1. I take it that here Spinoza is offering a definition of “law” in the most general sense of that term, which covers both the two kinds of law he is about to distinguish: descriptive laws, true in virtue of natural necessity, and prescriptive laws, valid because of human decisions. The laws of nature (of physics and of psychology) exemplify the first kind of laws; the laws of human societies, which establish principles according to which men agree to live, exemplify the second. In iv, 5, Spinoza seems to privilege the second kind of law, saying that this is what men commonly mean by the term, that the term “law” is applied only figuratively to laws of the first kind, and that the term “law” seems to need to be defined more particularly, as a principle of living men prescribe to themselves. But I agree with Rutherford 2010 that the first type of law is more basic, in that the necessary laws of human nature explain why men prescribe to themselves the laws they do. If Spinoza gives preference in §5 to the definition of laws as prescriptions, I think that is primarily because that is the sense of “law” which is most relevant to this chapter. But in Chapter VI, it is the definition of laws as statements of natural necessity which will be most relevant.
2. This is roughly Descartes’ third law of motion. Cf. his Principles of Philosophy II, 40.
4. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan xv, 10.
5. As Hobbes notes (Leviathan xv, 3), this is the common scholastic definition of justice, defended, for example, by Aquinas, ST II-IIae, qu. lviii, art. 1. In DC iii, 5, Hobbes also gives an account of what it is for a man to be just which is like (but not identical with) Spinoza’s.
6. In x, 4, Spinoza will implicitly reject the attribution of Proverbs to Solomon.
7. Reading hinc for hunc here (following a suggestion of Wernham’s).
8. A central theme in Spinoza, to which he will return in the last half of Part V of the Ethics.
9. Homo carnalis. An allusion to St. Paul. Cf. Romans (6:19, 7:5, 18, 25) or 1 Cor. 3:1–3.
10. Spinoza does not spell out the implications of this position, but on its face it excludes a doctrine common in Christianity, that belief in certain historical facts about Jesus—that he was the son of God, whose sacrificial death on the cross redeemed mankind from sin—is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for salvation. Cf. John 3:16–18.
11. This formula provides an interesting gloss on the definition of “good” in E IV D1, answering a question that definition does not address: For what end is the good useful to us?
12. For an alternate version of this argument, see KV II, xxiv, 4 (Volume I, p. 142). See also E II P3S, ADN. XXXIV at xvi, 53 (III/198/13), and TP ii, 22.
13. This is a common medieval doctrine—cf. Maimonides Guide I, 53; Aquinas, ST I, 3—also advocated by Descartes. See his letter to Mersenne, 6 May 1630 (where the formulation nevertheless seems to give a certain priority to God’s will). But since Spinoza’s Ethics denies both will and intellect to God (E I P31), his argument here may be ad hominem.
14. ALM note that this claim will reappear in xix, 18, where it becomes a ground for claiming that the teachings of religion do not acquire the force of a command immediately from God, but only from the civil sovereign. Cf. TP ii, 22, where Spinoza explains a sense in which man can act contrary to God’s decrees.
15. I take Spinoza’s point in this paragraph to be that, contrary to the usual way of reading Gen. 2:15-17, we should not interpret that passage as reporting that God commanded Adam not to eat of the tree, i.e., expressing a volition that Adam not eat from the tree. Spinoza thinks it involves a contradiction for an omnipotent being to command one of his creatures not to do something which the creature then does. On a proper understanding of omnipotence, it is impossible for an omnipotent being to will something – something logically possible, at least – which does not happen. So if God really had commanded Adam not to eat from the tree, Adam would not have eaten its fruit.
The passage in Genesis does contain a form of words naturally understood as expressing an imperative: e.g., (in the New JPS translation) “you must not eat of the tree.” But imperatives do not always express commands; sometimes they express counsel. (Cf. Hobbes, DCv, iv, 1; Leviathan xxv, 1-3) The fact that God does not simply tell Adam to refrain, relying only on that’s being his will, but offers a reason for refraining which involves a benefit to Adam ("in the day that you eat of it, you shall die"), arguably makes this counsel rather than command. Spinoza’s language in l. 17 – Scriptura . . . narrat, Deum id Adamo praecepisse – admits both these possibilities, since a praeceptum can be either advice or an order. Of course, laws are normally accompanied by penalties which must be paid if they are broken, but those penalties normally depend on the contingent will of the lawmaker, not natural necessity.
Note that when Spinoza returns to this topic in §§38–39, he offers a different reading, and expresses doubt that he has understood the intention of the writer of Genesis.
16. Spinoza reiterates his opposition to anthropomorphic conceptions of God. As ALM note, the term “attribute” is not used here in the technical sense it has in the Ethics. Cf. KV I, vii.
17. But in i, 22, Spinoza did seem to attribute supernatural knowledge to Christ.
18. The passage cited is one which suggests that Jesus had an esoteric teaching intended to be understood only by the few. This seems difficult to reconcile with Spinoza’s earlier claim that Christ was sent to teach the whole human race. Cf. iii, 45; iv, 31.
19. Reading cognitionis (with Wernham), in preference to Gebhardt’s cogitationis. Cf. III/63/25–29. Glazemaker has kennis.
20. Gebhardt (V, 33) notes various authors who interpreted the story of the fall as a parable (e.g., Philo, Allegory of the Laws I, 100–108 [in Philo, Works]; Maimonides Guide II, 3), and others who interpreted it as historical (e.g., Ibn Ezra and Calvin).
21. For Spinoza’s other discussions of the fall, E IV P68S, V P42, Letter 19 (IV/90), and TP ii, 6.
22. Perhaps the reference is to ii, 46–47, or iii, 45, or iv, 15.
23. Accepting Wernham’s suggestion that we should read praecepit.
24. *This is a Hebraism. He who has some thing or contains it in his nature is called the Lord of that thing. Thus a bird is called in Hebrew the Lord of wings, because it has wings. One who understands is called the Lord of the intellect, because he has understanding.
25. Bennett notes that the Vulgate and the King James Version render this verse: “the instruction of fools is folly.” The ambiguity of the Hebrew (מוסר) makes this a possible translation, with the idea that it is foolish to listen to what fools teach. But more modern translations (e.g., the NRSV, the NJPS) tend to translate this verse as Spinoza does, with the idea that foolish people do foolish things, and that the foolishness of their behavior is a sufficient punishment for their folly. Spinoza will return to this verse at the end of the chapter [§§49–50], and gloss it significantly.
26. So Spinoza translates תורה here, and so did the KJV. More recent translations prefer teaching (NRSV) or instruction (NJPS).
27. Where Spinoza has ובן אדם, MT has simply ואדם.
28. *A Hebraism, which signifies nothing but life.
30. Wernham suggests reading ex ea easdem deduci. Whether the text needs emendation or not, it certainly must be translated as if that is what we had.
31. *Strictly speaking, מזמה mezima means thought, deliberation, and vigilance.
32. On Tremellius, see the annotation at III/3.
33. In the NRSV the passage from Romans reads: “Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made. So they are without excuse.” The prima facie difference between this more familiar translation and Tremellius’s version may cause some to doubt whether Spinoza may have been misled in his understanding of Paul by a bad translation. But it’s evident from his discussion of this text that he regards Tremellius’s sine effugio (without escape) as entailing that the people so characterized are inexcusable. A more serious question is whether Spinoza’s reading of Romans here is consistent with the position he ascribes to Paul in xvi, 6 and 53.
34. Note the qualifications Spinoza attaches to the doctrine that as we sow, so shall we reap. The generalizations that good deeds lead to good results, and evil deeds to bad results, hold only subject to certain conditions.
[1] In the preceding Chapter we have shown that the divine law, which [5] renders men truly blessed, and teaches a true life, is universal to all men. We have deduced this from human nature in such a way that we must think that it itself is innate to, and as it were, written in the human mind. [2] But ceremonies—at least those treated in the Old Testament—were instituted only for the Hebrews, and were so adapted to their state that [10] for the most part they could be performed only by the whole society, not by each person. So it’s certain that they do not pertain to the divine law, and make no contribution to blessedness and virtue, but concern only the election of the Hebrews—i.e., as we have shown in Ch. 3 [§§6–21], [15] only the temporal happiness of the body and the peace of the state. For that reason, they could be useful only so long as their state lasted.
[3] Therefore, if the Old Testament referred those ceremonies to the law of God, that was only because they were instituted by revelation or from revealed foundations. But because most Theologians do not [20] value reason highly, even when it is very solid, I want to prove what we have just shown by the authority of Scripture as well. Then, for greater lucidity, I want to show why and how the ceremonies served to stabilize and preserve the Jewish state.
[4] [As for the first point,] Isaiah teaches nothing more clearly than that the divine law, taken without qualification, means that universal [25] law which consists in the true manner of living, but not in ceremonies. For when the Prophet calls his nation to hear the divine Law from him (Isaiah 1:10), he first excludes from it all kinds of sacrifices, and then all festivals. Only then does he teach the law itself (see vv. 16–17), [30] summing it up briefly as consisting in the purification of the heart, in the performance (or habitual practice) of virtue (or of good actions), and finally, in giving aid to the poor.1
[5] No less clear is the testimony of Psalm 40:7, 9,2 for here the Psalmist addresses God:
[III/70] זבח ומנחה לא חפצת אזנים כרית לי עולה וחטאה לא שאלת לעשות רצונך אלהי חפצתי ותורתך בתוך מעי you did not want sacrifice and offering, you have opened my ears,3* you did not ask for a burnt offering or an offering for sin; I have wanted to follow your will, my God; for your law is in my inmost parts.
[5] Therefore, he calls the law of God only that which is written in the inmost parts, or in the mind, and he excludes ceremonies from it. For they are good only by institution, and not by nature; so they are not written in minds. In addition to these there are still other passages in Scripture which testify to the same thing. But it’s enough to have mentioned these two.
[6] [As for the second point,] Scripture itself also establishes that ceremonies contribute nothing to blessedness, but only concern the [10] temporal prosperity of the state. For it promises nothing in return for ceremonies except the advantages and pleasures of the body, and promises blessedness only in return for following the universal divine law. For in the five books commonly attributed to Moses4 nothing else is promised (as we have said above [iii, 19]) than this temporal [15] prosperity, i.e., honors or reputation, victories, wealth, pleasures and health.
[7] And although those five books contain, in addition to ceremonies, many precepts related to morals, nevertheless they do not contain those precepts as moral teachings, universal to all men, but as commands especially [20] accommodated to the grasp and mentality of the Hebrew nation, and so as commands which concern only the advantage of the state. For example, Moses does not teach the Jews as a teacher or Prophet that they should not kill or steal, but commands these things as a lawgiver and prince. For he does not prove these teachings by reason, but adds [25] a penalty to the commands, which can and must vary according to the mentality of each nation, as experience has sufficiently taught.
[8] Similarly, the command not to commit adultery concerns only the advantage of the republic and the state. For if he had wanted to teach this as a moral teaching, which concerns not only the advantage of the republic, but also the peace of mind and true blessedness of [30] each person, he would not condemn only the external action, but also the consent of the mind itself, as Christ did, who taught only universal teachings (see Matthew 5:28).5 That’s why Christ promises a spiritual reward, not, as Moses does, a corporeal one. [9] For as I’ve said,6 Christ [III/71] was sent, not to preserve the state and to institute laws, but to teach the one universal law.
From this we easily understand that Christ did not at all repeal the law of Moses, since he didn’t want to introduce any new laws into the republic, nor was he concerned about anything but teaching moral [5] lessons, and distinguishing them from the laws of the Republic. This was important to him mainly because of the ignorance of the Pharisees, who thought that one who lived blessedly was one who observed the legislation of the Republic, or the law of Moses, whereas that law, as we’ve said [iv, 29–30], was concerned only with the Republic, and did not serve so much to teach the Hebrews as to compel them.
[10] [10] But let’s return to our theme, and cite other passages in Scripture which promise nothing more than corporeal advantages in return for ceremonies, and blessedness only in return for adhering to the universal divine law. Among the Prophets no one taught this more clearly than Isaiah. For in ch. 58, after he has condemned hypocrisy, he commends [15] freedom and loving-kindness toward oneself and one’s neighbor.7 In return for these he promises that
אז יבקע כשחר אורך וארוכתך מהרה תצמח והלך לפניך צדקך כבוד יהוה יאספך then your light will burst forth like the dawn, and your health will blossom out immediately, and your justice will go before you, and the glory of God will gather8* you etc. [v. 8].
After this he commends the sabbath also, and in return for diligence [20] in observing it, he promises that
אז תתענג על יהוה והרכבתיך על במותי ארץ והאכלתיך נחלת יעקב אביך כי פי יהוה דבר then you will take pleasure9* in God, and I shall make you ride10* on the high places of the earth, and I shall make you eat the heritage of Jacob, your father, as the mouth of Yahweh has spoken [v. 14].
We see, therefore, that in return for freedom and loving-kindness the [25] Prophet promises a sound mind in a sound body, and the glory of God even after death,11 but that in return for ceremonies he promises nothing except the security of the state, prosperity and bodily good fortune.
[11] In Psalms 15 and 24 there is no mention of ceremonies, but only of moral teachings, because in those Psalms it is only a question of blessedness, and that alone is held out as an inducement, although [30] in metaphors. For it is certain that by the mount of God, and his tents, and the inhabitation of these, the Psalmist understands blessedness and [III/72] peace of mind, not the mount of Jerusalem or the tent of Moses.12 For no one inhabited these places, nor did anyone administer them, except members of the tribe of Levi.
[12] Next, all the maxims of Solomon which I mentioned in the preceding chapter promise true blessedness in return only for the cultivation of understanding and wisdom. That is, they promise that [5] in this way we will at last understand the fear of God, and discover the 'knowledge of God.
[13] But it’s evident from Jeremiah that after the destruction of their state the Hebrews are not bound to perform ceremonies. When he has seen that the destruction of the city is at hand, and is predicting it, he says God loves only those who know and understand that he exercises [10] compassion, judgment, and justice in the world; and so hereafter only those who know these things are to be viewed as worthy of praise (see Jeremiah 9:23),13 as if to say that after the destruction of the city God requires nothing special of the Jews, and that henceforth he will not ask of them anything beyond the natural law which binds all mortals.
[15] [14] The New Testament completely proves this. For as we have said, it teaches only moral lessons, and promises the kingdom of heaven in return for adherence to them. Moreover, after the Gospel began to be preached also to other nations, who were bound by the legislation of another Republic, the Apostles set aside ceremonies.
It’s true that the Pharisees retained them, or at least many of them, [20] after they lost their state; but they did this more in a spirit of opposing the Christians than to please God. [15] For after the first destruction of the city, when they were led as captives to Babylon, because (so far as I know) they were not then divided into sects, they immediately neglected ceremonies. Indeed, they said good-bye to the whole law of Moses, consigned the legislation of their country to oblivion, as completely [25] superfluous, and began to mix with the other nations. Ezra and Nehemiah establish this more than adequately.14 So there is no doubt that after their state was dissolved the Jews were no more bound by the law of Moses than they were before their social order and Republic began. For before the exodus from Egypt, when they lived among other nations, they had [30] no laws peculiar to themselves, and were not bound by any law, except natural law and, no doubt, the legislation of the Republic in which they were living (insofar as it was not contrary to divine natural law).
[16] As for the fact that the Patriarchs sacrificed to God, I think they did that to rouse their hearts more to devotion; their hearts were accustomed to sacrifices from childhood. For from the time of Enosh [III/73] all men had become completely accustomed to sacrifices,15 so that it was only by them that they were most roused to devotion. So the Patriarchs sacrificed to God, not because some divine legislation commanded it, nor because they had been instructed in the universal foundations of divine law, but only because it was the custom at that time. If they did [5] it because of someone’s command, that command was nothing but the legislation of the republic in which they were living, by which they were also bound (as we have already noted here, and also in Ch. 3, when we spoke about Melchizedek).16
[17] With this I think I have proven my opinion by the authority [10] of Scripture. It remains now to show how and why ceremonies served to preserve and stabilize the Hebrews’ state. I shall show this from universal foundations, as briefly as I can.
[18] A social order is very useful, and even most necessary, not only for living securely from enemies, but also for doing many things more [15] easily. For if men were not willing to give mutual assistance to one another, they would lack both skill and time to sustain and preserve themselves as far as possible. [19] Not all men are equally capable of all things, and no one would be able to provide the things which a man alone needs most. Everyone, I say, would lack both the strength and [20] the time, if he alone had to plow, to sow, to reap, to grind, to cook, to weave, to sew, and to do the many other things necessary to support life—not to mention now the arts and sciences which are also supremely necessary for the perfection of human nature and for its blessedness. [20] For we see that those who live barbarously, without an organized [25] community, lead a wretched and almost brutal life, and that still it is not without mutual assistance, such as it is, that they are able to provide themselves with the few wretched and crude things they have.17
Now if nature had so constituted men that they desired nothing except what true reason teaches them to desire, then of course a society could exist without laws; in that case it would be completely sufficient [30] to teach men true moral lessons, so that they would do voluntarily, wholeheartedly, and in a manner worthy of a free man, what is really useful. [21] But human nature is not constituted like that at all. It’s true that everyone seeks his own advantage—but people want things and judge them useful, not by the dictate of sound reason, but for the most part only from immoderate desire and because they are carried away by affects of mind which take no account of the future and of other [III/74] things. [22] That’s why no society can continue in existence without authority and force, and hence, laws which moderate and restrain men’s immoderate desires and unchecked impulses.
Nevertheless, human nature does not allow itself to be compelled in everything. As the Tragic poet, Seneca, says, no one has sustained a [5] violent rule for long; moderate ones last.18 For as long as men act only from fear, they act very unwillingly, and don’t recognize the advantage, even the necessity, of doing what they’re doing. All they care about is saving their necks, and avoiding punishment. They can only rejoice whenever some evil or harm happens to their ruler, however much evil it may bring them; they can’t help wanting all sorts of bad things to [10] happen to him; when they can, they help to bring them about. Again, the hardest thing for them to endure is being subservient to their equals, and being governed by them. Finally, nothing is more difficult than to take freedom away from men again, once it has been granted.
[23] From these [foundations] it follows, first, that either the whole society should hold sovereignty as a body (if this can be done), so that [15] everyone is bound to be subject to himself, and no one is bound to be subject to his equal—or else, if a few men have sovereignty, or one man alone, he ought to have something above ordinary human nature. If he does not surpass ordinary human nature, he at least must strive with all his might to persuade the common people of this.
[24] Secondly, [it follows from the foundations that] in each state the laws must be so instituted that men are checked not so much by fear as by the hope of some good they desire very much. For in this [20] way everyone will do his duty eagerly.
[25] Finally, since obedience consists in someone’s carrying out a command solely on the authority of the person who commands it, it follows that obedience has no place in a social order where sovereignty is in the hands of everyone and laws are enacted by common consent, [25] and that whether the laws in such a social order are increased or diminished, the people nevertheless remains equally free, because it does not act from the authority of someone else, but by its own consent. But the opposite happens where one person alone holds sovereignty absolutely. For everyone carries out the commands of the state solely because of the authority of one person, with the result that, unless they have been [30] educated from the beginning to hang on the words of the ruler, it will be difficult for him to institute new laws when it is necessary, and to take away a freedom once it has been granted to the people.
[26] Let us now apply these general considerations to the Hebrew republic.19 When they first left Egypt, they were no longer bound by the legislation of any other nation; so they were permitted, as they [III/75] wished, to enact new laws or to establish new legislation, and to have a state wherever they wished, and to occupy what lands they wished. [27] Nevertheless, they were quite incapable of establishing legislation wisely and keeping the sovereignty in their own hands, as a body. Almost all of them were unsophisticated in their mentality and weakened by [5] wretched bondage. Therefore, the sovereignty had to remain in the hands of one person only, who would command the others, compel them by force, and finally, who would prescribe laws and afterward interpret them.
[28] But Moses was easily able to retain this sovereignty, because he excelled the others in divine power, persuaded the people that he had [10] it, and showed this by a great deal of evidence (see Exodus 14:29, 19:9). So through a divine power in which he was preeminent, he established legislation and prescribed it to the people. But in these matters he took the greatest care that the people should do their duty, not so much from fear, as voluntarily.20 Two things in particular forced this on him: [15] the stubborn mentality of the people (because it would not allow itself to be compelled solely by force) and the threat of war. For if war is to go well, it is better to encourage the soldiers than to frighten them with penalties and threats. In this way they will be eager to distinguish themselves for excellence and nobility of spirit rather than merely to avoid punishment.
[29] That’s why Moses, by divine power and command, introduced [20] religion into the Republic, so that the people would do their duty not so much from fear as from devotion. He also placed them under obligation with benefits, and in the name of God promised them many things in the future. Moreover, the laws he enacted were not very severe. Anyone who has concerned himself with them will easily grant that, particularly if he has attended to the circumstances which were [25] required to condemn someone as guilty.21
[30] Finally, in order that the people, who were not capable of being their own masters, should hang on the words of its ruler, he did not permit these men, accustomed as they were to bondage, to act just as they pleased. For the people could do nothing without being bound at the same time to remember the law, and to carry out commands which depended only on the will of the ruler. For it was not at their [30] own pleasure, but according to a fixed and determinate command of the law, that they were permitted to plow, to sow, to reap.22 Likewise, they were not permitted to eat anything, to dress, to shave their head or beard, to rejoice, or to do absolutely anything, except according to the orders and commandments prescribed in the laws. This was not all. They were also bound to have on the doorposts, on their hands, [III/76] and between their eyes, certain signs, which always reminded them of the need for obedience.23
[31] This, then, was the object of the ceremonies: that men should do nothing by their own decision, but everything according to the command of someone else, and that they should confess, both by constantly repeated actions and by meditations, that they were not their own master in anything, but were completely subjected to someone [5] else’s control. From all this it is established, more clearly than by broad daylight, that ceremonies contribute nothing to blessedness, and that those of the Old Testament, indeed, the whole law of Moses, was concerned with nothing but the Hebrew state, and consequently, with nothing but corporeal advantages.24
[32] As for the Christian ceremonies, viz., Baptism, the lord’s Supper, the festivals, public statements, and whatever others there may be [10] which are and always have been common to all Christianity, if Christ or the Apostles ever instituted these (which so far I do not find to be sufficiently established), they were instituted only as external signs of the universal Church, not as things which contribute to blessedness or have any holiness in them.25
[15] [33] So though these ceremonies were not instituted with respect to a state, still they were instituted only with respect to the whole Society.26 So someone who lives alone is not bound by them at all. Indeed, someone who lives in a state where the Christian religion is forbidden is bound to abstain from these ceremonies. But he can still live blessedly. [20] [34] We have an example of this in Japan, where the Christian religion is forbidden, and the Dutch who live there are bound by a command of the East India Company to abstain from all external worship.27
I do not intend to prove this now by any other authority, though it would not be difficult to deduce this too from the fundamental principles [25] of the New Testament, and perhaps to show it also by clear evidence. Nevertheless I prefer to put these things to one side, because I am anxious to get to other matters. So I proceed to the second question I have decided to discuss in this chapter: for whom is faith in the historical narratives contained in Scriptures necessary? and why? To investigate this by the natural light, it seems that we should proceed as follows.
[30] [35] If someone wants to persuade or dissuade men of something not known through itself, to get them to embrace it he must deduce it from things which have been granted, and convince them either by experience or by reason, viz., either from things they have experienced through the senses as happening in nature, or from intellectual axioms known through themselves. But unless the experience is such that it [III/77] is clearly and distinctly understood, even though it convinces a man, it will still not be able to affect his intellect and disperse its clouds as much as when the thing to be taught is deduced solely from intellectual axioms, i.e., solely by the power of the intellect and its order in perceiving. This is particularly true if it is a question of a spiritual [5] thing, which does not in any way fall under the senses.
[36] But because deducing a thing solely from intellectual notions very often requires a long chain of perceptions, plus extreme caution, mental perceptiveness, and restraint—all of which are rarely found in men—men would rather be taught by experience than deduce all their [10] perceptions from a few axioms and connect them together.
[37] It follows that if someone wants to teach a doctrine to a whole nation—not to mention the whole human race—and wants everyone to understand him in every respect, he is bound to prove his doctrine solely by experience, and for the most part to accommodate his arguments and the definitions of his teaching to the power of understanding [15] of ordinary people, who form the greatest part of the human race. He should not connect his arguments, or give definitions, according as they serve to connect his arguments better. Otherwise he will write only for the learned, i.e., he will be intelligible only to very few men, compared with the rest.
[20] [38] Since the whole of Scripture was revealed first for the use of a whole nation, and eventually for the use of the whole human race, the things it contains must necessarily have been accommodated chiefly to ordinary people’s power of understanding and proved by experience alone. Let us explain this matter more clearly. The strictly speculative matters Scripture wishes to teach28 are chiefly these:
[25] there is a God, or a being who has made all things, who directs and sustains them with supreme wisdom, and who takes the greatest care of those men who live piously and honorably. As for the others, he inflicts many punishments on them and separates them from the good.
[39] Scripture proves these teachings solely by experience, i.e., by [30] the narratives it relates. It does not give any definitions of these things, but accommodates all its words and arguments to ordinary people’s power of understanding. And although experience cannot give any clear knowledge of these things, or teach what God is, and how he sustains and directs all things, and how he takes care of men,29 still it [III/78] can teach and enlighten men enough to imprint obedience and devotion on their hearts.
[40] This establishes clearly enough, I think, who needs faith in the historical narratives contained in Scripture, and why. From what we have just shown it follows with utmost clarity that acquaintance with them, and faith in them, is most necessary for the common people, [5] whose mentality is not able to perceive things clearly and distinctly.
Next it follows that whoever denies these narratives because he does not believe that there is a God, or that God provides for things and for men, is impious. On the other hand, someone who is not familiar with them, and nevertheless knows by the natural light that God exists, and the other things we have just mentioned [in §38], and moreover has a [10] true manner of living, that person is completely blessed.30 Indeed, he is more blessed than the common people, because in addition to true opinions, he has a clear and distinct conception.
[41] Finally, it follows that if someone is not familiar with these historical narratives in Scripture and does not know anything by the natural light, even if he is not impious or stubborn, still he is devoid of human feeling, and almost a beast. He does not have any of God’s gift.
[15] But note: when we say that acquaintance with historical narratives is very necessary for the common people, we do not mean acquaintance with absolutely all the narratives contained in Scripture, but only with the main ones, which by themselves, without the others, show the teaching we have just mentioned more clearly, and are most capable [20] of moving men’s hearts. [42] For if all the Scriptural narratives were necessary to prove its teaching, and no conclusion could be drawn without a general consideration of absolutely all the stories contained in it,31 then surely the demonstration of the teaching and the conclusion would surpass, not only the grasp and powers of ordinary people, [25] but those of all men without exception. For who could attend all at once to so many narratives, to so many circumstances, and to so many parts of the teaching which would have to be drawn from so many and such different stories?
[43] For my part, I cannot believe that the men who left us the Scripture as we have it were so plentifully supplied with understanding [30] that they could find such a demonstration; much less can I believe that the teaching of Scripture could not be understood except by someone who had heard the quarrels of Isaac, the advice given by Achitophel to Absalom, the civil war of the Jews and the Israelites, and other Chronicles of that kind. Nor can I believe that that teaching could not be demonstrated as easily to the first Jews, who lived in the time [III/79] of Moses, as it could to those who lived in the time of Ezra. But more of this later.
[44] The common people, then, are bound to know only those narratives which are most able to move their hearts to obedience and devotion. But they themselves are not very well able to make a judgment [5] [about which narratives those are], because they take more pleasure in the narration, and in the particular and unexpected outcomes, than they do in what the narratives teach. So, in addition to reading the narratives, they need Pastors or ministers of the Church as well, who will teach them according to the weakness of their understanding.
[45] But not to wander from our subject, let us conclude with what [10] we mainly meant to show, viz. that faith in historical narratives, whatever in the end those narratives may be, does not pertain to the divine law and does not render men more blessed in itself, and does not have any utility except in relation to teaching. It is only in this respect that some narratives can be better than others.
[46] So the narratives contained in the Old and New Testaments [15] are better than the other, secular narratives, and among the [scriptural narratives], some are better than others, in proportion as the opinions which follow from them are salutary. Hence, if someone has read the narratives of Holy Scripture, and has had faith in them in every respect, and has nevertheless not attended to the lesson Scripture intends to teach with those stories, nor improved his life, it is just the same as if [20] he had read the Koran, or the dramas of the Poets, or even the ordinary Chronicles, with the same attention as the common people usually give to these things. On the other hand, as we have said, someone who is completely unfamiliar with these narratives, and nevertheless has salutary opinions and a true manner of living, is completely blessed and really has the Spirit of Christ in him.32
[47] But the Jews think just the opposite.33 For they maintain that true [25] opinions and a true manner of living contribute nothing to blessedness so long as men embrace them only by the natural light and not as teachings revealed prophetically to Moses. In ch. 8 of Kings, law 11, Maimonides is bold enough to affirm this openly, in these words: [30] כל המקבל שבע מצות ונזהר לעשותן הרי זה מחסידי אומות העולם ויש לו חלק לעולם הבא : והוא שיקבל אותן ויעשה אותן מפני שצוה בהן הקדוש ברוך הוא בתורה והודיענו על ידי משה רבינו שבני נח מקודם נצטוו בהן אבל אם עשהן מפני הכרע הדעת אין זה גר תושב ואינו מחסידי אומות העולם ואינו מחכמיהם [III/80]everyone who has accepted the seven precepts34* and has carried them out diligently is among the pious of the Nations, and will inherit the world to come, that is, provided he has accepted them and carried them out because God commanded them in the law and because he revealed to us through Moses that previously he gave the same precepts to the sons of Noah; but if he [5] has carried them out because he has been led by reason, he is not a resident,35 nor to be numbered among the pious of the Nations, nor among their wise men.36
[48] Those are the words of Maimonides. And Rabbi Joseph, son of Shem Tov, adds in his book, Kevod Elohim, or Glory of God,37 that even if Aristotle (who he thinks wrote the best Ethics, and whom he [10] esteems above all others) had included all the things which concern the true Ethics, and which he has embraced in his own Ethics, but had carried out all of them diligently, this still could not have helped him attain salvation. For he did not embrace the things he teaches as divine teachings, prophetically revealed, but only as dictates of reason.
[49] But I think anyone who reads these things attentively will find [15] it clear enough that these are all just inventions, unsupported either by any reasons or by the authority of Scripture. To refute this position, it’s enough to give an account of it. Nor do I intend here to refute the opinion of those who maintain that the natural light cannot teach anything sound about the things bearing on true salvation. For a person [20] who does not grant himself any sound reason can not prove this by any reason.38 And if they seek to recommend themselves as having something beyond reason, that is a mere invention, and far beneath reason, which their ordinary way of living has already sufficiently shown.
[50] But there is no need to speak more openly about these people. I add only this: that we cannot know anyone except by his works. [25] Therefore, if a man is rich in these fruits,39 loving-kindness, gladness, peace, patience, beneficence, goodness, good faith, gentleness, and selfrestraint—against which (as Paul says in Galatians 5:22) there is no law—whether he has been taught only by reason or only by Scripture, he has truly been taught by God and is completely blessed. With this [30] I have finished everything I had decided to say about the divine law.
1. Isa. 1:16–17 reads: “Wash yourselves clean; put your evil doings away from my sight. Cease to do evil; learn to do good. Devote yourself to justice; aid the wronged; uphold the rights of the orphan; defend the cause of the widow” (NJPS).
2. Spinoza uses the numbering of the Hebrew Bible for what in the English versions are vv. 6 and 8. The Hebrew which Spinoza translates here as lex (“law”), torah, can also be translated “teaching,” and is so translated in the NJPS translation.
3. *A phrase meaning perception.
4. The first hint, I think, that Spinoza will question the attribution of those books to Moses.
5. Matt. 5:28 reads: “But I say to you that everyone who looks at a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in his heart” (NRSV). Sanders (1993, 201–4) has argued that we need to put the “idealistic perfectionism” of passages like this into context, noting that it seems to be localized in the gospel of Matthew, and to be inconsistent with the compassion toward human frailty found elsewhere in the teachings of Jesus.
6. I believe the reference is to iv, 31–34.
7. hic enim cap. 58., postquam hypocrisin damnavit, libertatem, et charitatem erga se, et proximum commendat. This sentence is puzzling, partly because of the reference to libertas. Totaro suggests that Spinoza may have in mind Isa. 58:6, which urges the people of Israel to free the workers they have oppressed. But she also suggests that libertas may have the broader meaning it had acquired by the seventeenth century, which includes what would classically have been called liberalitas (liberality or generosity). Cf. Isa. 58:7, with its call to the people of Israel to share their bread with the hungry, bring the homeless into their homes, and clothe the naked.
Also puzzling is the apparent injunction to love oneself (commending charitas erga se). Isaiah does not seem to think that the people suffer from a deficit of self-love, but that their self-love fails to motivate the behavior God really wants, not ritual, but care for others. We might propose taking the reflexive se to have reciprocal force, so that the injunction is to love one another. But then the reference to loving one’s neighbor seems redundant.
8. *A Hebraism by which the time of death is meant. To be gathered unto one’s people means to die. See Gen. 49:29, 33. [Spinoza is at odds with the major modern translations, which interpret the verb אסף here as meaning to be one’s rearguard, and not, as Spinoza does, to gather or collect (with a reference to the custom of gathering a person’s bones for burial with those of his ancestors). So the NJPS has for the last verse: “The presence of the LORD shall be your rearguard.” The NRSV and NIV are similar. I owe this information to John Huddlestun. Cf. Isa. 52:12, where the HCSB commentary suggests a contrast with the exodus.]
9. *This means to take pleasure in honorably, as is also said in Dutch: met Godt en met eere [, with God and with honor].
10. *This means control, as to handle a horse by the reins.
11. So here Spinoza finds a reference to reward in the afterlife in the Hebrew Bible (though apparently he bases this on a misreading of Isaiah).
12. See Ps. 15:1 and Ps. 24:3.
13. Though in italics in the text, this is more a paraphrase than a quote. The verse cited reads: “But only in this should one glory: in his earnest devotion to Me. For I the Lord act with kindness, justice and equity in the world; for in these I delight” (NJPS). The verses which follow reject the importance of physical circumcision, in favor of a circumcision of the heart.
14. See Ezra 9 and Neh. 13.
15. Gen. 4:26, which does not specifically mention sacrifices, reports that in the time of Enosh (the grandson of Adam through Seth) people began to invoke Yahweh by name. According to a different tradition, preserved in Exod. 3:13–15, 6:2–3, the name Yahweh was introduced in the time of Moses. See the discussion in Anchor Genesis, 37–38.
17. The considerations Spinoza introduces here will recur in xvi, 13, as part of his argument for a social contract. They occur also in Hobbes. Cf. Leviathan xiii, 9, 14.
18. Seneca, Troades 258–59, quoted again at III/194/15. As ALM note, Spinoza’s Latin teacher, Van den Enden, had his students put on performances, not only of Terence’s comedies, but also of Seneca’s tragedies.
20. ALM call attention to a passage in Terence’s Adelphi, 74–75, another of the Latin authors whose plays Van den Enden had his students perform. Cf. also TP x, 7.
21. Cf. Deut. 19:15, according to which two or more witnesses are required for conviction for any crime.
22. Cf. Deut. 22:9–10.
23. Cf. Deut. 6:8–9.
24. This section of the TTP would thus provide one way for Spinoza to defend one of the opinions for which he was excommunicated, his contention that the Law of Moses was not the true law. Cf. the Editorial Preface to the TTP, pp. 49–50, 52–53.
25. In rejecting these Christian ceremonies, Spinoza’s position resembles that of the Quakers. Cf. Barbour 2005.
26. That is, as I take it, the Christian religious community, which lacks the political structure characteristic of a state, and transcends national boundaries.
27. Catholic missionaries had been active in Japan since the mid-sixteenth century and the Dutch established a trading post there early in the seventeenth century. But the Tokugawa shoguns, aware of the role of missionaries in the Spanish and Portuguese colonialism in Asia, came to view them as a threat to their rule. They banned Christianity, expelled the missionaries, and adopted a policy of national seclusion. From 1633 until the nineteenth century, Japanese subjects were prohibited from traveling abroad. Foreign contact was limited to a few Chinese and Dutch merchants allowed to trade through the port of Nagasaki, on the condition that they would refrain from proselytizing and from publicly practicing Christianity. When this agreement became known in the Netherlands, the Calvinist clergy, mindful of the willingness of the early Christians to suffer martyrdom in the Roman Empire, strongly opposed it. During the French invasion of the Dutch Republic in the 1670s, Jean-Baptiste Stouppe, a Swiss Calvinist in the service of Louis XIV, sought to justify the participation of Protestants in a Catholic war against a Protestant country on the ground that the Dutch Republic was not truly a Protestant country. He cited both the agreement with Japan and the “unlimited freedom” the Republic extended to all sorts of religions (and to freethinkers like Spinoza). For further detail, see Stouppe 1673; ALM, 727–28, n. 29; and Gebhardt V, 34–36. Spinoza will refer to this agreement again in xvi, 67.
28. Here we get a first sketch of the minimum creed Spinoza will develop later in xii, 34–38, and xiv, 5–34.
29. Questions Spinoza addressed earlier in iii, 7–11.
30. Here Spinoza sets himself against the exclusivism affirmed in such New Testament passages as John 3:18, 14:6; Acts 4:12; Romans 3:9–28, 5:12–21; etc. Cf. Letter 76 and the discussion of it in Curley 2010.
31. As Maimonides had argued, Guide III, 50.
32. So Spinoza’s view is pluralistic, in the sense that he thinks no one religious book which claims to offer a unique route to salvation actually does that.
33. Maimonides’ position was not universal among Jews even in the medieval period. But the issue was an important one in the Amsterdam Jewish community of Spinoza’s day, and seems to have been one of the issues which separated Spinoza and Juan de Prado from that community. On this see Kaplan 1989, 122–78. Since the Enlightenment a more pluralistic understanding of the relation of Judaism to other religions has been common (though not universal). In the eighteenth century Moses Mendelssohn is particularly close to Spinoza’s view. On history of this problem, see Porton 2005.
34. *The Jews think that God gave Noah seven precepts and that it is only by those precepts that all nations are bound; but they think he gave a great many others as well to the Hebrew nation alone, so as to make it more blessed than the others. [The seven precepts which Spinoza says God is thought to have given to Noah (known as the Noachide laws) include prohibitions of idolatry, blasphemy, murder, adultery, theft, eating a limb torn from a living animal, and an injunction to establish a legal system. There has been debate within the Jewish tradition as to whether the Noachide laws constituted a formulation of natural law or were intended only to govern the conduct of non-Jews living under Jewish jurisdiction. For further detail, see Schwarzschild et al. 2007.]
35. Spinoza uses the term incola, resident, or inhabitant, to translate a Hebrew phrase which normally designates a resident alien, someone who has the right to live in a political community without being a citizen.
36. See the Mishneh Torah, Hilkot Melakim 8, 11, and the discussions of this passage in Fox 1990, 130–32, and Kaplan 1989, 118–22. The text Spinoza translates appears to be corrupt. Modern editions of Maimonides have a reading in which the last clause would be translated “but among their wise men.” ALM, 729–30, n. 40, helpfully summarizes the debate among Joel, Cohen, and Strauss about whether Maimonides’ position on the righteous among the gentiles is truly representative of the Jewish tradition. See also Porton 2005.
37. Joseph ben Shem Tov (c. 1400–c. 1460) was a philosopher and physician in the court of two Spanish kings, John II and Henry IV. His Kevod Elohim (written in 1442, but not published until 1556) argued that Aristotle’s views could be reconciled with the teachings of the Torah, and that philosophical inquiry could be useful to religion. A Jew who philosophizes is better than one who practices his religious duties blindly. But he did not think it was necessary to understand philosophy or the reasons for the divine commandments in order to practice them.
38. Another reference to the Calvinists. Cf. Preface, §17.
39. Alluding to a proverb found in the gospels, e.g., Matt. 7:16, 20; 12:33.
[1] Just as men are in the habit of calling divine whatever 'knowledge surpasses the human power of understanding, so they’ve become accustomed [5] to call a work divine, or a work of God, if its cause is commonly not known. For the common people think God’s power and providence are established most clearly when they see something unusual happen in nature, which is contrary to the opinion they have of nature from custom. This is particularly so if the event has turned out to their profit [10] or advantage. They judge that nothing can prove God’s existence more clearly than that nature, as they think, does not maintain its order.
That’s why these people think someone who explains things and miracles by their natural causes, or who strives to understand them, eliminates God, or at least God’s providence. [2] For they think that God does nothing so long as nature acts according to its usual order. [15] Conversely, they think the power of nature and natural causes are inactive so long as God acts. So they imagine two powers numerically distinct from one another, the power of God and the power of natural things. Nevertheless, they think the power of natural things is determined by God in a certain way—or (as most think today instead) created.
[20] [3] But what do they understand by these two powers, and by God and nature? They don’t know, of course, except that they imagine God’s power as the rule of a certain Royal majesty, whereas they imagine nature’s power as force and impulse. So the common people call unusual works of nature miracles, or works of God. Partly from devotion, partly [25] from a desire to oppose those who cultivate the natural sciences, they don’t want to know the natural causes of things. They long to hear only the things they’re most ignorant of, which they’re most amazed by. [4] They can worship God and relate all things to his rule and will only by eliminating natural causes and imagining events outside the [30] order of nature. They marvel most at the power of God when they imagine the power of nature as if it were subjected to God’s control.
This [attitude] seems to have originated with the earliest Jews. The Gentiles of their time worshipped visible Gods, such as the Sun, the Moon, the Earth, Water, Air, etc. To prove them wrong and to show [III/82] them that those Gods were weak and inconstant, or changeable, and under the rule of an invisible God, the Jews related their miracles, by which they tried to show that the whole of nature was directed only for their advantage, by the command of the God they worshipped. This was so pleasing to men that to this day they haven’t ceased to feign miracles, so that they might be believed to be dearer to God than the [5] rest, and the final cause on account of which God has created, and continually directs, all things.
[5] What do the common people not foolishly claim for themselves, because they have no sound concept either of God or of nature, because they confuse God’s decrees with men’s decisions, and finally, because [10] they posit a nature so limited that they believe man to be its chief part! But that’s enough about the opinions and prejudices of the common people regarding Nature and miracles. [6] To treat this topic in proper order, I’ll show
(i) that nothing happens contrary to nature, but that it preserves an eternal, fixed and immutable order [§§7–12]; at the same time, I’ll show [15] what must be understood by a miracle [§§13–15];
(ii) I’ll show that we cannot know either the essence or the existence of God from miracles, and hence, that we cannot know his providence from miracles, but that all these things are far better perceived from the fixed and immutable order of nature [§§16–38];
(iii) by a number of Scriptural examples I’ll show that Scripture itself understands by God’s decrees and volitions—and hence his providence—nothing [20] but the order itself of nature, which follows necessarily from its eternal laws [§§39–51];
(iv) finally, I’ll discuss how the miracles of Scripture are to be understood, and what must principally be noted regarding the miracle narratives [§§52–64].
These are the main points of the argument of this chapter. I think [25] they’ll contribute in no small way to the purpose of the work as a whole.
[7] The first point [that nothing happens contrary to nature, but that it preserves an eternal, fixed and immutable order] is easily shown from what we demonstrated in Ch. 41 regarding the divine law: viz. that whatever God wills or determines involves eternal necessity and truth; [8] for we have shown, from the fact that God’s intellect is not [30] distinguished from his will, that we affirm the same thing when we say that God wills something as when we say that he understands it. So by the same necessity with which it follows from the divine nature and perfection that God understands a thing as it is, it follows also that God wills the same thing as it is.2 [9] But since nothing is necessarily true except by the divine decree alone, it follows quite clearly from [III/83] this that the universal laws of nature are nothing but decrees of God, which follow from the necessity and perfection of the divine nature. Therefore, if anything were to happen in nature which was contrary to its universal laws, it would also necessarily be contrary to the divine [5] decree, intellect and nature. Or if someone were to maintain that God does something contrary to the laws of nature, he would be compelled to maintain at the same time also that God acts in a way contrary to his own nature. Nothing would be more absurd than that.
We could also show the same thing from the fact that the power of nature is the divine power and virtue itself. Moreover, the divine power is the very essence of God. But for the present I prefer to pass over this.3
[10] [10] Nothing, therefore, happens in nature4* which is contrary to its universal laws. Nor does anything happen which does not agree with those laws or does not follow from them. For whatever happens, happens by God’s will and eternal decree, i.e., as we have now shown, whatever happens, happens according to laws and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth.
[15] [11] So nature always observes laws and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth—though they are not all known to us—and so it also observes a fixed and immutable order. No sound reason urges us to attribute a limited power and virtue to nature, or to maintain that its laws are suited only for certain things and not everything. For since [20] nature’s virtue and power is the very virtue and power of God, and its laws and rules are God’s decrees themselves, we must believe without reservation that the power of nature is infinite, and that its laws are so broad that they extend to everything which is conceived by the divine intellect itself. [12] For otherwise what else are we saying but that God [25] has created a nature so impotent, and established laws and rules for it so sterile, that often he is compelled to come to its aid anew, if he wants it to be preserved and wants things to turn out as he wished? I think nothing is more foreign to reason than that.
[13] Thus, from these propositions—that nothing happens in nature [30] which does not follow from its laws, that its laws extend to all things conceived by the Divine intellect itself, and finally, that nature maintains a fixed and immutable order—it clearly follows that the term “miracle” cannot be understood except in relation to men’s opinions, [III/84] and means nothing but a work whose natural cause we cannot explain by the example of another familiar thing, or at least which cannot be so explained by the one who writes or relates the miracle.
[14] I could, of course, say that a miracle is something whose cause cannot be explained according to the principles of natural things known [5] to the natural light. But since miracles have occurred according to the power of understanding of the common people, who were, in fact, completely ignorant of the principles of natural things, it is certain that the ancients took for a miracle what they could not explain in the way the common people are accustomed to explain natural things, viz. by falling back on memory to recall some other similar thing they are [10] accustomed to imagine without wonder. For the common people think they understand a thing well enough when they do not wonder at it.
[15] So the ancients, and almost everyone up till now, has had no other standard for a miracle than this. We ought not doubt that many things are related as miracles in the Sacred Texts whose causes can easily [15] be explained according to known principles of natural things. We already hinted at this in Ch. 2 when we spoke about the sun’s standing still in the time of Joshua, and its going backward in the time of Ahaz.5 But we’ll soon treat this more fully, when we discuss the interpretation of miracles, as I’ve promised to do in this chapter.
[20] [16] It’s time now to pass to the second point, viz. to show that from miracles we understand neither God’s essence, nor his existence, nor his providence, but that on the contrary these things are far better perceived from the fixed and immutable order of nature. I proceed to demonstrate this as follows.6
[17] Since God’s existence is not known through itself,7** it must [25] necessarily be inferred from notions whose truth is so firm and steady that no power can be or be conceived by which they could be changed. At least, so they must appear to us when we infer God’s existence from them, if we want to infer it beyond any chance of doubt. For if we [30] could conceive that the notions themselves could be changed by some power, whatever in the end it was, we would doubt their truth, and consequently also doubt our conclusion, viz. God’s existence, so that we could never be certain of anything.
[18] Next, we know that nothing agrees with nature (or is contrary to it) except what we have shown to agree with those principles (or to be contrary to them). So if we could conceive that by some [III/85] power (whatever in the end it was) something could happen in nature which was contrary to nature, that would be contrary to those first notions, and we would have to reject it as absurd—either that, or we would have to doubt the first notions (as we have just shown) and consequently, doubt God and all things, however they might have been perceived.
[5] [19] So it is far from true that miracles (understood as works contrary to the order of nature) show us the existence of God. On the contrary, they would make us doubt his existence, since without them we could be absolutely certain of his existence, i.e., when we know that all things in nature follow a fixed and immutable order.
[10] [20] But suppose a miracle is something which cannot be explained by natural causes. This can be understood in either of two ways: either it in fact has natural causes which nevertheless cannot be found by the human intellect, or it admits no cause except God, or God’s will. [21] But because all things which happen through natural causes also [15] happen from God’s power and will alone, in the end we must arrive at this: that whether a miracle has natural causes or not, it is a work which cannot be explained by its cause, i.e., a work which surpasses man’s power of understanding.
But from a work, and absolutely, from anything which surpasses [20] our power of understanding, we can understand nothing. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly must become known to us either through itself or through something else which through itself is understood clearly and distinctly. [22] So from a miracle, or a work surpassing our power of understanding, we can understand neither God’s essence, nor his existence, nor absolutely anything concerning [25] God and nature. On the contrary, since we know that all things are determined and ordained by God, that nature’s operations follow from God’s essence, indeed, that the laws of nature are God’s eternal decrees and volitions, we must conclude absolutely that the better we know natural things—the more clearly we understand how they depend on [30] their first cause, and how they produce effects according to the eternal laws of nature—the better we know God and his will.
[23] That’s why, in relation to our intellect, we have a far better right to call those works we clearly and distinctly understand works of God, and to refer them to God’s will, than we do those we are completely ignorant of, though the latter occupy our imagination powerfully and [III/86] carry men away with wonder. For only the works of nature which we understand clearly and distinctly make our knowledge of God more elevated and indicate God’s will and decrees as clearly as possible. So those who have recourse to the will of God when they have no knowledge of a thing are just trifling. It’s a ridiculous way of confessing their ignorance.8
[5] [24] Again, even if we could infer something from miracles, we could still not infer God’s existence from them in any way. For since a miracle is a limited work, and never expresses any power except a definite and limited one, it is certain that from such an effect we cannot [10] infer the existence of a cause whose power is infinite, but at most that of a cause whose power is greater [than that expressed by the effect]. I say at most, because from many causes concurring at the same time, there can also follow a work whose force and power is indeed less than the power of all the causes together, but far greater than the power of each cause. [25] But since (as we’ve already shown)9 the laws of nature [15] extend to infinitely many things, and we conceive them under a certain species of eternity, and nature proceeds according to them in a definite and immutable order, to that extent they indicate to us God’s infinity, eternity and immutability.
[26] We conclude, then, that we cannot know God, his existence, [20] or his providence, by miracles; but we can infer these things far better from the fixed and immutable order of nature. In this conclusion I speak of a miracle only as a work which surpasses, or is believed to surpass, men’s power of understanding. For insofar as we suppose it to destroy, or interrupt, the order of nature, or to be contrary to nature’s laws, to [25] that extent (as we have just shown) it could give no knowledge of God; on the contrary, it would take away the knowledge we naturally have, and make us doubt God and everything else.
[27] I don’t recognize here any difference between a work contrary to nature and a work above nature (i.e., as some say, a work which in [30] fact is not contrary to nature, but which still cannot be produced or brought about by it).10 For since a miracle doesn’t happen outside nature, but in nature itself, even if it’s said to be above nature, it’s still necessary that it interrupt the order of nature, which we otherwise conceive as fixed and immutable, according to God’s decrees. [28] Therefore, if something were to happen in nature which did not follow from its laws, [III/87] that would necessarily be incompatible with the order which God has established to eternity in nature through the laws of nature. And so that would be contrary to nature and its laws. Hence belief in it would make us doubt everything and would lead to Atheism.
[29] I think I’ve now shown, by strong enough reasons, what I wanted [5] to regarding the Second point. From this we can conclude again that a miracle—whether [defined as] contrary to nature or above nature—is just an absurdity. So the only way we can understand a miracle in the Sacred Texts is as a work of nature which, as we have said, either surpasses men’s power of understanding or is believed to surpass it.
[10] [30] Before I proceed to my third point, I should like first to confirm, by the authority of Scripture, this opinion of ours—viz. that we cannot know God from miracles. Scripture nowhere teaches this openly. Still, it can easily be inferred from it, especially from what Moses commands (Deuteronomy 13[:1–5]), that [the people of Israel] should condemn to [15] death a Prophet who leads them astray, even if he performs miracles. [31] For he says that (even if) ובא האות והמופת אשר דבר אליך : לא תשמע אל דברי הנביא ההוא וגו כי מנסה יהוה אלהיכם אתכם וגו והנביא ההוא יומת וגו a sign and a wonder he has predicted to you should happen, etc., do not (nevertheless) assent to the words of this Prophet etc., because the Lord your God tests you [20] etc. (Therefore) let that Prophet be condemned to death etc. From this it clearly follows that even false Prophets can perform miracles, and that unless men are well protected by the true knowledge and love of God, miracles can lead them to embrace false Gods as easily as the True God. For Moses adds כי מנסה יהוה אלהיכם אתכם וגו since the LORD your God is testing [25] you, to know whether you love him with all your heart and all your soul.
[32] Moreover, in spite of their many miracles, the Israelites were still not able to form any sound concept of God, as experience itself has testified. For when they believed Moses had left them, they sought visible divinities from Aaron. The idea of God they finally formed from so many miracles was a calf. How shameful! [Exodus 32:1–6]. [30] [33] Although Asaph had heard of so many miracles, he still doubted God’s providence and would almost have been turned from the true way if he had not at last understood true blessedness. See Psalm 73. Even Solomon, in whose time the affairs of the Jews were at the peak of their prosperity, supposes that all things happen by chance. See [III/88] Ecclesiastes 3:19–21, 9:2–3, etc.11
[34] Finally, almost all the Prophets found it extremely obscure how the order of nature and what happened to men could agree with the concept they had formed concerning God’s providence. But this was always quite clear to the Philosophers, who strive to understand things, [5] not from miracles, but from clear concepts. They locate true happiness only in virtue and peace of mind; they are concerned, not that nature should obey them, but that they should obey nature; they know with certainty that God directs nature as its universal laws require, not as the particular laws of human nature require, and that God takes account, [10] not of the human race only, but of the whole of nature.
[35] Scripture itself, then, establishes that miracles do not give a true knowledge of God or teach his providence clearly. Moreover, what is often found in Scripture—that God brought about wonders, to make [15] himself known to men (as in Exodus 10:[1–]2 God deceived the Egyptians and gave signs of himself, that the Israelites would know that he was God)—does not entail that miracles really teach this, but only that the Jews had opinions which disposed them to be easily convinced by these miracles. [36] For we have shown clearly in the second chapter that the Prophetic arguments, or those which are formed from revelation, [20] are not drawn from universal and common notions, but from things previously granted, no matter how absurd, and from the opinions of those to whom the things are revealed, or whom the Holy Spirit wishes to convince. We’ve illustrated this by many examples, and also by the testimony of Paul, who was a Greek with the Greeks and a Jew with the Jews [1 Corinthians 9:20–22].
[25] [37] But although those miracles could convince the Egyptians and the Jews from things they granted, they still could not give a true idea and knowledge of God. They could only make them grant that there is a Divinity more powerful than anything else they knew, and that this Divinity cared, above all others, for the Hebrews (whose affairs at that time were turning out much more fortunately than they hoped). [30] They could not make them grant that God cares equally for all. Only Philosophy can teach that. [38] So the Jews, like all who have known God’s providence only from the different conditions of human affairs and men’s unequal fortunes, persuaded themselves that they were dearer to God than the others, even though they still did not surpass the others in true human perfection, as we’ve already shown in Chapter 3.
[III/89] [39] I pass, then, to my Third point. I shall show from Scripture that God’s decrees and commands, and consequently his providence, are really nothing but the order of nature. That is, when Scripture says that God did this or that, or that this or that happened by the will of God, what [5] it really means is just that it happened according to the laws and order of nature, and not, as the common people think, that for some period nature ceased to act, or that for some time its order was interrupted. [40] But Scripture doesn’t teach directly things which don’t concern its doctrine; as we’ve shown concerning the divine law, its purpose is not to teach things through their natural causes, or things which are [10] merely speculative. So what we want to prove here must be drawn by inference from certain Scriptural Narratives, where, by chance, events have been related more fully and with more circumstances.12 I’ll cite a number of examples.
[41] In 1 Samuel 9:15–16 it’s related that God revealed to Samuel [15] that he would send Saul to him. Nevertheless, God didn’t send Saul to him the way men usually send one man to another; this sending of God’s was nothing but the order of nature itself. The same chapter relates [vv. 3–10] that Saul was looking for asses he had lost, and was already deliberating whether to return home without them when he went to the Prophet Samuel, on the advice of his servant, to learn from [20] him where he could find them. The whole narrative shows that Saul did not have any other command of God than this order of nature to cause him to go to Samuel.
[42] In Psalm 105:24[–25] it’s said that God changed the hearts of the Egyptians so they would hate the Israelites. This was also a [25] completely natural change. It’s evident from Exodus 1 that the Egyptians had no slight reason which moved them to reduce the Israelites to bondage.13
[43] In Genesis 9:13 God says to Noah that he’ll put a rainbow in the clouds. This action of God is certainly nothing but the refraction and reflection of the rays of the sun, which the rays undergo in the drops [30] of water.14 In Psalm 147:18 the natural action of the wind, and the heat by which frost and snow are melted, is called the word of God; and in v. 15 the wind and cold are called the command and word of God. In Psalm 104:4 wind and fire are called the messengers and ministers of God. Many other things of this kind are found in Scripture, which indicate quite clearly that the decree, order, dictate and word of God [III/90] are nothing but the very action and order of nature.
[44] So there is no doubt that everything related in Scripture happened naturally, and yet is referred to God, because, as we’ve already shown, the purpose of Scripture is not to teach things through their natural causes, but only to relate those things which fill the imagination, and to do this [5] by that Method and style which serves best to increase wonder at things, and consequently to impress devotion in the hearts of the common people.
[45] So if we find in the Sacred Texts certain things whose causes we do not know how to give an account of, and which seem to have happened beyond, and indeed, contrary to the order of nature, they must not cause us any difficulty; we must believe without reservation [10] that what really happened happened naturally. This is also confirmed by the fact that in miracles many circumstances were found, although they are not always related, particularly when they are celebrated in the Poetic style. I say that the circumstances of the miracles clearly show that they require natural causes.
[15] [46] For example, to harass the Egyptians with boils, it was necessary for Moses to scatter ashes up into the air (see Exodus 9:10). Also the locusts attacked the country of the Egyptians by a natural command of God, i.e., by an east wind blowing a whole day and night, and they left it again by a very strong west wind (see Exodus 10:14, 19).15 It was [20] also by the same order of God that the sea opened a way for the Jews (see Exodus 14:21), viz. by Eurus,16 which blew very strongly all night.
[47] Again, to revive the boy who was believed to be dead, Elisha had to lie upon him several times, until first he became warm and finally he opened his eyes (see 2 Kings 4:34–35).17 So also the Gospel of John [25] relates certain circumstances Christ used to heal the blind man.18 Thus many other things are found in Scripture, all of which show sufficiently that miracles require something else besides what they call the absolute command of God.19
[48] So we must believe that although the circumstances of miracles [30] and their natural causes are neither always nor all fully described, nevertheless the miracles did not happen without them. This is established also by Exodus 14:27, where it is related only that it was simply by the command of Moses that the sea rose up again, and there is no mention of a wind. Nevertheless, in the Song it is said (15:10) that it happened because God blew with his wind, i.e., with a very strong wind.20 So this circumstance is omitted in the story, and for this reason [III/91] the miracle seems greater.
[49] But perhaps someone will object that we find a great many things in Scripture which don’t seem capable of being explained in any way by natural causes, e.g., that men’s sins and prayers can be the cause of rain or of the fertility of the earth, or that faith was able to heal the [5] blind, and other things of this kind, related in the Bible.
But I think I have already replied to this. For I have shown21 that Scripture does not teach things through their proximate causes, but only relates them in that order and with those phrases with which it can most effectively move people (especially, ordinary people) to devotion. For this reason it speaks quite improperly concerning God and [10] things, because its concern is not to convince people’s reason, but to affect and fill their fantasy and imagination.
[50] If Scripture were to relate the destruction of some state in the way political historians usually do, that would not stir ordinary people at all. On the other hand, if it depicts everything poetically and refers everything to God, as it usually does, it will move them very much. [15] So when Scripture relates that the earth is barren because of men’s sins, or that the blind were healed by faith,22 those passages ought not to move us more than when it relates that because of men’s sins God becomes angry, or sad, or repents of the good he has promised or done, or that because he sees a sign, he recalls a promise, or a great many [20] other things, which are either said poetically or are related according to the opinions and prejudices of the Writer.
[51] So we conclude here, without qualification, that everything Scripture truly relates as having happened must have happened, as all things do, according to the laws of nature. And if anything should be found which can be conclusively demonstrated to be contrary to the [25] laws of nature, or to have been unable to follow from them, we must believe without reservation that it has been added to the Sacred Texts by sacrilegious men.23 For whatever is contrary to nature is contrary to reason; and what is contrary to reason is absurd, and therefore to be rejected.
[52] It remains now only to note a few things concerning the interpretation of miracles, or rather to recapitulate them (for the main [30] points have already been made), and to illustrate them with one or two examples, as I have promised to do here in this Fourth part of the chapter. I want to do this to prevent anyone from rashly supposing, because he has misinterpreted some miracle, that he has found anything in Scripture contrary to the light of nature.
[53] It is quite rare for men to relate a thing simply, just as it happened, without mixing any of their own Judgment into the narration. [III/92] Indeed, when they see or hear something new, unless they take great precautions against their preconceived opinions, they will, for the most part, be so prejudiced by them that they will perceive something completely different from what they see or hear has happened, particularly if the thing which has been done surpasses the grasp of the narrator or the audience, and especially if it makes a difference to his affairs that [5] the thing should happen in a certain way.
[54] That’s why in their Chronicles and histories men relate their own opinions more than the actions they’re reporting, and why two men who have different opinions relate one and the same event so differently that they seem to be speaking about two events, and finally, why [10] it is often not very difficult to find out the opinions of the Chronicler and historian just from their histories. If I did not think it would be superfluous, I could cite many examples to confirm this, both from Philosophers who have written the history of nature, and from Chroniclers. But I’ll cite only one example from Sacred Scripture. Let the Reader himself judge of the others.
[15] [55] In the time of Joshua the Hebrews (as we noted above)24 believed, with the common people, that the sun moves, as they say, with a daily motion and that the earth is at rest. They adapted the miracle which happened to them when they fought against the five kings to this preconceived opinion. For they did not relate simply that that day was longer than usual, but that the sun and the moon stood still, or ceased [20] their motion [Joshua 10:12–13]. This was also quite advantageous to them at that time in overcoming the Gentiles, who worshipped the sun, and in proving to them by experience that the sun is under the control of another divinity, according to whose command it is bound to change its natural order. [56] So partly because of religion and partly because [25] of preconceived opinions they conceived and recounted the affair far differently than it really could have happened.
Therefore, to interpret the miracles in Scripture and to understand from the narrations of them how they really happened, we need to know the opinions of those who first narrated them, and those who left them to us in writing, and to distinguish those opinions from what the [30] senses could have represented to them. Otherwise we’ll confuse their opinions and judgments with the miracle itself, as it really happened.
It’s important to know their opinions not only for these purposes, but also so that we do not confuse the things which really happened with imaginary things, which were only Prophetic representations. [57] For many things are related in Scripture as real, and were even [III/93] believed to be real, which were, nevertheless, only representations and imaginary things, e.g., that God (the supreme being) descended from heaven (see Exodus 19:18 and Deuteronomy 5:19),25 and that Mt. Sinai was smoking because God had descended upon it, surrounded with [5] fire, and that Elijah ascended to heaven in a fiery chariot with horses of fire [2 Kings 2:11]. Of course all these things were only representations, adapted to the opinions of those who handed them down to us as represented to them, i.e., as actual things. [58] For anyone who is even a little wiser than the common people are knows that God has [10] neither a right hand nor a left hand, that he neither moves nor is at rest, that he is not in a place, but is absolutely infinite, and that all the perfections are contained in him.26 They know these things, I say, if they judge things from the perceptions of the pure intellect, and not as the imagination is affected by the external senses, as the common people usually do. That is why they imagine God as corporeal and as [15] maintaining a kingly rule, whose throne they feign to be in the dome of heaven, above the stars, whose distance from the earth they do not believe to be very great. It is to these and similar opinions (as we have said) that a great many events in Scripture are adapted, which therefore ought not to be accepted by Philosophers as real.
[59] Finally, to understand miracles as they really happened, it is [20] important to know the Hebrews’ expressions and figures of speech.27 For whoever does not attend sufficiently to them will ascribe to Scripture many miracles which its writers never intended to relate, so that he will know nothing at all, not only about the things and miracles as they really happened, but also about the mind of the authors of the sacred texts.
[25] [60] For example, Zechariah, speaking in 14:7 of a future battle, says והיה יום אחד הוא יודע ליהוה לא יום ולא לילה והיה לעת ערב יהיה אור and there shall be one day, known only to God, (for there will be) neither day nor night, but in the evening there will be light. With these words he seems [30] to predict a great miracle, but all he means is that for a whole day the battle will be in doubt, and its outcome known only to God, and that they will win victory in the evening. For the Prophets were accustomed to use expressions of that kind to write about and predict the victories and defeats of nations.
[61] In the same way we see Isaiah, who in 13:[10] depicts the destruction of Babylon thus: כי כוכבי השמים וכסיליהם לא יהלו אורם חשך השמש בצאתו וירח לא יגיה אורו [III/94] since the stars of the heavens and their constellations will not give their light, the sun will grow dark in its rising, and the moon will not give forth the brightness of its light. I don’t think anyone believes that this happened in the destruction of that state, or that those other things happened which he soon adds, viz. על כן שמים ארגיז ותרעש הארץ ממקומה [5] therefore I shall make the heavens tremble and the earth will be moved from its place.28
[62] So also in 48:21, to signify to the Jews that they would return safely from Babylon to Jerusalem, and that they would not suffer from thirst on the journey, Isaiah says ולא צמאו בחרבות הוליכם מים מצור הזיל למו ויבקע צור ויזבו מים and they did not thirst, he led them through the deserts, he made water flow from the rock for them, he split open the rock and the [10] waters flowed. By these words he means only that the Jews, as happens, will find springs in the deserts, from which they will quench their thirst. For when, with Cyrus’ agreement, they made their way to Jerusalem, it is apparent that no such miracles happened to them.
[15] [63] In this way a great many things happen in the Sacred Texts which were only a manner of speaking among the Jews. There is no need to recount them all separately here. But I do want to make this general point: in using these habitual expressions the Hebrews were speaking not only eloquently, but also, and mainly, in a spirit of devotion. That is why to bless God is found in the Sacred Texts in place of [20] to curse God (see 1 Kings 21:10 and Job 2:9). That’s also the reason why they referred all things to God, and why Scripture seems to relate nothing but miracles, even when it speaks of the most natural things.29 We’ve already given several examples of this above. So we must believe that when Scripture says that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh [25] [e.g., in Exodus 4:21, 7:3], that means nothing but that Pharaoh was obstinate. And when it is said that God opens the windows of heaven [Genesis 7:11], that means only that it rained very hard, and similarly with other things.
[64] If you attend thoroughly to these things, and to the fact that Scripture relates many things very briefly, without any circumstances, and in a way almost mutilated, you will find almost nothing in Scripture [30] which can be demonstrated to be contrary to the light of nature; on the other hand, with moderate reflection you will be able to understand, and interpret easily, many things which seemed most obscure. With this I think I’ve shown clearly enough what I intended to.
[65] Before I end this chapter, there’s something else I want to note. I’ve proceeded regarding miracles according to a method completely [III/95] different from the one I followed regarding Prophecy. Concerning Prophecy I affirmed nothing but what I could infer from foundations revealed in the Sacred Texts. But here I’ve elicited the main points only from principles known to the natural light. I did this deliberately. For since Prophecy surpasses man’s power of understanding, and is a purely [5] Theological question, I could affirm nothing about it, nor even know in what it chiefly consisted, except from the foundations which have been revealed. I was compelled to put together a history of Prophecy, and to formulate certain doctrines from it, which would teach me the nature and properties of Prophecy, as far as this can be done.
[10] [66] But concerning miracles what we are asking is completely philosophical: can we grant that something happens in nature contrary to its laws, or something which couldn’t follow from them? So I didn’t need anything like that. Indeed, I thought it wiser to unravel this question according to foundations known to the natural light, as those which [15] are most known. I say that I thought it wiser, for I could easily have resolved it solely from the doctrines and foundations of Scripture. To make this evident to everyone, I shall show it here briefly.
[67] In certain passages30 Scripture affirms of nature in general that it observes a fixed and immutable order. For example, see Psalm 148:6 [20] and Jeremiah 31:35–36. Moreover, the Philosopher31 teaches most clearly in Ecclesiastes 1:10 that nothing new happens in nature. And illustrating this same point in vv. 11–12,32 he says that although sometimes something happens which seems new, nevertheless it is not new, but happened in ages past of which there is no memory. For as he says, [25] there is no remembrance of things past among us today, nor will there be any remembrance of today’s events among those who come after us. [68] Again, he says in 3:11 that God has ordered all things well in their time, and in 3:14 he says that he knows that whatever God makes will remain to eternity, and that nothing can be added to it or subtracted from it. All these passages teach very clearly that nature observes a [30] fixed and immutable order, that God has been the same in all ages, both those known to us and those unknown, that the laws of nature are so perfect and fruitful that nothing can be added to them or taken away from them, and finally, that miracles are seen as something new only because of men’s ignorance.
[69] Scripture, then, teaches these things explicitly, but nowhere does it teach that anything happens in nature which is contrary to its laws, [III/96] or which cannot follow from them. So these things ought not to be ascribed to Scripture. To this we may add that miracles require causes and circumstances—as we have already shown [§§39–51]—and that they do not follow from I know not what kingly rule which the common [5] people ascribe to God, but from his command and divine decree, i.e.,—as we have also shown from Scripture itself [§§52–64?]—from the laws of nature and its order, and finally, that miracles can also be performed by those who seduce the people, as is proven by Deuteronomy 13[:1–5] and Matthew 24:24.
[70] From these conclusions it follows with utmost clarity that miracles were natural events, and hence, that they are to be explained in [10] such a way that they do not seem to be something new (to use Solomon’s term) or to be contrary to nature. If possible, they should be explained in such a way that they seem to be very much in agreement with natural things. That everyone may be able to do this more easily, I have passed on certain rules derived solely from Scripture.33 [71] But though I say Scripture teaches these things, I don’t mean by that that [15] it teaches them as lessons necessary for salvation, only that the Prophets embraced the same things we do. So everyone is free to judge of these things as he thinks best for himself, for the purpose of entering wholeheartedly into the worship of God and religion.
[72] Josephus agrees, for he writes as follows at the end of Book II of his Antiquities:
Let no one resist the word miracle, if a safe passage was made through [20] the sea for these ancient men, free of wickedness, whether this was done by the will of God or of its own accord; once the Pamphylian sea was also divided for those who were with Alexander, king of Macedon, and when there was no other way, it offered a passage to them, it being God’s will to destroy the Persian empire through him. Everyone who [25] writes about Alexander’s deeds admits this. So anyone may judge these things as he pleases.34
These are the words of Josephus, and his judgment concerning belief in miracles.
2. That is, because God’s intellect necessarily understands things as they are, and because his will and intellect are identical, his will necessarily wills them as they are.
3. Because the argument of the preceding paragraph relied on ascribing will and intellect to God, we might reasonably suspect it of being ad hominem. Cf. iv, 23, and the annotation there. But this paragraph seems to suggest an argument which relies only on doctrines Spinoza himself holds.
4. *NB: By Nature here I do not understand only matter and its affections, but in addition to matter, infinite other things.
5. See Josh. 10:12–14, Isa. 38:7–8, and 2 Kings 20:8–11, discussed in ii, 26–28.
6. Gebhardt points out (V, 39) that this was one of the issues on which Spinoza and Juan de Prado agreed, as we can learn from Orobio de Castro’s Epistola invectiva contra Prado. ALM cite Revah 1959, 102–4.
7. **[ADN. VI] So long as the idea we have of God himself is not clear and distinct, but confused, we doubt God’s existence, and consequently we doubt everything. For just as someone who does not properly know the nature of a triangle does not know that its three angles are equal to two right angles, so one who conceives the divine nature confusedly does not see that it pertains to the nature of God to exist. But for us to be able to conceive God’s nature clearly and distinctly, we must attend to certain very simple notions, called common notions, and connect with them those pertaining to the divine nature. If we do that, it becomes evident to us: first, that God exists necessarily and is everywhere; next, that whatever we conceive involves in itself the nature of God and is conceived through it; and finally, that everything we conceive adequately is true. But on these matters see the preface of the book entitled The principles of philosophy demonstrated in a geometric manner [Volume I, pp. 231–38].
10. In CM II, 12 (I/276–77) Spinoza had noted that “most of the more prudent theologians concede that God does nothing against nature, but only acts above nature.” As he explained the distinction there, God’s acting “above nature” involves his acting according to laws he has not communicated to the human intellect. It seems doubtful that the theologians to whom he refers would accept that explanation. In ST I, qu. 105, art. 6, Aquinas wrestles with the problem posed by Augustine’s statements that “God, the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature” (Answer to Faustus, a Manichean, vol. I/20, in Augustine 1990; PL 42, 480) and “God sometimes does things which are contrary to the usual course of nature” (Answer to Faustus, a Manichean, vol. I/20, in Augustine 1990; PL 42, 481). His solution seems to depend on making a distinction between “the order of things as it depends on the first cause” (which God cannot act against, since doing so would involve acting against his foreknowledge, or his will, or his goodness) and “the order of things according as it depends on any secondary cause.” Because God is not subject to the order of secondary causes, which depends on his will, he can do something outside that order. So, he can produce “the effects of secondary causes without [the secondary causes],” or produce “certain effects to which the secondary causes do not extend.”
11. The two passages explicitly cited are more notable for their mortalism (or at least, agnosticism about immortality) than for explicitly teaching that all things happen by chance. But see Eccles. 9:11–12. The criticism of Solomon here is somewhat surprising, after the praise of iv, 41–46, and v, 12. Though Ecclesiastes was traditionally ascribed to Solomon, this attribution is now generally rejected. See HCSB 890. When Spinoza discusses Ecclesiastes in x, 5, he does not discuss its authorship, only its canonicity.
12. Maimonides’ view in the Guide II, 48, is similar: whatever is produced in time must have a proximate cause, which is also produced in time—a natural cause, in Spinoza’s terms—but the prophets sometimes omit these intermediate causes, and refer the events directly to God. Among the proximate causes omitted Maimonides includes free human choices. This will be a point of difference if Maimonides understands freedom as requiring an absence of causation. But on the face of it, that would be contrary to the causal principle he embraces. It appears that Maimonides was not consistent on this issue. Cf. Fox 1990, 87–88.
13. Exod. 1:7–11 suggests that the rapid growth in numbers, and consequent increasing power, of the Israelites prompted the Egyptians to reduce them to slavery.
14. Spinoza assumes the explanation of the rainbow offered by Descartes in his Météores, Discourse 8.
15. Exod. 10:13, 19 would be more exact.
16. That is, the east wind.
17. Spinoza’s account of this story—emphasizing that Elisha lay upon the boy several times (aliquoties)—seems closer to the version given in the Septuagint than to that in the Masoretic text. But he omits the detail we might find most significant: that Elisha seems to have used what we would call mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.
18. John 9:6–7 relates that Jesus spat on the ground, made mud with the saliva, and applied the mud to the man’s eyes.
19. That is, to explain the event in terms of God’s decrees (the laws of nature) it is necessary also to understand the particular circumstances under which the laws were operating.
20. Spinoza refers here to the song ascribed to Moses in Exod. 15:1–18, which recapitulates in verse the prose account of the crossing of the Red Sea in Exod. 14.
22. ALM suggest Mark 10:51–52 and Luke 18:41–42 as examples of faith-healing. We might add Ps. 107:33–34 as an example of a land said to be barren because of men’s sins.
23. On the possible corruption of the text by pious frauds, see also vii, 3 and 25. See also Letter 76, IV/324a/5–10.
25. The first edition has Deut. 5:28, which seems to be clearly a mistake for 5:19 (in the numbering of the Hebrew Bible) or 5:22 (in the numbering of English versions).
26. Although Spinoza would endorse the conception of God which he here contrasts with that of the common people, his rejection of the anthropomorphism of Scripture (and of popular conceptions of God) is common among philosophical theologians. Cf., for example, Maimonides’ comments on the biblical passages which seem to imply that God has a place, and may move from one place to another, in the Guide I, 8–10. See also his comments on the Talmudic saying, “The Torah speaks in the language of the sons of man,” in Guide I, 26. That God is absolutely infinite—i.e., has infinitely many attributes, each of which is infinite in its own kind—is a position Spinoza shares with Descartes. Cf. Descartes’ discussion of the idea of God in the Third Meditation.
27. Cf. Maimonides Guide II, 47.
28. Isa. 13:13. Maimonides uses these examples to make the same point in Guide II, 29 (Gebhardt V, 41).
29. Cf. Maimonides Guide II, 48 (Gebhardt V, 42).
30. As Joël noted (1870), Maimonides discusses the passages cited in this paragraph in his Guide II, 28. Maimonides reminds us that some wished to suppress the book of Ecclesiastes as heretical.
31. A reference to Solomon. Cf. ii, 48n. The author of Ecclesiastes is identified in the first verse as Qoheleth, “the son of David, king in Jerusalem.” Qoheleth has usually been taken to mean “the Preacher,” or “the Teacher,” or more generally, “one who speaks to an assembly.” Spinoza’s identification of him as a philosopher is presumably based on his assumption that the author was Solomon and on Solomon’s reputation for wisdom.
32. It seems that Spinoza’s reference would more logically be to vv. 9–11.
33. I think that by the “rules derived from Scripture” Spinoza is referring to the points about Hebrew ways of speaking made in §§59–64.
34. Josephus, Antiquities II, xvi, 5, discussing the parting of the Red Sea. Shirley (2002) points out that Spinoza quotes Josephus from a fifteenth-century Latin translation by Rufinus Aquileiensis which was in his library, and which uses a phrase which makes no sense. Rather than go back to Josephus’ Greek, I’ve followed ALM in omitting the unintelligible phrase, which seems inessential to Spinoza’s point. Thackeray (LCL edition of Josephus) observes that the concluding sentence is a standard formula Josephus uses whenever he recounts a miracle. See his comment on i, 108, where the issue is the longevity of the biblical patriarchs. He reports that by the second century C.E. “this noncommittal attitude to the marvellous had become a rule for historians,” citing a passage from Lucian which reads (in the Fowler translation): “It may occasionally happen that some extraordinary story has to be introduced; it should be simply narrated, without guarantee of its truth, thrown down for anyone to make what he can of it; the writer takes no risks and shows no preference” (Lucian 1905, II, §60).
[1] Everyone says that Sacred Scripture is the word of God, which teaches men true blessedness or the way to salvation. But their deeds [5] reveal a completely different view. For the common people seem to care nothing about living according to the teachings of Sacred Scripture. We see that almost everyone peddles his own inventions as the word of God,1 concerned only to compel others to think as he does, under the pretext of religion. [2] We see that the Theologians have mainly [10] been anxious to twist their own inventions and fancies out of the Sacred Texts, to fortify them with divine authority. There’s nothing they do with less scruple, or greater recklessness, than interpret Scripture or the mind of the Holy Spirit. If they’re worried about anything, it’s not that they fear they may ascribe some error to the holy Spirit and stray [15] from the path to salvation, but that others may convict them of error, trampling on their authority and exposing them to scorn.
[3] But if men were sincere in what they say about Scripture, they would live very differently. These disagreements wouldn’t upset them so often; they wouldn’t quarrel with such hatred; and they wouldn’t be [20] in the grip of such a blind and reckless desire to interpret Scripture and think up new doctrines in Religion. On the contrary, they wouldn’t dare to embrace anything as the teaching of Scripture which it doesn’t teach with the greatest possible clarity. And finally, those sacrilegious people who have not been afraid to corrupt Scripture in so many passages [25] would have taken great care to avoid such a crime, and would have kept their sacrilegious hands away from those texts.2
[4] But in the end ambition and wickedness have been so powerful that religion is identified not so much with obeying the Holy Spirit as with defending human inventions, so that religion consists not in loving-kindness, but in spreading dissension among men, and in propagating [30] the most bitter hatred, which they shield under the false name of religious zeal and passionate devotion. To these evils we may add superstition, which teaches men to scorn reason and nature, and to [III/98] admire and venerate only what is contrary to both of these.
[5] So it’s no wonder that to admire and venerate Scripture more, men have been eager to explain it in a way that makes it seem as contrary as possible to both reason and nature. They dream that the most profound mysteries lie hidden in the Sacred Texts, wear themselves [5] out searching for these absurdities, neglecting the rest, which are useful. Whatever they invent in their madness they attribute to the Holy Spirit, and strive to defend with the utmost force and violent affects. That’s how men are made: what they conceive by the pure intellect, they defend only with the intellect and reason; but what they think [10] because of affects of the heart, they defend with those affects.
[6] To extricate ourselves from these confusions, to free our minds from theological prejudices, and to stop recklessly embracing men’s inventions as divine teachings, we must treat the true method of interpreting Scripture and discussing it. For as long as we are ignorant of [15] this, we cannot know anything with certainty about what either Scripture or the Holy Spirit wishes to teach.
To sum up briefly, I say that the method of interpreting Scripture does not differ at all from the method of interpreting nature, but agrees with it completely. [7] For the method of interpreting nature consists [20] above all in putting together a history of nature, from which, as from certain data, we infer the definitions of natural things. In the same way, to interpret Scripture it is necessary to prepare a straightforward history of Scripture and to infer from it the mind of Scripture’s authors, by legitimate inferences, as from certain data and principles. [8] For [25] in this way everyone—provided he has admitted no other principles or data for interpreting Scripture and discussing it than those drawn from Scripture itself and its history—everyone will always proceed without danger of error. He will be able to discuss the things which surpass our grasp as safely as those we know by the natural light.
[30] [9] But to establish clearly that this way is not only certain, but also the only way, and that it agrees with the method of interpreting nature, we must note that Scripture most often treats things which cannot be deduced from principles known to the natural light. For historical narratives and revelations make up the greatest part of it. [10] But the historical narratives give a prominent place to miracles, [III/99] i.e., (as we showed in the last Chapter) narratives of unusual events in nature, accommodated to the opinions and judgments of the historians who wrote them. Moreover, the revelations were also accommodated to the opinions of the Prophets (as we showed in the second Chapter); [5] they really surpass man’s power of understanding. So the knowledge of all these things, i.e., of almost everything in Scripture, must be sought only from Scripture itself, just as the knowledge of nature must be sought from nature itself.
[11] As for the moral teachings also contained in the Bible, although they can be demonstrated from common notions, still, it cannot be [10] demonstrated from these notions that Scripture teaches them. This can only be established from Scripture itself. Indeed, if we want to testify, without prejudice, to the divinity of Scripture, we must establish from Scripture alone that it teaches true moral doctrines. For only from this can its divinity be demonstrated. We have shown that the Prophets’ [15] certainty is known chiefly from the fact that they had a heart inclined toward the right and the good.3 So it’s necessary to establish the same thing for us also, if we’re to be able to have faith in them.4
[12] Moreover, we’ve also demonstrated already that the divinity of God cannot be proven by miracles (not to mention that miracles could [20] also be performed by false Prophets). So the divinity of Scripture must be established only by the fact that it teaches true virtue. But this can only be established by Scripture. If it could not be done, it would only be as a result of great prejudice that we would embrace it and testify to its divinity. Therefore, all knowledge of Scripture must be sought only from Scripture itself.5
[25] [13] Finally, Scripture does not give definitions of the things of which it speaks, any more than nature does. So just as the definitions of natural things are to be inferred from the different actions of nature, in the same way [the definitions of the things spoken of in Scripture] are to be drawn from the different narratives occurring in the Texts concerning them.
[30] [14] Therefore, the universal rule in interpreting Scripture is to attribute nothing to Scripture as its teaching which we have not understood as clearly as possible from its history. What sort of history must that be? What must it chiefly relate? These are the questions we must now answer.6
[15] First, it must contain the nature and properties of the language in which the books of Scripture were written, and which their Authors [III/100] were accustomed to speak. For in this way we shall be able to find out all the meanings each utterance can admit in ordinary conversational usage. And because all the writers, both of the Old Testament and the New, were Hebrews, it’s certain that the History of the Hebrew language [5] is necessary above all others, not only for understanding the books of the Old Testament, which were written in this language, but also for understanding those of the New. For though they’ve been circulated in other languages, nevertheless they are expressed in a Hebrew manner.7
[16] Second, it must collect the sentences of each book and organize them under main headings so that we can readily find all those [10] concerning the same subject. Next, it must note all those which are ambiguous or obscure or which seem inconsistent with one another. When I call these sentences clear or obscure here, I mean that it is easy or difficult to derive their meaning from the context of the utterance, not that it is easy or difficult to perceive their truth by reason. For we [15] are concerned only with the meaning of the utterances, not with their truth. [17] Indeed, we must take great care, so long as we are looking for the meaning of Scripture, not to be predisposed by our own reasoning, insofar as it is founded on the principles of natural knowledge (not to mention now our prejudices). In order not to confuse the true [20] meaning with the truth of things, we must seek that meaning solely from linguistic usage, or from reasoning which recognizes no other foundation than Scripture.8
To make this clearer, I’ll illustrate with an example. [18] These sentences of Moses—that God is a fire and that God is jealous9—are as clear as possible, so long as we attend only to the meaning of the words. So I count them among the clear sentences, even though they [25] are very obscure in relation to truth and reason. Indeed, although their literal meaning is contrary to the natural light, we must still retain that literal meaning, unless it is also clearly opposed to the principles and foundations derived from the history of Scripture. And conversely, if [30] we find that these sentences, in their literal interpretation, are contrary to principles derived from Scripture, they would still have to be interpreted differently (i.e., metaphorically), even though they agreed completely with reason.
[19] So to know whether Moses believed that God is a fire, we must in no way infer our answer from the fact that this sentence [taken literally] agrees with reason or is contrary to it. Instead, we must rely only [III/101] on other statements Moses himself made. Since Moses teaches clearly, in a great many places, that God has no likeness to any visible things in the heavens, on the earth, or in the sea,10 we must give a metaphorical explanation, either of this sentence or of all of the others. [20] But we [5] ought to depart from the literal meaning as little as possible. So we must first ask whether this one sentence, God is a fire, admits another meaning beyond the literal one, i.e., whether the term fire means something other than natural fire. If linguistic usage does not show that that term [10] can signify something else, then we must not interpret this sentence in any other way, no matter how contrary it may be to reason. Instead, we would have to accommodate the others [which say or entail that God is not a fire] to this one, however much the other statements agree with reason.
[21] But if linguistic usage does not offer us an alternative meaning, then these sentences would be irreconcilable, and we would have to [15] suspend judgment about them. However, because the term fire is also taken for anger and jealousy (see Job 31:12), these sentences of Moses are easily reconciled, and we legitimately infer that these two sentences, God is a fire and God is jealous, are one and the same [i.e., make one and the same statement].
[22] Next, since Moses clearly teaches that God is jealous, and nowhere teaches that God lacks passions or passive states of mind, from [20] this we must conclude without reservation that Moses believed this, or at least that he wished to teach it, however much we may believe that this opinion is contrary to reason.11 For as we’ve already shown, it’s not permissible for us to twist the meaning of Scripture according to the dictates of our reason and according to our preconceived opinions. Our [25] whole knowledge of the Bible must be sought from the Bible alone.
[23] Finally, this history must describe fully, with respect to all the books of the Prophets, the circumstances of which a record has been preserved, viz. the life, character, and concerns of the author of each book, who he was, on what occasion he wrote, at what time, for whom [30] and finally, in what language. Next, it must relate the fate of each book: how it was first received, into whose hands it fell, how many different readings of it there were, by whose deliberation it was accepted among the sacred books, and finally, how all the books which everyone now acknowledges to be sacred came to be unified into one corpus.
The history of Scripture, I say, must contain all these things. [24] For [III/102] to know which sentences are put forward as laws and which as moral teachings, it’s important to know the life, character, and concerns of the author. Moreover, the better we know someone’s spirit and mentality, the more easily we can explain his words. Next, if we’re not to confuse eternal teachings with those which could be useful only for a time or [5] only for a few people, it’s important also to know on what occasion, at what time, and for which nation or age all these teachings were written.
[25] Finally, it’s important to know the other things I’ve also mentioned, in order to know, in addition to the authority of each book, whether it could have been corrupted by falsifying hands, and whether [10] errors have crept in, and whether they have been corrected by men sufficiently expert and worthy of trust.12 We absolutely need to know all these things, so that we may embrace only what is certain and indubitable, and not be carried away by a blind impulse to accept whatever has been thrust upon us.
[15] [26] Once we have this history of Scripture, and have firmly resolved to maintain nothing as certainly the teaching of the Prophets unless it follows from this history, or is derived from it as clearly as possible, then it will be time for us to prepare to investigate the intentions of the Prophets and the Holy Spirit. To do this we also need a method and [20] order like the one we use for interpreting nature according to its history.
[27] In examining natural things we strive to investigate first the things most universal and common to the whole of nature: motion and rest, and their laws and rules, which nature always observes and through which it continuously acts. From these we proceed gradually [25] to other, less universal things.13 In the same way, the first thing we must seek from the history of Scripture is what is most universal, what is the basis and foundation of the whole of Scripture, and finally, what all the Prophets commend in it as an eternal teaching, most useful for all [30] mortals. For example, that a unique and omnipotent God exists, who alone is to be worshipped, who cares for all, and who loves above all those who worship him and who love their neighbor as themselves, etc.14
[28] Scripture, I say, teaches these and similar things everywhere, so clearly and so explicitly that there has never been anyone who disputed the meaning of Scripture concerning these things. But what God is, [III/103] and in what way he sees all things, and provides for them—these and similar things Scripture does not teach explicitly and as an eternal doctrine. On the contrary, we have already shown above that the Prophets themselves did not agree about them. So concerning such things we must maintain nothing as the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, even if it [5] can be determined very well by the natural light.
[29] Once we rightly know this universal teaching of Scripture, we must next proceed to other, less universal things, which nevertheless concern how we ordinarily conduct our lives and which flow from this universal teaching like streams. Examples would include all the particular external actions of true virtue, which can only be put into [10] practice when the occasion for them arises. Whatever is found to be obscure or ambiguous in the Texts about these things must be explained and determined according to the universal teaching of Scripture. But if we find any things which are contrary to one another, we must see on what occasion, and at what time, and for whom they were written.
[30] For example, when Christ says blessed are those who mourn, for [15] they shall receive comfort [Matthew 5:4], we do not know from this Text what kind of mourner he means. But because he teaches later that we should be apprehensive about nothing except the kingdom of God and his justice, which he commends as the supreme good (see Matthew 6:33), from this it follows that by mourners he understands only those who mourn for the kingdom of God and the justice men have [20] neglected. For this is the only thing they can mourn, who love nothing but the divine kingdom or righteousness, and who completely disdain what fortune may bring.
[31] So also, when he says to a man who strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also, and what follows [Matthew 5:39ff.]. If Christ had ordered this to judges, as a Lawgiver, he would have destroyed the [25] law of Moses with this precept. Nevertheless, he advises us expressly that this is not his intention. See Matthew 5:17. So we must consider who said these things, to whom they were said, and when.
[32] It was Christ who spoke. And he did not institute laws as a lawgiver; instead as a teacher he taught lessons, because (as we have shown above)15 he did not want to correct external actions so much as [30] the heart. Secondly, he said these things to oppressed men, who were living in a corrupt republic, where justice was completely neglected. Finally, he said it at a time when he saw that the ruin of the republic was near at hand.16 But we have seen that the very same thing Christ teaches here, when the ruin of the City is at hand, Jeremiah17 also taught at the first destruction of the City, i.e., at a similar time (see Lamentations 3:25–30). [33] So the Prophets taught this only in a [III/104] time of oppression, and nowhere put it forward as a law. By contrast, Moses, who wasn’t writing at a time of oppression, but (note this) was working for the institution of a good republic, commanded that an eye be paid for an eye18—although he also condemned vengeance and hatred of one’s neighbor.
[5] From this it follows very clearly, just from the fundamental principles of Scripture, that this teaching of Christ and Jeremiah that we should submit to injuries, and yield to the impious in everything, is appropriate only in those places where justice is neglected and in times of oppression, but not in a good republic. Indeed, in a good republic, where [10] justice is preserved, everyone is bound, if he wants to be thought just, to exact a penalty for injuries in the presence of a judge (see Leviticus 5:1)—not for the sake of vengeance (see Leviticus 19:17–18), but with the intention of defending justice and the laws of one’s native land, and so that the evil should not profit by being evil.19 [34] All these things also agree completely with natural reason.
I could cite many other examples in this manner, but I think these [15] will suffice to explain what I intend, and how useful this method is. That’s all I care about for the present. But so far we have taught only the method of investigating those statements of Scripture which concern the way we should conduct our lives, and which therefore can be investigated more easily. For really there was never any dispute among the Writers of the Bible on these matters.
[20] [35] The other things which occur in the Texts, which are matters of pure speculation, cannot be investigated so easily. For the path to these is narrower. As we’ve already shown,20 the Prophets disagreed among themselves in speculative matters, and their narrations of things were very much accommodated to the prejudices of each age. So it is not at [25] all permissible for us to infer or explain the intention of one Prophet from the clearer passages of another, unless it is established with the utmost clarity that they both favored one and the same opinion.
[36] Therefore I shall now explain briefly how in such matters the intention of the Prophets is to be unearthed from the history of Scripture. Concerning these matters too, we must begin with the things [30] which are most universal, inquiring first from the clearest statements of Scripture, to find out what Prophecy or revelation is, and in what it chiefly consists. Next we must ask what a miracle is, and so on, with the things which are most common. From there we must descend to the opinions of each Prophet. And from these things finally we must proceed to the meaning of each revelation or Prophecy, of each story, [III/105] and of each miracle.
[37] We must use great caution here not to confuse the intention of the Prophets and Historians with that of the Holy Spirit or with the truth of the matter. We’ve shown this already in the appropriate places, with many examples. So I don’t consider it necessary to discuss these things at greater length. Still, there’s one point we must make [5] about the meaning of revelations: this method teaches us only how to seek out what the Prophets really saw or heard, not what they wanted to signify or represent by those symbols. For we can conjecture this, but not deduce it with certainty from the foundations of Scripture.
[38] We’ve shown, then, the way to interpret Scripture, and at the [10] same time demonstrated that this is the only way to find its true meaning with great certainty. Of course, if anyone has a certain tradition about this, or a true explanation received from the Prophets themselves (as the Pharisees claim), I concede that he is more certain of the meaning of Scripture. Similarly, if anyone has a High Priest who cannot err [15] concerning the interpretation of Scripture (as the Roman Catholics boast). [39] Nevertheless, since we cannot be certain, either of this tradition or of the authority of the High Priest, we also cannot found anything certain on these things. For the most ancient Sects of the Christians denied [the authority of the Pope], and the most ancient Sects of the Jews denied [the Pharisaic tradition]. Moreover—not to [20] mention other objections now—if we pay attention to the chronology the Pharisees received from their Rabbis, by which they extend this tradition all the way back to Moses, we shall find that it is false, as I show elsewhere.21
[40] So a tradition like that must be very suspect to us. It’s true that in our Method we are compelled to suppose that one tradition of the [25] Jews is uncorrupted: the meaning of the words of the Hebrew language, which we have accepted from them. But though we don’t doubt that tradition at all, we still doubt the tradition [about the meaning of passages in Scripture]. For it could never be to anyone’s advantage to change the meaning of a word; but it could often be to someone’s advantage [30] to change the meaning of an utterance. [41] It’s extremely difficult to change the meaning of a word. Anyone who tried to do this would be forced, as part of the process, to explain all the authors who wrote in that language and used that word in its accepted meaning. Either he would have to do this according to the temperament and mind of each author, or else he would have to distort them very carefully.
[42] Moreover, both the common people and the learned preserve language; but only the learned preserve books and the meanings of utterances. So we can easily conceive that the learned could have [III/106] changed or corrupted the meaning of an utterance in some very rare book which they had in their 'power,22 but not that they could have changed the meaning of words. Moreover, if someone wants to change the meaning of some word to which he has become accustomed, it will be difficult for him to observe the new meaning afterward both in [5] speaking and in writing. [43] These and other reasons easily persuade us that it could not occur to anyone to corrupt a language, but that it could often occur to someone to corrupt the intention of a Writer by changing his utterances or by misinterpreting them.
This method of ours, founded on the principle that the knowledge [10] of Scripture is to be sought only from Scripture, is the only true method [of interpreting Scripture]. So whatever it cannot furnish for acquiring a complete knowledge of Scripture, we must absolutely give up as hopeless. [44] But now we must say what difficulty this method involves, or what is to be desired in it, for it to be able to lead us to a complete and certain knowledge of the Sacred Texts.
[15] To begin with, a great difficulty in this method arises from the fact that it requires a complete knowledge of the Hebrew language. But where is this now to be sought? [45] Those who spoke and wrote Hebrew in ancient times left nothing to posterity regarding its foundations and teaching. Or at least we have absolutely nothing from them: no Dictionary, [20] no Grammar, no Rhetoric. Moreover, the Hebrew nation has lost all its marks of distinction and honor—this is no wonder, after it has suffered so many disasters and persecutions—and has retained only some few fragments of its language and of a few books. For almost all the names of fruits, birds, fish, and many other things have perished in [25] the injustice of the ages. Again, the meaning of many nouns and verbs which occur in the Bible is either completely unknown or is disputed.
[46] We lack, not only all these things, but also and especially, a phraseology of this language. For time, the devourer, has obliterated from the memory of men almost all the idioms and manners of speaking peculiar to the Hebrew nation. Therefore, we will not always be [30] able, as we desire, to find out, with respect to each utterance, all the meanings it can admit according to linguistic usage. Many utterances will occur whose meaning will be very obscure, indeed, completely incomprehensible, even though they are expressed in well-known terms.
[47] In addition to the fact that we cannot have a complete history of the Hebrew language, there is the very nature and constitution of [III/107] this language. So many ambiguities arise from this that it is impossible to devise a method23** which will teach you how to find out with certainty the true meaning of all the utterances of Scripture. For besides the causes of ambiguity common to all languages there are certain others in this language from which a great many ambiguities are born. [5] I consider it worth the trouble to note these here.
[48] First, ambiguity and obscurity of utterances often arises in the Bible because the letters of the same organ are confused. The Hebrews divide all the letters of the Alphabet into five classes according to the five parts of the mouth used in pronunciation: the lips, the tongue, the [10] teeth, the palate, and the throat. E.g., aleph, א, het, ח, ayin, ע, and he, ה, are called gutturals and are used for one another without any distinction, or at least without any known to us. So אל, el, which means to, is often taken for על, hgal, which means over, and vice versa. As a result, all the parts of an utterance are often made either ambiguous or sounds [15] which have no meaning.
[49] A second cause of the ambiguity of utterances is the multiple meanings which conjunctions and adverbs have. For example, ו, vau, is used indiscriminately for conjoining and disjoining and means and, but, because, also, then. כי, ki, has seven or eight meanings: because, although, [20] if, when, as, that, burning, etc. Almost all the particles are like this.
[50] A third cause, which is the source of many ambiguities, is that the verbs in the Indicative lack the Present, Imperfect, Pluperfect, Future perfect, and other tenses commonly used in other languages. Moreover, [25] in the Imperative and the Infinitive, they lack all except the Present; and in the Subjunctive, they lack all tenses without exception. And although all these defects of Tenses and Moods could easily—indeed, with the greatest elegance—have been made up by certain rules deduced from the foundations of the language, nevertheless, the most ancient writers completely neglected them, and indiscriminately used the Future tense [30] for the Present and the Past, and on the other hand, the Past for the Future, and the Indicative for the Imperative and Subjunctive. This causes great ambiguity in the utterances.
[51] In addition to these three causes of ambiguity in the Hebrew language, there are still two others to be noted, each of which is of far greater importance. First, the Hebrews do not have letters for vowels. [III/108] Second, they were not accustomed to use any signs [of punctuation] to separate their utterances, or to make their meaning more explicit or emphasize them. [52] And although the lack of these two, viz. vowels and signs of punctuation, is usually made up by points and accents, nevertheless we cannot trust these, since they have been devised and [5] established by men of a later age, whose authority ought to be worth nothing to us. The ancients wrote without points (i.e., without vowels and accents), as is established by many testimonies. Those who came later added these two things, as it seemed to them proper to interpret the Bible. So the accents and points which we have now are only modern [10] interpretations, and do not deserve any more trust or authority than any other explanations of the authors.
[53] Those who don’t know this and also don’t know how they ought to excuse the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, who (in 11:21) interprets the text of Genesis 47:31 very differently than it is taken [15] in the pointed Hebrew text, as if the Apostle ought to have learned the meaning of Scripture from those who added the points. To me, of course, it seems rather that those who added the points are to be blamed. So that everyone may see this, and at the same time see that this discrepancy has arisen only from the lack of vowels, I shall set out each of the two interpretations.
[54] Those who added the points, by their points, interpreted the [20] text to read and Israel bent over, or (changing ayin, ע, to aleph, א, a letter of the same organ) toward the head of the bed. But the Author of the letter interpreted the text to read and Israel bent over the head of his staff, reading מטה, mate [staff], where others read מטה, mita [bed], a difference which arises only from the vowels. Now since, in that narrative, it is a question only of Jacob’s old age, but not, as in the following chapter, [25] of his illness, it seems really more probable that the meaning of the historian was that Jacob bent over the head of his staff (which elderly men need to hold themselves up), not over the head of the bed, especially since in this way it is not necessary to suppose any change of letters.
[55] By this example I didn’t want just to reconcile that passage [30] of the Letter to the Hebrews with the text of Genesis, but mainly to show how little trust we should put in the modern points and accents. Anyone who wants to interpret Scripture without prejudice is bound to doubt these matters, and to reexamine them.
[III/109] [56] Let’s return now to our subject. From the constitution and nature of the Hebrew language anyone can easily conclude that so many ambiguities must occur that there can be no method for resolving all of them. We’ve shown that the only way of unearthing the true meaning [5] from the many which linguistic usage makes possible is the mutual comparison of utterances. But there’s no reason we should hope to be able to do this in every case. There are two reasons for this. First, it’s only by chance that the comparison of utterances can throw light on an utterance. No Prophet wrote with the intention of explaining the words of another Prophet; they didn’t even write to explain their own [10] words! Second, we cannot infer the mind of one Prophet, Apostle, etc., from that of another except in matters concerning the conduct of life—not when they speak concerning speculative matters or when they relate miracles and historical narratives. We’ve already shown this quite plainly.24
[57] I could show, by various examples, that there are many inexplicable [15] utterances in Holy Scripture. But for the present I prefer to pass over them, and to proceed to the other things which need to be noted: namely, what difficulty this true method of interpreting Scripture still contains, or what is lacking in it.
[58] There is yet another difficulty in this method: it requires a history [20] of the circumstances of all the books of Scripture. For the most part we do not know this history. Either we are completely ignorant of the authors (or, if you prefer, Writers)25 of many of the books, or else we have doubts about them. I shall show this fully in what follows. Moreover, for the books whose Writers we do not know, we also do not know on what occasion or at what time the books were written. [25] In addition, we do not know into whose hands all the books fell, nor in which copies so many different readings were found, nor, finally, whether there were not many other readings in other copies.
[59] Why it matters to know all these things, I’ve indicated briefly in the proper place. But there I deliberately omitted certain things we [30] now need to consider. If we read a book which contains incredible or incomprehensible things, or is written in very obscure terms, and we don’t know its author, or when or on what occasion it was written, it will be pointless for us to try to become more certain of its true meaning. [60] If we’re ignorant of all these things, we can’t know anything [III/110] about what the author intended, or could have intended. On the other hand, when we know these things properly, we determine our thoughts in such a way that we’re not predisposed by any prejudice. So we don’t attribute to the author—or to the one on whose behalf the author wrote—more or less than is just. And we don’t think about any things other than those the author could have had in mind, or which [5] the time and occasion required.
I think everyone knows this. [61] It often happens that we read similar stories in different books and make very different judgments about them, according to the different opinions we have of their writers. I [10] know I once read in a book that a man named Orlando the furious26 used to ride a winged monster in the air, that he flew over whatever regions he wanted to, and that by himself he slaughtered an immense number of men and giants. The book contained other fantasies of this kind, which are completely incomprehensible from the standpoint of the intellect. [62] I’d also read a similar story in Ovid, about Perseus,27 and [15] finally, another, in the books of Judges and Kings, about Samson, who, alone and unarmed, slaughtered thousands of men, and about Elijah, who flew through the air, and at last went up into heaven in a chariot of fire, with horses of fire.28 These stories, I say, are completely similar. Nevertheless, we make a very different judgment about each of them: [20] that the first wanted to write only trifles, the second, political matters, and the third, finally, sacred matters.29 And we persuade ourselves of this only because of the opinions we have of these writers.
[63] So it’s clear that for writings which are obscure or incomprehensible to the intellect, we must have some knowledge of the authors [25] if we want to interpret their writings. And for the same reasons, when we have different versions of obscure stories, if we are to select the true reading, we need to know in whose copies the different readings are found, and whether still other readings have ever been found in the writings of other men of greater authority.
[30] [64] There’s one final difficulty in interpreting certain books of Scripture according to this method: we don’t possess them in the same language in which they were first written. For according to the common opinion, the Gospel of Matthew, and no doubt also the Letter to the Hebrews, were written in Hebrew.30 Nevertheless, these [original texts] are not extant. Moreover, regarding the book of Job there is doubt [III/111] about what language it was written in. In his commentaries Ibn Ezra affirms that it has been translated from another language into Hebrew, and that this is the reason for its obscurity.31 I say nothing about the apocryphal books, since they are of greatly different authority.
[65] These are all the difficulties I had undertaken to recount arising [5] from this method of interpreting Scripture according to the history available to us. I consider them so great that I don’t hesitate to say this: in a great many places either we don’t know what Scripture really means or we’re just guessing about its meaning without any certainty.
[66] On the other hand, we should note again that all these difficulties [10] can prevent us from grasping the intention of the Prophets only concerning things we can’t perceive and can only imagine—not concerning things we can grasp with the intellect and easily form a clear concept of.32** For things which by their nature are easily perceived can’t be said so obscurely that they aren’t easily understood. As the proverb says: to one who understands a word is enough.33
[15] [67] Euclid wrote only about things quite simple and most intelligible. Anyone can easily explain his work in any language. To grasp his intention and be certain of his true meaning we don’t need a complete knowledge of the language he wrote in, but only a quite ordinary—almost childish!—knowledge. Nor do we need to know about his life, [20] concerns and customs, or in what language, to whom and when he wrote, or the fate of his book, or its various readings, or how and by whose deliberation it was accepted.
[68] What I’ve said here about Euclid must be said about everyone who has written about things by their nature perceptible. So we conclude that the history available to us is enough to enable us to easily [25] grasp the intention of Scripture concerning moral teachings. In that area we can be certain of its true meaning. For the teachings of true piety are expressed in the most familiar words, since they are very ordinary and no less simple and easy to understand. And because true [30] salvation and blessedness consists in true peace of mind, and we truly find peace only in those things we understand very clearly, [69] from this it follows with utmost clarity that we can grasp with certainty the intention of Scripture concerning things salutary and necessary for blessedness. There’s no reason why we should be apprehensive about the rest. Since for the most part we cannot embrace these other things by [III/112] reason and the intellect, this would show more curiosity than concern for our advantage.
With this I think I have shown the true method of interpreting Scripture and explained my opinion about it adequately. [70] No doubt everyone now sees that this method requires no light beyond the natural [5] light itself. For the nature and excellence of this light consists above all in this: that by legitimate principles of inference it deduces and infers things obscure from things known, or given as known. Our method requires nothing else. We grant that it doesn’t suffice for tracking down, with certainty, everything in the Bible. Still, that doesn’t arise [10] from any defect in the method, but from this: the way it teaches to be true and right has never been practiced or commonly used by men. So with the passage of time this way has become very difficult, and almost impenetrable. I think the difficulties I’ve raised establish this very clearly.
[71] Now it’s time to examine the opinions of those who disagree [15] with us. First, we must examine the opinion of those who maintain that the natural light does not have the power to interpret Scripture, but that a supernatural light is most necessary for this.34 What this light is beyond the natural light, I leave it to them to explain. [72] For my part, I can only conjecture that they too wished to confess, though in [20] rather obscure terms, that for the most part they are in doubt about the true meaning of Scripture. For if we look at their explanations, we find that they contain nothing beyond the natural, indeed, nothing but mere conjectures. Compare them, if you will, with the explanations of those who confess candidly that they have no light beyond the natural. [25] You’ll find them to be completely similar: human, long pondered, and laboriously devised.
[73] As for their contention that the natural light does not suffice for the interpretation of Scripture, two things show that this is false: first, as we’ve already demonstrated, the difficulties of interpreting Scripture have not arisen from a defect in the powers of the natural light, but only from the negligence (not to say wickedness) of the men who were [30] indifferent to the history of Scripture while they could still construct it; and second, this supernatural light is a divine gift granted only to the faithful. (Unless I’m mistaken, everyone acknowledges this second point.)35 [74] But the Prophets and the Apostles were accustomed to preach, not only to the faithful, but for the most part to the impious and those lacking in faith. So those people were capable of understanding [III/113] the Prophets’ and Apostles’ meaning. Otherwise, it would have seemed that the Prophets and Apostles were preaching to small children and infants, not to men endowed with reason. Moreover, Moses would have prescribed laws in vain, if they could be understood only by the faithful, who require no law. So those who demand a supernatural light [5] to understand the Prophets’ and Apostles’ meaning obviously seem to be lacking in the natural light themselves. Far be it from me, then, to judge that such people possess a supernatural divine gift.
[75] Maimonides’ opinion was quite different. He thought that each passage of Scripture admits various (indeed, contrary) meanings, and that we aren’t certain of the true meaning of any passage unless [10] we know that, as we interpret it, it contains nothing which does not agree with reason, or which is contrary to it. If it’s found that its literal meaning is contrary to reason—no matter how clear the literal meaning seemed to be—he thinks it should still be interpreted differently. [76] He indicates this as clearly as possible in The Guide of the Perplexed (II, 25), for he says:
[15] דע כי אין בריחתנו מן המאמר בקדמות העולם מפני הכתובים אשר באו בתורה בהיות העולם מחודש כי אין הכתובים המורים על חדוש העולם יותר מן הכתובים המורים על היות השם גשם ולא שערי הפירוש סתומים בפנינו ולא נמנעים לנו בעניין חדוש העולם אבל היה אפשר לנו לפרשם כמו שעשינו בהרחקת הגשמות ואולי זה היה יותר קל הרבה והיינו [20] יכולים יותר לפרש הפסוקים ההם ולהעמיד קדמות העולם כמו שפרשנו הפסוקים והרחקנו היותו יתברך גשם וגו
Know that it isn’t the scriptural texts concerning the creation of the world which deter us from saying that the world has existed from eternity. For the texts which teach that the world is created are no more numerous than those which teach that God is corporeal; we are not without [25] opportunities for explaining them. We’re not even hindered, but could have explained the texts concerning the creation of the world as we did when we denied that God is corporeal. Perhaps this would have been much easier to do; perhaps we could have explained them and laid a foundation for the eternity of the world more conveniently than when [30] we explained the Scriptures to get rid of the doctrine that the blessed God is corporeal. But two reasons move me not to do this, and not to believe this (i.e., that the world is eternal):
1) because it is established by a clear demonstration that God is not corporeal, and it is necessary to explain all those passages whose literal meaning is contrary to the demonstration; for it is certain that they must then have an explanation (other than the literal explanation); but [III/114] the eternity of the world is not shown by any demonstration; so it is not necessary to do violence to the Scriptures and to smooth them out36 for the sake of a merely probable opinion, to whose contrary we could incline, if some reason should persuade us; and
2) because to believe that God is incorporeal is not contrary to the fundamentals [5] of the Law, etc.; but to believe in the eternity of the world, in the way in which Aristotle did, destroys the foundation of the law, etc.
[77] These are Maimonides’ words. From them it clearly follows [that he thought we must interpret Scripture so as to make it consistent with reason]. For if he thought it was established by reason that the world is eternal, he would not hesitate to twist Scripture and to [10] smooth it out so that in the end it would seem to teach this very thing. Indeed, he would immediately be certain that, however much Scripture everywhere expressly protested against it, nevertheless it meant to teach this eternity of the world. This means he can’t be certain of the true meaning of Scripture, however clear it may be, so long as he can doubt whether the proposition it seems to assert is true, or [15] so long as he thinks the truth of that proposition has not been established. For so long as the truth of the matter is not established, we don’t know whether the thing agrees with reason or is contrary to it. So [on this theory] we wouldn’t know whether the literal meaning is the correct interpretation or not.
[78] If [Maimonides’] opinion were true, I would concede, absolutely, that we need some other light beyond the natural to interpret Scripture. [20] For (as we’ve already shown)37 hardly any of the things found in these Texts can be deduced from principles known by the natural light. So the power of the natural light can’t establish anything for us about their truth, and hence, can’t establish anything for us about Scripture’s true meaning and intention. For this we would need another light.
[79] Again, if this opinion were true, it would follow that the common [25] people, who for the most part have no knowledge of demonstrations, and don’t have time for them, wouldn’t be able to accept anything about Scripture except on the authority and testimonies of those who philosophize. They’d have to suppose that the Philosophers can’t err concerning the interpretation of Scripture. This would obviously introduce [30] a new authority into the Church, and a new kind of priest, or a High Priest, which the people would mock rather than venerate.
[80] It’s true that our method requires knowledge of the Hebrew language, and that the common people don’t have time for studying that either. Still, we’re not vulnerable to an analogous objection. For the ordinary Jews and gentiles to whom the Prophets and Apostles preached long ago, and for whom they wrote, understood the language [III/115] the Prophets and Apostles used. This knowledge of the language enabled them to grasp the Prophets’ meaning. But it didn’t enable them to grasp the reasons for the things they preached. On Maimonides’ view, to be able to grasp the Prophets’ meaning they would also have had to know those reasons.
[81] From the nature of our method, then, it doesn’t follow that [5] the common people must trust in the testimony of interpreters. For I point out ordinary people who knew the language of the Prophets and Apostles; but Maimonides does not point to any ordinary people who understand the causes of things, from which they might grasp the Prophets’ and Apostles’ meaning.
[82] As for today’s common people, we’ve already shown [§§68–69] that everything necessary for salvation can easily be grasped in any [10] language, even though the reasons for them aren’t known, because they are so ordinary and familiar. This grasp is what the common people trust, not the testimony of interpreters. As for the things [not necessary for salvation], in those matters they share the same fate as the learned.
[83] But let’s return to Maimonides and examine his opinion more [15] carefully. First, he presupposes that the Prophets agreed among themselves in everything, and that they were Philosophers and Theologians of the highest caliber. For he maintains that they drew their conclusions from the truth of the matter. But we have shown in Chapter 2 that this is false.
[84] Next, he supposes that the meaning of Scripture can’t be established from Scripture itself. For the truth of things isn’t established [20] from Scripture itself (since it demonstrates nothing and doesn’t teach the subjects it treats through definitions and first causes). So in Maimonides’ opinion, the true meaning of Scripture can’t be established from Scripture, and so, shouldn’t be sought from Scripture. But we’ve established in this chapter that this too is false. For we’ve shown, both [25] by reason and by examples, that the meaning of Scripture is established only from Scripture itself, and must be sought from Scripture itself alone, even when it speaks of things known by the natural light.
[85] Finally, he presupposes that we’re permitted to explain and twist the words of Scripture according to our preconceived opinions, to deny their literal meaning (even when that meaning is most clearly perceived [30] or most explicit), and to change it into any other meaning we like. Quite apart from the fact that this license is diametrically opposed to the things we’ve demonstrated in this Chapter (and in others), everyone sees that it’s excessive and rash.
[86] But suppose we grant him this great freedom. What good will that do? None, of course. For we won’t be able to investigate in this way things which can’t be demonstrated. These make up the greatest [III/116] part of Scripture. And we won’t be able to explain or interpret them according to this standard. By contrast, following our method we can explain most of these passages, and discuss them with confidence. We’ve already shown this, both by reason and by example. As for the [5] things perceivable by their nature, we can easily elicit their meaning just from the context of the utterances. We’ve already shown this too. So Maimonides’ method is utterly useless.
[87] Furthermore, his method completely takes away all the certainty the common people can have about the meaning of Scripture from a natural reading of it, and which everyone can have by following another [10] method. So we condemn Maimonides’ opinion as not only useless, but harmful and absurd.
[88] As for the Pharisees’ tradition, we’ve already said above [§§38–39] that it’s not consistent. Moreover, we’ve said [ibid.] that the Roman Pontiffs’ authority needs a clearer testimony. I reject it for this reason alone. For if the Roman Pontiffs could establish it [15] for us from Scripture as certainly as the Jewish High Priests previously did, I would not be at all upset by the fact that there were heretics and impious men among them. After all, there were also heretics and impious men among the High Priests of the Hebrews, men who achieved the Priesthood by perverse means, but who still had, according to the command of Scripture, the supreme 'power of [20] interpreting the law. See Deuteronomy 17:11–12, 33:10, Malachi 2:8. [89] But since [the Popes] show us no such testimony, their authority remains highly suspect.
In case anyone should be deceived by the example of the High Priest of the Hebrews into thinking that the Universal religion also requires a Pontiff, it should be noted that because the laws of Moses [25] were the public legislation of their Country, they required, if they were to be preserved, a certain public authority. For if each person had the freedom to interpret the public legislation according to his own will, no republic could survive. It would immediately be dissolved by this very fact, and the public legislation would be private legislation. [90] But the nature of Religion is very different. For since it consists not so [30] much in external actions as in simplicity and honesty of heart, it is not the domain of any public legislation or public authority. For simplicity and honesty of heart are not instilled in men by the command of laws or by public authority, and absolutely no one can be compelled by force or by laws to become blessed. For this what is required is pious and brotherly advice, good education, and above all, one’s own free judgment.
[III/117] [91] Therefore, since each person has the supreme right to think freely, even about Religion, and it’s inconceivable that anyone can abandon his claim to this right, each person will also have the supreme right and the supreme authority to judge freely concerning Religion, and [5] hence to explain it and interpret it for himself. [92] For the supreme authority to interpret the laws, and the supreme judgment concerning public affairs, are lodged with the magistrates only because those are matters of public right. So for the same reason the supreme authority to explain religion, and to judge about it, will be in each person’s hands, because it is a matter of each person’s right.
[10] [93] It is, therefore, far from true that we can infer the authority of the Roman Pontiff to interpret religion from the authority of the Hebrew Priests to interpret the laws of their Country. On the contrary, we can more easily infer from [the authority of the Priests] that each of us has that authority to the greatest extent possible.
[94] And we can also show from this that our method of interpreting [15] Scripture is the best. For since each person has the utmost authority to interpret Scripture, the standard of interpretation must be nothing but the natural light common to all, not any supernatural light or external authority. [The standard of interpretation] must also [20] be not so difficult that only the most acute Philosophers can apply it; it must be accommodated to the natural and common human mentality and capacity. We have shown that our method satisfies this condition. For we have shown that the difficulties [our method] now has have arisen from men’s negligence, and not from the nature of the method.
1. A recurrence of the theme first mentioned in the Preface, §20, which will return in xiv, 1.
2. A recurrence of the theme first mentioned in vi, 51. Gebhardt argues that Spinoza’s reference to sacrilegious men is aimed at the Pharisees, appealing to a report by Salomon van Til (V, 43–44). ALM are skeptical.
3. Spinoza refers here to ii, 4–10, where he had argued that, in addition to a sign, the moral rectitude of the prophet was a necessary condition for his certainty regarding the truth of the prophetic message.
4. I take this to mean that if we are to have confidence in the truth of the moral teachings we find in Scripture, we must first establish that our hearts are inclined toward the right and the good. If we assume that knowing that our hearts are so inclined requires at least a basic knowledge of the right and the good, this seems to entail that Scripture cannot be our sole, or even most fundamental, source of moral knowledge.
5. That our knowledge of Scripture must be sought only from Scripture itself is a fundamental Reformation principle, advocated by both Luther and Calvin, for whom it was essential in maintaining the status of Scripture as the final authority in matters of Christian doctrine. Cf. Althaus 1966, ch. 9, and John Thomson, ch. 4 in McKim 2004. See also the Westminster Confession, I, ix: “The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself: and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it must be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly.” Note that this rule of interpretation assumes the fundamental consistency of Scripture, a principle Spinoza rejected as an a priori assumption in the Preface, §19.
6. Spinoza’s requirements for a history of Scripture are set out in three sections of unequal length. First, it must contain an account of the nature and properties of the language of Scripture (§15); next, it must contain a subject index (§§16–22); and finally, it must contain an account of the authorship, intended audience, reception, transmission, and canonization of the work (§23). This history of Scripture only provides us with the tools we need to apply the method for interpreting Scripture which Spinoza will expound in §§27–37. It is not evident that we can compile a history of Scripture, in the sense Spinoza has in mind, consistently with the principle that our knowledge of Scripture must be derived only from Scripture itself.
7. Note that Spinoza does not say that the New Testament was written in a language other than Hebrew, only that it circulated in such a language. Apparently he does not say it was written in Greek because he does not believe that. See ADN. XXVI, attached to xi, 3. The adnotations were not published until after Spinoza’s death. In some cases—notably, ADN. XXI—they contain material Spinoza seems to have regarded as highly sensitive, and perhaps dangerous to publish during his lifetime.
8. Here Spinoza applies the principle, announced in the Preface, §19, that we must not assume, in advance of determining the meaning of Scripture, that it is true and divine. We must first determine what Scripture means, and then make whatever inferences seem appropriate about its truth and divinity.
9. Both claims are made in Deut. 4:24. See also Exod. 20:5, 34:14; Deut. 5:9; and—to take a New Testament text which Spinoza believes was originally written in Hebrew (vii, 64)—Heb. 12:29.
10. Cf. ii, 36 and 43. When Maimonides defends the claim that God has no likeness to any existing thing (Guide I, 55), his scriptural evidence comes from Isaiah (40:18, 25) and Jeremiah (10:6), not any books Moses is supposed to have written. He might have cited Exod. 8:10, 9:14, 15:11, or Deut. 33:26, 29.
11. ALM note two passages in the Metaphysical Thoughts where Spinoza explains why it might be thought contrary to reason to ascribe passions to God: in CM ii, 4, he argues that God cannot be changed by an external cause; and in CM ii, 8, he argues that we speak improperly if we say that God hates some things and loves others. In the Ethics Spinoza will argue, not only that God is without passions, but more generally, that he does not have any affects of joy or sadness, even active ones (V P17). Spinoza will return to this example in xv, 15.
12. Gebhardt (V, 45–46) calls attention to a passage from the epilogue of Ludwig Meyer’s Philosophy the Interpreter of Holy Scripture which makes it clear that he and Spinoza were both concerned with this issue. See Meyer 1666, 231. Totaro (vii, n. 40) cites an interesting passage from Richard Simon’s Histoire critique du Vieux Testament, in which he concedes that there have been many changes made in the texts by later authors, but claims that this fact does not impugn the authority of Scripture, because the authors of these changes were inspired by God (Simon 1678, Préface, a2).
13. Cf. Spinoza’s geometric exposition of Cartesian physics, in Part II of his Descartes’ “Principles of Philosophy” (in Volume I of this edition, pp. 262ff.).
14. Here, and later, in xii, 34–36, Spinoza will give the impression that the prophets consistently taught monotheism. Prima facie this is inconsistent with his attribution of monolatry to Moses in ii, 37. But this passage does neatly express his preference for the teachings of the later prophets.
16. Perhaps a reference to Luke 19:41–44.
17. A tradition which goes back as far as the Septuagint identifies Jeremiah as the author of Lamentations, but modern critical scholarship is “practically unanimous” in rejecting this view. See ABD IV, 138.
18. Cf. Exod. 21:23–25, Lev. 24:19–20, Deut. 19:21.
19. ALM note a reminiscence here of a line from Terence’s Phormio, which might be translated: “It’s our fault if it profits the evil to be evil because we are too eager to be called good and kind” (766).
21. See the discussion of chronological issues which begins in ix, 8.
22. Reminiscent of Hobbes, Leviathan xxxiii, 20, which raises a concern about the possibility of falsification of the text of the New Testament by the ecclesiastics who had control of the texts, but dismisses it (ironically, I think), on the ground that if they had been inclined to falsify the texts, they would have made them more favorable to their power.
23. **[ADN. VII] That is, for those of us who are not accustomed to this language and who are not familiar with its ways of speaking.
25. Bennett suggests, plausibly, that the intention may be to accommodate the traditional view that the ultimate author of Scripture was God, and that the human “writers” were no more than scribes. Cf. Maimonides’ eighth fundamental principle of the Jewish religion: “We are to believe that the whole Torah was given us through Moses our Teacher entirely from God. . . . We do not know exactly how it reached us, but only that it came to us through Moses, who acted like a secretary taking dictation.” Maimonides Reader, 420. See also below, vii, 60.
26. See Ariosto, Orlando furioso Canto X, 66ff. But as the commentators note, the story is that of Ruggiero, not Orlando.
27. See Ovid, Metamorphoses IV, 614ff.
28. The stories about Samson are in Judg. 15:15 and 16:30. The one about Elijah is in 2 Kings 2:11.
29. Appuhn took the first author referred to here to be Ariosto, and accordingly expressed surprise that Ovid should be taken to be a political writer. Droetto/Giancotti suggest that we should count Ovid (rather than Ariosto) as the first writer Spinoza is referring to, the author of Judges as the second, and the author of Kings as the third.
30. The opinions discussed here—that Matthew originally wrote his gospel in Hebrew and that the Letter to the Hebrews was also written originally in Hebrew—go back at least to Eusebius. See his Church History III, xxiv, 6; III, xxxix, 16; and VI, xiv, 2–3. But it seems that they no longer represent the consensus of biblical scholars. See Brown 1997, 208–12, 683–704. Eusebius and his sources are probably using the term “Hebrew” to refer to what we would now call Aramaic, the language most commonly spoken by Palestinian Jews in the first century. On this see Meyer 1896.
31. The Hebrew of the Book of Job is exceptionally difficult, with more unique or rare words than any other biblical book, words whose meaning we are often obliged to conjecture on the basis of what we know about other related languages. It also has many syntactic peculiarities. But apparently few modern scholars would explain these difficulties the way Ibn Ezra did. See Anchor Job, xlvii–l.
32. **[ADN. VIII] By things one can perceive I understand not only those legitimately demonstrated, but also those we’re accustomed to embrace with moral certainty and hear without wonder, even if they can’t be demonstrated in any way. Everyone grasps Euclid’s propositions before they’re demonstrated. Thus I also call perceptible and clear those stories of things, both future and past, which don’t surpass human belief, as well as laws, institutions and customs (even if they can’t be demonstrated mathematically). Those obscure symbols and stories which seem to surpass all belief, I call impossible to perceive. Still, many of these can be investigated according to our method, so that we can perceive the author’s thought.
33. The proverb “A word to the wise is sufficient” occurs both in Terence (Phormio III, 541) and Plautus (Persa V, 729) (ALM).
34. Here Spinoza surely has in mind the Calvinist view that our knowledge of God through Scripture depends on the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. Cf. Calvin, Institutes I, vi, 1–3; I, vii, 1, 2, 4, 5; and Parker 1995b, 21–27. Calvin, however, is more concerned with issues about the authority of Scripture, the establishment of the canon, and the uncorrupted transmission of its text than he is with the interpretation of particular passages.
35. Cf. Calvin, Institutes III, i, 1; xxiv, 1; IV, xiv, 8.
36. Perhaps Spinoza’s translation of Maimonides is tendentious here. The Pines translation at this point reads: “Consequently, in this case the texts ought not to be rejected and figuratively interpreted.”
THEN WE ASK: WERE THERE SEVERAL WRITERS OF ALL OF THESE BOOKS, OR ONLY ONE? AND WHO WAS HE?
[1] In the preceding Chapter we treated the foundations and principles of our knowledge of the Scriptures, and showed that they are just a [30] genuine history of the Scriptures. Though such a history is very necessary, the Ancients still neglected it. Or if they wrote any of it (or handed it down [in an oral tradition]), that has perished by the assault of time. So a large part of the foundations and principles of this knowledge has [III/118] fallen into oblivion.
[2] This loss is one we might still have endured, if those who subsequently transmitted the texts had stayed within the proper limits, and in good faith transmitted to their successors the few things they had received or found, without concocting new things out of their own brains. The result has been that the history of Scripture has been [5] left, not only incomplete, but also quite faulty. The foundations of the knowledge of the Scriptures are not just too slight to have allowed a whole [history of Scripture] to be built on them; they are defective.
[3] My aim is to correct these faults and to remove the common prejudices of Theology. But I fear my attempt may come too late. [10] Things have already nearly reached the point where men do not allow themselves to be corrected about this, but stubbornly defend what they have embraced under the guise of religion. Nor does any place seem to be left for reason, except among a very few (few if compared with the rest), so widely have these prejudices taken possession of men’s minds. [15] Nevertheless, I shall try. I shall not give up putting the matter to the test, for there is no reason to despair completely.
[4] To show these things in an orderly way, I’ll begin with the prejudices concerning the true Writers of the Sacred Books. First, concerning the writer of the Pentateuch. Almost everyone has believed him to be Moses.1 Indeed, the Pharisees maintained this so stubbornly that they considered anyone [20] who seemed to think otherwise a heretic. That’s why Ibn Ezra, a Man with an independent mind and no slight learning, who was the first of all those I’ve read to take note of this prejudice, didn’t dare to explain his thought openly, but only disclosed the problem in rather obscure terms.2 I won’t be afraid to make them clearer here, and to show the thing itself openly.
[25] [5] Here are Ibn Ezra’s words, as they are found in his commentary on Deuteronomy:
בעבר הירדן וגו ואם תבין סוד השנים עשר גם ויכתוב משה והכנעני אז בארץ בהר יהוה יראה גם הנה ערשו ערש ברזל תכיר האמת
Beyond the Jordan etc. . . . provided you understand the mystery of the [30] twelve . . . and Moses also wrote the law . . . and the Canaanite was then in the land . . . it will be revealed on the mountain of God . . . then also behold, his bed is a bed of iron . . . then you will know the truth.3
[6] With these few words he discloses, and at the same time shows, that it was not Moses who wrote the Pentateuch, but someone else, who lived long afterward, and finally that the book Moses wrote was another one. To show these things, I say, he notes
[III/119] first, that the preface to Deuteronomy4 could not have been written by Moses, who never crossed the Jordan.
second, that the whole book of Moses was written down very clearly within the expanse of one altar (see Deuteronomy 27[:1–8] and Joshua 8:31 etc.), which, according to the account of the Rabbis,5 consisted of [5] only twelve stones. From this it follows that the book of Moses was much smaller in bulk than the Pentateuch.6
This, I think, is what the author wanted to signify by the mystery of the twelve.
(Possibly he meant the twelve curses found in Deuteronomy 27[:11–26]. Perhaps he believed they hadn’t been written down in the book of [10] the law because Moses commands the Levites, in addition to writing down the law, to read those curses aloud, so that they might bind the people by an oath to observing the laws which had been written down. Or perhaps he meant to indicate the last chapter of Deuteronomy, concerning the death of Moses, a chapter which consists of twelve verses. But there is no need to examine these things more carefully here, or [15] those which others may conjecture in addition.)
third, that in Deuteronomy 31:9 it is said that ויכתוב משה את התורה Moses wrote the law. . . . But these can’t be the words of Moses; they must be those of another Writer, relating the deeds and writings of Moses.
fourth, the passage in Genesis 12:6, where—relating that Abraham was passing through the land of the Canaanites—the Historian adds that the [20] Canaanite was then in that land, by which he clearly separates the time of the events described from the time when he wrote these words. So these words must have been written after the death of Moses, when the Canaanites had already been driven out and no longer occupied those regions.
In commenting on this passage Ibn Ezra also signifies the same thing with these words
[25] והכנעני אז בארץ יתכן שארץ כנען תפשה מיד אחר ואם איננו כן יש לו סוד והמשכיל ידום
And the Canaanite was then in that land. It seems that Canaan (the grandson of Noah) seized the land of the Canaanite, which was occupied by someone else. If this is not true, there is some mystery in this matter. Let him who understands this be silent.
That is, if Canaan invaded those regions, then the meaning will be [30] that the Canaanite was already then in that land, excluding the time past, when it was inhabited by another nation. But if Canaan was the first to cultivate those regions (as follows from Genesis 10), then the Text sets apart the present time, i.e., that of the Writer; and so not the time of Moses, in whose time [the Canaanites] still occupied those regions. This is the mystery he says should be kept quiet.
fifth, that in Genesis 22:14 mount Moriah is called7** the mountain of God, a name it didn’t have until after it was dedicated to the building of the temple. But this choice of the mountain had not yet been made in the time of Moses. For Moses doesn’t indicate that any place has been [5] chosen by God; on the contrary, he predicts that some day God will choose a place, on which the name of God will be bestowed.
sixth, that in Deuteronomy 3 these words are inserted into the story of Og, King of Bashan: Only Og, King of Bashan, remained of the rest of the giants;8* behold, his bed was a bed of iron, certainly this (bed), which is in Rabbah, of the children of Ammon, nine cubits long, etc. [Deuteronomy 3:11]
[10] This insertion indicates very clearly that the Writer of these books lived long after Moses.9 For only someone relating events which happened long ago would speak this way, mentioning the remains of the past to induce belief. Doubtless this bed was discovered first in the time of David, who subdued this city (as 2 Samuel 12:30 relates).
[15] [12] Not only here, but also a bit below, this same historian inserts in the words of Moses:
Fair, the son of Manasseh, took the whole territory of Argob, as far as the border of the Geshurites and the Maacathites, and he called those places by his own name, Bashan, villages of Jair, unto this day. [Deuteronomy 3:14]
These words, I say, the Historian added to explain the words of [20] Moses which he had just reported,
and the rest of Gilead and all of Bashan, the kingdom of Og, I gave to the half-tribe of Manasseh, all the territory of Argob, under the whole of Bashan, which is called the land of the Giants.
[13] Doubtless the Hebrews in this Writer’s time knew which were the villages of Jair of the tribe of Judah, but did not know them under [25] the name of the territory of Argob, nor of the land of the Giants. So he was forced to explain which places, long ago, used to be called by these names, and at the same time to give a reason why in his time they were identified by the name of Jair, who was of the tribe of Judah, not that of Manasseh (see 1 Chronicles 2:21–22).
[14] With this we’ve explained Ibn Ezra’s opinion, and also the [30] passages in the Pentateuch he cites to confirm it. But he didn’t note all the passages, or even the main ones. For there are many others worth noting in these books, some more important than the ones he mentioned.
[III/121] [15] First, the Writer of these books not only speaks of Moses in the third person, he also testifies to many things about him, such as:
God spoke with Moses [e.g., Numbers 1:1, 2:1, etc.];
God spoke with Moses face to face [Exodus 33:11, cf. Numbers 12:8];
Moses was the most humble of all men (Numbers 12:3);10
Moses was seized with anger against the leaders of the army (Numbers 31:14);
[5] Moses, the man of God (Deuteronomy 33:1);
Moses, the servant of God, died [Deuteronomy 34:5];11
Never was there a Prophet in Israel like Moses etc. [Deuteronomy 34:10].
[16] By contrast, when Deuteronomy records the Law Moses explained to the people, the Law he had written, Moses speaks and relates his deeds in the first person, thus: God spoke to me (Deuteronomy [10] 2:1, 17, etc.), I prayed to God etc. [Deuteronomy 9:26]. Then later, at the end of the book [32:44–34:12], after he has reported Moses’s words, the historian again speaks in the third person, when he narrates how Moses gave the people, in writing, the law he had explained, how he warned them for the last time, and finally, how he ended his life. All [15] these things—the manner of speaking, the testimonies, and the very continuity of the whole history—clearly indicate that these books were not composed by Moses himself, but by someone else.
[17] Second, note that not only does this history relate how Moses died, was buried, and caused the Hebrews to mourn for thirty days, [20] but when it compares him to the Prophets who lived afterward, it says that he excelled them all. Never, [the Writer] says, was there a Prophet in Israel like Moses, whom God knew face to face. Obviously Moses couldn’t give this testimony about himself. Neither could someone who came immediately after him. Only someone who lived many generations later would speak of the past time as this Historian does: Never was there a [25] Prophet etc., and (of the tomb), no one knows to this day [where Moses is buried—Deuteronomy 34:6].12
[18] Third, note that certain places are indicated not by the names they had while Moses was alive, but by other names they came to have [30] much later. For example, Abraham pursued the enemy as far as Dan (see Genesis 14:14), a name that city did not have until long after the death of Joshua (see Judges 18:29).
[19] Fourth, sometimes the Histories too are extended beyond the time of Moses’ life. For Exodus 16:34 relates that the children of Israel ate Manna for forty years, until they came to an inhabited land, [III/122] the border of the land of Canaan, i.e., until the time spoken of in Joshua 5:12. Another example: Genesis 36:31 says These are the kings who reigned in Edom before any king reigned over the children of Israel. No doubt the historian is speaking there of the kings the Edomites had [5] before David conquered them13** and established governors in Edom itself. (See 2 Samuel 8:14.)14
[20] From all of this, then, it’s clearer than the noon light that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses, but by someone who lived many generations after Moses. But please, let’s attend also to the books Moses [10] did write, which are mentioned in the Pentateuch. From these references it will be evident that they were different from the Pentateuch.
[21] First, then, it’s evident from Exodus 17:14 that by God’s command Moses wrote an account of the war against Amalek. That chapter doesn’t establish what book he wrote this in, but Numbers 21:14 mentions a book called of the wars of God. No doubt this book related the [15] war against Amalek—and also all the encampments which the author of the Pentateuch testifies that Moses described (Numbers 33:2).
[22] Moreover, Exodus 24:4–7 establishes the existence of another book, called ספר הברית book of the covenant,15* which he read before [20] the Israelites when they first entered into a covenant with God. But this book (or this letter) contained only a few things, viz. the laws or commands of God related from Exodus 20:22 through 23:33. Anyone who has read that chapter impartially and with sound judgment will acknowledge this. [23] For it’s related there that as soon as Moses [25] understood the people’s intention to enter into a covenant with God, he immediately wrote down God’s pronouncements and laws. Then in the morning light, after he had performed certain ceremonies, he read out to the whole assembly the conditions of entering into the covenant. Once these conditions had been read out, and without doubt grasped by all the ordinary people, they bound themselves with full consent. So [30] both the shortness of the time it took to write it down, and the nature of the covenant the people were making, show that this book contained nothing beyond the few things I have just mentioned.
[24] Finally, it’s evident that in the fortieth year after the departure from Egypt Moses explained all the laws he had promulgated (see Deuteronomy 1:5), and bound the people to them again (see Deuteronomy [III/123] 29:14), and finally wrote a book which contained the laws he had explained, and this new covenant (see Deuteronomy 31:9). Afterward Joshua added to this book, called the book of the law of God, an account of the covenant by which the people bound itself once again, [5] in his time. This was the third covenant it entered into with God (see Joshua 24:25–26).
[25] But since we have no book which contains this covenant of Moses together with the covenant of Joshua, we must concede that this book has perished—unless we want to be as crazy as the Chaldean Paraphrast Jonathan,16 and twist the words of Scripture to our liking. For in the [10] face of this difficulty, he preferred to corrupt Scripture rather than confess his own ignorance. [26] These words from the book of Joshua
17ויכתב יהושע את הדברים האלה בספר תורת האלהים and Joshua wrote these words in the book of the Law of God (Joshua 24:26)
he translates into Chaldean as follows
וכתב יהושוע ית פתגמיא האילן ואצנעינון בספר אוריתא דיהוה and Joshua wrote these [15] words and kept them with the book of the Law of God.
[27] What can you do with people who see nothing but what they want to? What, I ask, is this, but to deny Scripture and to forge a new Scripture out of one’s own brain?
We conclude, therefore, that the book of the law of God which Moses wrote was not the Pentateuch, but an altogether different book, which the author of the Pentateuch inserted into his own work in an [20] orderly way. What we’ve just said shows this with utmost clarity. So does what is now to be said.
[28] When it’s related, in the passage of Deuteronomy just mentioned [31:9], that Moses wrote the book of the law, the historian adds that Moses handed it over to the priests, and that he commanded them to read it out to the whole people at a fixed time [every seventh year]. That [25] shows that this book was much shorter than the Pentateuch, since it could be read out in this way in one assembly, so that everyone would understand it. [29] We must also not fail to mention here that, of all the books Moses wrote, he commanded them to scrupulously preserve and keep this one of the second covenant and the Song (which he also [30] wrote afterward, so that the whole people would learn it thoroughly).18 For by the first covenant he had bound only those who were present, but by the second he bound everyone, even their posterity (see Deuteronomy 29:14–15). So he commanded the book of this second covenant to be preserved scrupulously by future generations—along (as we have said) with the Song, which concerns future generations most especially.
[30] Therefore, since it’s not established that Moses wrote other [III/124] books besides these, since he didn’t command posterity to scrupulously preserve any other book besides the little Book of the law and the Song, and finally, since many things occur in the Pentateuch which Moses could not have written, it follows that no one has any basis for saying that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch. To claim this is [5] completely contrary to reason.
[31] But here, perhaps, someone will ask whether Moses didn’t also write, besides [the laws of the second covenant and the Song], the laws when they were first revealed to him? In the course of forty years, didn’t he write down any of the laws he promulgated, apart from those few which I said [viii, 22] were contained in the book of the first covenant?
[10] [32] I reply: though I grant that it seems reasonable for Moses to have written down the laws at the very time and place in which he happened to communicate them, I nevertheless deny that we are entitled to affirm this [simply because it would have been reasonable for him to do so]. For we’ve shown above that we must maintain nothing about such matters except what is established from Scripture itself, or [15] which is elicited solely from its foundations by a legitimate principle of inference. We mustn’t maintain things of this kind simply because they seem to be consistent with reason.
[33] In any case, reason itself does not compel us to maintain this. For perhaps the assembly of elders communicated Moses’ edicts to the people in writing, and afterward the historian collected them and inserted them in an orderly way in the story of Moses’ life.
[20] This will be enough about the five books of Moses. [34] Now it’s time for us to examine the remaining books. By similar reasoning the book of Joshua is also shown not to be an autograph.19 For it is another person who testifies that Joshua was famous throughout the whole land (see Joshua 6:27), that he omitted none of the things Moses had commanded (see Joshua 8:35, 11:15), that he grew old and called [25] everyone into an assembly [Joshua 23:1–2], and that after some time he breathed his last [Joshua 24:29].
[35] Secondly, the book of Joshua too relates certain things which happened after Joshua’s death: e.g., that after his death the Israelites worshipped God as long as the elders who had known him lived [24:31]. And 16:10 relates that Ephraim and Manasseh did not drive out the [30] Canaanite who was living in Gezer, but, he adds, the Canaanite dwelled in the midst of Ephraim unto this day and was a slave. [36] The very same thing is related in the book of Judges (1[:29–30]). And the manner of speaking—unto this day—also shows that the Writer is relating things which happened long ago. Similar to this are [Joshua] 15:63, concerning the children of Judah, and the story of Caleb in 15:13. [37] Also the case [III/125] related in 22:10[–33], concerning the two and a half tribes who built an altar beyond the Jordan, seems to have happened after the death of Joshua. In that whole story no mention is made of Joshua, but the people alone considers whether to make war, sends out envoys, waits for their reply, and in the end approves it.
[5] [38] Finally, it follows clearly from Joshua 10:14 that this book was written many generations after Joshua. For [the author] testifies that there was no other day like that day, either before or afterward, on which God (thus) obeyed anyone etc. Therefore, if Joshua ever wrote any book, it was surely the one mentioned in this same story.20
[10] [39] I believe no one of sound mind persuades himself that the book of Judges was written by the Judges themselves.21 For the summation of the whole story in 2[:6–23] shows clearly that the entire book was written by a single historian. Next, because the Writer of this book frequently reminds us that in those times there was no King in Israel, [15] it was doubtless written after kings had achieved rule.22
[40] There’s no reason why we should linger long over the books of Samuel, since the story is extended far past his life.23 Still, I should like to note just this: that this book too was written many generations after Samuel. For in 1 Samuel 9:9 the Historian reminds us in [20] a parenthesis that long ago in Israel, when someone went to consult God, he said “Come, let us go to the seer,” for long ago one who is today called a prophet was called a seer.
[41] Finally, the books of Kings themselves establish that they are gathered from the books of the acts of Solomon (see 1 Kings 11:41), the Chronicles of the Kings of Judah (see 1 Kings 14:29), and the [25] Chronicles of the Kings of Israel (see 1 Kings 14:19).24
[42] We conclude, therefore, that all the books enumerated so far are apographs,25 and relate the things contained in them as having happened long ago.
If now we attend to the connection and theme of all these books, we shall easily infer that they were all written by one and the same [25] Historian, who wanted to write about the past history of the Jews from their first origin up to the first destruction of the City.26 [43] Just from the way these books are connected with one another, we can see that they contain only one narrative of one historian. As soon as he has stopped narrating the life of Moses, he passes to the history of Joshua:
and it came to pass, after Moses, the servant of God, died, that God said to Joshua etc. [Joshua 1:1]
[III/126] And when he has finished this story with the death of Joshua, he begins the history of the Judges with the same transition and linkage:
And it came to pass, after Joshua died, that the children of Israel inquired of God etc. [Judges 1:1]
[44] And to this book, as an appendix, he attaches the book of Ruth:
And it came to pass, in the days when the Judges judged, that there was a [5] famine in the land. [Ruth 1:1]
To this, in the same way, he also attaches the first book of Samuel. When this is finished, he proceeds by his customary transition to the second book. And to this, since the story of David was not yet finished, he joins the first book of Kings, and continuing to relate the history of David, in the end he attaches the second book to it with the same linkage.
[10] [45] Next, the continuity and order of the histories also indicates that there was only one Historian, who set himself a definite goal. For he begins by narrating the first origin of the Hebrew nation, and proceeds by telling in an orderly manner on what occasion and at what times Moses promulgated laws and predicted many things to [the people]. Then he relates how, in accordance with Moses’ predictions, they invaded the [15] promised land (see Deuteronomy 7), but how, once they had occupied it, they abandoned the laws (Deuteronomy 31:16), and how, as a result, many evils came upon them (Deuteronomy 31:17). Next, the Historian tells how they decided to elect Kings (Deuteronomy 17:14), and relates that things went prosperously for them when the kings heeded the laws, but unhappily when they did not (Deuteronomy 28:36, 68). Finally he [20] relates the downfall of the state, as Moses had predicted it.
[46] But as for things which contribute nothing to strengthening the authority of the law, either he passes over them in complete silence or else he refers the reader to other Historians. Therefore, all these books agree in having one purpose, viz. to teach the statements and edicts of Moses, and to demonstrate them through the outcomes of things.
[25] [47] These three things taken together—the simplicity of the theme of all these books, the way they are connected, and the fact that they were apographs, written many generations after the events related—lead us to infer that, as we have just said, they were all written by just one [30] Historian. [48] Who he was, I cannot show so clearly; but I suspect that he was Ezra.27 The considerations which combine to prompt this conjecture are not trivial.
[First,] since the Historian (whom we now know to have been only one person) produces a history up to Jehoiachin’s release [2 Kings 25:27] and adds, as well, that [25:29–30] Jehoiachin dined at the King’s table his whole life (i.e., either Jehoiachin’s life or that of Nebuchadnezzar’s son—the meaning is quite doubtful), it follows that he was not anyone [III/127] before Ezra. [49] But except for Ezra Scripture doesn’t mention anyone who flourished then, who zealously tried to discover God’s law and honored it (see Ezra 7:10), and who was a Writer skilled in the Law [5] of Moses (see 7:6). So I cannot suspect anyone but Ezra of having written these books.28
[50] Second, we see in this testimony concerning Ezra that he used zeal not only in trying to discover God’s law, but also in enhancing it. Moreover, Nehemiah 8:8 also says that they read the book of God’s law explained, and they used their intellect, and they understood the Scripture.29 [10] [51] But since the book of Deuteronomy contains not only the book of the law of Moses (or the greatest part of it), but also many things inserted for a fuller explanation, I conjecture from this that the book of Deuteronomy is the book of God’s law which they then read—written, enhanced, and explained by Ezra.
[52] When we explained Ibn Ezra’s opinion, we gave two examples [15] illustrating that many things are inserted parenthetically in the book of Deuteronomy, to explain it more fully. But there are many other examples of this feature in that work. E.g., in Deuteronomy 2:12, and previously the Horites lived in Seir, but the sons of Esau drove them out and [20] destroyed them from their sight and dwelled in their place, as Israel did in the land of their inheritance, which God gave them. This explains 2:3–4, viz. that the sons of Esau, who received mount Seir as an inheritance, were not the first to occupy that land, but that they invaded it and dislodged and destroyed the Horites, who dwelt there previously, as the [25] Israelites did to the Canaanites after the death of Moses.
[53] Again, verses 6–9 in Deuteronomy 10 are inserted parenthetically in the words of Moses. For no one fails to see that verse 8, which begins at that time God set apart the tribe of Levi, must be related to verse 5, not to the death of Aaron, which Ezra seems to have inserted [30] here for no other reason than because, in this account of the calf the people had worshipped, Moses had said that he had prayed to God for Aaron (see Deuteronomy 9:20). Next, he explains that, at the time Moses is speaking of here, God chose the tribe of Levi for himself, so that he might show the reason for the choice, and why the Levites were not called to a share of the possession. This done, he goes on to follow the thread of the history in the words of Moses.
[III/128] [54] To these examples we should add the preface of the book [Deuteronomy 1:1–5] and all those passages which speak of Moses in the third person. Beyond these, he has added, or expressed in other words, many other things which we cannot now recognize as distinct—doubtless so that the men of his own time would grasp them more easily.
[5] [55] If we had the book of the law of Moses itself, I say, I don’t doubt that we would find a great discrepancy, both in the words and in the order of the precepts and the reasons for them. For when I compare just the Decalogue of this book with the Decalogue of Exodus (where its history is explicitly related), I see that it is inconsistent with the latter in all these respects:30
[i] the fourth commandment [Deuteronomy 5:12–15, Exodus 20:8–11] is [10] not only stated in a different way, it is much longer;
[ii] the reason given for it differs entirely from the reason offered in Exodus; and finally,
[iii] the order in which the tenth precept is explained here [Deuteronomy 5:21] is also different from that in Exodus [20:17].
[56] I think Ezra did these things, both here and in other places, as I’ve said, because he was explaining the law of God to the men of his [15] time. That’s why he set out and explained this Book of God’s Law. And I think this book was the first of all those which I’ve said he wrote. I conjecture this because it contains the Laws of his Country, which the people most needed, and also because it’s not attached to the preceding book by any linkage, as all the others are, but begins with the detached [20] statement, These are the words of Moses, etc.
[57] But after he finished this, and after he had imparted a thorough knowledge of the law to the people, I believe he then applied his zeal to writing down a complete history of the Hebrew nation, from the origin of the world to the final destruction of the City. In this history he inserted the Book of Deuteronomy in its place. And perhaps he [25] called its first five books the books of Moses because it’s mainly his life which is contained in them, and he took the name from the more important part. [58] For the same reason he also called the sixth book by the name of Joshua, the seventh, Judges, the eighth, Ruth, the ninth and perhaps also the tenth, Samuel, and finally the eleventh and twelfth, Kings. But whether Ezra put the finishing touches on this work, and [30] brought it to completion in the way he wanted to—that’s a topic for the following Chapter.
1. The view that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch seems to be based on a misunderstanding of Deut. 31:9 (see Anchor Genesis, xix) and may be found in Philo (On the Life of Moses I, 4, and II, 11), Josephus (Against Apion I, 8), Augustine (Confessions XII, 17), and the Talmud (see Baba Bathra 14b–15a). The Talmud makes an exception for the last eight verses of Deuteronomy, which describe the death of Moses, and ascribes those verses to Joshua. Maimonides made it a fundamental principle of Judaism that the whole Pentateuch comes to us from God through Moses, “who acted like a secretary taking dictation” (Maimonides Reader, 420–21). As the text indicates, Spinoza was not the first to question this tradition. But he does so more openly than Ibn Ezra and more effectively than such more recent doubters as Hobbes and Isaac de la Peyrère. For discussion see Curley 1990b and 2014, and Malcolm 2002.
2. Whether Ibn Ezra really intended to suggest doubts about the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch (as Spinoza believed), or merely meant to suggest that there had been a few glosses or slight changes in the text by later editors, is still a matter of dispute. In their foreword to Ibn Ezra’s commentary on the Pentateuch, Strickman and Silver claim that Spinoza “totally misrepresented” Ibn Ezra’s views (V, xvii).
3. Cf. Ibn Ezra 1988, V, 3.
4. The reference is to Deut. 1:1–5, which begins: “These are the words which Moses spoke unto all Israel, beyond the Jordan, in the wilderness.”
5. The figure of twelve stones is given by Rashi (1960) in his commentary on Deut. 27:8, relying on a passage in the Talmud, Sota 35b.
6. In his commentary on Deut. 27:8, Ibn Ezra approved the view of Saadia Gaon, that the stones must have contained only the commandments, because they would not have been large enough to contain the entire five books of the Pentateuch. See Ibn Ezra 1988, V, 194.
7. **[ADN. IX] By the historian, that is, not by Abraham. For he says that the place which today is called on the mountain of God it will be revealed was called by Abraham God will provide.
8. *Note that the Hebrew word רפאים rephaim signifies condemned, and seems also to be a proper name in 1 Chron. 20. Therefore I think that here it signifies some family.
9. The Talmud had tried to deal with the fact that the last chapter of Deuteronomy describes the death of Moses by ascribing the last eight verses of that chapter to Joshua. The language to which Spinoza here calls attention not only excludes that hypothesis, but also, by putting the historian at a considerable distance from the events he is describing, raises doubts about his reliability.
10. Apparently this verse had long been recognized as a stumbling block for the theory that Moses wrote the entire Pentateuch himself, because that theory required the humblest of men to praise himself for his humility. Cf. HCSB at Num. 12:3, and Kugel 2007, 30–31.
11. Another traditional stumbling block for the theory of Mosaic authorship. The fact that the last chapter of Deuteronomy describes the death of Moses was presumably the reason why the Talmud assigned those verses to Joshua (Baba Bathra 14b–15a), and the reason why Luther ascribed the whole last chapter of Deuteronomy to either Joshua or Eleazar. See his Lectures on Deuteronomy in Works IX, 310.
12. As Hobbes pointed out in Leviathan xxxiii, 4, this language is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis some had entertained, that Moses spoke of his burial place by prophecy.
13. **[ADN. X] From this time until the reign of Jehoram, when they detached themselves from him (2 Kings 8:20), Edom did not have kings, but governors established by the Jews took the place of a king. See 1 Kings 22:48. So the governor of Edom was called a king (2 Kings 3:9). There may be some dispute whether the last of the Edomite kings began to reign before Saul was made king, or whether in this chapter of Genesis Scripture meant only to tell of the kings who died unconquered. Those people who want to list Moses among the Hebrew kings are clearly trifling. The state of the Hebrews he established (by divine agency) was completely different from a monarchic one.
14. The first person to identify this problem for the theory of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch—the fact that Gen. 36:31–39 lists kings who reigned in Edom long after the death of Moses—seems to have been an eleventh-century Jewish court physician in Spain, Isaac ibn Yashush. On this see Friedman 1989, 18–19, who notes the irony that Ibn Ezra (whose cryptic remarks may have prompted Spinoza’s doubts about the Mosaic authorship) sharply criticized Isaac for his theory that this chapter was composed in the reign of King Jehoshaphat, and said that Isaac’s book deserved to be burned. See Ibn Ezra 1988, I, 341, which makes the suggestion Spinoza dismisses in ADN. X, that Moses can be counted as a king of Israel. Spinoza will return to this passage in ix, 6.
15. *NB: In Hebrew ספר sepher more often signifies letter or scroll. [This explains the parenthetical remark in the next sentence of the text.]
16. Spinoza refers to a work now known as the Targum Pseudo-Jonathan, an Aramaic translation (or paraphrase) of the Pentateuch, traditionally (but it seems wrongly) ascribed to Jonathan ben Uzziel, a pupil of Hillel (who had in fact produced an Aramaic paraphrase of the prophets). The Buxtorf Bible, which Spinoza owned, reproduced these paraphrases, along with selections from the most prominent medieval commentaries. The Targums played an important role in medieval Jewish liturgy and biblical studies. For more, see ABD VI, 320–21.
17. So Spinoza’s text reads. For the final word the Masoertic text reads אלהים.
18. Earlier references to a song ascribed to Moses (at III/39, 90) clearly referred to the song in Exod. 15. But here Spinoza seems to have in mind the song in Deut. 32:1–43.
19. By denying that these books are autographs Spinoza means, not just that our oldest manuscripts are not actually written in the hand of the people to whom tradition assigned authorship, but that they are not even transcripts of any document substantially written by the authors to whom tradition assigned them. The same Talmudic tradition which made Moses the author of (most of) the Pentateuch assigned authorship of the book of Joshua to Joshua, and similarly for the other books Spinoza discusses in this chapter (Baba Bathra 14b–15a).
20. Josh. 10:13 says that the story of Joshua’s commanding the sun to stand still is written in the Book of Jashar, a book which has not survived in the Bible as it has come down to us.
21. Indeed, Talmudic tradition assigned authorship of Judges to Samuel (Baba Bathra 14b–15a).
22. At this point the title of this chapter would lead us to expect a discussion of the book of Ruth. But Spinoza does not discuss its authorship or date, though he will argue later (in §44) that its opening links it with Judges. In Christian Bibles Ruth normally does come immediately after Judges. In the Hebrew Bible it is grouped with the Writings, immediately after the Song of Songs.
23. Nevertheless, Baba Bathra 14b–15a does make Samuel the author of the books bearing his name. Samuel’s death is reported in 1 Sam. 25:1.
24. Baba Bathra 14b–15a makes Jeremiah the author of the books of Kings. Spinoza’s theory that the books of Kings derived from the lost works it mentions seems now to be generally accepted. Cf. HCSB 474 and ABD IV, 70–71.
25. That is, these books are not autographs in the sense defined in the note to viii, 34.
26. Spinoza refers here to the destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonians in 586 B.C.E. In his theory that the primary historical books of the Hebrew Bible—beginning with Genesis and ending with 2 Kings—were in the end the work of one final editor, an historian working in the postexilic period, who wrote a history of his people to demonstrate that the calamities which had befallen them were the result of their disobedience to God’s law, Spinoza’s picture resembles that offered by David Noel Freedman in Freedman 1994. (Spinoza counts twelve books in this series when he sums up in viii, 57–58, because he counts Ruth as part of the series, and divides Samuel and Kings into two books each. Freedman counts nine books because he does not divide Samuel and Kings and omits Ruth.)
27. In Leviathan xxxiii, 19, Hobbes had reached a similar conclusion, on the basis of two passages in the apocryphal 2 Esdras. Hobbes’ argument does not rely on the premise that, because of their unity of theme, the historical books were the work of one author. Indeed, Hobbes does not limit his conclusion to the historical books. For a thorough discussion of the ancestry of the Ezra hypothesis, see Malcolm 2002. See also Curley 1994 and 2014.
28. Spinoza mistakenly thinks that Ezra was among the first wave of those who returned to Jerusalem at the end of the Babylonian captivity. See below, annotation at x, 1. For a summary of the debate over Ezra’s work and importance, see ABD II, 726–28, which concludes that there was an historical Ezra, who did some of the things later tradition ascribed to him, but about whom hagiographic legends accumulated.
Some do credit him with editing the Pentateuch in its present form. For argument to this effect, see Friedman 1989, ch. 13. Friedman would not assign the historical sequence from Joshua to 2 Kings to Ezra, arguing instead that the final version of those books is the work of Jeremiah (ch. 7).
29. The text (incorrectly) has Neh. 8:9. I take it that when Spinoza says that Ezra ‘enhanced’ [adornandam] God’s law, he means that he offered an interpretation of the law which made it more understandable.