety is completed, yet even theology is not of itself religion, just as conduct divorced from religious stirrings is not religion. A vital faith cannot ever be reduced, however, to correct belief or prescribed behavior, as such.

3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher held that whereas what is religious issues from individual life, the ethical/moral domain issues predominantly from collective life. See his discussion of this contrast in OR (1821) V, supplemental note 13.

4. Ed. note: In the proposition, the adjective unmittelbar (“immediate”) before “self-consciousness” means without any mediation, direct. It does not mean instantaneous. For the latter sense of “immediate,” several other words are available in German usage (augenblicklich, etc.), but never this one.

5. Henrich Steffens’s (1773–1845) depiction of feeling is very closely related to mine and can easily be rendered in terms of it. See his book Von der falschen Theologie (1823), 92–100, where he speaks of “the immediate presence of undivided existence in its entirety,” etc. In contrast, Ludwig Friedrich Otto Baumgarten-Crusius’s (1788–1843) depiction, for one thing, does not encompass the whole of feeling but includes only the higher region of feeling. For another thing, by using the expression “sense perception” (Wahrnehmung) his depiction also seems to pull “feeling” way over into the domain of objective consciousness, not to speak of the opposition it draws between “feeling” and “self-consciousness.” Dogmatik (1820), 56.

6. Ed. note: In logic, this is a proof showing—indirectly, not by direct demonstration—the absurdity of denying a given claim.

7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s own “Psychology” lectures (SW III.6, 1863) essentially covered only certain basics in philosophy of mind.

8. Ed. note: The word here is sei (is, be, would be). That is, as in On Religion II, in its very nature, the roots of “piety” (or “religion”) lie in “feeling” (and “perception”), so that piety distinctively consists in feeling; however, as he outlines his case there and explicates it in the remaining three discourses, a lively piety is also necessarily expressed in thinking and acting; piety takes shape and itself develops in particular communities and social contexts and in relation to other religions. It is not, and cannot claim to be, vital if it is simply a matter of stimulation within some isolated sector of the psyche (or brain, as some might say today).

9. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “All that piety consists of lies to be recovered in feeling. Sharper distinction in feeling [comes] from self-disapprobation [rather] than [from] judgment and shame” (Thönes, 1873).

10. Ed. note: At this point in the first edition, §8.2 (KGA I/7.1, 27), Schleiermacher quotes from Clement of Alexandria’s Stromateis 2.2; cf. Migne Gr. 2:117f.

11. Ed. note: As it happens, the word for “surety” (alternatively, for “certainty”) is Gewissheit, and that for “knowing” is Wissen. The word for “science” is Wissenschaft. Schleiermacher, however, was not engaged in a search for unqualified, absolute certainty; in contrast, “surety” more exactly conveys his sense for degrees of reliability in one’s knowing, hence in the clarity and integrity of one’s conviction concerning what one “knows.” See his writings on dialectic.

12. Ed. note: Cf. OG 40, where he explains that “pious feeling” proceeds not from any notion (Vorstellung) but from “an immediate existential relationship” (ein unmittelbares Existentialverhältnis).

13. Ed. note: The phrase “in the name of piety” translates als fromm. In this context, fromm (literally, “pious”) means the same thing as “piety” (Frömmigkeit); see §3n1 above. Within this work as a whole, however, when it modifies words such as “feeling” or “self-consciousness,” fromm is always translated “religious.” The reason is twofold. First, in ordinary usage “pious” has come to bear a strongly pejorative connotation, which Schleiermacher does not at all intend. Second, for him fromm points to what religion (Religion) is at its base, at its very roots, in religious feeling and perception, thence also in its more extended expression into thinking, acting, and communal life (in Christian Faith first explicated in §§3–6). In this broader sense, then, what is fromm basically is that base, and only then does it lead to and become a component of all else that is distinctively “religious” (religiöse). Schleiermacher’s fullest account of this continuum of religious life is given in On Religion I–V, though further, more precise details are provided throughout the present work. Accordingly, in Christian Faith the noun Frömmigkeit serves both functions, depending on context, referring either to the roots or base of all genuine religion or to its necessary expression in religion through thought and action. Far more often than not, however, Frömmigkeit refers to the broader life, thus rooted. The adjective fromm almost always refers to the basic religious experience (Erfahrung), hence to “faith” in that sense, which he also contrasts with belief and customary action (Sitte, including but not restricted to morals).

14. Antrieb. Ed. note: Or, “motive,” “motivating factor.” Here “impetus” is chosen so as not to confuse what moves one to action with a “reason,” which is often presupposed in using “motive.” In any case, the impetus is viewed as internal, not strictly external. Just below, pleasure (Lust) and the lack of pleasure (Unlust) are given as internal determinations of self-consciousness that can, in turn, underlie an impetus to action (see §4n13).

15. Ed. note: The term Affekt, in Schleiermacher’s usage, refers to a stirring in the body, literally an “emotive” stirring component by which feeling consciously rises and is registered somewhere in the body (in what we call the brain and nervous system today). In his psychology lectures, the human psyche is always body-mind, never separably body and mind. Thus, an “affective” state, such as an experience of joy or a mood of depression, is an expression of body-mind/mind-body.

16. Trieb zur Betrachtung. Ed. note: Betrachtung can mean reflection, observation, or contemplation.

17. Ed. note: This presentational action (darstellende Handlung) is the chief feature of Schleiermacher’s Christian ethics, over time closely interconnected with and critically codetermined by propagative (or broadening) and purifying (or corrective) action.

18. Ed. note: Here “determination” translates Bestimmtheit, which points to some definite and distinct (bestimmte) qualities of experience that are being held in the “self-consciousness” of an individual. In §§3–6 Schleiermacher develops the accompanying position that this given form or quality must, in large part, be drawn from some collectivity, just as all human language, thought, and action is, though in the process made distinctively (eigentümlich) one’s own. Piety, held in a person’s “immediate self-consciousness” as “feeling,” consists in such a determinate form or quality of experience (definite, no doubt to some considerable extent shared with others but made distinctly one’s own—see §3n14 above and in its context). The actual content of Christian experience that “intervenes” between thinking and doing, as between doing and thinking, is yet to be more precisely defined in this work. Here, Schleiermacher is simply seeking to indicate in what domain of experience this feature of it essentially occurs versus those of thinking and acting, which, in the religious domain being discussed here, are themselves authentically a part of the pious life only as attempted “expressions” of piety and only as created by the “impetus” (Antrieb) of piety (see §3n13 and n14 above). This account will continue to unfold in the remaining propositions of the Introduction.

§4. However diverse they might be, what all the expressions of piety have in common, whereby they are at the same time distinguished from all other feelings—thus the selfsame nature¹ of piety—is this: that we are conscious of ourselves as absolutely dependent or, which intends the same meaning, as being in relation with God.

I am indebted to Professor Delbrück for the word “absolute” (schlechthinig), which often appears in the explanations that follow. At first, I was not inclined to use it, and I have no knowledge of its having already been employed elsewhere, but now that he has offered this adjective, I am very pleased to follow him in its use.2

1. In no real instance of self-consciousness, no matter whether it accompanies only a piece of thinking or of doing or whether it fills a moment of itself, is anyone conscious of one’s self alone, in and of itself, in its selfsameness. Rather, one is always conscious, at the same time, of a changing determination of one’s self. The “I” can be objectively envisaged in itself. Every instance of self-consciousness, however, is, at the same time, that of a changeable being-in-such-and-such-a-way. Already implied in this distinction of the two states, however, is the fact that the changeable state does not issue from the selfsame state alone, for in that case it would not be distinguishable from it. So, present in every instance of self-consciousness are two features: a being positioned-as-a-self and a not-having-been-positioned-as-such, so to speak, or a being and a somehow-having-come-to-be.³ Thus, for every instance of self-consciousness, something other than one’s “I” is presupposed, something whence its determinate nature exists and without which a given self-consciousness would not be precisely what it is. Still, this “other” would never be objectively depicted in immediate self-consciousness, with which alone we have to do here. This is so, for the twofold nature of self-consciousness is indeed the reason why we are continually trying to find objectively an other to which we may trace our being such-and-such. This effort, however, is an act different from that with which we are concerned here. Instead, in self-consciousness only two features are joined: the one feature expresses the being of a subject⁴ of itself, and the other feature expresses the coexistence of a subject with an other.

Now, receptivity and self-initiated activity⁵ in the subject correspond to these two features, as they coexist in temporal self-consciousness. If we could imagine coexistence with an other to be nonexistent, yet could imagine ourselves as otherwise being exactly as we are, then no self-consciousness that would express preponderantly a being-affected that belongs to receptivity would be possible.6 Rather, in that condition self-consciousness would thus be able to express only self-initiated activity. Such activity, however, not being related to any object, would consist only in a desire to step forth on one’s own, an indistinct capacity to act⁷ that is without shape or color. However, just as we always do find ourselves to exist only in coexistence with some other, in every instance of self-consciousness that arises of itself it is also true that the feature of somehow having come to have receptivity comes first. Moreover, even the self-consciousness that accompanies an instance of doing—an instance that can also include cognition—although it does predominantly give evidence of a self-initiated activity on the move,⁸ will always have been referred to an earlier element of receptivity already met with. By that element the originative capacity to act would have received the direction it took, except that often even this prior reference can have been quite indefinite.

Assent to these statements can be expected without qualification. No one would gainsay them, moreover, who is capable of self-observation to any degree and who can deem the distinctive object of our investigations to be of interest.

2. What is common in all those determinations of self-consciousness that predominantly give evidence of a having-been-encountered-from-somewhere that belongs to receptivity⁹ is that in them we feel ourselves to be dependent. On the other hand, what is common in all those determinations of self-consciousness that predominantly give evidence of a self-initiated activity on the move is that we have a feeling of freedom. We feel dependent not only because we have come to be from elsewhere but chiefly because we could not come to be in this way except by some other. We do feel free, because something else is determined by us and could not be determined in this way without our own self-initiated activity. Yet, these two explanations could still seem to be inadequate, in that a capacity of the subject for movement10 also exists that does not interconnect with another, a capacity to which the same contrast appears to apply. However, even if we were to come into being somehow self-generated from within, absent any being coposited on the part of some “other” in the process, then this would be the simple situation of a temporal development of one who eventually remains self-identical,¹¹ and this situation could only very improperly be referred to the concept of “freedom.”¹² On the other hand, if somehow we could not come into being from within ourselves, then this situation would designate only the boundary of one’s self-initiated activity, a characteristic that belongs to the very nature of oneself as a subject, and only very improperly would the existence of this boundary be called “dependence.”

In any case, this contrast between freedom and dependence is in no way to be confused with a contrast between melancholic or depressive feelings versus elevating or joyful feelings, which will be taken up later.¹³ That is to say, a feeling of dependence too can be elevating if one’s accompanying state of having come to be in such-and-such a way were to make itself known as full blown. Likewise, a feeling of freedom can be depressive, in part, if the element of receptivity to which one’s doing is traced were overweeningly of that nature and, in part, if the manner of one’s self-initiated activity were expressed in a more disadvantageous coexistence.

Now, suppose that we imagine a feeling of dependence and a feeling of freedom to be one, in the sense that not only the subject but also the coposited “other” would be the same in both feelings. In that case, the overall self-consciousness that is composed of the two feelings would be one of reciprocity of the subject with the coposited “other.” If we take the further step of positing the totality of all elements of feeling that belong to these two kinds to be one, the result is that the coposited other is also to be posited as a totality, or as one. Moreover, the expression “reciprocity” is thus the right one for our self-consciousness in general, this to the extent that our self-consciousness gives evidence of our coexistence with everything that engages our capacity for receptivity and that is exposed to our self-initiated activity as well. Indeed, all of these considerations apply not only to the extent that we particularize this other and ascribe to each particularized other a relationship to that twofold process within us, even though this is done in varying degrees; they also apply to the extent that we posit the totality of what lies outside us as one, indeed, also because additional receptivity and self-initiated activity to which we also have some relationship is included therein as one, existing together with ourselves—that is, as world.

Accordingly, our self-consciousness, viewed as a consciousness of our being in the world or as a consciousness of our coexistence with the world,14 exists as a series in which we have feelings divided into those of dependence and freedom. In this entire domain, however, there is no such thing as a feeling of absolute dependence—that is, a feeling of dependence without a feeling of freedom related to the same codetermining factor—and no such thing as a feeling of absolute freedom—that is, a feeling of freedom without a feeling of dependence related to the same codetermining factor. Suppose that we are observing our circumstances in nature or are observing those in human activity. In doing this, we can discover a great mass of objects in relation to which freedom and dependence have very much the same weight, and these objects constitute the area of parity in the process of reciprocity.15 Still other objects exercise a far greater effect on our receptivity than does the effect of our self-initiated activity on them, and vice versa. In consequence, one of the two factors can be restricted by an imperceptibly small amount,¹⁶ but neither one of the two would ever entirely disappear. The feeling of dependence is predominant in the relationship of children to their parents or of citizens to their fatherland. Yet, individuals can still exercise a counteractive effect or a leading influence on their fatherland even without dissolving that relationship. Moreover, just as children’s dependence on their parents is soon felt to be a dependence that gradually diminishes and fades, so, from early on, it is also not without an admixture of a self-initiated activity directed toward their parents, just as even in the most absolute autocratic situation the one who gives orders is never without some slight feeling of dependence. The same thing is true with regard to nature, as we then exercise the tiniest bit of counteraction toward all natural forces ourselves—indeed, one can say, even on world bodies—in the same sense in which they influence us. So, accordingly, our whole self-consciousness in relation to the world or in relation to its particular aspects is always contained within these bounds.

3.¹⁷ Accordingly, there can be no such thing as a feeling of absolute freedom for us. Rather, anyone who claims to have that feeling either deludes oneself or separates factors that belong together. This is so, for if the feeling of freedom gives evidence of a self-initiated activity that issues from ourselves, then this activity must have an object that has somehow been given to us, but this process could not have happened without having an effect on our receptivity; hence, in every such case a feeling of dependence that belongs to the feeling of freedom is coposited, and thus the feeling of freedom is limited by the feeling of dependence. The opposite case could arise only if the given object were in every respect to come into being only by our activity; but this is always only relatively, and never absolutely, the case.

Suppose, however, that the feeling of freedom gives evidence only of an inner self-active movement. Then, not only does every such particular movement interconnect with the actual state of our aroused receptivity, but also the totality of our inner free movements, viewed as a unity, cannot be represented by a feeling of absolute freedom, because our entire existence18 does not come into consciousness for us as having arisen from our own self-initiated activity. Therefore, no feeling of absolute freedom can have its locus in any temporal being.¹⁹

Now, suppose, as our proposition states, that, on the other hand, a feeling of absolute dependence is possible, despite all these considerations. Then, this feeling of absolute dependence can in no way proceed on the same basis. That is, it cannot proceed from the effect of some object somehow given to us, for some counteraction to such an object would always take place, and even any voluntary refusal to react in this way would always include a feeling of freedom with it. Therefore, strictly speaking, this feeling too, if viewed in this way, is not possible in any single element of life. This is so, because this element, in accordance with its overall content, would always be determined by something given, thus by something toward which we could have some feeling of freedom. This being said, however, precisely this self-consciousness—which both accompanies all of our self-initiated activity, thus also our entire existence²⁰ because this self-initiated activity is never at zero, and also negates absolute freedom, as just explained—is already in and of itself a consciousness of absolute dependence. This is so, for it is the consciousness that our entire self-initiated activity likewise issues from elsewhere, just as anything in relation to which we would be thought to have a feeling of absolute freedom would have to issue entirely from us. If we were to have no feeling of freedom, however, no feeling of absolute dependence would be possible.

4. In our proposition “absolute dependence” and “being in relation with God” are made equivalent. This affirmation is to be understood in such a way that precisely the whence²¹ coposited in this self-consciousness, the whence of our receptive and self-initiated active existence, is to be designated by the term “God,”²² and for us “whence” holds the truly primary meaning of the term “God.”

In this connection, it remains only to recall, first of all, based on our previous considerations, that this “whence” is not the world in the sense of the totality of temporal being, and still less is it any one part of that totality. That is to say, the feeling of freedom, limited though it is, that we have in relation to the world—in part, as components complementary to the world and, in part, in that we are continually engaged in affecting particular aspects of the world—together with the possibility afforded us to have some effect on all aspects of the world, permits only a feeling of limited dependence but excludes the feeling of absolute dependence. It is also to be remarked, next, that our proposition would inveigh against the opinion that this feeling of dependence would itself be conditioned by any prior knowing about God. This position, moreover, may well be all the more called for since many people—people who already consider themselves to be sure of having a completely grasped, primary concept of God, that is, a concept independent of all feeling, in this higher self-consciousness, which higher self-consciousness may well border closely enough on a feeling of absolute freedom—also set way aside precisely that feeling which we consider to be the basic form of all piety23 but which they take to be something almost subhuman.

Now, on the other hand, in no way does our proposition intend to dispute whether there can be such a primary knowing. Rather, it intends only to set it aside as something with which we could never have anything to do in a presentation of Christian faith-doctrine. This is so because, obviously enough, that sort of knowing has nothing directly to do with piety.

Yet, if the word “God” is in general originally at one with its attendant notion, and thus the term “God” presupposes some notion of it, then the following is to be said. This notion, which is nothing other than simply a declaration of the feeling of absolute dependence, or the most direct possible reflection24 of it, is the most primary notion with which we have to do here, completely independent from the primary knowing proper just mentioned. Moreover, the notion we have to do with here is conditioned only by our feeling of absolute dependence, with the result that for us “God” signifies, first of all, simply that which is codeterminant in this feeling and that to which we push back our being, that being viewed as what we are. Any content of this notion that would be derived from some other quarter, however, has to be explicated based on the fundamental content just specified.

Now, precisely this basic content is especially intended by the formulation that feeling oneself to be absolutely dependent and being conscious of oneself as in relation with God are one and the same thing. This is so, because absolute dependence is the fundamental relation that all other relations must include within themselves. The second expression includes God-consciousness²⁵ in self-consciousness at the same time, and it does so in such a way that the two cannot be separated from each other, entirely in accordance with the above discussion. The feeling of absolute dependence simply becomes a clear self-consciousness, in that this notion of it arises at the same time. To the extent that this happens, one can also well say that God is given to us in feeling in an originative fashion. Suppose, moreover, that one were to speak of an “original revelation of God”²⁶ to human beings or in human beings. Then precisely the following meaning would always be intended by it: that what is given to human beings, along with the absolute dependence inherent in all finite being no less than in oneself, is also the immediate self-consciousness of that absolute dependence arising to the point of being God-consciousness.

Now, in whatever measure this combined sense really arises during the temporal course of one’s personal existence,27 we ascribe piety to that individual to the same degree. On the other hand, any sort of givenness of God’s being²⁸ remains completely excluded. This is so, because everything that is externally given must also always be given as an object to which some counteraction is directed, to whatever small degree that may occur. The rendering²⁹ of that notion to any sort of sense-perceptible object is always a corruption, unless one is and remains conscious of that notion as a purely incidental symbolization. This is true whether what is given may then be a transient rendering, thus a theophany, or a constitutive rendering, in which God is imagined to be a sense-perceptible, constant individual being.³⁰

1. Wesen. For Schleiermacher, the “nature” of a thing or concept is its very being, its essence, to which all else is related as its expression, not as an incidental, merely secondary attribute. It is also true for him, however, that all other characteristics that may be applied, however necessary for a full definition, are comparatively only approximations to the basic characterization in which they are considered to be rooted.

2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “Schlechthinig is the same [gleich] as absolut” (Thönes, 1873). Thus, the word schlechthinig is a simple Germanizing of the Latin adjective “absolute.” On occasion words like “utter” and “unexceptionably” could also translate it.

3. Ed. note: The pairs of concepts here are ein Sichselbstsetzen and ein Sichselbstnichtsogesezthaben, then ein Sein and ein Irgendwiegewordensein. The first of each pair refers to an awareness of oneself simply as an existing being, the second to an awareness of one’s having come into being and being changeably sustained in a process of being and becoming by some agency outside oneself.

4. Subjekt. Ed. note: That is, what is meant here is not a “topic” but an individual viewed as a “subject,” an active being with one’s own agency.

5. Empfanglichkeit und Selbsttätigkeit. Ed. note: Sometimes elsewhere Schleiermacher uses the Latinate terms Receptivität und Spontaneität.

6. Ed. note: Here Schleiermacher’s marginal note indicates this consequence: “Then an effect [Affekt] would be regarded as if it were also produced by ourselves” (Thönes, 1873).

7. Agilität. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s German usage, as in Latin, this word means simply an ability or tendency to move or act. For the nimbleness or quickness of movement contained in English usage of the word, German writers would use words such as Beweglichkeit or Flinkkeit.

8. Ed. note: Here the qualifying adjective is regsam (on the move). In such passages, where exact definition is especially important, Schleiermacher takes great care over his choice of terms. In other contexts regsam would normally mean “active,” but here he is already using Tätigkeit for activity. The refined question, then, is What kind of activity is this act, and at what stage does it occur within a very complex process?

9. Irgendwohergetroffensein der Empfanglichkeit. Ed. note: These longer verbal inventions and combinations are intended to take the reader into imagining (or recalling) a specific element in one’s experience for which there is no ready concept. They represent an instant of self-perception to which he thus invites close attention. See On Religion II.A.1 (1821). Thus far, the analysis states only that “we feel ourselves to be dependent.” Then he takes the further step of specifying a “feeling of absolute dependence” (schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl). If the phrase were literally rendered “absolute feeling of dependence,” it would be grammatically distinct from our “consciousness” or “feeling” of ourselves “being absolutely dependent” (Gefühl der schlechthinige Abhängigkeit), which he says is “identical” to our “being in relation to God” (e.g., §4.2 below). In §§5–10, as with different language in the third and fifth discourses of On Religion, Schleiermacher does posit many stages in a development from a mere feeling of being dependent on some “perceptible object” (e.g., successively a fetish in fetishism, figures, or images in polytheism, or the world as a whole in pantheism) to “this highest stage” wherein the “whence” (woher) of the feeling of absolute dependence is God. However, the first, shorthand phrase is used for this highest meaning throughout Christian Faith, notably at the most critical points: e.g., §§30.1, 36.1, and 62.2.

10. Beweglichkeit.

11. Ed. note: That is, as Schleiermacher’s brief marginal comment indicates, it would simply point to “the constant feature” of one’s being as one develops over time (Thönes, 1873). Thus, in this respect we can see, as an implication, that some other would have to be “coposited” toward which or toward whom one could exercise some impression or influence for one to act freely at all. This observation implies that without the presence of some other, one’s action would be automatic, not free.

12. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “Self-development nevertheless belongs entirely to the category ‘constant feature,’ yet it also operates only as something co-posited” (Thönes, 1873).

13. Ed. note: See §5.4, also discussions of similar contrasts between joy and feelings far in the other direction in §§82.2, 85.1, 108.3, and 146.1. Such contrasted feelings, as Schleiermacher’s marginal note here suggests (Thönes, 1873), fall under the “general form” of self-consciousness that he calls “pleasure and the lack of pleasure” (Lust und Unlust) (cf. §§62 and 66). In his account, human beings are constitutionally interactive and interpersonal and communal beings, thus coposited in all these ways. Accordingly, he adds in this same note the intention of discussing the mistaken view “that dependence would effect an absolutely depressive [niederdrückend] result,” countering with the thought that “having confidence in another does not occur without dependence.” On these grounds, then, shared feeling, sympathy, or compassion (Mitgefühl), each of these with or toward others, can be oriented in the direction of pleasure or of the lack of pleasure, i.e., as shared joy (Mitfreude, e.g., §156.2) with or toward others or as shared sorrow, or as compassion (Mitleid, e.g., §163.P.S.), all of these with or toward others.

14. Ed. note: In a marginal note (Thönes, 1873), Schleiermacher marks these two modes of self-consciousness vis-à-vis the world as “twofold.” That is, the two are distinguishable, so that neither can be substituted for the other, but the two can be simultaneous. We exist both as being inextricably embedded in the world and as separate entities in relation to the codetermining factors that make up the rest of the world, coexisting with these factors, all being conceived both as particulars and as the totality of what lies outside us.

15. Ed. note: Affixed here is Schleiermacher’s marginal comment: “This is where dreams of having a countering influence on God are to be considered” (Thönes, 1873).

16. Ed. note: In a marginal comment, Schleiermacher adds: “The inclination to deify natural bodies (e.g., stars) and natural forces (e.g., elements), against which our feeling of freedom is at a minimum, is understood on this basis” (Thönes, 1873).

17. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “How can the feeling of dependence be absolute? It can be so only in an exclusive sense, not in contrast to the feeling of freedom. It also follows that if objects are not created by our own activity, then they exist in the way they do independent of us. Thus, even our influence on them cannot contradict their given being, and, consequently, our power over them is broken” (Thönes, 1873).

18. Dasein. Ed. note: That is, our literally “being there,” where we can be seen to be.

19. Sein.

20. Dasein.

21. Woher.

22. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “Here the word ‘God’ is presented as meaning nothing else, in our language domain, than what is co-posited in the feeling of primary [ursprünglichen], absolute dependence. Accordingly, all narrower definitions must be explicated only on this basis. Hence, the anthropopathic approach is yet to be explained. The customary view moves in the reverse direction, claiming that the feeling of dependence would first arise based on a knowing about God that is given from elsewhere. This move, however, is mistaken, for if we ascribe such a knowing even to philosophers, the God-consciousness of the mass of people cannot be considered to come from that source, since all attempts to popularize speculative God-consciousness (e.g., proofs for the existence of God) proved unsuccessful. Now, if we accede to that customary approach, we ought not in any case also to imagine that the two approaches are split in such a way that some people have piety only because they cannot have the fruits of speculation and that others either never had piety or would have had to have forgotten it if they come to a speculative consciousness of God. Rather, both approaches are alike primary, each in its own way, and they can also exist alongside each other on that account. It is almost inconceivable how people can have ascribed pantheism to me, since I completely sunder the feeling of absolute dependence from any relation to the world” (Thönes, 1873).

23. Ed. note: In this context the reference of “all” can only be to “Christian piety” (see how the next paragraph begins), or at most to any that rests on the feeling of absolute dependence, though Schleiermacher does also claim that all genuine “piety” is based on feeling, not on “knowing.” See also On Religion I, supplemental note 18. Discourse II briefly reiterates what had been said in that work regarding the “strivings” of piety/religion as “the immediate being of God in us through feeling,” now placed “in a clearer light” in Christian Faith. On “religious feeling” (fromme Gefühl) see the entire presentation in CF §§3–5, especially §3.4 and §5.P.S. and indexes in both works. In all three editions of OR the combination of Anschauung and Gefühl (perception, beholding, or intuition with feeling) is the basis for all religious feeling, reaching greater articulation and strength in “higher feelings” within religions as they rise up the developmental scale. In CF this pair comes to a focus in schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl (the feeling of absolute dependence), which for Schleiermacher has to arise among the monotheistic religions and to be reaching its height in Christianity. On this basis, it is especially instructive to trace the uses of this concept through the whole works. Closely related feelings, attitudes, and dispositions such as awe, reverence, gratitude, love, joy, trust, contentment, and peace are best indicated in other forms of discourse.

24. Reflexion. Ed. note: This word here refers to such phenomena as a mirror reflection of light or of sound (an echo), not to contemplative reflection (Betrachtung, Contemplation).

25. Gottesbewuβtsein. Ed. note: This is to be a key term throughout this book, and it grows in fullness of meaning the whole way. See BO §1 and index.

26. Ed. note: The phrase is von einer ursprünglichen Offenbarung Gottes. In this immediate context, ursprünglich is translated with both “original” or “originative,” and “primary,” to indicate the fundamental, bedrock role of both the feeling of absolute dependence and the ever accompanying notion (Vorstellung) of one’s being in relation with God. In the Christian context, the only context to be considered in this work, the notion of being in relation with God is taken to exist on a degree scale from rather vague and tentative to very strong, steady, and compelling. In dogmatics this notion is to be filled in conceptually through the presentation of doctrine, but it is not ever to be separated from, or to take over from, the primary, originative sensibility described here as the “feeling of absolute dependence” or from closely associated feelings expressed in faith.

27. Persönlichkeit. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this term never carries the mostly later meaning of “personality.”

28. Gegebensein Gottes. Ed. note: That is, any claim of knowing God’s being in God’s self, as it were, apart from God’s distinct work of creation and preservation, redemption, and reconciliation in history, is strictly a matter of speculation, not of faith-doctrine.

29. Übertragung. Ed. note: Besides the more literal sense of “rendering” or “carryover,” Schleiermacher also uses this word to describe the overall process of “translation,” viewed as a “transference” from one sphere of language usage into another such sphere.

30. Einzelwesen. Ed. note: Here the anthropomorphic error, or “corruption,” to which Schleiermacher points would be that of translating “the Supreme Being” (das höchste Wesen) into such an individual, thus making “God” into “a person” rather than the Creator who, as it were, chooses to be and is in relation to persons in a way appropriate to their existence as persons, as would be true, respectively, of God’s relation to everything else. As will be seen, the only place Schleiermacher (very carefully) selects use of the word “is” in anything like either a strictly identitative sense or a strictly predicative sense is in §167: “God is love.” This “is” is itself still being used symbolically even there, for it is still appropriate to ask even in that case: In concrete terms, what is that? Love is both an attitude and act directed toward someone and an experience of what some other gives, in a relationship. As such, even God’s “love” cannot be translated into a merely abstract concept.

§5. What has just been described forms the highest level of human self-consciousness, which level in its actual occurrence is still never disconnected from the immediately lower level. Moreover, through its conjunction with the lower level in a distinct unity within a given element, the highest level also partakes in the contrast between what is pleasurable and what is not pleasurable.

1. Two formations of self-consciousness have been presented: the feeling of absolute dependence and that self-consciousness which, in expressing that relation to finite being which can be perceived by the senses, is split into a feeling of partial dependence and a feeling of partial freedom. We will best see how these two formations of self-consciousness relate to each other if we add yet a third formation to them. That is, suppose that we go back to the initial, more obscure period of the life of human beings. Everywhere therein we would then find the animalistic life to be almost alone predominant, but the spiritual1 life would still be entirely suppressed. As a result, moreover, we would have to imagine the state of a human being’s consciousness in that obscure period also to be very much akin to that of the lower animals.² To us, the state of lower animals is indeed actually quite alien and hidden. Yet, it is nonetheless generally denied that, on the one hand, there is any actual knowledge³ in that state as well as any complete self-consciousness that would combine the separated elements of consciousness into a constant unity of life; yet, on the other hand, a total lack of consciousness is not attributed to them either. Now, this matter is hardly to be settled except by our assuming that there is a consciousness such that what is object-oriented and what is ever-originating-in-oneself, or perception and feeling,⁴ respectively, do not, properly speaking, become distinctly separate from each other; rather, when they are as yet undeveloped, they are entangled in each other. This is the third formation mentioned above, and it patently comes close to the consciousness of children, above all before they have gained any mastery of language. From then on, however, this state increasingly diminishes and draws back into those dreamy elements of consciousness which mediate the transition between wakefulness and sleep. In contrast, during times when we are clearheaded and alert, perception and feeling do plainly separate from each other, and in this way they form the entire fullness of the sensory life of a human being, understood in the broadest compass of the word “sensory.” In sticking purely with consciousness and viewing it quite apart from action proper, we embrace two things by this word. On the one hand, we embrace the gradual process of getting filled up with sense perceptions,5 which constitutes the whole domain of “experience,”⁶ in the broadest sense of that word. Likewise, on the other hand, we embrace all the determinations of self-consciousness that develop out of relations with nature and with humankind, including even those which we have set forth above (§4.2) as the determinations of self-consciousness that come closest to the feeling of absolute dependence. In consequence, we also include social and moral feelings⁷ no less than self-oriented feelings within the meaning of “sensory,” in that, taken as a whole, they too are still located within the domain that consists of all that is separated apart and involved in contrast.

Now, the first of these two locations of consciousness, which is that of sense-oriented consciousness, we skip over in the present context, since it does not belong to this second location.⁸ However, among those feelings which are designated as sensory, taken as a whole, there is something coposited and codetermining therein that belongs to the domain of reciprocity, something to which we trace back our state of being in every instance. Thus, whether we are then conscious of ourselves in the process as more dependent or more free, in a certain sense we nonetheless place ourselves both on a par with and in contrast to it. Moreover, we do this in such a way that as an individual or as caught up in some other larger individual entity—for example, in patriotic feelings—we are positioned over against some other individual being.

Now, what has just been indicated is how all such feelings are most definitely distinguished from the feeling of absolute dependence. This distinction is displayed in the following ways. First, if in this feeling of absolute dependence any feeling of absolute freedom is essentially negated (§4.3), then this negation does indeed occur under the form called self-consciousness. Yet, second, this self-consciousness is not of ourselves as individuals who exist at the present instant in a certain way and not in another way but is only of ourselves as individual finite being overall. Third, in consequence, at this juncture we are not positioned over against any other individual being; rather, herein all contrast between one individual being and another such being is transcended. Hence, in the fourth place, it appears that three levels9 of self-consciousness are undeniably to be distinguished: (1) the level of entangled self-consciousness after the manner of lower animals, in which the contrast we have just discovered cannot have been called forth as yet, as the lowest level; (2) the level of sensory self-consciousness, which totally rests on this contrast, as the middle level; and (3) as the highest level, the level of the feeling of absolute dependence, in which this contrast fades away, in turn, and everything over against which the subject would be set at the middle level is, as a whole, apprehended to be identical with the subject.

2.¹⁰ If there were such a thing as a feeling of absolute freedom, then the contrast discussed above would also be transcended in that very feeling, except that such a subject could never stand in any kind of relation to others of the same sort; rather, everything that would exist for that subject would have to exist for that subject only as receptive material.¹¹ For this reason, however, such a feeling is never present in a human being.¹² Thus, at the same level, even in that subject no immediate self-consciousness can persist other than the feeling of absolute dependence described here. That is to say, every element of consciousness that is composed of a feeling of partial freedom and a feeling of partial dependence places us on a par with and over against another such subject.

The only question that now remains is whether there would be another self-consciousness that is not immediate but that, as such, accompanies knowing or doing of some kind, a self-consciousness that is to be placed parallel to the one we have been considering. Suppose that we then imagine, as an act or state of an individual, a supreme knowing in which all subordinate knowing is encompassed. Indeed, in its domain this knowing would, in any case, rise above all contrast. Yet, its domain would be that of objective consciousness. To be sure, it would be accompanied, however, by an immediate self-consciousness that expresses surety or conviction. On the other hand, in that this self-consciousness would refer to the relationship the subject has as one who is knowing to what is known, viewed as an object, this self-consciousness accompanying supreme knowing would nevertheless lie within the domain of contrast.

Suppose that we likewise imagine a supreme doing in the form of a decision encompassing the entire domain of self-initiated activity, a decision from which all subsequent decisions would unfold as particular parts13 already contained in it. Then, in its domain this supreme doing would, in any case, stand above every contrast, and it would, in any case, be accompanied by some self-consciousness. Yet, when the subject is viewed as the one performing an action, this supreme doing too would refer to the subject’s relationship to that which could be the object of one’s action, and it would thus have its location within that of contrast.

Suppose, further, that the same condition would have to hold for every accompanying self-consciousness that is related to any instance of knowing or doing that is separated off. It follows that no other self-consciousness exists that is raised above the subject-object contrast. Rather, this characteristic attaches exclusively to the feeling of absolute dependence.

3. Now, suppose that the lowest level of self-consciousness, similar to that of lower animals, were gradually to disappear. Then, even though the middle level would develop but the highest level¹⁴ could not develop at all as long as the lowest level were present, so, conversely, the middle level would have to continue undiminished even if the highest level would already have reached its full development. In and of itself, the highest self-consciousness does not depend at all on externally given objects that can stimulate us at one time and then not at another time, and as a consciousness of absolute dependence¹⁵ it is also an entirely simple consciousness and remains ever the same in all conditions that are otherwise changing. Thus, it cannot possibly be one thing in one element of life and a different thing in another element,16 or even be varyingly present in one element but not so in another element. Rather, it is either not present at all or, as long as it is present overall, it is also always present and always the same.

Suppose, then, that the highest level could no less coexist with the second level of self-consciousness than with that of the third, lowest level. In that case, either it should never come up in any instant but would remain in the same obscurity in which it existed as long as the lowest level was predominant, or it would have to be present all alone after the second level were driven out and indeed be inalterably self-identical. Now, the latter option is controverted by all experience. This option also shows itself to be impossible unless our ideation¹⁷ and our doing were to be entirely stripped of self-consciousness, whereby the interconnectedness of our very existence¹⁸ would be irretrievably destroyed for us.

A claim of perseverance for highest self-consciousness can be set forth only on the presupposition that sensory self-consciousness would also be posited with it at the same time. Naturally, this being posited at the same time cannot, however, be thought of as a fusion of the two kinds of self-consciousness, which would be totally contrary to the concept of each that has been set forth here. Rather, what is meant by this being posited at the same time is a simultaneous being of the two in the same element. To be sure, this would imply a mutual being-referred of each of the two kinds of self-consciousness to the other, if the “I” is not to be split apart. Even in certain elements of life, no one can be exclusively conscious of one’s relationships as being in a state of subject-object contrast and, conversely, in other elements of one’s feeling of absolute dependence in and of itself and in general terms. Rather, one is conscious of one’s absolute dependence as one who is already determined for a given element in a certain way within the domain of that contrast. This being-referred of what is sensorially determined to higher self-consciousness in the unity of the given element is the consummatory apex of self-consciousness. That is to say, for a person who has once recognized piety and has taken it up into one’s very existence as a summons, every element of a purely sensory self-consciousness is a defective and imperfect state. Even if the feeling of absolute dependence were generally the entire content of an element of self-consciousness, however, this would still be an imperfect state, for it would be lacking in the boundedness and clarity that arises from being referred to the definiteness of sensory self-consciousness.

Yet, since that very consummation consists of the relation of these two features of self-consciousness to each other, it can also be described in a twofold fashion. Starting from below, that consummation can be described in the following way. Suppose that sensory self-consciousness had entirely expelled subject-object entanglement similar to that of the lower animals. Then a higher tendency would unfold over against the subject-object contrast, and the term for this tendency in self-consciousness would be “the feeling of absolute dependence.” The more a subject would then posit oneself in every element of sensory self-consciousness to be absolutely dependent, alongside one’s partial freedom and partial dependence at the same time, the more religious19 one would be. In contrast, starting from above, that consummation can be described in another way. The very same tendency just described, now viewed as a primary and congenital²⁰ tendency in the human soul, would strive to break through within one’s self-consciousness already from the very outset on. This cannot happen, however, so long as the subject-object contrast is still decomposed and entangled in self-consciousness similar to that of the lower animals. Eventually, however, this tendency does emerge. Moreover, the more it then slips into every element of determinate sensory self-consciousness, without passing over any such element—so that as a human being one continually feels oneself to be partially free and partially dependent over against other finite beings, yet, at the same time, one also feels oneself to be absolutely dependent, equally so along with everything toward which one has those other feelings—the more religious one is.

4. In accordance with its nature and of itself, sensorially determined self-consciousness breaks up into a series of elements that are different in content. This happens because our activity toward another being is a temporal one and influences of another being on us are likewise temporal. In contrast, the feeling of absolute dependence, always being self-identical in and of itself, would not evoke a series of such distinguishable temporal elements. Rather, if it were not to relate with sensorially determined self-consciousness precisely in the way described, then either it could not be a real time-filling consciousness at all or it would have to resonate in unison alongside sensory self-consciousness but lacking any relation to that sensory self-consciousness in the latter’s manifold changes as the latter rises and falls.

Now, in contrast, our religious self-consciousness is actually formed in neither one of these ways. Rather, it is formed in a way that fits the description we have already offered. That is, it comes to be a particular religious stirring only in its being related to a datum that is viewed as a co-constitutive element,21 as an element made up of a feeling of partial freedom and a feeling of partial dependence, and in another element it comes to be a different religious stirring only in relation to a differently constituted datum. This process occurs, however, in such a way that what is essential in both elements, namely, the feeling of absolute dependence, is the same and remains so throughout the entire series of temporal elements. Moreover, the differentiation involved arises only from the fact that this essential aspect—namely, the feeling of absolute dependence—comes to be a different element in its being accompanied by some different sensorially determined self-consciousness, yet it ever remains an element of higher potency. In contrast, where there is no piety at all, sensory self-consciousness comes apart, in the manner likewise already described, and it is thus divided into a series of elements of lower potency; in contrast, in the period of self-object entanglement similar to that of the lower animals, no distinct separation and apartness of elements takes place for the subject itself.

The same process occurs with respect to the other part of our proposition. That is, in accordance with its nature and in and of itself, sensory self-consciousness also falls apart into contrasting features, into what is pleasurable and what is not pleasurable or into pleasure and the lack of pleasure.²² It is not as if the feeling of partial freedom were somehow always one of pleasure and the feeling of partial dependence were somehow always one lacking in pleasure, as people seem to presuppose who are mistakenly of the opinion that the feeling of absolute dependence would, by its very nature, be depressive. For example, a child can be found to be completely well-disposed in the consciousness of dependence on one’s parents and likewise—thank God!—a subject in one’s relationship to a governmental authority; also, others—indeed even parents and governmental authorities—can be found to be ill-disposed in consciousness of their freedom. Thus, as a result, either sort of consciousness can give one either pleasure or the lack of it, depending on whether life is being advanced or obstructed thereby. On the other hand, higher consciousness does not bear any such contrast within it. The very first emergence of higher consciousness is, to be sure, an enhancement of life,23 at a point when a comparison is offered between self-consciousness at this level and a state of isolated sensory self-consciousness.

Suppose, however, that we imagine the latter, sensory self-consciousness in its being-self-identical, apart from any relation to higher self-consciousness. Then what would also happen is simply an unchanging sameness of life, one that would exclude any such contrast with higher consciousness. Now, to this state we would apply the term “blessedness,”²⁴ that of a finite being viewed as at the very apex of one’s perfection.²⁵ As we actually observe our religious consciousness, however, it is not like this. Rather, we see it to be subject to a fluctuation, in that some religious stirrings lean more toward joy, while others lean more toward sorrow.²⁶ Thus, the contrast here relates to nothing other than how the two levels of self-consciousness relate to each other in the unity of the given element of life. Accordingly, in no way is it as if whatever is pleasurable or unpleasurable that is already posited in sensory feeling then, by that token, imparts the same characteristic to the feeling of absolute dependence. Instead, when the two levels of self-consciousness are being bound to each other in one and the same element, this occurrence manifests a clear sign that the two levels of self-consciousness have not been fused together and have not been neutralized by each other either, also that thereby they have come to be a third phenomenon, namely, a sorrow belonging to lower self-consciousness and a joyousness belonging to higher self-consciousness—just as occurs, for example, whenever trust in God is conjoined with some feeling of suffering. Rather, this contrast attaches to higher self-consciousness by virtue of its way of becoming temporal and making an appearance—namely, in that it comes to be a temporal element in its being-referred to the other, second level of self-consciousness. That is, just as the emergence of this higher self-consciousness is, in every instance, an enhancement of life, so too whenever it emerges with ease, so as to be referred to something distinctly sensory, whether this be pleasurable or not pleasurable, it then consists in an easy process of that higher life. Moreover, if it comes to a point of sense perception through this encounter with something distinctly sensory, it then bears the impress of joy. Further, just as the disappearance of higher consciousness, if this process could be an object of sense perception at all, would amount to a diminishment of life any time this higher self-consciousness emerges with difficulty, so this is an approximation to its not appearing at all. This phenomenon, moreover, can be felt only as a restraint placed upon the higher life.

Now, this fluctuation undeniably forms the feeling-content of every religious life, so that it would seem superfluous to make these formulations clearly perceptible by giving examples. Thus, we can go right on to ask how this familiar process relates to what was presented earlier, admittedly only in a problematic way,27 as its ultimate climax.²⁸ Suppose that we then imagine that these contrasting characteristics are constantly being strongly imprinted on particular religious stirrings, so that the two characteristics would alternately rise to a high degree of enthusiasm.²⁹ Such a process, then, would give the religious life an instability that we could not deem to be of highest value. Suppose, however, that we imagine that the difficulties that we have been facing are gradually disappearing, consequently that the quality of ease that can adhere to religious stirrings has become our steadfast state and, at the same time, that the higher level of feeling has gradually gained predominance over the lower level of feeling. In that case, in immediate self-consciousness the sensory determinations that are becoming the occasion for the temporal appearance of the feeling of absolute dependence would emerge more strongly than the subject-object contrast that exists within the sensory domain itself, and therefore the subject-object contrast would pass over more into the sphere of sheer sense perception. Thus, indisputably, this almost-re-disappearance of that subject-object contrast from the higher level of life would, at the same time, consist in its strongest feeling-content.³⁰

5. Now, at the same time, it follows from the above account that an uninterrupted sequence of religious stirrings can be set forth as a summons and also in what sense it can be viewed in this way—as indeed Scripture too actually sets this forth.³¹ Moreover, every element of grieving by a religious mind and heart³² over an element of life that is entirely bereft of any God-consciousness³³ confirms this summons, in that no one indeed would mourn over the absence of something known to be impossible. To be sure, in that respect it is self-evident that the feeling of absolute dependence in its combination with some sensorially determined self-consciousness, thus viewed as a stirring within, must also be differentiated according to its strength. Yes, there will be elements of life, of course, in which one is not directly conscious of that feeling in any distinct fashion, but it is nonetheless possible to demonstrate indirectly that this feeling has not died away in such instances. This is possible, for example, when such an element is followed by another one in which this feeling of absolute dependence has strongly arisen without that element’s being sensed as of a different kind from the preceding one—without its being viewed, that is, as an element distinctly divorced from the preceding one. Rather, it would be sensed simply as a quiescent joining upon and continuation of a state that is, in its essential character, still the same.

The situation would be quite different if the preceding element were one in which that feeling of absolute dependence was definitely excluded. Accordingly, it is indeed true that even the various formations of sensory self-consciousness, which contain the most multifarious mixtures of the feeling of freedom and the feeling of dependence, are dissimilar in the way they more or less draw forth or are favorable to the attachment of higher self-consciousness to them. Furthermore, in elements where these various formations of sensory self-consciousness are less effective in this way, even a weaker emergence of higher self-consciousness is, at that point, not to be sensed as a hindrance to one’s higher life. Instead, no determination of immediate sensory self-consciousness34 is incompatible with that higher life. As a result, from neither aspect of immediate self-consciousness does any necessity arise that either one would have to be interrupted at any time, except in elements where both aspects sink back behind a rapidly increasing subject-object entanglement of consciousness.

Postscript: Now, suppose that the immediate internal articulation of the feeling of absolute dependence is God-consciousness, as has been asserted here. Suppose too that every time that feeling attains to a certain degree of clarity it is accompanied by such an immediate, internal articulation but at that point is always conjoined with some sensory self-consciousness and is referred to it. Then, in all its particular formations, God-consciousness, having emerged along this same pathway, will also bear determinations within it that belong to the domain of contrast in which sensory self-consciousness is activated.35 This consciousness of God, moreover, is the source of all anthropomorphism.³⁶ Anthropomorphism is unavoidable in statements made about God within this domain. It also forms an obvious pivot in the unending controversy between those who acknowledge the basic presupposition that such statements are unavoidable and those who deny it. This is made manifest in the following way. On the one hand, there are those who are glad to possess a primary concept of Supreme Being from elsewhere but have no experience³⁷ of piety. Those persons do not want to admit that the articulation of that feeling of absolute dependence is the same thing as what is posited as active in what their primary concept states. Also, in claiming that the God of feeling would be only a fiction, an idol, they can perhaps even insinuate that such a poetic product would also be acceptable under the form of polytheism. On the other hand, those who do not want to accede either to a concept of God or to a feeling that is representative of God base their position on the observation that any notion composed of assertions wherein God appears in a human fashion does itself in. Meanwhile, religious people are aware that they cannot avoid using anthropomorphism only in acts of speaking, but in their immediate consciousness the object involved remains firmly separate from any mode of presenting it. Moreover, they make every effort to show their opponents that without this quality of completeness that belongs to feeling,³⁸ no surety could arise, not even for the most strongly supported instance of objective consciousness or of action issuing from oneself, also that, in order to be consistent, persons making these claims would have to restrict themselves entirely to the still lower level of life.

1. Ed. note: The word geistig refers to a higher set of mental functions versus those dominated by sensory functions, as will be explained below.

2. Ed. note: In referring to the animalistic (animalistisch above, tierisch at this spot) aspect or level of human life, Schleiermacher appends this marginal note: “The characteristic of the lower level of consciousness: In that object and subject do not really become distinctly separate from each other, freedom and dependence too cannot become so” (Thönes, 1873).

3. Erkenntnis. Ed. note: This statement does not deny that there is some sort of consciousness, hence some storing and using of bits of information (Kenntnisse). True knowledge, in contrast, would require much more complex mental functioning, including consciousness of oneself as an “I” (a knowing subject) and as a “me” (the object of others’ knowing, as of one’s own). These matters he sorts out further in his ordered notes and lectures on psychology (mostly philosophy of mind) and dialectic (on the art of doing philosophy, with special attention to “the aim of knowing”). See bibliography.

4. Anschauung and Gefühl. Ed. note: This distinguishable but inseparable pair of concepts is used to describe the root feature or essence of religion throughout all editions of On Religion (1799, 1806, 1821) and was even added in key passages throughout as that work grew larger. See Tice, “Conception of Religion,” 1984.

5. Das allmähliche Angefülltwerden mit Wahrnehmungen.

6. Erfahrung.

7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher affixes the following marginal comment here: “Here it is indeed paradoxical that moral feeling would be counted as among sensory feelings. However, this also has to do only with moral feelings in their social relation. What is taken to be absolutely moral is also what is absolutely imperative and thus belongs to the arena of absolute dependence” (Thönes, 1873).

8. Ed. note: The “second location” Schleiermacher here identifies as “reciprocal” with respect to the self ‘s relation “in self-consciousness” and in “feeling” to nature and to other human beings.

9. Stufen. Ed. note: Since, as Schleiermacher shows, a “finite being” or “subject” cannot exclusively sustain the third, highest level but must remain functional at the second level as well, it seems preferable to use “level” here rather than “stage,” or “grade,” “phase,” or “degree.” Some of these levels, as he defines them, are on the same footing as the others, but the second and third levels are also not simply a matter of degree either.

10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal comment: “At its level piety stands alone” (Thönes, 1873).

11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal comment: “‘Only as receptive material because everything, to the extent that it is action, would have to come from that subject, in that otherwise it would serve as an obstacle to that subject” (Thönes, 1873).

12. Ed. note: Schleiermacher certainly knew persons (e.g., Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Schlegel) who could sometimes act as if they had this feeling, which had been described by philosophers as “solipsism” (then, after his time, as an advanced state of narcissism). Here, however, the claim seems to be that this state is inconsistent with what reality brings to (is “given to” or “exists” for) human beings and is therefore at base episodic only and unsustainable. It would be entirely out of place at the third, highest level described here.

13. See pp. 4–6 in my essay on the concept of duty (1824). Ed. note: Particularly pertinent is this statement in SW III.2 (1838), 383, and KGA I/11 (2002), 420: “Nevertheless, we cannot deny that that expression—act in every element of life with one’s entire concentrated moral strength and striving to achieve the undivided moral task in its entirety—presents the one resolve that conditions the whole moral life. Under that resolve, all particular duty-bound actions are already encompassed in such a way that no new resolve need ever be formed whenever that action is properly to occur but also in such a way that this resolve will certainly be broken by every action contrary to duty.” This essay, yet to appear in translation, was read on August 12, 1824. The entire essay is in SW III.2, 379–96, and KGA I/11, 415–28.

14. Ed. note: In his marginal note, Schleiermacher states: “The highest level would have no basis for achieving a difference in itself, hence its interconnection with the middle level’s conditioning of its temporal existence” (Thönes, 1873).

15. Ed. note: This concept will accrue meaning, especially as it applies to the highest stage of religion (cf. §2) and to Christianity in particular. See OG 70f.

16. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note adds: “Indeed, neither the middle level nor the highest level could come to the fore if it were impossible for them to exist together at the same time” (Thönes, 1873).

17. Vorstellen. Ed. note: That is, our ideation in general, including our imagining, forming of notions, and more complex cognition, this alongside all our activity, or doing (Tun).

18. Daseins. Ed. note: That is, of our actually “being-there,” not necessarily of our being (Sein) itself, if we could imagine our ever existing divested of being in a location.

19. Ed. note: As usual here, fromm is the word translated “religious.” The same meaning can be carried in the word “pious,” if both words are referring to the very roots of “piety” (Frömmigkeit), which in the broader sense, also used by Schleiermacher, also includes expressions in thought and action.

20. Ed. note: Here “primary” translates ursprüngliche, which usually means “original” in Schleiermacher’s discourse. “Congenital” translates mitgeborene, betokening some form of interrelation arising after or from the point of one’s birth, whereas “innate” (angeborene) would refer to an inborn capacity, one already functional before or at one’s very birth. This distinction does not always seem to be so significant in Schleiermacher’s usage as it is here.

21. Moment. Ed. note: In this subsection the word seems to be used to refer both to a “moment” in time and to an “element” of a process. The regular meaning, however, is taken to be “element.”

22. Angenehm/Unangenehm and Lust/Unlust. Ed. note: Since “element” regularly translates Moment, “feature” regularly translates Element. A neighboring synonym, “character” or “characteristic,” translates Charakter.

23. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal comment at this place is “‘Enhancement of life’ because a higher factor is internally co-posited” (Thönes, 1873).

24. Seligkeit.

25. Ed. note: Here the marginal comment is “‘Blessedness’ not as a maximum of pleasure but as simply pleasure concerning what has happened” (Thönes, 1873).

26. Freude … Schmerz. Ed. note: That is, “sorrow” as more of a mental pain (Leid) than of a physical pain (Pein).

27. Problematisch. That is, only under a supposition. See §5n25 and n26 above.

28. Ed. note: That is, blessedness. See the statement at §5n25 just above. See also the unfolding of this concept in Part One §§63 and 80, then in Part Two §§87, 91, 101, 108, 119, 137, and 159.3.

29. Begeisterung.

30. Gefühlsgehalt.

31. Ed. note: Examples might prominently include Gal. 5:13–26; Eph. 1:16–23; 4:1–3; 5:18–20; 6:23–24; Phil. 4:4–9; and Col. 3:12–17.

32. Gemüthes. Ed. note: “Mind and heart” captures the more complex nature of this concept in Schleiermacher’s usage than does either term alone.

33. Ed. note: See §§59–61 and 62–63. To his critics, see OG. 45f.

34. Ed. note: What would characterize an “immediate” sensory self-consciousness? The first sentence of the following postscript would seem to provide part of the answer. That is, it is held internally, however much it might have been determined by external, objective features of experience. Second, it is not directly mediated by external, objective features of experience at the given elements and instances; thus, it is sensed within the body as affect, as in many of the experiences to which the scriptural passages point in §5n31 just above, e.g., “peace” and “joy.” Such experiences certainly do include awareness of the subject-object contrast, as is amply illustrated in these passages, but many, insofar as they purvey and articulate the feeling of absolute dependence in relation to God, also both accompany and transcend that awareness, at the same time.

35. Ed. note: On God’s “immediate being … in us through feeling,” presented in §§3–5, see also OR (1821) II, supplemental notes 16 and 18.

36. Menschenähnlichen. Ed. note: Sometimes Schleiermacher uses the Latinate word Anthropomorphismus, as he does in his marginal note at this point: “Connection of this relation to anthropomorphisms” (Thönes, 1873). Cf. §172n5 and index.

37. Erfahrung. Ed. note: “Experience,” a term subsequently used prominently in works by William James, John Dewey, and many others, is one used quite naturally by Schleiermacher in key statements like this one, if not frequently. Ordinarily he replaces it with variations on the theme of Anschauung (“perception” or sometimes “intuition”) and Gefühl (“feeling”), a twofold theme that is prominently displayed in key passages provided anew in each of the successively enlarged editions of On Religion (1799, 1806, and 1821). See Tice, Schleiermacher (2006), chap. 2.

38. Vollständigkeit des Gefühls. Ed. note: That is, feeling tends to be utterly clear, pure, or focused; otherwise, reference to a feeling that is unusual in its not carrying this complete surety tends to be qualified as vague, wishy-washy, confused, mixed, indefinite, and the like.