[Introduction to the First Aspect of the Contrast]
§65. All the propositions to be set forth in this First Aspect of Part Two must be in accord with and refer to those of the same form in Part One. Likewise, however, they must also look ahead to the propositions that belong to the Second Aspect of Part Two, which explicate the concept of grace and, in doing so, these propositions must remain in provisional status.
1. Here a contradiction threatens, probably one arising within itself once sin is to be considered in and of itself. This would be the case if, based on our own standpoint alone, we should have to view every hindrance of the efficacy of God-consciousness simply as a human deed. Then, as a turning away from God, sin’s status would be contrary to the tendency to have God-consciousness, a tendency that befits human beings as a vital drive and, as such, is presupposed by us. Moreover, it would seem difficult for the actual persistence of sin to be regarded as compatible with divine omnipotence, in that if it were so, then a human being’s turning away from God would still have to be no less ordained by God than all the other human characteristics are. This would be the case, because in the state of sin humans are indeed also placed within the interconnectedness of nature, and only in proportion to that placement—with which divine causality is indeed to be directly associated1 over its entire compass—can sin expand within them. Suppose, furthermore, that divine attributes were to exist that relate to sin yet did not include any preservation and confirmation of this sin. How, then, should something come into being in connection with all else that has come into being through eternally omniscient divine omnipotence, something that in accordance with its nature, should not survive?
Suppose, finally, that sin were to exist only where an incapacity2 for God-consciousness does, and suppose that sin were to expand in a human being only based on some occasion of certain impressions that one would have received from the totality of finite being. How, then, would what we have posited to be the original perfection of humankind and also the original perfection of the world in relation to humankind not be dissolved?
2. Now, this contradiction can be only apparent, since the two statements about original perfection do indeed equally refer back to our immediate self-consciousness, which, viewed as containing the truth concerning our very existence, cannot be in contradiction with itself. This being so, what then, nevertheless, comes to the fore within the relationship being referred to here is the following: that the locus here is one that offers a host of difficulties. This is the case, for several reasons. Suppose, first, that someone were too much inclined to exclude sin from an area of absolute dependence on God. Then, one would unavoidably be bordering on the Manichean position. Suppose, moreover, that someone then wants to displace going that far with affirmation of the original perfection of humankind. Then, the Pelagian position would scarcely be avoidable. Indeed, one could say that in development of ecclesial doctrine, vacillation between these two contrasting positions has never entirely come to rest.
Today, however, even this vacillation has not been managed, and no formulation is to be detected that does not appear more in agreement with the Pelagian position, whereas alternative ones appear to lie more on the side of a Manichean position. Thus, at least in general terms, the second section of our proposition is just as suited to even out such difficulties as the first section necessarily stirs them up.3
That is to say, suppose that in statements concerning sin we were constantly to have future statements of witness concerning grace in view. Accordingly, then, we could contemplate sin, on the one hand, only as that which would not exist were not redemption to have existed as well. At that point, moreover, every apparent necessity for approaching the Manichean position would vanish. On the other hand, we could contemplate sin as that which as it should vanish could do so only through the process of redemption, and if we were to proceed based on this understanding from here on out, then we would fall into a Pelagian position only well-nigh too wantonly. Suppose that this danger of falling into either extreme were constantly and repeatedly renewed but not by any necessity to refer to expressions that have currency in the church. Then we would have to claim the right to interpret the church’s expressions in such a way that either type of situation would be most securely avoided.4 Alternatively, if these expressions do not lend themselves to such a use, then other expressions could be exchanged for them. Under all three forms of dogmatic propositions, we would have to reach for one or the other of these two tactics in order to come at least close to a complete resolving of our tasks.
1. Ed. note: The word gleichgesetzt used here means that the entire interconnected process of nature is caused by God. Thus, cause and effect are not literally equated or identified with each other but are “directly associated,” the effect (Natur) being implied by this divine cause irreversibly so.
2. Unkräftigkeit. Ed. note: This word means a lack in force or a weakness, hence “incapacity” to a large degree. This word does not necessarily imply a total lack of all capacity for God-consciousness, though some might (wrongly) suppose that it would.
3. Ed. note: The first section of the proposition looks back in part, to Part One, whereas the second section emphasizes the rule for propositions already set forth in §64, thus looks ahead to what the second aspect of Part Two emphasizes, namely, the activities of divine grace. Thus, propositions that are provided in the second aspect, chiefly on grace, are addressed earlier here through concepts of “God-consciousness,” “need for redemption,” and the like, particularly when the actual doctrines of sin are covered in §§66–85. Such necessarily anticipatory and provisional concepts here reflect his introductory insistence on a Christian orientation and on indications of this sort that are further explicated in doctrinal introductions to this point. Throughout his systematic presentation, such terms are ordinarily meant to refer specifically to human relationships with God in Christian religious immediate self-consciousness. As a whole, this proposition only begins to handle what is announced in its second sentence, which does not exclusively correspond to the second subsection of its explanation.
4. Ed. note: That is, each extreme, as well as tendencies moving very much in their direction, are termed “heresies,” thus holding doctrinal meanings to be avoided. See index.
§66. We have consciousness of sin whenever God-consciousness, coposited within or somehow joining upon some condition of mind and heart, determines our self-consciousness to be in a state lacking in pleasure. This is why we conceive sin as a definite conflict of flesh against spirit.2
1.3 Even regarding sin, we cannot set forth an objective elucidation of it without straying from our method.4 Instead, we have to go back to an individual’s own self-consciousness, which declares such a condition to be sin. This approach has all the less against it, moreover, since sin cannot arise in the life of a Christian without such a consciousness.5 This is so, for this lack of consciousness would itself be simply a new sin, which would, nevertheless, also have to come into consciousness as such later on.
Our next task would then be to set forth what is characteristic in one’s consciousness of sinfulness. If we do this, we may not seek this characteristic within the domain of Christian piety, then, apart from its relationship to God-consciousness. Accordingly, what remains, moreover, is simply for us to posit as sin all that has hindered the free development of God-consciousness.
Now, suppose a somewhat dubious element of consciousness in which God were coposited to be present but the aforementioned God-consciousness would have no capacity to permeate the other effective features of consciousness and in this way to be determinative of that same element. At that point, then, sin and consciousness of sin would occur simultaneously. Moreover, in that case any pleasure would lie in sensory self-consciousness, this by dint of one’s satisfaction in having pleasure. Yet, in the case of higher self-consciousness a lack of pleasure would be experienced, this on account of a lack of force in God-consciousness.6
In contrast, suppose that God were not coposited to be present in a given element of consciousness at all. Then, if bringing that element of consciousness to mind were to expel God-consciousness, in that case consciousness of sin would follow one’s having the sin itself. This would happen, in that patently God-consciousness could not assimilate itself to that element of consciousness, and consequently God-consciousness could not be even acquiescently presupposed as being within that element in such a manner as to concur with it.
Suppose, however, that God-consciousness would actually have determined a given element of consciousness and that pleasure would actually be present at the level of higher self-consciousness. Then, nevertheless, in every feeling of exertion therein some consciousness of sin would be present—consequently, a consciousness of sin that is partially overcoming that sense of pleasure. This would be the case, because we would be conscious that if the currently overwhelming sensory features were to have been strengthened from external sources, from that point onward Godconsciousness would not have had the capacity to be determinative of the given element.
Now, in this sense, an unceasing consciousness of sin does exist, of a kind that at times simply precedes sin itself as a warning presentiment, and at times accompanies sin as an inner reproach, or at times succeeds sin as penitence. Yet, all this occurs only because a living seed of sin exists that is constantly at the point of bursting forth. How would any Godconsciousness ever be directed toward such an element of consciousness as was just described? None could be so directed if no relationship at all were to exist within an agent between an element of consciousness and the class of actions just indicated, in which case the agent would find oneself in a state of innocence—or if God-consciousness were no longer effectual at all within an agent, this would comprise a state of hardness of heart.
2. Now, suppose that we think of a condition such that flesh, that is, the totality of the soul’s so-called lower forces, bears only receptivity for impulses that proceed from the locus of God-consciousness, this without the receptivity being itself an independently self-moving principle. In this condition, a conflict between flesh and spirit would not be possible. Yet, then we have to think of a sinless condition as well. The two potencies would be completely at one in every element within self-consciousness, in that every one of those elements in self-consciousness would begin in spirit and also end in spirit. Moreover, flesh would proceed only as a living intermediary, as a healthy organ. It would do this without ever bringing anything into appearance that is not something begun and accompanied by spirit, whether this something be viewed as flesh’s own act or be viewed as an admixed, extraneous component of an act proceeding from spirit.
Now, so long as flesh and spirit have not come to be at one in this sense, they persist as two agents struggling against each other.7 Moreover, inasmuch as spirit presses toward that complete unity of the two, this condition can be assessed only as a lack in capacity of spirit. In addition, in treatment regarding the original perfection of humankind,8 we also left aside considering the possibility of complete unity of spirit and flesh, except that in that proposition exclusively those relationships were to be conveyed which contained in themselves the principles for progressive development.
Now, in contrast, in the soul of a Christian a consciousness of sin is never in place without consciousness of the force present in the process of redemption.9 Furthermore, that consciousness of sin is also never realized without its other, complementary half.10 This other half we have yet to describe more fully later on. Here we may simply add that of itself alone, consciousness of sin simply represents a condition outside the domain in which redemption is the predominant force. That is, it represents a hopelessly incapacitated condition of spirit.
Explanations that describe sin itself as a turning away from the Creator11 are indeed compatible with the present explanation of sin in terms of a hindering of spirit’s determinative force, a hindering that is caused by autonomous activity of one’s sensory functioning. The present explanation of sin is less compatible, however, with explanations that declare sin to be transgression of divine law.12 Even so, little can be gained by trying to establish agreement with the latter position. This is the case, because in the sense in which God and eternal law permit of being differentiated—as if one could possibly turn away from eternal law, viewing this action as turning away from a particular, perhaps arbitrary act of God, without actually turning away from God—“law” is no original Christian expression, and on that account it would have to be taken up within some higher-order expression. One would then have to extend that expression of “law” in a very indefinite and arbitrary manner, in order to include all that could count as sin not only in works but also in thoughts and words.
Our explanation, however, provides the most natural unity for the present classification of sin in this work.13 This is the case, for when a thought or a word that is not considered to be a deed completely fills out some element of consciousness, it would also be incorrect to call it a sin. An explanation that is more Christian in its origin and that is also immediately in harmony with our own explanation, however, is one that says: Sin exists when we desire what Christ holds in disregard, and vice versa.14
1. Ed. note: Appended here is Schleiermacher’s marginal note regarding §66–§69.P.S.: “Discussion independent [of ecclesial doctrine]: 1. §66. Explanation of sin as self-consciousness. 2. §67. Prior presence [Priorität] of sin before God-consciousness [actively emerges in us]. 3. §68. That sin is, nevertheless, only a distortion of nature. 4. §69. Sin’s being doubly grounded. Discussion in conformity with ecclesial doctrine regarding two points of doctrine” (Thönes, 1873). Thönes himself adds: [This brief heading] “refers to §69.P.S.”
2. Ed. note: Three terms in this proposition require some explanation: (1) Gemütszustand ordinarily means “disposition”; however, a clearer translation for a presentation of Schleiermacher’s meaning is “a state or condition (Zustand) of mind and heart (Gemüth),” especially in this context, which seeks to explain a transition from a relatively simple state of feeling and perception (though not merely sense-perception), with its potential for wavering or hesitancy between staying put and venturing out (itself a condition comprised of both confusion and irresolution) to a more complex involvement of cognitive attentiveness and resolve of will. (2) Unlust could mean “displeasure,” which indicates a definite attitude against something instead of feeling pleasure; however, wherever Schleiermacher uses this term, he clearly intends to indicate only some varying possible degree in one’s “lack of pleasure,” on a scale between uttermost pleasure and uttermost lack of pleasure. (3) Widerstreit connotes a degree of mildly to markedly assertive to aggressive struggle against something; thus, adding the qualifier positiven indicates reaching a degree of “definite conflict” of one condition, namely flesh, militating against another, namely spirit, as will be explained below.
3. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note: “Explanation. Note: It might appear that when God-consciousness enters into the picture, sin would be gone. However, seen thus, this explanation too is only a description of sin as it existed in the past. In its bare immediacy sin is too entangled [with other factors to be clearly noticed, as such]. Yet, [in the presence of such factors as] punishment or reform efforts, a state of internal irresolution conveys the same thing, even where no God-consciousness is as yet taking place” (Thönes, 1873). Schleiermacher’s additional marginal note here reads: “1. Elucidation of this first proposition. As soon as a condition is declared to be sin, God-consciousness is there; it is hindered, however, when its immediate influence on a deed [of sin] is hindered” (Thönes, 1873).
4. Ed. note: See §64 for the “method.”
5. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note further marks this reverting back to self-consciousness to imagine sin’s arising from within it: “Sin in conflict (with consciousness). Sin’s precipitating [in der Übereilung] ([doing so] without an accompanying consciousness)” (Thönes, 1873).
6. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “Seeking out sin [is] also a good” (Thönes, 1873).
7. Gal. 5:17; Rom. 7:18–23.
9. Rom. 7:25–8:2.
10. Ed. note: Namely, the divine activity of grace and thereby consciousness of grace. The two together are the subject matter throughout Part Two.
11. Augsburg Confession (1530) 19: “… their will turned away from God.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 53; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 72; cf. §63n7.
12. For several holding such a view, see Gerhard, Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 5, 2ff. Redeker note: “Among others Gerhard names Augustine, Ambrose, John of Damascus, and Melanchthon.”
13. Ed. note: In §§70–74 sin is presented in two forms: original sin and actual sin.
14. Augustine (354–430), Of True Religion (390), chap. 15, at par. 31: “Indeed, no sin can be committed except as things are desired that he [Christ] holds in disregard or things [like suffering] are sought after that he has [simply] undergone.” ET Tice, cf. Library of Christian Classics, vol. 6 (1953), 240; Latin: Migne Lat. 34:135.
§67. We are conscious of sin as the force and work of a time when the bent toward God-consciousness had not yet come to the fore within us.1
1.2 Actually, it already lies in the relation that this proposition has to all those preceding it that in that time to which consciousness of sin is traced back, sin was not placed in us as sin, not in the way that we are now conscious of it. This is the case, for now sin can have its place within us only at the same time as God-consciousness is present and also in relation to God-consciousness. If God-consciousness has not yet developed, there is also not yet any resistance to it; rather, what is present is only a self-focused activity of flesh.3 By the nature of the matter, in the future this self-focused activity of flesh will indeed become resistance to spirit, but beforehand it cannot actually be observed as sin, but only as a seed of sin at best. In general, we also make judgments concerning individuals at early stages of their development in this way, as we do concerning entire peoples and eras.4 The proposition is not to be understood, however, as if all sin, even as to its content, is to be assigned to that past. Rather, it speaks of a sinful state only in general terms, for not all functions of human beings’ lower life that can get into conflict with spirit are already developed before Godconsciousness develops. In that these lower functions develop in their initial onset without God-consciousness being directed toward them, the same result arises in either case, however.
2. Resistance, viewed as an activity by which a counterposed activity is to be overcome, is predisposed to being more or less in magnitude. In consequence, it bears an intensive magnitude5 that is conditioned by its position in time. Moreover, if taken to occur within a living being, this activity of resistance, through repetition over time, would be growing toward proficiency. Now, our proposition reaches back to a general experience, one indicating that in every person flesh has been shown to bear a certain magnitude already before spirit had any magnitude. Hence, it follows that as soon as spirit enters into the domain of consciousness—and it belongs to an original perfection of humankind that the self-focused activity of flesh, nevertheless, cannot, in and of itself, prevent spirit’s coming to the fore—resistance to it also comes to be present. This means that we become conscious in such a way that just as God-consciousness is awakened in a human being, sin will also come into consciousness.
Now, in contrast, the activity of spirit, both overall in the form of human living and also especially in its effort to attain dominion over flesh, then likewise bears a certain intensive magnitude, and as a living activity would also grow toward proficiency through repetitive exercise over time. Thus, the strength that spirit gradually accrues is itself the work and force of the time that would have occurred since the awakening of Godconsciousness—though, to be sure, in connection with a previously given spiritual force through the stimulus of which that very awakening will have ensued. In contrast, the strength of resistance that flesh produces and that is expressed in consciousness of sin depends on the head start which flesh would already have gained at that earlier time.6 Yet, by all means, the extent of that head start also would have its basis in connection with collective life.
Now, let us suppose that collective relationship makes its start based on an awakening of God-consciousness, conceived as spirit’s gradual gain in force over flesh. Then, self-consciousness could hardly have had the same character as consciousness of sin did. On this account, moreover, consciousness of sin would have to have receded the more our apprehension of spirit’s gain in force were to gain currency and vice versa. Yet, we do constantly find ourselves in an uneven development of spirit and flesh. In its activity spirit is hindered by flesh, and it is precisely one’s consciousness of sin that is conditioned thereby. To begin with, this unevenness is twofold in nature. First, it is uneven inasmuch as spirit’s development succeeds by fits and starts and in instances of extraordinary illumination and animation that are at some distance from each other. Now, suppose, that after such an instance has occurred, the spirit’s activity seems to be more diminished than it was during that instance, or suppose that, already from the very beginning of that instance on, the animation did not correspond to the illumination. Then, we would be conscious of that condition as sin, because in fulfillment of an element of consciousness, flesh would have become victorious over spirit’s effort.7
The other factor of that uneven development between flesh and spirit is this: Before long we are conscious of spirit as one, whereas flesh is something manifold, and this manifold is dissimilar within itself. As a result, even spirit cannot engage flesh in a uniform manner. In that spirit’s claim upon people, however, is everywhere the same in such a way that it also appears everywhere, anywhere spirit is able to make less of an effect, spirit appears to be repulsed and subdued; consequently, the human being involved appears to be in a condition of sin. Now, the more we were to trace the condition of spiritual life back to a conscious beginning of it, to a general self-governing-of-oneself, as it were,8 one that is represented in every particular spiritual bent of will, the more would we also be conscious of flesh’s holding sway over us wherever the deed done does not comport with that prior resolve. Moreover, then we could not do otherwise than to refer this deed back to the time before that conscious beginning of the condition of spiritual life.
1. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note is “The prior existence of sin’s force” (Thönes, 1873).
2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note marks this spot as follows: “1. The proposition [is] explained [in this way]: Sin, as such, is not based on [the existence of ] Godconsciousness. The force wherewith flesh will have been able to resist [spirit] later on has [indeed already] come into being” (Thönes, 1873).
3. Fürsichtätigkeit des Fleisches.
4. Ed. note: At this juncture, Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “[As to the content of sin, here interpretation is] also not [placed on its form] but is material in nature. Both [formal and material aspects], however, depend on a capacity for passivity of one’s will over against sinfulness” (Thönes, 1873).
5. Ed. note: That is, to exist as a Größe, or in Schleiermacher’s marginal note (Thönes, 1873), to be a Quantum. In accordance with Schleiermacher’s dialectic (or, his way of thinking philosophically), the contrast here is between inner and outer forces in time and/or space. Thus, an “intensive” quantity (magnitude or quantum) in anything that appears or is taken to be an object represents an immediate/unmediated internal quantity, and an “extensive” one represents a mediated, external one. He often identifies an object as having a “unity” composed of a “multiplicity” of elements or features. In general form, distinctions of this kind are all familiar in Immanuel Kant’s critical writings, but in Schleiermacher’s writings they tend to be used with somewhat different analytical organization, functions, and meanings. Cf. Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (1995), and Rudolf Eisler, Kant-Lexikon (1930). Schleiermacher’s own manuscript notes for lectures on dialectic and select student notes, both from 1811 and 1832, are published in KGA II/10.1–2 (2002). Thus far, notes, glossaries, and indexes within the Schleiermacher literature are the closest one can get to a well-formed lexicon of his terminology.
6. Gen. 8:21.
7. Rom. 7:18.
8. Rom. 7:22. Ed. note: The actual text referred to here would appear to be Rom. 7:22–23.
§68. Although sin is based on an uneven development of discernment and force of will,1 we can conceive the presence of sin in such a way that the concept of the original perfection of human nature is not invalidated through the presence of sin, yet sin is apprehended only as a distortion of nature.
1. Our proposition does seem to place the entirety of spiritual life under the contrast between understanding2 and will. However, in no way, precisely here, does it bear the intention of putting into the shadows a third feature alongside these two, namely, immediate self-consciousness. Instead, we proceed on the basis of immediate self-consciousness throughout our presentation. The relationship of self-consciousness to those two features quite properly provides the measure of unevenness in their development. If we think of the above-mentioned3 governing-of-oneself in its general characteristics, then this consists of nothing other than discernment of the exclusive, superior status of those states which are at one with God-consciousness and do so without hindering it. Yet, this discernment cannot arise without an individual’s appropriating it, which occurs by an act of self-consciousness, one in which this discernment, in the form of approbation and recognition, then becomes a governing command.4 When this stirring up of self-consciousness then follows this particular discernment more quickly than it is able to determine stirrings of will, this phenomenon comprises precisely that unevenness which accompanies the existence of both sin and consciousness of sin. We can think straightaway of this unevenness as eradicated in a twofold manner. In each case, moreover, no consciousness of sin would then exist.5 That is to say: Suppose that one were gradually to reach discernment concerning the relationship of various states of sin to God-consciousness but only to the same degree as one’s recognition would also be able to set one’s will in motion. Then, one could not reach a consciousness of sin, just as one could also never think of a more godly life than what a person would actually present in each discrete moment. In addition, suppose likewise that the contrast between discernment and force of will were evenly present and observed over the entire compass of one’s life but in every case one’s will were also equally strong enough to resist all stirrings of flesh.6 Then, in no way could even such a person arrive at any consciousness of sin, viewed as one’s own state.
Yet, we find neither of these cases in our experience. Indeed, it is conceivable that we could not find them there. This is so, for, to begin with the second case, the contrast between discernment and force of will is presented to understanding after the manner of an image or of a formulation that in any particular case would already be recognized from far afield.7 In this way, moreover, an immature child too, soon after one’s own stirrings arise, receives this discernment from adults. However, the impact that a governing recognition affords to will must be a particular one in the case of every individual child, precisely because flesh has to do only with what is individual and knows nothing of what is general.8 In this situation, then, in its “members”9 flesh, of itself, has habit for its actual law. However, only very gradually do earlier, happier elements in life prove useful to spirit.
In contrast, suppose that we go back to the first case: Attaining discernment concerning the relationship of the various states of sin to Godconsciousness and to the same degree as recognition could indeed set the will in motion. Nowhere, however, would a complete balance of factors exist even then. Instead, what would be present is an alternating process of advancing and retreating. One could indeed think that this would somehow be possible for an individual, but it would not be possible within a life shared in common.10 The reason is that not everyone in a shared life would move along in the same pathway; instead, each one would have to take a look at others’ process and then recognize why, for all that, one lacks their same force of will in the same instance.
Now, consciousness of sin could not emerge without some occurrence of this unevenness. To be sure, one could also think of understanding’s lagging behind will as a counterpart to this unevenness, even though this lag would only seem to be so. If this main assertion about consciousness of sin in connection with unevenness is true, however, then that consciousness of sin is to be conceived directly on that same basis of unevenness. As a result, no one could claim to reach consciousness of sin in any other way. Even the indisputably worst situation would be of the same kind, namely, one in which resistance of flesh to spirit also bears a reactive effect on understanding.11 The result would be that, in part, understanding would try to gloss over states of sin that had been brought about in this way, as if they had, nevertheless, been compatible with God-consciousness.12 In part, already in its first seeds God-consciousness itself would have been so altered and split, being held in sway by flesh, that each state of Godconsciousness would be compatible with some aspect or another of flesh, and in this way the moral contrast between sin and God-consciousness would have got lost.13 Now, if in this manner idolatry would seem rightly to have the same origin as sin,14 then, with equal right, all notions of God tending to be anthropopathic would be viewed as residues of idolatry that weaken this moral contrast or reduce to a human legal situation.
2.15 All this notwithstanding, one cannot say that sin, as it has been conceived here, stands in contradiction to the original perfection of humanity, with the result that the original perfection of humanity would come to be vanquished thereby. Nevertheless, we must stick with our affirmation that, in general terms, sin exists only insofar as a consciousness of sin also exists. Thus, this consciousness of sin is conditioned by what is good, which must precede it and which is simply a result of that original perfection. That is to say, we only have a bad conscience, in part insofar as we discern the possibility of a better conscience and an image of this better conscience is impressed upon us in some other way, and in part insofar as we have a conscience at all—that is, to the extent that the demand for harmony with God-consciousness is set forth within us.
Hence, what is lacking in perfection16 and under the dominion of flesh appears to us17 not as sin but rather as rawness and a lack of formation, if a better conscience is not even imagined in an individual at a period of life when God-consciousness could yet be developed or in a people at some earlier period when they do not yet imagine a better conscience in that way at all. As a result, sin must be revealed only within some good that has already come into being and by virtue of that good; it is revealed to be sin simply as that which hinders future good. Likewise, if sin comes to consciousness by God-consciousness’s exercising less efficacy on one sensory tendency than on another one, then consciousness of sin also comes to the fore based on a comparison with something that has already come to be good. Moreover, this consciousness is also confirmed by the counterpart to the foregoing account, namely, in that some trace of a consciousness of sin is sheltered within even a peak instance of piety. This would occur precisely because, nevertheless, God-consciousness would not yet have evenly permeated our entire nature. Furthermore, this minimal amount of a consciousness of sin would then be planted over into the time that follows, because an element such as this consciousness of sin also could not leave behind effects that are distributed evenly in all directions.
Thus, over its entire compass the condition of sinfulness presupposes original perfection of humankind and is conditioned by it. As a result, just as this concept of original perfection expresses the unity that is present in our ongoing development, so sin expresses what is broken up and isolated from the whole in that development. However, that unity is never eradicated thereby.
3.18 Now, suppose that just as we have the capacity to conceive sin in its being connected with the original perfection of humankind, we could also have a full surety concerning the impossibility of avoiding sin.19 Thus, nothing would remain for us but to reassure ourselves in face of it. At that point, the most natural thing would be to say that in its entire compass—also including a vitiated God-consciousness that by being shattered is deprived of its distinctive character—the consciousness we designate as consciousness of sin would be nothing but the consciousness we picture to ourselves regarding whatever good is still lacking to us, that good having been disrupted by particular human actions and conditions. This view,20 along with truth regarding sin, does also raise the need for redemption.21 However, as a whole it actually leaves so little room for the distinctive activity of a redeemer that it can scarcely be taken to be a Christian view.
Now, suppose a surety in which we would be conscious of some good, one that would have been placed within us at some extraordinary instant. Suppose too that this surety would, indeed, be simultaneously a surety of our capacity for avoidance of sin in all elements of consciousness in which an equally matching level of one’s force of will were not made evident. Moreover, suppose further that every retrogressive movement would be a distortion of what was originally designed in nature. Accordingly, to the extent that these suppositions are the case, the experience of a decline in force of will and of a decline in consciousness of a capacity to avoid sin, as well as the conception of sin as a distortion of nature, would all be one and the same thing.
In contrast, what would belong to positing the possibility of a total capacity to avoid the actual resistance offered by flesh is this: surety regarding a constantly advancing dominion22 of God-consciousness, from its very first emergence up to its reaching an absolute strength—that is, a sinlessly developed human perfection. Two characteristics would thus be equally rooted in this surety: full consciousness of sin, viewed as a distortion of nature, and faith in the possibility of a process of redemption through communication of spiritual force, a process of redemption that would be authenticated by this communication. This would be the case, for even if a trace of sin were still to adhere to our most nearly perfect states and this situation were the expression of our common consciousness of sin as human beings, then only the one person to whom we would not assign this common consciousness and inasmuch as we would rightly not assign this common consciousness of sin to this person—in a manner expressed precisely in the formulation given just above—could exercise a truly redemptive activity.23
To be sure, consciousness of sin does come from the law.24 Yet, this law, itself being a multiplicity of prescriptions, is only an incomplete presentation of what is good. Moreover, an accompanying possibility of the law’s being adhered to is not exhibited, not even in the unity of an all-encompassing formulation of it. Thus, even the knowledge of sin that arises from the law remains, in part, deficient and, in part, dubious; and complete knowledge of sin comes to us only in and through the Redeemer’s utter lack of sinfulness25 and his absolute strength of spirit. Sin can appear to us, moreover, only as a distortion of nature, since the possibility presents itself to us that based on the above-described presupposition of an original perfection, Godconsciousness could have developed steadily from the first human being right on up to the pure and holy state it had in the Redeemer.
1. Ed. note: Einsicht (discernment) is understood as a property acquired through examination of what sin is in relation to human nature, hence “discernment,” not the more literal “insight.” In this context, Willenskraft (force of will) is understood more literally than is customary in English usage of “willpower.” Indeed, it means a force that is inherent in will, to match that present in other agents of will, that is, individuals and communities.
2. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, gaining discernment is a mode of “understanding” (Verstand), itself a general term not for a strictly differentiable faculty, as if it had set boundaries and only one mode of activity; rather, it is a versatile feature of intellect that can alter its operations to fit different contexts.
3. Ed. note: See §67.2 closing paragraph.
4. Ed. note: As just above, where “governing” becomes “self-governing-self “(sichselbst Gebieten), the term used here is “command” (Gebot). In both cases the choice could as well be “ordering” and “order,” except that the form of the self-conscious act is one of “approbation and recognition” of what one has discerned to be something received from God. Thus, either term could wrongly suggest governing by rigid demands. Schleiermacher’s marginal note reads: “The feeling of approbation, thus the command given to oneself, is fixed earlier and stays long before feeling would obtain the force [Kraft] to determine will” (Thönes, 1873). In Schleiermacher’s usage, “force” is energic, hence need not be an exercise of power that is rigid, harsh, coercive, or overly demanding in what it orders or commands. In fact, it can be quite loving; if firm, it would not be “tough love” in any of these ways.
5. Ed. note: Schleiermacher affixes this marginal note: “Consciousness of sin does not come to pass (a) when discernment goes slowly [retardiert]” (Thönes, 1873).
6. Ed. note: According to Schleiermacher’s marginal note here, consciousness of sin would also not come to pass in a second of two ways: “(b) when the relationship between feeling and will accelerates [akzelereirt]” (Thönes, 1873).
7. Ed. note: In his marginal note, Schleiermacher emphasizes that the second case “cannot arise, because discernment works only as a [shared] formulation, but impulse adheres to a particular individual [as such]” (Thönes, 1873).
8. Ed. note: As Schleiermacher tends to indicate in his discourses on child development, ordinarily children take in concrete matters, until they learn to feel, think, and act more maturely. This is another contrast that presents a sliding scale of comparatively less or more of two characteristics: a less formed, secondhand, narrower, and restrained consciousness and a generally formed consciousness that is broader in scope. Perhaps the broader consciousness would consist in increasing proportions of certain general characteristics and would expand to the extent that the same individuals actually grow into maturity and keep on growing. In a Christian setting, in particular, attaining more of a generally focused “feeling of absolute dependence” (a key formulation throughout Part Two) and a broader perception of the “interconnected process of nature” in a universe that is created and preserved by God (see what is “presupposed” in Part One) would be subject to such development.
9. Rom. 7:23. Ed. note: Here Paul refers to the “members” of his person being subject to “the law of sin.”
10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note forthrightly claims: “The first case is not imaginable within a life shared in common” (Thönes, 1873).
11. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note states: “Postscript: Also a reactive effect on discernment” (Thönes, 1873).
12. Rom. 2:15.
13. Rom. 1:18, 25. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s understanding, the term “moral” is unavoidable in many instances but is also problematic. For him, “moral” refers to customary behavior across the entire spectrum of human life, not just to that more restricted sense that sorts out “moral” from all the rest of human life (all human life and behavior being studied by Ethik) versus all physical aspects of the world (studied by Physik). In offering this distinction, he was borrowing from ancient Greek nomenclature. For him, psychology studies Psyche, which he defines as inseparably bodily and mental. See index.
14. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note marks this sentence as follows: “Practical application of this observation” (Thönes, 1873).
15. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note regarding this subsection states: “Sin does not stand in contradiction with the original perfection of humanity” (Thönes, 1873).
16. Ed. note: Unvollkommne, a term that conveys a lack of completeness, somewhere short of a wholly good, ideal state—in these cases that of an individual, of a whole people, or, ultimately, of the entire human race. Thus, Schleiermacher’s familiar emphasis on “development” is based theologically on this awareness of the contrasts between grace and sin, spirit and flesh, God-consciousness and consciousness of sin.
17. Ed. note: At this point, Schleiermacher’s marginal note offers this reminder: “Cf. above [§61.5], the point that sin cannot be our first state” (Thönes, 1873).
18. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s marginal note carries this slight admission, to be modified forthwith: “The just previous presentation sounds as though sin would be something [purely] natural” (Thönes, 1873).
19. Ed. note: As usual, “surety” is used for Schleiermacher’s meaning of Gewißheit. By his own report in his dialectic manuscripts from 1811 onward (ed. and trans. Tice, 1996) and in the general Introduction here, the closest he could get to absolute certainty was a currently reliable conviction of truth. Even then he might well retain at least a smidgen of critical doubt. Full, reliable surety would be sufficient for his pragmatically oriented grasp of knowledge and for attaining a thoroughly grounded, high degree in the direction of certainty in one’s convictions. Of the presence of divine grace he held the near “certainty” of immediate experience in feeling and perception (Gefühl and Anschauung) but, as such, not reliant on observations at the level of sense perceptions (Wahrnehmungen) alone. In the full, overall life of piety (Frömmigkeit), conviction could be bolstered, cautiously but with temporary firmness, by further efforts of observing, contemplating, thinking, and doing. These four forms of human activity could gain theological surety if rooted in the fundament of Christian immediate self-consciousness that may be afforded those activities. This entire work, then, is a result of that specific process, carried out in a limited use of philosophical mindedness, which is not intended to determine or define content, and use of corresponding scientific methods of investigation and hermeneutical interpretation. This is why Schleiermacher takes great pains to formulate appropriate questions, propositions, and explanations under each proposition, as well as organizing the whole, aiming at the greatest accuracy and critically apt entertaining of many different views on the subject. All of these features, with careful uses of formative-evaluative judgments in the process, are well illustrated in the propositions on sin.
As a set, these propositions do not simply indicate degrees of surety, all short of certainty. They also provide new information and knowledge as a result, especially regarding what goes on within a person whose life is genuinely rooted in Christ, thus in Christian faith in a relationship of God with oneself. These same observations apply to propositions mostly regarding grace in the following portions of the work. Introductory propositions tend to clarify both grounds and intent regarding all of these features, which are then summarized, with further explanations and arguments, in the strictly doctrinal propositions that follow in each instance.
20. Ed. note: Schleiermacher penned this lengthy marginal note here: “The purely negative view is not the Christian one but extends only so far as one puts one’s mind at rest with it. This is the case, for when one’s longing for what is good is strong enough, a longing for a remedy has to arise” (Thönes, 1873).
21. Ed. note: Here it is important to recall that the face value of the term “redemption” (Erlösung)—that is, its most obvious value face-to-face with the German word—is “release,” or “freedom from,” the shattering effects of sin. For Schleiermacher, the word does not so much conjure images of release from debt or from jail (punishment or satisfaction of God’s commands), fulfillment of which Jesus is said to have substituted for us by his sacrifice, as is held in most traditional views of atonement by Jesus on the cross, but release by God’s sending the incarnate Jesus for what remedy from sin he could offer by all his words and deeds, including the way he suffered unto death and God’s raising him up from death to eternal life. See esp. §§11, 86–91, 100–101, l04, and 106–15.
22. Gewalt. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this term connotes a power too lacking in love or wisdom to be attributed to God or to good human behavior, for it is too unremitting and domineering, hence the word “dominion.” Ordinarily the word connotes “holding sway,” as what can happen to otherwise free agents who come into bondage under the dominion of sin. The action of God is not at all like this latter rule. Thus, here what is investigated is the possibility of God-consciousness’s holding sway over sin. This relative impossibility, in turn, underscores the need for redemption through a perfectly sinless redeemer.
23. Rom. 7:24–8:2. Ed. note: Schleiermacher adds this marginal note: “The actuality of the Redeemer precedes full consciousness of sin, all the more so the lower one’s estimate of the value of the particular foregoing element of consciousness would be” (Thönes, 1873).
24. Rom. 7:7.
25. Unsündlichkeit.
§69. We are conscious of sin, in part, as grounded in ourselves, and, in part, as having its ground somewhere beyond our own individual existence.1
1. In a particular manner, unevenly operative within each individual, the way various tendencies and functionings of one’s sensory orientation stand in relation to the higher activity of one’s spirit2 is grounded in an “innate difference”3—as we want to say provisionally—among these tendencies, which innate difference helps to constitute a personal existence distinctive to each one. However, in part, we see such differences as they are propagated within the same lineage and so also as they coalesce in the forming of new families out of different lineages; and, in part, we find these differences in large masses of human beings, established as the distinctive character of tribes and peoples. Thus, by virtue of this dependence of a particular formation of individual life on some large type held in common, as well as by virtue of the dependence of later generations on earlier ones, the sin of each individual has its source in an earlier existence above and beyond one’s own existence. Hence, even if someone, denying innate differences, were simply to ascribe these differences to education,4 the matter would remain the same, in that any given mode of education is grounded in leanings and experiences that have preceded the existence of the one who is to be educated. On the other hand, inasmuch as the urgent movement of some sensory stirring toward its goal, without placement in more elevated self-consciousness, is still undeniably the deed of any given individual, every particular sin of that individual has to be grounded in oneself.
By means of the first mode of observation we distinguish our good-naturedness5—in that many an inclination of our senses also makes no effort to strive beyond what is demanded of them by spirit itself—from our ill-naturedness, and we are conscious of both kinds of attitude as both received and obtained in company with other human beings. By virtue of the other mode of observation, however, we recognize our sin even in our ill-naturedness. That is, we do so because instead of having already surmounted that attitude by some deed of ours, we rather propagate it from one moment to another by our own self-initiated action.
2. To take two examples, one person may incline more to reflection, wherewith the person’s external efficacy may then be either weak overall or even if it is strong may still be raw and uncultivated. In contrast, another person may apply oneself entirely to external efficacy, whereas, generally speaking, thinking either may rarely enter into the process or may at least remain obtuse and confused. Both of these cases we also count as innate differences. Now, even the first person is indeed drawn into the domain of efficacious action by life shared with others; and results of reflection that have currency within the domain one shares with others will somehow come into the imagination even of the second person. Yet, those original differences in disposition continue to have an effect nonetheless, and in the first person awakening piety will more readily unite with thought, but modes of action will remain of a fleshly nature, whereas in the second person awakening into piety will be more readily resistant to understanding. As a result, sin will take a different shape in each of these persons.
Now, to the extent that this differentiation coheres with the predisposition that is natural to each person and precedes every deed, to that extent the sin of any given person is, as to the shape it takes, also grounded beyond the person’s own life. In contrast, to some extent every element of consciousness, be it filled with some notion or action in the narrower sense, nonetheless always comes to pass only by one’s self-initiated activity. To that extent, even in an element of consciousness that does not bear God-consciousness within it, whether or not God-consciousness has already been aroused, in the same fashion the sin of each person would, in accordance with its reality, also be grounded in oneself.
3. The same thing is true of the development of sensory life, which in all human beings enters in before spiritual development,6 namely, that it is not dependent on the individual person oneself. That is to say, the entrance of “I”7 into this world through conception and birth can in no way be recognized by our immediate self-consciousness as our own deed, even though occasionally speculation has tried to present precisely this entrance of “I” as the most primordial falling away of which the self can be guilty. Rather, just as this entrance of the “I” is for every later generation everywhere conditioned by the deed of the previous generation, in the same way the sin-ridden self-reliance8 of orientation to the senses, itself being conditioned by its earlier development, is also grounded beyond the separate existence of any individual. However, once God-consciousness is in place as a distinct, active factor and as one capable of growth, then every element of consciousness in which it does not come to light as that factor and with a surplus, even if infinitesimal in comparison with previous similar instances, is a restraint upon higher activity, a restraint that is founded in one’s own agency and is truly sin.
Postscript. This twofold relation, which on all sides we simply find once more, in varying degrees, within every consciousness of sin, is the most authentic and innermost ground on account of which explication of the Christian consciousness of sin in our ecclesial doctrine is split into two points of doctrine—namely, regarding original sin9 and actual sin.10 The true sense of this division also clearly emerges from the explication given here thus far. That is, in the doctrine of original sin the state of sin is viewed as something received and brought along prior to any deed; yet, at the same time one’s own fault also lies hidden within it already. In the doctrine of actual sin, that state is depicted as appearing in one’s own sinful deeds, which themselves have their foundation in each individual; yet, that sin which is received and brought along is also disclosed within them.
In either case, only the conventional terms used for these sins are troublesome. The reasons are as follows. In the second formulation, “actual sin,” the word “sin” is indeed posited of a person’s own actual deed,11 entirely in accordance with ordinary usage. However, the addition of “actual” to it easily occasions the confusing subordinate thought to the effect that original sin would not be anything actual, or at least that, in the same sense, next to actual sin there would be a kind of sin that is a mere semblance or that lies apart from one’s deed. On the other hand, in the first formulation, “original sin,” to be sure, the word “original”12 does rightly express the connection of later generations with earlier ones and with the way the entire species is preserved. However, it is erroneous to add the word “sin,” as if it would be taken in the same sense as that in the other formulation. In that case, moreover, only some actual sins would have had to be founded in some earlier occurrence but others would not. This cannot at all be what is meant, however, since the term “original sin” points to the inherited constitution of the acting subject that coconditions the actual sins of every individual and has done so prior to any deed.13 Hence, an alteration of these inexact terms, which are not at all to be found in Scripture, is greatly to be desired. Such an effort, however, must be introduced with considerable caution, to which the treatment to follow will provide some contribution. Moreover, the task ought to be carried out only by gradual adjustments if one does not want entirely to sever the doctrine from its historical connection and simply call forth new misconstruals and misunderstandings.14
1. Ed. note: Within the introduction to Part Two (§§62–64), sin was defined as “turning away from God,” originating in acts within ourselves. In the introduction to the doctrine of sin (§§65–69), it has been stated that everything in Part Two is to refer to “the contrast between sin and grace.” For the sake of convenience only, sin is to be the first of two “aspects” to be presented; however, the other aspect, grace, is that occurrence we experience in accordance with which sin is always to be recognized—grace having been defined (in §63), in general terms, as a relationship (or communion) with God that for us as Christians wholly rests on “a communication from the Redeemer.” Accordingly, sin was then further defined (in §66) as “a positive conflict of flesh against spirit.” This conflict, occurring within some “disposition” of ours, first becomes clear to us when such Godconsciousness as has developed within ourselves “determines our self-consciousness” in a way that causes it to be “lacking in pleasure.” Still further (in §68), sin is defined as “a distortion” of our nature that arises from “an uneven development of discernment and force of will,” yet not such as to abrogate “the original perfection of humanity.”
2. Richtungen und Verrichtungen der Sinnlichkeit zu der höheren Geistestätigkeit. For Schleiermacher, Geist (spirit) always refers to any or all functions of one’s mind. Thus, it is never wholly restricted to one’s intellect.
3. Angebornen Differenz. Ed. note: Or “inborn.” Actually, though echoing tradition, in Schleiermacher’s usage here this term means not in the baby’s control and presupposes possibly prenatal and definitely postnatal impacts of a sinful nature from other human beings. Today those impacts and corresponding influences that serve to form an infant’s tendencies and dispositions in relation both to other humans and to the world are called “congenital.”
4. Erziehung. Ed. note: In German this term stands for both child rearing and any type of education outside the home, hence the general issue here is the familiar one of “nature vs. nurture.”
5. Gutartigkeit. Ed. note: The concept points to an attitude of kindliness, goodwill. In contrast, Bösartigkeit points to an attitude of unkindliness, ill will. Böse means ill behavior as distinguished from evil (Übel) that is brought about through human agency—that is, wickedness.
6. Ed. note: See §69n2 above. Here geistige eintretenden Entwicklung refers to development of the entire mind, in any or all of its interconnected functions.
7. Ich. Ed. note: In his structural theory of the self, Freud later used Es (it), Ich (I), and Überich (above I); the Latin terms Id, Ego, and Superego were contributed by his English translators. “Ego” was not much used for “I” before that.
8. Selbständigkeit. Ed. note: Or strict autonomy, independence.
9. Peccatum originis. Ed. note: Erbsünde.
10. Peccatum actuale. Ed. note: wirklichen Sünde.
11. Ed. note: Here eigentlichen Tat, referring as it does to a person’s own (eigen) deed, further explains the interpretation of actuale (wirklich) given here. In contrast, the term actuale could mean simply that the sin is actually happening, at present, not just being passed down as a consequence of another’s original act (Adam’s).
12. Ed. note: Erb (original), without any further qualification, strictly means “heir,” hence “inherited” sin, a property that could be gained only genetically in this case. Ordinarily ursprünglich would be the word translated as “original.” In some cases Ur is attached to a word to mean a “cause of something” (Ursache), a “judgment” from some person or persons (Urteil), but the similar-sounding Erbsünde is not typically used, apparently never by Schleiermacher.
13. Epitome (Formula of Concord, 1577) 1.10: “Original sin is not a sin that a person commits [aliquod delictum quod actu perpetratur]; rather, it is embedded in the human being’s nature, substance, and essence.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 490; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 774.
14. Ed. note: Indeed, the discussion of every proposition that follows concerning the operation and consequences of sin in human life (§§70–85) consists of a succession of adjustments to this doctrine. Thus, this treatment presents a continuous, highly refined argument, impossible to grasp without closely following Schleiermacher’s “cautious” (vorsichtig), careful analysis. Still, it can be helpful to get an overall picture of what he comes to in the process. Accordingly, §70 begins by using several sample statements in confessions and dogmatics in order meaningfully to assert that the individual’s “complete incapacity for good,” which can be removed only by redemption, precedes any deed performed and in part comes from a source, to be called “the collective life of sin” (cf. §71), that is beyond (jenseits) one’s own existence. Yet, this incapacity does not obviate the capacity inherent in the original perfection of humanity to appropriate grace. Both capacities are still in us to some degree. Thus, we all have some ability to do good, and the regenerate can do ill, both within the reign of God and outside it. In both places, inseparably, the question is How are we to do “spiritual” good?