§97. Second Doctrinal Proposition: In the uniting of divine nature with human nature, the divine alone was active or communicating itself,¹ and the human alone was passive or in process of being taken up; during the union of both, however, every activity was also an activity of both in common.

1. If one conceives the task as that of objectively and clearly presenting Christ to be such a unity of the two natures, then it is natural and unavoidable to separate from each other the act of unity and the state of being in union. This is the case, for that act of uniting would have been only the very beginning of the person of Christ’s appearing in the world, and thus it must also be expressed by means of some relation to the earlier nonexistence of that person, whereas the state of being in union, viewed as the distinctive being of the person itself, must also be expressed by a formulation that is equally in keeping with all elements of that person’s existence. However, for our task the description of the very first beginning appears to be an excessive undertaking, because we are not immediately affected by it at all. Accordingly, the undertaking would be best omitted, because things of that kind are always dubious, and so the adoption of this proposition requires a special justification.

First of all, however, it is entirely in order to attribute such a difference as that between Christ and all other human beings to its beginning as well, because it is one thing if the difference is recognized to be an original one, and, on the contrary, the impression received is shaped quite differently if the difference is something additional and thus is only a later state of a person who was originally wholly like us. We can only deny the latter position, moreover, if we return to the impression as it was first received. Thus, the task arises of depicting the first observed element in continuity with every later element observed. Hence the two propositions above do indeed distinctly establish the difference between beginning a person’s life and its further course; nevertheless, they can be conceived only as they simultaneously merge into each other. This is so, for, on the one hand, the beginning of the person is, at the same time, the beginning of the person’s activity; on the other hand, every element, to the extent that it can be isolated and observed in itself, is simultaneously a new coming into being of this distinctive personal existence. Furthermore, every activity of Christ must display the same relationship which the act of uniting expresses, given that this act would indeed have been a uniting only for such activities, such that the impetus would have stemmed from the divine nature; so also, in reverse, the act of uniting must display the same relationship through which every activity of Christ exists, namely, that both natures would work together as one, because every activity is indeed only a particular appearance of this uniting. Both formulations that are set forth in our doctrinal proposition, and likewise all other formulations yet to come up and those derived from them, must necessarily be evaluated and applied in accordance with this canon.

2. The expression by which the active communication of divine nature in that act of uniting is to be more precisely designated is subject to manifold reproof. Specifically, the assertion that in the act of uniting, the divine nature would have taken up the human nature in the unity of its person.2 This is the case not only by virtue of the expression “divine nature” but above all because it makes the personal existence of Christ entirely dependent on the personal existence of the second person in the divine being. The Sabellians have denied this position, but they have still had no less belief in the uniting of the divine and human in Christ than do orthodox Christians. Thus, it appears to be an injustice against all who perhaps might approach the Sabellian position to attach the expression for this belief to the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. This is so, particularly because the original impression that constitutes faith, which the disciples received and did so in such a way that they conceived and rendered it in thoughts, was not connected with any acquaintance with a trinity. The worst feature of the orthodox position, however, is that in this manner the human nature could only become one person in the sense in which this befits one person in the Trinity, with the result that the following dilemma then arises: either the three persons would have to be like human persons, wholly independent, self-standing individual beings, or Christ, viewed as a human being, would be no such thing, with which assertion the picture of Christ as a human being would then entirely dissolve into something docetic. Hence, it is much more reliable to establish the doctrine of Christ in a way independent of that doctrine, since an analogue to the emergence and formation of faith is also available.

To be sure, someone could still also find our first proposition to be docetic—that is, as if the true reality of the human nature in Christ would already be lost through it as well. This finding would imply that in emergence of Christ’s person, the human nature would have to be entirely passive, since human nature would plainly exercise activity in the emergence of every other human person, given that the body-forming force of human nature is shaped into a new unity of human existence in the full integrity of all one’s life functions.

Yet, suppose that we accept the help of the canon set forth above, in consequence of which the act of uniting would also have to have been, at the same time, a common activity of both, of the divine nature communicating itself3 and of this distinct human nature’s being-taken-up.⁴ Then the matter would be disposed in such a way that the human nature could surely not have been active for the purpose of being taken up by the divine nature, with the result that, as it were, the existence of God in Christ would have been developed based on his human nature, or even simply in such a way that a capacity to draw the divine to itself would have existed in human nature. On the contrary, to be sure, only the possibility of this union would have been created along with human nature, and this possibility would have had to remain conserved during the dominion of sin in order to be taken up in such a uniting with the divine. However, this possibility would consist by far, neither in capacity nor in activity. On the contrary, in pursuance of our canon we must add to it that the human nature could be taken up by the divine only in the process of some person-forming activity, with the qualification that the divine activity is not person-forming in the manner of procreation. Hence, if the discussion regards the emergence of Christ’s distinctive personal existence—that is, concerning the planting of what is divine into human nature—then human nature would only have been taken up thereby and could only behave passively, in that in each case the person-forming activity of human nature could always simply be brought about by an ordinary human person without that planting activity of the divine nature. However, inasmuch as Christ was also a completely human person, so too the forming of this person must also have been an act of the human nature of Christ; thus the whole must have been one act in communion between the two.⁵ All dogmaticians also recognize this point who, along with rejection of the opinion that the body of Christ was formed entirely in one instant⁶ or the opinion that he came from heaven with everything essential,7 accord the gradual formation of how his life was organized from its very first beginning onward with the true reality⁸ of human nature. However, just as over the course of this development Christ’s human nature would not have been entirely passive, there would also have been a physical activity of his human nature at the first beginning of life, this, with and alongside physical activity, being a purely passive behavior in his relation to divine activity.

On the other hand, one could raise entirely contrary doubts against positing a special divine activity with the beginning of the person of Christ. That is, this activity would have to be either an activity in time—which conflicts with the first canon that God would have to remain strictly identical beyond all the means and measures⁹ of time—or this activity would then have been nothing special and immediate, wherewith, in turn, God’s supernatural character, already agreed to, would be endangered. In addition, one sees, based on this consideration, how even given a genuinely Christian disposition, two false paths could be chosen. In order not to implicate what is eternal in temporality, one could decide to condition presentation of the distinctive dignity of Christ in such a way that he could still be viewed as a product of human nature as every other person would have to be. Moreover, in order to gain room all the more surely hereby for some immediate divine activity, one could set forth the view that even the humanity of Christ would not have first begun at some point or other in time. This view would necessarily border on holding a docetic position, however, and thereby the genuinely historical character of Christ would be no less threatened than his prototypical character is threatened by the contrary position. Yet, it would completely obviate the oscillation between these two positions if one were to grant that the uniting activity of God is also an eternal activity, but only in that there is no difference in God between decision and activity. This is to say, for us the divine activity is only decree,¹⁰ and, as such, it is also already identical with God’s decree of humanity’s creation, and it is contained in that decree. However, the aspect of this decree turned toward us as activity, or the appearance of the decree in the Redeemer’s actual beginning of life, is temporal. Through the Redeemer that eternal decree is actualized in one point of space as well as in one period of time. As a result, the temporal character of this process relates entirely to the person-forming activity of human nature in the course of which human nature was taken up into the uniting, and one could also just as rightly say that already Christ was also always coming into being, even as a human person, at the same time as the world was coming into being.11

Two further formulations also are classed with the presentation of this act of uniting and of the relationships of the two natures in this act. The one formulation expresses the nonpersonal existence of human nature in Christ before its uniting with the divine. The other formulation asserts his supernatural procreation.

As concerns the first formulation, the proposition is that the human nature of Christ would be nonpersonal, in and of itself, or would have no subsistence of its own but rather would subsist only by means of the divine nature. This formulation is very vague and clumsy in its scholastic dress. If one were to picture something as the human nature of Christ but, nevertheless, in a nonpersonal way, the task of showing this would not be easy to fulfill. This is so, since the nature belonging to us all can designate the nature of an individual only insofar as that nature has become personal in the individual. If one were to entertain these thoughts, however, the new predicament would unavoidably arise as to how, given its not being specifically personal, the human nature in Christ would, nevertheless, not be less complete in him than in all the rest of us. Yet, removing this confusion simply requires having a correct conception. The expression “human nature” can properly signify this form of life only when it is viewed as a unity—that is, as it is person-forming in accordance with its very being¹² and has its actual existence¹³ in the changing course of personal life. Hence, then the emergence of every individual being of our species is to be viewed as a deed¹⁴ which human nature, viewed as a vital force, brings to completion by its own means.¹⁵ Then, the opinion would be that, because by this deed a person could have been bestowed only with the seed of a God-consciousness that is incomplete and clouded, it is not yet Christ’s absolutely strong God-consciousness. Yet, in the person of Christ precisely this absolutely strong God-consciousness would have to have been in process in his development already from the very beginning of life on. Precisely on that account, the person of Christ would not have come to pass without addition of the uniting divine activity. However, the expression that the human nature of Christ would not have been specifically personal would always remain absurd. Moreover, it would always simply signify that the human nature would not have become this specific personal existence of Christ. Instead, that divine influence on Christ’s human nature would occur simultaneously and constantly and would be viewed as the same in both cases: that is, God becoming human16 in Christ’s consciousness and human nature coming to be shaped into the personal character of Christ. Likewise, even the expression that Christ’s human nature would have remained nonpersonal—which would also be only seemingly negative—would designate only the constancy of that selfsame divine influence and of that which proceeded from it in the person of Christ. This formulation, however, is constructed especially with a view to those who want to unite the term “personal” with the person of Jesus only later, after the person of Jesus had been long since culturally formed to completion, consequently with a view to those who assume that a personal existence would belong to his human nature without this uniting.

Now, just as it already lies in this formulation that in the emergence of the person of Christ a supernatural influence did occur, a second formulation is then connected with this influence. This second formulation appends to this influence a further, supernatural factor, namely, the entire exclusion of male activity in the procreation of Christ. That is to say, this factor is indeed a different one, in that the being of God in Christ cannot possibly be explained based on its claim that male activity did not take part. One must reflect on this definition from a twofold viewpoint, first in relation to evidence present in the New Testament, and then in relation to its dogmatic value.

Those accounts¹⁷ are not returned to anywhere in the wider course of the story of Christ and also appeal to no apostolic passage. They also contradict both genealogical accounts of Christ, which accounts refer directly and without artifice back to Joseph and without any reference to that allegation. As concerns the Gospel of John, those accounts contradict, in part, not only its silence on the subject itself but also the manner in which it narrates, without any amending remark, that Jesus was called Joseph’s son by acquaintances and by people of his country.18 Further, something similar is found in both of those other Gospels too.¹⁹ Now, admittedly, whoever takes those accounts quite literally has something miraculous yet to advocate. However, surely no one would want to claim that by this assumption a feature contrary to Christ’s true nature would have come into our faith, although, to be sure, those accounts do report the addition of certain forces to such a feature, delighting in parallels between these reports and many kinds of Jewish and pagan sayings regarding highly reputed men’s being conceived supernaturally. Likewise, under these circumstances, suppose that others would have had mental reservations about grounding doctrine on those accounts alone and about setting it forth perhaps even as indispensable doctrine of faith. Suppose instead that they would find it acceptable to conclude from the available evidence that among the original disciples of Christ neither was great value placed on this circumstance nor was even an entirely fixed and generally recognized tradition available concerning it. Then, one could in no way deny to them that whoever would not also believe in Christ’s supernatural procreation, in this sense, could still very well believe in Christ as Redeemer.

Now, as concerns what pertains to the second viewpoint, namely, the dogmatic value of this assumption: first of all, not only were passages in ancient creedal symbols²⁰ composed in such a way that they betray virtually nothing whatsoever of a dogmatic aim, but the same is also valid for newer ones that are derived from them.²¹ Additions to expressions of the old creedal symbols,22 expressions in part readopted and, in part, granted and presupposed, scarcely have a faint dogmatic hue now and then, whether in relation to original sin or to an implanting of the divine into human nature. This is the case, for these additions are, nevertheless, the only ones for the sake of which the alleged fact of a supernatural procreation can have any importance for Christian faith. However, a more exact examination will show that this alleged fact is a matter of indifference in both respects. That is, since we have already explained that what is supernatural, in our sense of the term, is claimed for the person of the Redeemer in respect to both relations, it has also been explained—even though it was not said explicitly—that natural procreation as a deed of the person-forming force of human nature, mediated through reciprocal sexual activity, is insufficient for the purpose of Christ’s emergence. This is so, for as a result of what was said about the susceptibility to sin of every individual being grounded in earlier generations,²³ natural procreation could not produce the Redeemer, if he himself should not belong to the collective life of susceptibility to sin.

The same is valid regarding the other point. This is the case, for the reproductive force inherent in the species cannot be sufficient to produce an individual being through whom something could be first brought into the species that did not exist in it previously. Rather, in addition to this reproductive force, yet another activity must be supposed, a divinely creative activity that combines with the activity of that human force. Moreover, only such a divinely creative activity can also remove that influence of sexual activity in procreation which is conditioned by some participation in susceptibility to sin in general. Furthermore, it is in this sense that everyone who assumes a natural sinlessness in the Redeemer, and a new creation by means of the uniting of what is divine with what is human, postulates a supernatural procreation as well. By itself, natural procreation is insufficient for this purpose, and a partial suspension of natural procreation must likewise be insufficient for the purpose. The reason is that the being of God cannot be established in a life that is generated within a young woman²⁴ without cohabitation, and, were the motherly share to remain entirely natural, just as little could the absence of a fatherly share in a new life free that life from community with the collective life of susceptibility to sin. Accordingly, the supplementary notion that, in the same fashion, Mary too would have to be free of hereditary susceptibility to sin, was also formed quite early. Yet, on the one hand, at that point the same would have to be claimed for the mother of Mary on the same basis, and so forth on back. On the other hand, indeed, even every actual sin of Mary, inasmuch as every element from her psyche would also have a physical aspect, would nevertheless have exerted some repercussion on the child as long as his life were enclosed within her own life.

Now, there is no doctrine or tradition of a continuous line of mothers conceived and remaining without sin. Thus, the suspension of male participation in the Redeemer’s being conceived is insufficient in both respects. Consequently, any supposition regarding a suspension of any natural participation by both genders would be superfluous. Therefore, here everything is based on a higher influence which, viewed as a divine creative activity, could have modified the fatherly and the motherly influence alike to that divine purpose, even if the procreation had been completely natural, so that no susceptibility to sin would have been established, since only the divine creative activity would have been able to make up for the natural incompleteness of this offspring. Thus, the general concept of supernatural procreation remains essential and necessary if the distinctive superiority of the Redeemer is to remain undiminished; however, the further determination of the concept as procreation without male assistance25 in the process does not cohere at all with the essential features regarding the Redeemer’s distinctive dignity. Thus, in and of itself the further determination of the concept is also definitely not a component of Christian doctrine. Accordingly, whoever embraces further determination of the concept does so only on account of the narratives containing it in the New Testament Scriptures. Thus, belief in it belongs only to doctrine regarding Scripture, as is the case with many factual issues that cohere to just as little degree of necessity with the dignity and work of the Redeemer. In addition, everyone has to decide on the matter for themselves in accordance with proper application of basic principles of criticism and of the art of interpretation that they have found trustworthy. Now, it would be difficult, at the very least, for anyone who embraces a supernatural procreation in our sense to find in the supernatural features that it contains any ground to deny a historical character to these narratives or to depart from literal explanation. In the same way, those who cannot accept these narratives as reliable, when they are viewed as literal and historical, are still free to remain true to the actual doctrine regarding supernatural procreation. However, if it is deemed superfluous to set forth an actual doctrine concerning virginal conception, then this choice too is open to question, because one can become all too easily entangled in investigations of the natural sciences, which lie entirely outside our domain.26

Now, in order to guard against misunderstandings, only the following is yet to be observed concerning this notion that has become generally predominant in Christendom.²⁷ First, however little this physiological supernatural character already of itself includes that within itself which we claim regarding divine influence in procreation of the Redeemer, just as little does it also have an influence on the character of popular culture in Jesus’ personal existence, either in order to eradicate already in itself that wherein communion with susceptibility to sin would lie, or in order to deprive him of what belongs to his historical character. Second, on the same grounds one must also beware of further enlarging upon the notion beyond what evangelical narratives require, since the notion indeed has no other ground than these narratives to call for such effort. In accordance with these narratives, the claim that Mary remained perpetually a virgin is to be dismissed as completely groundless. Now, third, the notion also cannot be grounded on nor intend to suggest that sexual urge is thoroughly bad, as if its satisfaction were something sinful and generative of sin. Finally, even if one takes the narratives literally and historically, a precise didactic terminology is, nevertheless, not presupposed therein. It is particularly to be borne in mind that at that time the angel could not speak to Mary about the Holy Spirit in the more precise New Testament sense.²⁸ Therefore, all forced explanations²⁹ thereof, on account of which this effect is particularly attributed to the Holy Spirit, are anachronistic. However, against all admittedly typical usage among teachers of the church,³⁰ it could only be a complete desecration to confuse the relationship to such an extent as to call Jesus the son of the Holy Spirit.

3. The second formulation in our proposition, which describes the condition of the two natures being united, can also be correctly understood only if we use the previously mentioned canon for assistance. Otherwise, one could easily hold the mutual participation³¹ of the two as an equal participation, and also assume, in turn, a preponderance on the aspect of human nature, because an absolutely equal weight is not to be presupposed. In every element of Christian life, however, the characteristic of mutual participation32 has to be such that the activity proceeds from God’s being³³ in Christ, and the human nature is only taken up into the mutual participation that comprises this activity. In this connection, if we think about the unmistakable contrast between predominantly active and predominantly passive elements in human life, one could indeed bear some concern that in this way the fullness of the human existence might, nevertheless, be lost to Christ. This might be the case, since passive states could indeed not proceed from what is divine within him, and yet everything ought to proceed from precisely this divine source; consequently, passive states would have to be absent in him. If we conceive this very same human existence in the most general way, then we would find a passive state to be necessary—indeed, to be posited as constantly present in Christ, as it were—such that, in a manner of speaking, all his actions would depend on that passive state, namely, a shared feeling regarding the condition of human beings.³⁴ At the same time, however, in everything that would have proceeded therefrom, we would most definitely discern the impetus of the reconciling being of God in Christ.³⁵ Thus, this reconciling impulse would appear to be conditioned by a passive state that could have begun only in human nature.

Now, suppose that passive states were genuinely present and Christ could have come to enter upon all those activities—thus, strictly speaking, even to the entire work of redemption—only by means of a sense perception occurring by chance, so to speak. Then unmistakably, by that supposition our entire notion regarding the Redeemer would no longer be the same as what we have visualized up to now. However, our canon obliges us to consider the human nature of Christ, even while those sense perceptions are occurring, not to be animated of and by his human nature itself but simply as it is taken up in a shared participation in an activity directed by what is divine in Christ.

Now, the divine factor here is the divine love in Christ, which love gave to human nature once and forever, or in every element of it—however one might express the matter—alignment of sense perceptions to the spiritual states36 of human beings. By virtue of these sense perceptions and as a result of them, impulses leading to particular beneficial actions were then to develop in turn. As a result, in this interrelation in Christ every original activity was due only to what is divine, and everything passive was due only to human nature. This is so, for human activities that were conditioned by those impulses to do beneficial activities were also to carry the character of passivity in themselves. To be sure, however, there must also have been other passive states in Christ’s life, states that did not proceed from any kind of spiritual impulse but that were proceeding only from the natural interconnected process of human organization with external nature. Now, likewise in accord with our canon, a formulation that was originally determined for the act of uniting is to be applied to these states, namely, the formulation that the human nature of Christ was not his personal nature before its being taken up into uniting with the divine nature. That is to say, in Christ all such states were still nonpersonal as long as they were merely passive; however, their being taken up into his innermost personal consciousness and their being penetrated by a divine impetus were so much at one that before the latter occurrence they would be taken up only as something external and foreign. As a result, we could summarize everything by saying this: In Christ, no active state could have existed that, viewed as a state persisting of itself, would not have been started by the being of God in him and then been completed by the human nature in him; and, likewise, in Christ no passive state could have existed in which the being of God would not first have taken the same course to a transformation that elevates the passive state into a personal one in activity.

To be sure, against this position the objection would be made that if one distinguishes particular elements of Christ’s life from each other and in this way ascribes to what is divine in Christ the beginning of all activities that temporally follow upon each other in this manner, then this process would surely be described as something temporal, including originating and passing activity, in contradiction to what can be said of any being of God. Yet, all this conflict is also resolved if we simply repeat, continuing in accordance with the guidance of our canon, the answer already given above³⁷ to the same reservations regarding the act of uniting: that even while being united, the divine being in Christ, in itself invariable, became active only in a temporal³⁸ manner, and only that aspect of this activity was temporal which was already crossing over into the domain of appearance clothed in human form. The result is that in Christ himself the original divine activity of taking up what is human and the divine activity during the being united are not distinguishable; however, all activities are also simply developments of what is human inasmuch as they are temporally distinguished. Every active element of Christ became, in a human fashion, a result of temporal development, whether a given element is then to be viewed more as an activity of understanding or more as an activity of will. Moreover, only to the extent that every activity of Christ that occurs is to be conceived just in this way can one justifiably ascribe to him a completely human soul, yet one put in motion internally by this special being of God in him. This being of God in him, itself remaining constant and invariable, pervades that completely human soul in the multiplicity of its functions and elements as this multiplicity is developed ever further.39

Now, this is also the sense of the scholastic expression that the union was a personal one. It is not that a single nature were to occur thereby, a nature that could and would then have to be distinguished from other human modes of being; rather, everything that comes into being through God’s being in Christ would be completely human. Furthermore, taken together it would all constitute a unity of one natural life process in which everything that appears would be purely human, and one aspect could be surmised from another, in that each element would presuppose earlier ones, but everything could be entirely understood only under the presupposition of that unity, itself the only means by which Christ’s person could come into being. As a result, each element of his life would also make manifest the divine in Christ, viewed as what would be the all-conditioning function. Moreover, if we were to measure out the domain of our two affirmations⁴⁰ over against each other in accordance with everything discussed thus far, then we would have to say the following: first, that the first affirmation is applicable only and exclusively to the absolutely first beginning of Christ’s existence, when his life would have come into being as a simple, singular life. Consequently, we would also have to say that all this would occur before the ongoing appearance of Christ. Likewise, the second affirmation is applicable only and exclusively after this appearance of Christ, for only if what is human in Christ were absolutely complete and if nothing more were to enter into coexistence41 with God’s being in Christ could what is human in him be exclusively cooperative.

In this way, moreover, it would be conceivable that there are two different ways of looking at the time of this appearance. Those two approaches, though congruous, jar against each other, based on a lack of information regarding their true relationship. In every element the one affirmation looks so exclusively at the inaugurating divine factor that it stands in danger of losing sight of the human connection. The other affirmation generally intends to grasp the human connection so fully that nothing is left out resulting in the underlying divine factor’s being lost from sight.

4. The old standards also agree with both formulations of our doctrinal proposition. They were preserved intact, of course, but do not constitute any sort of new standards. The old standards were attendant upon proceedings from previous councils then laid out in the oldest systems of doctrine.⁴² In the first threesome of these standards,⁴³ the thought that in Christ the divine nature was in no way divided from the human nature in him is plainly laid as a foundation, to avoid anyone’s being able to sunder the two natures from each other. That division, in case someone would also intend to form it spatially or temporally in accordance with the guidance of those formulations, could, all the same, only have been a division of activities. Moreover, if there were then such a division, in Christ there would have to have been, on the one hand, human activities that were not dependent on the divine impetus, and, on the other hand, divine activities that would have been manifested through nothing in the human nature. However, these activities could also not have demonstrated their origin in the act of uniting, because in themselves they would have borne no similarity with that act, and therewith that generally held formulation wards off the same thing as our canon also wards off.

The other threesome of standards⁴⁴ quite clearly has the aim of setting aside any notion regarding modification of one of the two natures by the other. Now, through any such modification that would indeed have to have proceeded from what is human, what is divine would have been something limited temporally and spatially. Likewise, if the human nature would have been changed by what is divine, the person would have moved away from identity with the rest of humanity. Thus, in both cases the uniting of what is divine with what is human would not have had lasting existence. Here too, then, the aim is also the same, which is why we seek to conceive what is divine in the uniting in such a way that it can exist on its own along with completeness45 of what is human and vice versa. In no less a way, these earlier formulations are not to be taken up again, since they rest throughout on the notion of divinity as a nature, which can function generally only in a confusing manner.

Given these negative formulations it would also be time to give extremely empty formalistic theory over to the history of dogma, since affirmations regarding Christ, if they were to be proper, would have to be formed differently depending on whether discourse is about the whole person of Christ or only about one of the two natures. If the same standards are to serve as a norm for expression in the domain of edifying communication so that the expression moves only within those bounds, then the communication could only be helpful in times of epidemic charges of heresy, which would, nevertheless, scarcely recur in this form. In general, we may not put ourselves on the same footing as those ancient times when the more strict doctrinal expression was formed only gradually out of the popular presentations of distinguished men. Since the early system of doctrine is complete and the development of the schools has run its course, now, in contrast, Christian speakers as well as poets must have freedom even to employ expressions that cannot be fit into the terminology of the schools at all, provided only that these expressions are unobjectionable in the immediate connection, out of which they should not be extracted, and provided that nothing lays the groundwork for diminishing the dignity of the Redeemer or infringing on people’s feeling for that dignity. On the other hand, suppose that these standards were to serve only the schools themselves, for the purpose of assuring more easily the congruity of particular formulations with general propositions at every point. Then they are based too much on use of the expression “nature” for what is divine as for what is human compared to the possible advantage if one were to relinquish this mode of presentation. Moreover, we have a far better canon in the formulation that the creation of human being is first completed in Christ. This is the case, since what is his most inner core distinguishes him from all others; then the being of God dwelling in Christ⁴⁶ has to relate to human nature taken as a whole in the same way as the prior innermost core of being a human being related to the human organism taken as a whole. This analogy has already run through the entire presentation up to now, though not explicitly articulated.

5. Based on the properties of God’s being in Christ laid out here and the necessity of giving up treatment of Supreme Being as a nature, as well as based on what has already been taught about the divine attributes, it already follows of itself that the theory regarding a mutual communication of attributes of both natures to each other is likewise to be banished from the body of doctrine, as is the whole history of its being handed down. This is so, for two reasons. First, inasmuch as we have arrived at our notions of divine attributes by using only analogy, the assignment of divine attributes to human nature expresses nothing other than absolute human excellence, if this human nature is not to be destroyed by the infinity of those attributes. Second, inasmuch as each individual attribute is only a negative expression regarding divine being47 and the attributes can present the divine being only if they are beheld synoptically as one, so too the human nature of Christ does not carry any picked-out members of this synoptic picture. If someone wanted, for example, to assign the identity of omniscience and omnipotence to Christ’s human nature, with the result that the one and the same omniscient omnipotence and omnipotent omniscience of the divine nature would have permeated the adopted human nature, as heat permeates iron,⁴⁸ then during this communication nothing human could have remained in Christ anymore, because everything human is essentially a negation of omniscient omnipotence. Thus, if someone were to revert to thinking that the divine attributes are entirely or in large part quiescent—in which case then the first option is alone consistent, so that even miracles could not be traced back to an efficacy of the divine attributes occurring as an exception⁴⁹—in this way the emptiness of this entire theory would be shown most distinctly. Given that the divine attributes are simply activities, what would constitute the communication of them if they were inactive? Then the uniting of the two natures would have entirely ceased to be a dogmatic notion in the narrower sense, since the uniting could not be an expression concerning an impression received from Christ at all, in that quiescent attributes could not come to sense perception even indirectly.

The same would be true of communication of human attributes to the divine nature. This is the case, for, on the one hand, all expressions concerning our God-consciousness are such an attribution, inasmuch as all divine attributes are drawn from human attributes. If those attributes were not formed in that manner, however, the divine being50 [in Christ] would also have to be suspended,⁵¹ given that what is human were also to be assigned to the divine nature in this way. Moreover, both what the divine being is and how it is would have had to be eliminated in the formation of that other set of divine attributes. For example, if the divine nature of Christ were to have communicated something human in the form of a capacity for suffering, then in such a communication nothing divine could be found any longer. This would be the case, since every outstanding human excellence would indeed already be a decrease in the capacity for suffering, and since the innermost godlike quality of what is human would not only not so much suffer as simply determine its activity as a counteraction. However, if it were believed, in part for this reason, that one would also have to attribute a capacity for suffering to the divine nature in Christ, because otherwise the redeeming force would be absent from Christ’s suffering,⁵² then this suffering would have just as many early pronouncements against it,⁵³ since it rests on incorrect notions regarding the work of redemption, as will be shown below.⁵⁴ Thus, one could doubtless say that this doctrine regarding the reciprocal communication of attributes, when followed through clearly and truthfully, would have to abrogate anew the uniting of the two natures, in that as a result of this communication each nature would cease to be what it is.

The discarding of this theory in no way implies promotion of the Reformed school over against the Lutheran school. This is the case, for if the Reformed school⁵⁵ speaks of attributes of two natures set over against each other in one person, instead of the theory examined above, then the Reformed school, not without justification, encounters the reproach that they totally divide Christ in two, because neither can being set over against each other also be one thing, nor can the two natures be one if their attributes are also held to be divided. Albeit, the Lutherans too do not avoid a similar total split. This is the case, for if the communication of attributes were to be a real communication, then through it two kinds of activities would originate in each nature, activities that could not form one series. For example, notions of activities within the human nature of Christ could not be formed either in accordance with the mode of limited consciousness or in accordance with the communicated omniscience that they propose. Hence, both modes of doctrine are equally objectionable, since they both do indeed trace back to a false notion of divine nature, one to which a range of attributes would really belong.

1. Sich mitteilend. Ed. note: In Schleiermacher’s usage, this term virtually always carries the nuance of self-impartation, which never requires but may include verbal communication. Thus “communication” is the corresponding word used throughout here.

2. Particularly infelicitous is Franz Volkmar Reinhard’s (1755–1812) expression in his Dogmatik (1818) §91, 340: “the one (the son of God) who produces a single person with a sort of human nature that he has added to himself.” Ed. note: ET from Latin, Kienzle.

3. To be sure, after having explained how fully disapproving I am of the expression “divine nature,” I have, nonetheless, let the expression stay in the proposition itself, indeed solely for convenience’ sake. Here, as I discuss the details, however, this consideration does not enter in and therefore at this point I have returned to the simplest expression. Ed. note: Here, göttlichen Wesen is used, as in “Supreme Being,” not göttlichen Natur, though this second expression (Natur) can also be taken to mean “the divine nature” (Wesen).

4. Ed. note: This key phrase is und der zum Aufgenommenwerden von dieser bestimmten menschlichen Natur.

5. Ed. note: Here the last phrase, ein gemeinschaftlicher Akt, reflects Schleiermacher’s frequent characterization of the relationship between God and Christ, God and a human being, and also God and the church, viewed as a community of faith, as “community” or “communion” in each case. The state of being or becoming united or being at one (Gemeinschaft) with each other comprises not a strict identity but a conjoint oneness between two distinct kinds of being.

6. (1) John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749), The Orthodox Faith (743–) 3.2: “Then the Son of God, bearing the wisdom and power truly of God, overshadowed her … and made for himself … an implanted body, … its form not being put together bit by bit but being completed all at once.” (2) Athanasius (ca. 300–373), Letters, no. 59 (to Epictetus): “Or whence again have certain men vomited an impiety as great as those already mentioned, saying, namely, that the body is not newer than the godhead of the Word but was coeternal with it always, since it was compounded of the essence of wisdom.” Ed. note: (1) ET Tice; cf. Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 270; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:985–86. (2) ET Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 2, vol. 4 (1892), 571; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 26:1053–54.

7. See Johann Gerhard (1582–1637), Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764) 3, 421.

8. Ed. note: Here, as just above, “true reality” translates Wahrheit, in accordance with one main meaning in ordinary usage.

9. Mittel. Ed. note: That is, in God’s own will and acts suitably entering into the lives of Jesus, other human persons, and the human community of faith, but not therewith becoming what God thus communes with, not even with time-bound means and measures.

10. Ratschluß. Ed. note: “Decree” versus an ordinary human decision (Beschluß).

11. Of the two expressions that were used for this act of union by leaders of the Greek church, ἐνσάρκωσις (incarnation) is by far to be preferred to ἐνσωμάτωσις (embodiment). This is so, for the latter expression, in part, permits the notion that the λόγος was planted in a body already prepared to receive it, and, in part, it permits the notion that the λόγος was simply attached to a body but took the place of the soul itself. When ἐνσάρκωσις came into use, both of these expressions dropped out of use. Hence, wherever the subject was authentically handled, this expression too and the corresponding Latin word incarnatio came into more customary use than corporatio and ἐνσωμάτωσις.

12. Wesen.

13. Dasein.

14. Tat. Ed. note: Previously in this discussion the term used was Akt.

15. Ed. note: That is, by procreation first, then by the new human being’s “vital force.”

16. Menschwerden. Ed. note: This is the word typically used for and instead of “incarnation” in German usage.

17. Matt. 1:18–25 and Luke 1:31–34. Ed. note: Sermon on Luke 1:31–32, Dec. 25, 1821, Festpredigten (1826), then SW II.2 (1834), 55–68. ET Wilson (1890), 279–94.

18. John 6:42.

19. Matt. 13:55; Luke 4:22.

20. Roman Symbol (= the so-called Apostles’ Creed, early 8th cent.): “… conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary.” Niceno-Constantinopolitan Symbol (325, 381): “… incarnate of the Holy Spirit and the virgin Mary, and became a human being.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 21, 23; Latin and German in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 21, 26. In the first instance, Schleiermacher actually quotes from the Greek of Marcellus (340). See note at §36.

21. (1) Augsburg Confession (1530) 3: “born of the virgin Mary.” (2) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) 11: “… not from the coitus of a man … but … most chastely conceived by the Holy Spirit and born of the ever virgin Mary.” (3) First Helvetic Confession (1536) 11: “… took on flesh from the immaculate virgin Mary through the cooperation of God by the Holy Spirit.” (4) Gallican Confession (1559) 14: “And as to his humanity, he was the true seed of Abraham and of David, although he was conceived by the secret and incomprehensible power of the Holy Spirit in the womb of the blessed virgin.” (5) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) 2: “… took man’s nature into the womb of the blessed virgin, of her substance.” (6) Belgic Confession (1561) 18: “… being conceived in the womb of the blessed virgin Mary, by the power of the Holy Spirit, without the means of man.” Ed. note: (1) ET Book of Concord (2000), 38; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 54. The two versions given have “pure” and “blessed” before “virgin.” (2) ET Cochrane (1972), 243; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 255. Cf. §37n3. (3) ET Tice, here drawn from the original German and Latin version in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 215f.; cf. Cochrane (1972), 103. (4) ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 368, also Cochrane (1972), 149; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 333. The Latin text Schleiermacher used adds “and incomprehensible” and “in the womb of the blessed virgin.” (5) Schleiermacher quoted from the earlier 1562 Latin edition. See 1571 English in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 488. See §37n5. (6) ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 409f.; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 371.

22. Even where the subject does not come up at all, as in the Symbolum Quicunque vult [the so-called Athanasian Creed after the late 4th cent.] and the Hungarian Confession (1562), no intentionality is to be sought in this regard.

23. See §69.

24. Jung frau. Ed. note: This young woman, sometimes called a virgin, was the mother of Jesus.

25. Zutun. Ed. note: Earlier this role was also called a cooperative sharing in the process.

26. Just consider, for example, the expressions that are emphasized in passages from the confessions cited above.

27. Christenheit.

28. Rightly understood, John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749) agrees with this position in 1.10, and 3.11: “The Father and the Holy Spirit in no way participate in the incarnation of the word save by good pleasure,” although elsewhere he also speaks differently and even more inexactly. Ed. note: The Orthodox Faith (743–); ET Tice, cf. Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 191 and 292; Greek and Latin: Migne Gr. 94:841–42 and 1027–28.

29. Cf. Gerhard, Loci (1610–1622, ed. 1764), 3, 416. His definitions are chiefly based on Hilary of Poitiers’ The Trinity (356–360) 2. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 25 (1954), 35–63; Latin: Migne Lat. 10:49–75.

30. Many passages on this subject are to be found in Gerhard, Loci (1610–1622).

31. Gemeinschaft. Ed. note: This instance makes clear that Schleiermacher’s usual meaning of “communion” and “community” can include as few as two members, hence the translation “mutual participation” for the presumed two “natures.”

32. Gemeinschaftlichkeit.

33. Sein Gottes. Ed. note: Here, as always regarding Christ, Schleiermacher’s real meaning is twofold: Sein as God’s presence and, at the same time, Sein or seiend as active existence.

34. Mitgefühl mit dem Zustand der Menschen. Ed. note: “Compassion for” would also be implied here.

35. Ed. note: Here the Impuls is an “impetus” from God and with God, thereupon an impulse within Jesus with and for and on behalf of other human beings: am bestimmtesten den Impuls des versöhnenden Seins Gottes in Christo erkennen. Thus, it testifies to how Christ’s mediatorial role occurred. On Christ’s reconciling activity, as such, see §101, esp. 101.3–4, then §§104.2–4 and 108.2.

36. Der geistigen Zustände. Ed. note: Indistinguishably, as it were, in German usage geistig means spiritual or mental, hence all the internal functions of a human being.

37. In subsection §97.2 here.

38. Ed. note: In the German third edition (1835–1836) is to be found the conjecture that Schleiermacher meant to say “timeless” (zeitlose). This could be the case, since for him the eternal God was being active in Christ. However, also for him, God was then acting in time: in Christ what is supernatural (but in this case not arbitrarily, i.e., not “absolutely” so) had become natural (finite, temporal, and personal), not bursting through these conditions created by God to be known as God in se.

39. Among others, John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749) said the same thing, if one but grasps him aright, in The Orthodox Faith (743–) 3.7: “One must know, moreover, that although we say that the natures of the Lord are mutually immanent, we know that this immanence comes from the divine nature. For this last pervades all things and indwells as it wishes, but nothing pervades it. And it communicates its own splendors to the body [more about this below] while remaining impassible and having no part in the affections of the body [to which everything temporal also belongs].” Ed. note: The comments in brackets are Schleiermacher’s. ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 284; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:1011–12.

40. Ed. note: That is, belief in the divine and human natures of Christ that was stated in the Evangelical confessional symbols, as indicated earlier under this proposition.

41. Zusammensein. Ed. note: See §§126 and 148 for parallel uses of this specific term.

42. For example, John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749), The Orthodox Faith (743–), 3.3ff. Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 271ff.; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:987ff.

43. Without division (ἀχωρίστως), without difference (ἀδιαιρέτως), and without separation (ἀδιαστάτως). Ed. note: In characterizing these standards as a “threesome” (Dreiheit), Schleiermacher is repeating the same term as what he used to name the divine threeness from that time on.

44. Not subject to change (ἀναλλοιώτως), unchangeable (ἀτρέπτως), without confusion (ἀσυγχύτως).

45. Vollständigkeit.

46. Ed. note: The phrase is das einwohnende Sein Gottes. In case it be overlooked, this phrase is a practically onetime brief characterization of Schleiermacher’s account regarding God’s being “in Christ.”

47. Negation des göttlichen Wesens.

48. Solid Declaration (1577) 8: “‘the whole fullness of deity’ [Col. 2:9] dwells in Christ … ‘bodily’ as in its own body … in the assumed human nature … exercises the same divine power, glory, and efficacy as the soul does in the body and fire in a glowing iron.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 628; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1038.

49. See Franz Volkmar Reinhard (1753–1812), Dogmatik (1818), §97.2. Redeker note: Page 369 reads: “Thus, one cannot say that his miracles were performed by his divine nature, i.e., by using his omnipotence. For this use he first obtained only in the state of being exalted (Erhöhung, glorification). … Rather, he performed his miracles as the other prophets did, through extraordinary spiritual gifts.” [ET Tice]

50. Wesen.

51. Ed. note: Be aufgehoben (suspended)—that is, as now grasped in one’s God-consciousness.

52. Solid Declaration (1577) 8: “For if I believe that only the human himself suffered for me, then Christ would be a poor savior for me; in fact, he himself would need a savior.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 623; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1029.

53. John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 744), The Orthodox Faith (743–) 3.7: “[The divine nature] communicates its own splendors to the body while remaining impassible and having no part in the affections of the body.” Ed. note: The addition in brackets is Schleiermacher’s, in Greek. See the expanded quotation to which this one belongs in §97.3. ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 284; Latin and Greek: Migne Gr. 94:1011–12. In this quotation, “impassible” implies what Schleiermacher has called an “incapacity for suffering” on the part of the divine nature earlier in this subsection.

54. Ed. note: See §§100–105.

55. Gallican Confession (1559) 15: “In one person … the two natures are actually and inseparably joined and united, and yet each remains in its proper character.” Likewise in the Belgic Confession (1561) 19. Ed. note: ET and original French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 368, 404; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 333, 372.

§98. Third Doctrinal Proposition: Christ was distinguished from all other human beings by his essential sinlessness and his absolute perfection.

1. Essential sinlessness is to be understood as a sinlessness that has its sufficient ground in the interior of Christ’s personal existence itself, with the result that, under whatever external relations there may be—in connection with which we also admit what is physical to be something external—Christ’s personal existence would have been the same throughout. At the very least, moreover, the point in dispute is set forth by means of this expression with sufficient definiteness, in that as a consequence of what was said earlier¹ this inner ground can be nothing other than the union of what is divine and what is human in his person. We must also imagine something to be possible in general that we immediately experience in individual instances, namely, that actualization of sin, even its inner actualization, can be prevented by a favorable chain of circumstances. However, this process must occur in such a way that thereby we not only remain conscious of ourselves as sinful human beings but are also further strengthened in this consciousness by sense perception itself, because this sense perception includes consciousness that the inner ground for averting sin has been lacking.² Thus, such a sinlessness, in comparison with that sinlessness which is only accidental, would not only not express the distinctive superiority of the Redeemer; rather, it would also express the following: that where the inner possibility of sinning would be posited, at least an infinitesimal bit of reality would also be coposited to be a tendency toward sinning. As a result, someone who can be content with such an accidental sinlessness for the Redeemer would also be able to let actual sin pass. However, this would be the case only inasmuch as such actual sin could not be registered in sense perception3 with the result that someone or other could be positioned higher than the Redeemer in some given instant.

In contrast, the typical formulations of the scholastics do not regard the difference with suitable rigor, and the dispute conducted among them appears to be entirely empty. To be sure, the formulation “It is possible not to sin”⁴ does express the essential superiority of Christ, if one takes it to express a contrast to the state of all other human beings. This is the case, for viewed collectively at no time could human beings not sin; on the contrary, sin creeps into everything, which, strictly speaking, would then have to have been the case also with Christ, if a real possibility of sin were located in him, by virtue of that infinitesimal bit premised just above. However, the formulation does not express that superiority as soon as it intends to say something other than the first formulation did, namely: “It is not possible to sin.”⁵ This is so, for in contrast to that first formulation, this one in itself forecloses the possibility of sin. The same situation holds, however, with the latter formulation, for one can also use it only if one assumes a general divine preservation that governs the Redeemer as well, with the result that this formulation would also correspond with the contents of our formulation only if one were to equate the second formulation with the first one in the sense indicated.

It would always remain difficult to determine, even based on the viewpoint of our formulation, what is then precluded regarding Christ as a result of the second formulation, with the result that everything that would have to befit him by virtue of his identity with us would remain intact. Moreover, this point is indisputably one based on which much that is essential for Christian ethics would have to be explicated, in that in order to define the beginning of sin everything would refer to this point.⁶ A particular difficulty originates here from this point on, that already in the first testimonies of faith Christ was imputed to be tempted in every respect, which in light of our determination above7 already implies sin if we imagine struggle therewith, even if it were only an infinitesimally tiny one. On the other hand, receptivity for the contrast between having a pleasant state and having a lack of any pleasant state⁸ belongs to the reality of human nature with the result that pleasure and the lack of pleasure must be able to exist in a sinless manner. At that point, moreover, the beginning of sin would have to lie between this element of behavior, when pleasure or the lack of pleasure are existing in a sinless manner, and the element that emerges when the struggle begins. At the same time, if we now imagine that in Christ every element of his behavior had to have been determined by God-consciousness, then it follows that pleasure and lack of pleasure could also exist in him, but not as something determining a given element, consequently only as the result of an element determined in a manner that is in keeping with him. This would be so, insofar as such results would entirely remain as sensation or feeling⁹ within the limited bounds of consciousness that is at rest. In contrast, such results could not exist in him inasmuch as they were to cross over into desire or repulsion.

Now, temptation consists precisely in an approximation to either of these two options. Christ, moreover, could have been tempted without detriment to his essential sinlessness, but only in such a way that pleasure and lack of pleasure had been conveyed to him, viewed as intensified sensation. However, essential sinlessness contains the basis for neither pleasure nor lack of pleasure ever forming the ability to become anything other than indicators of a state, yet without their bearing any determining or contributing force, though not in such a way that their transition from being an indicator into the state of desire or repulsion would actually have come to pass at any time.¹⁰ To the extent that this standard must be valid for all Christ’s life moments without distinction, there is only to be observed that this standard is only expressed for a developed consciousness, and that the childhood of Christ can also have had the character of complete innocence only if this standard also held validity at that time, this in accordance with the respective state of his development. Thus, with respect to sin, Christ would at all times have been at once very differentiated from all other human beings and, in the same way, always essentially free from sin.

It also belongs to this sinlessness that Christ could neither have produced actual error himself nor could have taken up into himself even foreign error with real conviction and as duly established truth. It is indeed not necessary, moreover, to limit this statement to the domain of his actual vocation, except that the difference must be firmly maintained between, on the one hand, receiving and spreading notions that are definitely advocated by others—hence, in relation to Christ’s use of these notions, one would neither engage in scrutiny of them nor acknowledge any kind of accountability for them—and, on the other hand, a settled judgment that in any relation would always determine a mode of conduct as well. In every case, to err in the latter judgment would either presuppose a hastiness that could have been produced only by extraneous motives, or would presuppose a clouded sensibility for reality that would, on the one hand, be grounded in general susceptibility to sin, but, on the other hand, would be connected in each individual case with the particular sinfulness of the individual involved.

Now, the opinion regarding the natural immortality of Christ is connected with this doctrine regarding the essential sinlessness of Christ, namely, that Christ would not have been subjected to death by virtue of his human nature. This opinion—which has indeed not come to be established through statements that became creedal, nor is even really grounded in biblical passages11—has, nevertheless, been very generally adopted. The connection, however, rests only on its being thought that death is the wages of sin and that one who is released from all connection with sin also could not have stood under the sway of death. Moreover, having taken into account what was already said earlier¹² regarding the natural immortality of Adam and regarding the interconnection of all natural evil with sin, nothing more can follow from the sinlessness of Christ than that death could not have been evil for Christ. In addition, we must stick with this point, and instead of that opinion hold on to those which maintain that immortality was first given to Christ’s human nature with the resurrection.¹³ We must do that all the more, since mortality and the capacity to suffer physically belong together to such an extent that if Christ had such a natural immortality, the capacity for the human nature in his person to suffer would be only an empty word, and only by contradicting oneself could one place any great value on his physical suffering.

Instead, this opinion is not merely to be considered as an inference drawn from the sinlessness of Christ; rather, only first in this opinion does one expect to find the correct explanation for all the declarations that present his death as voluntary and so only then to exhaust the higher meaning of his suffering and death. Yet, it is precisely regarding this aspect of the matter that the notion of Christ’s immortality is most highly questionable, for a person who could not die by natural means also could not be killed violently. Accordingly, by some miracle Christ would first have had to make himself mortal, in order to be able to be killed, and he would have fairly directly killed himself.

2. Now, as regards the absolute perfection14 of human nature at the time of Christ’s masculine maturity: very frequently, spiritual and physical excellence are found to be especially set forth, particularly in ancient discussions on this subject. Yet, it is well to ponder—since no accounts come to assist here that would transform every such statement into a simply historical one,¹⁵ whereby it would then be deleted from the domain of doctrine—whether or not we could, based on the impression that we receive from Christ, give an accounting for the disposition of attributes that we cannot trace back to the uniting of what is divine with human nature. Only one thing can be said if we trace the temporal appearance of this creative activity, viewed as a particular fact, back to the general divine ordering. That is, just as the Redeemer could first emerge only at a certain time and only from among this people, so also the divine activity would not have taken up human nature in the process of a person-forming act that would somehow have been able to be caught up in a malforming one earlier. Hence, it is then natural enough to ascribe to the Redeemer a physical, prototypical character as well. However, since the physical aspect of his appearance was bound to be and to effect nothing at all of itself, except as an organ for that uniting, this physical, prototypical character is also to be restricted solely to that function. What follows from this presupposition and from the uninterrupted continuing effective influence of a pure will is simply a healthiness that is equally far removed from a one-sided strength or a mastery of particular physical functions as it is from sickly frailty. This is the case, since through them both the proportionate soundness of Christ’s overall organization16 for the sake of all demands from his will would be diminished thereby. Accordingly, we must limit ourselves to this latter function and so much the more set aside all impertinent questions,¹⁷ since our notions of the connection between body and soul are still open to significant corrections. Hence, if discourse among the ancients not seldom also concerns the beauty of the Redeemer,¹⁸ then this notion already lies very near the boundary that we may not touch, and we may disregard this notion as an unconscious, secondary effect of heathen views.

1. Ed. note: Concerning §§93–97.

2. Ed. note: That is, the inner ground for averting sin in reversed circumstances is virtually absent (fehlte).

3. John 8:46. Ed. note: Sermon on John 8:46–59, June 19, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 123–37. Note that in this context, sense perception (Wahrnehmung) is the base level of inner mental functioning being addressed.

4. potuit non peccare.

5. non potuit peccare.

6. Sittenlehre. Ed. note: See Hermann Peiter’s edition of Schleiermacher’s Christliche Sittenlehre (1826–27), Bd. I (2011). After establishing an exact correspondence of this ethical treatment of Christian life in and through the church with his Glaubenslehre (Christian Faith), over the main text Schleiermacher established how the essential reference to sin operates as a basis for treatment of Christian life as well. For example, see in Peiter’s edition of Christliche Sittenlehre, pp. 28–37, 97–107, and 128–37. See also BO §§223 and 305, wherein sin is only indirectly even alluded to (cf. 2011, p. xvii).

7. Compare §93.4.

8. Ed. note: Angenehmen und Unangenehmen, immediately thereafter supplanted by Lust und Unlust, the first pair presumably implying the second pair.

9. Empfindung oder Gefühl.

10. In this discussion I could not make a specific reference to the temptation story, because for me it is not possible to treat it as a historical account. Taken literally, however, the story’s content is such that very often in the midst of his active life, Christ would have to have been much more strongly tempted. On this account, the teller of this story is not at all to be blamed for not exactly taking this to be the end of all temptation (Luke 4:13). Ed. note: The narrative in Luke ends with this statement: “And when the devil had ended every temptation, he departed from him until an opportune time” (RSV). See Schleiermacher’s sermon on Matt. 4:1–11, Mar. 11, 1810, published that year and in SW II.4 (1835), 378–89, and in 1844, 428–40.

11. This is so, for what Christ himself says in John 10:17–18 directly expresses no physical relation but only a social and ethical one. Ed. note: Sermon on John 10:17–18, Mar. 31, 1809, separately published in 1811, also in SW II.4 (1835), 778–81.

12. Cf. §59.P.S.

13. Belgic Confession (1561) 19: “And though he hath by his resurrection given immortality to the same [his body], nevertheless he hath not changed the reality of his human nature, etc.” Ed. note: ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 404; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 372.

14. Ed. note: schlechthinige Vollkommenheit.

15. Ed. note: einen historischen Satz, thus quite secondhand or worse, and auxiliary as evidence, at most. “Historical” using this term (historisch) for it, has two uses in Schleiermacher’s vocabulary: (1) as a general title for what has the deeper, more integrative, and more highly significant matters of Geschichte (“history” proper) for its core subject matter, and (2) the narrower sense of auxiliary material. See BO §§28–37, 70, 86, 145–59, and 249–51 with notes.

16. Organization. Ed. note: This term refers to the arrangement of one’s physical organs or organism for accomplishing given functions.

17. It is a matter of divine leading, one surely of very great importance though insufficiently known, that neither a reliable tradition regarding the external aspect of Christ’s person nor an authentic picture of it has reached us. Indeed, that even an exact depiction of how he lived and a coherent narrative regarding how occurrences in his life proceeded are lacking to us—all this also belongs precisely to this [recital of what we do not have].

18. For example, John Chrysostom (ca. 347–407), Homilies on Colossians (n.d.), Homily 8 (on Col. 3:5–7): “For Christ … was so beautiful as it is not even possible to tell.” Ed. note: ET in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Ser. 1, vol. 8 (1889), 295; Migne Gr. 62:353.

§99. [Addendum to This Point of Doctrine:] The facts regarding Christ’s resurrection and ascension and the prediction of his return to judge cannot be set forth as genuine components of the doctrine of his person.

1. If we compare, on the one hand, the doctrinal propositions concerning the person of Christ set forth up to this point, and the propositions¹ already embodied in the oldest creedal symbol² that express these factual claims regarding resurrection and ascension, on the other hand, with the canon for dogmatic propositions set forth above,³ then those doctrinal propositions set forth here are consistent with both criteria in that canon, but the creedal statements are consistent with neither criterion. This is the case, for if Christ’s redemptive efficaciousness rests on God’s being in him, and precisely the impression from that efficaciousness that such an existence dwells in him and grounds faith in him, then an immediate connection between these factual claims regarding resurrection and ascension and the doctrine of the person of Christ cannot be proven. The disciples recognized the Son of God in him without suspecting anything about his resurrection and ascension, and we can say the same for ourselves as well. In the same way, the spiritual presence promised by him and everything that he says about his perpetual influence on those surviving him is mediated by nothing originating from these two factual claims. Now, suppose that this mediating work were indeed actually to depend on his sitting at the right hand of God—by which expression, notwithstanding, since the impression cannot possibly be authentic, nothing may be understood other than Christ’s distinctive and incomparable dignity, itself elevated above all conflict—but this dignity would not depend on a resurrection or ascension having been made perceptible, since Christ could indeed have been elevated immediately to glory even without these connecting links. Even this case does not allow one to disregard in what connection the two events would stand with Christ’s redeeming efficaciousness. Although Paul does appear, on the one hand, to ascribe to the resurrection a role of its own in redemption, as well as to Christ’s death,4 on the other hand, the manner in which he advances the resurrection as a guaranty for our own resurrection⁵ shows that in no way does he think of it as in an exclusive connection with the distinctive being of God in Christ. In addition, the resurrection is never advanced as a testimony of the divine dwelling in Christ, since everywhere it is attributed not to Christ himself, but to God.⁶ Just as little did John advance the perceptible ascension as a proof of Christ’s higher dignity. Accordingly, we can certainly expect the discernment of those who ply dogmatic propositions, that the correct impression of Christ can exist completely, and also did so, without taking any notice of these factual claims.

As regards the return to judge, we cannot treat the doctrinal meaning of this notion until later.⁷ Only the following is to be observed here. Suppose that judgment, to the extent that we would view it as a communicable divine action, would stand in such close union with the work of redemption that it would not be easy to conceive that God could hand over that work to anyone other than the Redeemer. In this case, the work of the Redeemer would not involve anything greater in the person of Christ than we would already attribute to him without this. Moreover, just as little would judgment belong to the works of redemption itself, since, indeed, those who have faith do not come under judgment. Viewed as the return of Christ, however, the return would be connected with the ascension as its counterpart. Just as ascension would be only an incidental form in order to bring about being situated at the right hand of God, so too that promise of Christ’s return would be only an incidental form for satisfaction of the desire to be united with Christ. Furthermore, what is incomprehensible and miraculous in the ascent cannot be traced back to what is divine in Christ, which is indicated as the impetus for all his free actions. Inasmuch as the ascension is also nowhere presented as his action, what is miraculous in that return of Christ also cannot be traced back to what is divine in him. The result is that the disparity between our doctrinal propositions up to this point, namely, those that we have accepted as such, and these statements must be obvious to everyone.

Something else is the case with Christ’s so-called descent into hell,8 for this would certainly belong to the redeeming activities, in accordance with the prevailing notion of it, if we could regard it simply as a fact. It would then be regarded as an expression of his prophetic and high-priestly office toward those who had died before his appearance. Nevertheless, in part, the sole passage that appears to treat of this event⁹ does not even cover it, not by far, and, in part, even expanded in this way the matter itself does not correspond to the event’s purpose as it would have to be conceived. The reason is that all those who would also have died after his appearance, but without proclamation of the gospel having come to them, would have the same claim as those others who died before his appearance. What is more, however, the expressions that comprise that passage in no way compel the supposition of such an otherwise entirely unattested fact, just as they also fix no point in time whatsoever. On this account, it also has not been taken up in our proposition in the first place.

2. Belief in these factual claims regarding resurrection and ascension is, accordingly, not a freestanding belief belonging to the original features of faith in Christ in such a way that we could not accept Christ as Redeemer or recognize God’s being in him if we were not to know that he had risen and gone to heaven, or if he had not promised a return for judgment. This belief is also not to be derived from those original features, not with the result that we could conclude that because God was in Christ, thus he could have risen and gone to heaven, or that because an essential sinlessness befitted him, he would have to return in order to sit in judgment. On the contrary, these factual claims are taken up only because they stand written. Moreover, it can only be required of each Evangelical Christian that one believe in these factual claims only to the extent one considers these claims to be sufficiently attested. This is so, in that in this regard the sacred authors are to be regarded simply as reporters. As a result, immediately and originally, belief in these factual claims belongs more to the doctrine of Scripture than to the doctrine of Christ’s person. Nevertheless, however, the belief ‘s indirect connection with the doctrine of Christ’s person is not to be denied, namely, insofar as judgment concerning the disciples, viewed as original reporters, would, in return, affect one’s judgment concerning the Redeemer. For example, take someone who, so as not to accept Christ’s resurrection as a literal event, would prefer, with regard to miraculous events, to presuppose that the disciples had been deceived and took something internal to be something external. That person would then attribute to the disciples a mental weakness, such that not only would their entire testimony to Christ be considered untrustworthy, but Christ would have to be adjudged not to have known “what is in human beings,”10 since he himself chose such witnesses. Or, if Christ himself were to have intended or arranged that they would have to take an internal phenomenon to consist of externally oriented sensory perceptions, then he himself would be an originator of error. Further, all moral concepts would be thrown into confusion if such a higher dignity were supposed to be compatible with all that.

It is a little different case with the ascension, insofar as we do not have sufficient cause to claim that an immediate report of any eyewitness, and least of all an apostolic eyewitness, lies before us regarding a course of events in the ascension, viewed as external fact. If it were asserted, nevertheless, that Christ was indeed resurrected but not raised up into heaven, that instead he had lived thereafter an indeterminate period in secret, and on that account he must have had to stage something that could have been considered to be observed as an ascension, then the case is entirely the same as that with the resurrection.

The promise of his return stands in combination with the actual doctrine of Christ’s person least of all. This is so, especially since the return is promised for the sake of a certain work and to that extent would pertain to the point of doctrine that would follow only if the work were one that would directly pertain to his calling as Redeemer. Only if an interpretation were to ascertain that a time for this return was specified, one that had long since expired by now, or, if this return would have been described in such a way that we could demonstrate its impossibility, would this have to have led to some repercussion, if not on the doctrine regarding Scripture then surely on the doctrine regarding Christ’s person.

Postscript to this point of doctrine: The foregoing presentation of the person of Christ that was given first in our own entirely independent mode of expression and then in closer connection with ecclesial forms is, as regards what is essential, so widespread in the Christian church and so old in it that one must view it all the more as the general belief of Christians. This is the case, because even many of those who are satisfied with a less encompassing notion of the Redeemer simply reject the latter prevailing notion. They reject it, moreover, for two reasons. In part, they do so because they shun anything miraculous altogether—whether they overlook the distinction we set forth11 or they reject it—in part, because they believe that they must assume the doctrine of the Trinity at the same time, a doctrine that is offensive to them on account of its polytheistic appearance. As a result, it is to be hoped that in a freer presentation many will more easily tolerate the same thing that repels them when it appears wrapped up in austere scholastic forms.

However, it is true, first, in part, that the same doctrinal contents cannot be definitely evidenced everywhere in Christendom where the same faith has underlain relationship to the Redeemer, because understanding and expression have not been far enough developed for this purpose. Second, in part, it is also undeniable that already very early in Christendom dissenting and less developed views were also in circulation alongside this view of the Redeemer. Thus, to be sure, one cannot evade the question as to whether the ecclesial view can even really be justified as the original view by means of expressions of Christ himself and those of the apostles, or whether those who maintain that this view of the Redeemer arose later are in the right. To preface our response, one need only say, first, supposing also that the originality of our doctrine had not been demonstrated, nevertheless, it would not follow therefrom that the doctrine had been falsely or arbitrarily thought out. Rather, our doctrine could stand only inasmuch as those original testimonies would not stand in demonstrable contradiction to it. However, the question itself is, admittedly, so complicated that it is impossible to resolve it in a way that could win general acknowledgment for itself so long as, on the one hand, the most varied opinions concerning the mode of origin and concerning the authors of the New Testament Scriptures still continue side by side, and, on the other hand, so many various, arbitrary options still prevail among hermeneutical methods. Now, if quarrels can arise without end concerning the contents of particular passages, then it is futile to appeal to singular odd sayings on behalf of his essential sinlessness12 or on behalf of God’s being in him.¹³ Yet, suppose that someone, after hearing the interpretation of particular statements, is not satisfied with the possibility of a sense in accord with one’s own theory. Suppose, instead, that someone sincerely holds oneself open to a total impression, unalloyed, just as Christ’s discourses on his relationship to human beings and on his relationship to his Father¹⁴ actually complement and permeate each other. Such a person would doubtless find it difficult to attribute more modest contents to those discourses than our propositions above express, even if these propositions do not exactly convey the sense of the ecclesial formulations associated with the doctrine of the Trinity. At the same time, moreover, the expressions we offer are still not constructed in such a way that they negate the true reality of Christ’s human existence,¹⁵ as if Christ could, as it were, have had a memory in his temporal consciousness regarding an isolated being of what is divine in him before he had become human.¹⁶

The twofold appellation “Son of Man”¹⁷ and “Son of God” that Christ attributes to himself fully agrees with this view. Such is the case, for he could not have attributed the first name to himself if he had not known himself to participate completely in the same nature as other human beings do. Nevertheless, it would have been meaningless to adopt the name specially for himself if he had not had grounds for doing so, grounds that others could not adduce. Consequently, the meaning would also have to have been a precise one that was supposed to indicate a distinction between him and all other human beings.18 Likewise, moreover, the connection of the designation “God’s son” with what Christ says regarding his relationship to his Father shows that he does not attribute it to himself in the same sense in which the usage of it had already been made.¹⁹ This understanding is already implied plainly enough in the expression “only begotten”²⁰ that derives from Christ himself. If one simply ruptures this natural connection between the two appellations, which obviously refer to each other, it becomes easier to grant room for more modest interpretations and easier to posit them in connection with ebionitic theories.

In contrast, there are, on the other hand, passages in which a high level of distress is imputed²¹ to Christ or something is narrated regarding him that carries in itself the semblance of impassioned agitation.²² Actually, these are only details that would not even remotely testify against his sinlessness or be incompatible with God’s being in him. Obviously, no one would have made a mistake about him in this regard, because everyone was already accustomed to conceiving such particular elements only in accordance with the total impression that one would already have held firm. Moreover, the elements also remind us simply that faith in Jesus as Redeemer did not arise based on details, but developed based on a total impression, whereupon it can only follow that no details present themselves that would have hindered that total impression. However, already in the first generation of his disciples, faith had the same content as that expounded here. This observation is based not only on the manifold testimonies that attribute a perfect purity²³ and a fullness of force²⁴ to Christ, but is based also on the way in which Paul describes him as the author of a new human standard of worth in contrast to Adam,²⁵ just as it is based on the Johannine presentation of the λόγος, and on the theory set forth in the Letter to the Hebrews.

Now, indeed, even these testimonies could also be weakened by forced interpretations if one wrenches them out of their interconnection and combines them with what is extraneous. Yet, it is not sufficient, nevertheless, simply to show that this or that expression can also signify less. On the contrary, one must also make clear how it can have come to pass that one would have designated an ordinary relationship using extraordinary and exceptional expressions and how the original sense went astray so early in the tradition. As long as this straying can be accomplished no better than through extremely arbitrary hypotheses, it would be well to let the matter rest in recognition that the faith of the church is also the original faith and in itself is grounded in the sayings of Christ.

Now, if this results clearly enough from reflection on Scripture taken as a whole, then, not only can our faith-doctrine easily dispense with the entire arsenal of individual sayings that are set forth under various titles26 that give evidence of God’s being in Christ, but our faith doctrine can also the more readily set aside these sayings if the most exact mode of presentation is not promoted thereby. Instead, often what is important and sure disappears in a context of what is unreliable. What does it help, moreover, if divine names are attributed to Christ since he himself appeals to a figurative linguistic usage of God’s word? In contrast, appellations that would express the oneness of what is divine and what is human in such a definite and unambiguous way as the later designation “God-human” are not found in Scripture; on the contrary, all predicates to be drawn from it into this context are more or less unsteady.²⁷ Thus, as regards divine attributes, it is also natural that only attributes that express an enhanced humanness are assigned to him, since discourse about Christ is always discourse about a human being, with the result that it is an easy task to explain these divine attributes simply as quite permissible hyperbolic expressions. Now, since it is also difficult to distinguish the utterances of a deep reverence that is not in the proper sense divine from strict devotion, the solution, in using the mode of procedure recommended here, would be to refer everything to the divine activities affirmed regarding Christ. However, creation and preservation are ascribed to Christ28 only in such a way that it must remain doubtful whether he is not to be effective cause only insofar as he is final cause. At the raising of the dead and the final judgment, Christ is finally distinguished from God throughout, in that he appears only as authorized representative,²⁹ and thus not only is the authority for that purpose presented as resting in the Father, but also the determination originally comes from the Father. Precisely this distinction applies to the sending of the Spirit, which Christ sometimes ascribes to himself, sometimes also to the Father at his request.³⁰ In consequence, little would be accomplished with all these details if it were not for those eminent, continuous testimonies.

1. Sätze.

2. Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (325, 381): “On the third day he rose again in accordance with the Scriptures; he ascended into the heavens and is seated at the right hand of the Father. He is coming again in glory to judge the living and the dead.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 23, from the Greek; Latin: Bek. Luth. (1963), 26.

3. See §29.3. Ed. note: Criteria in this subsection include these two: “Nothing touching upon the Redeemer can be set forth as genuine doctrine that is not tied to his redemptive causality and that does not permit of being traced back to the original and distinctive impression that his actual existence made.”

4. Rom. 4:25.

5. 1 Cor. 15:13, 16.

6. Acts 2:24; 4:10; 10:40; Rom. 4:24; 1 Cor. 6:14; 15:15; 2 Cor. 4:14.

7. Ed. note: §160.

8. Roman Symbol (the so-called Apostles’ Creed, after later 4th cent.): “Descended into hell.” [Schleiermacher’s comment:] This phrase appears in only one Greek version but in several ancient Latin versions. Symbolum Quicunque vult (= so-called Athanasian Creed): “descended into hell.” Ed. note: ET Leith (1982), 24. Predecessors to the Roman Symbol included the Greek Interrogatory Creed of Hippolytus (ca. 215), which read only: “died (and was buried).” Among the various Latin examples, the Creed of Rufinus (ca. 404) read: “crucified under Pontius Pilate and buried. He descended to hell.” The Apostles’ Creed (ca. 700) has “suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, and buried. He descended to hell.” The Symbolum Quicunque vult, called after its initial words, is the so-called Creed of St. Athanasius (probably ca. late 4th–early 5th cent.). See Leith (1973, 1982) for a fuller discussion; see Bek. Luth. (1963), 21–23, for the Apostles’ Creed; and cf. §36n1.

9. The only one is 1 Pet. 3:19, for in no way is Eph. 4:9 to be drawn into this position.

10. John 2:25. Ed. note: Sermon on John 2:18–25, Nov. 16, 1823, SW II.8 (1837), 142–54.

11. Cf. §13.

12. John 8:46. Ed. note: Sermon on John 8:46–59, June 19, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 108–22.

13. John 10:30–38. Ed. note: See sermons on John 10:22–33 and 34–42, Oct. 9 and 23, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 213–37.

14. John 5:17, 24, 26; 8:24, 36; 14:11, 20; 17:10, 21–25. Ed. note: Sermons on John 5:16–23 and 24–30, June 13 and 27, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 331–64; John 8:20–26, May 8, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 82–94; John 10:12–21 and 22–33, Sept. 11 and Oct. 9, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 198–225; John 14:7–17 and 18–24, May 21 and June 4, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 428–56.

15. Dasein. Ed. note: That is, not strictly Sein, as in simply possessing a human nature, but really “being there,” in true human existence and thus having a wholly “existential relationship” with God and with other human beings. See OG (1981) 40.

16. If one wants to make out an intimation of this sort in John 17:5, then John 5:19–20 makes this particular explanation almost impossible. Yet, it would have to be questionable even without that reference, because Jesus’ petition [to the Father to glorify him “with the glory which I had with thee before the world was made” (John 17:5)] remained unrealized at that time, in that, despite all the pains taken to understand, no one has reached a clear consciousness of what he meant or ever will. Ed. note: Menschenwerdung is the usual German term for “incarnation,” which itself (as the actual Latin term) bears the meaning “becoming embodied.” In John 5:19–20 (RSV), Jesus says, “The Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing.” Sermon on John 5:16–23, June 13, 1824, SW II.8 (1837), 331–46.

17. Ed. note: Menschensohn, or “human son,” sometimes reinterpreted to mean simply “son of Mary,” thus not procreated by or the child of Joseph as well.

18. The thought is just as peculiar that this title [“son of man”] was supposed to run counter to the popular view of it, namely, that no one would know wherefrom the Messiah would come, as is that other thought that it was supposed to refer to a vision in Daniel (7:13) where someone like a son of man—clearly in contrast to the beasts mentioned earlier—comes before the Ancient of Days in the clouds of heaven. Ed. note: The word translated “precise” (prägnante) also appears in ordinary German and English, to connote “pregnant with meaning,” an allusion not to be missed in this context.

19. Compare esp. John 10:35ff. Ed. note: Sermon, see §99P.S.n13 just above.

20. John 3:16 KJV. Ed. note: Sermon on John 3:16–18, Dec. 25, 1823, SW II.8 (1837), 185–96.

21. Matt. 26:31; Luke 19:44. Ed. note: Sermon on Luke 19:41–48, Aug. 11, 1822, first separately published in 1825, later SW II.4 (1835), 416–31.

22. John 11:33, 38. Ed. note: Sermon on John 11:28–40, Dec. 4, 1825, SW II.9 (1847), 264–67.

23. See 2 Cor. 5:21; 1 Pet. 2:22; Heb. 1:3; 7:26–27; and 9:14.

24. Phil. 4:13. Ed. note: Sermon on Phil. 4:10–13, Mar. 28, 1823, SW II.10 (1856), 781–93.

25. Ed. note: This points to a summation of Pauline doctrine containing allusions especially to 1 Cor. 15:45 on Jesus as the second Adam of the new creation and to Phil. 3:8 on “the surpassing worth of following Christ Jesus,” as well as to new life in “the Spirit of Christ” versus life merely in “the flesh,” as in Rom. 8 and Gal. 3. See sermons, within his Philippians series, on Phil. 3:4–11, Oct. 27 and Nov. 10, 1822, in SW II.10 (1856), 625–50. Similar themes, somewhat differently stated, appear, as Schleiermacher notes, in Johannine talk of Christ as λόγος (word) and in Hebrews.

26. For example, God is called one who is ὀνομαστικῶς (named), ἰδιωματικῶς (uniquely), ἐνεργητικῶς (efficaciously), and λατρευτικῶς (worshiped) in Christ.

27. It is self-evident that Old Testament signs, voices from heaven, and phenomena in which some want to recognize the Son of God cannot be the subject here, for in no instance can they say anything of the person of Christ; rather, at most they could be considered in the doctrine of the triune God.

28. As in 1 Cor. 8:6; Col. 1:15–17; Heb. 1:4. Ed. note: Sermon only on Col. 1:13–18, July 25, 1830, SW II.6 (1835), 232–43.

29. Bevollmächtigter. Ed. note: In legal parlance this term sometimes translates “plenipotentiary,” which means endowed with unrestricted power to represent.

30. Luke 24:49 and John 15:2, 6; cf. John 14:16, 30. Ed. note: Sermons only on the John passages: John 15:1–7, July 2, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 469–83; John 14:1–7 and 18–24, June 4 and 18, 1826, SW II.9 (1847), 428–56. See also John 14:26 there, on the coming of the Holy Spirit.