§170. All that is essential in this Second Aspect of the Second Part of our presentation is also posited in the essential features of the doctrine of the Trinity;1 however, in its ecclesial formulation2 this doctrine is not itself an expression that immediately conveys Christian self-consciousness but is only a combination of several such expressions.
(1) Symbolum Quicunque Vult (the so-called, “Athanasian Creed” after late 4th century) 1.3: “This is the catholic faith: that we worship one God in trinity and the trinity in unity.”3
(2) Augsburg Confession (1530) I: “First, we teach … according to the decree of the Council of Nicaea that there is one divine nature … and that there are nonetheless three persons in one and the same divine nature, equally powerful, equally eternal, etc.”4
(3) Second Helvetic Confession (1562) III: “Nevertheless, we believe in [and teach] that this only God [boundless, one and undivided] exists inseparably and unconfused in the distinct persons Father, Son and Holy Spirit.”5
(4) Gallican Confession (1559) VI: “Scripture teaches us that in this sole and simple divine nature subsists three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit”6
(5) Hungarian Confession (1562) (“On the Triunity of Jehovah”): “We believe this one and only God to be three, attested in heaven as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, who, even though they are three as they subsist in their distinctiveness and in the management of their functions, are also one in this being three.”7
1. In this Part the doctrine of the uniting of the divine nature with human nature, both through the individual person of Christ and through the common spirit of the church,8 is essential to our presentation, and the whole conception of Christianity in our ecclesial doctrines stands or falls with this Part. The reason is that unless a being of God in Christ were assumed, the idea of redemption could not be concentrated in this manner in his person. Moreover, if there were no such uniting in the common spirit of the church as well, the church too could not in such a manner be the bearer and perpetuator of the redemption brought about through Christ.
Now, precisely these features are also the essential features in the doctrine of God’s tri-unity. Clearly this doctrine was established only in defense of the view, first, that nothing less than the divine nature was in Christ and indwells the Christian church as its common spirit. Second, in these expressions we intend neither a diminished nor a totally figurative meaning, not wanting to have anything to do with exceptional higher beings—conceived, as it were, as subordinate deities—in Christ and in the Holy Spirit. The doctrine of the Trinity had no other origin than this, at first having wanted simply to equate,9 in the most definite way possible, the divine nature considered in this union with the divine nature in itself. This origin is all the less to be doubted since religious parties within Christianity that conceive the doctrine of redemption in a different fashion also necessarily dispense with the doctrine of the Trinity. They do this because they have no point of doctrine to which it could be attached, which could not be the case, even in Catholic doctrine, if the doctrine of the Trinity were also at least attached to points of doctrine other than these at the same time. Moreover, that this is the origin of the doctrine of the Trinity is also obvious from the fact that those divergent parties,10 distinguished chiefly by their negation of God’s tri-unity, are not thereby obliged to adopt still other divergences in the doctrine of God and the divine attributes, as would have to occur if the doctrine of the Trinity were based on a particular conception of the nature of Supreme Being as such; in all probability they are directly obliged, however, to advance a different theory of the person of Christ and thus also of the human need for redemption and of the significance11 of redemption.
By virtue of this interconnection we now justifiably regard the doctrine of the Trinity, insofar as these features are lodged within it, as the copestone12 of Christian doctrine. Accordingly, we also regard this equal status13 of the divine in each of these two unions with the divine in the other, and then also of the two with the divine nature as such, to be what is essential in the doctrine of the Trinity.
2. We would also like to stop with this affirmation, however, not being able to assign the same importance14 to the additional formation of this dogma, which also first justifies the customary use of the term. This point is to be explained as follows. The term “triune” is first founded on each of the two unitings being traced back to a separateness posited both as independent of the two unitings and as existing eternally in Supreme Being as such. Then, once the distinct member of this separate existence that was destined15 to be united with Jesus had been designated by the term “Son,” it was also deemed necessary in a corresponding way to posit the term “Father” as designating such a separate existence. The result was the duality present in that term: the unity of the divine nature and the threeness, or trinity,16 of the persons.
Now, however, surely that presupposition of an eternal separation in Supreme Being is not the expression of any religious self-consciousness, in which it could indeed never emerge. Or, who would venture to assert that the thought of such an eternal separateness would be implied in the impression made by the divine in Christ as the basis of that impression? No one, surely, for suppose that one wanted somehow to find this task set forth in John’s teaching about the Logos, as though this one feature of Trinitarian doctrine were definitely contained there and thus, as though establishing the rest of it, were naturally implied. Then, one would be confronted by so many objections that one would hardly find ground to stand on. For one thing, the Arian position sought to substantiate itself in this very passage. In addition, the exegesis of both sides in that controversy succumbs to equally telling, though contrasting, difficulties. As a result, it must be said that whichever of the two notions is taken to underlie the passage and is viewed as in John’s mind as well, it must be admitted that he would have had to have gone about his work in a most unsatisfactory, unfitting manner. For another thing, if the Trinity had been in the apostle’s mind, this presentation would easily have lent itself also to a similar introduction of the Holy Spirit, which is indeed mentioned quite frequently in the discourses of Christ recorded for us by John, nor would he have lacked occasion to bring in this second member elsewhere as well, speaking of the relationship of the Spirit as one that was from the beginning with God and is God.17
Suppose, however, that one had simply to grant the assumption that here John asserted of the divine united with human nature in Christ that it was to be posited as a particular in God from all eternity. It would not remotely follow that this assertion would be meant in the way the doctrine of the Trinity takes it or that this doctrine would therefore be the true natural completion of the Johannine statements and be the only one. This is so, for what underlies the development of the doctrine would be not simply the endeavor quite exactly to reproduce our Christian self-consciousness that the divine nature is of equal status in the two forms of union and is also equal to the being of God as such. Rather, once this distinction regarding the onset of the divine and the human being united were transplanted into eternity, only then would the need arise both to guard against the emergence of something polytheistic in appearance and to see to it that this being of God, which is in a certain sense set apart, nevertheless coheres in the unity of the divine nature. In contrast, there is not even a trace of such a need in John’s discourse; nor, therefore, was he on the way to the doctrine of the Trinity as we have it.
3. Hence, the second part of our proposition is not to be understood as if the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity were to be viewed as an immediate, or even one at all necessary, combination of expressions regarding self-consciousness. Rather, the intermediate step is first to view the eternalized18 being of God in itself as something separate from the eternalized being of God for the activity of uniting. Now, suppose that this distinction arose with such definiteness, based on statements that Christ and the apostles made regarding him and the Holy Spirit, that we would have to accept it on their testimony. The doctrine of the Trinity would then be a fully developed doctrine of this kind, and we would accept it as a collection of testimonies concerning a supersensible fact.19 However, it would no more be a doctrine of faith20 in the most fundamental, proper sense of the term than are the doctrines of the resurrection and ascension of Christ.21 Moreover, it would also resemble these doctrines in that our faith in Christ and our living communion with him would be the same even if we had no knowledge of this transcendent fact or if this fact were different. Now, however, exegesis that has intended to establish the doctrine in this manner has never been able to gain such currency as to have avoided attacks constantly being lodged against it. For that reason, it is important to establish the independence of those main two cardinal points of ecclesial doctrine—the being of God in Christ and in the Christian church—from the doctrine of the Trinity.
Now suppose that information regarding this supersensible fact were further built on and taught in such a way that the proposed separation in Supreme Being had no point to it until the uniting began. Suppose, even still, that the second and third persons of the Trinity were involved in the creation of the world and continued to be involved afterward, and that the second person was the subject of all the Old Testament theophanies, and the entire activity of prophecy under the old covenant received its impetus from the third person. These propositions would be still farther removed from containing expressions concerning our Christian self-consciousness, and we can wait all the more calmly to see whether the exegeses on which these expansions rest are more securely validated by the latest efforts on this subject than has been true up to now.
Postscript. Suppose that at some point it had proved possible, or ever could be proved possible, to bring the notion of a threeness in God to light or to demonstrate it either on the basis of general conceptions or a priori, yet without reference to the circumstances of redemption and without appeal to Scripture; such a doctrine of the Triune God would still be incapable of finding any place in a Christian doctrina fidei.22 This would be the result even if it were far more fully executed than ecclesial doctrine—insofar as that is bound to the basic facts of Christianity—has had or can ever have success in doing. This would be the case even if the task were occasioned by our ecclesial doctrine, for without this condition hardly anyone would have thought to do it. Indeed, even if the proposed revision strictly held to the same terms for designating both the threeness and the oneness as the ecclesial doctrine uses, we would still firmly maintain that it is a different kind of doctrine. Not only do such deductive products, which are not closely connected with those basic facts of Christianity, manifest a totally different origin for that doctrine; precisely on this account, they also can be of no use whatsoever in Christian doctrine. As a consequence, we can simply leave them alone in this context, since they are mere dicta of philosophy;23 and we are in no way called upon to subject them to any critique, whether they might stem from ancient24 or modern25 teachers of the church.
1. Ed. note: On Schleiermacher’s contrast between “triune” and “Trinity,” see OR (1821) II, supplemental note 1. He preferred to use “triune” when referring to who God is in relation to human beings. According to OR (1821) V, supplemental note 9, at the highest stage among the forms of religion, high enough to have formed a theology, one task of dogmatics is to map out its domain. Moreover, it is to do this so completely that all that has occurred of any significance, not simply moments of sudden awareness, is to be located and understood in its relation to the whole domain. See the BO index and table of contents on the key theme of God’s triune domain in theology, and see biographical sources that show how this interest arose for him already as a teenage lad at the Herrnhüter Brethren’s secondary school in Barby. For a summary on “The True Nature of Piety,” see OR II, its concluding subsection. See also OR index on “piety” and “religion,” especially that of Christianity. On the “perfectibility” of Christianity, see CF §93.2 and OR V.
2. Ed. note: Here, as in other contemporaneous contexts, “ecclesial” (kirchliche) refers to decisions made by the church as a corporate entity, notably through the creeds and other doctrinal symbols. See an earlier explanation of where this doctrine is placed in §123.1; see also §§96.1, 97.2, and 99.P.S.
3. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 24; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 28.
4. Ed. note: ET Tice; cf. Schaff’s translation from the Latin, Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 7, also Book of Concord (2000), 17; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 50.
5. Ed. note: Here, material omitted by Schleiermacher is supplied in brackets. ET Tice; cf. Cochrane (1972), 228; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 470. Cf. §37n3.
6. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 362f., also Cochrane (1972), 146; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 330.
7. Ed. note: ET Tice; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 542. The Latin title is Confessio Czengerina.
8. Cf. §§94 and 123. Ed. note: Gemeingeist der Kirche.
9. Gleichstellung. Ed. note: The term selected is open and ambiguous, suggesting at least features of similarity or commonality but not necessarily identity in the strictest sense, though this too is possible, depending on what “the most definite way possible” would be. In all his writing on the doctrine of the Trinity, Schleiermacher himself insists on equal divine status among the three, but he does so under nonphilosophical presuppositions, thus in ways quite different from those to be found in the classic ecclesial doctrine.
10. Ed. note: For an account of those “divergent parties,” see Schleiermacher’s own essay On the Discrepancy between the Sabellian and the Athanasian Method of Representing the Doctrine of the Trinity (1822, trans. 1835).
11. Wert. Ed. note: As used here, this term especially denotes importance—worth, dignity, value—as to what meaning is to be attached to redemption, hence “significance.”
12. Schlußstein. Ed. note: This is a stone placed all along the peak of a sloping roofline. Schluß is also the word used for “conclusion”; hence, this concluding discussion is intended to “cap,” or draw together synthetically, the entire system in summative fashion, not to produce a merely inconclusive addendum. The words for “coping stone,” as in an archway, are Deckstein and Kappenstein (coping stone of an archway, not the concluding copestone of a structure’s roofline).
13. Gleichstellung. Ed. note: See note 8 above.
14. Wert. Ed. note: See §170n11 above.
15. Ed. note: “Intended” translates bestimmte. That is, “determined” or “destined” by theologians and church leaders.
16. Ed. note: Einheit (unity) versus Dreiheit (threeness).
17. Ed. note: See John 1:1.
18. Verewigung.
19. Ed. note: übersinnlichen Tatsache. Schleiermacher means a supposed fact that refers beyond sense experience and is thus abstract, transcendent.
20. Glaubenslehre. Ed. note: Below, this term is usually translated by its direct historical referent, doctrina fidei (faith-doctrine).
22. Ed. note: See §170n16 and main text.
23. Philosopheme.
24. For example, in Anselm (1033–1109), Monologian (1076), chaps. 29–61. Ed. note: ET and Latin: Hopkins (1986), 132–81; ET only: Williams (1996), 48–74.
25. For example, in Karl Daub (1763–1836) of Heidelberg, Theologumena (1806), §§126–27. Ed. note: Quoted in KGA I/7.3, 393–96. Daub came to hold that dogmatics is the science of the Trinity.
§171. The ecclesial doctrine of the Triune God requires that we consider each of the three persons to be equal to the divine being and the reverse, also that we consider each of the three persons to be equal to the other; yet, we do not have the capacity to do either the one or the other, but we can represent the persons only in some kind of gradation and likewise either represent the unity of the divine nature as something less than the three persons or the reverse.
(1) Symbolum Quicunque Vult (= the so-called Athanasian Creed, after late 4th century): “This is the catholic faith: that we worship one God in trinity and trinity in unity neither confusing the persons nor dividing the substance. For the person of the Father is one, that of the Son another, and that of the Holy Spirit still another, but the deity (divinitas) of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit is one—equal in glory, coequal in majesty. … and in this trinity none is before or after, greater or less than another, but all three persons are in themselves coeternal and coequal.”1
(2) Augsburg Confession (1530) I: “That there is one divine nature, which is called and truly is God, and that there are nonetheless three persons in one and the same divine nature … and by the word person is meant not a part, not an attribute within some other, but that which subsists of itself, just as the fathers have used this word in this matter.”2
(3) Belgic Confession (1561) VIII: “Who is one single being, in which there are three persons that are from eternity really and truly distinct in their inexchangeable characteristics.”3
1. The acceptance of eternal separations in the divine nature necessarily implies to us this further presupposition regarding this twofold equality of the divine in all three persons among themselves and in each person, with Supreme Being conceived as a unity. Of this result there can be no doubt.4 The explanation is as follows. If divinity or power and glory were something less in all three persons together than in Supreme Being conceived as a unity, the three persons would also be not in Supreme Being but under Supreme Being. Therefore, the divine in them would be called divine only figuratively, and our community of life with Christ as well as our participation in the Holy Spirit would not be any sort of community with God. The outcome would also be exactly the same if the divine in the three persons themselves were not the same, and perchance only the divine in the Father would be the true, proper divine, while that in Christ and the Holy Spirit would be something figurative and subordinate. Then, however, even our indwelling consciousness of the need for redemption would have to express something different, since we would be satisfied differently by redemption that would not bring us into community with God, viewing it as a hindrance to our community with God. In short, everything that is most important in Christianity would have a different cast. Hence, in proceeding from the presupposition stated above, nothing further could be determined than is posited in the ecclesial doctrine, and the constantly renewed zeal for it would be perfectly understandable to us.
2. Now, the passages from the creedal and confessional symbols cited here undeniably assert, first and foremost, that might and divinity are not less in any of the three persons than in the other two.5 Patently, this would be sufficient to avert all inequalities were it not for a contradiction that shows up with the view that presenting the way in which the persons are distinguished is required to continue alongside presenting this equality. The contradiction lies in the fact that asserting this equality would have to serve, at the same time, as the canon to be followed in presenting the distinctions among the persons—that is, the canon that no feature that includes within itself an inequality of the designated sort is to be taken into presentation of the doctrine. Now suppose, however, that Father and Son are distinguished from each other in that the Father is eternally begetting but is himself unbegotten, but in contrast the Son is begotten from eternity but does not himself beget. Then—however remote the eternal generation may also be from all temporal and organic generation—the word itself, if it is to mean anything at all, must at least denote a relationship of dependency. Thus, suppose that might has indwelt the Father from eternity to beget the Son as second divine person, but no such might indwelt the Son and yet no relationship of dependence in which the Father would stand to the Son could be adduced as a counterweight. It is then undeniable that the might of the Father would be greater than that of the Son and that the glory that the begetter has in relation to the begotten would have to be greater than the glory the begotten has in relation to the begetter.
Moreover, the same holds true of the Spirit, whether the Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, as in the Greek dogma, or from the Father and the Son, as the Latin dogma will have it. In the Greek case, the Son has a twofold incapacity as compared with the Father, since he does not beget, nor does a person proceed from him. In the Latin case, only the Spirit has this twofold dependency—for this procession is also a relationship of dependence, except that it is supposed to be something different from being begotten, even though no one has ever been able to make clear what the distinction between the two is—but here the Son has one capacity in common with the Father that puts him in a position above the Spirit, whereas in the Greek case the Spirit is equal to the Son. Thus, in either case the Father stands above the other two, and all that remains in dispute is whether these two are equal to each other or even whether one of them is subordinate to the other; but the equality of all three persons does not emerge from either side of this distinction.
3. Likewise, this proposition that the divinity in the three persons, taken together, is the same as that of the one divine nature would have to be the canon by which the relationship of the three persons to the unity of the divine nature is to be represented. Yet, suppose that, at the same time, we are to add into our consideration what has just been treated, namely, the view that the persons are distinguished from one another by distinctive properties that cannot be predicated of the divine nature in and of itself,6 but that the divine nature itself is present only in these three persons, not perchance also outside of them either as a fourth person or as an impersonal entity,7 and even in them not somehow dispersed such that some attributes would reside in one person and different attributes in another;8 rather, the divine nature is in each one wholly and undivided. The required equality, therefore, cannot be extracted from this account. The reason is that we have no closer typus by which to represent a relationship such as is advanced here than that of the concept of a species and of the individual entities included under it, for the concept of a species is likewise present wholly and undivided in the individual entities that belong to it but is not present anywhere outside them.
Admittedly, this suggestion has been in dispute all along, since some grant the analogy validity9 while others reject it.10 Still, if the relationship is not to be considered in terms of this typus, then, as its opponents also grant,11 we could not be in a position to conceive anything definite on the subject and thus could not attribute any importance to it. In contrast, if we are to follow the analogy, no equality between the unity and the threeness is possible. Instead, we must do one of two things. Either, more realistically, we would grant the superior position to the unity, conceived as the nature common to all three, and then the separateness of the persons would appear to be a subordinate matter and would recede accordingly while the divine monarchy would step to the fore. Or, more nominalistically, we would grant the superior position to the threeness, and then the unity, conceived as something abstract, would recede; but then that which has immediate existence for our religious self-consciousness—the divinity of the Holy Spirit and the divinity of Christ, along with the relation of Christ as Son to his Father—would step to the fore, yet at the same time there would be the danger of bordering on the tritheistic12 view.
Between these two approaches—for we must, in any case, always begin either with the unity or with the threeness—no strictly middle course would be possible, not one that would fail to be an approximation to one or the other of the two. Yet, neither a subordination of the unity under the threeness nor the reverse lies in the presupposition stated in the above proposition. Accordingly, with reference to the separation that subsists in Supreme Being from eternity, there are no other options than to take only one or the other course, which conflicts with the requirements of the propositions contained in the confessional symbols; or, should we be wary of these requirements, we could settle on neither of the two positions—either that emphasizing the unity or that emphasizing the threeness, but be left wavering unsteadily between them.13 In these circumstances, then, this doctrine can offer little toward securing those two main positions, which are, nevertheless, its sole points of reference, or to place them in clearer light.
4. The task remains of showing how the unity and threeness are related to the divine causality—which is apprehended in our self-consciousness as the feeling of absolute dependence—both in redemption and sanctification as well as already in a general way in creation and preservation.14 The divine causality should not be parceled out among the persons, however proximate it may be to say that the Father alone is creator and preserver and likewise that the Son alone is redeemer and the Spirit alone is sanctifier. Thus, if the divine causality is to remain undivided, here too we reach the same conclusion as before: that either these causalities as a set belong to the one divine nature as such, but to the persons only inasmuch as they are in this nature and not inasmuch as they are distinct from one another, or they belong to the three persons as such but to the unity of the divine nature only inasmuch as it is composed of them.
The first view has not been able to gain currency, patently because the threeness would recede further than is permitted by the dominant tendency,15 for it is almost the case in this view that the persons would retain some reality16 only for the kinds of particular acts mentioned above. That is to say: The Father would retain reality only insofar as he has begotten the Son from eternity, but creation and preservation would have reality only in the unity of the divine nature. To be sure, the Son would not merely have been begotten and the Spirit merely have been breathed into being; rather, the Son would also have become human and the Spirit would also have been poured forth. However, the activity of justification would nonetheless not be that of the Son and the activity of sanctification not that of the Spirit; rather, both activities would belong to the unity of the divine nature.
Now, the second view has, therefore, been the one generally accepted, the view that the entire divine causality belongs to the three persons. However, the way it has taken shape in ecclesial doctrine does not appear to be free of a hidden contradiction. This is shown as follows. If the divine causality belongs to the persons as such, it belongs to each of them inasmuch as each is distinguished from the others and, thus, the same causality would in the one person be the causality of the unbegotten, in another person the causality of the begotten. The consequence is that a threefold causality would belong to each person, though only to one in effect because in each the divine causality would issue from what is distinctive of the person. The situation is roughly like that of Christ’s being supposed to accomplish the same thing with two wills: the three persons also accomplish the same thing, each time in the person’s own way, thus also with the person’s own act.17 This consistent arrangement, however, has not gained currency, patently because the divine unity then recedes in a wholly nominalistic fashion and scarcely anything is left to that unity than to serve as the equality of the three persons in accordance with their nature and will. Contrariwise, for people to assume that those causalities would indeed belong to the three persons as such but that each causality would be one and the same in all three, not a distinct causality in each, would actually mean that the divine causalities would not refer to the persons after all but would refer to the divine nature in its unity. As a consequence of using this approach, once it were presupposed that the eternal threeness exists in the divine unity, we would again arrive only at the same result as before: a wavering between one feature rising to the fore and the other receding, or vice versa.
5. Now, if we observe the way in which this doctrine is handled almost everywhere in dogmatic presentations, it becomes still clearer how little of what is required in the general formulations survives in exposition.18 That is, first, the doctrine of the nature and attributes of God is treated without reference to the threeness, thus God is considered only in terms of the divine unity. Among these attributes, however, no single attribute is presented as threefold and in some distinct way separated or distributed. Rather, the doctrine of the three persons follows, treated separately without any such interconnection and, in any case, without having been prepared for by the consciousness of a being of God in Christ and in the Christian church. Yet, even then it is handled in such a way that if this or that divine attribute is designated as belonging also to the three persons, the demonstration is always carried out only for the Son and the Spirit in particular, while ordinarily the demonstration for the Father is held to be self-evident already. Now, if the equality of the persons were not only asserted as a formulation but also operative as a canon, such self-evident claims would have to be true either of all three persons or of none. The superior position accorded the Father in this respect proves that he is still conceived as having a different relationship to the unity of the divine nature. Thus, those who deem it to be superfluous to demonstrate that divine attributes and activities belong to the Father, while they demand this demonstration for the Son and the Spirit, are as a group not strict Trinitarians, since they identify the Father with the unity of the divine nature but not the Son or the Spirit. This approach can be traced back directly to Origen’s notion19 that the Father is unqualifiedly God but the Son and Spirit are God only through their participation in the divine nature. This notion is indeed rejected straightaway by orthodox teachers of the church, but it secretly underlies their overall procedure, nonetheless.
1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 24; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 28.
2. Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 7; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 50.
3. Ed. note: ET Tice, cf. Cochrane (1972), 192f., and French version in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 389; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 363f.
4. Ed. note: This paragraph corresponds to §189.1 in CG1 (1822). An exact comparison of the two texts in both editions of the conclusion is given in Schleiermacher, The Triune God, trans. and ed. Tice (forthcoming).
5. Ed. note: This paragraph corresponds to §189.2 and §190.1 in CG1 (1822).
6. Ed. note: From here on, the subsection draws from discussion in §189.2 in CG1 (1822). On this point the Belgic Confession and a statement by Gregory Nazianzus were cited in CG1 (1822).
7. Ed. note: At this point the phrase unitas in trinitate was cited in CG1 (1822).
8. Passages like the following in the Gallican Confession (1559) 6, “the Son, his (the Father’s) word and eternal wisdom … the Holy Spirit, his virtue, power and efficacy,” are to be viewed as too inexact, though they have functions belonging to a confessional symbol. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 363, also Cochrane (1972), 146; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 330.
9. (l) Gregory Nazianzus (ca. 329–390), Oratio 21 (“In Praise of Athanasius,” 380), sec. 35: “… the nature of essence [οὐσία φύσιν] … signifies hypostasis of a particular nature [ἰδιότητας].” Ed. note: These concepts are drawn from a passage differently formed, which reads: “We use in an orthodox sense the terms one essence and three hypostases, the one to denote the nature of the godhead, the other the properties of the three.” ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 2, 7:279; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 35:1123–24.
(2) Basil of Caesarea (“the Great,” ca. 330–379), Epistolarum Classis 2, letter 214: “Substance [οὐσία] has the same relation to person [ὑπόστασιν] as the general has to the particular.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 28 (1955), 102; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 32:789–90.
(3) Theodoret of Cyrus (ca. 393–ca. 466), Dialogue 1 (with Eranistes): “But, according to the teaching of the fathers, substance differs from subsistent entity as the common differs from the proper, or as the genus differs from the species or the individual.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 106 (2003), 31; Greek: Migne Gr. 83:33.
10. Augustine (354–430), The Trinity (400–416), 7.11: “We do not use these terms according to genus and species. … Nor do we therefore call the Trinity three persons or substances one essence … as though three somethings subsist from one matter.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 45 (1963), 238; Latin: Migne Lat. 42:944.
11. Augustine (354–430), The Trinity (400–416), 7.8. “These three together are one God on account of their ineffable union.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 45 (1963), 232; Latin: Migne Lat. 42:941.
12. Tritheistische.
13. Gregory Nazianzus (ca. 329–390), Oratio 40 (In sanctum baptisma) sec. 41 (381–). “No sooner do I conceive of the One than I am illumined by the splendor of the three; no sooner do I distinguish them than I am carried back to the one.” Ed. note: ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Church, Ser. 2, vol. 7 (1894), 375; Greek: Migne Gr. 36:417.
14. Ed. note: This paragraph corresponds to §189.3 in CG1 (1822).
15. This is so, for ecclesial doctrine, which is actually inclined to give greater validity to the persons than to the unity of being (Wesen), arises unobscurely from these words: “We are compelled by the Christian truth to confess that each distinct person is God and Lord, so we are forbidden by the catholic religion to say there are three gods or three lords.” Symbolum Quicunque vult (= so-called Athanasian Creed, after late 4th cent.) 19. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 24; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 28.
16. Realität.
17. Ed. note: Thus, presumably the Father would act on his own but also in two other respects: in his distinct relation to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. The same would be true of the other two persons.
18. Ed. note: This subsection corresponds to §190.2 in CG1 (1822).
19. Origen (ca. 185–ca. 254), Commentary on John (230–231): “At one time the God is very God [αὐτόθες]. … On the other hand, everything besides the very God which is made God by participaton in his divinity would more properly not be said to be ‘the God,’” where the context unquestionably posits that αὐτόθες is the Father. Cf. Origen’s Peri Archon (“On Principles”) 1.62. Ed. note: In the above elision, Origen quotes Jesus’ praying “that they may know you to be the only true God” (John 17:3). ET Fathers of the Church 80 (1989), 98–99; Greek: Migne Gr. 14:109. Peri Archon ET On First Principles (1966); Greek: Migne Gr. 11:115ff.
§172. Since we have all the less reason to regard this doctrine as settled in that it did not receive any fresh treatment when the Evangelical1 church was established, it must still await a reorganization of it that goes back to its very beginnings.
1. We may now recall, on the one hand, that the formulations that still have currency in the doctrine of the Trinity today derive from a time when Christianity was still spreading extensively across heathendom.2 We may also recall how easily, as a consequence, unconscious echoes of things heathen could slip in when it was necessary to speak of a plurality or differentiation in God. It is no wonder, then, that from the outset designations of this plurality were unsteady and subject to misconceptions and that at later times, when no admixing of things heathen was a matter for concern anymore, they could no longer be suitable. Reservations did have to be attached to the use of these designations, however, so as to guard against deviations in various directions. Moreover, in part, even such reservations rarely avoid bordering on one extreme in trying to guard against the other; and, in part, they must likewise lose their value when the danger of misunderstanding to which they originally referred has disappeared, and then the deceptive appearance that they afford in some other respects will come to the fore all the more.3
Now let us move to the original tendency of the doctrine, which was to make clear that it is no hyperbolic expression of our consciousness of Christ and of the common Spirit of the Christian church when we assert that God is in them both. At this point, what shows up as the first problem this doctrine must tackle is that this distinctive being of God in another must be defined in terms of its relationship both to the being of God in and of itself and to the being of God in relation to the world in general. Moreover, it is patent that there is no prospect of ever so completely resolving this problem that a formulation could be drawn up that is adequate for all time and every deviation from this formulation could be rejected as non-Christian. This is the case, because since we are concerned only with the God-consciousness given to us in our self-consciousness along with our world-consciousness, we have no formulation for the being of God as such, distinct from the being of God in the world. Rather, any such formulation would have to be borrowed from the speculative domain and, as a consequence, would not be faithful to the nature of our discipline.4 In addition, if we know that in itself every one of our dogmatic expressions for God’s relationship to the world bears the inevitable error of anthropomorphizing God,5 how are we supposed to believe that we would do better at the more complicated problem of differentiating the distinctive being of God in Christ, viewed as one who has an individual nature, and in the Christian church, viewed as a single historical whole from the omnipotent presence of God in the world in general,6 of which world Christ and the church are parts? Instead, we will have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that the problem can be resolved only by approximation and that on this account formulations that have contrasting points of departure must remain in motion over against each other.7 This will continually occur, since interest in the problem is bound to be renewed again and again.
2. Given this state of the subject, one could be most surprised concerning the subject that whereas so many other problems first posed only later on have been resolved to a rather satisfactory extent, precisely this one, which encompasses so much, has remained stationary for such a long time at a point that vouchsafes little satisfaction, a point to which it was advanced at the very onset, so to speak.8 Still, precisely those later questions—particularly those concerning the person of Christ and the gracious actions9 of the Spirit—did treat the same subject, in the aspect of it that is directed to the immediate interest of faith. Moreover, the actual Trinitarian formulations had to remain as they had already come to be, all the more so to the degree that they were regarded as basic to these discussions. They remained so, in spite of the undeniable fact that an impassioned zeal for polemics,10 by which mistakes are so easily committed, had had all too great a part in their formulation.
Now as it happens, however, the doctrine of the Trinity persists in not being free of the above-indicated vacillations between equality and subordination on the one side and, on the other side, between tritheism and a unitarianism such that it, in turn, completely obscures the eternal separateness of the persons, which was regarded as of chief importance. Thus, it should not be particularly surprising to us that anti-Trinitarian opinions should constantly reemerge and occasionally gain more ground, nor should we rise too quickly to judgment.11 The reason is that the situation here is like that with the doctrine of God in general, where many not only allege but also think that they are opposed to every belief in God, when actually they are simply rebelling against the customary presentations of the doctrine but have by no means removed from themselves all conditions of the mind and heart12 that are based on God-consciousness. Likewise, it is natural, given the difficulties and imperfections with which the formulations of the doctrine of the Trinity still current are burdened, that those who cannot reconcile themselves to it should assert that they repudiate everything connected with it, whereas their piety by no means lacks the impress of what is distinctively Christian. Even today this is often enough the case not only in the unitarian societies in England and America but also among the scattered opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity here. This situation can only lead us to resolve, in part, to secure free room for a thoroughgoing critique of this doctrine in the form it has had up to now and, in part, to prepare the way for and introduce a reconstruction of it appropriate to the condition of allied faith-doctrine at the time.
3. Now, perhaps the position that the doctrine of the Trinity has obtained here is at least an initial, preliminary step toward that end. Here are the reasons.13 First, one who is a “believer” in the ecclesial sense cannot be equipped with the equanimity required either for an impartial critique of the procedure used up to now or for a reworking of the doctrine, if one has not oneself become convinced that our faith in the divine that exists in Christ and in the Christian community can find dogmatic expression suitable to it before discussion is also focused on these further definitions that form the doctrine of the Trinity. This independence, however, can never attain clear status if that doctrine is handled before the two main points of faith just mentioned, for doing that all too easily gives rise to the impression that accepting the doctrine of the Trinity is the necessary precondition of faith in redemption and in the founding of the reign of God through the divine in Christ and the Holy Spirit. The church’s history, however, completely contradicts this impression. These reasons do not yet take into account that the character of the entire presentation is clouded with respect to dogmatic interests, hence neither the critique nor the points of contact needed for a reworking of the doctrine can be put on a proper footing if that doctrine, despite its saying nothing directly about our Christian self-consciousness, is advanced as a fundamental doctrine and accordingly, of course, in a speculative fashion. Furthermore, this approach is then extended into the doctrines of the Redeemer and the divine Spirit, made out as being dependent on that doctrine, with the result that gate and door are opened to the intrusion of speculative elements.
We would not be satisfied, however, to take this preliminary step but would have to give at least some indications of what remains to be done in the matter. Thus, based on the present situation it appears that the following two sets of observations are pertinent. The first unresolved difficulty lies already in the relationship of the unity of the divine nature to the threeness of the persons, and here everything focuses on the proposed original, eternal separation within the divine nature. Thus, it would be of primary importance to investigate whether this notion is given in some clear yet indefinite way in New Testament passages so that one must view it as an assertion made by Christ about himself or by the divine Spirit that determined the thinking of the apostles. For this purpose there can scarcely be a better test, to go the other way around, than to ask whether the same passages adduced in support of the notion officially held in the church could not also be explained by the Sabellian notion set up against it. Suppose that the answer is that they could not. Then nothing remains but to put to the test whether the ecclesial doctrine could not, without damaging the two essential presuppositions noted earlier, be reduced to formulations that could avoid the rocks on which the ecclesial presentation founders, without contradicting the biblical passages. Suppose, in contrast, that the answer is that they could. Then it cannot be asserted that our ecclesial doctrine, even if it does not have a purely exegetical origin, can still at least be grounded on a purely exegetical basis. As a result, the Athanasian hypothesis would then be on a par with the Sabellian hypothesis. At that point, it may be asked whether the Sabellian view cannot render the same service without entanglement in such irresolvable difficulties. In other words, the question would be whether formulations could not be found that did not predicate eternal distinctions in Supreme Being but were still capable of presenting in their true light both unitings of Supreme Being with human nature and in an equal manner. The precondition would be that thereby no mutability would be ascribed to Supreme Being. A second precondition would be that although the uniting activities of Supreme Being are presented as temporal, this would not occur in any manner different from what we always see to be the case, because we are able to conceive the divine causality in its eternity only as decree but to represent its realization only as temporal.
The second difficulty that the ecclesial doctrine offered us is that the designation of the first person as Father and the Father’s relationship to the other two persons would seem rather to present the relationship of the persons to the unity of the divine nature than to be compatible with equality among the three persons. Now, at this juncture the question comes down to this: whether it was correct at the outset to apply the designation “Son of God” only to the divine in Christ and to refer the expression “Father” to one of the distinctions in the divine nature and not rather to the unity of the divine nature itself. Now, suppose that it turns out that by “Son of God” Scripture always means only the whole Christ himself. Suppose, too, that Scripture does not recognize a difference between “God” and “Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” as designators of Supreme Being but uses the second name in precisely the same way as the first. Then the task would be to ask whether a similar question could not be asked about Holy Spirit and with a similar answer, whereby propositions would then result that would resolve the second difficulty.
Now, if the results of the two inquiries would fit together,14 a reworking of the doctrine could easily be devised. In contrast, if this would not happen, then new adjustments would have to be sought, depending on what the remaining differences are. Moreover, these considerations already justify in themselves an inability to move beyond these indications here; thus, the matter at hand is hereby brought to a close.
1. Der evangelischen Kirche. Ed. note: This refers to the Lutheran and Reformed churches in Germany, without separating the two. This dogmatic work is geared strictly to that “evangelical” church in Germany at that time. The proposition corresponds to §188 in CG1 (1822).
2. Ed. note: The first part of this subsection corresponds to §188.2 in CG1 (1822).
3. Ed. note: The remainder of this subsection corresponds to §188.1 in CG1 (1822).
4. Ed. note: On the discipline of dogmatics, for its primary restrictions see esp. the notes in §§2–4 and 11, on the discipline as a whole see BO (2011) index.
5. Ed. note: Although Schleiermacher reports having to form human analogies to describe God’s activity in Christ, in self, and in church and world, throughout this work he attempts strictly to avoid anthropomorphizing God. Already in the Introduction he has announced this organic principle in §30.2. There he announces that one can afford no security for the “truly dogmatic character” of any statement in which anthropomorphic expressions are used for God’s nature (Supreme Being in se). Such use, he admits, would seem to be unavoidable in the poetic practices of piety, including rhetorical expressions in hymns and sermons, but not in dogmatics (§53). Thus, the only other times he was forced to use the root concept “anthropo-” in either volume was to warn against anthropopathische ascriptions for God’s activities with human beings in space and time (§§13.2, 33.2, 68.1, 85.1). Such ascriptions would describe God as feeling in the way humans do, thus as receiving what affects them in affective ways. Yet, by analogy, he does depict the all-benevolent God in the best way he can, as Christ and his closest companions on earth did, namely, “God is love” (§§166–67). Regarding use of analogical language, see in the Introduction how he already sets up the conditions for and considerable limits regarding use of analogy itself. See also §172n7.
6. Ed. note: Everywhere in this work Schleiermacher has advised trying to view Christ, above all else, as a whole, and the church, first of all, as a whole. As here, he also advises viewing them as “parts” of the world, taken as a whole. The sense of God’s eternal omnipotent omnipresence in the world is presupposed in immediate Christian religious self-consciousness. The “feeling of absolute dependence” he uses as a basic rubric for experience among Evangelical Christians to serve as a perception of these wholes. The ultimate object of this experience is God—that is, God’s creative presence in their world-consciousness, registered in their self-consciousness. This process happens alongside and under dominion of their God-consciousness, hence the constant threefold structural feature of presenting doctrine throughout this work.
7. Ed. note: Essentially the “problem” addressed in speaking of analogy at all is that of comparing and contrasting concepts by seeking proper “approximations,” if any. In dogmatic/systematic/constructive theology it is not possible to approximate very far toward God in se, transcendent over and beyond this world. This is so, because there are no prospects for anything approaching toward identity between humans and God. However, there is some room for using analogy in relation to God’s activities in Christ, among regenerate persons in the church and in its coexistence with the world. This is so, because there God is known by what God brings about, among and in them, namely, grace. There is no clear identity with God in those quarters either, but one has grounds for seeing approximations. There the central struggle is between action under sway of sinfulness and under sway of God-consciousness. Within that setting there is then room for testing language concerning what God does in relation to human beings who are there.
Actually, after introducing the concept “analogy” in §2.1 of the Introduction, in the rest of it Schleiermacher continually focuses on its limitations with respect to variability and distinctiveness among characteristics adherent in history, nature and reason. He particularly takes into account limitations tied to the distinctiveness of Christ, redemption and those affected by him, also regarding faith experience and religious stirrings, relations between East and West, Roman Catholic and Evangelical. Finally, the lack of “a point of culmination.” This lack already places limits on any spots where analogies might be applied (cf. §§23.1, 24.2, 27.4). Choice of how various terms are used to describe relations between God and humans—e.g., by reason of “force” (Kraft, a soft sense of energic power; cf. §§53.1 and 53.P.S.) and “infinite causality” in relation to God’s omnipresence. Nowhere in this work is a full account on use of analogy given. In Part Two the most widely influential analogy is closely based in Scripture: “that the creation of humanity is first brought to completion in Christ,” who in his person also creates “the new human being” (§97.5). Whereas this analogy offers nothing toward an analogy between human beings and any attribute of God presupposed in Part One, because human attributes are a pure “Negation” of those (§97.5). See index for other uses of the concept “analogy.” His lectures on dialectic come closest to a general account in KGA II/10.1–2 (2002). There the two largest sets of accounts (ca. 300 pages each) are from 1818/19 and 1822. Indications given in the 1811 notes (ET Tice, 1996) concern analogies applied to individual ways of knowing.
8. Ed. note: This paragraph corresponds to §188.3 in CG1 (1822).
9. Gnadenwirkungen. Ed. note: This term refers to key points in the communities of faith where lives of regenerate persons are most notably touched by God, as does the closely related term göttliche Selbstmitteilung (divine self-communication). Cf. CG1 first edition (1822) §181.3 and the present edition §133 and its first subsection, also in §168 as a whole. In §133 here the discussion is about divine self-communication through service to the word of God through the church’s “common spirit,” then in §168 here God’s attribute of “wisdom” is defined as the moving principle of God’s self-communication in redemption for ordering and determining the world, as was done in the first edition (1822) in §181.3. In the first edition (1822), Schleiermacher also referred to three special points at which God’s “workings of grace” appear in the lives of persons, successively (§§130.3, 130.P.S2, 138.3): in baptism (described as “the beginning”), conversion (as another step taken in faith, expressed further in “cooperation” with God), and election (as what registers for each person through proclamation, in its broadest sense). In both editions, other concepts tend to be used for other points of doctrine regarding divine grace. In the first edition (1822) §180.3, however, Schleiermacher also distinguishes among two modes in which workings of grace appear: as preparatory (vorbereitende) and as fulfilled or realized (erfüllende).
10. Ed. note: Schleiermacher’s 1829 open letters to his friend Lücke, On the “Glaubenslehre,” displays examples of his kindly, sometimes ironic approach to controversy. Apparently few of his many earlier reviewers knew quite what to do with this tightly interwoven whole that he called his Glaubenslehre. Few even grasped the main points of the Introduction, or seem to have read much beyond it. Yet, he took their alarming retorts seriously, wherever he could. He faced them with puzzled humor when he could only conclude that they had used poor critical skills for reading. As is all too often practiced in the academy, then and now, polemics is an undisciplined free-for-all, lacking in real respect and quick to be haughtily dismissive, drawing upon habitual presuppositions, some largely hidden even to their purveyors. For him, polemics were to be struggles for understanding, not out-and-out fights. They were also to be directed inwardly within the church, not outwardly to enemies or strangers. The activities of polemics were to be entirely directed to diseased conditions within Christianity, within and among the churches, and in the spirit that is proper to the reign of God. Their leadership function, even among academics, is to foster and engage in healing, in Seelsorge, care of souls. See BO §§40–42 and index there.
11. Ed. note: The term is verurteilen, ordinarily meaning to condemn; however, it also means to deliver a sentence, which in a court, as in this saying, means most generally to decide “guilty” (as charged) or “not guilty” (acquitted). Here, Schleiermacher has summarized an argument against keeping the long-lasting early set formulations and for rehabilitation of the doctrine by reformulation, knowing that the trouble it has caused cannot properly be restored on scriptural ground nor gain currency in the direction he has taken it any time soon. As an aid to further inquiry, translations of his 1822 essay, his CG1 (1822) Conclusion, and this (1831) Conclusion showing changes from the CG1 text, are all included in Schleiermacher, The Triune God (ed. Tice, forthcoming).
12. Gemütszustände.
13. Ed. note: This paragraph corresponds to §188.P.S. and §190.P.S. in CG1 (1822).
14. Ed. note: The German has “einem” in italics to emphasize fitting “together” as one.
Preface to the First Edition (1821)
The practice among the public teachers of our institutions of higher education1 of issuing supplementary textbooks and handbooks for the sciences in which they are lecturing is something so customary that a new example of this sort needs no justification, even though it would always be an inflating of the literature we have, itself already too abundant. Thus, the appearance of this book also needs no justification, particularly since this custom is so very common among teachers of dogmatic theology that not to do this would almost be an exception. In large part, the fact that aids of this kind are published is also simply for convenience’s sake in the teacher’s relationship to students. Only rarely, moreover, does a new general textbook on Christian faith turn out to be a scientifically significant event. This is the case, in that deeply reflective, historically thoroughgoing treatments of particular points of doctrine add far more to the advancement of science. For that purpose, a comprehensive, unfettered critical inventory2 concerning recent dogmatics overall would be very soon desired instead of a constant stream of new textbooks that, taken as a whole, tend to go back to basic forms that bear scarcely any true difference.
Now, as relates to the present book, it does indeed appear to be less able than most other such books to make any claim to be excused from obeying the general rule followed by German institutions of higher education, in that the book is too detailed for it to serve only as a guide to accompany lectures. It ought rather to be considered as the legacy of one who intends to relinquish taking that route. Having this characteristic, however, has entailed the book’s taking shape as follows. To be sure, I have worked first and foremost for my past and future hearers. Yet, I could not cast aside the thought that a number of others might take this book in hand, viewing it as an account for the general public of the mode of teaching that I had finally rendered to the theological public. Now, I did not believe that my presentation could be understood by general readers in the brief form that students hearing my lectures could have found satisfactory for purposes of preparation or perhaps also of recollection. As a result, a fullness of detail emerged that, wholly contrary to my original intention, eventually necessitated my dividing the book into two volumes so that it would not be far too unwieldy. The book’s original purpose, however, should not fail because of this enlargement. Rather, it would be very convenient for me, if I am then able to offer my lectures in dogmatics more often, to be able to assume that those who hear them are already acquainted with the book’s contents and thereby to gain time for discussions that would otherwise have to be omitted.
Now, after I had decided to divide the book into two volumes, I did not want to hold back an earlier publication of this first volume, all the less so since I have already referred to this textbook in a number of passages in the third edition of my discourses On Religion, which is already being printed (1821). Yet, I cannot hide my wish that knowledgeable readers might foreswear issuing an appraisal of my work in public until the second volume, which is to be delayed as little as possible, appears. The reason is that, in my view—further discussed in the Introduction—what can offer a distinctive value to a work of doctrine regarding Christian faith is the way in which the whole work is arranged and the interconnected order in which its individual propositions are placed. This is so, since people are accustomed to be more forbearing toward such writings in view of their style, and I too must lay a strong claim to such forbearance. In general terms, moreover, this interconnectedness of the whole is indeed already laid down in this first volume, but it is not yet made nearly so obvious as to enable movement to a well-grounded appraisal. If one has only this half in view, even the content of a number of its propositions can readily make an inappropriate impression, which can be corrected, in turn, only once these propositions can be conceived in their natural relationship to the whole.
No one will overlook a particular defect that already appears even in this first volume, and unfortunately I cannot promise to do any better in this respect in the volume to follow. I refer to the overall deficiency in references to the literature, which elsewhere makes up a large and valuable part of the whole in writings of this sort. Yet, I am far from wishing that anyone who wants to make a more exact study of Christian faith-doctrine3 would take my book alone in hand. Precisely for this reason, even at this point I have wanted all the less to fill space with references that are found better and more fully made in every other similar book than I could vouch for on my own. Instead, I have used the space gained in this fashion to write out only a relatively small selection of pertinent citations. If needed, I would have devoted still more space to them. For me, the ones I chose were necessary, in part, so as to display statements being assessed at the most suitable spot. In part, I did this so as to furnish statements, which I myself have approved of, by the most prominent authorities and in the most original form possible. All too often, in such works citations not written out are overlooked by readers or are even made ineffectual by errors, which in the case of numbers and abbreviations are extremely difficult to avoid. In contrast, the less I have set forth such points for comparison, the more important it has been to me that the comparisons I have intended are also really made. Nevertheless, in order not to do too much even here, in the passages cited I have had no scruples about passing over intermediate statements and elaborations that do not belong to the matter under discussion. Moreover, only where words that were actually pertinent could be removed from their larger context at all have I refrained entirely from writing out a statement referred to. Given this process of selecting passages for citation, I have simply to refer to principles of demonstration for dogmatics that are already set forth in my Brief Outline of Theology as a Field of Study (1811) and are also further discussed in the Introduction to the present work. Based on these principles, anyone will also readily grasp why more recent dogmaticians are cited almost not at all.
Now, I am the first to set forth a work of faith-doctrine in accordance with the principles of the Evangelical church as if it were one united church,4 and thereby I declare that for me no dogmatic wall of partition seems to exist between our two Evangelical communities of the church.5 Thus, I hope that this declaration will be justified by my efforts here. That is to say, I have sought to present the nature of the Evangelical outlook on faith and life within its distinctive boundaries as the same in both confessions and to indicate the locus for the various opinions of the two confessions within this domain. Thus, this process must shed light on the following facts. First, it is supposed that, on the same basis, we do not want our shared ecclesial community to continue to be divided any longer, so that ultimately each part would have to go on subsisting for itself alone. Second, these differences in doctrine within our two confessions can, and perhaps must, just as well exist side by side in the unity of the Evangelical church, even though externally this has not yet been fully accomplished, just as within the greater unity of Christendom6 there exists, side by side, a mass of deviations that do indeed appear to come close to being nonChristian notions but that have happily avoided getting that far. As a consequence, I hope that since this outcome flows naturally from the whole design, I will not be saddled with blame as if the outcome would be something artificially induced by my predilection for the union that is to be achieved.
Finally, I should like to plead indulgence from those among whom the term “Protestant” has begun to be objectionable,7 given that in treating of this subject I have frequently, indeed predominately, made use of this term and meanings allied with it.8 In many respects they are in the right. This is so, for, in the first place, this term is not suitable for designating a body of doctrine, because it does not in any way convey the character of Evangelical doctrine and instead can only occasion faulty understandings among persons not conversant with it. Not only that, but also those who are opposed to this expression are in the right inasmuch as, in going back to its origin, it also can designate only the German, not the entire Evangelical church. However, even apart from the fact that it hardly works either to eliminate or to establish any usage within the domain of language simply by stipulation, I believe nonetheless that we ought to go on using the term “Protestant,” provided that from time to time we take precautions against misconstruing it. That is to say, the historic protestations of the German estates comprised no stolid opposition against a legitimate power but were simply directed against an illegitimate use of such power, and thus there is nothing in that protestation of which we would have to be ashamed. So, why should we ban from our language an expression that has always been used in our most important proceedings related to church polity, by which precisely the distinctive way in which the German Evangelical church arose is preserved in memory? The church of our fatherland all the more requires its own designation as it takes on a still more distinct character through dissolution of the contrast between Reformed and Lutheran. Moreover, is “Protestant” not also the expression used, at the same time, by every knowledgeable person to memorialize that point of historical development with which the church’s Reformation is so closely connected?9 Indeed, even in our dogmatic language we cannot well dispense with this expression, because we have to be able to indicate the contrast to “Catholicism” with a ready and satisfactory word and thus say “Protestantism” up to the point at which it has been found and commended for ordinary usage as being an inclusive word of like meaning with “Evangelical,” a word that likewise cannot be contrived and given currency in an arbitrary way.
May these considerations suffice for this preface, except simply to express, out of a full heart, the devout wish that this book may truly serve that end for which it is honestly intended—at best by itself but wherever this goal is not reached then at least by disagreement because of its defects, which disagreement will not at that point cease to be under God’s direction. That end is to assist in our attaining a clearer shared understanding concerning the content of our holy faith.
Written in Berlin, on the day before Trinity Sunday in the year 1821
[June 16, 1821].10
1. Hochschulen. Ed. note: This term then included both universities and technical or professional schools, all part of what would be called “academia” or postsecondary education today.
2. Repertorium.
3. Glaubenslehre. Ed. note: This term for a work in dogmatics translates doctrina fidei, “faith-doctrine” or doctrine regarding Christian faith.
4. Ed. note: See Schleiermacher’s preface to the second edition (1830) for his recanting of this claim.
5. Ed. note: See note 4 under the 1830 preface.
6. Christenheit. Ed. note: In contrast, the term for “Christianity” is Christentum, odd as it may seem to English ears.
7. Ed. note: Peiter gives examples here, KGA I/7.1, 6–7.
8. Ed. note: Actually, Schleiermacher does not make much use of this term in either edition, except in a few limited contexts to express the contrast of Protestant versus Roman Catholic institutional identity and practice; thus uses in the second edition are almost exclusively in §§19.2, 23–24, and 27.2–3; cf. also §127. The same usage appears in several passages of Brief Outline.
9. Ed. note: Verbesserung is the word for “Reformation” used here. In this connection, see Schleiermacher’s 1817 official Oratio: “Address Celebrating the Third Centennial of the Reformation of the Church by Luther at the University of Berlin Held on 3 November 1817,” in Nicol (2004), 45–64. There he attributes the Protestant Reformation especially to the relative freedom enjoyed by academic professionals in certain German universities.
10. Ed. note: The first edition’s second volume was finished on June 29, 1822, and published later that year. After writing this preface on Saturday, the next day Schleiermacher preached from 1 Cor. 12:3–6, on the theme “Who and What Belongs in the Reign of God?” This sermon was initially published in his first collection of Festpredigten (1826), also in SW II.2 (1834, 1843), 249–66.