1 Freudenthal 1, 227ff. Some of the details of Stolle’s account, however, seem incorrect. The chapter on the Devil is XXV in our manuscript. More important, Stolle’s claim that the work was originally written in Dutch is contradicted by the subtitle.
2 Though Letter 6 (IV/36/10-25) is almost certainly referring to this work. And L. Meyer apparently referred to it in his Philosophia Sacrae Scripturae Interpres (1666).
3 The classic article on this topic is Freudenthal 2, which exercised considerable influence on Gebhardt and other subsequent editors and translators. It should be noted, however, that the most recent editor, Mignini, reacts strongly against many of Freudenthal’s and Gebhardt’s conclusions. The general tendency of his work is to affirm the integrity of the manuscript.
4 As drafts of the Ethics and the geometric exposition of Descartes’ “Principles” were circulated. Cf. Letters 8 and 13. Letter 6 (IV/36), however, indicates that at that stage Spinoza was contemplating publication of the Short Treatise.
5 Gebhardt brackets the notes he prints but does not regard as Spinoza’s. I have normally indicated this by a bracketed comment following the note. Sometimes I find Gebhardt too ready to bracket notes and where it has seemed to me that there was reason to retain the note, I have indicated this. Many of the notes in Part II are mere marginal summaries of the central point in the text (in the manner of the marginal notes Meyer added to the Metaphysical Thoughts). Gebhardt relegates all of these to his textual commentary. The new critical edition by Mignini, however, prints them with the text. Since Mignini’s edition became available to me only at a very late stage of my work on this translation, I have not tried, as he does, to reproduce in print the exact arrangement of the manuscript. But I have tried, in my notes, to give an account of any marginalia that might have any importance.
6 Boehm considers the eleven passages that Gebhardt cites at I/428 and finds only one of them even partly convincing. Without going into details of specific passages, I would suggest that Gebhardt’s list omits some of the strongest cases. For example, I think the use of geloof at I/54/10-11, where one would expect waan, is better evidence for Gebhardt’s thesis than the cases he cites. In Curley 1, I argue that other inconsistencies in the use of technical terminology indicate that two different translators may have had a hand in producing different strata in our manuscript. Some of Boehm’s arguments are ad hominen, directed against Gebhardt’s theory that the Treatise was first dictated in Dutch, then reworked in Latin, and then translated back into Dutch. Someone who thinks the manuscript a translation, however, need not adopt that theory of its composition, as Mignini’s work illustrates.
7 On this, see Freudenthal 2. The references to other parts of the Treatise and the dialogues’ connection with one another seem good evidence for Freudenthal’s view that the dialogues are not earlier than the main text, though Gueroult apparently regards both dialogues as earlier (Gueroult 1, 472). In Curley 1, I argue that at least the second dialogue and certain sections of II, xxvi, are later than the main body of the text.
8 Mignini’s edition was the first to reproduce these sequences of numbers in the text itself. It is clear that they are not footnote numbers. To distinguish them from footnotes, they are set in italics in this edition. Mignini has argued at some length (Mignini 3) that these numbers represent Spinoza’s own thoughts about the reordering of his material, a transitional phase, intermediate between the order of the Short Treatise and the order of the Ethics. The first series stops abruptly in I, i, presumably because the copyist would not take the trouble to reproduce features of the manuscript that meant nothing to him. The second series, which runs, with some lacunae, throughout KV II, is better preserved. If Mignini’s ingenious hypothesis about these numbers is correct, the consequences are very important. Not only would we be able to feel greater confidence in the integrity of our manuscript, since Spinoza himself would have seen something closely approximating our manuscript but also we would have an insight into the development of Spinoza’s thought between the Short Treatise and the Ethics and a further tool for the establishment of the text (cf. Mignini on KV I, i, 1, and on II, xix, 12). In such matters proof is out of the question, but it seems fair to say that no one else has advanced any plausible alternative explanation of the number sequences.
9 Cf. Francès in Pléiade, 3: “Sauf entre les mains de commentateurs spécialisés de ce philosophe ou de critiques de textes méfiants par profession, la confrontation de cette copie suspecte au reste de l’oeuvre de Spinoza offre beaucoup plus d’inconvénients que d’avantages.”
10 As Gueroult frequently does in the appendices to Gueroult 1, on such topics as: the definitions of substance and attribute (I, app. 2), God’s essence (I, app. 6), the proofs of God’s existence (I, app. 8), determinism (I, app. 16), the physics of bodies (II, app. 7), and the different kinds of knowledge (II, app. 16).
1 The author of this outline has usually been thought to be the Amsterdam philosopher, Willem Deurhoff (1650-1717). Some, however, attribute it to Monnikhoff. Cf. Gebhardt I/436.
2 In B (i.e., in Monnikhoff s version of this outline, which he prefaced to his manuscript of the Short Treatise): “that there can only exist one of the same nature.” Cf. I/20/4.
3 Freudenthal (followed by Wolf) asserted that the Dialogues were not mentioned in the Outline, which might cast doubt on their authenticity. But as Gebhardt points out, that is incorrect.
4 Whoever the author of this outline was, he was clearly not a Spinozist.
5 The manuscript, has zij, which Meijer and Appuhn gloss as “the human soul.” If the reference is to “the (true) intellect,” as the context would lead us to expect, grammar would require het. Nevertheless, that would be a more accurate account of II, xxvi.
1 Meijer suggests that the “short” (korte) of the title translated contractus rather than brevis, and so had reference to the somewhat summary style of exposition, not to the length of the work.
The term translated by “well-being” is welstand. The Pléiade editors (Pléiade, 1361) suggest that this translates beatitudo; in his Latin translation of the outline, Meijer renders it by salus (an interpretation supported by the NS at E VP36CS). If either is correct there are religious overtones not captured by “well-being.” I retain Wolf’s translation mainly because I am reluctant to alter the title of a work when it has become well-entrenched.
2 This long subtitle was evidently not written by Spinoza himself. The Pléiade editors (Pléiade, 1362) remark that the tone suggests a follower of one of the Protestant sects flourishing in Holland at that time—possibly Jarig Jelles, for whom the translation of the Short Treatise may have been done.
3 Note that the two dialogues following Chapter II are not mentioned in the Table of the Chapters.
4 The title here given to the second book is not the same as that given at the beginning of Book II. Note also that the appendices and the Preface to Book II are not mentioned.
1 The manuscript gives no title for this part of the work, though there is one for the second part. Gebhardt supplies a title from the Table of Contents.
2 The abrupt beginning of this chapter has suggested to some scholars that some material might have been lost. Also suspicious is the absence of a definition of God. Freudenthal conjectured that the chapter may originally have begun: “Man has in him an idea of God as a being consisting of infinite attributes, of which each is infinitely perfect in its kind. We shall first [in Chapter I] show that such a being exists, and then [in Chapter II] show what he is.…” This is based partly on the summary of Chapter I in the Outline, which Freudenthal conjectured to rest on a lost, more complete manuscript. Although Gebhardt had accepted this conjecture in his translation of the Short Treatise (1922), in his edition (1925) he rejected it on the ground that the summary in the Outline contains nothing that could not have been reconstructed from passages in the existing manuscript. Mignini defends the integrity of the text at length.
I incline to the view that the ms. Spinoza circulated among his friends probably did not begin with a definition of God, that Spinoza had not yet appreciated the need to begin an a priori proof of God’s existence with a true definition of God (cf. I/249/22) and that n. b in this chapter may owe its existence to someone’s having objected to the absence of a definition of God. In this connection, I think the absence of definitions in the first appendix is significant.
a Understand the definite nature, by which the thing is what it is, and which cannot [I/15] in any way be taken from it without destroying it, as it belongs to the essence of a [25] mountain to have a valley, or the essence of a mountain is that it has a valley. This is truly eternal and immutable, and must always be in the concept of a mountain, even if it does not exist, and never did.
b From the subsequent definition (in Chapter II) of God as having infinite attributes, we can prove his existence as follows: whatever we clearly and distinctly see to belong [30] to the nature of a thing, we can also truly affirm of the thing; but to the nature of a being that has infinite attributes, an ‘attribute’ belongs, which is Being. Therefore.3
If someone now replies that this may indeed be affirmed of the Idea, but not of the thing itself, that is false. For the Idea [of this being and] of the attribute belonging to it [I/16] does not exist materially. So what is affirmed [of the Idea], is affirmed neither of the [30] thing nor of what belongs to it, so that there is a great difference between the Idea and the Object: therefore, what is affirmed of the thing is not affirmed of the Idea, and vice versa.4
3 Meijer incorporated this and the following two notes into the text immediately after section 2. In favor of this arrangement it may be said (1) that n. b at least seems misplaced in the manuscript as it stands, since it bears on the a priori arguments more than it does on the a posteriori argument, (2) that notes b, c, and d make a good deal of sense if they are read as forming one continuous discussion, and (3) that this arrangement makes more intelligible the account of the chapter given in the Outline, which mentions this argument, but not the others. Like Freudenthal, Meijer thought the author of the Outline may have had access to a better manuscript than we have.
Gebhardt rejected Meijer’s arrangement on the ground that the second note presupposes the a posteriori arguments and must follow it. But though the second note does refer to the a posteriori argument, it is independent of it. And the question whether my idea of God is something I have feigned or invented arises just as crucially in the ontological argument as it does in the a posteriori argument. (Cf. AT VII, 64, 115-120.)
I suspect that these notes represent material that would have been incorporated in the text in connection with the a priori arguments (or possibly replacing them) in a subsequent revision.
4 The text of the paragraph just ended looks defective as it stands in the manuscript, though Mignini thinks it can be defended. Gebhardt has a long discussion of various proposed emendations. The bracketed additions reflect my acceptance of suggestions made by Appuhn and Freudenthal.
[I/16] c Furthermore, it is also false to say that this idea is a fiction, for it is impossible to have it unless [its object] exists. This is shown below,5 to which we add the following:
[35] It is indeed true that when an Idea has first come to us from the thing itself, and we [I/17] have made it universal by abstraction, our mind6 can also then feign many particular things of this Idea, to which we can also ascribe many other properties abstracted from [5] other things. But it is impossible to do this unless we first know the thing itself of which they are abstractions.
But if it is once granted that this Idea is a fiction, then all the other Ideasd we have [10] must no less be fictions. If this is so, how is it that we find so great a difference between them? For we find some whose existence is impossible, such as all the monstrous animals one composes of two natures, like a beast that would be both bird and horse, and other things of that kind. It is impossible for them to have a place in Nature, which we find to be differently constituted.
[15] d That other Ideas exist is, indeed, possible, but not necessary. But whether they exist or not, their essence is always necessary like the Idea of a triangle, or that of the soul’s love without the body,7 etc., so that even if I thought at first that I had feigned them, afterwards I would still be forced to say that they are and would be no less the same, even if neither I nor any other man had ever thought of them. That is why they [20] are not feigned by me, and also must have a subject outside me, which is not me, a subject without which they cannot be.
In addition to these, there is still a third idea, which is unique. This brings with it a necessary being, and not, like the preceding ones, only the possibility of existence. For though the essence of the others is indeed necessary, their existence is not. But of this both the existence and the essence are necessary, and without its existence, its essence is not.8
[25] So I see now that the truth, essence or existence of any thing does not depend on me. For as has been shown in connection with the second kind of Ideas, they are what they are without me, whether according to their essence alone or according to their essence and existence together. I find this to be true also—indeed much more so—of this third, unique idea: not only does it not depend on me, but on the contrary he alone [30] must be the subject of what I affirm of him, so that if he did not exist, I would not be able to affirm anything at all of him, though I can do this of other things, even if they do not exist. [I find] also that he must be the subject of all other things.
From what has now been said, it is clear that the Idea of infinite attributes in the [35] perfect being is no fiction. But we shall still add the following: After the preceding reflections on Nature we have not yet been able to find in it more than two attributes that belong to this all-perfect being. And these give us nothing by which we can satisfy ourselves that these would be the only ones of which this perfect being would consist. [40] On the contrary, we find in ourselves something which openly indicates to us not only that there are more, but also that there are infinite perfect attributes which must pertain to this perfect being before it can be called perfect.
5 Gebhardt takes the reference to be to sections 5-8.
6 Ms: verstand. But I doubt that this can represent intellectus here.
7 Appuhn sees in this an allusion to the purely intellectual love described in Descartes’ letter to Chanut, 1 Feb. 1647.
8 The Dutch here is too compressed to be readily intelligible. I follow Gebhardt’s conjecture as to its meaning.
And where does this Idea of perfection come from? It cannot come from these two, for two gives only two, not infinitely many. From where, then? Certainly not from me, [45] for then I would have had to be able to give what I did not have. From where else, then, than from the infinite attributes themselves, which tell us that they are, though they so far do not tell us what they are. For only of two do we know what they are.
[I/18] e His ‘attributes’: it is better [to say] “because he understands what is proper to God,” [30] because those things are not God’s attributes. God is, indeed, not God without them, but he is not God through them, because they indicate nothing substantive, but are only like Adjectives, which require Substantives in order to be explained. [Gebhardt brackets this note because he suspects it of being an interpolation.]
f The cause of these changes would have to be either outside it or in it. Not outside [35] it, for no substance which, like this one, is in itself depends on anything outside it; so it can undergo no change from outside. Also not in it, for no thing, much less this one, wills its own destruction. All destruction comes from something outside. [Gebhardt brackets this note as doubtful, on the ground that it merely restates more clearly what is said in the text.]
9 Wolf finds the clause I have placed in parentheses “both irrelevant and inaccurate,” and suspects it of being a reader’s interpolation. But he also makes a plausible suggestion as to what may be intended, viz. that nothing could contain more reality formally than is contained objectively in the idea of God. Gebhardt takes the clause in this sense, and conjectures a mistranslation of the Latin.
[10] a The reason for this is that since Nothing can have no attributes, the All must have all attributes; and just as Nothing has no attributes because it is nothing, Something has attributes because it is something. So the more it is Something, the more attributes [15] it must have. Consequently, God, being most perfect, infinite, and the Something-that-is-all, must also have infinite, perfect, and all attributes.
10 The interpretation of this passage has been disputed. Wolf, Sigwart, and Appuhn took the phrase here translated “in this way” to be a reference to the a posteriori way, and the passage to defend Spinoza’s preference for a priori proofs over a posteriori ones. Meijer, Dunin-Borkowski, and Gebhardt (rightly, I think) take the phrase to refer to the a priori way, and the passage to expound an objection Spinoza is about to reply to. Mignini objects that this cannot be done without emending I/47/16, a step Gebhardt was unwilling to take. Mignini prefers to insert a “not” in l. 20, reading: “For the things one does not prove in this way.…” But his interpretation assumes that an a posteriori proof is a proof through external causes. That is hard to reconcile with Spinoza’s usual (e.g., in KV I, i, 3; E IP10S; but see KV II, xxiv, 12) contention that God’s existence can be proven a posteriori. The a posteriori proof Spinoza has offered in this chapter would be a posteriori in the sense common in the seventeenth century (cf. the Glossary on “a priori”), but not in Mignini’s sense. I think we must recognize that I/47/16 is a corrupt text, even if we have no straightforward emendation to suggest for it.
11 The reference is apparently to Summa theologiae Ia,2,2. The annotation in Aquinas 1, 2:10-11, is helpful.
1 Meijer thought it contrary to seventeenth-century ways of thinking to prove God’s existence before investigating his nature, citing Descartes’ First Replies: “According to the laws of the true logic, one must never ask of a thing whether it exists unless one first knows what it is.” (AT VII, 107-108). On this ground he thought the first two chapters “in this form” could not have come from Spinoza. But even Descartes did not consistently follow the ‘laws of the true logic’ Both in the analytic Meditations and in the synthetic Principles the question of my existence is raised before the question of my nature.
b If we can prove that there can be no limited substance, then every substance belonging to the divine being must be unlimited.2 We do this as follows:
[20] 1. Either it must have limited itself, or another must have limited it. It did not limit itself, for being unlimited, it would have had to change its whole essence. It is also not limited by another, for that other would have to be either limited or unlimited. Not the former; therefore, the latter. So the other is God. God, then, would have to have limited [25] it either because he lacked the power, or because he lacked the will. But the first is contrary to his omnipotence, and the second is contrary to his goodness.
2. That there cannot be a limited substance is [also] clear from this, that such a substance would necessarily have to have something which it had from Nothing. But this is impossible. For from where does it have that in which it differs from God? [30] Never from God, for God has nothing imperfect or limited, etc. So from where, if not from Nothing? Therefore, there is no substance except an unlimited one.
From this it follows that there are not two equal unlimited substances.3 For if there were, there would necessarily be a limitation.
And from this it follows in turn that one substance cannot produce another. As [35] follows: the cause which would produce this substance must have the same attribute as the one produced, and also, either as much perfection, or more, or less. Not the first, for then there would be two equal substances. Not the second, for then there would be a limited substance. Not the third, for Something does not come from Nothing.
An alternative proof: if a limited substance came from an unlimited one, then the [40] unlimited one would also be limited, etc. Therefore, one substance cannot produce another.
And from this it follows in turn that every substance must exist formally. For if it does not exist, there is no possibility of its being able to come to be.
2 Even in the Ethics, after he has proven that there is only one substance, Spinoza will still speak of the attributes as substances constituting the divine nature. Cf. II/57/13-14, 22-23.
3 Gueroult (1, 1:474-475) protests against the translation of gelijk by “like.” The practice of the translators of the Ethics seems to be against Gueroult’s claims about seventeenth-century Dutch usage (since gelijk is used for both aequus and similis), but I agree that the context here requires “equal.”
4 Bepaalde zelfstandigheid. Wolf has finite substance (similarly, Appuhn, Pléiade, Gueroult). Certainly this is correct in spirit (cf. I/26/5-6). But if the Latin were finita, we would expect eindig.
[I/20] c To say here that the nature of the thing required this [limitation], and therefore it [25] could not be otherwise, is to say nothing.5 For the nature of the thing cannot require anything unless it exists. If you say that one can nevertheless see what belongs to the nature of a thing that does not exist, that is true as regards existence, but not at all as regards essence.
In this lies the difference between creating and generating: creating, then, is bringing a thing about as regards essence and existence together; but in generating a thing comes about [30] as regards existence only.6 Therefore, there is no creating in Nature, but only generating.
So if God creates, he creates the nature of the thing together with the thing. And so he would be envious if (being able but not willing) he had created the thing in such a way that it would not agree with its cause in essence and existence.
[35] But what we here call creating cannot really be said to have ever happened, and we mention it only to show what we can say about it, once we make the distinction between creating and generating.
5 Possibly Spinoza has in mind Descartes’ Fourth Meditation (AT VII, 60), but the line of thought does not begin with Descartes. Cf. Summa theologiae Ia, 25,6.
6 Cf. Summa theologiae Ia,45,1.
7 On this theme, see Lovejoy.
8 So the manuscript reads. The inclination to emend to substance persists (Meijer, Appuhn, Pléiade), but I agree with Gebhardt and Mignini that the text is defensible.
9 The text here is in doubt and has frequently been suspected of being a reader’s interpolation. Wolf offers: “… there would be more infinite substances not in existence than there are in existence …,” but finds neither that nor the version I prefer very intelligible. Gebhardt explains that the absurdity claimed consists in this: that on the hypothesis some substances would be merely possible, not actual, whereas existence belongs to the essence of substance. One difficulty with Gebhardt’s explanation is that it is not easy to see the relevance of there being more nonexistent substances than existent ones.
10 The series of objections and replies which occupies sections 13-16 has often been thought to be a later addition. As for their content, cf. E IP17C2S.
[I/22] d That is: when we make them argue from their belief that God is omniscient, then [35] they cannot argue otherwise. [Gebhardt brackets this note as certainly not from Spinoza, on the ground that it only repeats what is said in the text.]
[I/23] e I.e., if there were different substances which were not related to one single being, [35] then their union would be impossible, because we see clearly that they have absolutely nothing in common with one another—like thought and extension, of which we nevertheless consist.
[I/24] f I.e., if no substance can be other than real, and nevertheless no existence follows from its essence if it is conceived separately, it follows that it is not something singular, [25] but must be something that is an attribute of another, viz. the one, unique, universal being.
Or thus: every substance is real, and the existence of a substance, conceived in itself, does not follow from its essence. So no real substance can be conceived in itself; instead [30] it must belong to something else. I.e., when our intellect understands substantial thought and extension, we understand them only in their essence, and not in their existence, i.e. [we do not understand] that their existence necessarily belongs to their essence. But when we prove that they are attributes of God, we thereby prove a priori that they exist, and a posteriori (in relation to extension alone) [that it exists] from the modes that [35] must have it as their subject.
11 Wolf remarks that this is not shown in the Treatise as we have it, and infers that something is missing. Dunin-Borkowski points out that the reference might be to I/19/33-43. Gebhardt, who regards that note as a later addition, suggests instead I/21/26-32. More plausibly, the reference may be to I/22/5-9.
12 Probably we should read: “to whose essence existence belongs.” Unless we assume a copyist’s error, the conclusion seems redundant, and the similarity of Wezenheid and Wezenlijkheid makes such an error only too easy.
[I/25] g In Nature, i.e., in substantial extension. For if this were divided, its nature and [20] being would be destroyed at once, since it consists only in infinite extension, or what is the same, being a whole. But, you will say, is there no part in extension prior to all its modes? None, I reply.
But, you say, if there is motion in matter, it must be in a part of matter, not in the [25] whole, since the whole is infinite. For in what direction would it be moved, since there is nothing outside it? Then in a part.
I reply: there is no motion by itself, but only motion and rest together; and this is, and must be, in the whole; for there is no part in extension.
If you still say that there are parts in extension, then I ask: when you divide the [30] whole extension, can you also, according to the nature of all parts, cut off from the others the part you cut off with your intellect? Assuming that you can, I ask what there is between the part cut off and the rest?
You must say: either a vacuum, or another body, or something of extension itself. There is no fourth alternative. Not the first, for there is no vacuum, something positive, [35] but not a body. Not the second, for then there would be modes where there can be none, since extension as extension is without and prior to all modes. The third then. And so there is no part, but only extension as a whole.
13 Cf. Descartes, Les méteores, chap. 1, AT VI, 233.
14 The ms. reads Modes. I follow Mignini, who prefers Monnikhoff’s emendation.
15 In the Treatise as we have it, this has not been said already, though it will be said in the First Dialogue. This has prompted the conjecture that the dialogue was originally placed earlier.
1 Avenarius (1) argued that this dialogue antedated the rest of the Short Treatise and represented a very early stage of Spinoza’s thought in which he was primarily under the influence of Bruno. (Sigwart 1 and 2 give a number of parallel passages in Bruno, but they are not restricted to this dialogue.) The present consensus (following Freudenthal) seems to be that both dialogues are later than the main body of the work, whose doctrines they presuppose.
2 Verstand. None of the Latin terms which verstand usually translates seem quite right, since in the dialogue it is contrasted with reason in the way intuitive knowledge typically is.
3 Begeerlijkheid. A term not used elsewhere in contemporary Dutch translations of Spinoza. Meijer warns against confusing it with begeerte and suggests the Dutch term lust, or “love in the lower sense,” as a gloss.
4 The manuscript here is extremely confused, with marginal insertions whose authority and proper placement are unclear. I have followed a suggestion of Freudenthal’s. Gebhardt favors an emendation which would be translated: “For if we want to limit Nature we will have to limit it, absurdly, with a Nothing, conceived as having the following attributes: it is one, eternal, existing through itself, infinite. We avoid this absurdity by maintaining that it—that is, infinite Nature and everything contained in it—is an eternal unity, infinite, omnipotent, etc.” Gebhardt regards as decisive a passage in the Metaphysical Thoughts (I/268/22-24) which condemns believers in a creation ex nihilo for imagining nothing as something real.
5 Freudenthal, followed by Wolf and Appuhn, introduced a negation here: “The one does not limit the other.” Certainly it is good Spinozistic doctrine that a thing can only be limited by another of the same kind (cf. E ID2, Epp.3,4). Gebhardt argues that there is no reason to credit Lust with this Spinozistic view, and Mignini seems to agree. But I take it that the first thing Lust claims to see here (that intellectual substance and extended substance have nothing in common) is also good Spinozistic doctrine (cf. E IP2). Since Lust seems to be trying to deduce unwelcome conclusions from Spinozistic assumptions, I find the emendation plausible.
6 Some have wanted to reject this sentence as an interpolation. Gebhardt defends it.
7 Because Reason makes no reply to the objections of sections 6 and 7, Freudenthal and Wolf thought them an interpolation. Gebhardt argues that since the dialogues are only supplementary to the main text, Spinoza may have considered what is said elsewhere (presumably at I/22/14ff.) a sufficient refutation. But even so, it is puzzling that the objections should be included without any indication of their having been answered elsewhere. Possibly something is lost or misplaced.
8 The Pléiade editors (Pléiade, 1368) call attention to the oddity of this expression and conjecture a mistranslation from the Latin original or a copyist’s omission.
9 Here (with Gebhardt, Wolf et al.) I follow Monnikhoff rather than the manuscript, in which the parenthesis would read: “insofar as, or in the respect that, it depends on its concepts.” Mignini defends this more difficult reading by arguing that as the intellect is the cause of its concepts (cf. I, ii, 24) so the concepts must be considered a cause of the intellect, insofar as they constitute it (appealing to II, xv, 5). Perhaps so, but in that case Spinoza offers no reason in this passage for calling the intellect a cause.
1 This has not yet been said, but (assuming that verder here and laatste there both represent remota) will be said at I/36/18-19. This is one thing which gives plausibility to Meijer’s proposal to place the Second Dialogue after Chapter III. Against that separation from the First Dialogue is the apparent continuity between them. Moreover, many subsequent references are to passages coming much later than Chapter III. The bracketed addition follows a suggestion made by Van Vloten and Land, and persuasively defended by Mignini.
2 My italics. Gebhardt correctly has verder in ll. 8, 10, and 14, but wrongly emends to eerder in l. 16. That makes the qualification pointless. Note that Francès, who accepts Gebhardt’s emendation, omits the qualification both here and in the passage to which Spinoza is apparently referring. The variations in Dutch wording (verder for laatste, in eenigen manieren for eenigzins) seem to confirm the hypothesis that the Second Dialogue was translated by a different hand than the bulk of the Short Treatise. Cf. Curley 1, 333-334. Mignini also reads verder in l.16.
3 Cf. I/110/32-111/2, and I/30/30-31. The fact that Spinoza also maintains that whole and part are beings of reason and do not exist in Nature (e.g., at I/24/19ff) has caused some perplexity. Freudenthal 2, 7-9, suggested that the latter doctrine was not meant to entail that the concepts were entirely without foundation in reality, that in saying that finite things formed a whole with God, Spinoza meant to express their dependence on him as immanent cause.
4 Gebhardt retains this sentence in the text, as a third example, though others (Van Vloten and Land, Appuhn) have thought it an interpolation. Here I think Gebhardt is wrong; the rest of section 7 seems to continue the second example.
5 The reference is apparently to I/46/34ff.
6 Busse wanted to take this section away from Theophilus and put in in the mouth of Erasmus, as an objection Spinoza’s spokesman must answer (placing it earlier). His ground was the apparent contradiction between saying that God and his effects form a whole and that the whole is only a being of reason, which does not exist in reality. Freudenthal pointed out other places where the two halves of this contradiction are asserted, so it cannot be removed so easily. Cf. I/31/20.
8 Possibly I/31/10-14 rather than I/35/29-I/36/3. This distinction will recur in an important and difficult passage in the Ethics, II/70/2-15. For discussion of some of the issues involved see Curley (1) and (3), chap. 2.
9 At I/111/12-20. It is interesting to see that the immortality of the intellect is recognized as problematic in Spinoza’s philosophy from the very beginning. But it is seen as raising problems relating to God’s causality, not the parallelism of the attributes.
10 Appuhn offers the following gloss: “The existence of the body is not the determining cause of the idea of God, but a condition which must be satisfied for this idea, existing from all eternity in the intellect, to become conscious of itself.”
[30] a The following are called Propria because they are nothing but Adjectives which cannot be understood without their Substantives. I.e., without them God would indeed not [I/35] be God; but still, he is not God through them, for they do not make known anything substantial, and it is only through what is substantial that God exists.
1 The manuscript has no title at this point. Gebhardt supplies “Of God’s Immanent Actions” from the running heads of subsequent pages of the manuscript. Mignini argues persuasively that these are without authority and supplies “That God is a Cause of All Things” from the Table of Contents, on the assumption that that represents the original title. I have been guided by the second sentence, which seems to describe more accurately the actual contents of the chapter.
2 This division of causes is to be found in Burgersdijk’s Logic and, with a slight variation in the order, in Heereboord’s Meletemata. On these philosophers and their relation to Spinoza see the Editorial Preface to Descartes’ Principles. For comment on Burgersdijk’s classification of causes, see Wolf 2, 190-195; Wolfson 1, 1:303-304; and Gueroult 1, 1:224-257.
3 The reference is to Exodus 14:21, an example which will recur in the Metaphysical Thoughts (I/265/14) and the Theological-Political Treatise (III/90/20ff).
1 Heil. Wolf: “welfare.” See the glossary entry on salvation. Translating in this fashion involves taking sides in the dispute between Kneale and Donagan as to whether Spinoza is committed to the ‘hideous hypothesis’ of universal salvation. Cf. Grene, 239-240, 257-258.
2 Wolf 2, 195, cites, as characteristic scholastic definitions, passages from Burgersdijk and Heereboord. But Aquinas’ position (Aquinas 1, 5:44-46) seems to be more complex, as is Descartes’ (AT VII, 57).
3 This doctrine is characteristic of the reformers (v. Luther 1, 209; Calvin 1, 949) but in the seventeenth century was associated also with Descartes (because of the doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths) and Hobbes (v. Hobbes 1, LW III, 256). Cf. II/76/8ff.
4 This passage has been much emended. I follow (partly) suggestions made by Wolf and Gebhardt. Mignini defends the manuscript reading, by reasoning I am unable to follow.
5 Gebhardt thought the sentences bracketed here, and below (11. 28-29), were misplaced, marginal notes that had crept into the text. Though they do seem to interrupt the train of thought, Mignini retains them without comment.
1 The Pléiade editors (Pléiade, 1372) observe that Spinoza’s procedure in this chapter is characteristic: he takes a popular term and gives it an entirely new sense derived from his system. For a more traditional approach, cf. Calvin 1, I, xvi. Note that in this, its first appearance in Spinoza’s writings, the striving is not merely a conservative tendency, but a progressive one.
1 The Pléiade editors (Pléiade, 1373) point out that throughout almost the whole of the seventeenth century the topic of predestination was the subject of fierce struggles between the various Dutch Protestant sects. In accepting a strict doctrine of predestination Spinoza would tend to alienate the liberal (Mennonite and Collegiant) groups from which most of his Christian friends came. But in giving the doctrine a wholly philosophic turn he would offend the Dutch national Church.
Whether the editors are equally correct in ascribing to the reading of Calvin a decisive influence on the young Spinoza is another matter. Not only are central notions reinterpreted, but the style of argument is quite different. Cf. Calvin 1, III, xxi, 2: “To seek any other knowledge of predestination than what the Word of God discloses is not less insane than if one should purpose to walk in a pathless waste.”
2 Aristotle’s followers clearly do not include Aquinas (cf. Summa theologiae I, 22, 2) and apparently not Maimonides (Maimonides 1, 286). Appuhn ascribes the position here attacked to Averroes.
4 Adopting a suggestion of Wolfs, which Gebhardt does not consider. Wolf also points out that the example is Cartesian (cf. Meditation Six, AT VII, 84).
[I/44] a Regarding the attributes of which God consists, they are nothing but infinite substances, each of which must, of itself, be infinitely perfect. Clear and distinct reason [25] convinces us that this must, necessarily, be so. So far,1 however, only two of all these infinite attributes are known to us through their essence: Thought and Extension. All other things commonly ascribed to God are not attributes, but only certain modes, [30] which may be attributed to him either in consideration of everything (i.e., all his attributes) or in consideration of One attribute. For example, that God is one, eternal, existing through himself, infinite, the cause of everything, immutable—these things are attributed to God in consideration of all his attributes. That God is omniscient and wise, etc., are attributed to him in consideration of the attribute of thought. And that he is omnipresent and fills all, etc., are attributed to him in consideration of the attribute of extension.
1 This is one of two passages in which Spinoza implies that the unknown attributes are not unknowable. Cf. I/17/36-47.
2 There does appear to be some confusion in the manuscript, since chapters III-IV have already discussed God’s ‘attributes.’ Cf. I/27/11ff., and Freudenthal 2, 258-259. Mignini, however, defends the manuscript and also rejects Gebhardt’s emendation of 1. 6. About the latter, at least, i.e., the substitution of beschrijven for bewijzen, I believe Gebhardt must be right.
3 Cf. Summa theologiae I, 3, 5. The view was a common one among scholastics and Spinoza’s source is likely to have been Heereboord 1, 1:147.
4 Cf. Maimonides 1, 81-83, with Summa theologiae I, 13, 12.
b I.e., in consideration of all that he is, or all his attributes. On this, see the note to [I/44/3]. [Gebhardt rejects this note as meaningless. Mignini defends it as an accurate explication of the text.]
5 Cf. I/18/17ff. It is not clear, however, that St. Thomas would accept Spinoza’s identification of proof through effects with probable argument. Cf. Summa theologiae I, 2, 2, ad 3.
6 Cf. Hobbes, De Corpore, VI, 13.
7 Cf. AT VII, 368.
8 In this sentence the copyist first wrote “a priori,” but immediately crossed it out and wrote “a posteriori.” The question is whether he was correcting a mistake he himself had made in copying or attempting a textual emendation. The reading the copyist preferred is certainly an easier one, but I find it suspiciously so. The first sentence refers us to a prior reply to the objection that God’s existence cannot be proven a priori. Probably the reference is to I, i, 10. Just possibly it is to I, vii, 5. In both passages, however, the objection assumes the usual seventeenth-century concept of an a priori proof, that it proceeds from cause to effect. (Though the text of I, i, 10 is disputed, 11. 25-28 are not.) If the objector also assumed that cause and effect are always distinct, he might take Spinoza to be implying that God has an external cause. And Spinoza might well reply that, although an a priori proof usually (I/47/16) proceeds from an external cause, it does not always do so, viz. not when the entity is causa sui. I assume that some such dialectic lies behind both I, i, 10, and I, vii, 12. But if so, then the text of I, vii, 12 is defective in a way that cannot be repaired simply by substituting “a priori” for “a posteriori.”
[I/48] a Note: What is said here of Motion in matter is not said seriously. For the Author [30] still intends to discover its cause, as he has already done, to some extent, a posteriori. But it can stand as it is here, because nothing is built on it, or depends on it. [The style and content of this note suggest that, while probably not written by Spinoza himself, it probably was written in his lifetime, by someone privy to his plans. It is unclear what portion of the text Spinoza intends to disavow, possibly the use of the language of creation. Gebhardt regards this note as evidence that the manuscript originated in a dictation, and points out that the problem here mentioned concerned Spinoza to the end of his life. Cf. Letters 82 and 83.]
1 Gueroult points out (1, 1:564-568) that although the use of the phrase Natura naturans to designate God was current among seventeenth-century Scholastics, there is reason to dissociate Thomas himself from this usage.
1 The Pléiade editors (Pléiade, 1375) observe that the use of traditional religious language here is neither a mark of Christian influence, nor a concession to the sensibilities of his audience, but a desacralization of an important theological concept. Cf. I/117-18.
1 Gebhardt brackets this concluding section as doubtful. This represents the consensus among students of the Short Treatise who have considered the question (e.g., Sigwart, Freudenthal, Wolf). But their main reason for bracketing seems to be that nothing like this argument is found elsewhere in Spinoza. Whether that is true or not, it seems an insufficient reason for rejecting the authenticity of the passage. Mignini cites various passages supporting the authenticity of the assumption that all things (dingen) existing in Nature are either things (zaaken) or actions, e.g., I/43/35, II/24/28, IV/311/16-17.
1 The reference is evidently to I/19/7ff.
2 Gelijk met. Here Wolf’s “like” seems more natural, though sense can be given to “equal to,” e.g., “has as much reality as.” Cf. above, note to I/19/32.
3 What follows is generally printed as a note to the first sentence of section 2 of this Preface, but no one has really thought that placement correct; the manuscript does not give any indication of where the “note” should go. Freudenthal suggested that it was probably intended to replace or supplement a passage originally appearing at the beginning of Chapter I, where there seems to be a gap in the manuscript.
If it is placed between the main content of the Preface and the main content of Chapter I, we do get an order approximating that of Part II of the Ethics. Sections 1 to 3 of the Preface to Part II of the Short Treatise would correspond to the Preface of Part II of the Ethics, P10, P10S, and P10C; sections 4 and 5, to P10CS; the ‘note’ (or at least its first thirteen paragraphs) would correspond to the section beginning with IIP11 and ending with P16C1 (though paragraphs 3 and 4 go back to IIP1 and P3); and Chapter I would correspond to the presentation in the Ethics of the three kinds of knowledge, beginning with IIP17 and ending with P47S.
a The modes of which man consists are perceptions, divided into opinion, true belief, and clear and distinct knowledge, produced by objects, each according to its own kind. [Gebhardt relegates this and the other five ms. notes in this chapter to his textual commentary, on the ground that they are clearly a reader’s comments. This second part of the work contains a great many notes of this kind: appearing in the margin of the ms., summarizing the content of the paragraph next to which it stands, and typically not being keyed to any word or phrase in the paragraph. Generally they read like a student’s notes and Gebhardt’s policy is to mention them only in his textual commentary. Mignini reproduces all of them in the margins of his text. I reproduce in bracketed footnotes all those which I think might illuminate the text in any way.]
4 Wolf thought this final section of the note both inaccurate and inessential, and doubted whether it came from Spinoza. Gebhardt saw nothing against its authenticity. I find it no more problematic than any of Spinoza’s other pronouncements on the eternity of the mind.
b The perceptions of this ‘belief’ are put first at [I/55/18]; also it is here and there called opinion, which it also is. [This seems to be a reader’s attempt to clarify a distinction blurred by the translation. According to a conjecture by Sigwart, now generally accepted, the translator used geloof for opinio at I/54/10, decided later that it was required for fides, and adopted waan for opinio, without making the change consistently. I mark nonstandard uses of geloof by putting single quotes around belief.]
c [This one only opines, or is commonly said, ‘believes’ only from report.]
1 The manuscript has begrippen, which I think must here correspond to perceptiones rather than ideas or conceptus or conceptiones. Cf. II/10/3 and II/122/2ff. Though this may be the earliest of Spinoza’s various divisions of knowledge, the initial division is like that of the Ethics (and unlike that of the Treatise on the Intellect) in recognizing three main species of knowledge, with a subdivision of the first, rather than four species of knowledge. As Freudenthal pointed out, there is, in the Short Treatise as a whole, a good deal of variation in Spinoza’s treatment of the division. For example, in II, iii, 4, the threefold division is into knowledge from report, from opinion, and from true perception. More important, it is unclear whether true belief ( = belief in II, ii, 1 = reason in II, xiv, 2 and E IIP40S2) can lead us to the knowledge and love of God which constitute our highest happiness or whether only science ( = clear and distinct conception = clear knowledge in II, ii, 1 = intuitive science in E II P40S2) can have this effect. Contrast II, iv, 3; II, v, 7; and II, xviii with II, xiv, 2; II, xix, 2; II, xxii, 1; II, iv, 2; II, xxvi, 6.
2 I have translated the ms. reading of this sentence, which is retained by Mignini. But many scholars have felt that it required emendation and have conjectured mistranslations of the original Latin. Here are the main alternatives: “viz. from certain ideas, or from the knowledge of ourselves, and then let us treat of things outside us” (Freudenthal); “viz. from certain ideas or from the knowledge of ourselves, or consciousness, and of things outside us” (Appuhn); “viz. certain perceptions of those things which are outside us and the knowledge of ourselves, or consciousness” (Gebhardt).
The ellipsis space marks the place where Gebhardt (following Freudenthal) believes the note from the Preface should come. See I/51/16ff.
d [This one opines or ‘believes’ not only through hearsay, but through experience. These are two kinds of opining.]
e [This one is certain through true belief, which can never deceive him. He is properly called a believer.]
f [But this last one never opines or believes, but sees the thing itself, not through something else, but in itself.]
a See the definition of belief, p. 2; and where the affirmation, taken for the will, is distinguished from belief, p. 2. [A marginal note. The first page reference would presumably be to I/59/23-36; the second, to I/80/24-34.]
3 The manuscript reads: “the proportionality and all the calculations.” Modern editors follow Monnikhoff, as I have. But even with that emendation, the expression does not seem very exact. The thought, presumably, is: “he immediately sees the proportionality of the numbers in [all those?] problems which others solve by calculation.” Cf. II/12/11-14.
1 Freudenthal 2, 262, thought it incredible that, having explained his view clearly and distinctly in II, i, Spinoza should have repeated it in a modified and less clear manner here.
2 As Sigwart pointed out, this seems to be aimed explicitly at Descartes, PA I, 27, where motions of the animal spirits are made the cause of the passions. Appuhn calls attention to E IIA3 as a parallel passage, but questions whether passion is not too narrow a term to use for lijding here. Lijding may translate passio in section 3, but perhaps renders affectus in section 4. See the Glossary-Index on passion.
1 Wolf has “from a few particulars” here, but I take it that what is in question is any inference from some to all. (One might see a great many sheep before seeing one with a long tail.)
[I/56] a This does not mean that a formal inference must always precede wonder; it also occurs without that, as when we tacitly presume that the thing is so, and not different [25] from the way we are used to seeing, hearing or understanding it.
For example, when Aristotle says that the dog is a barking animal, he concludes therefore that whatever barks is a dog. But when a peasant says a dog, he tacitly understands just the same thing Aristotle does with his definition. So when the peasant hears barking, [30] he says a dog. Hence, if they once heard another animal barking, the peasant, who had drawn no conclusion, would be as astonished as Aristotle, who had drawn a conclusion.
[I/56] Again, when we come to perceive something of which we have never thought before, it is still not as though we had never known anything like it before, as a whole or in [35] part; it is only that it was not so constituted in every respect, or that we have never been affected by it in this way, etc.
b That Love comes from opinion, clear knowledge, and report. This is the foundation of all good and evil. See p._____, chap. 14. [A marginal note relegated to the textual commentary by Gebhardt and probably stemming from a reader, but interesting nonetheless for the forward reference to I/77/24.]
2 Many scholars have found the order of this and the next three paragraphs illogical and have preferred the arrangement in Monnikhoff, who gives us first the discussion of love arising from report (§ 7), then the discussion of love arising from opinion (§ 5), and finally the passing over of love arising from true perceptions (§ 6), with appropriate rewriting of § 4 (but also omitting the third sentence of § 4). Gebhardt retains the order of the manuscript, though he finds it confused. Mignini finds the order of the manuscript defensible.
3 According to Wolf, this doctrine would be rejected in E IIIP9S. Not so, however, according to Gueroult 2, 2:492-495.
c Love that comes from true perceptions or clear knowledge is not treated here because it does not come from opinion. But see ch. XXII. [Gebhardt rejects this marginal note.]
[I/58] d The first definition is the best, for when the thing is enjoyed, the desire ceases; so the inclination which we then have to retain that thing is not desire but fear of losing [35] the thing we love. [Gebhardt brackets this note as a critical, but imperceptive, reader’s interpolation. Mignini defends it as thoroughly Spinozistic, but the passages he cites (most notably, I/84/22) do not seem very satisfactory.]
e It comes also from experience, according to the second definition, which does not please me. [A marginal note, relegated by Gebhardt to his textual commentary but regarded by Mignini as Spinoza’s. See Mignini 3,270-271.]
[I/59] a Belief is a strong proof based on reasons, by which I am convinced in my intellect [25] that the thing truly is, outside my intellect, such as I am convinced in my intellect that it is.
I say a strong proof based on reasons, to distinguish it thereby both from opinion, which is always doubtful and subject to error, and from science, which does not consist in conviction based on reasons, but in an immediate union with the thing itself.
[30] I say that the thing truly is such, outside my intellect; truly, because the reasons can not deceive me in this, otherwise they would not differ from opinion; such, because it can only indicate to me what it belongs to the thing to be, not what it truly is, otherwise it would not differ from science; outside, because it makes us enjoy intellectually, not what is in us, but what is outside us. [Gebhardt brackets this note, on the ground (dubious in this instance) that it adds nothing really new to what is said in the text. Joel had pointed out parallel passages in Crescas’ The Light of the Lord, II, v, 5.]
4 Freudenthal observed (2, 262) that after Chapter III and the early sections of Chapter IV, we would expect it to be proven that the ethically superior affects arise from the higher kinds of knowledge. Instead they are distinguished more by the objects which produce them than by the kind of knowledge they originate from (II, iv, 10; II, v). Instead of showing how these affects arise from these kinds of knowledge, Spinoza enumerates their effects and reviews the whole series of Descartes’ Passions of the Soul. Affects already discussed—wonder, love, hate, and desire—are once again discussed, as if this had not been done. Freudenthal plausibly infers that we have here two presentations of a moral psychology, stemming from different times and juxtaposed by an unknown editor. This is confirmed by the difficulties mentioned above (II, i, 1, n. 1).
1 The addition to the title is supplied from the table of chapters.
b On the fourth effect of true belief see p.____ It shows us what truth and falsity consist in. [A marginal note, probably stemming from a reader. The forward reference would be to I/78/16.]
c For one cannot have an idea that is perfect from any particular creature; for the very perfection of this Idea, [i.e., the judgment by which one decides] whether it is perfect or not, must be deduced from a perfect universal Idea, or Being of Reason. [Gebhardt brackets this note as doubtful, on the ground that it merely repeats what is said in the text. The bracketed emendation is a suggestion of Appuhn’s.]
1 Gebhardt, following a suggestion of Meijer’s, rearranges the first five sections of this chapter so that they come in what he sees as a more logical order and make a smoother transition to section six. Mignini defends the arrangement of the ms. I have followed Gebhardt’s arrangement, but to allow readers to reconstruct easily the order of the ms. I have introduced Mignini’s paragraph numbers in italics.
a Which are incorruptible only through their cause. See p. 53f. [A marginal note, probably due to a reader. The reference is to a ms. page number corresponding to I/47f.]
2 Though this is similar to the Cartesian formula rejected in the Ethics (II/192/22ff.), the conception is still not Cartesian, since the Love defined in PA II, 79, is a passion caused by motion of the animal spirits. Appuhn’s interpretation of the religious significance of this transitional conception of love deserves consideration. Cf. Appuhn 1, 1:408-409.
3 The ms. has de Liefde (the love), which Mignini, like most scholars, emends to de lievende. Gebhardt defended the text with an appeal to passages in Leone Ebreo’s Dialoghi de amore where the love, the lover, and the loved are all identified. Spinoza possessed a copy of this work in a Spanish translation, and Gebhardt devoted a long article to his relation to Spinoza (Gebhardt (2)). Wolfson thought his influence on Spinoza had been exaggerated (Wolfson (1), II, 277). See also Bidney (1), 178, 180. I follow Mignini.
4 The very negative evaluation of honor (eer = honor? or gloria?) implied here seems to mark this passage as belonging to a different stratum than II, xii. Cf. Spinoza’s account of his development in the Treatise on the Intellect, §§ 1-11.
b What we understand by things which are outside our power or do not depend on us. P. 80. So we must also not unite with those objects which are incorruptible through their cause, which are the second kind of objects we posited. [A marginal note. The ms. page reference = I/62/19-63/1. This note seems to go beyond anything said explicitly in the text. Is it by Spinoza?]
c Because they are only modes which depend immediately on God, [we] cannot unite with them. Because we cannot know them without [knowing] God, and knowing God, would not possibly love them. For knowing God, we cannot but love him immediately. [Again a marginal note which goes beyond anything in the text. Meijer ascribed it to Spinoza, Gebhardt didn’t. I see no impossibility in Meijer’s view.]
5 Meijer, appealing to I/63/7-10, proposed emending to: “make ourselves more powerful through love.”
6 The Pléiade editors conjecture that the Latin was affectus, rather than passio, and that the Dutch translator did not respect the distinction between these two, “perhaps because the teaching of his church declared human nature to be always corrupted.”
1 This definition of hate, like the earlier definition of love, is closer to Descartes’ (PA, II, 79) than to Spinoza’s definition in the Ethics (E III Def Aff 7). In II, vi, 4, the definition will be narrowed in a way which one might have expected to find paralleled in Descartes, though it is not.
a Of Desire and Joy. What the third effect of belief will show us about them.
Each of the following is a certain species of joy: 1. Hope, though it is mingled with some sadness; 2. Confidence; 3. Laughter; 4. Honor. [A marginal note. The marginalia in this chapter seem to foreshadow the reductionist program of the Ethics.]
2 After II, v, 6, this is most surprising.
1 Three things are particularly noteworthy about this chapter: a) from the point of view of the Ethics the order of the chapters is anomalous, since love and hate, the subjects of the two preceding chapters, will in the Ethics be reduced to species of joy and sadness; b) the marginal notes attached to the first two paragraphs (relegated to the textual commentary by Gebhardt) call attention to the role joy and sadness will play in the accounts of some of the passions to be discussed in subsequent chapters; and c) the sequence of mysterious numbers in the ms. breaks off here, to resume in Chapter IX with a repetition of n. 37. According to Mignini’s hypothesis, all of these facts are connected and are a sign of the new logical order the author of the series of numbers intended to assign to the passions. See Mignini 3, 244ff. The text itself is quite vague, both about the nature of desire, joy and sadness, and about the relation of these passions to love and hate.
b These because they arise from the same cause as Love, as can be seen from pp. 70, 79. [A marginal note. The ms. page references are to KV II, iii, 4-7, and v, 1-3 (Mignini numbering).]
c Of Sadness. It arises only from opinion and it is necessary to be freed of it, because it hinders us. Each of the following is a certain species of sadness: 1. Despair; 2. Remorse and Repentance; 3. Shame; 4. Longing. [A marginal note.]
a What division the third effect of belief makes in these six, viz. [A marginal note.]
2 Waan, as it is normally used in the Short Treatise, does not seem to connote error, but to be a synonym for opinie. This context, like I/69/28, is exceptional.
1 The technical terminology in this chapter is more than usually difficult to translate with confidence, mainly because it is hard to be sure how the Dutch terms are related to their Latin analogues in Descartes’ Passions of the Soul, which was Spinoza’s model, and in the Ethics, whose analysis of the passions Spinoza has not yet achieved. See the Glossary entries on esteem, disdain, legitimate self-esteem, humility, etc.
One striking feature of Spinoza’s treatment here is the comparatively favorable evaluation of nederigheid (humility), which Appuhn took as evidence of Christian influence (Appuhn 1, 1:28). The Pléiade editors point out that in the Short Treatise humility and legitimate self-esteem are not opposites, but naturally associated with one another, as humilité and générosité are in Descartes. Moreover, though the Ethics will provide a generally negative evaluation of humilitas, Spinoza does recognize even there that it has some instrumental value (E IV P54S).
2 Wolf’s translation of this passage implies that our judgment of the thing’s perfection or imperfection is not merely accurate, but known to be so. But I take it that both legitimate self-esteem and pride are intended to be species of esteem, and both humility and self-depreciation to be species of disdain.
3 Waan. But cf. the note at I/68/6.
a What belief shows us in the following ten, viz., that they arise from the conceptions we have of a thing. [A marginal note.]
4 I take it that the qualification true here implies a correct estimate of one’s imperfections and not merely that the humility is unfeigned. So it is simply the (nonculpable) humility of § 4.
5 Wolf cites II, v, ii, with the thought, apparently, that Spinoza is implying that we should esteem God more than anything else. Other sections in that chapter (e.g., 6, 7, 10, 12) might suggest that we should esteem only God and disdain all singular things. In any case, the very cursory treatment of esteem and disdain is puzzling.
a What belief tells us about Remorse and Repentance. And what they arise from. [A marginal note.]
1 Because of a miscalculation regarding good and evil.
a What belief says that Mockery and Ridicule depend on, viz., on a false opinion, what that [false opinion] is and what it arises from. [A marginal note.]
2 Spinoza’s close contacts with members of the Collegiant sect, and some of the themes of the Short Treatise, have suggested a possible Christian influence on him at this stage of his development. But in his attitude toward repentance, he is even more critical than in the Ethics. Cf. the first Dialogue, where repentance is cited as one of the two mortal enemies of the human race (in company with hate), with E IVP54S.
1 Descartes, by contrast, had held that a moderate use of mockery could correct vices by making them appear ridiculous (PA III, 180).
a What belief shows us in these and what Love of Esteem is. [A marginal note.]
2 Cf. PA II, 124-127.
1 Wolf renders eer by “glory,” pointing out the agreement between the definition given here and the definition of gloria in E III Def. App 20. Appuhn contends that the eer of the Short Treatise does not correspond to the gloria of the Ethics because the evaluation of gloria at E IVP58 is more favorable than that of eer here. But I take it that this is a sign of a change of view about the same affect, not a sign that these are two different affects.
1 The manuscript does not indicate clearly where the division between Chapters XIII and XIV falls. Gebhardt puts the discussion of longing in Chapter XIII as the fourth section, modifies the title given to Chapter XIII in the table of contents and makes up a new title for Chapter XIV. Mignini (in company with most editors before Gebhardt) puts the discussion of longing in Chapter XIV and preserves the titles given to these chapters in the table of contents. I follow Mignini.
2 To my knowledge no one has questioned the text here. But comparison with the definitions of favor and gratitude in the Ethics (E III Def. Aff. 19, 34) or in Passions of the Soul (PA II, 192, 193) suggests that there may be some confusion. We would expect something like: “The former [i.e., favor], I say, when we desire that good be done in return to one who has done some good; the latter [gratitude], I say, when we desire that good be done to someone who has done some good we ourselves have obtained or received.”
a The last passion regarding which the third effect of belief shows us the difference between good and evil is Longing. [A marginal note.]
b And also the immortality of the soul as that will subsequently be proven on the same basis in Chapter 23. [A marginal note.]
1 This topic will come up for treatment again in Chapter XXIII, but the “perhaps” is an indication of the character of this work as not having received a final revision. There were similar instances earlier at I/43/33 and I/60/33. Cf. also Freudenthal 2, 259-260.
2 This sentence occurs as a note in the manuscript. Gebhardt rejects it. Mignini accepts it as the conclusion of the chapter. The style of the note suggests that Mignini is right.
1 Appuhn observes correctly that Spinoza here defines truth by what he will later call an extrinsic denomination, the agreement of the idea with its object (cf. E II D4). What Appuhn adds, however, seems incorrect: that Spinoza will exclude this extrinsic denomination formally from the definition of the true idea. In the passage cited Spinoza is defining adequacy, not truth. As late as Letter 60 Spinoza seems to think that a proper definition of truth is in terms of agreement. Cf. also I/246/15ff. The anomalous passage seems to be II/26/15ff.
a That it is foolishness to ask how one knows that one knows. [A marginal note.]
2 Gebhardt incorporates the bracketed phrase into the text, following the reading in Monnikhoff (and Meijer and Appuhn). Mignini rejects it as not necessary and even confusing.
3 Cf. II, xvi, 5 and the note thereto.
[I/80] a What true belief has taught us according to the third effect, and also the fourth. [A marginal note.]
b The Will, taken as the affirmation, or the decision, differs from true belief in this: [25] that it extends also to what is not truly good, because the conviction is not such that the thing is clearly seen not to be able to be otherwise; but the conviction is always of this kind, and must be, in true belief, because nothing but good Desires proceed from it.
[30] But [the will] differs from opinion also, in that it can sometimes be infallible and certain; in opinion, which consists of guessing and conjecturing, [such certainty] has no place.
So one could call it a belief, insofar as it is capable of certainty, and opinion, insofar as it is capable of error.
4 Freudenthal (2, 278) contended that the third of Spinoza’s questions in II, xv, 2 (“how is it that the one errs and the other does not?”) has not yet been answered and will not be answered until we reach II, xvi, 7, which he thought ought to be placed near the end of II, xv. Against this is the fact that II, xvi, 7 addresses an objection based on a doctrine first enunciated in II, xvi, 5. I suggest that Spinoza considered his third question to have been answered in II, xv, 5.
1 Freudenthal (2, 278) thought that II, xvi-xviii ought to come after II, xix-xx, partly on the ground that II, xvi, 1 alludes to a previous discussion of the well-being of a perfect man, a discussion which, Freudenthal maintained, came only in II, xix-xx. But all of Spinoza’s other references to a perfect man come in earlier chapters (II, iv, vi, ix, and xiii).
2 What appears here as section [3a] is printed by Gebhardt as a note to “the particular willing” in l. 9, though as he observes, the manuscript does not indicate where the note should go. I follow Meijer in introducing it into the text.
3 The manuscript reads: “the Idea of its efficient cause is not an Idea.” Most subsequent editors (including Mignini) have followed Monnikhoff in deleting the initial phrase. Gebhardt thinks the text can be defended, and would understand: “the idea that each particular volition must have an efficient cause is not an idea which can be conceived, i.e., is an absurdity.”
4 Meijer proposed to emend this to: “without which the idea cannot exist,” a reading which both Appuhn and Dunin-Borkowski preferred to the text. The objection Spinoza rebuts would thus see the intellect as the cause of particular ideas, as the will is the cause of particular volitions. Gebhardt defends the text, arguing that Spinoza’s reply presupposes an objection which represents the intellect as determining the will.
5 Ms.: “it.” Meijer, followed by Appuhn and Francès, would gloss: “freedom of the will.”
6 The italicized phrases are in Latin in the text.
c For those who only consider the definition we gave of the intellect on [ms.] p. 112. [A marginal note. The ms. page reference = I/79/10-27.]
7 The doctrine that the intellect is wholly passive appears to be rejected in the Ethics IIIP1, but so much of what Spinoza says in this and the next section is retained in his later attacks on the Cartesian doctrine of judgement, that Wolf is probably right to attempt a reconciliation. Cf. Pléiade 1384-85.
8 The ms. reading, retained by Mignini, would be translated: “the object is the cause of that of which something is affirmed or denied.” I have accepted an emendation of the text advocated by Gebhardt, Appuhn and Wolf. Even if sense can be made of the ms. as it stands, anyone who retains that reading must assume the burden of finding a place where something like that has previously been said. The emenders can apeal to II, xv, 5. (A marginal note refers us to ms. pp. 110-111 ( = I/78/11-79/10), but it is difficult to see the relevance of that citation.)