Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being

EDITORIAL PREFACE

IN 1704, Gottlieb Stolle, later to become professor of political science at Jena, visited Holland. His travel diary contains the following account of an interview with Jan Rieuwertsz the Younger, the son of Spinoza’s friend and publisher:

After this he brought out another manuscript, which his father had also transcribed, but in this case, from Spinoza’s own hand. This was the Ethics, i.e., a Dutch Ethics, as Spinoza originally composed it. This Ethics was organized quite differently from the printed one. For whereas in the latter everything is worked out by the more difficult mathematical method, in this everything was divided into chapters and argued in a continuous succession (without the artificial proof of each point), as in the Theological-Political Treatise.

Rieuwertsz assured me also that the printed Ethics was much better worked out than this manuscript, but he acknowledged that it contained various things not in the printed version. In particular he pointed out a chapter on the Devil, which was Chapter XXI, and which is not in the printed Ethics. In this Spinoza treated the question “Whether the Devil exists?” and began by examining the definition that the Devil is a spirit contrary to the divine essence, and having its essence through itself. In this sense he seemed to deny the Devil’s existence.

According to Rieuwertsz, some friends of Spinoza had copied this manuscript, but it had never been printed, because there was already in print a fine edition of the more orderly Latin version, whereas the work which had been overlooked was written far too freely.1

This is our first definite2 indication of the existence of the Short Treatise, a work that had to wait for another century and a half before the rediscovery of two manuscript versions permitted its publication.

The work which thus made its entry into the Spinozistic corpus is a scholar’s delight, but it is hard to believe that anyone as familiar with its problems as Wolf could ever have recommended it as suited to be an introduction to Spinoza’s philosophy. True, it contains expositions of many central themes of Spinoza’s thought in a shorter and less demanding form than does the Ethics. But the work bristles with difficulties.3

First of all, it is clear that neither of the manuscripts that form the basis for modern editions is Spinoza’s own manuscript. At best they are copies of lost manuscripts, and each of them seems to contain a number of copyist’s errors. Quite possibly our best manuscript is only a copy of a copy (cf. Mignini 1, 235), though it is probably not far from the original.

Secondly, it is also clear that these manuscripts are copies of a work Spinoza himself never fully prepared for publication, a work in progress which was intended in the first instance only for private circulation among friends interested in studying Spinoza’s philosophy.4 So, for example, there are inconsistencies, repetitions, and expressions of uncertainty about whether particular topics would be treated later, some of which surely would have been emended if Spinoza had given the work a final revision for publication.

Again, written in the margins of the older, and probably more authentic of the manuscripts, are many notes, whose authorship and relation to the text are often obscure. Some must certainly come from Spinoza himself; others must certainly not; but the origin of many others is a matter of speculation,5 and there is the further possibility that some reader’s notes have, in the process of copying, inadvertently been brought into the text. In addition, some of the longer notes may be intended to replace sections of the text, and some passages of the text may be superseded versions which have inadvertently been retained. Some editors ascribe these hypothetical retentions, some apparent illogicalities in the ordering of materials, and even the chapter divisions, to the editorial work of a zealous, but not very acute, disciple.

As if these were not difficulties enough, there is doubt whether Spinoza wrote this work in Dutch or in Latin. Stolle’s travel diary describes it as written in Dutch. But the subtitle says it was originally written in Latin, for Spinoza’s pupils, and then translated into Dutch, for a wider audience. The first of these witnesses is not entirely reliable, but the authority of the second is unclear.

Gebhardt, in company with nearly every other scholar who has considered the question, regarded the work as a translation of a lost Latin original, principally on the ground that there are many apparent mistakes in the text which can best be explained as translation errors. But recently his arguments have been challenged by Boehm, who has established at least that Gebhardt’s conclusion is less certain than he took it to be. It is extremely difficult, of course, to demonstrate that any particular passage is corrupt, and doubly difficult to demonstrate that the error can only be set right by assuming a Latin original that has been mistranslated (though this is what Gebhardt sometimes claims). Nevertheless, I think Gebhardt is probably right to postulate a lost Latin original, even if his arguments for this hypothesis are unsatisfactory.6

If we do assume that our work is a copy of a translation of a lost original, we add to the possible sources of textual error, and increase the uncertainty of an already uncertain text. But this question is primarily of interest to the textual critic. However it is decided, the translator must think of the technical terms as if they were translations of Latin terms. At the time when the Short Treatise was written, Latin was still the main language of philosophical discussion. Most of Spinoza’s other works, like most of Descartes’ and Hobbes’, were first written in Latin and then translated into the vernacular. The vernacular languages were like Latin itself before Cicero. They lacked a well-established philosophical vocabulary. Glazemaker’s useful practice of indicating the Latin terms in the margins of his Dutch translations of Descartes and Spinoza was a step toward the creation of such a vocabulary. But the process was incomplete when the Short Treatise was translated, and the treatment of technical terms there is not as firm as in other contemporary Dutch translations of Spinoza’s works.

A further difficulty that hampers the study of the Short Treatise is the uncertainty about the relationship between the two manuscripts. It is clear that one of them (called “codex A” by Schaarschmidt) dates from the seventeenth century, is older than the other (called “codex B” by Schaarschmidt), and was at least a partial source for the later manuscript. It is also clear, however, that “codex B” sometimes has a better reading than “codex A.” The question is whether the transcriber of “codex B,” an eighteenth-century Dutch doctor named Monnikhoff, had access to another source, which enabled him to correct some of the defects of “A.”

The first editor to consider this issue, Schaarschmidt, did not think highly of Monnikhoff s corrections and took them to have no value for the establishment of the text. Sigwart thought better of them and inferred that Monnikhoff also had access to another, hypothetical manuscript, called “C.” Wolf shared this view and consequently incorporated a great deal of information about “codex B” in his translation. Gebhardt’s position is that while many of Monnikhoff s corrections are justified, others are not, and that Monnikhoff relied only on his own good judgment in making them. So what was formerly called “codex A” Gebhardt refers to simply as “the manuscript” and what was formerly called “codex B” he treats as an attempt at a critical edition, deserving the respect due any intelligent exercise in textual criticism, but not possessing any special authority. Mignini has accepted this view (Mignini 1, 226) and my translation, like that in the Pléiade edition, assumes that it is correct.

Finally, to put an end to the listing of problems, it is generally thought that the work contains various strata, dating from different periods. The notes, for example, were probably written later than the main text. It seems to have been Spinoza’s habit to go back over works he had previously written and to make marginal notes, amplifying, correcting, and flagging topics for further discussion. Similarly, the appendices seem to be a later addition. The dialogues have sometimes been thought to be earlier than the main text, and theories of Spinoza’s development have been constructed on that assumption,7 though the more usual view now would be that both dialogues are later than the main body of the text.

At this stage there appear to be two main theories of the composition of this work. According to Gebhardt (I/424-431), Spinoza originally dictated a work on these topics in Dutch to friends in Amsterdam prior to his departure for Rijnsburg; then in Rijnsburg he revised portions of the manuscript in Latin in the form of separate treatises, of which the present TdIE is the only one to survive both in Latin and in Dutch; these treatises Spinoza sent to Amsterdam, where they were immediately translated into Dutch (by Pieter Balling) for the benefit of those members of the Spinoza circle who could not read Latin (principally, Jarig Jelles); in response to questions from the friends in Amsterdam, Spinoza added notes, appendices, and dialogues; finally, Jelles put this disorganized material into order for his private use, and added various notes and observations of his own.

Mignini, however, has a very different account of the manuscript. According to his theory (Mignini 1, 230-240), Spinoza’s friends asked him (either while he was still in Amsterdam, or on his departure for Rijnsburg) to write a concise exposition of his most important ideas on metaphysics and ethics; Spinoza wrote the treatise in Latin, about the middle of 1660, exclusively for the friends and not for immediate publication; his friends asked for a Dutch translation and suggested that the work be published; Spinoza corrected the Latin text and added notes and dialogues in response to the objections of his friends; someone translated the work into Dutch with a view to publication, and someone (possibly the translator) added marginal notes and cross-references; toward the end of 1661 (Mignini’s date for Letter 6), Spinoza made revisions on a Dutch copy of the work, adding still more notes, marginalia, and cross-references, and reworking some parts of the text; then, toward the end of 1661 or early in 1662, Spinoza abandoned the project of publishing the Short Treatise and decided to rework this material into an entirely different, geometric form; he added to the Dutch manuscript two mysterious sequences of numbers,8 indicating what materials he wished to retain and in what order, and then began to write the Ethics; finally, someone made a copy of Spinoza’s Dutch copy of the manuscript, translating any Latin additions or correcting their style if they were written in Dutch. Our manuscript A would stem from this copy.

Clearly, if Mignini’s theory is correct, our manuscript would be a considerably more trustworthy account of Spinoza’s thought at that stage of his development than it would be on Gebhardt’s theory. Equally clearly, it is going to be very difficult to decide which is correct, or at least nearer the truth. This is not the place for that kind of investigation, but perhaps it will be helpful to at least mention the principal sources of data bearing on these theories. They are: 1) the subtitle of the work (11/7-11); 2) the conclusion of the main text (112/20-113/6); 3) a marginal note attached to the conclusion; 4) passages in the letters which either inform us about the KV or provide us with analogies from the histories of Spinoza’s other works (Letters 6, 8, 12a, 13, and 15); 5) so-called “doublet” passages (e.g., 85/3-19, 55/16-29); 6) expressions of uncertainty about the contents of the work (43/33-34, 60/33-34, 78/11); and 7) the sequences of superscript numbers (passim). Perhaps it is not too much to hope that future investigations will clarify our understanding of the history of this work.

In the face of all these difficulties, it is not surprising that some scholars have doubted the value of studying this work.9 But this is an overreaction. First of all, as Rieuwertsz recognized, this work does contain discussions of topics not treated in the Ethics, or not treated so fully there, some of them of considerably greater interest to the modern reader than the chapter on the devil. For example, the discussions of definition (I, vi), of God’s causality of the finite (Second Dialogue), and of the distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata (I, viii, ix) are all valuable supplements to the exceedingly brief treatment these topics get elsewhere.

Secondly, even where Spinoza’s discussion of a topic is sketchy or immature compared with later treatments (e.g., in the analysis of the emotions), it remains extremely interesting to see the stages he went through in arriving at the mature doctrine. The literary form of the Ethics has been a stumbling block to Spinoza’s readers from the beginning, partly, perhaps, because that work is so very well worked out. We would like to have some grasp of the processes of thought that lay “behind the geometrical method.” To achieve that grasp, we must examine the earlier works that did in fact lead up to the Ethics.10

A further advantage which has been claimed for the Short Treatise is that it may help us to understand better Spinoza’s position in relation to Christianity, which in turn is useful for the proper interpretation of the Theological-Political Treatise. Appuhn has even argued (Appuhn 1, 27) that though it contains many propositions incompatible with Christian dogma, the Short Treatise is nevertheless much more open to a Christian reading than is the Ethics. Appuhn does not contend that Spinoza was ever a Christian in any formal sense, only that at a certain stage of his life certain Christian ideas and sentiments “penetrated his soul.” But even this may go too far. At any rate, the Pléiade editors argue, in their preface and notes, that the use of traditional religious language here is designed to gradually lead susceptible minds away from anthropomorphic conceptions.

Finally a word about the Outline. This was first discovered by Boehmer in 1851, bound with a copy of Colerus’ biography of Spinoza. That copy also contained a marginal note, apropos of Colerus’ discussion of Spinoza’s unpublished works (Colerus does not mention the Short Treatise):

Among some lovers of philosophy there exists a manuscript treatise by Spinoza; though not composed in the geometric manner, as his printed Ethics is, nevertheless it contains the same thoughts and topics. From its style and arrangement it is easy to see that it is of the author’s earliest works. After this rough draft of his thought, in the course of time he composed his Ethics. And though in the later work the same topics are presented more extensively and in a more polished way, in geometric order, nevertheless because such a mathematical order is quite uncommon in metaphysical matters, and few people are practiced in them, many find the Ethics more obscure than this treatise. Only in the beginning of its Appendix is a small portion of the treatise composed in geometric order. [I/412]

Discovery of the outline was instrumental in leading to the discovery of the first manuscript of the Short Treatise. But its primary interest today lies in the possibility (argued for by Freudenthal) that its author may have had access to a better manuscript than any we possess. This suspicion is raised particularly by its account of the first chapter of Part I, though it should be noted that Gebhardt and Mignini reject Freudenthal’s conjecture (see the note at I/15/7).

The section numbers are not in the original, but are due to Sigwart, and are included for convenience in making references (and following references in secondary sources). I, iii, 2 = Part I, chapter iii, section 2.

[I/3] A SHORT OUTLINE OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA’S TREATISE ON GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELL-BEING CONSISTING OF TWO PARTS, [5] FOLLOWED BY AN APPENDIX1

THE FIRST Part of this Treatise is divided into ten Chapters.

In the 1st Chapter, the Author shows that he has an idea of God; according to this idea he defines God as a being consisting of infinite [10] Attributes, of which each is infinitely perfect in its kind. From this he then infers that existence belongs to [God’s] essence, or that God necessarily exists.

But in order to discover further what perfections in particular are contained in the Divine nature and essence, he passes in the 2nd Chapter [15] to a consideration of the nature of substance. He tries to prove that substance is necessarily infinite; consequently that there cannot exist more than one substance;2 that one cannot be produced by another, but that whatever is belongs to that one Substance (which he calls [20] God); that thus Thinking and Extended nature are two of its infinite Attributes, each of which is supremely perfect and infinite in its kind; that therefore (as he explains more fully later), all singular finite and limited things, such as Human Souls and Bodies, etc., must be conceived [25] as modes of these attributes, through which these Attributes (and thereby, Substance, or God) are expressed in infinite ways.

All of this is explained more fully in Dialogues.3

[30] In the 3rd Chapter he deduces what sort of cause God is of things, viz. that he is an immanent cause, etc. But in order to make known what (in his opinion) God’s essential Attributes are, he passes to:

[I/4] The 4th Chapter, where he maintains that God is a necessary cause of all things, and that it was as impossible for them to have had a nature different from that already posited or to have been produced by God in another form or order, as it would be for God to have [5] another nature or essence than that which belongs to his actual and infinite existence. And the aforementioned production, or posited necessity of things to exist and act, is here called God’s first ‘Attribute.’

In Chapter 5 the author considers, as a second ‘Attribute’ of God, [10] a striving, by which (so he maintains) the whole of nature, and consequently each thing in particular, has tended to preserve its state and being. This striving, insofar as it concerns the totality of things, is called God’s general providence; but insofar as it belongs to each individual, [15] in itself, without regard to the other parts of Nature, it is called God’s particular providence.

In Chapter 6 a third ‘Attribute’ of God is considered: his Predestination, or predetermination, which extends to the whole of nature, [20] and to each thing in particular, and excludes all contingency. This doctrine is based mainly on Chapter 4. For once one has granted his fundamental principle that the Universe (which he calls God) is necessary, both as to its essence and its existence, and that everything there is belongs to it, it follows unavoidably from this false principle [25] that nothing contingent can occur in the universe.4 After this, to clear away difficulties raised against him, he sets out his thoughts concerning the true causes of evil, sin, confusion, etc. With this he concludes his study of God’s essential ‘Attributes,’ and proceeds to Chapter 7, [30] where he enumerates certain ‘Attributes’ of God which he regards as only relational, not propria, or also, indeed, as Denominations of his essential Attributes. He also takes this opportunity to examine and rebut briefly the opinions of the Peripatetics concerning the nature of the definition of God and the proof of his existence.

[I/5] But in order that the reader may conceive clearly the difference there is (in the Author’s opinion) between natura Naturans and natura Naturata, he expands on this briefly in the 8th and 9th Chapters.

[5] Then in Chapter 10 (as in Chapter 6), he shows that after men have formed certain universal ideas, and reduced things to them, and compared [things] with [these ideas], they form from this concepts of good and evil, and call things good insofar as they agree with this universal [10] idea, but evil insofar as they differ from it, and have no agreement with it. So good and evil are nothing but beings of reason, or modes of thinking.

This concludes the first Part of this Treatise.

[15] In the second the Author explains his thoughts about Man’s existence, how man is subjected to and slave of the Passions; then how far the use of his reason extends; and finally, by what means he may be brought to his Salvation and perfect Freedom.

[20] After having spoken briefly in the Preface of this Part about Man’s nature, he goes on to treat:

In the 1st Chapter, of the particular kinds of knowledge or perception, and how they are produced in Man in four ways,

[25] 1. By report, some story or other sign.

2. By bare experience.

3. By good and pure reasoning, or true Belief.

4. By internal enjoyment and clear intuition of the thing itself.

[30] All of this is clarified and explained by an example taken from the Rule of Three.

In order that the Effects of these four kinds of knowledge may be clearly and distinctly perceived, their definitions are given in the 2nd Chapter, and after that the effects of each are taken separately. As [I/6] effects of the first and second kinds of knowledge, he notes the Passions which are contrary to good reason; of the third kind, good desires; and of the fourth, genuine love, with all its consequences.

First, then, in the 3rd Chapter, are treated the Passions originating [5] from the first and second kinds of knowledge, i.e., from Opinion: such as Wonder, Love, Hate and Desire.

After that, in the 4th Chapter, he shows the utility for man of the third kind of knowledge, by teaching him how he has to live according [10] to the true guidance of reason, and so arouses him to embrace what alone is worthy of love; which teaches him also to distinguish carefully the Passions which arise from Opinion, and indicates which he should follow, and which avoid. To apply this use of reason more particularly, our Author treats

[15] In the 5th Chapter, of Love.

In the 6th, of Hate and Aversion.

In the 7th, of Desire, Joy, and Sadness.

In the 8th, of Esteem and Disdain; of Humility and Legitimate Self-esteem; [20] of Pride and Self-depreciation.

In the 9th, of Hope and Fear; of Confidence and Despair; of Vacillation, Strength of Character, Daring and Emulation; of Cowardice [25] and Dismay; and finally, of Jealousy.

In the 10th, of Remorse and Repentance.

In the 11th, of Mockery and Ridicule.

In the 12th, of Love of Esteem, Shame and Shamelessness.

In the 13th, of Favor; Gratitude, and Ingratitude.

[30] And finally, in the 14th, of Longing.

Having finished with what, in his judgment, required to be noted regarding the Passions, he passes to:

The 15th Chapter, where the last effect of true Belief, or the third kind of knowledge, is introduced, as the means by which the true is separated from the false, and becomes known to us.

[I/7] Having discovered what, in his opinion, Good and Evil, Truth and Falsehood are, and also what the well-being of a perfect Man consists in, Spinoza then considers it necessary to inquire as to whether we arrive at such a well-being freely or by necessity.

[5] In this connection, he shows in the 16th Chapter what the Will is, maintaining there that it is not at all free, but that we are in every respect determined by external causes to will, to affirm or deny this or that.

But in order that the Will should not be confused with Desire, he [10] indicates in the 17th Chapter the difference between them. He thinks that, like Intellect and Will, desire also is not free, but that each and every desire, like this or that volition, is determined by external causes.

And to entice the Reader to embrace all the preceding, in the 18th [15] Chapter he elaborates on all the advantages which in his judgment are implied in this.

But in the 19th and 20th Chapters, our author inquires whether by that Belief, or the third kind of knowledge, Man can be brought to the enjoyment of the greatest Good and the highest Blessedness, and [20] freed of the Passions, insofar as they are evil.

As far as the last is concerned, he inquires how the soul is united with the Body and receives from it various affections; these, conceived [25] under the form of good or evil, are regarded as the cause of all the various Passions. And since, according to the 1st Chapter of this Part, the Opinions by which those affections of the Body are thought good or evil (thus giving rise to the Passions) are founded either on the first kind of knowledge (on report or some other external sign) or on the [30] second kind of knowledge (on some experience of ours), he persuades himself in the 21st Chapter of this conclusion: since what we find in ourselves has more power over us than what comes from outside, reason can be the cause of the destruction of those Opinions which we acquire only through the first kind of knowledge, because reason does [I/8] not come to us from outside, as those opinions do; but it does not have the same power over those which we acquire by the second kind of knowledge, since what we enjoy in ourselves cannot be overcome, even through something more powerful, if it is outside us and we only contemplate it through reason.

[5] Since, then, reason, or the third kind of knowledge, has no power to bring us to our well-being or to overcome the Passions which proceed from the second kind of knowledge, Spinoza proceeds in the 22nd Chapter to discover what the true means for this may be. Since [10] God is the greatest good the Soul can know and possess, he concludes that if we once acquire a union with him, or knowledge and love of him, as close as our union with the Body, not one arising from reasoned conclusions, but one consisting of an internal enjoyment of and [15] immediate union with God’s essence, then by this fourth kind of knowledge we shall have attained our greatest Salvation and Happiness. Therefore, this fourth kind of knowledge is not only necessary, but also the only means. And because in this way the most excellent [20] effect and an immutable constancy arise in those who enjoy it, he calls it Rebirth.

Since, in his opinion, the human Soul is the idea, in the thinking [25] being, of a certain thing, and the soul is united to the thing by this idea, he concludes from that in the 23rd Chapter that its constancy or change must be estimated according to the thing of which it is the idea. Consequently, if the Soul exists only in union with a thing which [30] is temporal and subject to change (as the Body is), it must necessarily be acted on and perish with it. On the other hand, if it undergoes union with a thing whose nature is eternal and immutable, it will be exempt from all Passion, and will share immortality.

But in order to omit nothing worth noting regarding this, our Author [I/9] inquires in the 24th Chapter whether Man’s Love for God is reciprocated, i.e., if man’s love has the result that God loves Man. Rejecting this, he explains what, according to his previous Teaching, [5] Divine and Human Laws are. Then he rebuts the opinions of those who maintain that God manifests himself and makes himself known to Man through something other than his own essence, such as a finite and limited thing, or by some external sign, whether by words or by Miracles.

[10] And since in his opinion the duration of a thing depends on its own perfection, or on its union with something else of a more perfect nature, he denies that there is a Devil, because he judges that something which lacks every perfection or union with perfection (as he defines [15] the Devil) can have neither essence nor existence.

Then, having put the Devil to one side, and having deduced the passions from the sole consideration of human nature, and indicated the means by which they are restrained and the supreme Salvation of [20] the human race is attained, our Author proceeds to note in the 26th Chapter the nature of Man’s true Freedom, which arises from the fourth kind of knowledge. For this purpose he introduces the following Propositions:

1. The more essence a thing has, the more it has of action, and [25] the less of Passion.

2. That all Passion proceeds not from an internal, but from an external cause.

3. That whatever is not produced by an external cause also has nothing in common with it.

[30] 4. That the effect of an immanent cause cannot change or perish so long as the cause endures.

5. That the freest cause of all, and that which he thinks agrees best with God, is the immanent.

From these Propositions, he deduces the following:

[I/10] 1. That God’s essence has an infinite action and involves a denial of any Passion. Hence whatever is united with it thereby participates in that action and is free of all Passion and corruption.

[5] 2. That the true intellect cannot perish.

3. That all the effects of the true intellect, which are united with it, are the most excellent of all, and are necessarily eternal with their cause.

4. That all our external effects are the more perfect the more they [10] can be united with us.

From all this he concludes then that human freedom consists in a firm existence which our intellect possesses through immediate union with God, so that neither it5 nor its effects can be subjected to any [15] external cause, or be destroyed or changed by it. Hence it must persevere with an eternal and constant duration.

And with this Spinoza finishes the Second and last Part of his Work.

However, he had added a kind of Appendix after this, containing [20] nothing but a short sketch of the things contained in the preceding. The first part of this, on the nature of Substance, is arranged in the Geometrical manner, agreeing essentially with his printed Ethics up to [25] IP8. And finally, in the second half of this Appendix, he inquires what the human soul is, and what its union with the Body consists in.

Furthermore, Spinoza has provided the whole Work with notes intended to elaborate and Clarify many passages.

[I/11] Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being1

PREVIOUSLY written in Latin by B.D.S. for the use of his pupils, who wished to devote themselves to the practice of ethics and true philosophy, and now translated into Dutch for the use of lovers of truth and virtue, so that those who boast so much on this subject, and press their dirt and filth on the simple as if it were ambergris, may one day have their mouths shut for them, and may stop blaming what they still do not understand: God, themselves, and how to help people have regard for one another’s well-being: and to cure those who are sick of mind, through the spirit of gentleness and forbearance, following the example of the Lord Christ, our best teacher.2

[I/13] TABLE OF THE CHAPTERS CONTAINED IN THE TWO FOLLOWING BOOKS, VIZ.

THE FIRST, treating of God, and what pertains to him, having the following chapters:3

[5] Chapter	I.	That God is
Chapter	II.	What God is
Chapter	III.	That God is a cause of all things
Chapter	IV.	Of God’s necessary actions
Chapter	V.	Of God’s Providence
[10] Chapter	VI.	Of God’s Predestination
Chapter	VII.	Of the ‘Attributes’ which do not belong to God
Chapter	VIII.	Of Natura Naturans
Chapter	IX.	Of Natura Naturata
Chapter	X.	What Good and Evil are

[15] The second, treating of a Perfect Man, capable of uniting himself to God:4

Chapter	I.	Of Opinion, Belief, and Science
Chapter	II.	What Opinion, Belief and clear Knowledge are
Chapter	III.	The origin of the Passions; Passion arising from opinion
[20] Chapter	IV.	What proceeds from Belief, and of Man’s Good and Evil
Chapter	V.	Of Love
Chapter	VI.	Of Hate
Chapter	VII.	Of Joy and Sadness
[25] Chapter	VIII.	Of Esteem and Disdain
Chapter	IX.	Of Hope and Fear
Chapter	X.	Of Remorse and Repentance
Chapter	XI.	Of Mockery and Ridicule
Chapter	XII.	Of Love of Esteem, Shame, and Shamelessness
[30] Chapter	XIII.	Of Favor, Gratitude and Ingratitude
Chapter	XIV.	Of Longing
Chapter	XV.	Of the True and the False
Chapter	XVI.	Of the Will
[I/14] Chapter	XVII.	Of the Distinction between Will and Desire
Chapter	XVIII.	Of the Advantages of the preceding
Chapter	XIX.	Of our Blessedness
Chapter	XX.	Confirmation of the preceding
[5] Chapter	XXI.	Of Reason
Chapter	XXII.	Of true Knowledge, Rebirth, etc.
Chapter	XXIII.	Of the Immortality of the Soul
Chapter	XXIV.	Of God’s Love for Man
Chapter	XV.	Of Devils
[10] Chapter	XXVI.	Of true Freedom

[I/15] The First Part Of God and What Pertains to Him1

[5] CHAPTER I
THAT GOD IS

[1]2 […] Regarding the first question, viz. whether there is a God? we say that this can first be proven a priori, as follows:

1. 1Whatever we clearly and distinctly understand to belong to the [10] naturea of a thing, we can truly affirm of that thing:

2But we can understand clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to God’s nature. Therefore, [we can truly affirm existence of God.]

[2] Alternatively, it can also be proven as follows:

[15] 2. The 3essences of things are from all eternity and will remain immutable to all eternity.

God’s existence is [his] essence. Therefore, [God’s existence is from all eternity and will remain immutable to all eternity.]

[3] [God’s existence can be proven] a posteriori as follows:

[20] 4If man has an Idea of God, then Godb must exist formally.

[I/16] 5But man has an Idea of God. Therefore.

[4] The first [premise] we prove as follows:

If there is an Idea of God, the cause of [this Idea] must exist formally and contain in itself whatever the Idea has objectively. But there [5] is an Idea of God. Therefore.

[5] To prove the first premise of this argument, we lay down the following principles:

1. That the things knowable are infinite.

2. That a finite intellect cannot comprehend the infinite.

[10] 3. That a finite intellect can understand nothing through itself unless it is determined by something external. For just as it has no power to understand everything at once, so it also has no power to begin by understanding this before that, or that before this. Not being able to do either the first or the second, it can do [15] nothing.

[6] The first (or major) [premise of the argument in § 4] is proven as follows:

If man’s [capacity of forming] fiction[s] were the sole cause of his Idea, then it would be impossible for him to perceive anything. But he can perceive something. Therefore.

[20] [7] The first [premise of the argument of § 6] is proven by the first principle, viz. that the things knowable are infinite. For according to the second principle, man cannot understand everything, since the human intellect is finite; and being [by hypothesis] determined by no external things to understand this before that, or that before this, it would be [25] impossible for him (according to the third principle) to be able to understand anything.

[8] cFrom all of this the second point is proved, viz. that the cause [I/17] of man’s Idea is not his capacity for forming fictions, but some external cause which compels him to understand one thing before another, and [I/18] is nothing other than that the things exist formally, and are nearer to him than others, whose objective essence is in his intellect. So if man has an Idea of God, it is clear that God must exist formally (but not eminently, since there is nothing more real or more excellent above or [5] outside him).9

[9] That man has an Idea of God is clear, because he understands his ‘attributes,’e which he could not produce because he is imperfect. But that he understands these attributes is clear from his knowing that [10] the infinite cannot be composed of a number of finite parts, that there cannot be two infinites, but Only One, that it is perfect and immutable. This last he knows because he knows that no thing through itself seeks its own destruction,f and that it cannot change into something [15] better, since it is perfect, which it would not be if it changed—and also that such a being cannot be acted on by something coming from outside, since it is omnipotent.

[10] From all of this, then, it follows clearly that one can prove God’s existence both a priori and a posteriori. Indeed, the a priori [20] proof is better. But, [it will be objected,]10 the things one proves in this way, one must prove through their external causes, which is an evident imperfection in them, since they cannot make themselves known through themselves, but only through external causes. But God, the first cause of all things, and also the cause of himself, makes himself [25] known through himself. So what Thomas Aquinas says11—that God could not be proved a priori, because he supposedly has no cause—is not of much importance.

[I/19] CHAPTER II
WHAT GOD IS

[1] Now that we have demonstrated that God is, it is time to show [5] what he is.1 He is, we say, a beinga of which all, or infinite, attributes are predicated, each of which is infinitely perfect in its own kind.

[2] In order to express this opinion of ours clearly, we shall first set out the following four things:

1. Thatb there is no limited substance,4 but that every substance [I/20] must be infinitely perfect in its kind, viz. that in God’s infinite intellect no substance can be more perfect than that which already exists in Nature.

2. That there are not two equal substances.

[5] 3. That one substance cannot produce another.

4. That in God’s infinite intellect there is no substance which does not exist formally in Nature.

[3] As for the first, viz. that there is no limited substance, etc., if anyone [10] should wish to maintain the contrary, then we would ask him the following: is this substance then limited through itself, i.e., has it limited itself thus and did it not want to make itself more unlimited? or is it limited through its cause, which either could not, or would not give it more?

[15] [4] The first is not true, because it is impossible that a substance should have willed to limit itself, especially a substance which has existed through itself. I say, then, that it is limited through its cause, which is necessarily God.

[5] Now if it is limited through its cause, that must be either because [20] its cause could not or would not give more. That he could not have given more would be contrary to his omnipotence. That che could [I/21] have, but would not, smacks of envy, which is not in any way in God, who is all goodness and fullness.7

[6] The second, that there are not two equal substances, we prove because every substance is perfect in its kind. For if there were two [5] equal substances, they would necessarily have to limit one another, and consequently, would not be infinite, as we have previously proven.

[7] Concerning the third, the one substance cannot produce another, [10] if someone wishes to maintain the contrary, we ask whether the cause which would have to produce this substance has the same attributes as the one produced or not?

[8] Not the latter, for Something cannot come from Nothing. Therefore, the former. And then we ask again whether, in that attribute8 [15] which would be the cause of what is produced, there is as much perfection as in what is produced, or more, or less? We say there cannot be less, for the reasons already given. We also say there cannot be more, because then these two would be limited, which is contrary to what we have just proven. So there would have to be as much. Then [20] there would be two equal substances, which is clearly contrary to our preceding proof.

[9] Furthermore, what is created has not in any way proceeded from Nothing, but must necessarily have been created by him who exists. But that something should have proceeded from him and that afterwards [25] he should still have it no less than before—this we cannot conceive with our intellect.

[10] Finally, if we wish to seek the cause of that substance which is the principle of the things which proceed from its attribute, then we shall have to seek in turn the cause of that cause, and then again, the [30] cause of that cause, and so on to infinity; so if we must stop somewhere (as we must), we must stop with this unique substance.

[11] Fourth, that no substance or attributes exist in God’s infinite intellect which do not exist formally in Nature, we can prove as follows:

[I/22] 1. From God’s infinite power, because there can be no cause in him by which he could have been moved to create one thing sooner or more than another.

2. From the simplicity of his will.

3. Because he cannot omit doing any good, as we shall prove later.

[5] 4. Because it is impossible that what does not exist now could come to be, since one substance cannot produce another. What is more, if that happened, there would be infinitely many more substances not existing than existing; and that is absurd.9

[12] From all of these it follows that of Nature all in all is predicated, [10] and that thus Nature consists of infinite attributes, of which each is perfect in its kind. This agrees perfectly with the definition one gives of God.

[13]10 Some want to argue against what we have just said—that no thing is in God’s infinite intellect unless it exists formally in Nature—in [15] the following way: if God has created everything, then he cannot create more. But that he should not be able to create more would be contrary to his omnipotence. Therefore.

[14] Regarding the first point, we grant that God cannot create more. [20] As for the second, we say that we acknowledge that if God could not create everything that is creatable, that would be contrary to his omnipotence; but it is not in any way contrary to it if he cannot create what is contradictory in itself (as it is to say that he has created everything and could still create more).

[25] And certainly it is a much greater perfection in God, that he has created everything that was in his infinite intellect, than it would be if he had not created it, and (as they say) never could have.

[15] But why say so much about this? Don’t they themselves argued [30] as follows (or shouldn’t they?): if God is omniscient, then he cannot know more; but that God cannot know more is contrary to his perfection. Therefore.

But if God has everything in his intellect, and through his infinite [I/23] perfection cannot know more, why can we not say that he has also produced everything he had in his intellect, and brought it about that it is, or will be, formally in Nature?

[5] [16] Because we know, then, that everything is equally in God’s infinite intellect, and that there is no cause for his creating this sooner or rather than that, and that he could have produced everything in a moment, let us see if we cannot use against them the same weapons [10] they take up against us: if God can never create so much that he could not create still more, then he can never create what he can create; but that he cannot create what he can create, is self-contradictory. Therefore.

[17] The reasons why we have said that all these attributes which [15] are in Nature are only one, single being, and by no means different ones (though we can clearly and distinctly understand the one without the other), are as follows:

1. Because we have already found previously that there must be an infinite and perfect being, by which nothing else can be understood [20] but a being of which all in all must be predicated. For of a being which has some essence, [some] attributes must be predicated, and the more essence one ascribes to it, the more attributes one must also ascribe to it. So if a being is infinite, its attributes [25] must also be infinite, and that is precisely what we call a perfect being.

2. Because of the unity which we see everywhere in Nature; if ethere were different beings in Nature, the one could not possibly unite with the other.

[30] 3. Because, as we have already seen,11 one substance cannot produce [I/24] another, and if a substance does not exist, it is impossible for it to begin to exist. We see, however,f that in no substance (which we nonetheless know to exist in Nature) is there, so long as it is conceived separately, any necessity of existing. Since no [5] existence pertains to its particular essence, it must necessarily follow that Nature, which comes from no cause, and which we nevertheless know to exist, must necessarily be a perfect being, to which existence belongs.12

[10]. [18] From all that we have said so far it is clear that we maintain that extension is an attribute of God. Nevertheless, this does not seem possible at all in a perfect being. For since extension is divisible, the perfect being would consist of parts. But this cannot be attributed to God, because he is a simple being. Moreover, when extension is divided, it is acted on; and that too cannot in any way be the case in [15] God (who is not susceptible of being acted on, and cannot be acted on by any other being, since he is the first efficient cause of everything).

[19] To this we reply:

1. That part and whole are not true or actual beings, but only [20] beings of reason; consequently in Natureg there are neither whole nor parts.

[I/25] 2. A thing composed of different parts must be such that each singular part can be conceived and understood without the others. For example, in a clock that is composed of many different wheels, [5] cords, etc., I say that each wheel, cord, etc., can be conceived and understood separately, without needing [the understanding of] the whole as a whole. Similarly with water, which consists of straight, oblong particles.13 Each part of it can be conceived and understood, and can exist, without the whole.

[10] But since extension is a substance, one cannot say of it that it has parts, since it cannot become smaller or larger, and no parts of it could be understood separately. For in its nature it must be infinite.

That it must be without parts also follows from this: if it did [15] consist of parts, it would not be infinite through its nature, as we have said it is. But it is impossible that parts could be conceived in an infinite Nature, for all parts are, by their nature, finite.

[20] To this we may add that if extension consisted of distinct parts, [I/26] then it would be intelligible that some of its parts might be destroyed even though it remained and was not destroyed by the destruction of some of its parts. This is clearly a contradiction in something which [5] is infinite through its own nature, and can never be, or be understood to be, limited or finite.

[21] Furthermore, concerning the parts in Nature, we say (as we said before) that division never occurs in the substance, but always [10] and only in the modes of the substance. So if I want to divide water, I divide only the mode of the substance, not the substance itself; the substance14 is always the same, [though] now [it is the substance] of water, now [the substance] of something else.

[22] Division, then, or being acted on, always happens in the mode, as when we say that a man perishes, or is destroyed, that is only [15] understood of the man insofar as he is a composite being and mode of substance, and not the substance itself on which he depends.

[23] Moreover, we have already said,15 and will say again, that outside God, there is nothing, and that he is an immanent cause. But being acted on, when the agent and the one acted on are different, is [20] a palpable imperfection. For the one acted on must necessarily depend on what, outside him, has produced this state of being acted on. In God, who is perfect, this cannot happen.

[24] Further, one can never say of such an agent, which acts in [25] himself, that he has the imperfection of being acted on, because he is not acted on by another; similarly, the intellect, as the Philosophers also say, is a cause of its concepts. But since it is an immanent cause, who would dare say that it is imperfect when it is acted on by itself?

[30] [25] Finally, substance, because it is the principle of all its modes, can with much greater right be called an agent, rather than one acted on. With this, we consider that we have answered all the objections satisfactorily.

[26] The further objection may be made, however, that there must necessarily be a first cause which makes this body move; for when it is at rest, it cannot possibly move itself. And since it is clear that there [I/27] is motion and rest in Nature, these must, they think, come from an external cause.

[27] But it is easy for us to answer this. For we grant that if body were a thing existing through itself, and had no other property than [5] length, breadth, and depth, then if it really were at rest, there would be no cause in it for it to begin to move itself. But we have posited above that Nature is a being of which all attributes are predicated. This being so, nothing can be lacking to it to produce everything there is [10] to produce.

[28] So far, then, we have spoken of what God is; now we shall say only a word about his attributes: those which are known to us consist of only two, viz. thought and extension, for we are speaking here only [15] of attributes which one could call God’s proper attributes, through which we come to know him in himself, and not as acting outside himself.

[29] Everything which men ascribe to God besides these two attributes, [20] must, if it does otherwise belong to him, either be an extrinsic denomination, such as existing through himself, being eternal, one, immutable, etc., or be in respect to his actions, such as that he is a cause, a predeterminer, and ruler of all things. These are all propria of God, but they do not give us any knowledge of what he is.

[25] [30] However, we shall say later, in the following chapters, how these ‘attributes’ can have a place in God. But to make this better understood and explain it further, we thought it good to add the following discourses, consisting of a:

[I/28] DIALOGUE1 BETWEEN THE INTELLECT,2 LOVE, REASON, AND LUST3

[5] [1] Love: I see, Brother, that my being and perfection depend entirely on your perfection; and since the perfection of the object you have conceived is your perfection, and mine in turn proceeds from yours, tell me, I beg you, whether you have conceived a supremely perfect [10] being, which cannot be limited by anything else, and in which I too am contained.

[2] Intellect: For my part, I consider Nature only as completely infinite and supremely perfect. If you doubt this, ask Reason. He will tell you this.

[15] [3] Reason: I find the truth about this indubitable: for if we want to limit Nature, we will have to limit it, absurdly, with a Nothing. We avoid this absurdity by maintaining that it—i.e., infinite Nature, in [20] which everything is contained—is an eternal Unity, Infinite, omnipotent;4 the negation of these we call Nothing.

[4] Lust: It will be marvelous, indeed, if this should turn out to be consistent: that Unity agrees with the Diversity I see everywhere in Nature: For how could this be?

[25] I see that intellectual substance has nothing in common with extended substance and that the one limits the other5 [5] and if, in addition to these two substances, you want to posit still a third, which is perfect in everything, then you will involve yourself in manifest contradictions. For if this third substance is posited, apart from the [30] first two, it will lack all the attributes which pertain to these two. And this is impossible in a whole, outside which no thing is.6

[I/29] [6] Furthermore, if this being is omnipotent and perfect, it will be such because it has produced itself, and not because something else has produced it. Nevertheless, it would be even more omnipotent if it could produce both itself and something else.

[5] [7] Finally, if you call it omniscient, it must know itself, and at the same time, you must understand that the knowledge of oneself alone is less than the knowledge of oneself together with the knowledge of other substances.

All these are manifest contradictions. That is why I would have [10] advised Love to content herself with what I show her, and not to look for other things.7

[8] Love: O dishonorable one! What have you shown me except that from which my immediate destruction would result? For if I had ever [15] united myself with what you have shown me, straightaway I would have been pursued by two of the human race’s main enemies—Hate and Repentance—and often also by Forgetfulness. So again I turn to Reason, that he may continue, and shut the mouths of these enemies.

[20] [9] Reason: O Lust! I tell you that what you say you see—that there are distinct substances—is false. For I see clearly that there is only one, which exists through itself, and is a support of all the other attributes.8

And if you want to call the corporeal and the intellectual substances [25] in respect to the modes which depend on them, you must equally call them modes too, in relation to the substance on which they depend. For you do not conceive them as existing through themselves. In the same way that you call willing, sensing, understanding, loving, etc., [30] different modes of what you call a thinking substance (all of which you lead back to one, making one of them all), so I also infer, by your own proof, that infinite extension and thought, together with other infinite attributes (or as you would say, substances) are nothing but modes of that unique, eternal, infinite Being, existing through itself; [I/30] and of all of these we make (as we have said) One Unique being or Unity, outside which one cannot imagine anything.

[10] Lust: In this way of speaking that you have, I think I see a very great confusion. For you seem to want the whole to be something [5] outside of or without its parts, which is indeed absurd. For the Philosophers all say unanimously that the whole is a second notion, which is no thing in Nature, outside human thought.

[11] Moreover, as I gather from your example, you confuse the whole [10] with the cause; for as I say, the whole consists of and exists through its parts; that is why you imagine the thinking power as a thing on which the intellect, love, etc., depend. And you cannot call it a whole, but a cause of the effects you have just named.

[15] [12] Reason: I certainly see how you call all your friends together against me. So what you have not been able to do with your false reasoning you try to do now with ambiguous words—the usual practice of those who oppose the truth. But you will not succeed in getting [20] Love on your side in that way.

You say, then, that since the cause is a producer of its effects, it must be outside them. You say this because you know only of the transitive and not of the immanent cause, which does not in any way [25] produce something outside itself. For example, the intellect is the cause of its concepts; that is why I called the intellect a cause (insofar as, or in the respect that its concepts depend on it);9 and on the other hand, I call it a whole, because it consists of its concepts. Similarly, God is, [30] in relation to his effects or creatures, no other than an immanent cause, and also a whole, because of the second consideration.

[I/31] SECOND DIALOGUE RELATING PARTLY TO THE PRECEDING, PARTLY TO THE SECOND PART TO COME, BETWEEN ERASMUS AND THEOPHILUS

[5] [1] Erasmus: I have heard you say, Theophilus, that God is a cause of all things, and moreover, that he can be no other cause than an immanent one. If, then, he is an immanent cause of all things, how could you call him a remote cause? For that is impossible in an immanent cause.

[10] [2] Theophilus: When I said1 that God is a remote cause, I said that only in respect to those things [which do not depend on him immediately and not those things] which God has produced immediately (without any circumstances, by his existence alone). But I have not at all called him a remote cause absolutely. You could also have inferred [15] this clearly from my words. For I also said that we can, in some way, call him a remote cause.2

[3] Erasmus: Now I understand sufficiently what you want to tell me; but I note also that you said3 that the effect of an internal cause [20] remains united with its cause in such a way that it makes a whole with it. If that is so, then I think God cannot be an immanent cause. For if he and what he has produced make together a whole, then you [25] ascribe more essence to God at one time than at another. Please, relieve me of this doubt.

[4] Theophilus: If you want to escape this confusion, Erasmus, pay close attention to what I am about to tell you. The essence of a thing [30] does not increase through its union with another thing, with which it makes a whole. On the contrary, the first thing remains unchanged.

[5] I shall give you an example, so that you will understand me [I/32] better. A sculptor has made various figures of wood, in the likeness of parts of a human body. He takes one of these, which has the shape of a human breast, adds it to another, which has the shape of a human [5] head, and makes of these two a whole which represents the upper part of a human body. Will you say now, on that account, that the essence of the head has increased, because it has been united to the breast? That would be a mistake, for it is the same as it was before.

[10] [6] To make this even clearer, I shall give you another example, viz. an idea I have of a triangle and another, arising from the extension of one of the angles. The angle formed by this extension is necessarily equal to the two opposite internal angles, etc. I say that these [ideas] have produced [15] a new idea, viz. that the three angles of the triangle are equal to two right angles. This idea is so united to the first, that it can neither be nor be conceived without it.

[7] [And of all the ideas which anyone has, we make a whole, or [20] (what is the same) a being of reason, which we call the intellect.]4

You see now that although this new idea is united to the preceding one, no change takes place on that account in the essence of the preceding one. On the contrary, it remains without the least change. You [25] can also see this in each idea which in itself produces love. This love does not in any way increase the essence of the idea.

[8] But why pile up examples? For you yourself can see this clearly in the matter we are speaking of. I have said5 distinctly that all the attributes, which depend on no other cause, and to define which no [30] genus is necessary, belong to God’s essence. And because created things do not have the power to form an attribute, they do not increase God’s essence, no matter how closely they are united to him.

[9] To this we may add that the whole is only a being of reason and [I/33] differs from the universal only in these respects: that the universal is made of various disunited individuals, whereas the whole is made of various united individuals, and that the universal includes only parts of the same kind, whereas the whole includes parts of the same kind and of another kind.6

[5] [10] Erasmus: As far as that question is concerned, you have satisfied me. But you have also said7 that the effect of an internal cause cannot perish so long as its cause endures. I see, indeed, that this is certainly true. But since it is, how can God be an internal cause of all things, since many things perish?

[10] According to your previous distinction,8 you will say that God is properly a cause of those effects he has produced immediately, through his attributes alone, without any further circumstances, and that these therefore cannot perish so long as their cause endures; but [you will [15] add] that you do not call God an internal cause of those effects whose existence does not depend immediately on him, but which have come to be from some other thing (except insofar as their causes neither do nor can act without God or outside him); and these, then, can perish, since they have not been produced by God immediately.

[20] [11] But this does not satisfy me. For I see that you conclude9 that the human intellect is immortal, because it is an effect that God has produced in himself. Now it is impossible that more was needed, to produce such an intellect, than God’s attributes alone. For to be a [25] being of such an eminent perfection it must have been created from eternity, like all other things which depend immediately on God. And if I am not mistaken, I have heard you say this yourself. How will you slip out of this without leaving difficulties behind?

[30] [12] Theophilus: It is true, Erasmus, that those things which have been created by him immediately (those which for their existence required nothing but God’s attributes) have been created from eternity. But it should be noted that even if it is necessary for the existence of [I/34] a thing that a particular modification be present and [so] something outside God’s attributes, that still does prevent God from being able to produce [such] a thing immediately. For of the things required to [5] make things exist, some are required to produce the thing, and others for it to be able to be produced.

For example, if I want to have light in a certain room, I light [a candle] and this, through itself, lights the room—or I open a window [shutter], and though opening it does not itself make light, still it brings [10] it about that the light can come into the room. Similarly, for the motion of a body, another body is required, which must already have that motion which passes from it to the first body.

But to produce an idea of God in us, no other particular thing is [15] required which has what is produced in us; all that is necessary is that there be in Nature a body such that its idea represents God immediately.10 This too you could have inferred from my words. For I have said11 that God is known only through himself and not through something else.

[20] [13] But I tell you this: so long as we do not have such a clear idea of God that it so unites us to him as not to let us love anything outside him, we cannot say that we are truly united with God, and so depend immediately on him.

[25] If you still have anything to ask me, leave it for another time. Right now I am required elsewhere. Farewell.

[14] Erasmus: For the moment I have nothing. But I shall think about what you have just told me until the next time we meet. I commend you to God.

[I/35] CHAPTER III
[HOW GOD IS A CAUSE OF ALL THINGS]1

[1] We shall now begin to treat of those ‘attributes’ we have called [5] Propria.a And first, how God is a cause of all things.

We have already said before that one substance cannot produce another, and that God is a being of which all attributes are predicated. From this it clearly follows that all other things cannot in any way [10] exist or be understood without or outside him. So we have every reason to say that God is a cause of all things.

[2] Since it is customary2 to divide the efficient cause into eight parts, let us now investigate how, and in what way God is a cause?

[15] 1. We say that God is an emanative or productive cause of his actions, and in respect to the action’s occurring, an active or efficient cause. We treat this as one thing, because they involve each other.

2. He is an immanent and not a transitive cause, since he does [20] everything in himself, and not outside himself (because outside him there is nothing).

3. God is a free cause, not a natural one, as we shall show very clearly when we treat the question whether God can omit doing [25] what he does? At that point we shall explain what true freedom consists in.

4. God is a cause through himself, and not an accidental cause. This will be more evident after our discussion of predestination.

5. God is a principal cause of the effects he has created immediately, [I/36] such as motion in matter, etc., where there can be no place for the subsidiary cause, which is confined to particular things (as when God makes the sea dry by a strong wind,3 and similarly in [5] all particular things in Nature).

The subsidiary initiating cause is not applicable to God, because there is nothing outside him that could constrain him. The predisposing cause, on the other hand, is his perfection itself, through which he is both a cause of himself, and consequently of all other things.

[10] 6. God alone is the first, or initiating, cause, as is clear from our preceding proof.

7. God is also a general cause, but only in the respect that he produces different things. Otherwise, such a thing can never be [15] said of him. For he does not need anyone to produce effects.

8. God is the proximate cause of those things that are infinite and immutable, and which we say that he has created immediately; but he is, in a sense, the remote cause of all particular things.

[20] CHAPTER IV
OF GOD’S NECESSARY ACTIONS

[1] We deny that God could omit doing what he does, and we shall prove this also when we treat of predestination, where we shall show that all things depend necessarily on their causes.

[25] [2] But this is also proven through God’s perfection, for it is true beyond any doubt that God can make everything just as perfectly as it is conceived in his Idea. And just as the things he understands he cannot understand more perfectly than he does understand them, in [30] the same way he has made them so perfect, that they cannot proceed more perfectly from him.

Moreover, when we conclude that God could not have omitted doing [I/37] what he has done, we derive this from his perfection, because in God it would be an imperfection to be able to omit what he does, without, however, assuming in God a subsidiary initiating cause, which would [5] have moved him to act, for then he would not be God.

[3] But now the dispute arises again as to whether God can omit doing everything that is in his Idea and that consequently he can produce [10] perfectly? and whether such an omission is a perfection in him?

We say that since everything that happens is done by God, it must be predetermined by him. Otherwise he would be changeable, and that would be a great imperfection in him. And since this predetermination by him must be from eternity, and since in eternity there is [15] neither before nor after, it follows inevitably from this that God was not able before to predetermine things in a way different from that in which they are now determined from eternity, and that before or without these determinations God could not have been.

[4] Furthermore, if God should omit doing something, that must [20] result either from a cause in him or from none. If the former, then it is necessary that he must omit doing it. If the latter, then it is necessary that he must not omit doing it. This is clear in itself.

Again, in a created thing it is a perfection to exist and to have been [25] produced by God, for the greatest imperfection of all is not being; and because God wills the salvation1 and perfection of everything, if God willed that this thing did not exist, the salvation and perfection of the thing would consist in not existing. This is self-contradictory. So we [30] deny that God can omit doing what he does.

[5] Some consider this a slander and belittling of God. But such talk comes from a misconception of what true freedom consists in. For it is not at all what they think, viz. being able to do or to omit something good or evil.2 True freedom is nothing but [being] the first cause, [I/38] which is not in any way constrained or necessitated by anything else, and only through its perfection is the cause of all perfection. So if God could omit doing this, he would not be perfect. For to be able to [5] omit doing good or bringing about perfection in what he produces can only be through a defect.

That God alone is the only free cause is clear, not only from what has just been said, but also from the fact that outside him there is no external cause which would force or necessitate him. This is not true [10] of created things.

[6] Against this our opponents argue in the following way: the good is only good because God wills it.3 Since this is so, he can always make the evil become good. This reasoning is as sound as if I said that [15] God is God because he wills that he is God, therefore it is in his power not to be God. This is absurdity itself.

Furthermore, if men do something, and one asks them why they do that, the answer is: because justice requires it. If one then asks why justice or rather, the first cause of everything that is just, requires it, [20] the answer must be: because justice wills it so. But would justice, indeed, be able to omit being just? Not at all, for then it could not be justice.

But those who say that God does everything he does because it is [25] good in itself may think they do not differ from us. That is far from being true. For they assume something prior to God, to which he is obligated or bound, viz. a cause [by] which [he] has a desire that this [which] is good, and again, that [which] is just should exist.4

[30] [7] Now there arises the further problem: if God had from eternity created all things in a different way, or had ordered or predetermined them differently than they are now, would he, then, be equally perfect?

It will serve as an answer to this, that if Nature had been created from all eternity in another way than it is now, it would necessarily [I/39] have to follow—according to the position of those who ascribe to God will and intellect—that God had both a different will and a different intellect then, according to which he would have made it differently. [5] So one would then be compelled to think that God is different now than he was then, and was different then than he is now. So if we maintain that he is supremely perfect now, we are compelled to say that he was not then, when he would have created everything differently. All of these are things which involve palpable absurdities in [10] themselves, and cannot in any way be ascribed to God, who is now, ever has been, and will remain to all eternity, immutable.

[8] We also prove this from the definition we have given of a free cause, which is not one which can both do and not do something, but only one which does not depend on anything else. So whatever God [15] does, he does and produces as the supremely free cause. [If, then, he had made things differently before than they are now, it must follow that at some time he was imperfect. And so that is false.]5 For since God is the first cause of all things, there must be something in him [20] through which he does what he does, and does not omit doing it. Because we say that freedom does not consist in [being able to] do something or not do it, and because we have also shown that what makes [God] do something can be nothing other than his own perfection, [25] we conclude that if it was not his perfection which made him do it, the things would not exist, or could not have come to be what they are now. [This is just as if one said that if God were imperfect, things would now be different than they are now.]

[30] [9] So much for the first ‘attribute’; we shall now pass to the second one that we call a proprium in God, and see what we have to say about that, and so on to the end.

[I/40] CHAPTER V
OF GOD’S PROVIDENCE

[1] The second ‘attribute’ which we call a Proprium is Providence, which according to us is nothing but that striving we find both in the [5] whole of Nature and in particular things, tending to maintain and preserve their being. For it is evident that no thing, through its own nature, could strive for its own destruction, but that on the contrary, each thing in itself has a striving to preserve itself in its state, and bring itself to a better one.1

[10] [2] So according to this definition of ours, we posit a universal and a particular Providence. The universal is that through which each thing is produced and maintained insofar as it is a part of the whole of Nature. The particular Providence is that striving which each particular [15] thing has for the preservation of its being insofar as it is considered not as a part of Nature, but as a whole.

This may be explained by the following example. All man’s limbs are provided and cared for, insofar as they are parts of man: That is [20] universal providence. The particular is that striving that each particular limb (as a whole, not as a part of man) has to preserve and maintain its own well-being.

CHAPTER VI
OF GOD’S PREDESTINATION1

[25] [1] The third ‘attribute,’ we say, is divine Predestination.

1. We have already proven above that God cannot omit doing what he does, viz. that he has created everything so perfect, that it cannot be more perfect.

2. And moreover, that without him no thing can be or be understood. [30]

[2] It remains now to consider whether there are any contingent things in Nature, viz. whether there are any things that can happen [I/41] and also can not happen. And again, whether there is any thing of which we cannot ask why it is? That there are no contingent things we prove as follows:

If something has no cause of its existence, it is impossible for it to [5] exist. Something that is contingent has no cause. Therefore.

The first [premise] is beyond all dispute. The second we prove as follows:

If something that is contingent has a determinate and certain cause of its existence, then it must exist necessarily. But that something should be both contingent and necessary is self-contradictory. Therefore.

[10] [3] Perhaps someone will say that, indeed, something contingent has no determinate and certain cause, but a contingent cause.

If that were so, it would be either in a divided sense or in a composite one, viz. either the existence of that cause is contingent (but not its being a cause), or it is contingent that that thing (which itself would [15] necessarily exist in Nature) should be a cause of the production of the contingent thing. But in either sense, this is false.

For as far as the first is concerned, if the contingent thing is contingent because its cause is contingent [with respect to its existence], then [20] that cause must also be contingent because the cause that produced it is also contingent [with respect to its existence,] and so on, to infinity. And because we have already proven that everything depends on one single cause, then that cause would also have to be contingent. And this is plainly false.

[25] As for the second, if that cause were not more determined to produce the one rather than the other, i.e., either to produce this something, or to omit producing it, then it would at the same time be impossible both that it should produce it and that it should omit producing it. This is an outright contradiction.

[30] [4] Regarding our second question: whether there is any thing in Nature of which one cannot ask why it exists? our saying this indicates that we must investigate through what cause a thing exists. For if that [cause] did not exist, it would be impossible for this something to exist.

[I/42] We must seek this cause, then, either in the thing or outside it. But if someone asks what rule we should follow in this investigation, we say it does not seem that any at all is necessary. For if existence belongs to the nature of the thing, then certainly we must not seek the [5] cause outside it. But if existence does not belong to the nature of the thing, then we must always seek its cause outside it. And since the former is true only of God, this shows (as we have already proven before) that God alone is the first cause of everything.

[10] [5] And from this it is also evident, then, that this or that will of man must also have an external cause by which it is necessarily produced (for the will’s existence does not belong to its essence). This is also clear from everything we have said in this chapter. And it will be [15] even more evident when we treat of man’s freedom in the second part.

[6] Against all this, others object: how is it possible that God, who is said to be supremely perfect, and the only cause, disposer and provider [20] of all things, nevertheless permits such a confusion to be seen everywhere in Nature? And also, why has he not created man so that he could not sin?

[7] First, then, it cannot rightly be said that there is confusion in Nature, since no one knows all the causes of things, and so no one [25] can judge them.

But this objection arises from ignorance, from the fact that men have formed universal Ideas, with which they think the particulars must agree in order to be perfect. They maintain, then, that these [30] Ideas are in God’s intellect, as many of Plato’s followers have said, viz. that these universal ideas (such as rational animal, etc.) have been created by God.

And though Aristotle’s followers say, of course, that these things are not actual, but only beings of reason, nevertheless they very often regard them as things. For they have said clearly that [God’s] providence [I/43] does not extend to particulars, but only to kinds.2 E.g., God has never exercised his providence over Bucephalus, but only over the whole genus Horse. They say also that God has no knowledge of particular and corruptible things, but only of universals, which in [5] their opinion are incorruptible.3

But we have rightly regarded this as indicating their ignorance; for all and only the particulars have a cause, not the universals, because they are nothing.

God, then, is a cause of, and provider for, only particular things. [10] So if particular things have to agree with another nature, they will not be able to agree with their own, and consequently will not be able to be what they truly are. E.g., if God had created all men like Adam was before the fall, then he would have created only Adam, and not [15] Peter or Paul. But God’s true perfection is that he gives all things their essence, from the least to the greatest; or to put it better, he has everything perfect in himself.

[8] As for the question, why did God not create men so that they would not sin? the following reply will serve: whatever is said about [20] sin is said only in respect to our knowledge, as when we compare two things with each other, or [consider one thing]4 in different respects. For example, if someone has made a clock precisely to strike and show the time, and that mechanism agrees well with its maker’s intention, [25] one says it is good; if not, one says it is bad, notwithstanding the fact that then it could also be good, provided his intention had been to make it confused and so that it did not strike at the hour.

[9] We conclude, then, by saying that Peter must agree with the [30] Idea of Peter, as is necessary, and not with the Idea of Man; good and evil, or sins, are nothing but modes of thinking, not things, or anything that has existence. Perhaps we shall show this more fully in what follows.

For all things and actions which are in Nature are perfect.

[I/44] CHAPTER VII
OF THE ‘ATTRIBUTES’ WHICH DO NOT BELONG TO GOD

[1] Here we shall begin to discuss those ‘attributes’a which are commonly [5] ascribed to God, but which do not belong to him, and also those through which they try in vain to define God.2 We shall also speak of the rules of true definition.

[2] To do this, we shall not trouble ourselves much with the things men commonly imagine about God; we shall only investigate briefly [10] what the philosophers can tell us about him.

They have defined God as a being existing of himself, cause of all things, omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, simple, infinite, the greatest good, of infinite compassion, etc.

[15] But before we enter into this investigation, let us first see what they allow us [to say about God].

[3] First, they say that no true or legitimate definition of God can be given; for they think there can be no definition except by genus [20] and difference, and since God is not a species of any genus, he cannot be properly or legitimately defined.3

[I/45] [4] Next, they say again that God cannot be defined because the definition must represent the thing absolutely and affirmatively, and in their view one cannot know God affirmatively, but only negatively.[5]4 So no legitimate definition of God can be given.

[5] Moreover, they also say that God can never be proven a priori (because he has no cause), but only probably, or through his effects.5

Because they have sufficiently conceded, by these doctrines, that [10] they have a very slight and inconsiderable knowledge of God, we may now go on to investigate their definition.

[6] First, we do not see that they give us here any Attributes through which it is known what the thing (God) is, but only Propria, which [15] indeed belong to a thing, but never explain what it is. For though existing of itself, being the cause of all things, the greatest good, eternal, and immutable, etc., are proper to God alone, nevertheless through those propria we can know neither what the being to which these propria [20] belong is, nor what attributes it has.

[7] It is time now also to look at those things which they ascribe to God, and which, nevertheless, do not belong to him,b such as being omniscient, compassionate, wise, etc. Because these things are only certain [25] modes of the thinking thing, they can neither be nor be understood without that substance of which they are modes. That is why they cannot be attributed to him, who is a being existing of himself, without anything else.

[8] Finally, they call him the greatest good. But if by that they [30] understand anything other than what they have already said, viz. that God is immutable, and a cause of all things, then they are confused in their own concept or have not been able to understand themselves. This arises from their error regarding good and evil, since they think [I/46] man himself, and not God, is the cause of his sins and evil. But according to what we have already proven, this cannot be, unless we are compelled to maintain that man is also a cause of himself. But this [5] will be still clearer when we treat, afterwards, of man’s will.

[9] Now we must untangle the sophistries by which they try to excuse their lack of knowledge of God.

[10] First, then, they say that a legitimate definition must be by genus and difference. But though all the logicians admit this, I do not know where they get it from.

Certainly if this must be true, then one can know nothing. For if [15] we can only know a thing perfectly through a definition consisting of genus and difference, then we can never know perfectly the highest genus, which has no genus above it. Now if the highest genus, which is the cause of the knowledge of all other things, is not known, the [20] other things which are explained by that genus are much less known or understood.

However, since we are free, and do not consider ourselves in any way bound to their positions, we shall produce, according to the true Logic, other laws of definition, guided by the division of Nature we [25] make.

[10] We have already seen that the attributes (or as others call them substances) are things, or, to put it better and more properly, a being existing through itself; and that this being therefore makes itself known [30] through itself. We see that other things are only modes of those attributes, and without them can neither exist nor be understood.

So definitions must be of two kinds:6

1. Of attributes, which are of a self-existing being; these require no genus, or anything else through which they are better understood [I/47] or explained; for since they, as attributes of a being existing through itself, exist through themselves, they are also known through themselves.

2. Of those things which do not exist through themselves, but [5] only through the attributes of which they are modes, and through which, as their genus, they must be understood.

And this is what we have to say about their position on definitions.

[11] Regarding their second claim, that we cannot know God with [10] an adequate knowledge, Descartes has answered this satisfactorily, in his reply to the objections regarding this.7

[12] And as for their third contention—that God cannot be proven a priori—we have already answered that previously. Since God is the [15] cause of himself, it is enough that we prove him through himself, and such a proof is much more conclusive than an a posteriori one, which usually proceeds only by external causes.8

CHAPTER VIII
OF Natura naturans

[20] Here, before we proceed to anything else, we shall briefly divide the whole of Nature into Natura naturans and Natura naturata. By Natura naturans we understand a being that we conceive clearly and distinctly through itself, without needing anything other than itself (like all the [25] attributes which we have so far described), i.e., God. The Thomists have also understood God by this phrase, but their Natura naturans was a being (as they called it) beyond all substances.1

We shall divide Natura naturata in two: a universal and a particular. [30] The universal consists in all those modes which depend on God immediately. We shall treat them in the next chapter. The particular consists in all those singular things which are produced by the universal modes. So Natura naturata requires some substances in order to be conceived properly.

[I/48] CHAPTER IX
OF Natura naturata

[1] Turning now to universal Natura naturata, or those modes or creatures which immediately depend on, or have been created by God—we [5] know only two of these: Motiona in matter, and Intellect in the thinking thing. We say, then, that these have been from all eternity, and will remain to all eternity, immutable, a work truly as great as the greatness of the workman.

[10] [2] With regard particularly to Motion, it belongs more properly to a treatise on Natural science than here, [to show] that it has been from all eternity, and will remain to all eternity, immutable, that it is infinite in its kind, that it can neither exist nor be understood through [15] itself, but only through Extension. So we shall not treat any of these things here, but shall say only that it is a Son,1 product or effect, created immediately by God.

[3] As for Intellect in the thinking thing, this too is a Son, product [20] or immediate creature of God, also created by him from all eternity, and remaining immutable to all eternity. Its sole property is to understand everything clearly and distinctly at all times. From this arises immutably a satisfaction infinite, or most perfect, since it cannot omit [25] doing what it does. And though what we have just said is sufficiently clear through itself, we shall nevertheless prove it more clearly later when we treat of the Affections of the Soul. So we shall say no more about it here.

[I/49] CHAPTER X
WHAT GOOD AND EVIL ARE

[1] To say briefly now what good and evil are in themselves, we begin as follows:

[5] Some things are in our intellect and not in Nature; so these are only our own work, and they help us to understand things distinctly. Among these we include all relations, which have reference to different things. These we call beings of reason.

[2] So the question now is whether good and evil should be regarded [10] as beings of reason or as real beings. But since good and evil are nothing but relations, they must, beyond any doubt, be regarded as beings of reason. For one never says that something is good except in respect to something else that is not so good, or not so useful to us as something [15] else. So one says that a man is bad only in respect to one who is better, or that an apple is bad only in respect to another that is good, or better. None of this could possibly be said if there were not something [20] better, or good, in respect to which [the bad] is so called.

[3] Therefore, if one says that something is good, that is nothing but saying that it agrees well with the universal Idea which we have of such things. But as we have already said, things must agree with [25] their particular Ideas, whose being must be a perfect essence, and not with universal ones, because then they would not exist.

[4] [As for confirming what we have just said, the thing is clear to us, but to conclude what we have said we shall add the following proofs.

[30] All things which exist in Nature are either things or actions.

Now good and evil are neither things nor actions.

Therefore, good and evil do not exist in Nature.

[I/50] For if good and evil were things or actions, they would have to have their definitions. But good and evil, say, Peter’s goodness and Judas’s evil, have no definitions apart from the [particular] essence[s] of Judas and Peter, for these [essences] alone [are] in Nature, and without them [the goodness of Peter and the evil of Judas] cannot be defined. Therefore, [5] as above, it follows that good and evil are not things or actions which are in Nature.]1

[I/51] The Second Part On Man and What Pertains to Him

PREFACE TO THE SECOND PART

[1] Because we have spoken in the First Part of God, and of the universal and infinite things, in this Second Part we shall now proceed to [10] treat of particular and limited things—not of all of them, since they are innumerable, but only of those that concern man. And first we shall consider what man is, insofar as he consists of certain modes (contained in those two attributes which we have noted in God).

[15] [2] I say of certain modes because I do not at all think that man, [I/52] insofar as he consists of a mind, soul, or body, is a substance. For we have shown previously, at the beginning of this book;1

1. That no substance can begin;

2. That one substance cannot produce another; and finally,

[I/53] 3. That there cannot be two equal substances.

[3] Since man, then, has not existed from eternity, is limited, and equal to2 many men, he cannot be a substance, so that whatever he [5] has of thinking are only modes of the attribute of thought which we ascribe to God. And again, whatever he has of form, motion, etc., are similarly modes of that other attribute which is ascribed to God.

[4] And though some try to prove that man is a substance from the [10] fact that the nature of man can neither exist nor be understood without those attributes which we ourselves concede to be substance, nevertheless, this has no other foundation than false suppositions.

For because the nature of matter or body has existed before the form [15] of this human body existed, that nature cannot be peculiar to the human body, because it is clear that at that time when man did not exist, it could not have belonged to man’s nature.

[5] And we deny what they make a fundamental principle: that that [20] belongs to the nature of a thing without which the thing can neither exist nor be understood. For we have already proven that without God no thing can either exist or be understood. I.e., God must first exist and be understood before these particular things exist and are understood. [25] Also, we have shown that genera do not belong to the nature of definition but that such things, which cannot exist without others, also cannot be understood without them. Since this is so, what rule do we lay down, by which one will know what belongs to the nature of a thing?

[30] The rule is this: That belongs to the nature of a thing without which the thing can neither exist nor be understood: but this is not sufficient; it must be in such a way that the proposition is always convertible, viz. that what is said also can neither be nor be understood without the thing.

[35] We shall begin, then, to treat of these modes of which man consists at the start of the first chapter, which follows.

[I/51/16] 1.3 Our soul is either a substance or a mode; not a substance, for we have already proven that there can be no limited substance in Nature. Therefore, a mode.

2. Being a mode, then, it must be a mode either of substantial extension or substantial thought; not of extension because etc.; therefore, [20] of thought.

3. Because substantial thought cannot be limited, it is infinitely perfect in its kind, and an attribute of God.

4. A perfect thought must have a knowledge, idea, mode of thinking, [25] of each and every thing that exists, both of substances and of modes, without exception.

5. We say “that exists” because we are not speaking here of a knowledge, Idea, etc., which knows the whole of Nature, the connection of all beings according to their essences, without knowing their particular [30] existence, but only of the knowledge, Idea, etc., of particular things which continually come into existence.

6. This knowledge, Idea, etc., of each particular thing which comes to exist, is, we say, the soul of this particular thing.

[I/52] 7. Each and every particular thing that comes to exist becomes such [5] through motion and rest. The same is true of all modes in the substantial extension we call body.

8. The differences between [one body and another] arise only from the different proportions of motion and rest, by which this one is so, and not so, is this and not that.

[10] 9. From this proportion of motion and rest, then, there comes to exist also this body of ours, of which (no less than of all other things) there must exist a knowledge, Idea, etc., in the thinking thing. This Idea, knowledge, etc., then, is also our soul.

10. But our body had a different proportion of motion and rest [15] when we were unborn children, and later when we are dead, it will have still another. Nevertheless, there was before our birth, and will be after our death, an Idea, knowledge, etc., of our body in the thinking thing, as there is now. But it was not, and will not be at all the same, because now it has a different proportion of motion and rest.

[20] 11. To produce in substantial thought an Idea, knowledge, mode of thinking, such as [this soul of] ours now is, not just any body whatever is required (for then it would have to be known differently than it is), but one which has this proportion of motion and rest and no other. For as the body is, so is the soul, Idea, knowledge, etc.

[25] 12. So if such a body has and preserves its proportion—say of 1 to 3—the soul and the body will be like ours now are; they will, of course, be constantly subject to change, but not to such a great change that it goes beyond the limits of from 1 to 3; and as much as it changes, so also the soul changes each time.

[30] 13. And this change, which arises in us from the fact that other bodies act on ours, cannot occur without the soul’s becoming aware of it, since it, too, changes constantly. And this change [i.e., in the soul] is really what we call sensation.

14. But if other bodies act on ours with such force that the proportion [35] of motion [to rest] cannot remain 1 to 3, that is death, and a destruction of the soul, insofar as it is only an Idea, knowledge, etc. of a body having this proportion of motion and rest.

15. However, because it is a mode in the thinking substance, it has been able to know and love this [substance] also, as well as that of [40] extension; and uniting itself with these substances (which always remain the same), it has been able to make itself eternal.4

[I/54] CHAPTER I
OF OPINION, BELIEF AND SCIENCE

[1] To begin our discussion of the modesa of which man consists, we shall say: 1. what they are, 2. what their effects are, and 3. what their [5] cause is.

Regarding the first, let us begin with those which are first 1known to us, viz. certain perceptions,1 or the consciousness, of the knowledge of ourselves and of those things that are outside us.2

[10] [2] We acquire these 2perceptions, then, either 1. simply through ‘belief’b (which comes either from experience or from report), or 2. through a true belief, or 3. through a clear and distinct concept.

[15] The first is commonly subject to error. The second and third, though they differ from one another, cannot err.

[3] To make this somewhat more clearly understood, we shall use an example taken from the rule of three.

[20] Someonec has merely heard someone else say that if, in the rule of three, you multiply the second and third numbers, and divide the product by the first, you then find the fourth number, which has the same proportion to the third as the second has to the first. And in spite of the fact that the one who told him this could have been lying, [25] he still governed his actions according to this rule, without having had any more knowledge of the rule of three than a blind man has of color. So whatever he may have been able to say about it, he repeated, as a parrot repeats what it has been taught.

A second person,d of quicker perception, is not content in this way [30] with report, but tests it with some particular calculations, and finding that these agree with it, he gives his ‘belief’ to it. But we have rightly said that this one too is subject to error. For how can he be sure that [I/55] the experience of some particular [cases] can be a rule for him for all.

A third,e being satisfied neither with report, because it can deceive, nor with the experience of some particular [cases], because it cannot [5] be a rule, consults true reason, which has never, when properly used, been deceptive. Reason tells him that because of the property of proportionality in these numbers, this is so, and could not have been, or happened, otherwise.

[10] But a fourth,f who has the clearest knowledge of all, has no need either of report, or of experience, or of the art of reasoning, because through his penetration he immediately sees the proportionality in all the calculations.3

CHAPTER II
[15] WHAT OPINION, BELIEF AND CLEAR KNOWLEDGE ARE

[1] We shall now come to treat of the effects of the different kinds of knowledge of which we have spoken in the preceding chapter, and as in passing, say again what opinion, belief and clear knowledge are.1

[20] [2] We call the first opinion because it is subject to error, and has no place in anything of which we are certain, but only where guessing and speculating are spoken of.

aWe call the second belief, because the things we grasp only through [25] reason, we do not see, but know only through a conviction in the intellect that it must be so and not otherwise.

But we call that clear knowledge which comes not from being convinced by reasons, but from being aware of and enjoying the thing itself. This goes far beyond the others.

[30] [3] This said, let us come now to their effects. From the first, we say, come 3all the passions which are contrary to good reason; from [I/56] the second, the good 4Desires; and from the third, true and genuine 5Love, with all that comes of that.

[4] 6So we maintain that knowledge is the proximate cause of all the [5] ‘Passions’ of the soul.2 For we consider it quite impossible that if someone neither perceives nor knows in any of the preceding ways, he should be able to be moved to Love, or Desire, or any other modes of will.

CHAPTER III
[10] OF THE ORIGIN OF THE PASSIONS IN OPINION

[1] Let us now see how the Passions arise, as we have said, from opinion. And to make this more intelligible, we shall take some particular [15] cases, and prove what we say by using them as examples.

[2] Let us take Wonder 7first. This is found in one who knows the thing in the first way, for because he draws a universal conclusion from some particular [cases],1 he is astonished when he sees something [20] that goes against this conclusion of hisa—like someone who has never seen any sheep without short tails, and wonders at those from Morocco, which have long ones.

[I/57] Similarly, they tell of a Peasant who deluded himself into thinking that, outside his fields, there were no others. But one day he missed one of his cows, and had to go far away in search of her. He was astonished that outside his own small farm there were so very many [5] others.

[3] Many Philosophers must also be like that. They have deluded themselves into thinking that beyond this plot of ground, or little globe, on which they are, there is nothing more (because they have seen nothing else). But there is no wonder in him who draws true conclusions. [10] This is one [passion].

[4]b The 8second will be love.2 Since this arises either from true perceptions, or from opinion, or finally, also from mere report, we shall first see how [it arises] from opinion, and then how [it arises] from [true] perceptions. For the first tends to our destruction, and the [15] second to our supreme salvation. And then [we shall see how it arises] from the last.

[5] Regarding the first, it is such that whenever someone sees something good, or thinks he does, he is always inclined to unite himself with it, and for the sake of the good that he perceives in it, he chooses [20] it as the best, apart from which he then knows nothing better or more pleasant.

But whenever it happens (as it usually does in these cases) that he comes to know something better than this good he now knows, then his love turns immediately from the first to the second. We shall make [25] all of this more evident when we discuss man’s freedom.

[6] Since this is not the place to speak of the love that arises from true perceptions,c we shall pass over them now, and speak of the third and last, viz. the love that comes from mere report.

[30] [7] We usually observe this in children in relation to their father. Because he says that this or that is good, they are inclined to it, without knowing anything more about it.

We also see it in those who, out of love, give up their lives for the Fatherland, and also in those who, because of a report about something, come to fall in love with it.

[I/58] [8] 9Hate, then, the direct opposite of Love, arises from that error which comes from opinion. For if someone has drawn the conclusion that something is good, and someone else does something to harm that thing, then the first person will acquire a hatred of the second. This [5] could never happen if one knew the true good, as we shall indicate later. For in comparison with the true good, whatever is, or is thought, is nothing but misery itself. And is not someone who loves misery in this way more worthy of compassion than of hate?

[10] Finally, Hate also comes from mere report—as we see in the Hate the Turks have against the Jews and the Christians, the Jews against the Turks and the Christians, and the Christians against the Jews and Turks, etc. For how ignorant most of these are of one another’s religion and customs.

[15] [9] As for 10desire—whether it consists (as some maintain) in an appetite or inclination to get what one lacks, or (as others contend), to preserve the things we already enjoyd—certainly it cannot be found to have occurred in anyone except for something which has seemed good.3

[20] [10] So it is clear that Desire, like the Love spoken of here, comes from the first kind of knowledge. For someone who hears that a thing is good acquires an appetite or inclination for it. This may be seen in a sick man, who, simply on hearing from the Doctor that such and such a remedy is good for his illness, is immediately inclined toward [25] it.

Desire comes also from experience,e as may be seen in the practice of Doctors. When they have found a certain remedy to be good in some cases, they usually regard it as something infallible.

[11] All that we have just said about these passions can equally be [30] said of all the others, as is clear to everyone. And since, in what follows, we shall begin to investigate which ones are rational for us, and which ones are irrational, we shall leave this topic for now and add no more.4

[I/59] CHAPTER IV
WHAT COMES FROM BELIEF [AND OF MAN’S GOOD AND EVIL]1

[1] In the preceding chapter we have shown how the passions arise [5] from the error of opinion. So now let us see the effects of the two other ways of knowing. First, of that which we have called true belief.a

[2] 12This shows us, indeed, what it belongs to the thing to be, but not what it truly is. That is why it can never unite us with the thing [10] we believe. I say, then, that it teaches us only what it belongs to the thing to be, not what it is. There is a great difference between the two. For as we have said in our example of the rule of three, if someone can discover through proportionality a fourth number that agrees [15] with the third as the second does with the first, then (having used multiplication and division) he can say that the four numbers must be proportional; but if this is so, then he speaks about it just as of a thing that is outside him. But if he comes to see the proportionality, as we [20] have shown in the fourth example, then he says that the thing is truly such, since then it is in him, not outside him. So much for the first effect of true belief.

[I/60] [3] The second is that it brings 13us to a clear understanding, through which we love God, and makes us perceive intellectually those things which are not in us, but outside us.

[5] [4] The third effect is that it provides 14us with the knowledge of good and evil, and shows us all the passions that are to be destroyed. And because, as we have already said, those passions which come from opinion are subject to great evil, it is worth the trouble to see [10] how they are sifted by this second kind of knowledge, to see what is good and what is evil in them.

b To do this conveniently, let us use the same method as before, and examine them closely, so as to know which we must choose and which [15] reject. But before we come to that, let us first say briefly what man’s good and evil are.

[5] We have already said before that all things are necessitated, and that in Nature there is no good and no evil. So whatever we require of [20] man, must relate only to his genus, and this is nothing but a being of reason. And when we have conceived an Idea of a 15perfect man in our intellect, that [Idea] 16could be a cause of our seeing (when we examine ourselves) whether we have any means of arriving at such a perfection.

[25] [6] 17Therefore, whatever helps us to attain that perfection, we shall call good, and whatever hinders our attaining it, or does not assist it, we shall call evil.

[7] 17I say, then, that I must conceive a perfect man, if I want to say anything regarding man’s good and evil. For if I discussed the [30] good and evil of, say, Adam, I would confuse a real being with a being of reason—something a true Philosopher must 18scrupulously avoid, for reasons we shall expound later, or on some other occasion.

[8] Since we are not aware of Adam’s end, or of that of any other [I/61] particular creature, except through the outcome, it follows that what we can say of man’s endc must be grounded on the concept in our intellect of a perfect man, whose end we can indeed know, because it [5] is a being of reason. We can also, as we have said, know his good and evil, which are only modes of thinking.

[9] To come gradually to the point, then, we have already indicated how the soul’s emotions, its passions and actions, arise from perception. [10] We have divided perception into four kinds: report alone, experience, belief, and clear knowledge. And since we have now seen the effects of all of these, it is evident from this that the fourth, 19clear knowledge, is the most perfect of all. For opinion often leads us into error; [15] true belief is good only because it is the way to true knowledge, awakening us to things that are truly worthy of love, so that the final end we seek, and the most excellent thing we know, is true knowledge.

[10] 20But this true knowledge is also distinguished according to the [20] objects presented to it. So the better the object with which it comes to unite itself, the better is this knowledge. 21And therefore, the most perfect man is the one who unites with the most perfect being, God, and thus enjoys him.

[11] So to discover what is good and evil in the Passions, let us take [25] them separately, as we have said. 22And first, Wonder. Because this arises either from ignorance or from prejudice, it is an imperfection in the man who is subject to this emotion. I say an imperfection, because Wonder through itself does not lead to any evil.

[I/62] CHAPTER V
OF LOVE

[1][3]1 Love, then, arises from the perception and knowledge which we have of a thing, and as the thing shows itself to be greater and [5] more magnificent, so also is our Love greater and greater.

[4] It is possible to rid ourselves of Love in two ways, either by knowledge of a better thing, or by finding that the thing we have loved, and have regarded as something great and magnificent, brings much misery with it.

[10] [2][5] But Love is also such that we never strive to free ourselves of it (as we do of wonder and the other passions). This is for two reasons: (1) because it is impossible; (2) because it is necessary that we not be free of it.

[15] [3] It is impossible because it does not depend on us, but only on the good or advantage we find in the object. If we did not want to love it, it would be necessary for us not to have known it before. And this does not depend on us or on our freedom. For if we knew nothing, [20] certainly we also were nothing.

[4] So it is necessary that we not be free of it, because, given the weakness of our nature, we could not exist if we did not enjoy something to which we were united, and by which we were strengthened.

[1] Love, then, is nothing but enjoying a thing and being united [25] with it.2 We divide it according to the qualities of the object man seeks to enjoy and unite with.

[5][2] 24Some objects are corruptible in themselves; 25others, through their cause, are not corruptible; but there is a third [object] which, [30] solely through its own power and capacity, is eternal and incorruptible.

The corruptible, then, are all the singular things, which have not existed from all time, or have had a beginning.

aThe next are all those modes which we have said are the cause of the singular modes.

[I/63] But the third is God, or what we take to be one and the same thing, the Truth.

[6] Which of these three kinds of object should we choose, and which reject?

[5] 27As far as the corruptible are concerned—because, as we have said, the weakness of our nature requires us to love something, and to unite ourselves with it, in order to exist—certainly loving them, and 28uniting ourselves with them, does not strengthen our nature at all. For they [10] are weak, and the one cripple cannot support the other. And not only do they not help us, but they are even harmful to 29us.

For we have said that Love is a union with an object that our intellect judges to be good and magnificent; and by that we understand a [15] union such that the lover3 and the loved come to be one and the same thing, or to form a whole together. So he who unites with corruptible things is always miserable. For because they are outside his power and subject to many accidents, it is impossible that, when they are acted on, he would be able to be freed of them.

[20] Consequently, we conclude that if they are so miserable who love corruptible things (which still have some essence), how miserable will they be who love honor, wealth, and sensual pleasure, which have no essence?4

[25] [7] Let this be enough, then, to show how 30Reason teaches us to separate ourselves from things so corruptible. For what we have just said indicates clearly to us the poison and the evil that lie hidden in the love of these things. But we shall see this incomparably more [30] clearly when we note how magnificent and excellent is the good from which we separate ourselves by enjoying these things.

[8] bWe said previously that the things that are corruptible are outside our power. Let us be properly understood. We do not mean that [I/64] we are a free cause, depending on nothing else. When we say that some things are in our power, and others outside it, we understand by those which are in our power those which we bring about through the order of, or together with, Nature, of which we are a part. By [5] those which are not in our power we understand those which, being outside us, do not undergo any changes through us, since they are very far removed from our actual essence, as it is constituted by Nature.

[9] Next we come to the second kind of objects. Though these are [10] eternal and incorruptible, they still are not such through their own power. 31And if we examine the question briefly, we shall immediately become aware that these are nothing but cmodes which depend immediately on God. Because that is their nature, we shall not be able to conceive them unless we have at the same time a concept of God. [15] Because he is perfect, our Love must necessarily rest in him. In a word, it will be impossible for us, if we use our intellect well, not to love God.

[10] The reasons why are clear:

[20] First, because we find that God alone has being, and all other things have no being, but are modes. And since modes cannot be understood properly without the being on which they immediately depend, and we have already shown that when we who love something come to [25] know something better than what we love, we always fall on it at once, and leave the first thing, it follows incontrovertibly that when we come to know God, who has all perfection in himself alone, we must love him.

[11] Second, if we use our intellect well in the knowledge of things, [30] we must know them in their causes. Now since God is a first cause of all other things, the knowledge of God is prior, according to the nature of things, to the knowledge of all other things, because the knowledge of all other things must follow from knowledge of the first [I/65] cause.

True love comes always from knowledge that the thing is splendid and good. What else, then, can follow, but that love will be able to pour forth more powerfully on the lord 32our God than on anyone [5] else? For he alone is magnificent, and a perfect Good.

[12] So we see, then, how we make Love powerful,5 and also how it must rest only in God. What we had to say further about Love, we shall try to do when we treat of the last kind of knowledge. Now we [10] shall return to our promised investigation of which ‘passions’6 we have to accept, and which reject.

CHAPTER VI
OF HATE

[15] [1] Hate is an Inclination to avoid something which has caused us some evil.1

Here we note that we perform our actions in two ways, viz. with or without passions. A common example of an action with passions [20] occurs in the treatment masters accord their servants who have done wrong, for this is commonly accompanied by anger. Socrates, they say, provides us with an example of action without the passions. For when he was obliged to correct his servant by punishing him, he did [25] not do this so long as he was aware of being angry at him.

[2] Because we see now that we perform our actions either with or without passions, we 33consider it clear that such things as are, or have been, an obstacle to us can be removed, if necessary, without emotion on our part. So which is better: that we should shun things with Aversion and Hate? or that through the power of reason we should [I/66] endure them without emotion (for we consider this possible)?

First, it is certain that when we do the things we must without passion, then no evil can come of that. And as there is no mean between [5] good and evil, we see that if it is evil to act with passion, it must be good to act 34without it.

[3] But let us see whether there is anything evil in shunning things with Hate and Aversion.

As for the Hate which stems from opinion, certainly that should [10] have no place in us. For we know that one and the same thing is at one time good for us, at another, bad for us (as is always the case with medicinal herbs).

So in the end, it comes to this: does Hate arise in us only through opinion, or sometimes also through true reasoning? To answer this, it [15] seems good to us to explain clearly what Hate is, and to distinguish it from aversion.

[4] I say, then, that Hate is an emotion of the soul against someone who has knowingly and willingly done us some ill. But aversion is that emotion against a thing which arises in us from some trouble or [20] injury which we either understand or opine it to cause by its nature.

I say by nature, for if we do not think so, then we are not averse to it, even though we have received some hindrance or injury from it, because, on the contrary, we expect some advantage from it—as someone [25] who has been hurt by a stone or a knife does not, on that account, have any aversion to it.

[5] This being noted, let us look briefly at the effects of both of these. From Hate, then, comes sadness; 36and if the Hate is great, it [30] produces anger, which strives not only (like Hate) to shun what is hated, but also to destroy it, if possible. This great Hate also produces Envy.

But 37 Aversion produces some sadness because we strive to deprive ourselves of something which, being real, must always have also its own essence and perfection.

[I/67] [6] From what we have said, then, it can easily be understood that, when we use our reason well, we can have no Hate or Aversion toward anything, because in [having such emotions] we deprive ourselves of the perfection that is in each thing. And so we also see through [5] reason that we can never have any Hate toward anyone, because if we will something regarding anything in Nature, we must always change it for the better, either for ourselves or for the thing itself.

[7] And because a perfect man is the best of all that we presently [10] know, or have before our eyes, then it is by far the best, both for us and for everyone individually, that we strive at all times to bring [men] to that perfect state. For only then can we have from them, and they from us, the greatest benefit.

The way to do this is for us always to treat them as our good [15] Conscience constantly teaches and exhorts us to do. For this never prompts us to our destruction, but always to our salvation.

[8] In conclusion we say that Hate and Aversion have in them as many imperfections as love has perfections. For love always produces [20] improvement, strengthening, and increase, which is perfection.2 Hate, on the other hand, always leads to desolation, weakening, and destruction, which is imperfection itself.

CHAPTER VII
OF JOY AND SADNESS1

[1]a We have seen that hate and wonder are such that we may freely say that they can have no place in those who use their intellect as they should. So we shall now proceed in the same way and speak of the other passions. To begin with, the first will be bDesire and Joy.

[I/68] Since these arise from the same causes as love does, we have nothing to say about them except that we must remember what we said then. With that we leave them.

[5] [2]c To these we shall add Sadness, of which we dare say that it arises only from opinion and the error2 which follows from that. For it comes from the loss of some good.

Now we have said before that everything we do must tend toward advancement and improvement. But it is certain that so long as we are [10] sad, we make ourselves incapable of doing such things. Therefore we must free ourselves of it. We can do this by thinking of ways to regain what we have lost, if this is in our power. If not, we must still dispel the Sadness, in order not to fall into all the misery that it necessarily [15] brings with it. Whichever we do, it must be with Joy. For it is foolish to want to recover and reclaim a lost good by an evil we ourselves have desired and fostered.

[3] Finally, he who uses his intellect properly must know God first, since God, as we have proven, is the greatest good, and all good. So [20] it follows incontrovertibly that someone who uses his intellect properly cannot fall into Sadness. For how could he? He rests in that good which is all good, and in which there is the fullness of all Joy and satisfaction.

CHAPTER VIII
[25] OF ESTEEM AND DISDAIN1

[1]a Now we shall speak of Esteem and Disdain, of Legitimate Self-esteem and Humility, of Pride and Self-depreciation. To distinguish the good and evil in them, we shall take them one by one.

[30] [2] Esteem and Disdain occur only when we judge something to be great or small, whether this great or small thing is inside us or outside us.2

[I/69] [3] Legitimate Self-esteem does not extend to things outside us and is only attributed to one who knows his perfection according to its true worth, without passion, and without regard to [others’] esteem of him.

[5] [4] Humility exists when someone knows his own imperfection, without regard to [others’] disdain of him; it does not extend to anything outside the humble man.

[5] Pride exists when someone attributes to himself a perfection that is not to be found in him.

[10] [6] Self-depreciation exists when someone attributes to himself an imperfection that does not belong to him.

Here I am talking not about hypocrites, who depreciate themselves to deceive others, without meaning what they say, but about those who believe themselves to be as imperfect as they say they are.

[15] [7] From what we have now noted, it is clear enough what there is of good and evil in each of these ‘passions.’

As far as Legitimate Self-esteem and Humility are concerned, through themselves they show their excellence. For we say that he who has [20] these knows his perfection or imperfection according to its worth. And this, as reason teaches us, is the chief means of attaining our perfection. For if we know our power and perfection accurately, we thereby see clearly what we must do to attain our good end. And again, if we [25] know our defect and lack of power, we see what we must avoid.

[8] As for Pride and Self-depreciation, their definitions indicate that they arise from a kind of error.3 For we said that Pride is attributed to one who ascribes to himself some perfection, which does not belong [30] to him. And Self-depreciation is the direct opposite.

[9] This said, it is evident that Legitimate Self-esteem and true Humility4 are as good and salutary as Pride and Self-depreciation are evil and destructive. For the former not only put their possessor in a very good state, but they are also the true stairway on which we climb to our highest salvation.

[I/70] The latter two, on the other hand, not only prevent us from attaining our perfection, but lead us to total destruction. Self-depreciation is what prevents us from doing what we should otherwise have to do [5] to become perfect. We see this in the Skeptics, who deny that man can have any truth, and by that denial, deprive themselves of having truth. Pride is what causes us to undertake things that tend directly to our destruction. We see this in all those who have been, or are, deluded into thinking that they stand wonderfully well with God; [10] standing in awe of no danger, ready for everything, they brave fire and water in their pride, and so die most miserably.

[10] As for Esteem and Disdain, there is no more to say of these, except to keep in mind what we have said of love.5

[15] CHAPTER IX
OF HOPE, FEAR, ETC.

[1]a We shall now begin to speak of Hope and Fear, Confidence, Despair, and Vacillation, Strength of Character, Tenacity and Emulation, Cowardice, Consternation, [and Jealousy]. As usual, we shall [20] take them one by one, and then indicate which of these are a hindrance and which can be advantageous.

We shall be able to do all this very easily, provided we take note of the conceptions which we can have of a thing which is to come, whether [25] it is good or evil.

[2] The conceptions we have in respect to the thing itself are either that we regard the thing as contingent, i.e., as able to happen or not happen, or that we regard it as happening necessarily. This is in respect to the thing itself.

[30] With respect to him who conceives the thing, [we conceive] either that he must do something to further the thing’s happening, or that he must do something to prevent it.

[3] From these conceptions all these ‘passions’ come, in the following [I/71] way. If we conceive that a future thing is good, and that it could happen, then from this the soul acquires a form that we call Hope. This is nothing but a certain kind of joy, mixed, however, with a certain sadness.

[5] And again, if we judge that the thing possible in the future is evil, the soul acquires from this the form we call Fear.

But if we conceive the thing to be good, and at the same time as necessarily to come, then from this there comes into the soul that tranquillity which we call Confidence. This is a kind of joy which is [10] not, as hope is, mixed with sadness.

But if we conceive a thing to be evil, and as necessarily to come, from this there arises in the soul Despair, which is nothing but a certain kind of sadness.

[4] So far our definitions of the passions considered in this Chapter [15] have been put in an affirmative way, and we have thus said what each of them is. But we can reverse the procedure and define them negatively, as follows: we hope that the evil will not come; we fear that the good will not come; we are confident that the evil will not come; [20] we despair that the good will not come.

[5] This will suffice for the passions insofar as they come from conceptions in respect to the thing itself. We must now speak of those which arise from conceptions in respect to him who conceives the [25] thing:

If we must do something to bring the thing about, and [can] make no decision about the thing, then the soul acquires a form we call Vacillation.

But if it decides in a manly way to bring the thing about, and this [30] can be done, then this is called Strength of Character. And if the thing is difficult to bring about, it is called Tenacity, or Bravery. When, however, someone decides to do a thing because someone else has done it before him with success, that is called Emulation.

If someone knows what decision he must make, to further a good [I/72] thing and prevent an evil one, and nevertheless does not do this, one calls this Cowardice, and if it is very great, Consternation.

Finally, Jealousy is an anxiety one has about being allowed to enjoy [5] and preserve exclusively something that has already been acquired.

[6] Because we now know how these ‘passions’ arise, it will be quite easy for us to show which are good and which are evil.

As for Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, and Jealousy, it is certain [10] that they arise from an incorrect opinion. For as we have already proven, all things have their necessary causes and must happen as they do happen.

And though 37Confidence and Despair seem to have a place in the [15] inviolable order and series of causes (for there everything is inviolable and unalterable), nevertheless when we examine the matter rightly, we find that is far from being the truth. For Confidence and Despair never exist unless Hope and Fear have previously existed (for they have their being from them).

[20] For example, if someone thinks something he is waiting for is good, he acquires in his soul that form we call Hope; and if he is assured of what he thinks is good, then his soul acquires that satisfaction we call Confidence.

What we have just said about Confidence must also be said about [25] Despair. But according to what we said about love, these [passions] can have no place in a perfect man: because they presuppose things we must not attach ourselves to, since they are subject to change (as is noted in relation to the definition of love).

[30] Nor may we have an aversion to them (as is shown in relation to the definition of hate). Nevertheless, the man who has these passions is always subject to such attachments and aversions.

[7] 38As for Vacillation, Cowardice, and Consternation, their very kind and nature indicates their imperfection. For whatever they contribute [I/73] to our advantage comes from actions of their nature only negatively. For example, someone hopes for something which he thinks is good, but which is not good. Nevertheless, because of his Vacillation or Cowardice, he happens to lack the Strength of Character required [5] to carry it out. So, negatively, or by chance, he is freed of the evil he thought was good.

These, then, also cannot have any place in the man who is led by true reason.

[8] Finally, regarding Strength of Character, Tenacity and Emulation, [10] there is nothing else to say about them except what we have already said about love and hate.

CHAPTER X
OF REMORSE AND REPENTANCE

[1]a Now we shall speak of Remorse and Repentance, but only briefly. [15] These occur only by surprise;1 for Remorse proceeds only from our doing something of which we afterwards doubt whether it is good or evil, while Repentance proceeds from our having done something evil.

[2] And because many people who use their intellect well sometimes [20] go astray, lacking the discipline required to always use their intellect properly, some might perhaps think that Remorse and Repentance would bring them to the right path, and conclude, as the whole world does,2 that these are good.

[25] But if we consider them correctly, we shall find that they are not only not good, 39but on the contrary, injurious, and consequently evil. For it is manifest that we always come to the right path more through reason and love of truth than through Remorse and Repentance. And [30] because they are species of sadness, which we have already proven to be injurious, and which we must therefore strive to avoid, as an evil, these too are injurious, evil, and to be shunned and fled.

[I/74] CHAPTER XI
OF MOCKERY AND RIDICULE

[1]a Mockery and Ridicule rest on a false opinion and indicate an imperfection in him who mocks and ridicules.

[5] They rest on a false opinion, because one thinks that he who is mocked is the first cause of his actions, and that they do not (like other things in Nature) depend necessarily on God.

They indicate an imperfection in him who mocks because either [10] what is mocked is ridiculous or it is not. If not, the mockery shows that he is ill-natured, mocking what does not deserve to be mocked. If it is ridiculous, then the mockery shows that he recognizes in the one mocked an imperfection which he ought improve with good reasons, [15] not mockery.1

[2] Laughter is not related to another, but only to the man who notices something good in himself; and because it is a certain kind of joy, there is nothing to say about it which has not already been said about joy.

[20] I am speaking here of such laughter as is produced by a certain idea which rouses one to laugh, not of the laughter produced by a motion of the [animal] spirits.2 Since the latter has no relation to good or evil, it would be out of place to speak of it here.

[3] We shall say nothing here about Envy, Anger, and Indignation, [25] except to recall what we have previously said about hate.

CHAPTER XII
OF LOVE OF ESTEEM, SHAME AND SHAMELESSNESS

[1]a We shall now speak briefly about Love of Esteem,1 Shame and Shamelessness.

[30] The first is a certain kind of joy which everyone feels in himself when he becomes aware that his conduct is esteemed and praised by others, without regard to any advantage or profit they have in view.

[I/75] Shame is a certain sadness which arises in someone if he comes to see that his conduct is disdained by others, without regard to any disadvantage or injury they have in view.

[5] Shamelessness is nothing but a lack or rejection of Shame, not through reason, but either through ignorance of Shame (as in children, savages, etc.), or through having been so greatly disdained that one now will do anything without regard to criticism.

[2] Now that we know these passions, we also know the vanity and [10] imperfection they have in them. For not only are Love of Esteem and Shame not advantageous, according to what we have noted in their definitions, they are also injurious and objectionable, insofar as they are built on self-love, and on an error, that man is a first cause of his own actions, and consequently deserving of praise and blame.

[15] [3] But I don’t mean that one must live among men as one would live without them, where Love of Esteem and Shame have no place. On the contrary, I grant that we are permitted not only to use [these passions] for men’s advantage and improvement, but also to do this even if it involves a restriction of our own freedom, which is otherwise [20] complete and lawful.

For example, if someone dresses expensively in order to be honored for that, then he seeks an Esteem that arises from self-love, not from any regard for his fellow men: But if someone sees that men disdain [25] his wisdom, by which he could be helpful to his fellow men, and trample it under foot because he dresses badly, then he does well if he provides himself with clothing that will not shock them, thereby becoming like his fellow men in order to win them over and help them.

[30] [4] As for Shamelessness, this shows itself to be such that we need only its definition to see its deformity. And that will be enough for us.

[I/76] CHAPTER XIII
OF FAVOR, GRATITUDE AND INGRATITUDE.1

[1] We come now to Favor, Gratitude and Ingratitude. As for the first two, they are inclinations the soul has to desire and to do some good [5] to its fellows. To desire, I say, when to one who has done some good, good is done in return; to do, I say, when we ourselves have obtained or received some good.2

[2] I know, of course, that all men judge these passions to be good. [10] But notwithstanding that, I dare say they can have no place in a perfect man. For a perfect man is moved to help his fellow man only by necessity, without any other cause. And therefore he finds himself all the more obliged to help the most godless, since he sees that they have [15] the greater misery and need.

[3] Ingratitude is a disdain for Gratitude (as shamelessness is for shame), arising not from reason, but either from greed or from an all too great love of oneself. That is why it can have no place in a perfect [20] man.

CHAPTER XIV
OF LONGING

[1]a We shall conclude our treatment of the passions by speaking about Longing. Longing is a kind of sadness arising from the consideration [25] of some good that we have lost and that there is no hope of our regaining.

It manifests its imperfection to us in such a way that as soon as we examine it, we find it to be bad. For we have already proven that it [30] is bad to tie ourselves to things which can easily, or at some time, fail us, and which we cannot have when we will. And because it is a certain kind of sadness, we have to avoid it, as we noted before, when we were treating of sadness.

[I/77] [2] I think I have now indicated sufficiently, and proven, that it is only true belief or reason that leads us to the knowledge of good and [5] evil. So when we prove that the first and principal cause of all these ‘passions’ is knowledge, then it will be clearly evident that when we use our intellect and reason properly, we can never fall into one of [10] those we are to reject. I say our intellect, for I do not think that reason alone has the power to free us from all of these, as we shall prove later, in its place.

[3] But we must note here an excellent thing about the ‘passions,’ [15] viz. we see and find that all those ‘passions’ which are good are of such a kind and nature that without them we can neither be nor persist, and they belong to us, as it were, essentially. Such are love, desire, and everything that is proper to love.

But it is quite the contrary with those which are evil, and to be [20] rejected by us. Not only can we be very well without them, but also only when we have made ourselves free of them, can we be properly what it belongs to us to be.

[4] To make all of this still clearer, note that the foundation of all [25] good and evil is love falling on a certain object. For whenever we do not love that object which alone is worthy of being loved, i.e. (as we have already said), God, but love those things which through their own kind and nature are corruptible, there follow necessarily from that hate, sadness, etc., according to the changes in the object loved [30] (because the object is subject to many accidents, indeed to destruction itself). Hate: when someone takes the thing he loves away from him. Sadness: when he loses it. Love of Esteem: when he depends on love of himself. Favor and Gratitude: when he does not love his fellow man for the sake of God.

[I/78] 47If, on the other hand, a man comes to love God, who always is and remains immutable, it is impossible for him to fall into this bog of the passions. And therefore, we maintain it as a fixed and unshakeable rule, 48that God is the first and only cause of all our good, and [5] one who frees us from all our evil.

[5] 49We must note, finally, that only Love, etc., are unlimited, viz. the more it increases, the more excellent it becomes, since it falls on an object that is infinite. That is why it can always increase, which is [10] not possible with any other thing. bAnd perhaps this will later give us material from which we shall prove the immortality of the soul, and how that can be.1

[6] Having spoken up to now of everything which the third kind of effect of true belief shows us, we shall now proceed to speak of the fourth and last effect, which we did not mention on p. [I/60].2

CHAPTER XV
[15] OF THE TRUE AND THE FALSE

[1] Let us now examine the True and the False, which indicate to us the fourth and last effect of true belief. To do this, we shall first state the definitions of truth and falsity:

Truth, then, is an affirmation (or denial) which one makes concerning [20] a thing and which agrees with the thing itself.1

Falsity is an affirmation (or denial) about a thing which does not agree with the thing itself.

[2] 50But this being so, it will seem either that there is no distinction between the false and the true Idea, or that there is no real distinction between them, 51but only a distinction of reason, because affirming or [25] denying this or that are only modes of thinking, and have no other distinction between them than that the one agrees with the thing and the other does not.

And if that should be so, one could rightly ask 52what advantage one man has with his Truth, and what harm the other has through [30] his Falsity? 53And how will the one know that his concept or Idea agrees more with the thing than the other’s does? Finally, how is it that the one errs and the other does not?

[3] To this we may answer, first, that the things which are clearest [I/79] of all make known both themselves and also Falsity, so that it would be very foolish to ask how one can be aware of them.a For because they are said to be the clearest of all, there can never be any other [5] clarity through which they could be explained. So it follows that Truth manifests both itself and falsity. For Truth becomes clear through Truth, i.e., through itself, as Falsity is also clear through Truth. But Falsity is never manifested or indicated through itself.

[10] So someone who has the Truth cannot doubt that he has it. But someone who is stuck in Falsity or error can indeed think that he has the Truth. Similarly, someone who is dreaming can think that he is awake, but no one who is awake can ever think that he is dreaming.

[15] (Having said this, we have to some extent explained also our previous statement that God is Truth, or that the Truth is God himself.)

[4] Why, then, is the one more aware of his Truth than the other? Because the Idea of affirmation (or denial) [in the first]2 agrees completely [20] with the nature of the thing, and consequently has more essence.

[5] To grasp this better, note that the intellect (though the word sounds otherwise) is wholly passive,3 i.e., that our soul is changed in such a way that it acquires other modes of thinking it did not have [25] before. Now if someone, because the whole object has acted in him, acquires such forms or modes of thinking, it is clear that he acquires a completely different sense of the form or quality of the object than another who has not had so many causes, and so is moved to affirm [30] or deny by a different, and slighter action (since he becomes aware of it in himself by a few, or lesser, affections).

[6] From this we see the perfection of one who has the Truth, as opposed to one who doesn’t have it. Because the one easily changes, and the other does not, it follows that the one has more constancy and [I/80] essence than the other. And so also, because those modes of thinking which agree with the thing have had more causes, they have more constancy and essence in them also. Because they agree completely with the thing, it is impossible that at some time they can be differently [5] affected by the thing, or undergo any change. For as we have said before, the essence of a thing is immutable. None of this is true of Falsity.

And with this the questions above are satisfactorily answered.4

[10] CHAPTER XVI1
OF THE WILL

[1]a Now that we know what good and evil, and truth and falsehood are, and also what the well-being of a perfect man consists in, it is time to begin investigating ourselves, 54and to see whether we arrive [15] at such a well-being freely or by necessity. For this purpose it is necessary for us to investigate what the Will is, according to those who posit the Will, and how it is distinguished from Desire.

[2] Desire, we have said, is that inclination which the Soul has toward something it considers good. From this it follows that before our [20] Desire extends externally to something, a decision has already taken place in us that such a thing is good. This affirmation, then, or taken generally, the power of affirming and denying, is called the Will.b

[I/81] [3] The question now is whether this affirmation of ours happens freely or by necessity, i.e., whether we affirm or deny something of a thing without 55any external cause compelling us to do so. But we [5] have already proven that a thing which is not explained through itself, or whose existence does not belong to its essence, must necessarily have an external cause, and that a cause which is going to produce something must produce it necessarily. So it must also follow that the particular willing this or that, the particular affirming or denying this [I/82] or that of a thing, must proceed from some external cause; and the definition we have given of a cause is that it cannot be free.

[I/81/10] [3a]2 It is certain that the particular willing must have an external cause through which it is. For since existence does not belong to its essence, it must necessarily exist through the existence of something else.

Some say: the efficient cause [of the particular willing] is not an [15] Idea,3 but the Will itself in the man; and the intellect is a cause without which the Will can do nothing;4 therefore, the Will, taken as undetermined, and also the intellect, are not beings of reason, but real beings.

But I say: when I consider them attentively, they seem to me to be universals, and I cannot attribute anything real to them. But even if [20] they are real beings, nevertheless, one must grant that the Volition is a modification of the Will, and the Idea a modification of the intellect. It follows necessarily that the intellect and the Will are different and really distinct substances. For the substance is modified, not the mode itself. If the soul is said to govern these two substances, then there is a third substance.

[25] All this confuses things so that it is impossible to have a clear and distinct perception of them. For because the Idea is not in the Will, but in the intellect, then according to the principle that the mode of one substance cannot pass into another substance, no love can arise in [30] the Will. For it involves a contradiction that one should will something the idea of which is not in the power which wills.

If you say that the Will, because of its union with the intellect, also perceives the same thing the intellect understands, and therefore also loves it, [the reply is that] because perceiving is also a concept and a [35] confused Idea, it too is a mode of the intellect, and according to the preceding, cannot be in the Will, even if there were a union like that of soul and body. For assume that the body is united with the soul, according to the common doctrine of the Philosophers; nevertheless, [I/82/17] the body never senses, nor is the soul extended. For then a Chimera, in which we conceive two substances, would be able to become one. And that is false.

If one says that the soul governs both the intellect and the Will, [20] that cannot be conceived. For in so doing we seem to deny that the Will is free, which is contrary to their position.

To conclude, then, I have no desire to bring up all the objections I have against positing a created finite substance. But I shall only show briefly that Freedom of the Will is completely inconsistent with a [25] continuous creation, viz. that the same action is required in God to preserve [a thing] in being as to create it, and that without this action the thing could not exist for a moment. If this is so, nothing can be attributed to [the will].5 But one must say that God has created it as it is; for since it has no power to preserve itself while it exists, much [30] less can it produce something through itself. If someone should say, therefore, that the soul produces the volition of itself, I ask: from what power? Not from that which was, for that no longer exists. Nor from that which it now has, for it does not have any by which it could exist or endure for the least moment, because it is continuously created. So [35] because there is no thing which has any power to preserve itself or to produce anything, the only conclusion left is that God alone is, and must be, the efficient cause of all things, and that all Volitions are determined by him.

[I/82/5] [4] Possibly this will not satisfy some, who are accustomed to occupy themselves more with Beings of Reason6 than with the particular things which are truly in Nature. In doing this, they consider the Being of Reason not as what it is, but as a Real Being. For because man has now this, now that Volition, he forms in his soul a universal mode [10] which he calls the Will, just as he forms the Idea of man from this and that man. And because he does not sufficiently distinguish real beings from beings of reason, it comes about that he considers the beings of reason as things that are truly in Nature, and thus posits [15] himself as a cause of some things.

This happens not infrequently in treating the matter of which we [I/83] speak. For if you ask someone why man wills this or that, the answer is: because he has a Will. But since, as we have said, the Will is only an Idea of this or that volition (and therefore only a mode of thinking, a Being of Reason, not a Real Being), nothing can be produced by it. For [5] nothing comes of nothing. So I think that when we have shown that the Will is no thing in Nature, but only a fiction, we do not need to ask whether it is free or not.

[5] I say this not only of the universal Will, which we have shown [10] to be a mode of thinking, but also of the particular willing this or that, which some have posited in affirmation or denial. This will be clear to anyone who only attends to what we have already said.c For we have said that the intellect is wholly passive, i.e., a perception in the [15] soul of the essence and existence of things. So it is never we who affirm or deny something of the thing; it is the thing itself that affirms or denies something of itself in us.7

[6] Some, perhaps, will not grant this, because it seems to 56them that they can affirm or deny of the thing something other than what [20] they are aware of. But they think this only because they have no conception of the concept which the soul has of the thing, without or apart from words. It is, of course, true that we can (when there are reasons which move us to do so) indicate to others, by words or other [25] means, something other than what we are aware of. But we shall never bring it about, either by words or by any other means, that we think differently about the things than we do think about them. That is impossible, as is clear to all, once they attend only to their intellect, apart from the use of words or other symbols.

[30] [7] 57But against this, some could perhaps say that if it is not we, but only the thing, which affirms or denies [something] of itself in us, then nothing can be affirmed or denied except what agrees with the thing. So there is no falsity. For we have said that falsity is affirming (or denying) something of a thing that does not agree with the thing, [I/84] i.e., that the thing does not affirm or deny that of itself.

But I think that if only we attend properly to what we have already said about truth and falsity, we shall immediately see that this objection [5] has been satisfactorily answered. For we have said that the object is the cause of what is affirmed or denied of it,8 whether it is true or false, i.e., because we perceive something coming from the object, we imagine that the object affirms or denies this of itself as a whole (even though we perceive [10] very little of it). This occurs most in weak souls which very easily receive a mode or idea through a slight action of the object on them. Apart from this there is no other affirming or denying in them.