SECTION ONE

Regarding the Christian’s Condition insofar as the Christian Is Conscious of Divine Grace

[Introduction to Section One]

§91. We have communion with God¹ only in a community of life with the Redeemer. Within this community of life, the Redeemer’s absolutely² sinless perfection and blessedness manifests a free activity proceeding directly from himself, but the need for redemption within the recipient of grace³ manifests a free receptivity in the process of taking up the Redeemer’s activity into oneself.

1. This is the basic consciousness of all Christians regarding their pardoned status,⁴ even where there is the most disparate conception of Christianity. That is to say, if a person does not refer the strength of God-consciousness that one finds within oneself to Jesus at all, then that person’s consciousness is also not a Christian consciousness. Alternatively, if a person does indeed refer the strength of God-consciousness to Jesus but without recognizing this contrast between sin and grace to any degree, then such a person must be finding in oneself not only no sin but also no imperfection. In that case, given that one’s activity is coming entirely out of oneself, one would also have to have left one’s pardoned status behind and would oneself have to have become a Christ.5

On the other hand, one might indeed refer to Jesus one’s state with respect to community with God but without finding in oneself a vital receptivity for him. In that case, one would indeed have faith in Christ, inasmuch as one presupposes an efficacious action from him that accords blessing, but one would not yet find oneself to be a recipient of grace, in that one still cannot have experienced any change through Christ. This is so, for in a person who has any vitality no change is devoid of the person’s own activity, hence also no influence from another can really be taken up without that activity—that is, in a completely passive manner. Alternatively, if one’s own activity had been entirely opposed to such influence—that is, had been in outright resistance—then any communication from another would have to have ensued against one’s will—that is, forcibly—and in such a case it would not produce blessedness.

All real interconnection of life⁶ with Christ in which he can be posited as Redeemer in some way thus depends on there already being a vital receptivity for his influence and on that influence’s continuing to be present. Moreover, this twofold dependence holds good in equal measure for all the elements of that interconnection, because as that interconnectedness of life with Christ would reach its boundaries, it would have to dissolve of itself.

Just as little, however, is it to be denied that our proposition still permits great leeway for all those conceptions concerning this relationship, however greatly varied they may be, as long as they stay within the boundaries that have been set forth. That is to say, one person could consider the relationship to be completely the same even in every one of its elements, so that no previously experienced influences of the relationship would alter its geometric expansion⁷ one whit. In contrast, another person could believe that a cooperating self-initiated activity⁸ would gradually arise in those who have received grace, so that the new “I,” considered in its self-identity, would be an “I” that would initiate one’s own activity and would continue to develop as such. In the latter view, generally speaking, only the person considered as a changing subject would be the seat of sheer receptivity, hence such a person would be conscious of the strength of God-consciousness as steadily one’s own, though it is, to be sure, derived from Christ. Indeed, suppose that someone wanted to refer back to the distinction between personal self-consciousness and consciousness held in common, and suppose that this person wanted to take our proposition to be an expression of the consciousness that Christians share. Suppose, further, that this person wanted to say, however, that every mature Christian could and should be conscious of oneself personally as one who is free and exercises self-initiated activity in the reign of God, also, at the same time, that one could become such a person only in that collective life, for which consciousness our proposition offers the correct expression. Then this entire conception would also lie within the boundaries set by our proposition. Admittedly, however, not all conceptions of this kind have equal currency in the church.

2. Now, if this statement is equally applicable for all the still widely divergent elements in the collective life founded by Christ, then no other division is indicated therein than the one to be explicated first—namely, how the Redeemer is posited by virtue of this consciousness, but, at the same time, how the redeemed are posited by virtue of this same consciousness. Accordingly, the order of presentation arises of itself, since what in the state of the Christian is contrasted with the earlier state in the community of sinfulness can be understood only as a result of the efficacious action of the Redeemer. Thus, the content of this section is to be fully accomplished in two main divisions.

To the first division9 belong all propositions concerning Christ that are immediate expressions of our Christian self-consciousness. Moreover, what appears in treatments of Evangelical faith-doctrine regarding Christ elsewhere but does not appear here is not to be explained as an arbitrary omission, as one might suppose; rather, this nonappearance is self-explanatory in that purely dogmatic content is lacking in it and, as a consequence, it can have only a subordinate explanatory or combinatory value here. This is so, for if it could be present in accordance with our design, then it would also have to find a place for itself in our procedure, but it does not.

The second main division¹⁰ has to contain all propositions that immediately describe the relation of grace to sinfulness in the human soul and indeed as mediated by entry of the Redeemer. Just as this main division has already been marked off from the second section in an earlier place,¹¹ so here everything must indeed be present whereby the individual receives and appropriates participation in the continuing existence of Christian community, but included only as regards one’s personal constitution or mode of action.¹²

1. Cf. §63. Ed. note: See also §§62.3, §164, and index. See OR (1821) V, supplemental note 18, on locating the crucial spot “in humans’ communion with God” versus efforts of his own time by “fiery intellects of contemporary culture” who in Germany possess “the itch for innovation” already shown to be “fruitless” in England and France to find a new “natural religion.” People engaged in these innovative efforts he describes as rejoicing “in seeing the crucial spot,” namely, “the passionate, enthusiastic Christ vanquished by the calm prosaic Zeus and … dreamed of returning to some symbolical or gnostic heathenism.”

2. Ed. note: Here schlechthin is translated “absolutely,” exactly as in the phrase “feeling of absolute dependence,” in both cases meaning “utterly and unexceptionably.” It is Schleiermacher’s preferred synonym for the Latin absolut, which he also uses occasionally.

3. Begnädigten. Ed. note: In ordinary usage, this word is used for one who is freely, unconditionally pardoned.

4. Gnadenstande. Ed. note: In some quarters this “pardoned status” is called a “state of grace.”

5. Christus. Ed. note: In contrast, a “Christian” translates ein Christ.

6. Lebenszusammenhang. Ed. note: The broader, richer term used in the proposition itself is Lebensgemeinschaft (“community of life”).

7. Exponenten.

8. Ed. note: The expression is mitwirkende Selbsttätigkeit.

9. Ed. note: §§92–105.

10. Ed. note: §§106–12.

11. §90.1.

12. Beschaffenheit oder Handlungsweise.

Division One

Regarding Christ

[Introduction to Division One]

§92. The distinctive activity and exclusive dignity of the Redeemer refer to each other and are inseparably one in the self-consciousness of those who have faith.

1. Now, whether we prefer to call Christ the Redeemer, or whether we prefer to view him as the one in whom the creation of human nature has been completed, human nature that until then had existed only in a provisional state, each designation has significance only to the extent that a distinctive efficacious action is attributable to him—indeed, one that is also connected with some distinctive spiritual content of his person. This is so, for if he has an effect only in a manner others do, even though his is much more complete and far-reaching, then the result too, namely, that human beings are made blessed, would simply be a work done in common by him and others, even if his share in that work were the greater. Moreover, there would not be one Redeemer in relation to the redeemed, but many, among whom only one would be the first among equals. Furthermore, the creation of humanity would then be completed through him no more than that. Rather, it would be completed collectively through those who uniformly differ from the rest, inasmuch as their work would presuppose a distinctive overall condition¹ in them. However, the case would also be no different if his efficacious action would have come to him exclusively but would have had its ground less in an inner overall condition belonging to him alone than simply in a distinctive circumstance in which he had been placed. The second expression, that the creation of human beings was completed in him, would then have no content at all, in that it could more likely be presupposed that there are many people who are like him but who simply did not come into the same circumstances. However, then he would also not actually be the Redeemer, even if one could say that human beings had been redeemed through his deed or through his suffering, as people have held. The reason is that the result, making people blessed, could not be something communicated2 by him but could only be aroused or released by him, because he embodied nothing distinctive.

Just as little, however, could people’s approximation to the state of blessedness be traced back to him if he had been present in exclusive dignity but had passively held back with it, and if he had not exerted any efficacious action corresponding to that dignity. This is the case, for, to begin with, it would be impossible to see how his contemporaries, and we after them, should then have come to assign such a dignity to him, especially given the manner of his appearance. Quite apart from that fact, in case blessedness could perchance be communicated through the simple perception³ of this dignity, even without any activity having been linked with this blessedness, in perceivers⁴ of this dignity more than receptivity would nonetheless have to have been present. Rather, his appearance could then be viewed only as the occasion for that notion, which perceivers would have brought forth independently of him.

2. Accordingly, if the approximation to blessedness that emerged out of people’s state of having a lack of blessedness cannot be explained as a fact that is mediated by Jesus based on only one of these two features, distinctive activity and exclusive dignity, without the other, it also follows that both features must entirely merge into each other and be the mutual measure of each other. As a result, it is futile to assign to the Redeemer a dignity higher than the efficacious action that is simultaneously ascribed to him calls for, in that nothing whatsoever is explained by the surplus of dignity. Likewise, it is futile to ascribe to him a greater efficacious action than can result from the dignity that one is willing to grant him. This is the case, for what follows from any surplus of efficacious action can certainly not be attributed to him in the same sense as efficacious action that results from his dignity. Hence, every doctrine regarding Christ in which this equivalence is not essential is deemed to be incoherent. This is so whether this doctrine would then seek to disguise the deprivation of dignity through great but certainly alien effects with which the doctrine credits him or, in reverse, whether the doctrine might grant less influence to him, thereby seeking to establish that the doctrine exalts him highly, though in an unfruitful way nonetheless.

3. Now, if we hold fast to this rule, we are able thereby to deal with the entire doctrine regarding Christ, whether it is presented simply as the doctrine regarding his efficacious action, for his dignity would then have to follow automatically therefrom, or whether it is presented simply as the doctrine regarding his dignity, for his efficacious action would then have to result automatically from his dignity. Both of the general formulations stated above already indicate this, as follows. The statement that the creation of human nature was completed in his person is, in and of itself, simply a description of his dignity—greater or lesser, according to whether one sets a distinction between earlier and later—yet his efficacious action follows of itself, provided that this creation is to continue. Likewise, the statement that he is the Redeemer describes his efficacious action in the same manner, yet his dignity follows of itself in the same measure. All the same, it is not advisable to choose between the two modes of treatment, unless we wish, at the same time, to relinquish ecclesial language and to make comparison of our expressions with other treatments of doctrines of faith more difficult. This is the case, for since some ecclesial formulations have to do with the efficacious action of Christ and others concern his dignity, the most secure warranty for their being in accord consists in the matter’s being viewed from both points of view separately. Moreover, the more what is distinctive in each is related to the other, the more probable it is that the propositions set forth will render an original self-consciousness purely. The common criterion for both, namely, the extent to which efficacious action and dignity are embraced in any given presentation, is then found in the presentation of the effects first in individuals but then also in the presentation of the church, which must likewise be the complete manifestation5 of the dignity of the Redeemer, just as the world is the complete manifestation of the attributes of God.

Accordingly, for us this main division falls into two points of doctrine, that regarding the person of Christ and that regarding his work. In the individual propositions the two points of doctrine are entirely different; however, their overall content is the same, with the result that the content of each of them, as well as that of the second main division of the second section,⁶ can be understood as that which has come into being through Christ.

1. Beschaffenheit. Ed. note: The reference is to their makeup, or constitution, hence to their particular overall condition.

2. Mitgeteiltes. Ed. note: This word can also mean “imparted,” but only in the same sense of a passing on, not an infusion. Hence, throughout his Christology Schleiermacher speaks of Christ’s sinless perfection and blessedness being “communicated” to his immediate followers and then from generation to generation afterward.

3. Ed. note: The words “simple perception” (bloße Anschauen) could denote perception at any level, not just sensory perception (Wahrnehmung).

4. Ed. note: Correspondingly, Schleiermacher then uses the phrase “in the perceivers” (in den Anschauenden).

5. Offenbarung. Ed. note: Or “revelation” in that sense, i.e., ideally the church and the world, respectively, are the full and adequate means through which what is to be attributed to Christ and to God is to be shown.

6. Ed. note: “Regarding the Continuance of the Church in Its Coexistence with the World” (§§126–56).

First Point of Doctrine
	Regarding the Person of Christ

[Introduction to First Point of Doctrine]

§93. The self-initiated activity of the new collective life is taken to be original in the Redeemer and to proceed from him alone. Thus, he must, at the same time, have been prototypical¹ as an individual entity in history. That is, what is prototypical² had to have become completely historical in him. At the same time, moreover, every historical element in him had to have borne what is prototypical within it.³

1. Suppose that the distinctive dignity of the Redeemer can be measured only by the overall efficacious action stemming from it but that this efficacious action is to be perceived completely only in the collective life established by him. Suppose further, on the one hand, that all other religious communities are destined to pass over into that collective life with the result that all religious life outside those religious communities would be something incomplete. On the other hand, within that religious life, however, completion would exist at all times—thus, even in the highest development of this collective life toward the Redeemer—only as the relationship referred to above,⁴ that is, in its being all that it is only by virtue of its receptivity to his influence. If this is true, then the dignity of the Redeemer must be conceived in such a way that he is able to make that happen. Yet, his efficacious action, such that it can be attributed immediately and exclusively to his person, is then to be considered, first of all, in his own public life. Here, however, particular acts in no way stand out that distinctly set themselves apart from the rest. Thus, the true manifestation⁵ of his dignity, which is identical with his efficacious action in establishing community, exists not in particular elements of it, but in the entire course of his life. Now, these two features are what is not only set forth but also fully and thoroughly related to each other in our proposition.

2. Now, we live in Christian community with the conviction, shared by all Christians, that no more complete formation of God-consciousness is forthcoming for humankind, yet that every purportedly new formation would be only a regression, also with the conviction that any increase in the efficacious action of God-consciousness proceeds not from any kind of newly supervening power but always simply from an ever alert receptivity to his influence. Thus, it is clear that every given state of this collective life must remain only an approximation to what is posited in the Redeemer himself, and this is precisely what we understand by his prototypical dignity. However, in this collective life it is not then a question of the myriad relations of human life, with the result that he would have to be prototypical for all knowing or all art and skill that develop in human society as well. Rather, all that is at issue is the strength of God-consciousness for giving impetus to all the elements of life and for determining them all. Moreover, we do not extend even the prototypical character of the Redeemer any more broadly than this. To be sure, one could object, on the other hand, that since the strength of God-consciousness in the collective life itself always remains only incomplete, then, in any case, an exemplary dignity would have to belong to the Redeemer. In contrast, his prototypical character, which the very nature of the concept itself actually declares, thus his absolute perfection, would also not belong to him, even according to the rule stated above,6 since such perfection would not be necessary in order to grasp a result, which result would always be only incomplete. Rather, this image would be the original hyperbole used by persons of faith when they view Christ in the mirror of their own imperfection. Moreover, this hyperbole would also constantly persist in the same manner, in that over the ages persons of faith have placed in Jesus what they were capable of apprehending as prototypical in this domain.

Two things, however, are to be observed in this regard. First, if this view of the matter is to be clear in itself—unfailingly at least a wish, because something absolutely perfect is nevertheless always aspired to at the very least—indeed, in this view the more an individual would subordinate one’s personal consciousness to species consciousness,⁷ the more a hope would also have to develop that the human race, even if only in its noblest and finest members, would eventually surpass Christ and leave him behind. This wish, however, obviously places a limit on Christian faith, which, to the contrary, knows no way toward a pure apprehension of what is prototypical in Christ other than an understanding of him that is constantly being improved. On the other hand, if this eventuality does not come into consciousness, or if it is resolutely denied, then this restriction of what is prototypical to an exemplary status could also be only a faultily understood precautionary measure, and the seeming ground for this maneuver would be offered only afterward.

The second thing to be observed is that if one considers, on the one hand, that as soon as one concedes the possibility of a constant progression in the strength of God-consciousness but denies that the completion of that progression exists anywhere, then one also could no longer maintain that creation of the human being is or will become complete. This is so, because in the constant progression of God-consciousness completion always, of course, remains posited only as a possibility, and as a consequence less is asserted regarding human beings than regarding other creatures. That is to say, one can affirm regarding all of the more constrained kinds of being that their concept really becomes complete in the totality of individuals supplementing one another. However, this cannot hold true of a freer, self-developing species if the completion of an essential life function is posited in the concept but exists in no individual, for what is incomplete in a species cannot itself be made up for among its members to reach completion. Moreover, on the other hand, suppose that one then adds how difficult it would have to be to specify a distinction between a true prototype and an exemplar, which exemplar would, at the same time, have to have the power to effect every possible heightening in the totality of individuals. Without doubt, since productivity resides only in the concept of “prototype” and not in the concept of “exemplar,” it clearly follows that being prototypical is the only suitable expression for the exclusive personal dignity of Christ.

Meanwhile, as concerns the first assertion considered above—the assertion that the thought of intending or being able to surpass Christ marks the limit of Christian faith—in this connection it is also not easy to distinguish, among conceptions of Christian faith that allow for a perfectibility8 of Christianity, those conceptions which are indeed still Christian, even though they do not appear to be so, from conceptions that are not Christian but might serve as Christian all the same.

Very likely, everyone sees this much, that a great divide exists between those who hold one of the following two views. Those holding the first view say that it is not only possible but it is also incumbent on us to surpass much of what Christ taught his disciples, because, in that there is no such thing as human thinking without words, he himself was essentially hindered by the incompleteness of language from fully realizing the innermost content of his spiritual nature in precise thoughts. On this view, moreover, in another sense the same reasoning would also apply to his actions, in which the circumstances by which these actions are determined then also always reflect imperfection. So, given this view, it can still be the case that an absolutely prototypical character belongs to him in accordance with his inner nature, with the result that the supposed surpassing-of-his-appearance referred to could, at the same time, always become simply a more complete unfolding of his innermost nature.

Those holding the second view, moreover, are of the opinion that even in accordance with his inner nature Christ was not any more than what could have been seen in his appearance but that the community of teaching and life that was proceeding from him, with the testimonies to Christ preserved in it, has, by virtue of special divine care, a very fortunate organization. This organization is so fortunate, they think, that both doctrine and life, in accordance with that more complete prototype which later generations could set forth, can easily be recast without the community’s needing to renounce its historical self-sameness. As a result, given this second view, the necessity of originating new religious communities would then be removed thereby for all time. That is to say, in this view, even in order to retain the initial presuppositions of Christian faith, there would simply fail to be a single member of the community that one could claim as originator with total consistency. That is, if Christ were thus squeezed into the limits of what was given at the time of his appearance, then he too, as well as all that he engendered, would have had to be comprehended based only on what was given to him historically. Thus, the entirety of Christianity would have had to be comprehended based on Judaism at the stage of development at which it then stood and at which a person such as Jesus could emerge from its bosom. As a result, Christianity would have been merely a new evolution9 of Judaism, though one saturated with foreign wisdom current at the time, and Jesus would have been merely a more or less original and revolutionary Jewish reformer of the law.

3. However, even if it were so very firmly held that the source of a collective life that is always increasing in the strength of God-consciousness can exist only in what is prototypical, even then it would be no more conceivable how precisely what is prototypical should have come to be perceived by the senses and experienced¹⁰ in an actual historically existing individual being. This is so, for already in general terms we cannot help but distinguish between the two, and we consider each individual only as complementary to others, each one in need of completion through others, whether the concern is undertakings of skill or formations of nature. Yet, given that sin is posited strictly as a collective act of humankind, how can the possibility then remain that a prototypical individual being could have developed out of that sinful collective life? Indeed, even the way out which claims that the prototype could be conceived and conferred upon Jesus with only greater or lesser arbitrariness is already precluded. The reason is that if Christianity were grounded on an imperfect prototype, then it would have to abandon claims to take all modes of faith into itself and to develop out of itself an increasing perfection and blessedness.

Suppose, however, that someone wanted to leave room for a capacity to produce a prototype that is pure and perfect in itself within human nature before Christ and without him. Then human nature could not have existed in the state of general sinfulness on account of the natural interconnection between intellect and volition. Hence, suppose that the human being Jesus was prototypical, or that the prototype became historical and was realized in him, given that either expression bears the same currency as the other one does. Then, in order to originate a new collective life within the old life and out of it, he would indeed have to have entered into the collective life of sinfulness, yet he would not have to have emerged from within it. Rather, he would have to be recognized as a “miraculous appearance” in that collective life, but, of course, only in the meaning of the word already set down here once and for all, following the analogies applied in the Introduction.11 That is, his distinctive spiritual content cannot be accounted for based on the content of the circle of human beings to which he belonged. Rather, it can be accounted for based only on the general source of spiritual life through a creative divine act, in which act the concept of the human being as the subject who holds God-consciousness is completed to an absolutely greatest extent.¹²

Now, strictly speaking, we never comprehend the beginning of life. Thus, complete satisfaction is also afforded to the demand for complete historicity in this completely prototypical life, on the condition that he would have developed from that point on only in the same manner as all others do. As a result, from birth onward his strengths would gradually have unfolded and would have formed in their appearance from a null-point on to proficiencies in the order natural to humankind. This complete historicity would also then apply regarding his God-consciousness, which is principally in question here. That God-consciousness would indeed be just as little instilled in others as in him, first through upbringing,¹³ whenever it might occur. Yet, the seed of God-consciousness would already have lain in all human beings originally. This God-consciousness would first have had to develop in him too, however, as in everyone, gradually in a human fashion up to the consciousness that was actually appearing in him. Earlier it would have existed only as a seed, though in a certain sense always as a force of some efficacy. Hence, also during this time of development, ever since it would have become a matter of consciousness, it also can have itself exerted its authority14 over sensory self-consciousness, but only to the degree that various functions of sensory self-consciousness would already have arisen. Thus, even viewed from this aspect, in him God-consciousness would appear as something unfolding to its full extent only gradually.

Suppose that someone erroneously thinks that, on account of his prototypical character, one has to deny this account, and perhaps believes that one has to assume that the Redeemer had already borne God-consciousness, as such, within himself from the very beginning of his life. Then originally he would have to have posited himself as an “I” already. Indeed, it would be very easy to infer that originally, at least as regards the more abstract part of language, and before he spoke out loud, he would also have to have mastered language. Consequently, his entire early childhood would have to have been a mere pretense. In that case, no real human life could be imagined; rather, the docetic aberration would be fully confirmed. Then one would have to separate temporally everything wherein Christ was the same as all human beings from what was prototypical in him, thus to concede to that pretense of sameness the entire period of development up to the beginning of the very age of masculine maturity, and only then would have to let what was prototypical be added to it. At that point, however, a case cannot be made for what is prototypical without an absolute miracle. Indeed, at that point sin too would have been at least possible in him previously, and would thus also undoubtedly have been really present, even if as the tiniest element of his life. Moreover, Jesus would therefore be Redeemer and redeemed in one person, and this would also be true of whatever else would result from this situation.

However, the following would also belong to the pure historicity of the Redeemer’s person, that he could have developed only in a certain affinity with his surroundings, thus in the general culture of his people. That is to say, first, his sensibility and intellect¹⁵ would have been nourished only based on this world surrounding him. Second, even his free, self-initiated activity would have had its distinct locus only in that specific world. Third, thus his God-consciousness would have been able, as at first the higher power of his sensibility and intellect would nevertheless also have been, to express and communicate itself only in notions that it had appropriated for itself from this domain, also in actions that were predetermined in this same domain accordance with the possibility contained in those notions.16 If someone would want to deny this dependence of his development on those surroundings, then logically one would have to assume an empirical omniscience in Christ, by virtue of which all human ways of looking at things,¹⁷ hence languages too, would have been directly known to him and fluent in him. As a result, he would likewise also have lived in the genuine and proper way that is peculiar to each human being, just as he did among his own people, and one would also have to add this same omniscience in relation to all the various human conditions and how they are to be handled. The Redeemer’s true humanity, however, would also have been lost thereby.

4. In contrast, whatever the prototypical character of the Redeemer’s personal spiritual content brings with it would also have to be compatible with this purely human conception of his historical existence.

Thus, in the first place, his development would have to permit of being thought of as wholly free from everything that can present itself only as struggle. The reason is that when an inner struggle would have occurred at some time or other, the traces of it could not possibly disappear entirely, and no more than that could his prototypical character have been perceived where even the slightest traces of this struggle would have become evident. Accordingly, the might¹⁸ with which God-consciousness determined each element of his life, to whatever extent that God-consciousness would have developed in each instance, could never be hesitant or clouded by the memory of some earlier struggle. He could never even find himself in a condition through which a future struggle could be grounded. That is, there can have been no inconsistency in him, even at the outset, in the way the various functions of sensory human nature relate to God-consciousness. Thus, in every element of his life, even at each of his developmental stages, he would also have had to be free from everything whereby the emergence of sin is conditioned in any individual human being.¹⁹ At the same time, two situations would also very well be possible. First, all his powers,²⁰ the lower ones that are to be controlled as well as the higher ones that lead, would have come to the fore only gradually and progressively, in such a way that these higher powers could gain mastery over those lower ones only to the degree that they had developed. Second, the mastery itself would have been complete in every instant, in the sense that something could never be positioned in the organization of his senses that would not already have been positioned as an instrument of his spirit also,21 with the result that neither a sheer sensory impression—that is, an impression before it would be taken up into his innermost consciousness and without God-consciousness having been assimilated into any given element of his life—nor even an action—one that could really have been viewed as such and indeed could have been viewed as a complete action—would ever have originated from the organization of his senses alone and not from God-consciousness. Earlier²² we set forth a sinless development of an individual human life only as something possible. That life would have to have really occurred in the person of the Redeemer by virtue of that uninterrupted continuity of relations to which we have referred, in such a way that we can conceive the growth of his personal existence from his earliest childhood up to the completion of his masculine maturity as a steady transition out of the state of purest innocence into that of a fully developed strength²³ that is purely spiritual, a strength that is at a far remove from everything we call “virtue.”²⁴ That is, in the state of innocence there also exists an efficacious action of God-consciousness, but it is only indirect,²⁵ in that it arrests, though still latently, every movement in the organization of the senses that would necessarily lash out in opposition. The approximation to this state, which occurs not infrequently in our experience, we are accustomed to designate with the expression “a happy childlike nature.” The fully developed strength of the adult male, however, though also having grown gradually and thus also having arisen through practice, is distinguished from virtue by its not being the result of a struggle, in that it would not have needed to work its way through either error or sin, indeed, not even an inclination to either one. Moreover, this purity must not be viewed at all as a result of external protection; rather, it must be grounded in the Redeemer himself—that is, in the higher God-consciousness originally given in him as he was sent.²⁶ Otherwise, what was prototypical in him would be more produced in him than productive through him, since the external protection just mentioned nevertheless originates in the actions of others, and he himself would be not only the first among a totality of the redeemed but subsequently also the Redeemer himself.

Now, in the second place, as concerns the characteristics of his people that existed in his person: to be sure, Christ could hardly have been a complete human being if his personal existence had not been determined by characteristics of his people. However, this determination would in no way have affected the actual principle27 of his life but would have affected only its organism. The characteristics of his people would in no way be the typus²⁸ for his self-initiated activity but are only the typus for his receptivity to the self-initiated activity of spirit. The characteristics of his people also could not have been a forbidding or excluding principle in him; rather, they would simply have united with his most open and unclouded disposition toward everything else that is human and also with his recognition of the identity of nature and of spirit in all human forms—thus, also without any effort to enlarge the characteristics of his people beyond the boundaries assigned to them. Moreover, only by regarding the matter in this restricted way can one say that the characteristics of his people in him were also determined in a prototypical fashion both in themselves and also in their relation to the whole of human nature.

5. Here it can be only parenthetically pointed out in advance what influence the notion of this prototypical character of the Redeemer in the completely natural historical course of his life exercises on all Christian doctrines that have currency in the church, all of which would also have to be framed differently if one decided to start off more or less from that notion. This is so, for, first of all, two conditions are grounded only on his perfect prototypical character in everything connected with the strength of his God-consciousness: that all those doctrines and instructions which develop in the Christian church obtain a generally valid standing²⁹ only thereby, and that they are traced back to Christ. To the degree that these two conditions are set aside the possibility must also be conceded that there could be doctrines and prescriptions in the domain of piety that surpass the declarations of Christ. Likewise, preaching of the written word, insofar as it comprises only glorification30 of Christ, as well as the sacrament of the altar, can be viewed as eternal institutions in the Christian church only if it is presupposed that all development and maintenance of Christian piety must always proceed from community of life with Christ. Furthermore, Christ could not have been set forth as a general exemplar if he had not related to all original differences among individuals in the same manner. This exemplary action was possible only through his prototypical character, in that if it had been otherwise he really would have had to be more of an exemplar for some than for others. Just as little, however, could he have been a general exemplar if every element of his life had not been prototypical, for otherwise his prototypical character would first have had to be separated from what is not prototypical, which then could have occurred only in accordance with some alien law that would therefore have been superior to him. The same thing would enter in if the characteristics of his people in him had not been restricted, as his prototypical character requires, for then one would, nevertheless, have to be willing also to take up into what is normative for Christian life everything from his life that is exclusively Jewish. Now, these main points held by the Christian community are not perchance doctrines that are first given currency through later developments; rather, they exactly cohere with the original teachings of his disciples in the way in which they applied the idea of “the Messiah” to Jesus, and they are easily linked with utterances of his own that are still accessible to us as well.

1. Ed. note: urbildliche.

2. Urbildlich. Ed. note: Throughout, in all their forms, Urbild = prototype, Vorbild = exemplar.

3. Ed. note: In OG 84f. Schleiermacher also writes: “Christ is supernatural” and that Christ becomes natural, as the Holy Spirit also does in the church. These two themes underlie everything that follows in the present work, right through the Conclusion, where the “triune” God (vs. “Trinity”) is the subject.

4. In §91.

5. Manifestation.

6. Ed. note: The closest things to a rule earlier in the subsection seem to be “Every given state of this collective life must remain only an approximation to what is posited in the Redeemer himself, … his prototypical dignity,” and, in the first subsection, “The dignity of the Redeemer must be conceived in such a way that he is able to make [receptivity to his influence] happen.”

7. Gattungsbewußtsein.

8. Perfektibilität.

9. Evolution.

10. Ed. note: zur Wahrnehmung und Erfahrung. These are given as two marks of Jesus’ real appearance (Erscheinung) in history.

11. Cf. §13.1. Ed. note: The “analogies” are between miracle and revelation.

12. Ed. note: The phrase “to an absolutely greatest extent” translates als einem absolute größten, thus meaning to the maximum degree possible in natural circumstances.

13. Erziehung. Ed. note: This term refers to upbringing in general, referring first to child rearing, thence more particularly to more formal education.

14. Ansehn. Ed. note: At its root, this conventional word for “authority” includes the images of oversight and looking-down-at, from an elevated position. See also §93n9.

15. Sinn und Verstand.

16. Probably everyone knows this for its having been contained in the expression in Gal. 4:4 that Christ is “born under the law.” Ed. note: One of Schleiermacher’s earliest Christmas sermons was on this text: Dec. 25, 1790, in SW II.7 (1836), 54–64. Two sermon outlines on the text are also extant, from Dec. 26, 1795, and Dec. 26, 1802.

17. Vorstellungsweisen. Ed. note: Literally, all modes of forming notions.

18. Macht.

19. Cf. §§67–69.

20. Kräfte. Ed. note: This word carries built-in ambiguity. It could also refer to the “forces” active within him or to the “strengths” he had attained. Here “powers” seems to be the better choice, since the issue is about which ones would gain dominance.

21. Ed. note: In this clause, “the organization of his senses” is used for Sinnlichkeit (otherwise to be translated “sensibility”), and “spirit” is used for Geist.

22. §68.1.

23. Vollkräftigkeit.

24. Tugend. Ed. note: In Latin and English, “virtue” literally means “manly strength.” In Greek too, “virtue” (ἀρετή) means a force or strength. Hence, Schleiermacher’s philosophical ethics treats of virtue alongside duty and aiming toward the highest good. In his Christian ethics, however, he rejects using any of these categories, since it aims at strengths that are “purely spiritual,” which he here identifies as present in the Redeemer.

25. Ed. note: indirekte.

26. Ed. note: What is mitgegebenen (“given in him as he was sent”) is like a gift, bestowal, or dowry that goes with a traveler, emissary, or bride.

27. Prinzip. Ed. note: This word does not mean a moral or intellectual principle but refers to what decisively underlay and drove that for which he was sent and became in his very person.

28. Typus. Ed. note: This Latin word is derived from the Greek τύπος and also exists in both German and English. It is used in biology, mathematics, and printing, today usually represented by the spelling “type.” As used here, it appears to mean both the stamp of Christ’s distinctive being and his taking on the form of human existence that presages how it is to exist as it does, eventually transformed into being by “the new creation” through the impression (Eindruck) of Christ in his role as the Redeemer.

29. Ansehn. Ed. note: See also §93n14 above.

30. Verklärung. Ed. note: This word alludes to the story of Christ’s transfiguration, in which his disciples saw him in all his glory. In the New Testament and in Schleiermacher’s preaching, being transfigured and having glory or glorification (Verherrlichung) are closely associated. For example, see his sermon on Acts 6:15, July 22, 1810, first published in 1810, also in SW II.4 (1835), 14–22; (1844), 42–51.

§94. In accordance with this understanding, the Redeemer is the same as all human beings by virtue of the selfsame character of human nature, but he is distinguished from all other human beings by the steady strength of his God-consciousness, a strength that was an actual being of God in him.¹

1. Since it has already been established² that sin belongs so little to the very nature of human beings that we can never view it except as a disturbance of nature,³ to conceive that the Redeemer is entirely free of all sinfulness in no way interferes with the complete identity of human nature. From this it follows that the possibility of a sinless development is not, in and of itself, incompatible with the concept of human nature. Indeed, this possibility is included as something acknowledged in the consciousness of sin as fault, as it is generally understood. However, this uniformity of human nature is to be understood in such a general way that even the first human being before the first sin stood no nearer to the Redeemer than all others do, nor was this human being like him in some higher sense. This is the case, for even if we must accept a time in the life of the first human beings when no sin appeared, any initial appearance of it nonetheless traces back to a state preparatory to sin.4 Even the Redeemer, however, participated in the same uneven characteristics without which we could think only with difficulty of the emergence of sin in a distinct element of life even in Adam, because these uneven characteristics are intrinsic to human nature. What is more, the first human being was originally free from all contagious influences of a sinful social life. In contrast, the Redeemer had to enter into a collective life already in advanced deterioration, so that it would hardly be possible to ascribe his sinlessness to an external conserving factor of some kind, which, to be sure, one must concede in a certain sense regarding the first human being if one does not wish to become entangled in contradictions. Regarding the Redeemer, however, one must concede that he did not obtain the ground of his sinlessness from outside himself. Rather, it had to be something intrinsic to him, grounded in himself, if he were to overcome the sinfulness of the collective life through what he was. Therefore, as far as sin is concerned, Christ is then no less differentiated from the first human being than he is from all others.

The following also belongs to the sameness of human nature, however, that even the manner in which Christ is distinguished from all others has its locus in this sameness. This would not be the case if it did not form part of human nature that individuals are distinguished from each other in an original way with respect to the measure to which various functions exist in each one. This means that in every self-contained collective life, viewed both in space and in time, those who possess more and those who possess less of those various functions still belong together, and one arrives at the truth of such a collective life only when one relates persons, all of whom are distinguishable from one another, to each other in this way. In the same measure, therefore, those persons who in some connection characteristically define an age or locale belong together with those who are deficient in the same connection and over whom they extend their formative influences, just as Christ belongs together with those persons whom his preponderantly strong God-consciousness binds to the collective life designated by that consciousness.

Now, the more certain persons stand out over the rest and the more distinctive their efficacious action is, the more even they would have to have secured themselves against obstructive influences from negative environments. Moreover, they are to be understood only on the basis of this self-differentiating capacity of human nature5 and not on the basis of the circle in which they are situated. Nevertheless, by divine ordinance they do belong together with this human nature, just as the Redeemer belongs together with the entire species.⁶

2. By acknowledging, however, that even what is distinctive in the manner of the Redeemer’s efficacious action belongs to a general locus in human nature, we in no way wish to attribute this efficacious action and the personal dignity that provides the condition for this efficacious action to others to the same degree. This is already made clear by the fact that with faith in Christ a relation between Christ and all humankind is posited intrinsically, whereas in every case everything analogous is valid only with respect to specific individual times and places. The reason lies in the fact that no one has succeeded, nor will anyone ever succeed, in claiming recognition in any realm of knowing or of art as a generally enlivening leader adequate for all humankind.

The expression used in our proposition, however, is the only one suitable for this distinctive dignity of Christ, understood in the sense in which we have already traced the prototypical character of his person back to this spiritual function of God-consciousness that is coposited⁷ in self-consciousness, in that to attribute an absolutely strong⁸ God-consciousness to Christ and to ascribe to him a being of God in him are entirely one and the same thing. In every instance, the expression “a being of God in some other” can only express the relationship of God’s omnipresence to this other.

Now, it is a given that God’s being can be conceived only as pure activity,⁹ and every singular being is simply an intertwining of both activity and passivity. However, it is also a given that on each such being the active aspect is found to be apportioned to this passive aspect which is present in all other singular beings. Thus, to that extent, there is no being of God in any individual thing but only a being of God in the world. Moreover, only if passive states are not purely passive but are mediated through vital receptivity and only if this receptivity is placed over against finite being as a whole—that is, to the extent that one can say of individual being, viewed as something alive, that it represents10 the world in itself by virtue of its taking part in the world’s general interaction—could one assume a being of God in that individual being. Accordingly, this characteristic certainly is not valid for anything that is a singular being but is without consciousness, for in that this being does not present any vital receptivity, in contrast to all the strengths that inhere in consciousness, it also cannot represent these strengths in itself. Just as little, however, and for the same reason, what is indeed conscious but not intelligent¹¹ also cannot represent these strengths. As a result, a being of God can be granted to occur only in rational individuals.

Now, the extent to which this account might be correct—in the same way and without distinction, when we look at reason in the functioning of objective consciousness—lies outside our inquiry. With regard to rational self-consciousness, however, it is surely the case that whatever God-consciousness was originally present in human nature along with self-consciousness prior to the Redeemer and apart from all connection with him cannot properly be called a being of God in us. This would be the case not only because it was not a pure God-consciousness in polytheism nor even in Jewish monotheism, given their being tainted with materiality¹² throughout—albeit sometimes more crudely, sometimes more refinedly. It would also be the case because this God-consciousness, as it was, would not have made itself felt¹³ as something in response to activity but was always being overpowered by sensory self-consciousness.

Now, if this God-consciousness is neither able to portray God purely and with true accuracy in thought, nor even able to show God to be pure activity, then it cannot be presented as a being of God in us. Rather, just as natural strengths without consciousness and living things without reason can become a revelation of God for us only insofar as we convey the concept of God with that revelation, so too that clouded and incomplete God-consciousness is, in and of itself, no being of God in human nature; rather, it can be so only insofar as we convey Christ with it and relate it to him. As a result, Christ is deemed to be the sole and original locus for the being of God in human nature, and he alone is the “other” in whom there is an actual being of God—that is, he does so inasmuch as we posit God-consciousness in his self-consciousness as determining every element of his life steadily and exclusively. In consequence, he has this status inasmuch as we also posit this complete indwelling of Supreme Being as his distinctive nature and his innermost self.14

Indeed, thinking in reverse order, we must now simply say that if human God-consciousness first becomes a being of God in human nature only through him, and if the totality of finite powers can first become a being of God in the world only through rational nature, then in truth he alone mediates all being of God in the world and all revelation of God through the world, inasmuch as he bears the entire new creation, comprising and developing the full strength of God-consciousness in himself.

3. Now, if, as such a person, he is to have all of human development in common with us, however, with the result that this being of God would have to develop over time in him too and could have become manifest as the most spiritual¹⁵ aspect of his personal existence only later than the subordinate functions, then he certainly could not appear in life as one for whom sin would already have been established on the other side of his public appearance. Now, we ourselves have brought to consciousness this earlier established existence of sin for us all,¹⁶ without going so far as to get into investigations of natural science concerning the origin of individual life and the coming together, so to speak, of soul and body, but have simply stopped at the general facts of experience. Thus, here too we wish to place the relatively supernatural features, the role of which we have already acknowledged in general terms with respect to the Redeemer’s entrance into the world, only in connection with these general facts of experience.

Every emergence of a human life can be viewed in a twofold manner: as an event within the small circle of parentage and sociability, which it immediately inherits, and as a fact of human nature in general. The more definitely the weaknesses of that small circle are repeated in an individual, the more the first view has validity. The more the individual is raised above that circle by means of the form and degree of one’s gifts, and the more the individual brings forth something new within that circle, the more one is thrown back to the other explanation. Consequently, in accordance with his distinctive nature, the beginning of Jesus’ life is not to be defined by the first view at all but is to be defined exclusively by the second one. As a result, from the very beginning onward, he would have had to be free of every influence from earlier generations that would propagate sin and that would disturb his inner God-consciousness, and he is to be understood only as an original feat17 of human nature—that is, as a feat of human nature not affected by sin.

Now, the beginning of his life is deemed to have been, at the same time, a new implanting of God-consciousness, one that exhausted the capacity for receptivity in human nature. Thus, this content and that manner of emergence belong together in such a way that they mutually condition and define each other. Because that new implanting occurred through the very beginning of his life, this beginning had to have been raised above every detrimental influence of his closest circle. Moreover, because he was such an original and sinless feat of nature, through that feat of nature a saturation of his nature with God-consciousness could also result. As a result, this relationship too is most fully illuminated when we regard the beginning of Jesus’ life as the completed creation of human nature.

The appearance of the first human being constitutes, at the same time, the physical life of humankind; the appearance of the second Adam constitutes the new spiritual life for that same nature, which life is communicated and further unfolded through spiritual insemination.¹⁸ Moreover, just as in that spiritual life his originality, with which the appearance of his human nature was first given, and his having proceeded from divine creative activity are the same thing, so too the two features are also the same in the Redeemer: his spiritual originality, which has broken loose from every detrimental influence of natural inheritance, and that being of God in him which likewise shows itself to be creative in character. If the communication of spirit¹⁹ to human nature that occurred in the first Adam was insufficient, in that the human spirit remained engulfed in a sensory orientation and scarcely a single instant²⁰ of his life entirely looked forward as a presentiment of something better, and if the work of creation was first completed through the second, equally original, communication²¹ to the second Adam, then both elements nevertheless refer to one undivided eternal divine decree,22 and also, in a higher sense, they form only one and the same interconnectedness of nature,²³ even if the full grasp of that interconnectedness is unattainable for us.

1. Ed. note: The phrase is ein eigentliches Sein Gottes in ihm. See §94n7 below.

2. §68 above.

3. Ed. note: Wesen (“very nature” of human beings) is followed by “disturbance of nature” (Natur).

4. Cf. §72.

5. Cf. §13.

6. Geschlecht. Ed. note: Or “the entire human race,” “humankind.”

7. Ed. note: mitgesetzt. That is, God-consciousness is taken to be something that can be present in and with self-consciousness as a natural function, even though it is, as in this one case, made complete, perfect, by God’s creative, supernatural intervention.

8. Ed. note: Here the words are schlechthin kräftiges.

9. Ed. note: rein Tätigkeit. That is, in the world, God’s being (Sein) is conceivable not as either passive or receptive but only as it is active (Seiendes, be-ing) and is thus received by one acted upon by God, hence the explanation that follows. God is always both Sein and Seiendes.

10. Ed. note: repräsentiert. That is, it re-presents some feature or factor that would be present everywhere in the interchanges that make up what Schleiermacher frequently calls “the interconnectedness of nature” (Naturzusammenhang) elsewhere in the present work.

11. Intelligente.

12. Versinnlichung. Ed. note: That is, emphasis was placed on “sensory self-consciousness” (just below: sinnlichen Selbstbewusstsein), to which the countering emphasis would be “spirituality” (Geistigkeit) or, more fully, “religious [frommen] self-consciousness.”

13. Ed. note: sich geltend machte. Or “been registered as having any currency,” in their experience.

14. Ed. note: Cf. the statement at this place in the first edition (KGA I/7.2, 29): “God was in him [the Redeemer] in the highest sense in which God can ever be in anyone” (dass Gott in ihm war in dem höchsten Sinne, in welchem überall Gott in Einem sein kann). At this place in this second edition, Schleiermacher clarifies the point that no one else actually reaches the same level of God-consciousness that is to be seen in Christ. A logical corollary would be that no one has to reach that same level to be considered as among the redeemed.

15. Geistigste.

16. Cf. §69.

17. Tat. Ed. note: Just above, the word used was “fact” (Tatsache).

18. Befruchtung. Ed. note: That is, in the “spiritual” (geistige) aspect of his life it is the counterpart, metaphorically expressed in biblical language, of the ordinary physical process of “making fruitful” through sexual intercourse.

19. Geist. Ed. note: In German der Geist can have any one of the following meanings: spirit, Holy Spirit, mind, and intellect. Typically, Schleiermacher uses der heilige Geist when he specifies the Holy Spirit and uses der gottliche Geist for “the divine Spirit” overall.

20. Ed. note: The expression is kaum auf Augenblicke.

21. Mitteilung. Ed. note: Throughout this work, this term is translated “communication,” for the process to which it refers here is always the same. Accordingly, the sense of a mere “impartation,” which bears the likely implication of a merely passive reception, would seem misleading.

22. Ed. note: On this one decree, see §109.3, also §§90.2, 117.4, 120.4, and 164.2.

23. Naturzusammenhang. Ed. note: See esp. §§46–47, also §14.P.S. and index.

§95. Ecclesial formulations regarding the person of Christ require an ongoing critical treatment.

1. Ecclesial doctrines are, on the one hand, products of conflict, in that even if the original consciousness was the same in everyone, the thought that expresses it would nevertheless have been differently formed within different persons. In each case, in order to present something new one person would have drawn upon some particular notion already given and another person would have drawn upon some other notion already given. In this way, features or presuppositions, in part Jewish and in part Gentile, can have slipped in, even unconsciously, and they can have called forth opposing views that were intended to be correctives. However, even the further development of original formulations would, in part, have taken the same course, in order to prevent misunderstandings that could emerge from rhetoricizing or poeticizing expressions in doctrinal usage of language,¹ and, in part, the development of these formulations would have continued to wrap itself up in an inquisitiveness that was later on brought to its highest peak in scholasticism, which, in a total failure to appreciate genuine dogmatic interest, brought up difficult questions solely for the purpose of defining concepts. By these means, these ecclesial doctrines had to end up being overladen with a mass of qualifications that stand in no relationship whatsoever to immediate Christian self-consciousness, except as traces of this mode of consciousness can be demonstrated through the history of doctrinal conflict. Based on this historical ascertainment,² an aversion to everything that has originated out of conflict then developed among those who in such aversion want to grant currency only to expressions that not only lie beyond all conflict but also want, where possible, to cut off all prospective conflict in advance. This aversion, moreover, also stands most rigorously in opposition to the tendency of others who want to hold fast to tradition, however it might have come into existence. As a result, neither settlement nor forward progress is possible without a sifting and mediating procedure.

2. Now, in relation to these two opposing parties it would be difficult to set forth any other canon3 for use of this indispensable critical procedure than the following two. The canon that applies to the one party⁴ is that, despite all its efforts, in reality its procedure no longer holds but has simply fallen victim to history, because a different situation to which it once exclusively referred has changed and is no longer present and thus it can also bear no further efficacy. In contrast, the canon that applies to the other party is that if one resorts to formulations that are quite simple but that are, precisely on that account, too indefinite to serve within the domain of didactic discourse, one achieves only a seeming satisfaction, and this satisfaction lasts only so long as the discord that had remained riddled under a given formulation’s identity breaks through at some point.

In contrast, the task of the present procedure consists in holding propositions of ecclesial doctrine to the standard provided by the above analysis⁵ of our Christian self-consciousness. This is done, in part, so as to assess the extent to which it accords, at least in all essentials, with that self-consciousness. In part, as concerns the details, it is done so as to investigate what among customary modes of expression is to be retained and, on the other hand, what would be better to give up, whether in that it is an incomplete fulfillment of the task or in that it is dispensable in and of itself but a harmful appendage by its occasioning continual misunderstandings.

1. Ed. note: See §§15–18, 28, and 61 on dogmatic language in contrast to these two kinds.

2. Wahrnehmung. Ed. note: This is an unusual but proper use of the word in Schleiermacher’s discourse. It is unusual, for it almost always means “sense impression” for him. It is proper, however, for in this context it stands for a sheer historical discernment, one that is not so much thought out as merely observed, hence “ascertainment.”

3. Kanon. Ed. note: That is, a basic rule.

4. Ed. note: Presumably, the temporal order is reversed, though both rules could apply to each of the two parties.

5. Analyse. Ed. note: The parameters for such analysis were set up in the Introduction but are carried out in fact only in the presentations of doctrine to follow. Even the analyses provided in Part One are found to be but presupposed in Part One, and the preceding analysis of sin itself arises out of an understanding of what is analyzed regarding grace. The Introduction alone makes clear that the analysis is to be thoroughly historical, encompassing psychological, social, and specifically spatial-temporal components. The latter includes authoritative original and later factors, up to and including current situations in and between churches, especially within the Evangelical church.

§96. First Doctrinal Proposition: In Jesus Christ divine nature and human nature were joined in one person.

(1) Augsburg Confession (1530): “… that the two natures, the divine and the human, are so inseparably united in one person that there is one Christ.”¹

(2) Anglican Articles of Religion (1571) II: “… so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say the Godhead and manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, etc.”2

(3) Second Helvetic Confession (1566) XI: “We therefore acknowledge two natures or substances, the divine and the human, in one and the same Jesus Christ our Lord. … And we say that these are bound and united … or joined together in one person. … Thus we worship not two but one Christ the Lord. … With respect to his divine nature he is consubstantial with the Father and with respect to the human nature he is consubstantial with us men.”³

(4) Gallican Confession (1559) XV: “We believe that in one person, that is, Jesus Christ, the two natures are actually and inseparably joined and united.”⁴

(5) First Helvetic Confession (1536) XI: “This Christ, … taking on true human nature in its entirety, body and soul, has two distinct, unmixed natures in one person and … has become our brother.”⁵

(6) Solid Declaration (in Formula of Concord 1577) VIII: “We believe … that there are now, in this one, inseparable person of Christ two distinct natures, the divine, from eternity, and the human, which was assumed into the union of the person of God’s Son in time.”⁶

(7) Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed (325, 381): “Jesus Christ, … begotten of the Father before all ages … true God … for us … came down … and was incarnate.”⁷

(8) Symbolum Quicunque Vult (= so-called Athanasian Creed, after late 4th cent.): “… our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is at once God … begotten from the substance of the Father before all ages and … of his mother in this age.”8

1. Although what this presentation of the distinctive personal existence of the Redeemer intends is indicated, at the same time, in only a few of the creedal passages cited here, it is nevertheless unmistakable that the orientation is the same as in the propositions set forth here up to now. That is, the point is to describe Christ as brother, consubstantial with us⁹ in such a way that in the new collective life a community of life is possible between ourselves and him but, at the same time, also that the being of God in him would be expressed in the clearest way. From this orientation it already follows that the most unqualified respect and intimate company¹⁰ in our relationship to him are formed into one. However much we assent to this depiction, there is, on the other hand, almost nothing in the execution of it against which no protest would have to be lodged, whether we are inclined to look at the scientific quality of the expression or at its suitability for the church’s use.

Now, to begin with what concerns scientific quality: first of all, we must beware of a very entangled designation of the individual subject¹¹ whenever the expression “Jesus Christ” is used not only to denote the subject of the union of the two natures, whereat the first four passages cited rightly stop, but also to describe the divine nature of the Redeemer from all eternity, before its union with the human nature, with the result that this union no longer appears at all as one element co-constituting the person Jesus Christ but already appears instead as an action of this person himself. This confusing admixture was transferred most glaringly from the two ancient creedal passages cited here into the Helvetic Confession.¹²

In contrast, the New Testament writings are not familiar with this usage at all. Indeed, the New Testament, where it speaks independently, employs even the expression “Son of God” only for the subject of this union¹³ and not for the divine therein before the union. On this account, our proposition has also adhered to correct usage.

To be sure, the expression “Jesus Christ” was itself fused into a single proper name, though very early on nevertheless, at first only through misuse, since, strictly speaking, “Christ” is only a designation for the distinctive dignity that is appended to the proper name. Yet, in this fusion what is historical and what is prototypical in this person are nevertheless unmistakably intended to be combined.

However, far worse still than this unsteady designation of this individual subject is this, and it cannot survive a more rigorous scientific judgment at all: that the expression “nature” is used commensurately14 for what is divine and what is human. Doubtless every other expression that would be employed with the same meaning for both of these natures would raise the suspicion that such a formulation would have to become the source of many confused admixtures. That is to say, how can the divine and the human be brought together under any concept in such a way that the two features named could be mutually coordinated and more exact determinations made of one and the same general category? For example, even divine spirit and human spirit could not be combined in this way without confusion. The word “nature” is especially ill suited for such a combined usage, however, even if one entirely sets aside Latin and Greek etymology and simply sticks with our manner of using it. The reason is that in one sense we posit God and nature¹⁵ as directly over against each other, and thus we cannot attribute a “nature” to God in the same sense. In this sense, nature is for us the aggregate of all finite existence, or, as we contrast nature with history, it is the aggregate of everything that is bodily, going back to what is rudimentary in its diversely divided appearance, in which everything that we designate thereby is mutually conditioned by each other. Moreover, precisely what is divided and conditioned we contrast with God, viewing God to be unconditioned and absolutely simple.¹⁶ Precisely for this reason, however, we also cannot attribute a nature to God in the other sense at all. That is to say, if we intend then to use “nature” in a general way, as in animal or vegetable nature, or for an individual entity, as when we ascribe a noble or an ignoble nature to a person, we always use it only of some restricted being, which is engaged in some contrast. In this restricted being the active and the passive are combined and this being is disclosed in a multiplicity of occurrences, at one point regarding individual entities, at another point regarding elements of life. In this way, moreover, with more exact deliberation it would be difficult to deny that this expression, where one traces it back to the original Greek word,17 bears in itself the traces of an influence from heathen notions, even if it were an unconscious influence. For example, in polytheism—which envisages deity just as cleft and divided as finite existence displays to us, the term “nature”¹⁸ certainly has the same meaning in the expression “divine nature” as one in which it is also used elsewhere. One should have been warned all the more thereby in noticing that heathen sages themselves already rose above this incomplete notion and said of God that God is to be placed above all being and nature.¹⁹

Moreover, it fares no better with the relationship between nature and person that is set forth here, for in complete contradiction to other usage, according to which the same nature is characteristic of many individuals or persons, here one person is to participate in two entirely different natures. Now, the claim is that “person” actually denotes a stable unity of life and that “nature” denotes an aggregate of modes of conduct or a body of laws according to which life circumstances not only change but are also contained within a distinct course of life. How, then, is the unity of a person’s life to endure with the duality of natures without the one yielding to the other when the one offers a larger and the other a narrower course of life, or, without the two natures blending into each other, in that the two systems of law and conduct actually become one in the one life? How is that to happen when one person—that is, an “I”—which is the same in all one’s successive elements over time, is at issue? Hence, even with the attempt to make this unity intelligible with that duality, rarely does anything come of this, other than one’s showing the possibility of a formulation that comprises a juxtaposition of indicators from which, however, one can in no way construe one figure.²⁰ On the other hand, not infrequently the same author, immediately upon avoiding this formulation regarding two natures, does say something that one can follow and that can be copied.²¹

So, whenever an attempt was bound to this expression, all results of the effort to attempt a true-to-life presentation of the unity of the divine and human in Christ have always wavered between opposing mistaken paths. The one path would fuse the two natures into a third that would be neither of the two, would be neither divine nor human. The other path would keep the two natures distinct. On the one hand, it would diminish the unity of the person in order to separate the two natures all the more distinctly. On the other hand, in order to hold to the unity of the person quite firmly, it would prefer to disturb the necessary balance and slight one nature in favor of the other, thereby limiting the one nature by the other. This second path is already apparent in people’s wavering between the expressions “to combine” and “to unite,”22 of which “to unite” inherently contains an inclination to blur the dissimilarity of the two natures, whereas “to combine” makes the unity of the person doubtful.

The total fruitlessness of this mode of presentation is especially conspicuous in treatment of the question as to whether Christ, the one person in two natures, would also have two wills in conformity with the number of natures or only one will in conformity with the number of the person. That is to say, if Christ has only one will, then his divine nature is incomplete if this will is human, and his human nature is incomplete if this will is divine. However, if Christ has two wills, then the unity of the person is really always simply fictitious, even if one intends to protect that unity by Christ’s always willing the same thing with both wills. This is the case, for only agreement, not unity, arises thereby, and, in fact, by this answer one returns to splitting Christ in two. Moreover, if either one of the two wills were merely to accompany the other, it would always remain simply superfluous, no matter whether the divine will is supposed to accompany the human or vice versa.

It is patent, however, that since we are nevertheless accustomed to place understanding and will together, one can also raise the same question in relation to understanding, since everything just said repeats itself here. This can be seen, in that each nature is incomplete without the understanding that belongs to it, and a unity of the person no more exists with a twofold understanding than one does with a twofold will. Moreover, it is just as unthinkable that divine understanding, which, viewed as omniscient, directed to everything all together, would think the same thing as a human understanding would think, which latter comparatively knows any one particular only in accordance with some other particular and based on some other particular. It is also equally unthinkable that a human will, which always strives only for some particular and for one particular for the sake of other particulars, would will the same as a divine will, the object of which is simply the entire world in the totality of its development.

Finally, the following also belongs to the scientific completeness of dogmatic expression: that it must be possible to comprehend related doctrines easily in their relation to each other. Thus, our customary formulation will prove to have little to recommend it in the way in which it is placed alongside the formulations used in the doctrine of the triune God.23 There the expression “unity of nature within the threeness of persons” has been avoided and “unity of being”²⁴ has been substituted. Yet, however much that is to be commended because the expression “being”²⁵ is, nevertheless, far better suited for the deity than the expression “nature,”²⁶ the question inescapably intrudes as to how that in Christ which we call his divine “nature” relates to that “unity of being” which all three “persons” have together, also as to whether each of the three persons also has a “nature” of its own apart from their participation in the divine being or whether this is something distinctive to the second person. Yet, we find a satisfactory answer to this question neither here nor in the doctrine of the triune God.²⁷

The matter becomes still more entangled, however, through the other use of the word “person” introduced into the doctrine of the triunity throughout the activity of Western dogmatics, according to which we then maintain in the one place three persons in one being and in the other place one person out of two natures. Now, suppose that one takes the clarifications that are customarily given in the doctrine of Christ concerning the word “person” across into the doctrine of the triunity as well—and there is occasion enough to do that if it is said, nevertheless, that not only would Christ first have become one person through union of the two natures, but also that the Son of God would simply have taken up the human nature into his person. Then the three persons would have to subsist and be present independently in and of themselves. Suppose, moreover, that, given those suppositions, each person is also taken to be a nature.²⁸ Then we come almost unavoidably to three divine natures for the three divine persons in the one divine being. On the other hand, if the same word, “person,” is to denote something different in the one doctrine than in the other, with the result that in the person of Christ yet a different person is posited in another sense of the word, the entanglement would be no less great.

2. It lies in the nature of the matter that after this formulation had once gained currency as a foundation for all other determinations29 concerning the person of Christ, a complicated and artificial procedure had to be introduced in order to apply these indefensible expressions with as little error as possible. Moreover, it could also scarcely occur otherwise than that because this foundation itself embodies an apparent contradiction, the entire development could not be anything but a justification in response to this reproof, given in a series of expressions in the negative. These expressions no more state and reproduce the real content of one’s immediate impression than they are also able to embody a knowledge of Christ under the form of perception, thus of objective consciousness.³⁰ For us, however, “knowledge” would be less of a recommendation for these expressions than it would be for others.

Accordingly, we can also assess the value of this theory for use of the church as only very negligible. It cannot give guidance for the correct preaching of Christ, since it is executed only in a negative fashion. Rather, at most it could serve in the domain of language usage in homiletics as a test for whether or not features are found in the glorification or in the depiction³¹ of Christ that overstep the boundaries drawn. Even in this regard, however, the determinations of the schools have already long since become a dead letter, to which no one can take recourse any more. This is so, for ascetic³² language—even of the most orthodox teachers, insofar as they are not only satisfied to transmit a traditional letter but seek edification and strengthening in living faith—is so remote from scholastic terminology that workable middle terms between the two would scarcely be found. This development appears just as unfruitful if one looks at the divergent opinions that are current among us: some of them are docetic, in that they identify the Redeemer so closely with God that the truth of his human aspect cannot persist alongside them; some of them are ebionitic, in that they leave no substantial difference between Christ and some excellent human being. That is to say, in both respects these divergent opinions are thoroughly unsuitable to use for finding the boundaries between what is Christian but appears to be unchristian, either as a result of its own awkwardness or as a result of hostile misrepresentation, and between what is no longer Christian because it is simply naturalistic or fanatical.

3. In addition to this consideration, it also happens that the only thing that occurred in the original form of an Evangelical body of doctrine for this article of faith was a repetition of the older formulations. This is so, for if the question had been taken up afresh by one side right away within the disputes that arose between the two Evangelical parties, even so this effort could neither have led to a new exhaustive study, because the matter would have come up only at some other point of disagreement, nor would what would have been settled on that occasion even have achieved creedal standing within the entire area covered by the Augsburg Confession. Hence, if faith-doctrine is increasingly to be purifying itself of scholasticism, the task arises of organizing a scientific expression for this doctrine too, one in which the impression that we have obtained regarding the distinctive dignity of the Redeemer from testimonies about him is reflected in more than formulations that are in a negative form. Moreover, at the same time, the expression, at the very least in that same relationship which enters into other dogmatic determinations, would be brought closer to what can be present in religious communications concerning Christ to Christian communities.

Now, above33 we hope to have laid down the ground for a treatment that seeks to denote the interrelation of what was divine and what was human in the Redeemer in such a way that the two expressions—most troublesome, to put it mildly—namely, “divine nature” and “duality of natures in the same person,” are avoided entirely. We may hope this, for suppose that the difference between the Redeemer and us is established in such a way that, instead of our clouded and weak God-consciousness, in him there was an absolutely clear God-consciousness, one that was exclusively determining every element of his life, hence one that must be regarded to be a steady living presence, consequently to be a true being of God in him. Then, by virtue of this difference, everything that we lack exists in him, and also, by virtue of his likeness with us, a likeness limited only by his absolute sinlessness, everything is such that we are able to grasp it. That is, the being of God in the Redeemer is posited as his innermost primary strength, from which all his activity proceeds and which links all the elements of his life together. However, everything human simply forms the organism for this primary strength and relates itself to that strength as its system both for taking this strength in and for presenting it, just as in us all other strengths have to relate to our intelligence.34 Thus, if this expression departs greatly from the former scholastic language, nonetheless it rests in equal measure on the Pauline expression “God was in Christ” and on the Johannine expression “The Word became flesh,” for “word” is the activity of God expressed in the form of consciousness and “flesh” is the general designation for what is organic.

Now, to the extent that all human activity of the Redeemer in its every connection depends on this being of God in him and presents it, the expression that God became human in the Redeemer is justified since the expression befits him exclusively. Likewise, every element of his existence,³⁵ to the extent that one can isolate it, presents this new God-becoming-human and God-having-become-human, because always and everywhere all that is human in him came from what is divine. Moreover, one could scarcely wish to prove that there is something docetic or ebionitic in this description too. Rather, only someone who believes, as it were, that one has to insist on an empirical emergence of divine attributes in the Redeemer if one is to acknowledge something in him that is more than human could want to call the above description ebionitic. Further, only the claim that there is no imperfection of God-consciousness in the Redeemer could someone find to be docetic. However, neither attempt would find any support, even in the literal statements³⁶ of ecclesial doctrine that have currency. Hence, in the ecclesial propositions that follow, our assessment will refer to the preliminary statement expressed in the present proposition. The purpose of this procedure is to show successively the extent to which the intent of these propositions agrees with what is set forth in that formulation and the extent to which the unsuitability and difficulty of such ecclesial formulations as this one has, in part, thwarted the possibility that their elaboration could not correspond with their aim throughout and has, in part, also opened an arena for futile hairsplitting.

1. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 38; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 53.

2. Ed. note: The quote is from the 1562 Latin edition. ET Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 488. See §37n5. Here Schleiermacher notes that for the Reformed confessional writings he was using Johann Christian Wilhelm Augusti (1771–1841), Corpus librorum symbolicorum (1827), and its corresponding page numbers. Later volumes by other editors are used here.

3. Ed. note: ET Cochrane (1972), 243f.; Latin only: Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 255. Cf. note at §37n3.

4. Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 368, also Cochrane (1972), 149; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 335.

5. Ed. note: ET Tice, drawn from the original German and Latin versions in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 216; cf. Cochrane (1972), 103.

6. Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 617; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 1019.

7. Ed. note: Schleiermacher cites the original Greek; ET cf. Book of Concord (2000), 22f. (from the Greek); Greek: Schwartz, Acta conciliorum oekumenicorum 2.1.2 (1922), 80; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 26.

8. Ed. note: ET cf. Book of Concord (2000), 24; Latin and German: Bek. Luth. (1963), 29. Schleiermacher quotes the original Latin.

9. Ed. note: These words translate frater, consubstantialis nobis.

10. Ed. note: Here “intimate company” stands for brüderliche Genossenschaft, an intimacy of brethren, both brothers and sisters, reminiscent, in Schleiermacher’s experience, of the Herrnhuter Brethren among whom he had lived as a youth.

11. Subjekt.

12. The Belgic Confession (1561) in 10 also gets itself involved in the same confusion: “It must follow that he—who is called God, the Word, the Son, and Jesus Christ—did exist at that time when all things were created by him.” Ed. note: ET and French in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 394; Latin: Niemeyer (1840), 366.

13. Probably no one would want to cite John 1:18 or 17:5 as evidence against this claim. Ed. note: See OR (1821) V, supplemental note 14, regarding his view of the Gospel according to John and its “Son of God” ascription to Jesus. For his use of “Son of God” in CF, see §§99.1, 99.P.S., 124.1, 128.1, and 172.3.

14. Ed. note: The plurivocal term gleichmäßig is used here, in this instance meaning that each of the two so-called natures bears exactly the same weight, as if the same term could do for each one.

15. Natur.

16. Unbedingten und schlechthin Einfachen.

17. ϕύσις. Only one piece of Scripture is implicated in this flaw, and this is but a deuterocanonical piece, 2 Pet. 1:4, where the expression Θέιɑς ϕύσεως κοινωνόι (“became partakers of the divine nature”) is present. However, the immediate context already shows that it cannot be taken so strictly as has to be required here, where a principal dogmatic determination is involved.

18. Natur.

19. Sein und Wesen. Ed. note: That is, even as might be seen in writings attributed to Aristotle (384–322 BCE).

20. Figur.

21. One may simply compare John of Damascus (ca. 675–ca. 749), The Orthodox Faith (743–) 3.9: “It is unnecessary for natures hypostatically united to each other to be provided each with its own subsistence. For they can concur in one subsistence without being nonsubsistent, yet not having each its own individuating subsistence but both being one and the same.” And 3.2: “He became hypostatically united to the … animated flesh which he had.” Ed. note: ET Fathers of the Church 37 (1958), 286, 270f.; Greek: Migne Gr. 94:1017, 988.

22. Ed. note: The two verbs are verknüpfen und vereinigen.

23. Dreieinigkeit. Ed. note: When Schleiermacher refers to the classic doctrine, he simply uses the familiar term Trinität (e.g., in §170), which literally means “threeness” (Dreiheit). The subject of the concluding propositions (§§170–72) is the problem of the Dreieinigkeit (literally, “the three-in-oneness”).

24. Einheit des Wesens. Ed. note: “being,” but presumably not strictly in the sense conveyed by Sein (also to be translated “being”). God is taken by Schleiermacher and others to be “Supreme Being” (höchste Wesen).

25. Wesen.

26. Natur.

27. Dreieinigkeitslehre.

28. These formulations are taken from Reinhard’s Dogmatik (1818) §92, 347. Redeker note: Page 347 reads: “Each person is one nature, but each nature is not one person, because it is possible for there to be one nature that does not exist alone and in and of itself but in its subsistence depends on some other. So, we assert that the two natures that are found to exist in Christ constitute but one singular person that exists in and of itself, and thus his human nature does not exist in and of itself but in its subsistence is bound to the divine nature” [ET Tice].

29. Bestimmungen. Ed. note: This word doubles for “definitions” as well.

30. Der Form der Anschauung, also des objektiven Bewusstseins. Ed. note: This usage of Anschauung, preceded by Erkenntnis (“knowledge”) and modified by objecktiven Bewusstseins, makes it clear that Schleiermacher is using Anschauung in the philosophical sense of “perception” rather than as referring to “intuition.” Schleiermacher is very consistent in his use of technical terms. Thus, based on this instance—and many other like instances—it is reasonable to anticipate that “perception” is his meaning for Anschauung throughout Christian Faith.

31. Veranschaulichung. Ed. note: That is, making clear the figurative actions and words of Christ, also making the hearers’ visualization and registering of them possible—in short, making them perceptible.

32. Ed. note: Ordinarily, asketische Sprache stands for “devotional language,” as here, but that too can become remote from a living faith (cf. §87.2).

33. See §94.

34. This is exactly how the Symbolum Quicunque vult (= the so-called Athanasian Creed, after late 4th cent.) has it, on line 35: “For, as the rational soul and the flesh are one human being, so God and the human being are one in Christ.” Ed. note: ET Book of Concord (2000), 25; Latin and German in Creeds, vol. 3 (1919), 30. Intelligenz is the term, above translated by “intelligence,” used in this creed for “rational soul.”

35. Dasein.

36. Buchstaben.