TO THE MOST EXCELLENT AND ACUTE PHILOSOPHER B. D. S. FROM EHRENFRIED WALTHER VON TSCHIRNHAUS
Most Excellent Sir,
I’m surprised, at least,113 that by the very fact that Philosophers demonstrate that something is false, by the same reasoning they show its truth. At the beginning of his Method, Descartes thinks that the certainty of the intellect is equal in all men.114 Moreover, in his Meditations [20] he demonstrates [this]. They prove the same thing who think they can demonstrate something to be certain in this way: that it is accepted as indubitable by all men.
But setting these things to one side, I appeal to experience, and I humbly ask you to attend to these things carefully. For in this way it will be found that if one of two men affirms something, but the other denies it, and they speak in such a way that they are each aware of [25] [their apparent disagreement], although they seem to be contrary to one another verbally, nevertheless if their concepts are weighed, they both speak the truth (each one according to his concept).
I mention this because it is immensely useful in everyday life. Once [IV/263] this one thing has been observed, countless disputes, and the quarrels stemming from them, can be prevented—although this truth in the concept is not always true absolutely, but only when those things are posited which are supposed in the intellect as true. This Rule is even [5] so universal that it is found among all men, madmen and dreamers not excepted. For whatever they say they are seeing (though it does not appear this way to us) or say they have seen, it’s quite certain that things really are this way.
This is also observed most clearly in the case at hand, concerning Free Will. For both those who argue for it and those who argue against [10] it seem to me to speak the truth, that is, as each conceives Freedom. For Descartes calls Free what is not compelled by any cause. And you, on the other hand, call Free what is not determined to something by any cause. Therefore, I confess with you that in all things we are determined to something by a definite cause, and thus that we have no free will [as you understand “free will”]. On the other hand, I also think, [15] with Descartes, that in certain things (as I shall show immediately) we are not in any way compelled, and so have free will [as he understands “free will”]. I shall take an example from the present situation.
The State of the Question is three-fold. First, do we have, absolutely, any 'power over things which are outside us? This is denied. [20] For example, that I am now writing this letter is not absolutely in my 'power, since I certainly would have written earlier, if I had not been prevented either by being away or by the presence of friends. Second, when the will determines the motions of our body in a certain way, do we have 'power absolutely over those motions? I reply with [25] a qualification: [we do] if we are living in a healthy body. For if I am healthy, I can always apply myself to writing or not. Third, when I have at my disposal the exercise of my reason, can I use it most freely, that is, absolutely? To this I reply “yes.” For who would deny to me, without contradicting his own consciousness, that I can think, in my [30] thoughts,115 either that I want to write, or that I want not to write. And as far as the action is concerned, because the external causes permit this (which concerns the second case), I indeed have the ability both to write and not to write.
I acknowledge, indeed, with you, that there are causes which determine me to write now, because you first wrote to me, and asked in [IV/264] the same letter that I write back at the first opportunity, and because there is an opportunity now, I would not like to lose it. I also affirm as certain, with my consciousness as a witness, and with Descartes, that such things do not on that account compel me, and that I really [5] could, notwithstanding these reasons, refrain from doing this. This seems impossible to deny.
If we were compelled by external things, who could acquire the habit of virtue? On the contrary, if we affirmed this, all wickedness would be excusable. But in how many ways does it not happen that if we are determined to something by external things, we resist this with a firm [10] and constant heart?
So to give a clearer explanation of the above Rule: you are both speaking the truth according to your own conception. But if we look to the absolute truth, this agrees only with Descartes’ opinion. For in your conception you suppose as certain that the essence of freedom consists [15] in this, that we are not determined by anything. If this is affirmed, both [opinions] will be true. But since the essence of each thing consists in that without which it cannot even be conceived, and freedom can certainly be conceived clearly, even though we’re determined to something in our actions by external causes—or even though there are [20] always causes which are an inducement for us to direct our actions in such a way (even though they do not completely bring it about)—but by no means [can freedom be clearly conceived] if it’s affirmed that we’re compelled. See, in addition to this, Descartes’ Vol. I, Letters 8 and 9, similarly, Vol. II, p. 4.116
But let this be enough. I ask you to respond to these difficulties [NS adds: and you will find that I will not only be grateful, but also, [25] health permitting,
Your most devoted, N.N.]
8 October 1674
TO THE VERY LEARNED AND ABLE MR. G. H. SCHULLER FROM BENEDICT DE SPINOZA
Reply to the Preceding
Most Able Sir,
Our friend J. R.117 sent me the letter you were kind enough to write me, together with your friend’s judgment concerning my opinion on free will and Descartes’, which was most welcome to me. Although at [10] present I’m greatly distracted by other matters—not to mention the fact that my health is not too good—your singular kindness, and what I think most important, the zeal for the truth which possesses you compel me to satisfy your desire as well as the limits of my ability allow.
I don’t know what your friend means before he appeals to experience [15] and asks for careful attention. Then he adds: if one of two men affirms something concerning some matter, but the other denies it, etc., [and they speak in such a way that they are each aware of this, although they seem to be contrary to one another verbally, nevertheless if their concepts are weighed, they both speak the truth (each one according to his concept)].118 This is true, if he understands that the two men, though they use the same words, are nevertheless thinking about different things. Previously I sent some examples of this to our friend J. [20] R. I am writing him now, to ask him to communicate them to you.
So I pass to that definition of Freedom which he says is mine. But I don’t know where he got it from. I say that a thing is free if it exists and acts solely from the necessity of its own nature, and compelled if it is determined by something else to exist and produce effects in a [25] fixed and determinate way.119 E.g., even though God exists necessarily, still he exists freely, because he exists from the necessity of his own nature alone. So God also understands himself, and absolutely all things, freely, because it follows solely from the necessity of his nature that he understands all things. You see, then, that I place freedom not in a [30] free decree, but in a free necessity.
[IV/266] But let’s examine created things, which are all determined by external causes to exist and to produce effects in a definite and determinate way. To clearly understand this, let’s conceive something very simple. Suppose a stone receives, from an external cause which strikes against [5] it, a certain quantity of motion, by which it afterward will necessarily continue to move, even though the impulse of the external cause ceases. This continuance of the stone in motion, then, is compelled, not because it is necessary, but because it must be defined by the impulse of the external cause. What I say here about the stone must be understood [10] concerning any singular thing, however composite it is conceived to be, and however capable of doing many things: each thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist and produce effects in a fixed and determinate way.
Next, conceive now, if you will, that while the stone continues to move, it thinks, and knows that as far as it can, it strives to continue [15] moving. Of course, since the stone is conscious only of its striving, and not at all indifferent, it will believe that it is very free, and that it perseveres in motion for no other cause than because it wills to. This is that famous human freedom everyone brags of having, which consists only in this: that men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of [20] the causes by which they are determined. So the infant believes that he freely wants the milk; the angry boy that he wants vengeance; and the timid, flight. Again, the drunk believes it is from a free decision of the mind that he says those things which afterward, when sober, he wishes he had not said. Similarly, the madman, the chatterbox, and a great many people of this kind believe that they act from a free decision [25] of the mind, and not that they are set in motion by an impulse.120
And because this prejudice is innate in all men, they are not so easily freed of it. For though experience teaches quite abundantly that there is nothing less in man’s power than to restrain his appetites, and that often, when men are torn by contrary affects, they see the better and [30] follow the worse,121 they still believe themselves to be free, because they want certain things only slightly, so that their appetite for these things can easily be restrained by the memory of another thing they recall more frequently.
With this, if I’m not mistaken, I’ve explained sufficiently what my opinion is concerning free and compelled necessity, and concerning that fictitious human freedom. From this it’s easy to reply to your friend’s [IV/267] objections. For when Descartes says that he is free who is compelled by no external cause,122 if he understands by a man who is compelled one who acts unwillingly, I grant that in certain things we are not at all compelled; in this respect we have free will. But if by compelled he [5] understands one who acts necessarily, though not unwillingly, then (as I have explained above) I deny that we are free in anything.
But your Friend affirms, for his part, that that we can use the exercise of our reason most freely—i.e., absolutely.123 He persists in this opinion with sufficient—not to say, too much—confidence. For who, he says, [10] would deny, except by contradicting his own consciousness, that I can think, in my thoughts, that I want to write, and that I do not want to write. I’d really like to know what sort of consciousness he’s talking about, if it’s not what I’ve explained above in the example of the stone.
For my part, unless I contradict my consciousness, i.e., contradict reason and experience, and unless I encourage prejudices and ignorance, [15] I deny that I can think, by any absolute power of thinking, that I will to write and do not will to write.
But I appeal to his consciousness. Doubtless he’s experienced that in dreams he doesn’t have the 'power to think that he wills to write and does not will to write—or that when he dreams that he wills to write, he has the 'power of not dreaming that he wills to write. I also [20] don’t believe that he’s learned from experience that the mind is always equally capable of thinking of the same object. [Rather, I think he’s learned from experience] that, as the body is more capable of having an image of this or that object stirred up in it, so the mind is more capable of contemplating this or that object.
Moreover, when he adds that the causes of his having applied his mind [25] to writing have prompted him to write, but have not compelled him to, all that means (if you want to examine the matter fairly) is that his mind was then so constituted that causes which could not have caused him at another time to go in that direction (i.e., when he was torn by some great affect) could now easily do this. I.e., that the causes which [30] could not compel him [then] to do otherwise have now compelled him, not to write unwillingly, but to necessarily have a desire to write.
As for what he has maintained next: that if we were compelled by external causes, no one could acquire the habit of virtue,124 I don’t know who has told him that it can’t happen from a fatal necessity, but only from a free decision of the Mind, that we should have a firm and constant disposition.
[IV/268] As for what he adds next: that if we affirmed this, all wickedness would be excusable, what of it? For evil men are no less to be feared, nor are they any less harmful, when they are necessarily evil. But concerning these matters, please see my Appendix to books I and II of Descartes’ [5] Principles, demonstrated in Geometric order, Part II, Chapter VIII.
Finally, I’d like your friend, who raises these objections against me, to tell me how he conceives the human virtue which arises from the free decree of the Mind to be consistent with God’s preordination. If he confesses, with Descartes,125 that he doesn’t know how to reconcile [10] these things, then he’s trying to launch against me the same weapon which has pierced him. But it’s no use. If you’ll examine my position attentively, you’ll see that everything in it is consistent, etc.
[The Hague, October 1674]126
TO THE MOST EXCELLENT AND ACUTE PHILOSOPHER, B. D. S. FROM EHRENFRIED WALTHER VON TSCHIRNHAUS
Most Excellent Sir,
When shall we obtain your method127 of rightly governing the reason in acquiring knowledge of unknown truths, along with General matters [20] in Physics? I know that you have made great progress in these things. The first was already known to me, and the second may be learned from the Lemmas added to the second Part of the Ethics,128 by which many difficulties in Physics are easily solved.
If you have the time and the opportunity, I humbly ask you for the [25] true Definition of Motion and its explanation, and how, since extension, insofar as it is conceived through itself, is indivisible, immutable, etc., we can deduce a priori that so many things, in such great varieties, can arise, and consequently, the existence of the shape in the particles of a body, which [shapes] nevertheless vary in each body, and are different from the shapes of the parts which constitute the form of another body?
[IV/269] When I was with you, you indicated to me the method you use for finding truths not yet known. By experience I know that this Method is very excellent, and still very easy, as far as I have understood it. I can affirm that just by observing it, I have made great progress in Mathematics. [5] I would like, therefore, for you to give me the true definition of an adequate idea, of a true idea, of a false idea, of a fictitious idea and of a doubtful idea.
I have tried to discover the difference between a true idea and an adequate idea, but so far all I have learned is this: when I investigated a subject, and a certain concept or idea, to find out whether this true [10] idea would also be an adequate idea of some thing, I asked myself what the cause of this idea or concept was. When I had found that, I asked again what the cause of this concept was. And so I proceeded, always seeking the causes of the causes of the ideas, until I found a cause of which I could not see any further cause, other than that, among all the [15] possible ideas I have in me, this one also exists.
For example, if we’re asking what the true origin of our Errors consists in, Descartes will reply that we give our assent to things we have not yet clearly perceived. But though this is a true idea of the thing, I will still not be able to determine everything it’s necessary to know [20] about it, unless I also have an adequate idea of the thing.129 To achieve this I ask again about the cause of this concept: why it happens that we give our assent to things we don’t clearly understand. I reply that this happens because we lack knowledge. But here it’s not possible to ask again what the cause of our not knowing certain things is. And from [25] that I see that I’ve uncovered an adequate idea of our errors.
Meanwhile, I ask you this: because it’s established that many things expressed in infinite ways have an adequate idea of themselves, and that from any adequate idea anything which can be known about the thing can be derived—though they may be elicited more easily from one idea than from another—is there a means of knowing which of [30] two ideas must be used in preference to the other?
For example, an adequate idea of a circle consists in the equality of the radii, but it also consists in the infinite rectangles, equal to one another, which are made from the segments of two lines [intersecting within the circle].130 So it has infinite further expressions, each of which explains the adequate nature of the circle. And though from each [IV/270] of these everything else which can be known about the circle can be deduced, still, it can be done much more easily from one of these than from the other. So anyone who considers the ordinates of curves will deduce many things which concern their measurement. But we’ll do this more easily if we consider the Tangents, etc.131
[5] In this way I wanted to indicate how far I’ve progressed in this Inquiry. I long for its completion—or if I’ve made a mistake somewhere, its correction—as well as the Definition I desire. Farewell.
5 January 1675
TO THE VERY NOBLE AND LEARNED EHRENFRIED WALTHER VON TSCHIRNHAUS FROM B. D. S.
Reply to the Preceding
Most Noble Sir,
[15] I don’t recognize any difference between a true idea and an adequate one, except that the term “true” concerns only the agreement of the idea with its object, whereas the term “adequate” concerns the nature of the idea in itself. So really there’s no difference between a true idea [20] and an adequate one except for that extrinsic relation. To know which of the many ideas of a thing is sufficient for deducing all its properties, I pay attention to one thing only: that the idea or definition of the thing expresses the efficient cause.
For example, in investigating the properties of a circle, I ask whether from the idea of a circle according to which it consists of infinite rectangles, [25] I could deduce all its properties. I ask, I say, whether this idea involves the efficient cause of the circle. Since it doesn’t, I seek another: viz. that a circle is the space described by a line one end of which is fixed [IV/271] and the other moving. Since this Definition now expresses the efficient cause, I know I can deduce all the properties of the circle from it, etc.
Similarly, when I define God as a supremely perfect Being,132 since that definition doesn’t express the efficient cause (for I understand [5] the efficient cause to be both internal and external), I won’t be able to derive all God’s properties from it. But when I define God to be a Being [absolutely infinite], etc. (see E I D6), [I can derive all God’s properties from it]. As for the other things, concerning motion and Method, because they aren’t yet written out in an orderly fashion, I [10] reserve them for another occasion.
As regards your contention that he who considers the ordinates of Curves will deduce many things about their measurement, but that he’ll do this more easily by considering the Tangents, etc., I think the contrary: that by considering the Tangents many other things will be [15] deduced with greater difficulty than by considering the ordinates in sequence. And I maintain absolutely that from certain properties of a thing (whatever idea is given) some things can be discovered more easily, others with greater difficulty—though they all concern the Nature of the thing. But I think it necessary to pay attention to just this one [20] thing: we should seek an idea from which all things can be elicited, as I said above. For if I want to deduce from a thing everything possible, it follows that the last things will be more difficult than the first, etc.
[The Hague, January 1675]133
TO THE MOST DISTINGUISHED MR. B. D. S. FROM HENRY OLDENBURG
With Warmest Regards
The Very Learned Mr. Bourgeois, a Doctor of Medicine from Caen, [IV/272] and an adherent of the Reformed Religion, is about to take a trip to the Netherlands. This offers me a convenient opportunity I don’t want to miss: to let you know in this way that some weeks ago I sent you thanks for your Treatise [the TTP], which you had sent me (though [5] it was never delivered). But I doubt whether my letter ever reached you. In it I indicated my opinion of that Treatise, which now, having subsequently examined and weighed the matter more carefully, I certainly think was premature.134
At that time certain things seemed to me to tend to the detriment of Religion, when I measured it by the standard provided by the common [10] herd of Theologians, and the accepted Formulas of the Confessions (which seem to be too full of partisan zeal). But now, as I rethink the whole matter more deeply, many things occur to me which persuade me that you are so far from trying to harm true religion, or solid philosophy, that on the contrary you are working to commend and establish the authentic purpose of the Christian Religion, and indeed, [15] the divine sublimity and excellence of a fruitful Philosophy.
Since, therefore, I now believe that in your heart you have this intention [to advance the cause of true Christianity], I should like to ask you earnestly to be kind enough to explain what you are now preparing and thinking about for that purpose, in frequent letters to your old and honest Friend, who longs for the happiest outcome of such a [20] godly plan. I solemnly promise you that I will not divulge any of this to any mortal, if you ask me not to. I shall only endeavor to gradually dispose the minds of good and wise Men to embrace those truths you sometimes bring into a fuller light, and to abolish the prejudices conceived against your Meditations.
[25] If I’m not mistaken, you seem to see very deeply into the nature and powers of the human Mind, and its Union with our Body. I earnestly implore you to please teach me your thoughts on this theme.
Farewell, Most Excellent Sir, and continue to be well-disposed to a Most Zealous Admirer of your Teaching and excellence,
Henry Oldenburg
London, 8 June 1675
TO THE MOST DISTINGUISHED MR. B. D. S. FROM HENRY OLDENBURG
[5] Now that Our Correspondence has been so happily resumed, Most Distinguished Sir, I don’t want to fail in the duty of a friend by neglecting it. From the reply you gave me on 5 July,135 I understand that you intend to publish that Five-part Treatise of yours [the Ethics]. Let me urge you, I beg you, from the sincerity of your affection toward me, [10] not to mix into it anything which might seem to any extent to weaken the practice of Religious virtue, especially since this degenerate and dissolute age chases after nothing more avidly than doctrines whose consequences seem to support the vices running riot among us.
As for other matters, I won’t decline to receive copies of the Treatise [15] you mention. I should only like to ask this: that they be addressed, when the time comes, to a certain Dutch merchant living in London, who will make sure that they are passed on to me afterward. There’ll be no need to mention that you have sent me books of this kind. Provided they come safely into my possession, I have no doubt that it will be convenient for me [20] to distribute them from here to my friends, and to get a just price for them.
Farewell, and when you have time, reply to
Your Most Devoted,
Henry Oldenburg
London, 22 July 1675
TO THE MOST EXCELLENT AND ACUTE PHILOSOPHER, B. D. S. FROM G. H. SCHULLER
Most Noble and Excellent Sir,
I would blush for my long silence up to this point, for which I could be accused of not being grateful for the favor you, in Your Benevolence, have shown me (who did not deserve it), if I did not think that in Your noble kindness You are inclined to excuse rather than to accuse, and [10] if I did not know that that same kindness devotes itself, for the common Good of your Friends, to such serious meditations that it would be injurious and harmful to disturb them without a valid reason. That is why I have been silent, and was content in the meantime to learn from friends that You are in good health.
[15] But now I write to let you know that our most noble friend, Mr. von Tschirnhaus, who is still in England, enjoys the same good health, and that he has asked me three times, in his letters to me, to send his regards and respectful greetings to you. He has also asked me repeatedly to propose a solution to the following doubts, and at the same time to ask for the reply we desire.136
[20] [First,] would you please, Sir, convince us by some probative [IV/275a] demonstration,137 not by a reduction to impossibility, that We cannot know more attributes of God than thought and extension? Furthermore, does it follow from this that, in contrast to us, creatures consisting of those other attributes cannot conceive extension. In this way it would [5] seem that there must be as many worlds established as there are attributes of God?138 For example, our World of extension has, so to speak, a certain size.139 Would there also be Worlds of the same size, consisting of other attributes, in which, as we perceive nothing besides extension (except thought), the creatures of those Worlds would have to perceive [10] nothing but the attribute of their own World and thought?
Second, since God’s intellect differs from our intellect both in Essence and in existence,140 it will have nothing in common with our intellect, and therefore, by I P3, God’s intellect cannot be the cause of our intellect.
[15] Third, in P10S you say that nothing in Nature is clearer than that each Being must be conceived under some attribute (which I see very well), and that the more reality or Being it has, the more attributes belong to it. From this it would seem to follow that there are Beings which have three, four, etc., attributes. Nevertheless, one could infer [20] from what has been demonstrated that each Being consists of only two attributes, namely, of some definite attribute of God and the idea of that attribute.
[IV/276a] Fourth, I would like Examples of the things produced immediately by God, and those produced by the mediation of some infinite modification. Thought and extension seem to me to be of the first kind; of the second kind, in thought, Intellect, and in extension, Motion, etc.141
[5] These are the things our Tschirnhausen and I would like Your Excellence to clear up, if your time permits. For the rest he reports that Messrs. Boyle and Oldenburg had formed a strange conception of Your person. Not only has he disabused them of this conception, he [10] has also added reasons inducing them, not only to think most worthily and favorably again of your person, but also to value most highly the Theological-Political Treatise.142 In accordance with Your instructions,143 I did not dare to inform You of this. Be assured that I am at your service in every way, and that I remain,
Most Noble Sir,
Your very devoted servant,
G. H. Schuller
Amsterdam, 25 July 1675
Mr. van Gent144 sends you his greetings, as does J. Riew.
TO THE VERY LEARNED AND ABLE MR. G. H. SCHULLER FROM B. D. S.
Reply to the Preceding
Most Able Sir,
I rejoice that finally the opportunity has presented itself for you to cheer me with one of your letters, which are always so welcome. I beg you to do this frequently, etc.
[10] Now to the doubts. To the first I say that the human Mind can achieve knowledge only of the things which the idea of an actually existing body involves, or what can be inferred from this idea itself. For the power of each thing is defined solely by its essence (by E III P7). Furthermore, (by II P13) the essence of the Mind consists only [15] in this, that it is the idea of an actually existing Body. Therefore, the Mind’s power of understanding extends only to those things which this idea of the Body contains in itself, or which follow from it. But this idea of the Body neither involves nor expresses any other attributes of God than Extension and Thought. For (by II P6) its object, that is, [20] the Body, has God for a cause insofar as he is considered under the attribute of Extension, and not insofar as he is considered under any other attribute. So (by I A6) this idea of the Body involves knowledge of God only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of Extension.
Next, this idea, insofar as it is a mode of thinking, also (by the same [25] Proposition)145 has God for a cause insofar as he is a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is considered under another attribute. Therefore, (by the same Axiom) the idea of this idea involves the knowledge of God insofar as he is considered under Thought, but not insofar as he is considered under any other attribute.
It is evident, then, that the human Mind, or the idea of the human [IV/278] Body, neither involves nor expresses any other attributes of God besides these two. Moreover no other attribute of God (by I P10) can be inferred or conceived from these two attributes, or from their affections. So I conclude that the human Mind cannot achieve knowledge of any other [5] attribute of God beyond these, as I proposed.
But you ask, in addition, whether this must not establish as many worlds as there are attributes? See E II P7S. Moreover, this Proposition could be demonstrated more easily by reducing the thing to an absurdity. Indeed, I usually prefer that kind of demonstration when [10] the Proposition is negative, because it agrees better with the nature of such things.
But because you ask for a positive demonstration only, I pass to the second question, which is, whether one thing can be produced by another from which it differs, both in its essence and in its existence. For things which differ in this way from one another seem to have nothing in common. But since all singular things, except those produced [15] by their likes, differ from their causes, both in their essence and in their existence, I do not see any reason for doubt here.
Moreover, I believe I have already explained sufficiently in what sense I understand that God is the efficient cause both of the essence and of [20] the existence of things (in E I P25C&S). We form the axiom of I P10S from the idea we have of an absolutely infinite Being (as I indicated at the end of that Scholium), and not from the fact that there are, or could be, beings which have three, four, etc., attributes.
Finally, the examples [of infinite modes] which you ask for: examples [25] of the first kind [i.e., of things produced immediately by God] are, in Thought, absolutely infinite intellect, and in Extension, motion and rest; an example of the second kind [i.e., of those produced by the mediation of some infinite modification] is the face of the whole Universe, which,146 however much it may vary in infinite ways, nevertheless always remains the same. On this, see L7S before II P14 [II/101/25–102/18].
[30] With this, most excellent Sir, I believe I have replied to the objections you and our friend have raised. Nevertheless, if you think some ground for uneasiness still remains, I ask you not to hesitate to convey it to me, so that I may remove it too, if I can.
Farewell, etc.
The Hague, 29 July 1675
TO THE MOST ACUTE AND LEARNED PHILOSOPHER B. D. S. FROM EHRENFRIED WALTHER VON TSCHIRNHAUS
Most Illustrious Sir,
I ask you for a Demonstration of what you say: viz. that the soul cannot perceive more attributes of God than Extension and Thought. Indeed, though I see this evidently, still it seems to me that the contrary [10] can be deduced from E II P7S. Perhaps this is only because I don’t grasp the meaning of this Scholium properly. I’ve decided, therefore, to explain how I deduce these things, begging you urgently, Sir, to be willing to come to my aid with your accustomed kindness, wherever I don’t follow your meaning rightly.
Here’s how things stand. Although I gather from that [scholium] [15] that the world is certainly unique, still it’s no less clear also from that [scholium] that it is expressed in infinite ways, and therefore each singular thing is expressed in infinite ways. From this it seems to follow that the Modification which constitutes my Mind and the Modification which expresses my Body, although it’s one and the same Modification, [20] is nevertheless expressed in infinite ways, in one way through Thought, in another through Extension, in a third through an attribute of God unknown to me, and so on to infinity (since there are infinitely many Attributes of God, and the Order and Connection of the Modifications seems to be the same in all).
[25] From this, now, the Question arises why the Mind, which represents a certain Modification, a Modification expressed not only in Extension, but also in infinite other ways, why, I ask, does the Mind perceive only the Modification expressed through Extension, i.e., the human Body, and no other expression through other attributes?
[30] Time does not permit me to pursue these matters at greater length. Perhaps all these doubts will be removed by more frequent Meditations.
London, 12 August 1675
TO THE VERY NOBLE AND LEARNED MR. EHRENFRIED WALTHER VON TSCHIRNHAUS FROM B. D. S.
Reply to the Preceding
Most Noble Sir,
For the rest,147 to reply to your Objection, I say that although each thing is expressed in infinite ways [modes?] in the infinite intellect of God, nevertheless those infinite ideas by which it is expressed cannot [10] constitute one and the same Mind of a singular thing, but infinitely many [minds], since each of the infinite ideas has no connection with any other, as I’ve explained in the Scholium to E II P7, and as is evident from I P10. If you attend just a bit to these things, you’ll see that that [15] there is no remaining difficulty, etc.
The Hague, 18 August 1675
TO THE MOST LEARNED AND ACUTE MR. B. D. S. FROM ALBERT BURGH
Many Greetings
[1] When I was leaving my Country, I promised to write to you if anything worth mentioning happened on the trip.148 Since something of the greatest importance has happened, I’m discharging that obligation [25] by letting you know that by God’s Infinite Mercy I have been brought back into the Catholic Church, and made a member of it. How this [IV/281] happened you will be able to understand in more detail from what I’ve written to that Most Illustrious and Knowledgeable Mr. D. Kranen,149 Professor at Leiden. Now I’ll add a few words for your benefit.
[5] [2] The more I’ve previously admired the subtlety and acuteness of your intelligence, the more I now lament and weep for you. Though you’re a very intelligent man, and have received a mind endowed by God with excellent gifts, though you love and are eager for the truth, nevertheless you’ve let yourself be led astray and deceived by that [10] wretched and very proud Prince of wicked Spirits. What is your whole Philosophy but sheer illusion and a Fantasy? Yet you commit to it, not only your peace of mind in this life, but the eternal salvation of your soul.
See what a wretched foundation all your ideas rest on. You presume that you’ve finally discovered the true Philosophy. How do you know [15] that your Philosophy is the best of all those which have ever been taught in the world, are still taught, or will ever be taught in the future? Not to get into the discoveries of future ages, have you examined all the Philosophies, both ancient and modern, taught here, and in India, and [20] everywhere else on the planet? And even if you have examined them all properly, how do you know that you have chosen the best?
You will say: “My Philosophy agrees with right reason, and the others are contrary to it.” But all the other Philosophers—except for your disciples—disagree with you; with the same right, they proclaim [25] the same thing about themselves and their Philosophy as you do about yours. And they accuse you of falsity and error, as you do them. It’s evident, then, that to let the truth of your Philosophy shine forth, you must offer reasons which are not common to the other Philosophies, but can be applied only to yours—or else you must confess that your [30] Philosophy is as uncertain and trifling as all the others.
[3] But now, confining myself to your book (to which you have given that impious title),150 and mixing together your Philosophy with your Theology—since you yourself really mix them together (though with Devilish cunning you pretend that one is separate from the other and that they have different principles)—I proceed further.
[IV/282] [4] Perhaps you will say, then: “The others have not read Holy Scripture as often as I have, and I prove my opinions from Holy Scripture itself, the recognition of whose authority makes the difference between Christians and everyone else in the world.” But how? “I explain Holy [5] Scripture by applying the clear passages to the more obscure,151 and from that interpretation of mine I compose my Doctrines (or confirm those previously produced in my brain).”
But I beseech you to reflect seriously on what you’re saying. How do you know that you are making that application properly? and [how do you know] that that application, rightly made, is sufficient for the [10] interpretation of Holy Scripture? (and thus that you are establishing your interpretation of Holy Scripture well?) Especially when the Catholics say—and it’s quite true—that the whole Word of God has not been given to us in writings, and so that Holy Scripture can’t be explained from Holy Scripture alone—not by one man, but not even by the [15] Church itself, which is the only interpreter of Holy Scripture. For we must also consult the Apostolic Traditions. This is proved from Holy Scripture itself and the testimony of the Holy Fathers, and it is equally in agreement with right reason and experience. So, since that principle of yours is quite false, and leads to ruin, where will that leave your [20] whole teaching, which is built on, and depends on, this false foundation?
[5] If, then, you believe in Christ crucified,152 recognize that wicked heresy of yours, repent the perversion of your nature, and be reconciled with the Church. [6] For how else do you prove your heresies, but in [25] the way all Heretics who have ever left God’s Church, leave it even now, and ever will leave it in the future, have done, do, and will do? They all use the same principle you do—that is, Holy Scripture alone—to form and establish their teachings. [7] Don’t flatter yourself that perhaps the Calvinists (or the Reformed, as they’re called), the Lutherans, the [30] Mennonites, the Socinians, etc., cannot refute your Doctrine. For as I’ve already said, they’re all just as wretched as you are, and are sitting with you in the shadow of death.
[8] If you don’t believe in Christ, you’re more wretched than I can [IV/283] say. But the remedy is easy. Repent your sins, realize the fatal arrogance of your wretched and insane reasoning. You do not believe in Christ. Why? You will say: “because the Teaching and life of Christ do not agree at all with my principles, any more than the Teaching of Christians about Christ himself agrees with my Teaching.” But I say again: are you [5] then so bold that you think you are greater than all those who have ever risen up in the State or in God’s Church—than the Patriarchs, the Prophets, the Apostles, the Martyrs, the Doctors, the Confessors, and the Virgins, than innumerable Saints, indeed, blasphemously, than the Lord Jesus Christ himself. Do you alone surpass them in teaching, in [10] your way of living, and in everything? Will you, wretched little man, base little earthworm, indeed, ashes, food for worms, exult that you are better than the Incarnate, Infinite Wisdom of the Eternal Father? Do you alone reckon yourself wiser and greater than all those who have ever been in God’s Church since the beginning of the world, and [15] who have believed, or even now believe, that Christ will come or has already come? On what foundation does this rash, insane, deplorable, and accursed arrogance of yours rest?
[9] You deny that Christ, the son of the living God, the Word of the eternal wisdom of the Father, was made manifest in the flesh, suffered [20] for mankind, and was crucified. Why? Because all that does not agree with your principles. But beyond what has already been proven—that you do not have true principles, but false, rash, absurd principles—I now say further that even if you depended on true principles and built everything on them, you still could not explain everything in the [25] world, what has happened or is happening. Nor can you boldly assert that when something seems to be contrary to those principles, it is for that reason really impossible or false. For there are a great many things—indeed, countless things—which, even if something certain can be known in natural things, you will nevertheless not be able to explain [30] at all. You will not even be able to remove the manifest contradiction between such Phenomena and your explanations of the other things, which you take to be most certain. From your principles you will not explain completely any of the things brought about in witchcraft and enchantments by the mere pronunciation of certain words, or by simply carrying the words or signs, written on some material, or the astonishing [IV/284] Phenomena of those possessed by Demons.153 I personally have seen various examples of all of these, and I know reports of countless such phenomena, very certain testimony from a great many highly credible persons, speaking with one voice.
[5] What will you be able to judge about the essences of all things, even if it is granted that some of the ideas you have in mind agree adequately with the essences of the things whose ideas they are? For you can never be confident about whether the ideas of all created things are possessed in the human mind naturally, or whether many, if not all, [10] can be, and really are, produced in it by external objects and even by the suggestion of good or evil spirits, and an evident Divine revelation. How will you be able from your principles, therefore, without consulting the testimonies of other men, and the experience of things (to say nothing of subjecting your judgment to God’s omnipotence), to define [15] precisely and establish for certain the actual existence or non-existence of the following things, the possibility or impossibility of their existing (that is, whether they actually exist or not, or can or cannot exist in nature): a divining rod for detecting metals and subterranean waters; the [20] stone the Alchemists seek; the power of words and symbols; the apparitions of various kinds of spirits, both good and evil, and their powers, knowledge and activities; the reappearance of plants and flowers in glass flasks after they have been burned; Syrens; the gnomes which, men say, [25] frequently show themselves in mines; the Antipathies and Sympathies of a great many things; the Impenetrability of the human body, etc.?
No, my Philosopher, you could not determine anything at all about these things, even if your native intelligence were a thousand times more subtle and acute than it is. And if you trust your own unaided intellect in judging these and similar matters, certainly you are already [30] thinking in the same way about things which are unknown to you, or which you have not experienced, and which you therefore consider impossible, although they really ought to seem to you only uncertain until you have been convinced by the testimony of a great many credible witnesses.
Julius Caesar, I imagine, would have judged the same way, if someone had said to him that a powder can be made, and will become common [IV/285] in later ages, whose power is so great that it makes castles, whole cities, and even mountains themselves, fly up into the air, and that immediately after being ignited, whatever place it is closed up in, it expands in a wonderful way, and breaks up everything which impedes its action. [5] For Julius Caesar would not have believed this at all, but would have mocked this man with hearty laughter, as wanting to persuade him of a thing contrary to his judgement and experience, and to the sum total of military science.
[10] But let’s get back on track. Wretched man, puffed up with Diabolic pride, if you’re not familiar with the things mentioned above, and [10] cannot decide about them, what rash judgments will you make about the awe-inspiring Mysteries of the life and Passion of Christ, which the very Catholics who teach them warn are incomprehensible? What trifling, useless raving will you babble about the countless Miracles and signs which after Christ[’s Ascension]154 his Apostles and Disciples, and [15] subsequently several thousands of the Saints, made known in testimony to, and confirmation of, the truth of the Catholic Faith, and which, through the omnipotent virtue of God, and through the same omnipotent Mercy and Goodness of God, happen even in our days, without number, throughout the whole earth? And if you cannot contradict [20] these things, as you certainly cannot, why continue to cry out against it? Give in, repent your errors and sins, clothe yourself in humility, and be born again.
[11] But I should like to get down to the truth of what has happened, which is really the foundation of the Christian Religion. How [25] will you dare to deny, if you consider it properly, the power of the consensus of so many tens of thousands of men—of whom several thousand far surpassed, and surpass, you in learning, in refinement, in true, precise solidity, and in perfection of life—who all, unanimously and with one voice, affirm that Christ, the Son incarnate of the living [30] God, suffered, was crucified, and died for the sins of the human race, that he was resurrected, transfigured, and reigns in the heavens, God with the eternal Father, in unity with the Holy Spirit, and the rest of the things which belong to this, the countless miracles which have been done in God’s Church by the same Lord Jesus, and afterward, in his name, by the Apostles and the rest of the Saints, by the Divine power and Omnipotence, miracles which not only surpass men’s grasp, [IV/286] but also contradict common sense? Countless material indications and visible signs of these miracles remain to this day, spread far and wide across the globe, and [these miracles] are still being done.
Would I not be permitted, in the same way,155 to deny that the ancient [5] Romans ever existed, and that the Emperor Julius Caesar, after he crushed the Freedom of the Republic, changed their government into a Monarchy? Of course, I would have to ignore the great number of monuments of the Roman power, visible to everyone, which time has left us, and the testimony of all those weighty authors who have written [10] Histories of the Roman Republic and Monarchy, which relate a great many particular things about Julius Caesar. And I would have to ignore the judgment of so many thousands of men who either have seen these monuments themselves or have put their trust in them, and still put their trust in them (since they are said to exist by countless witnesses), as they did and do put their trust in the histories mentioned.
[15] On this foundation, namely, that last night I dreamt that the monuments remaining from the Romans are not real things, but mere illusions, and similarly, that what is said about the Romans is like what the books they call “Romances” childishly relate about Amadis de Gaul [20] and similar Heroes, and that Julius Caesar either never existed, or if he existed, was a Melancholic man who did not really crush the Freedom of the Romans, or set himself up on an Imperial Throne, but was induced to believe he had accomplished these great deeds, either by his own foolish imagination or by the persuasion of friends flattering him.
[25] In the same way, in short, could I not deny that the kingdom of China was occupied by the Tartars, or that Constantinople is the seat of the Turkish Empire, and countless similar things? But if I denied these things, would anyone think I was in possession of my faculties? Would they excuse my deplorable madness? All these things rest on [30] the common agreement of several thousand men, and for that reason their certainty is quite evident. It’s impossible that everyone who asserts such things (and a great many other things) would either have deceived themselves, or have wanted to deceive others, through the succession of so many centuries, indeed, in a great many things, from the first years of the world to the present day.
[12] Consider, second, that from the beginning of the world to this [IV/287] day, God’s Church has been spread without interruption, and continues unchanged and solid, whereas all the other Religions, whether Pagan or Heretical, have at least had a beginning afterward, if they have not also come to an end already. The same must also be said about the [5] Monarchs of kingdoms and the opinions of any Philosophers.
[13] Consider, third, that through the coming of Christ in the flesh God’s Church was transformed from the worship of the Old Testament to that of the New, founded by Christ himself, the Son of the living God, and spread after that by the Apostles and their Disciples and [10] successors. As the world judged them, these were unlearned men, who nevertheless confounded all the Philosophers, even though they taught the Christian Doctrine, which is contrary to common sense,156 and exceeds and transcends all human reasoning. They were, in the judgment of the world, undistinguished men, base and ignoble, who received [15] no aid from the power of Kings and earthly Princes, but who, on the contrary, were persecuted by them with every kind of tribulation, and suffered all the other misfortunes of the world. The more those Supremely Powerful Roman Emperors strove to hamper their work, and indeed, to crush it, killing as many Christians as they could, with [20] every kind of martyrdom, the more it increased.
Consider that in this way Christ’s Church spread throughout the world in a short period of time, and that finally, the Roman Emperor himself having been converted to the Christian faith, along with the Kings and Princes of Europe, the Church Hierarchy increased its power to such an extent that today we find it wonderful. Consider that all [25] this was brought about through love, gentleness, patience, trust in God, and all the other Christian virtues (not by the din of warfare, the force of large armies, and the devastation of territories, as worldly Princes extend their boundaries), so that even the gates of Hell will not prevail against the Church, as Christ promised it.157
[30] Weigh also here the terrible and unspeakably severe punishment by which the Jews were forced down to the utmost degree of wretchedness and disaster, because they were the authors of Christ’s crucifixion.158 Read, think about, and then think again about, the Histories of all times. You will not find there that anything similar has happened to any other Society, not even in dreams.
[IV/288] [14] Notice, fourth, the properties included in the essence of the Catholic Church, which are really inseparable from that Church: namely,
[i] Antiquity, by which, since it took the place of the Jewish Religion, which at that time was the true [Religion],159 it counts its beginning [5] from the time of Christ, sixteen and a half centuries ago, throughout which period it reckons an uninterrupted succession of its Pastors, and by which it alone possesses Divine, pure and uncorrupted Sacred Books, together with a tradition of God’s unwritten Word, equally certain and unstained;
[ii] Immutability, by which its Doctrine and the administration of the [10] Sacraments, as established by Christ himself and the Apostles, are preserved inviolate, and in their force, as is appropriate;
[iii] Infallibility, by which it determines and decides everything pertaining to the faith with the utmost authority, security and truth, according to the 'power bestowed on it by Christ for this end, and according to the [15] direction of the Holy Spirit, whose Bride the Church is.
[iv] Unreformability, since it cannot be corrupted or deceived, and cannot deceive, it is evident that it never needs reform;
[v] Unity, by which all its members believe the same thing, teach the same thing regarding faith, have one and the same altar and all the Sacraments in common, and finally, work together toward one and the [20] same end, obeying one another;
[vi] That no soul is Separable from it, under any pretext whatever, without at once incurring eternal damnation, unless before death it has been reunited with it through repentance—from this it is evident that all heresies have departed from it, whereas it always remains the same as [25] itself, constant, steadfast, and stable, as built on a Rock;
[vii] Its Tremendous Extent, by which it visibly spreads itself throughout the whole world; which cannot be asserted of any other Society, Schismatic, or Heretic, or Pagan, or of any other Political Regime or Philosophical Doctrine, since none of the cited properties of the Catholic Church [30] pertains, or can pertain, to any other Society; and finally,
[viii] Perpetuity to the end of the world, which the Way, the Truth and the Life himself has made sure, and which the experience of all the properties mentioned, promised and given to it likewise by Christ himself, through the Holy Spirit, also manifestly demonstrates.
[IV/289] Consider, fifth, that the admirable order by which the Church, such an immense body, is directed and governed indicates plainly that it depends very particularly on God’s Providence and that its administration is arranged, protected and directed amazingly by the Holy Spirit, as the harmony which is seen in all the things in this universe indicates the [5] Omnipotence, Wisdom and Infinite Providence which has created all things, and preserves them even now. For in no other society is such an excellent and strict order preserved without interruption.
Sixth, reflect on the following:
[10] [i] that countless Catholics of each sex, many of whom are still alive today (I myself have seen and known some of them), have lived wonderful and most holy lives;
[ii] that they have also performed many miracles, through the power of an omnipotent God, in the revered name of Jesus Christ;
[iii] that sudden conversions of a great many people, from a very bad life [15] to a better, truly Christian and holy life, still occur daily;
[iv] that in general the holier and more perfect Catholics are, the humbler they are, the more they consider themselves unworthy, and the more they yield to others the praise of a Holier life; and
[v] that even the greatest sinners nevertheless always retain a proper respect for Sacred Things, confess their own wickedness, accuse their [20] own vices and imperfections, and want to be freed from them, and so to be improved.
It can be said, then, that the most perfect Heretic or Philosopher who ever lived hardly deserves to be compared with the most imperfect Catholics. From this it is also clear, and follows most evidently, that Catholic Teaching is the wisest, and wonderful in its profundity—in [25] a word, that it surpasses all the other Teachings in the world, since it makes people better than those of any other Society, teaches them the secure path to peace of mind in this life, and delivers the eternal salvation of the soul to be achieved after this.
[30] Seventh, reflect seriously on the public confession of many Heretics hardened by obstinacy, and of the most serious Philosophers, that after they received the Catholic faith, they saw at last, and knew that previously they had been wretched, blind, ignorant, indeed, foolish and mad, when, swollen with pride and puffed up with arrogance, they falsely [IV/290] persuaded themselves that they were elevated far above the rest in doctrine, learning, and perfection of life. Some of these afterward led a most holy life and left behind the memory of countless miracles. Some faced up to martyrdom cheerfully and with the greatest rejoicing. Some [5] also (among them St. Augustine) became the subtlest, deepest, wisest and therefore, most useful Doctors of the Church, indeed, its pillars.
Finally, reflect on how wretched and restless the life of Atheists is. Sometimes they manifest great cheerfulness and try to seem to be [10] leading a pleasant life, with the greatest internal peace of mind. But see what unfortunate and horrible deaths they experience. I myself have seen several examples of this, and I know, both from the accounts of others, and from History, a great many other, indeed, countless examples. [15] Learn from the example of these men to be wise in time.
In this way, then, you see, or at least I hope you see, how rashly you are committing yourself to the opinions of your brain. For if Christ is the true God, and is at the same time man, as is most certain, see what you are reduced to. If you persevere in your abominable errors [20] and most grievous sins, what else can you expect but eternal damnation? Think about how horrible that is. Think how little reason you have to mock the whole world (your wretched disciples excepted)! How foolishly proud you are, puffed up with the thought of the excellence of your intellect and with wonder at your very vain, and indeed, quite [25] false and impious teaching! How shamefully you make yourself more wretched than the beasts themselves, by denying yourself freedom of the will! Nevertheless, if you do not really experience or recognize this freedom, how can you deceive yourself by thinking that you are worthy of the greatest praise, and indeed, of the most exact imitation?
[30] If you don’t want God or your Neighbor to have mercy on you—far be it from me to think this—may you yourself at least have mercy on your wretchedness, by which you may strive to make yourself more wretched than you are now, or less wretched than if you had continued in this way.
Repent, Philosophic man. Recognize that your foolishness is wise and your wisdom mad. From a proud man, become humble, and you [IV/291] will be healed. Worship Christ in the most holy Trinity, so that he may deign to have mercy on your wretchedness, and receive you. Read the Holy Fathers and the Doctors of the Church, and let them instruct you concerning what you ought to do, that you may not perish, but may have eternal life. Consult Catholic men who have been deeply [5] instructed in their faith, and are living a good life, and they will tell you many things you never knew, by which you will be astounded.
I have indeed written this Letter to you with a truly Christian intention: first, that you may know the love I have for you, even though you are a Pagan; and second, that I may call upon you not to persist [10] in corrupting others too.
I conclude with this: God wants to rescue your soul from eternal damnation, provided you are willing. Don’t hesitate to obey the Lord, who has called you so often through others, and now calls you again, perhaps for the last time, through me. Having attained this grace by [15] the inexpressible Mercy of God himself, I pray wholeheartedly that you will attain the same grace. Do not refuse. If you do not listen to God now, when he is calling you, the wrath of the Lord himself will be inflamed against you. There is a danger that you will be left behind by his Infinite Mercy and become a wretched victim of the Divine Justice, which consumes all things in its wrath. May the Omnipotent [20] God avert this, for the greater glory of his Name and the Salvation of your soul, and as an example to be followed, bringing salvation to the many unfortunate people you have led into Idolatry, through the Lord, our Savior, Jesus Christ, who with the Eternal Father lives and reigns in unity with the Holy Spirit, God through all ages of ages. Amen.
Florence, 11 September 1675
LETTER FROM NICHOLAS STENO TO THE REFORMER OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHY CONCERNING THE TRUE PHILOSOPHY
[5] [1] In the Book they say you have authored—which I myself also suspect, for various reasons, that you have authored—I notice that you bring everything back to the public security,161 or rather, to your security, which, according to you, is the goal of public security. But you have embraced means contrary to the security you desire, and you have neglected completely that part of you whose security ought uniquely to be desired.
[10] That you have chosen means contrary to the security you desire is evident from the fact that while you seek the public peace, you are throwing everything into confusion, and that while you strive to deliver yourself from all dangers, you are exposing yourself, quite unnecessarily, to the greatest danger. You have neglected completely that part of yourself which you ought especially to be anxious about, as is established [15] by the fact that you permit everyone to think and say whatever they like about God, provided what they say does not destroy the obedience which, according to you, ought to be given, not so much to God, as to man. This is the same as restricting every human good to the goods of a civil order, that is, to the goods of the body.162 You don’t help yourself by saying that you reserve the care of the soul for philosophy: your [20] philosophy treats the soul by a system formed from suppositions and you leave those unsuited to your philosophy in a condition of life like that of automata, devoid of a soul, and born only for the body.
[2] I see a man wandering in this darkness who was once a close friend [25] of mine, and who even now, I hope, is not an enemy. I am convinced that the memory of our former companionship preserves even now a mutual love. And I remember that I too was once stuck in very serious errors, even if not exactly the same ones. So the more the magnitude of the danger from which I have been liberated makes evident God’s [30] mercy to me, the greater the compassion with which I am moved to pray that you receive the same heavenly grace I have attained, by no [IV/293] merit of my own, but only by Christ’s kindness.
To add deeds to my prayers, I offer myself to you as most ready to examine with you all the arguments it may seem suitable to examine, to discover and maintain the true way to true security. Although [5] your writings show you to be very far from the truth, still, the love of peace and of the truth I have seen in you in the past, which is not yet quenched in this darkness, makes me hope that you will lend a receptive ear to our Church, if only it has been adequately explained to you what it promises everyone, and what it offers those willing to approach.
[10] [3] As for the first, the Church promises everyone true security, eternal security, or the enduring peace which accompanies infallible truth. At the same time it offers the necessary means for attaining such a great good: first, a certain pardon for evil actions; second, a most perfect standard for acting rightly; third, the true, effective perfection [15] of all activities according to this standard. It offers these things, not only to the learned, or to those endowed with a refined intelligence, and not occupied with a variety of affairs, but indiscriminately, to all people, of whatever age, sex or condition.
Lest this astonish you, know that those who approach are required, not just not to resist, but even to cooperate (though this cooperation [20] happens by his acting within, who proclaims his external word through the visible members of the Church). Though he says to anyone who approaches that he must grieve for his sins before the eyes of God, that he must show before the eyes of men works appropriate to this grief, and that he must believe such and such things concerning God, the soul, and the body, etc., nevertheless, his meaning here is not that [25] one who approaches would have to advance toward these things by his own forces. For nothing else is required, for doing and believing such things, than not to deny assent and cooperation. This alone is in his 'power, since willing those things, and when you will them, doing them, depend on the spirit of Christ, anticipating, accompanying, and perfecting our cooperation.
[30] If you have not yet understood this, I am not surprised. I will not in any way attempt to make you understand. It is not in my power to do that. But so that these things may not seem to you completely foreign to reason, I shall outline briefly the form of a Christian government, insofar as this can be done by a new resident of that state, or rather, by a stranger who still waits on its lowest benches. The [35] goal of this government is that all men should direct, not only all their external actions, but also their most secret thoughts according [IV/294] to the order established by the author of the universe, or what is the same, that in every work the soul sees God as its author and judge. In respect to this the life of each man infected with sins is divided into four stages.
[5] The first is that in which man acts in all things as if his thoughts were not subject to any judge. This is the condition of men who either have not yet been purified by baptism or have become hardened in sin after baptism. This stage is sometimes called blindness, because the soul has no concern for God’s seeing her—as is said in Wisdom 2: “Their wickedness has blinded them.”163—and sometimes death, because the soul [10] lies as if buried under passing pleasures, in which sense Christ said “Let the dead bury their dead,”164 and many other things of that kind. It is not contrary to this condition that they say many things (often true things) about God and the soul, but because they treat [God and the soul] as if they were distant or external objects, what they say about them is always doubtful, and often contradictory. [This condition results in] frequent [15] vices, if not in external acts, at least in thoughts. This is because the soul, like the dead, is destitute of a spirit to give life to her actions, and is moved by every puff of desire.
The second stage is when a man, not resisting either the external or the internal word of God, begins to be mindful of him who is calling, when he recognizes, by the beam of this supernatural light, that there [20] are many things false in his opinions and vicious in his actions, and commits himself totally to God, who, administering his Sacraments to him through his servants, grants him invisible grace by visible signs. This stage of those who are reborn is called infancy and childhood, and the word of God which is preached to them is compared to milk.
The third stage is reached when, by conquering concupiscence through [25] continuous exercise of the virtues, the soul is prepared to properly understand the mysteries hidden in sacred scripture, which she will not grasp until, already pure in heart, she has reached the fourth stage.
Then she [in the fourth stage] begins to see God and acquires the wisdom of the perfect. Here there is a perpetual, and sometimes also [30] mystical, union of the will. There are examples of this among us even today.
[4] Thus the whole program of Christianity strives for this: that the soul may be transformed from a state of death to one of life, that whereas before she had the mind’s eyes turned away from God, and fixed on error, now she always directs them away from every error, and has them turned toward God in everything, both the actions of body and those of the mind, willing and rejecting the same things [IV/295] her author, and the author of all order, has willed or rejected. So if you examine everything properly, you will find in Christianity alone the true philosophy, teaching things about God which are worthy of God, and about man which are in agreement with man, and leading its worshippers to the true perfection of all actions.
[5] [5] As for the second point, only the Catholic Church gives whatever it promises to those who do not resist it, for only the Catholic Church, in every age, has produced perfect examples of the virtues, and even today prepares for posterity’s veneration examples from people of every age, sex, and condition. You cannot legitimately doubt the trustworthiness with which it promises eternal security, if it provides, with utmost [10] fidelity, all the means ordained for this end, including miracles. I have not yet completed my fourth year in the Church, and already I have seen such examples of holiness that I am truly compelled to exclaim with David: “Your testimonies are most credible.”165
I say nothing about the Bishops, I say nothing about the Priests. The words I have heard in intimate conversation with them were human [15] signs of the divine spirit, as I would witness with my own blood, such are their innocence of life and power of speaking. Nor shall I name the many who have embraced the strictest rule of life,166 of whom I might affirm the same thing. I shall cite only examples of two kinds: people converted from the worst sort of life to the most holy; and laymen, as [20] you call them,167 who nevertheless acquired sublime notions of God, without any study, at the feet of the crucified one. Of this kind I have known both men and women, employed in mechanical trades or bound to menial service, who by the practice of divine virtues were brought to understand wonderful things about God and the soul, people whose [25] lives were holy, whose words were Divine, and whose actions were not infrequently168 miraculous, such as the prediction of future events, and other things which, for the sake of brevity, I do not mention.
I know what objections you can make to miracles. But we do not have faith in miracles alone.169 Whenever we see that the effect of a miracle is the perfect conversion of someone’s soul from vices to virtues, [30] we rightly ascribe that to the author of all virtues. For of all miracles I consider this the very greatest: that someone who has passed thirty or forty years or more giving complete license to their desires, in a moment of time should have turned against all wickedness, and become the holiest example of the virtues. I have seen this with my own eyes, and with these hands embraced it. Frequently they moved me and others to tears of joy. There is no God like our God.170
[IV/296] Indeed, if you reflect on the history of past times, and on the present condition of the Church, not [as it is represented] in the books of our opponents, nor by those among us who are either dead, or at least have not yet laid aside infancy, but, as is normally done in learning [5] every other teaching, from those who are considered true Catholics according to the profession of our own people, you will see that it has always stood by its promises and still does, every day. There you will find that evidence of credibility which will satisfy you, especially since you make a far milder judgment about the Roman Pontiff than the rest of our opponents171 and admit the necessity of good works. But I beseech [10] you to examine our doctrines in our writings, which your own teaching concerning the strength of prejudices will easily persuade you to do.
I would gladly have cited the passages of Scripture attributing authority to the Pontiff, which you yourself deny only because you do not find it in Scriptures and do not admit that the Christian Republic is like the [15] Republic of the Jews. But because your view about the interpretation of Scripture is different from our teaching, which admits only the interpretation of the Church, I pass over that argument at this time, and I say to the second argument that Christian government, which seeks only a unity of the Faith, of the Sacraments and of loving-kindness, admits [20] only one head, whose authority does not consist in making arbitrary innovations in whatever matter he pleases—that’s the slander of our opponents—but in this, that matters of divine law or things which are necessary should always remain unchanged, whereas matters of human law or things which are indifferent may change, as the Church shall, for just causes, have judged useful—for example, if it should see that [25] wicked men are misusing indifferent things to subvert those which are necessary. Hence in interpreting Holy Scripture, and in determining the doctrines of the Faith, it acts to preserve the doctrines and interpretations delivered by God through the Apostles, and to prohibit new and human doctrines and interpretations. I shall not speak about the other matters subject to his authority, since the unity of belief and action so [30] often enjoined by Christ should suffice to make you find monarchic government worthy of acceptance.
[7] Surely, therefore, if you are led by love of virtue, and if you delight in the perfection of actions, you must inquire diligently into all the societies in the world. Nowhere else will you find the pursuit of perfection undertaken with such fervor, and brought to a conclusion so fruitfully, as it is among us. This argument by itself can be like a demonstration to you that truly “this is the finger of God.”172
[IV/297] [8] But so that you may recognize this more easily, first penetrate deeply into yourself and search your soul. If you examine everything properly, you will find it to be dead. You live among matter in motion as if the moving cause were absent or were nothing. For it is a religion [5] of bodies, not of souls, which you introduce. In the love of neighbor you provide for the actions necessary for preserving the individual and propagating the species, but have very little, or hardly any, concern for the actions by which we acquire knowledge and love of our author. But you believe that everyone is dead with you, you who deny the light of grace to everyone, because you yourself have not experienced [10] it. Ignorant of the certainty of faith surpassing all demonstrations, you think the only certainty is demonstrative. But is that very certainty of yours, which is confined within such narrow limits, demonstrative? Examine all your demonstrations, I beseech you, and bring me even one concerning the way thinking and being extended are united, by which the moving principle is united with the body which is moved.
[15] But why do I seek demonstrations about these matters from you? You cannot even explain how things probably happen. Without suppositions you cannot explain the sensations of pleasure or pain, or the motion of love or hate. The whole Philosophy of Descartes, however diligently you have examined and reformed it, cannot explain to me [20] even this one single phenomenon, namely, how the impact of matter on matter is perceived by the soul united to the matter.
But what other notion of matter itself do you give173 us, I ask, beyond what you derive from a mathematical examination of quantity concerning shapes, not yet proven to consist of any kind of particles (except [25] hypothetically)? But what is more contrary to reason than to deny the divine words of him whose divine works lie open to the senses, because they are contrary to human demonstrations made by hypotheses? And [what is more contrary to reason], although you [new philosophers] do not even understand that state of the body by whose mediation the mind perceives corporeal objects, than to nevertheless make a judgment about [30] the state of that which, when glorified by the change from corruptible to incorruptible, is to be united again with the soul?
Of course, I am quite convinced that [what you call] discovering new principles for explaining the nature of God, of the soul, and of body, is just inventing fictitious principles. For reason at any rate teaches that it is contrary to divine providence that the true principles concerning those things should have been concealed from the holiest men for so many thousands of years, to be uncovered first in this century by men [IV/298] who have not even achieved perfection in the moral virtues. I would believe rather that those principles about God, the soul, and the body are true which have always been preserved from the beginning of created things to this day in one and the same society, the city of God. [5] That old man who convinced St. Justin174 to pass over from a worldly Philosophy to the Christian Philosophy says of the first teachers of those principles that they were
the more ancient Philosophers, blessed, Just, precious to God, who spoke under the inspiration of the Divine Spirit, and who prophesied that those things would happen which are now happening.175
I would believe rather that the Principles proposed by such Philosophers—transmitted [10] to us by successors like them, in an uninterrupted succession, and by philosophers of the same kind even today—principles easily accessible by one who seeks them by right reason—are the only true principles, where the holiness of the life demonstrates the truth of the doctrine.
Examine thoroughly the principles and doctrines of this Philosophy, not among its enemies, not among those of its followers whom either [15] wickedness has united with the dead, or ignorance with children, but among those of its teachers who are perfect in all wisdom, precious to God, and probably already participants in eternal life. Then you will recognize that the perfect Christian is the perfect philosopher, even if that person is only a little old woman, or a serving girl busy with menial chores, or someone scratching out a living by washing rags, a layman [20] in the eyes of the world. And at the same time you will exclaim with St. Justin: “this one Philosophy I find to be both sure and useful.”176
[9] If you wish, I will gladly take upon myself the task of showing you how the points in which your teachings depart from ours are partly inconsistent, and partly uncertain, although I might wish that as soon [25] as you have recognized one or two errors in your doctrines, compared with the evident credibility in ours, you would make yourself a pupil of the teachers I have mentioned and that among the first fruits of your repentance you would offer God a refutation of your errors which you yourself have recognized by the illumination of the Divine light, so that if your first Writings have turned a thousand souls from the [30] true knowledge of God, your recantation of them, confirmed by your own example, will bring a thousand thousands back to him with you, like a second St. Augustine.177 With all my heart I pray for this grace for you. Farewell.
[Florence 1675]
TO THE MOST NOBLE AND LEARNED MR. HENRY OLDENBURG FROM B. D. S.
Reply to Letter 62
Most Noble and Distinguished Sir,
Just as I received your letter of 22 July, I set out for Amsterdam, intending to commit to the press the book I wrote to you about. While I was dealing with this, a rumor was spread everywhere that a certain book of [10] mine about God was in the press, and that in it I tried to show that there is no God. Many people, indeed, accepted this rumor. As a result certain Theologians, perhaps the authors of the rumor, took the opportunity to complain about me to the Prince [of Orange] and the Magistrates. Moreover, the stupid Cartesians,178 because they are believed to favor me, [15] try to remove that suspicion from themselves by constantly denouncing my opinions and writings everywhere. Even now they’re still at it.
Since I had learned these things from certain Men worthy of trust, who at the same time said that the Theologians were setting traps for me everywhere, I decided to put off the publication I was planning, [20] until I saw how the matter would turn out. And I resolved to let you know what plan I would then pursue. But every day the matter seems to get worse, and I don’t know what I should do.
In the meantime I did not want to delay any longer my reply to your letter. First, thank you very much for your most friendly warning. [25] Nevertheless, I’d like a fuller explanation of it, so that I may know what doctrines you believe might seem to undermine the practice of religious virtue. For I believe that the doctrines which seem to me to agree with reason are also most conducive to virtue. Next, if it’s not too much trouble, I’d like you to let me know the passages in the Theological-Political Treatise which have caused learned men to have misgivings. For [30] I want to make that Treatise clearer with certain notes,179 and to remove the prejudices conceived about it, if possible. Farewell.
[The Hague, September/October 1675]180
TO THE MOST LEARNED MR. LAMBERT VAN VELTHUYSEN FROM B. D. S.
Most excellent and distinguished Sir,
I’m surprised that our friend Nieuwstad181 said that I’m considering a refutation of those writings which for some time have been published against my treatise, and that among other things, I’m planning to refute your manuscript.182 I know I never had in mind [10] rebutting any of my opponents,183 so unworthy did I find all those to whom I would respond. And I don’t remember saying anything to Mr. Nieuwstad except that I planned to clarify some more obscure passages in that treatise with notes, and to attach your manuscript to them, together with my reply, if I could do so with your permission [15] (which I asked him to get from you). I added that if by any chance you were unwilling to give us permission because I said some things too harshly in my reply, you would have complete discretion to correct or delete them.
In the meantime, I’m not at all angry at Mr. Nieuwstad. Still, I did want to let you know how the matter stands, so that if I couldn’t [20] obtain the permission I seek, I would at least show that I didn’t want to publish your manuscript against your will. And though I believe it can be done without any danger to your reputation, provided that your name is not attached to it, nevertheless, I won’t do anything unless you give me leave to publish it.
But to confess the truth, you would do something much more [25] pleasing to me, if you were willing to write down those arguments by which you think you can combat my treatise, and add them to your manuscript. I beg you, most earnestly, to do this. For there is no one whose arguments I would be more pleased to weigh carefully. I know that you are possessed only by a zeal for the truth, [30] and I know the singular integrity of your heart. I beg you again not to hesitate to undertake this task, and to believe me to be,
Your most respectful,
B. de Spinoza
[IV/301] Mr. Lambert [van] Velthuysen
Dr. of Medicine
Living on the new canal
In Utrecht
[The Hague, Autumn 1675]
TO THE MOST EXCELLENT AND ACUTE PHILOSOPHER B. D. S. FROM G. H. SCHULLER, M.D.
Most Learned and Excellent Sir, Most cherished Patron,
I hope that my last letter, together with the Experiment184 of the Anonymous author, has been properly delivered to you, and at the same time that You are still well, as I am.
[15] For three months I had no letter from Our Tschirnhaus. From that I had formed the sad conjecture that some calamity had happened to him on his trip from England to France. But now I rejoice to say that I have received a letter from him, which, according to his request, I must share with you, Sir.
I am to convey to you, together with his most solicitous greetings, [20] that He has arrived safely in Paris, and that he has met Mr. Huygens there, as we had advised him to. So he has accommodated himself to Huygens’ mentality in every way, with the result that Huygens thinks very well of him. He mentioned that you, Sir, had recommended that he make Huygens’ acquaintance, and that you value his [25] person greatly. This pleased Huygens very much; he replied that he likewise values your person greatly, and that recently he received the Theological-Political Treatise from you, which many people there think very well of. They ask eagerly whether other Writings by the same [IV/302] Author have been published. To this Mr. Tschirnhaus has replied that he knew of none except the Demonstration of the First and Second Part of Descartes’ “Principles.” Otherwise, he reported nothing concerning you apart from the remarks already mentioned. He hopes that this will not be unwelcome to you.185
[5] Recently Huygens called our Tschirnhaus to him, and told him that M. Colbert186 wanted someone to instruct his son in Mathematics. If a position of this kind would please him, Huygens would arrange it. Tschirnhaus replied by seeking some delay, but in the end said he was available. Huygens replied, therefore, that that proposition pleased M. [10] Colbert very greatly, especially since, not knowing French, Tschirnhaus will have to speak to his son in Latin.
Regarding the objection [Tschirnhaus] recently made [in Letter 65, IV/279/14–29], he replies that the few words I wrote at your request [in Letter 66] have revealed your meaning to him more deeply, and that he had already entertained the same thoughts (since [your words [15] in the Ethics] chiefly admit of explanation in these two ways). But the two following considerations led him to pursue the train of thought contained in the objection recently made. [i] First, otherwise P5 and P7 of Book II seem to him to be inconsistent.
In [P5] it is maintained that the Objects [Ideata]187 are the efficient cause of ideas,188 which nevertheless seems to be refuted by the demonstration of [P7], [20] because it cites I A4—perhaps (as I rather think)189 I am not making a proper application of this axiom, according to the Author’s intention. I would, of course, be very glad to learn from him what his meaning is, if his affairs allow.
[ii] The second reason which prevented me from following the explanation given was that in this way the Attribute of thought is held to extend [25] itself much more widely than the other attributes. But since each of the attributes constitutes the Essence of God, I certainly do not see how the one is not contrary to the other.
In any case, let me add this: if I may judge other Understandings from my own, P7 and P8 of Bk. II will be very difficult to understand, simply [30] because it has pleased the Author (to whom they no doubt seemed so evident) to provide them with such short demonstrations and not to explain them at greater length.
Tschirnhaus reports, moreover, that in Paris he has met a remarkably learned Man, named Leibniz, who is very capable in the various Sciences, and also free of the common prejudices of Theology. He has [IV/303] entered into a close friendship with him, the basis for which is that he, like Tschirnhaus, works continually on the perfection of the intellect, indeed that he values nothing more highly than this, or thinks nothing more useful. In Morals, Tschirnhaus says, he is most well-versed, and [5] he speaks without any influence of the affects, simply from the dictate of reason. In Physics, and especially in Metaphysical studies concerning God and the Soul, he continues, he is most expert.
In the end he concludes that Leibniz is most worthy of having your Writings communicated to him, Sir, if you first give your permission. He believes that great advantage will come to the Author from this, as he [10] promises to show fully, if it would please you, Sir. But if not, don’t worry that he will not conceal them, honorably, in accordance with the promise he made. So far he has not even made the least mention of them.190
This same Leibniz thinks very well of the Theological-Political Treatise, on the subject of which, if you remember, he once wrote you a Letter.191 [15] I would ask you, therefore, Sir, unless there is some weighty reason against it, not to refuse to permit this, in keeping with your generous kindness. If it can be done, please tell me Your decision as soon as possible. When I have received Your reply, I will be able to reply to our Tschirnhaus, which I am anxious to do on Tuesday evening, unless some serious obstacle forces You to delay.
[20] Mr. Bresser, having returned from Cleves, has sent here a great quantity of the Beer of his Country. I suggested to him that he set aside half a Barrel for You, which he has promised to do. He sends you his most friendly greeting.
Finally, I ask you to overlook the roughness of my style and the speed of my pen, and to command me to carry out some service for [25] You, so that I may have a real opportunity to show that I am
Most Distinguished Sir,
Your very willing servant,
G. H. Schuller
Amsterdam, 14 November 1675
TO THE MOST DISTINGUISHED MR. B. D. S. FROM HENRY OLDENBURG
With Warmest Greetings
Reply to Letter 68
As far as I can see from your Last Letter, the Appearance of the Book you intended for publication is in danger.192 I can only approve your intention to clarify and soften193 the things in the Theological-Political Treatise which caused trouble to your Readers. I would think [10] that these include especially those passages in the work which seem to speak ambiguously about God and Nature. A great many people think you confuse these two things. Furthermore, many think you deny the authority and value of miracles, the only possible support for the certainty of Divine Revelation, as almost all Christians are [15] convinced. In addition, they say you conceal your opinion concerning Jesus Christ, the Redeemer of the World and only Mediator for men, as well as your opinion concerning his Incarnation and Atonement. They ask that you reveal clearly your thinking about these three points. If you do this, and if in this matter you please intelligent Christians, who value reason, I think your affairs will be safe. I wanted you to [20] know these things briefly, I who am most devoted to you. Farewell.
15 November 1675
P.S.: Let me know quickly, please, whether these few lines of mine have reached you properly.
TO THE VERY LEARNED AND ABLE MR. G. H. SCHULLER FROM B. D. S.
Most able Sir, Most honored friend,
I was very pleased to learn from your letter, which I received today, that you are well, and that our Tschirnhaus has successfully completed [IV/305] his trip to France. In the conversations he had concerning me with Mr. Huygens, he conducted himself very wisely, in my judgment at least. And I rejoice very much that he has found such a favorable opportunity for the end he had set himself.
[5] But I do not see what he finds in I A4 which seems to contradict II P5. For in this proposition it is affirmed that the essence of each idea194 has God for a cause insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing; but in that axiom it is affirmed that the knowledge or idea of an effect depends on the knowledge or idea of its cause.
[10] To confess the truth, I do not sufficiently follow the meaning of your letter in this matter, and I believe that there is a slip of the pen, due to haste, either in your letter or in his copy [of the Ethics]. For you write that in P5 it is affirmed that objects [ideata] are the efficient cause of ideas, although this is expressly denied in the same proposition.195 And it is from this, I now think, that all the confusion arises. So it would be [15] pointless for me now to try to write about this more fully. I ought to wait until you explain his mind to me more clearly and I know whether he has a copy which is adequately corrected.
I believe I know, from letters, the Leibniz about whom he writes. But why he has gone to France, when he was a counsellor in Frankfurt, [20] I don’t know.196 As far as I have been able to conjecture from his letters, he seemed to me to be a man with a liberal mentality, and wellversed in every science. Nevertheless, I judge it ill-advised to entrust my writings to him so quickly. I’d like to know first what he is doing in France, and to hear the judgment of our Tschirnhaus after he has associated with him longer and knows his character better.
[25] For the rest, greet that friend of ours in my name, as solicitously as possible, and if there is any matter in which I can serve him, let him ask whatever he wishes, and he will find me most ready to help him. I wish our most worthy friend Mr. Bresser well on his arrival, or return, and thank him very much for the promised beer. I shall repay him in whatever way I can.
[30] Finally, I have not yet tried to test the experiment of your Author,197 and I don’t believe I’ll be able to apply my mind to trying it. The more I think about the matter, the more I’m convinced that you have not made gold, but only separated out a little which was hidden in the antinomy. But more of this on another occasion. Now the lack of time [IV/306] prevents me. Meanwhile, if I can do anything for you, I am here, and you will always find me,
Most excellent sir,
Your very good friend
and Most Obedient Servant,
B. despinoza
The Hague, 18 November 1675
Mr. G. H. Schuller
Doctor of medicine, Amsterdam
TO THE MOST NOBEL AND LEARNED MR. HENRY OLDENBURG FROM B. D. S.
Most Noble Sir,
Last Saturday I received your very short letter of 15 November. In it you only point out the things in the Theological-Political Treatise which have troubled readers, although I had also hoped to learn from [IV/307a] it what opinions seemed to undermine the practice of religious virtue, which you had previously warned me about. But to explain my intention regarding the three points you mention, I say that:
[5] [1] Regarding the first, I favor an opinion concerning God and Nature far different from the one Modern Christians usually defend. For I maintain that God is, as they say, the immanent, but not the transitive, cause of all things. That all things are in God and move in God, I affirm, I say, with Paul,199 and perhaps also with all the ancient philosophers, though in another way—I would also be so bold as to say, with all the ancient [10] Hebrews, as far as we can conjecture from certain traditions, corrupted as they have been in many ways. Nevertheless, some people think the Theological-Political Treatise rests on the assumption that God is one and the same as Nature (by which they understand a certain mass, or corporeal matter).200 This is a complete mistake.
[15] [2] Regarding miracles, I’m convinced that the certainty of divine revelation can be built only on the wisdom of the doctrine, not on miracles, that is, on ignorance. I’ve shown this in sufficient detail in Ch. 6, on miracles. Here I add only this, that I understand this to be [IV/308a] the chief difference between Religion and Superstition, that the latter has ignorance as its foundation, and the former, wisdom. And I believe this is the reason why Christians are distinguished from non-Christians, not by faith, not by loving-kindness, not by the other fruits of the Holy [5] Spirit, but only by opinion. Like everyone else, they defend themselves only by miracles, that is, by ignorance, which is the source of all wickedness. And thus they turn faith, even though true, into superstition. But whether kings will ever permit using a remedy for this evil, I doubt very much. Finally,
[3] to reveal my thinking more clearly regarding the third point, too, [10] I say that it is completely unnecessary201 for salvation to know Christ according to the flesh. We must think quite differently about that eternal son of God, i.e., God’s eternal wisdom, which has manifested itself in all things, but most in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus. No one can attain blessedness without this, as that which alone teaches what [15] is true and false, good and evil. And because, as I said, this wisdom was manifested most through Jesus Christ, his disciples preached the same [IV/309a] thing, insofar as he revealed it to them, and they showed that they could pride themselves beyond other people in that spirit of Christ.
As for what certain Churches add to this—that God assumed a human nature—I warned expressly that I don’t know what they mean. Indeed, [5] to confess the truth, they seem to me to speak no less absurdly than if someone were to say to me that a circle has assumed the nature of a square.202
I think these words will be enough to explain what I think about those three points. Whether it will please the Christians of your acquaintance, you will be able to know better than I. Farewell.
[The Hague, c. 1 December 1675]203
TO THE MOST DISTINGUISHED AND LEARNED MR. B. D. S. HENRY OLDENBURG
Sends Many Greetings
Reply to the Preceding
Since you seem to reproach me for excessive brevity, I shall purge myself of that fault this time by excessive prolixity. I see that you had [25] expected an account of those opinions in your Writings which seem to your Readers to destroy the practice of Religious virtue. I shall say [IV/310] what most distresses them. You seem to build on a fatal necessity of all things and actions. But once that has been asserted and granted, they say the sinews of all laws, of all virtue and religion, are cut, and all [5] rewards and punishments are useless. They think that whatever compels or implies necessity excuses. Therefore, they think no one will be inexcusable in the sight of God. If we act by the fates, and everything, brought round again204 by an unyielding hand, proceeds in a certain and inevitable path, they do not understand what room there is for [10] guilt or punishments. It’s quite hard to say what means there are to untie this knot. I should very much like to know and learn what help you can offer in this matter.
Regarding your opinion about the three points I raised, which you think fit to reveal to me, the following things need to be asked.
First, in what sense do you take Miracles and Ignorance to be Synonyms [15] and equivalent, as you seem to do in your Most Recent letter? For the raising of Lazarus from the dead, and the resurrection of Jesus Christ from death, seem to surpass the whole power of created Nature, and to belong only to the divine power. That this necessarily exceeds the limits of a finite intelligence, bound within certain constraints, does not [20] argue a culpable ignorance. Don’t you think it suits a created Mind and knowledge to recognize in an uncreated Mind and supreme Divinity such knowledge and power that it can penetrate into and do those things whose reason and means we puny humans can neither give nor explain? We are men, and it seems that nothing human should be considered alien to us.
[25] Next, since you confess that you cannot grasp [the doctrine] that God really assumed a human nature, it is proper to ask you how you understand those passages of our Gospel and of the Letter to the Hebrews, the first of which affirms that “the word became flesh,” and the second of which says that “the Son of God assumed not [the nature of] the Angels, but [30] [that of] the seed of Abraham.”205 I should think that the whole tenor of the Gospel is this: that the only begotten Son of God, the λόγον [the Word], who both was God and was with God, showed himself in human nature and by his passion and death paid the ἀντίλυτρον [the ransom] for us sinners, the price of our redemption. I would be very glad to learn what should be said about these and similar passages, for the truth of the Gospel and of the Christian Religion (which I think you are well-disposed [35] toward) to be established.
[IV/311] I had intended to write more, but I’ve been interrupted by visiting friends, to whom I think it wrong to deny the duties of politeness. But the things I’ve thrown together in this Letter may have been enough, and may perhaps have been wearisome to you as a Philosopher. Farewell, then, and believe that I am always an admirer of your Erudition [5] and Knowledge.
London, 16 December 1675
TO THE MOST NOBLE AND LEARNED MR. HENRY OLDENBURG FROM B. D. S.
Reply to the Preceding
Most Noble Sir,
At last I see what it was you were asking me not to publish. But [15] because this is the principal foundation of everything in the treatise I had intended to publish, I want to explain briefly here in what way I maintain the fatal necessity of all things and actions. For I do not in any way subject God to fate, but I conceive that everything follows with inevitable necessity from the nature of God, in the same way everyone [IV/312a] conceives that it follows from the nature of God that God understands himself. Certainly no one denies that this follows necessarily from the divine nature, and yet no one conceives that God is coerced by some fate. Rather they think he understands himself completely freely, even if necessarily.
[5] Next, this inevitable necessity of things does not destroy either divine or human laws. For whether or not the moral teachings themselves receive the form of law or legislation from God himself, they are still divine and salutary. The good which follows from virtue and the love of God will be just as desirable whether we receive it from God as [10] a judge or as something emanating from the necessity of the divine nature. Nor will the bad things which follow from evil actions and affects be any less to be feared because they follow from them necessarily. Finally, whether we do what we do necessarily or contingently, we are still led by hope and fear.
[15] Next, the only reason men are inexcusable before God is that they are in his 'power as clay is in the 'power of the potter, who, of the same mass, makes some vessels for honor, and others for dishonor.206 If you’re willing to attend briefly to these few things, I don’t doubt that you will [IV/313a] easily be able to reply to all the arguments usually raised against this opinion, as I and many others have already learned from experience.
I’ve taken miracles and ignorance to be equivalent, because those who try to erect the existence of God and Religion on miracles want [5] to reveal something obscure by something more obscure, which they’re completely ignorant of. So they use a new kind of argument, by reduction, not to the impossible, as they say, but to ignorance. Otherwise, if I’m not mistaken, I’ve explained my position on miracles sufficiently in the Theological-Political Treatise. Here I add only this one thing:
[10] If you attend to the following things—that Christ did not appear to the Senate, or to Pilate, or to any of the unfaithful, but only to the saints; that God has neither a right hand nor a left, and is not in any place, but is everywhere according to his essence; that matter is everywhere the same; that God does not manifest himself outside the World, in that [15] imaginary space they hypothesize; and finally, that the structure of the human body is kept within its proper limits only by the weight of the air—you will easily see that this appearance of Christ was not unlike that by which God appeared to Abraham, when he saw three men whom he [IV/314a] invited to eat with him [Genesis 18:1–8].
But you will say that all the Apostles believed completely that Christ was resurrected from the dead, and really ascended into heaven. I don’t deny this. For Abraham himself also believed that God had dined with [5] him, and all the Israelites believed that God descended from heaven to Mount Sinai, surrounded by fire, and spoke immediately with them [Exodus 19:18–24]. Nevertheless, these and many other things of this kind were apparitions, or revelations, accommodated to the grasp and opinions of those men, by which God willed to reveal his mind to them.
I conclude, then, that the resurrection of Christ from the dead was really [10] spiritual, and was revealed only to the faithful, according to their power of understanding, that is, that Christ was endowed with eternity, and that he rose from the dead (here I understand “dead” in the same sense in which Christ said, “let the dead bury their dead”),207 and at the same time that he gave, by his life and death, an example of singular holiness, [15] and to that extent he raises his disciples from the dead, insofar as they follow this example of his life and death. It would not be difficult to explain the whole teaching of the Gospel according to this hypothesis. [IV/315a] Indeed only on this hypothesis can 1 Corinthians 15 be explained and the arguments of Paul be understood.208 Otherwise, by following the common hypothesis, they seem weak, and can easily be refuted—not to mention the fact that the Christians have interpreted Spiritually all the things the Jews interpreted carnally.
[5] With you, I recognize human weakness. But may I ask you, on the other hand, whether we puny humans209 have such a great knowledge of Nature that we can determine how far its force and power extend, and what surpasses its force? Because no one can presume without arrogance [to have this knowledge], it will therefore be permissible, without boasting, [10] to explain miracles through natural causes, as far as this can be done. And it will be preferable to suspend judgment about the things we cannot explain, and also cannot demonstrate to be absurd, and to erect Religion, as I have said, only on the wisdom of the Teaching.
Finally, you believe that the passages in the Gospel of John and the Letter to the Hebrews are incompatible with what I have said [15] because you measure the phrases of oriental Languages by European ways of speaking. And although John wrote his Gospel in Greek, he still hebraizes.
However that may be, do you believe that when Scripture says that God manifested himself in a Cloud, or that he dwelt in the Tabernacle, [IV/316a] and in the Temple, God himself took on the nature of a Cloud, or a Tabernacle, or a temple? But this is the most Christ said of himself: that he was the temple of God, because, as I said in my letter, God [5] manifested himself most in Christ. To express this more powerfully, John said that the word became flesh. But enough of these things.
[The Hague, c. 1 January 1676]
TO THE MOST NOBLE YOUNG MAN ALBERT BURGH FROM B. D. S.
Reply to Letter 67
What I could hardly believe when others told me about it, I have at last understood from your letter: that you have become, not only a [20] member of the Roman Church, as you say, but also a very vehement defender of it, and that you have learned already to revile your opponents and petulantly rage against them.
[IV/317a] I had not intended to reply to your letter. I was certain that you needed the passage of time more than you needed argument, to restore you to yourself and yours, not to mention other reasons, which you once approved when we talked about Steno, whose footsteps you now follow. But certain friends,210 who from your excellent natural qualities [5] had conceived a great hope, as I had, asked me most urgently not to fail in the duty of a friend, and to think rather of what you recently were than of what you are now. By these, and other arguments of that kind, I have finally been persuaded to write you these few lines, asking you earnestly to be so kind as to read [and weigh]211 them fairly.
[10] I shall not, as the opponents of the Roman Church usually do, relate the vices of the Priests and Popes, to turn you against them. People often bring up these stories maliciously, more to irritate than to instruct. Indeed, I’ll concede that in the Roman Church there are more men of great erudition, who have led commendable lives, than in any other [15] Christian Church. For as there are more members of this Church, so there are also more men of every condition in it. Nevertheless, unless by chance you have also lost your memory, along with your reason, you can’t deny this: that in every Church there are many very honorable [IV/318a] men, who worship God with justice and loving-kindness. For we know many men of this kind among the Lutherans, the Reformed, the Mennonites, and the Enthusiasts.212 And, not to mention others, you know your own ancestors, who in the time of the Duke of Alva, with [5] equal constancy and freedom of mind, suffered all kinds of torture for the sake of Religion.213
So you ought to concede that holiness of life is not peculiar to the Roman Church, but is common to all. And because we know by this—to speak with the Apostle John214—that we remain in God, and God remains in us, it follows that whatever distinguishes the Roman [10] Church from the others is completely superfluous, and so has been established only by superstition. For as I’ve said, with John, justice and loving-kindness are the unique and most certain sign of the true Universal faith.215 They are the true fruits of the Holy Spirit. Wherever they are present, Christ is really present; wherever they are absent, [15] Christ is absent. For only by the Spirit of Christ can we be led to the love of justice and loving-kindness. If you had been willing to weigh these things rightly, you would not have lost yourself, and you would not have driven your parents, who are now lamenting your misfortune, into bitter grief.
[IV/319a] But I return to your Letter, in which first you lament that I allow myself to be led astray by the Prince of wicked Spirits. I beg you to be of good heart, and return to yourself.216 When you were in possession of your faculties, if I’m not mistaken, you worshipped an infinite [5] God, by whose power absolutely all things happen and are preserved. Now you are dreaming of a Prince, an enemy of God, who, in spite of God’s will to the contrary, leads most men astray and deceives them. (For good men, in fact, are rare.) And [you imagine] that because this master of wicked acts has deceived these men, God hands them over to him, to be tortured to eternity. The divine justice therefore allows [10] the Devil to deceive men with impunity. But not the wretched men the Devil has deceived and led astray. They are by no means without punishment.
Would these absurdities still have to be tolerated if you worshipped an infinite and eternal God, instead of the one whom Chatillon, with impunity, fed to his horses in the city of Tienen?217 And you weep that I am wretched? You call my Philosophy, which you have never seen, a [15] fable? O, young man bereft of understanding, who has bewitched you, so that you believe you are eating that highest and eternal being, and have him in your intestines?
Yet you seem to want to use reason, and you ask me: “how do I know that my Philosophy is the best, among all those which have ever [IV/320a] been taught in the world, are still taught, or will ever be taught in the future?” I can certainly ask you this with far better right. I do not presume that I have discovered the best Philosophy; but I know that I understand the true one. Moreover, if you ask how I know this, I will [5] reply: in the same way you know that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right angles. No one will deny that this is enough, not if his brain is healthy and he is not dreaming of unclean spirits, who inspire in us false ideas which are like the true. For the true is the indicator both of itself and of the false.
[10] But you, who presume you have at last discovered the best Religion, or rather the best men, to whom you have abandoned your credulity, how do you know that they are the best among all those who have ever taught other Religions, still teach them, or will teach them in the future? have you examined all those religions, both ancient and modern, which are taught here, [15] and in India, and everywhere throughout the globe? And even if you had examined them properly, how do you know you have chosen the best? You cannot give any reason for your faith.
Now you will say that you are trusting in the internal testimony of the Spirit of God, and that the others are led astray and deceived by the Prince of wicked Spirits. But all those who are outside the Roman [IV/321a] Church will make the same claim about their church as you do about yours, with equal right.
Moreover, what you add about the common agreement of many thousands of men, and about the uninterrupted succession of the Church, [5] etc., is the same old song of the Pharisees. For with no less confidence than the adherents of the Roman Church, and with as much stubbornness as the Roman witnesses, they display many thousands of witnesses who report the things they have heard as things they have experienced. They trace their lineage all the way to Adam, and boast with equal arrogance that their Church has spread to this day, and [10] remains unchanged and genuine, in spite of the hostility of the Pagans and the hatred of the Christians.
They defend themselves most of all by their antiquity. They claim, unanimously, that their traditions were received from God himself, and that they alone preserve both the written and the unwritten Word of God. No one can deny that all the heresies have arisen from them, but that they have remained constant for some thousands of years, without [15] any state compulsion, solely by the effectiveness of [NS: their] superstition. The miracles they tell of [NS:—setting aside the thing itself—] are enough to weary a thousand babblers.
But what they are most proud of is that they count far more martyrs [IV/322a] than any other nation, and that the number of those who have suffered, with a singular constancy of heart, for the faith they profess increases daily. This is not a lie. For I myself know, among others, a certain Judah, whom they call the faithful,218 who in the midst of the flames, when he was already believed to be dead, began to sing the hymn which begins [5] “To Thee, Lord, I offer my soul.” And in the middle of the song he breathed his last.
I grant that the organization of the Roman Church, which you praise so highly, is well-designed politically, and profitable for many. I do not believe there is any order more suitable for deceiving ordinary [10] people and controlling men’s minds, unless it would be the order of the Mahommedan Church, which surpasses it by far. For from the time this superstition began, no schism has arisen in their Church.219
So if you make the calculation correctly, you will see that only the point you mention in the third place [at IV/287/6] is in favor of the [15] Christians: namely, that unlearned and base men were able to convert almost the whole world to the faith of Christ. But this argument supports not the Roman Church, but everyone who professes the name of Christ.220
But suppose all the reasons you cite favor only the Roman Church. [IV/323a] Do you think that by them you can mathematically demonstrate the authority of that Church? That’s far from true. So why do you want me to believe that my demonstrations come from the Prince of wicked Spirits, whereas yours are inspired by God—especially since I see, and [5] your letter clearly indicates, that having become a slave of this Church, you’ve been guided not so much by the love of God as by fear of hell, the only cause of superstition. [NS, LC: For I ask you,] is this your humility, that you don’t trust at all in yourself, but in others, whom many, many people condemn? Do you ascribe it to arrogance and pride, that I use reason, and that I trust in this true Word of God, which is [10] in the mind, and can never be distorted or corrupted?
Away with this pernicious221 superstition! Recognize the reason God has given you, and cultivate it, unless you want to be considered one of the brute animals. Stop calling absurd errors mysteries, and don’t shamefully confuse the things unknown to us, or not yet discovered, [15] with those demonstrated to be absurd, as are the horrible secrets of this Church. The more [these secrets/mysteries] are contrary to right reason, the more you believe they transcend the intellect.
For the rest, the foundation of the Theological-Political Treatise, namely, [IV/324a] that Scripture must be explained only through Scripture, which you so vehemently declare to be without any reason, and false, is not merely supposed, but also demonstrated conclusively to be true or firm, especially in Ch. 7, where the opinions of the opponents are also refuted. [5] To this we may add what is demonstrated at the end of Ch. 15.
If you’re willing to attend to these [NS, LC: few] things, and in addition, to examine the Histories of the Church (of which I see that you are most ignorant), so that you can see how falsely the Popes transmit many things, and by what fate and what tricks the Roman Pontiff acquired the leadership of the Church, 600 years after the birth of [10] Christ,222 I don’t doubt that you will at length repent. I heartily desire this for you. Farewell, etc.
[The Hague, end of 1675 or beginning of 1676]
TO THE MOST DISTINGUISHED MR. B. D. S. FROM HENRY OLDENBURG
EY ΠPATTEIN223
Reply to Letter 75
You were exactly right when you perceived the reason I did not want that fatal necessity of all things to be published: so that the practice of [30] virtue would not thereby be hampered, and rewards and punishments would not become worthless.
[IV/325] What your most recent letter suggests about this matter does not yet seem to lessen this difficulty or to calm the human Mind. For if we men, in all our actions, moral as well as natural, are in the 'power [5] of God as the clay is in the hand of the potter, how, I ask, can any of us properly be called to account for having acted in this or that way, when it was completely impossible for him to act otherwise? Will not everyone, without exception, be able to retort to God:
your inflexible decree and irresistible 'power have forced us to act in this way; we could not have acted otherwise. Why, then, and with what [10] right will you subject us to the direst punishments, which we could not in any way have avoided, since you were doing and directing everything by supreme necessity, according to your will and good pleasure?
When you say that Men are inexcusable before God for no other reason than because they are in God’s 'power, I would turn that argument [15] completely around. I would say (with better reason, as it seems): men are for that reason completely excusable, because they are in God’s 'power. For everyone can easily object: “your 'power is inescapable, O God; therefore, it seems that I deserve to be excused for not having acted otherwise.”
Next, you still take Miracles to be equivalent to Ignorance. By that [20] you seem to confine the power of God and the knowledge of Men (even the most acute Men)224 within the same limits, as if God cannot do or produce anything for which men cannot give a reason if they exert all the powers of their intelligence.
Furthermore, that Narrative of Christ’s Passion, Death, Burial and [25] Resurrection seems to have been painted with such lively and genuine colors that I would dare even to appeal to your conscience: provided that you are persuaded of the truth of the Narrative, do you believe that it is to be taken Allegorically rather than literally? The details the Evangelists have recorded so clearly about this matter seem to weigh [30] heavily in favor of taking the narrative literally.
These, briefly, are the things I wanted to note regarding that subject. I beseech you to pardon them, and in accordance with your sincerity, to reply in a friendly fashion. Mr. Boyle greets you courteously. At another time I shall explain what the Royal Society is doing now. Farewell, and continue to love me.
Henry Oldenburg
London, 14 January 1676
TO THE MOST NOBLE AND LEARNED MR. HENRY OLDENBURG FROM B. D. S.
Reply to the Preceding
Most Noble Sir,
What I said in my previous letter—that we are for that reason inexcusable, because we are in God’s 'power, as clay in the hand of the potter—I wanted to be understood in this sense: namely, that no [10] one can reproach God because he has given him a weak nature, or a mind lacking in power. That would be as absurd as if a circle were to complain that God did not give it the properties of a sphere, or a child who is suffering from a stone, that he did not give it a healthy body. Similarly, a weak-minded man can’t complain225 that God has denied him [15] strength of character, and a true knowledge and love of God himself, so that he cannot restrain or moderate his desires. For nothing else belongs to the nature of any thing than what follows necessarily from its given cause. But it does not belong to the nature of any man that [IV/327a] he should be strong-minded. And no one can deny that it is no more in our 'power to have a healthy Body than it is to have a sound Mind,226 unless he wants to deny both experience and reason.
But, you insist, if men sin from a necessity of nature, then they are [5] excusable. But you don’t explain what you want to infer from that. Is it that God cannot become angry with them? Or that they are worthy of blessedness, i.e., of the knowledge and love of God? If the former, then I grant completely that God does not become angry, but that all things happen according to his decree. But I deny that for that reason all men [10] ought to be blessed. Indeed, men can be excusable, and nevertheless lack blessedness and suffer in many ways. A horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man, but he must still be a horse and not a man. Someone who is crazy because of a dog’s bite is indeed to be excused; nevertheless, he is rightly suffocated.227 And finally, one who cannot govern [15] his desires and restrain them by fear of the laws, although he too is to be excused because of his weakness, nevertheless, cannot enjoy peace of mind, and the knowledge and love of God. He necessarily perishes.
I don’t think it’s necessary to warn here that when Scripture says that [IV/328a] God becomes angry with sinners, and that he is a judge, who finds out about men’s actions, makes decisions about them, and passes sentence, it is speaking in a human way, and according to the accepted opinions of the common people, because its intent is not to teach Philosophy, and not to make men learned, but to make them obedient.
[5] Moreover, I don’t see why I seem to confine the power of God and human 'knowledge within the same limits, just because I have taken miracles and ignorance to be equivalent.
However that may be, I accept Christ’s passion, death, and burial literally, as you do, but his resurrection, allegorically. I grant, certainly, [10] that the Evangelists relate the resurrection too in such detail that we can’t deny that they themselves believed that the body of Christ was resurrected and ascended into heaven, where he sits on the right hand of God. We also can’t deny that they believed this could have been seen by non-believers, if they had been present at the same time in the places where Christ himself appeared to the disciples. Nevertheless, [15] they could have been deceived about this, without harm to the teaching of the Gospel, as also happened to other prophets. I’ve given examples of this in my preceding letter [Letter 75, IV/314/1–9]. But Paul, to whom Christ also appeared afterward, gloried that he knew [IV/329a] Christ not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit.228
[IV/329b] [LC: I thank you very much for the Catalog of the Books of the most noble Mr. Boyle. Finally, I shall look forward to learning from [5] you the present business of the Royal Society, when the opportunity presents itself.]
Farewell, most esteemed Sir, and believe that I am yours in all zeal and affection.
[The Hague, 7 February 1676]229
TO THE MOST DISTINGUISHED GENTLEMAN MR. BENEDICT DE SPINOZA FROM HENRY OLDENBURG
Warmest Greetings
In your letter to me of 7 February there remain some things which seem to merit critical examination. You say that a man cannot complain [15] that God has denied him true knowledge of himself [God], and sufficient powers for avoiding sins, since nothing belongs to the Nature of anything except what follows necessarily from its cause. But I say that since God, the creator of men, formed them according to his own image, which seems to imply wisdom, and goodness, and power in its [20] concept, it seems to follow completely that it is more in man’s 'power to have a sound Mind than to have a healthy body, since the physical soundness of the Body depends on mechanical principles, whereas the soundness of the Mind depends on choice and prudence.
You add that men can be excusable,230 and yet suffer in many ways. At [25] first glance this seems hard and what you go on to offer as a proof—that a dog gone mad from a bite231 is indeed to be excused, but nevertheless rightly killed—does not seem to settle the matter, since killing a dog of this kind would show cruelty if it were not necessary to preserve other dogs, or other animals, or men themselves from a bite of this [IV/330] kind which would make them mad.
But if God were to implant a sound Mind in men, as he can, no contagion of vices would need to be feared. And of course it seems very cruel for God to destine men to eternal torments (or at least for a time to dire torments) on account of sins which they could not avoid in any [5] way. Furthermore, the tenor of the whole of Sacred Scripture seems to suppose and imply this: that men can abstain from sins. Indeed, it abounds in curses and promises, proclamations of rewards and threats of punishments, which all seem to argue against a necessity of sinning, [10] and imply the possibility of avoiding punishments.232 If this should be denied, the human mind would have to be said to act no less mechanically than the human body.
Next, the foundation for your continuing to take Miracles and Ignorance as equivalent seems to be this: that the creature can and must [15] have a clear insight into the Infinite power and wisdom of the creator. So far I am completely convinced that this is certainly false.
Finally, you do not support your claim that Christ’s passion, death and burial are to be taken literally, but his Resurrection allegorically, [20] with any argument that is clear to me. In the Gospels the Resurrection of Christ seems to be related as literally as the other things. And the whole Christian Religion and its truth rests on this article of the Resurrection. Take this away, and the mission of Christ Jesus and his heavenly Teaching both collapse. It cannot escape you how [25] much trouble Christ took, once he had been raised from the dead, to convince his disciples of the truth of the Resurrection, properly so called. To try to turn all those things into allegories is the same as if someone did his best to undermine the whole truth of the Gospel Narrative.
I wanted to convey these few remarks to you again, in accordance [30] with my freedom of Philosophizing, which I earnestly beseech you to take in good part.
London, 11 February 1676
I’ll write to you very soon233 about the studies and activities of the Royal Society, if God grants me life and health.
TO THE MOST ACUTE AND LEARNED PHILOSOPHER, B. D. S. FROM EHRENFRIED WALTHER VON TSCHIRNHAUS
Most Distinguished Sir,
First, I have great difficulty conceiving how the existence of bodies, which have motions and shapes, is demonstrated a priori. For in Extension, considering the thing absolutely, no such thing occurs.
Secondly, I should like to learn from you how to understand what [10] you said in your Letter on the Infinite: “Still they do not infer from the multiplicity of their parts that such things exceed every number.”234 For in fact all Mathematicians seem to me to demonstrate, always, concerning such infinites, that the number of the parts is so great that it exceeds every [15] assignable number. And in the example of the two circles which you use there, you do not seem to show what you had undertaken to show. For there you show only that they do not infer this from the excessive size of the intervening space, and that they do not infer it from the fact “that we do not know its maximum and minimum.” But you do not demonstrate as you wanted to, that they do not infer it from the multiplicity of the parts.
[20] [NS: I have learned from Mr. Leibniz that the Tutor of the Dauphin of France, Huet, who is a man of outstanding learning, will write concerning the truth of human Religion, and will refute your Theological-Political Treatise.235
Farewell.]
2 May 1676
TO THE MOST NOBLE AND LEARNED EHRENFRIED WALTHER VON TSCHIRNHAUS FROM B. D. S.
Reply to the Preceding
Most Noble Sir,
What I said in my Letter concerning the Infinite,236 that [Mathematicians] do not infer the infinity of the parts from their multiplicity [IV/59/10–11], is evident from the fact that if they inferred it from their [10] multiplicity, we could not conceive a greater multiplicity of parts, but their multiplicity would have to be greater than any given multiplicity, which is false. For in the whole space between two circles having different centers we conceive twice as great a multiplicity of parts as in half of the same space. Nevertheless, the number of parts, both in the [15] half and in the whole space, is greater than every assignable number.
Next, from Extension, as Descartes conceives it (i.e., as a mass at rest), it is not only difficult to demonstrate the existence of bodies, as you say, but completely impossible. For matter at rest, insofar as it is in itself, will persevere in its rest, and will not be set in motion except [20] by a more powerful external cause. For this reason I did not hesitate, previously, to affirm that Descartes’ principles of natural things are useless, not to say absurd.
The Hague, 5 May 1676
TO THE MOST ACUTE AND LEARNED PHILOSOPHER, B. D. S. FROM EHRENFRIED WALTHER VON TSCHIRNHAUS
Most Learned Sir,
Since you remind me of Descartes’ opinion—that he can’t deduce the variety of things from Extension except by supposing that it was brought about in Extension by a motion initiated by God237—I’d be glad if you would oblige me by indicating how, according to your meditations, [10] the variety of things can be shown a priori from the concept of Extension. In my opinion, Descartes doesn’t deduce the existence of bodies from a matter at rest (unless, perhaps, you would consider the supposition of God as a mover to be of no importance). For you have not shown how [the variety/existence of bodies] must necessarily follow [15] a priori from God’s essence, something which Descartes believed surpassed man’s grasp.
So I ask this of you, knowing very well that you think otherwise [about this]—unless perhaps there’s some other weighty reason why you have so far not wanted to make this plain. And if this [concealment] had not been necessary, which I don’t doubt, you would not indicate such a [20] thing obscurely. But be assured that whether you indicate something to me openly or conceal it, my feeling toward you will remain unchanged.
Nevertheless, the reasons why I would particularly desire an explanation are these: I have always observed in Mathematics that from any thing you like, considered in itself, i.e., from the definition of each [25] thing, we can deduce, anyhow, just one property, no more;238 if we want more properties, it’s necessary for us to relate the thing defined to other things. Then, indeed, from the conjunction of the definitions of these things, new properties result.
For example, if I consider only the circumference of a circle, I will not be able to infer anything except that it exists everywhere like itself, [IV/334] or is uniform. By this property, indeed, it differs essentially from all other curves. And I will never be able to deduce any other properties. But if I relate it to other things, such as the radii drawn from the center, or two lines intersecting [within the circle], or to many [NS: other lines], I shall certainly be able to deduce more properties from this.
[5] In some way this seems to be contrary to P16 of the Ethics, nearly the most important proposition in Book I of your Treatise. In this proposition, it is assumed as known that from the given definition of each thing many properties can be deduced. This seems to me impossible, if we do not relate the thing defined to other things. And it has the [10] further result that I cannot see how, from any Attribute considered by itself, e.g., from Extension, an infinite variety of bodies can arise.239 Or if you think that this can’t be inferred from one [Attribute] considered by itself, but can be inferred from all [the Attributes] taken together, I’d like you to explain how this will have to be conceived. Farewell, etc.
Paris, 23 June 1676
TO THE MOST NOBLE AND LEARNED MR. EHRENFRIED WALTHER VON TSCHIRNHAUS FROM B. D. S.
Reply to the Preceding
Most Noble Sir,
You ask whether a variety of things can be demonstrated a priori from the concept of Extension alone. I believe I have already shown clearly enough that this is impossible, and that therefore Descartes defines [25] matter badly by Extension, but that it must necessarily be explained by an attribute which expresses eternal and infinite essence. But perhaps I will pursue these matters more clearly with you some other time, if life lasts.240 For up till now I have not been able to set out anything concerning them in an orderly way.
[IV/335] But as for what you add—that from the definition of each thing, considered in itself, we can deduce only one property—perhaps this is correct for very simple things, or beings of reason (under which I include shapes also), but not for real beings. For from the mere fact [5] that I define God to be a Being to whose essence existence pertains,241 I infer many of his properties: that he exists necessarily, that he is unique, immutable, infinite, etc. In this way, I might mention many other examples, but for now I will omit them.
Finally, would you inquire whether M. Huet’s Treatise has been published yet—I mean the one you wrote me about previously, directed [10] against the Theological-Political Treatise. [If so,] will you be able to send me a copy? Again, do you already know what has recently been discovered concerning Refraction?242
With this, most Noble Sir, farewell, and continue to love, etc.
[NS: Your B. d. S.]
The Hague, 15 July 1676
LETTER FROM THE AUTHOR TO ONE OF HIS FRIENDS WHICH IS SUITABLE TO SERVE AS A PREFACE TO THIS POLITICAL TREATISE243
Dear Friend,
Yesterday I received your welcome letter. I thank you heartily for [20] the kind concern you show for me. I would not let this opportunity go by, etc., if I did not have something in hand which I judge to be rather useful, and which, I believe, will be more pleasing to you: composing the Political Treatise I began some time ago, on your recommendation.
Six Chapters of this treatise are already complete. The first contains, [25] as it were, an Introduction to the Work itself; the second treats of natural Right; the third, of the Right of the Supreme 'Powers; the fourth, what matters of State depend only on the governance of the Supreme 'Powers; [IV/336] fifth, what is the ultimate thing a State can aim at;244 and sixth, how a Monarchic Government must be set up, so as not to fall into Tyranny.
Now I am busy with the seventh chapter, where I demonstrate Methodically all the main points of the preceding sixth chapter, concerning the organization of a well-ordered Monarchy. Afterward I’ll proceed to [5] Aristocratic and Popular Governments, and finally to the Laws and other particular Questions concerning Politics. With this, farewell, etc.
[mid-1676?]245