The Collected Works of Spinoza Volume I and II

[III/129] CHAPTER IX

Other questions concerning the same Books,
e.g., whether Ezra put them in final form,
and whether the marginal notes
found in the Hebrew manuscripts
were variant readings

[5] [1] Just from the passages we’ve cited to confirm our opinion about the true Writer of these books—passages which without our perspective would have to seem very obscure to anyone—it’s easy to infer how much the preceding investigation of this issue aids the perfect understanding of the books. But besides the Writer, there remain other things to be [10] noted in the books themselves, which the common superstition doesn’t permit the common people to recognize.

[2] The most important of these is that Ezra—whom I shall take to be the Writer of the books discussed, until someone establishes another writer with greater certainty—did not put the narratives contained in these books in final form, and did not do anything but collect the narratives [15] from different writers, sometimes just copying them, and that he left them to posterity without having examined or ordered them.1[3] I can’t conjecture what causes prevented him from carrying out this work in every detail, unless perhaps it was an untimely death.

But though we’ve been deprived of the ancient Hebrew historians, [20] the few fragments we do have establish with utmost clarity [that Ezra did collect different histories in this way]. [4] For the story of Hezekiah (from 2 Kings 18:17) is copied from Isaiah’s account, as it was found written in the Chronicles of the Kings of Judah.2 Indeed, in the book of Isaiah we read this whole story, which was contained in the [25] Chronicles of the Kings of Judah 3 (see 2 Chronicles 32:32), related in the same words as here, with only a very few exceptions.⁴** From these exceptions the only conclusion we can draw is that various readings of Isaiah’s narrative were found—unless someone prefers to dream of mysteries in these things also.

[5] Again, the last chapter of this book [2 Kings] is also contained in [30] the last chapter of Jeremiah and in chapters 39 and 40 of that work.5 In addition, we find 2 Samuel 7 copied in 1 Chronicles 17.⁶ But we discover that the words in the different passages are so remarkably changed⁷** that we may easily recognize that these two chapters were [III/130] taken from two different copies of the story of Nathan.

[6] Finally, the Genealogy of the Kings of Edom, treated in Genesis 36:31[–39], is also described in the same words in 1 Chronicles 1[:43–51], though it is manifest, nevertheless, that the author of this book has taken the things he narrates from other Historians, but not [5] from the twelve books we’ve attributed to Ezra.8

[7] There is no doubt that if we had these Historians, this conclusion would be established directly. But because, as I’ve said, we have been deprived of them, the only thing remaining for us is to examine the histories [which have survived]: their order and connection, the variations [10] in their repetitions, and finally, the discrepancy in the computation of years. In this way we can judge of the others.

[8] Let us, then, carefully assess at least the principal narratives, taking first that of Judah and Tamar, which the Historian begins to relate in Genesis 38: And it happened at that time that Judah departed from his brothers [38:1]. This time must be related to another 9** which he has just [15] spoken of. But it can’t be related to the time just discussed in Genesis.10 For we can’t count more than twenty-two years from the time Joseph was taken to Egypt to the time the Patriarch Jacob also went there with his whole family. [9] When Joseph was sold by his brothers, he was seventeen [20] [Gen. 37:2]; he was thirty when Pharaoh ordered him to be released from prison [41:46]. If we add to these [thirteen years] the seven years of fertility [41:47] and two years of famine [45:6], that makes twenty-two years.11

[10] But no one can conceive that so many things could have happened in this length of time: viz. that Judah had three sons, one after another, [25] by the one wife he had then married; that the eldest of these, when his age permitted, married Tamar; that after the first son had died, the second took Tamar as his wife; that the second son also died; and that some time after all these things happened, Judah himself unknowingly had relations with his own daughter-in-law, Tamar, by whom he begot two more sons (though in one birth); and that one of these sons also [30] became a father—all within the time previously mentioned.

[11] Since not all these events can be related to the time in question in Genesis, they must be related to another time, treated just previously in another book. Ezra, then, has merely copied this story, and inserted it among the others, without having examined it.

[12] But it must be confessed that, not only this chapter, but the [III/131] whole story of Joseph and Jacob is so full of inconsistencies that it must have been culled from different historians and copied out.12 For Genesis 47 relates that when Joseph first brought Jacob to greet Pharaoh, Jacob was 130 years old. If we subtract from that the twenty-two years he [5] spent in grief because of Joseph’s absence, as well as the seventeen years of Joseph’s age when he was sold, and finally the seven years he served because of Rachel, it will be found that he was very, very old—eighty-four in fact—when he married Leah. On the other hand, Dinah was [10] hardly seven,13** when Shechem raped her, and Simeon and Levi were hardly twelve and eleven when they pillaged that whole city and put all its citizens to the sword.¹⁴

[13] There’s no need for me to review everything in the Pentateuch here. If you just attend to this—that all the precepts and stories in these five books are related indiscriminately, without order, with no [15] account taken of the times, and that one and the same story is often repeated, sometimes in a different way 15—you will easily see that all these things have been collected and piled up indiscriminately, so that afterward they might be more easily examined and reduced to order.

[14] This is true not only of the narratives in the Pentateuch, but [20] also of the other narratives in the remaining seven books, down to the destruction of the city. They were collected in the same way. Who does not see that in Judges 2, from v. 6, a new Historian is brought in (who had also written of the things Joshua did), and that his words are simply copied out?16 For after our Historian related (in Joshua 24) that Joshua [25] died and was buried, and after he promised at the beginning of this book [Judges] to relate what happened after Joshua’s death, how, if he wanted to follow the thread of his story, could he have connected what he begins to relate here, about Joshua, with what he has just said?17**

[16] But I pass over all this, and proceed to examine the chronology. [5] In 1 Kings 6[:1] it is said that Solomon built the temple 480 years after the departure from Egypt.19 But from the individual narratives we infer a much greater number. [17] For

Moses governed the people in the wilderness for . . .	40 years²⁰
In the opinion of Josephus and others, we attribute to Joshua [10] (who lived 110 years) a reign of not more than . . .	26 years²¹
Cushan-rishathaim had the people in subjection for . . .	8 years²²
Othniel, the son of Kenaz, judged²³** for . . .	40 years²⁴
Eglon, king of Moab, ruled the people for . . .	18 years²⁵
Ehud and Shamgar were judges for . . .	80 years²⁶
[15] Jabin, king of Canaan, had the people in subjection . . .	20 years²⁷
Afterward the people had peace for . . .	40 years²⁸
Then the people were in subjection to the Midianites for . . .	7 years²⁹
In the time of Gideon the people were free for . . .	40 years³⁰
They were under the rule of Abimelech for . . .	3 years³¹
[20] Tola, the son of Puah, judged for . . .	23 years³²
Jair judged for . . .	22 years³³
The people were in subjection to the Philistines and the Ammonites for . . .	18 years³⁴
Jephthah judged for . . .	6 years³⁵
Ibzan of Bethlehem judged for . . .	7 years³⁶
[25] Elon the Zebulunite judged for . . .	10 years³⁷
Abdon the Pirathonite judged for . . .	8 years³⁸
The people were in subjection to the Philistines for . . .	40 years³⁹
Samson judged⁴⁰** for . . .	20 years⁴¹
Eli judged for . . .	40 years⁴²
[30] Before Samuel freed them, the people were again in subjection to the Philistines for . . .	20 years⁴³
David reigned . . .	40 years⁴⁴
Before Solomon built the temple, he reigned for . . .	4 years⁴⁵

[III/133] The sum of all these years is 580.46

[18] To these years we must add, next, those of the period in which, after the death of Joshua, the Hebrew Republic flourished (before Cushan-rishathaim subjugated it [Judges 3:8]). I believe this period lasted many years. For I cannot persuade myself that immediately [5] after the death of Joshua everyone who had seen his wonders perished at once, and that the next generation straightaway abandoned the laws and fell from the pinnacle of virtue to the depths of profligacy and negligence. Nor can I believe that no sooner had this happened than Cushan-rishathaim subjugated them. [19] But since each of these [10] developments requires almost a generation, there is no doubt that in Judges 2:7, 9 and 10, Scripture covers the stories of many years, which it has passed over in silence.47

We must also add [to the figure of 580] the years during which Samuel was a Judge, which are not given in Scripture, [20] and the years of the reign of Saul, which I omitted in the above calculation, because [15] what Scripture says about him does not adequately establish how long he reigned. It is said, indeed, in 1 Samuel 13:1, that Saul reigned for two years, but that text is mutilated and from the narrative itself we infer a greater number of years. [21] That the text is mutilated, no one who has even the slightest acquaintance with the Hebrew language can [20] doubt. For it begins thus: בן שנה שאול במלכו ושתי שנים מלך על ישראל, Saul was a year old when he reigned, and he reigned over Israel for two years. Who, I ask, does not see that the text omits Saul’s age when he began to reign?48 [22] But I believe no one doubts that the account of his reign implies that it lasted longer than two years. For 1 Samuel 27:7 [25] mentions that David stayed among the Philistines, to whom he fled on account of Saul, for a year and four months. So from this calculation the remaining events must have happened in eight months. I suppose no one believes this. Josephus, at least, at the end of book six of his Antiquities, corrects the text in the following way: Saul, therefore, reigned [30] for eighteen years while Samuel was alive, and for two more after his death.49

[23] Indeed, this whole narrative in chapter 13 does not agree at all with the preceding chapters. At the end of chapter 7 it is related that the Philistines were so subdued by the Hebrews that they did not dare to cross the borders of Israel during the life of Samuel.50 But here [in ch. 13, it is related] that (while Samuel was still alive) the Philistines invaded the Hebrews and reduced them to such wretchedness and poverty [III/134] that they were left without arms to defend themselves, or even the means of making arms. [24] It would surely cost me sweat enough if I were to try to reconcile all the accounts contained in this first book of Samuel so that they all looked like they were written down and ordered [5] by one Historian. But, to return to the point I was making, we must add the years of Saul’s reign to the above calculation.

[25] Finally, I have also not counted the years of anarchy of the Hebrews,51 because Scripture does not establish what that number was. That is to say, I do not find it established what that period was in which the events narrated in Judges 17–21 happened.

[10] [26] These considerations show very clearly that we cannot establish a correct calculation of the years [between the exodus and the building of the temple] from the narratives themselves and that the narratives do not agree in one and the same calculation, but presuppose quite different ones. So we must confess that these narratives were gathered [15] from different writers, and still haven’t been put in order or examined.

[27] There seems to have been no less a discrepancy concerning the calculation of years in the books of the Chronicles of the Kings of Judah and the books of the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel.52 For it was said in the Chronicles of the Kings of Israel that Jehoram, the son of Ahab, began to reign in the second year of the reign of Jehoram, the son of Jehoshaphat (see 2 Kings 1:17). But in the Chronicles of [20] the Kings of Judah, it was held that Jehoram the son of Jehoshaphat began to reign in the fifth year of the reign of Jehoram, the son of Ahab (see 2 Kings 8:16).

[28] If anyone wants to compare the narratives of the book of Chronicles with those of the books of Kings, he will find numerous similar discrepancies, which I don’t need to recount here.53 Much less do I need to discuss the devices authors use to try to reconcile these [25] accounts. For the Rabbis are completely crazy. The commentators I have read indulge in idle fancies and hypotheses, and in the end, completely corrupt the language itself. [29] For example, when it is said in 2 Chronicles [22:2] that Ahaziah was forty-two years old when he reigned, some indulge in the hypothesis that these years are calculated from the reign of Omri, not from the birth of Ahaziah.54 If they could [30] show that this was what the author of the books of Chronicles meant, I wouldn’t hesitate to say that he didn’t know how to express himself. And they invent many other things of this kind. If these things were true, I would say, without qualification, that the ancient Hebrews were completely ignorant both of their own language and of how to tell a story in an orderly way. I wouldn’t recognize any principle or standard [III/135] for interpreting Scripture. Instead, we could invent anything we like.

[30] If anyone thinks I’m speaking too generally here, and without adequate foundation, I ask him to show us some definite order in these accounts, which Historians could imitate without fault in their Chronicles. And while he’s interpreting these accounts and trying to [5] reconcile them, let him respect the expressions and ways of speaking, and of organizing and connecting statements, so strictly, and let him explain them in such a way, that we too could imitate them in our writing, according to his explanation.55** If he does this, I’ll immediately surrender to him, and he’ll be a great oracle for me.⁵⁶ [31] For [10] I confess that although I’ve long sought such an explanation, I’ve still never been able to find anything like it. I add that I write nothing here which I haven’t thought about long and hard. Although I was instructed from childhood in the common opinions concerning Scripture, in the end I couldn’t help but admit these things.57 But there’s no reason to detain the reader long regarding these matters, or to challenge him to [15] such a hopeless task. It was only necessary to propose this to explain my position more clearly. [32] Now I proceed to the other things I’ve undertaken to note concerning the fate of these books.

What needs to be noted, in addition to the things we’ve just shown, is that Posterity hasn’t preserved these books with such diligence that [20] no errors have crept in. For the early Scribes noticed many doubtful readings, as well as some (though not all) of the mutilated passages. I’m not arguing now that these errors are such as to make difficulties for the reader. I believe they are of little importance, at least for those who read the Scriptures with a more independent judgment. This I can certainly affirm: that I haven’t noticed, concerning moral teachings, [25] any error, or any alternative reading, which could make them obscure or doubtful.

[33] But most people don’t admit that any defect at all has cropped up even in the other parts of Scripture. Instead they maintain that by a certain particular providence God has kept the whole Bible uncorrupted.58 They say the variant readings are signs of the most profound [30] mysteries, and they allege the same about the asterisks which occur in the middle of a paragraph twenty-eight times.59 Indeed, they claim that great secrets are contained in the very markings of the letters.⁶⁰

[34] I don’t know whether they’ve said these things out of foolishness and credulous devotion, or out of arrogance and malice, so that they alone would be believed to possess God’s secrets. I do know this: I’ve read nothing in their writings which had the air of a secret, but only childish thoughts. I’ve also read, and for that matter, known personally, [III/136] certain Kabbalistic triflers. I’ve never been able to be sufficiently amazed by their madness.61

[35] But I believe no one doubts that errors have crept in—not anyone of sound judgment, anyway, who has read that text about Saul (the one we appealed to above [in §20], 1 Samuel 13:1), and also 2 Samuel [5] 6:2, and David arose and went, with all the people who were with him from Judah, that they might carry off the ark of God from there. Here also no one can fail to see that the place they went to has been omitted—that is, Kirjath-jearim,62** from which they carried off the ark.⁶³

[36] We also can’t deny that 2 Samuel 13:37 is confused and mutilated: [10] and Absalom fled and went to Talmai, the son of Ammihud, king of Geshur, and he mourned his son every day, and Absalom fled and went to Geshur and stayed there three years.64** I know that previously I have noted other things of this kind, but at the moment I cannot recall them.

[37] The marginal notes 65 found throughout the Hebrew Manuscripts [15] were doubtful readings. If you attend to the fact that most of them have arisen from the great similarity some Hebrew letters have to others, you will not be able to doubt this. כ kaf is very similar to ב bet, י jod to ו vau, ד dalet to ר res, and so on. So, in 2 Samuel 5:24, where it is written, בשמעך, and in that (time) in which you hear, in the margin [20] there is כשמעך, when you hear, and in Judges 21:22, where it is written, והיה כי יבואו אבותם או אחיהם לרוב, and when their fathers or brothers come to us in a multitude (i.e., often), in the margin there is לריב, to dispute.

[39] These things are clear enough in themselves, but [I mention them because] I want to reply to the arguments of certain Pharisees, who try to persuade us that the Writers of the Sacred books themselves [30] attached the marginal notes, or gave indications for them, in order to signify some mystery. The first of these arguments, which doesn’t much move me, they take from the practice of reading the Scriptures. They ask: if these notes were attached because of variant readings, which later generations could not decide between, why has the practice prevailed of always retaining the meaning of the marginal note?66 Why, they ask, [III/137] did [the later generations] note the meaning they wanted to retain in the margin? They ought to have written the books themselves as they wanted them to be read, instead of relegating to the margin the meaning and reading they most approved.

[40] Their second argument, drawn from the nature of the thing [5] itself, seems to have an air of plausibility. Suppose the errors are not intentional, but have crept into the Manuscripts by chance. What happens by chance, happens now one way, now another. But in the Pentateuch, with only one exception, the word נערה, girl, is always written defectively, contrary to the rule of grammar, without the letter ה, he, whereas in the margin it is written correctly, according to the universal [10] rule of grammar.67 Has this, too, happened because someone’s hand erred in copying? By what fate could it have happened that the pen always acted too quickly whenever this word occurred? Again, [the scribes of the later generations] could easily, without any misgivings, have made good this defect, and corrected it according to the rules of grammar. [41] Therefore, since these readings did not happen by chance, and [15] they did not correct defects so clear, [the Pharisees] conclude from this that the first Writers made these [errors] according to a definite plan, to signify something by them.

We can easily reply to these arguments. I see little merit in [the Pharisees’] arguing from the practice which has prevailed among [the later generations]. [42] I don’t know what superstition could have persuaded [20] them to do. Perhaps they did these things because they regarded each reading as equally good or acceptable, and therefore, in order that neither of them should be neglected, wanted one to be written and the other to be read. In so great a matter, they were afraid to determine their judgment, lest in their uncertainty they choose the false [reading] in place of the true one. So they did not want to prefer either one to the other, as they would have done, without qualification, if they had commanded only one reading to be both written and read, especially [25] since the marginal notes are not written in the Sacred books.68 [43] Or perhaps it happened because, although certain things were copied correctly, they still wanted them to be read differently, as they had noted them in the margin. Therefore, they established the general practice of reading the Bible according to the marginal notes.

[44] But now I shall say what cause moved the Scribes to note certain [30] things explicitly in the margin as to be read. Not all the marginal notes are doubtful readings, but [the Scribes] also noted readings which were alien to their usage, viz. obsolete words and those which the customs of their time did not permit to be read in a public assembly. [45] For the ancient Writers, without evil intent, used to indicate things by their proper names, without any courtly euphemisms. But after wicked conduct [III/138] and extravagant living became prevalent, things which the ancients said without obscenity began to be considered obscene. There was no need to change Scripture itself for this reason. Nevertheless, out of consideration for the weakness of ordinary people, they introduced the custom of using more respectable terms for intercourse and excrement when the works were read in public; and they indicated these terms [5] in the marginal notes.

[46] Finally, whatever the reason why it became customary to read and interpret the Scriptures according to the marginal readings, at least it was not that the true interpretation must be found only there. For not only do the Rabbis in the Talmud often depart from the Masoretes [10] and have other readings which they approve, as I shall soon show, other things are found in the margin which seem less sanctioned by linguistic usage. [47] E.g., in 2 Samuel 14:22 is written אשר עשה המלך את דבר עבדו, because the King has acted according to the advice of his servant, a construction which is entirely regular and agrees with that in v. 15 of [15] the same chapter. But what is in the margin (עבדך, of thy servant) does not agree with the person of the verb. [48] Similarly, in 2 Samuel 16:23 is written כאשר ישאל בדבר האלהים, and when (one) consults the word of God (i.e., when it is consulted). In the margin איש, someone, is added as the subject of the verb. But this does not seem to have been done accurately enough, for the ordinary usage of this language is to use impersonal [20] verbs in the third person singular of the active verb, as Grammarians know very well. In this way we find many notes which simply can’t be preferred to what is written.

[49] As for the Pharisees’ second argument, what we’ve just said enables us to respond to it easily too. In addition to doubtful readings, [25] the Scribes also noted obsolete words. For there’s no doubt that in the Hebrew language, as in every other, subsequent usage made many things obsolete and antiquated, that the last Scribes found such things in the Bible,69 and that, as we’ve said, they noted all of them, so that when the texts were read in public they would be read according to [30] the usage accepted at that time. [50] That’s why the word נער, na’‘ar, is found everywhere with a marginal note; in antiquity it was of common gender, and meant the same thing juvenis does in Latin [i.e., a young person of either sex]. Similarly, the ancients pronounced the capital city of the Hebrews ירושלם, yerushalem, not ירושלים, yerushalayim. I think the same concerning the pronoun, הוא, [which can mean either] he [or] she; the later Hebrews changed the ו to a י (a frequent change in the [III/139] Hebrew language) when they wanted to signify the feminine gender; but the ancients were accustomed to distinguish the feminine from the masculine of this pronoun only by vowels [which were not, at that time, a part of the written language]. [51] Moreover, the irregularity of certain verbs was also different at different times. And finally, the [5] ancients used the paragogic letters, האמנתיו, with a refinement peculiar to their own times. I could illustrate all these things here with many examples, but I do not want to detain the reader in tedious material.

[52] If you ask, “how do you know these things?” I reply: because I’ve found them frequently among the most ancient Biblical Writers, and yet saw that later writers did not want to imitate them. This is the [10] only way words can be known to be obsolete in the other languages, even in languages now dead.

[53] But perhaps someone will still insist: [i] since I’ve maintained that most of these notes are doubtful readings, why don’t we ever find more than two readings of the same passage? why not sometimes three, or more? Again, [ii] certain things in the Written texts (which are [15] indicated correctly in the margin) are so clearly contrary to Grammar that it’s just not credible that the scribes could have been in difficulty about them and doubted which was the true reading.

[54] To these objections, too, it’s easy to reply. To the first, [i] I say that there were more readings than we find noted in our manuscripts. [20] For the Talmud notes many which the Masoretes neglected. The authors of the Talmud depart from the Masoretes so openly in many places that that superstitious 70 corrector of the Bomberg Bible⁷¹ was finally compelled to confess in his preface that he doesn’t know how to reconcile them, ולא ידענא לתרוצי אלא כדתריצנא לעיל דארחיה דגמרא לפלוגי על המסורת, we [25] don’t know how to reply here, except as we’ve done above, that the practice of the Talmud is to contradict the Masoretes. So we can have no adequate foundation for maintaining that there were never more than two readings of one passage.

[55] Nevertheless, I grant readily—indeed, I believe—that not more than two readings of one passage have ever been found. And that for [30] two reasons. First, because the cause we’ve shown for the variety of readings which exist cannot allow more than two. We’ve shown that they’ve come mainly from the similarity of certain letters. [56] So the doubt almost always came back in the end to this: which of two letters (whose use is very frequent) ought to have been written, beth, ב, or kaph, כ, yod, י, or waw, ו, daleth, ד, or resh, ר, etc.? So it could often [III/140] happen that either one would yield a tolerable meaning. Again, [in some cases the doubt might arise from the question] whether a syllable was long or short, where the length of the syllable is determined by [the presence or absence of] the Quiescent letters. Moreover, not all of the notes are doubtful readings. For we’ve said that many notes [5] were inserted for the sake of decency, or to explain obsolete and antiquated words.

[57] The second reason I’m persuaded that not more than two readings of one passage are found is that I believe the Scribes found very few copies, perhaps not more than two or three. The treatise of the Scribes, סופרים,72 ch. 6, mentions only three, which they hypothesize [10] were found in the time of Ezra, because they claim that these notes were inserted by Ezra himself. [58] However that may be, if they had three, we can easily conceive that in a given passage two of them always agreed. Indeed, it would’ve been marvelous if, with only three copies, they found three different readings of one and the same passage.

[15] By what fate did it happen that after Ezra there were so few copies? If you read 1 Maccabees 1[:54–61] or Josephus’ Antiquities XII, v, you won’t wonder any longer.73 Indeed, it will seem marvelous that after such extensive and enduring persecution they were able to retain those few. I [20] think no one who has read that account with even moderate attention has any doubt about this.

[59] So we see why there aren’t more than two doubtful readings anywhere. The fact that there are never more than two readings is no reason to infer that in the annotated passages the Bible was deliberately written incorrectly to signify some mystery.

[25] [60] [ii] As for the second objection [§53] – that certain things are written so incorrectly that they couldn’t have doubted their being contrary to correct usage in every period, and ought to have just corrected them, without noting them in the margin – this doesn’t concern me. I’m not bound to know what religious scruple moved them not to [30] do this. [61] Perhaps they did it out of integrity, because they wanted to hand the Bible down to posterity in whatever way they themselves had found it in a few originals, and to note the discrepancies between the originals, not, indeed, as doubtful readings, but as variants. I have called them doubtful only because in almost every case I have no idea which is to be preferred to the other.

[62] Finally, in addition to these doubtful readings, the Scribes also [III/141] noted a number of mutilated passages by inserting an empty space in the middle of a paragraph. The Masoretes pass on twenty-eight of these passages where an empty space is inserted in the middle of a paragraph. I don’t know whether they also believe that some mystery lies hidden [5] in that number. Moreover, the Pharisees scrupulously keep to a certain quantity of space [in indicating these lacunae]. [63] There is an example of this—to mention one—in Genesis 4:8, where it is written: and Cain said to Abel, his brother, . . . and it happened, while they were in the field, that Cain etc.1 An empty space is left where we were expecting to learn [10] what Cain said to his brother. Besides the things already noted, there are twenty-eight passages of this kind, left untouched by the Scribes. Many of these, however, wouldn’t appear mutilated if there weren’t a space inserted. But that’s enough on these matters.

1. Dunin-Borkowski 1933–36, III, 325–26, argued that there is a contradiction between this claim and the preceding chapter’s claim that Ezra wrote the historical books under consideration. ALM argue that there is no contradiction, that Ch. viii contends only that Ezra undertook to write a history of Israel—making extensive use of preexisting materials—and that ix, 2, contends only that his execution of this plan was very imperfect.

2. Though the question is evidently still open to debate, the current view seems to be that 2 Kings 18:13–20:19 was the source for the account of Sennacherib’s invasion of Judah in Isaiah 36–39, rather than Isaiah being the source for 2 Kings. See Anchor Isaiah, I, 459. At 2 Kings 18:13 HCSB comments that “The narrative includes much traditional material and shows signs of having gone through a long editorial history.”

3. One of the historical sources for our present Bible which it refers to, but does not include.

4. **[ADN. XI] E.g., in 2 Kings 18:20 we read in the second person אמרת, you have said, but these are only words, etc., whereas in Isaiah 36:5 we read אמרתי, I have said, surely these are words, that in war there is a need for counsel and strength. Again, in 2 Kings 18:22 we read וכי תאמרון, but perhaps you will say, in the plural; but in Isaiah’s copy [36:7] this is in the singular. Moreover, in the text of Isaiah we do not read these words (from 2 Kings 18:32) ארץ זית יצהר ודבש וחיו ולא תמתו ואל- תשמעו אל- חזקיהו [a land of olive oil and honey, so that you may live and not die. Don’t listen to Hezekiah]. In this way there are many other variant readings. No one will be able to determine which should be chosen in preference to the others.

5. On the relationship between 2 Kings and Jeremiah, see Anchor Kings, II, 320–21.

6. On the relationship between 2 Sam. 7 and 1 Chron. 17, see Anchor Chronicles, II, 662–64.

7. **[ADN. XII] E.g., in 2 Samuel 7:6 we read ואהיה מתהלך באהל ובמשכן, and I have continually wandered with a tent and a tabernacle, whereas in 1 Chronicles 17:5 we read ואהיה מאהל אל-אהל וממשכן, and I went from tent to tent and from tabernacle, with מתהלך changed into מאהל, אהל into אל-אהל and במשכן into ממשכן. Again, 2 Samuel 7:10 reads נותו, to afflict him, and 1 Chronicles 17:9 reads לבלתו, to waste him. And in this way everyone who is neither completely blind nor altogether mad, and who has once read these chapters, will notice many discrepancies, and others of greater importance.

8. The information about the kings of Edom in Genesis is almost identical to that in 1 Chronicles, except that the last verse of this section in Chronicles reports the death of Hadad. HCSB comments that “this addition makes the chiefs [whose names immediately follow] clearly subsequent to the list of Edomite kings.”

9. **[ADN. XIII] That this text concerns only the time when Joseph was sold is not established only from the context of the statement. It may also be inferred from Judah’s age. At that time he was twenty-two at most, if we may make a calculation from the preceding narrative about him. For it is evident from Genesis 29:35 that Judah was born in the tenth year after the Patriarch Jacob began to serve Laban; but Joseph was born in the fourteenth year. [For this claim concerning the year of Joseph’s birth, see the note to §12.] Since Joseph was seventeen years old when he was sold, Judah at that time was no more than twenty-one. So those who believe that Judah’s long absence from home happened before Joseph was sold are deluding themselves, and are more anxious about the divinity of Scripture than certain of it.

10. Gen. 37 had concluded by reporting the sale of Joseph to the Egyptians. Gen. 38 interrupts the narrative about Joseph with the story of Judah and Tamar, which Spinoza summarizes in §10. The problem is that the events recounted in Gen. 38 are supposed to have begun when Joseph was sold into bondage in Egypt and that twenty-two years later, when Judah moved to Egypt, he was accompanied not only by the children he had by Tamar, but also by the two grandchildren he had through one of her sons (as we learn in Gen. 46:12).

Worries about the chronology of Gen. 38 go back to Seder Olam, a biblical commentary from the second century C.E. Seder Olam is able to squeeze all these events into the twenty-two years which it supposes to have passed between the sale of Joseph and Judah’s move to Egypt by assuming that Judah’s sons by Shua’s daughter and Tamar all married at the age of seven. See Seder Olam 2005, 32–34.

In his commentary on Gen. 38:1 Ibn Ezra rejected this solution, arguing that procreation starts at twelve at the earliest. His solution is that the phrase “at that time” does not (as we might have expected) refer to the time mentioned in the immediately preceding verse—the time when Joseph was sold—but to an earlier time. He does not say when that time was, and it is hard to see when it could have been, consistently with Judah’s participation in the sale of Joseph in Gen. 37. See Ibn Ezra 1988, I, 354–55. Spinoza therefore proposes an alternative theory of the text.

11. This is the traditional calculation, as given in Seder Olam 2005, 30–31 (and assumed by Ibn Ezra in his commentary on Gen. 38).

12. A clearer example than the one Spinoza gives, perhaps, is that twice Jacob is told that he will no longer be called Jacob, but will henceforth be known as Israel. (See Gen. 32:28 and 35:10.) But he continues to be called Jacob after that, though not consistently. Sometimes he is called Israel. (E.g., in Gen. 35:20, 35:22b, and 37:1–2 he is called Jacob. In Gen. 35:21–22a, 37:3, and 37:13, he is called Israel.) This was a classic problem, addressed by Manasseh ben Israel in his Conciliator, 1842/1972, I, 82–84. For other inconsistencies in the Joseph-Jacob stories, see Anchor Genesis, xxxiii.

13. **[ADN. XIV] For what some people think—viz. that Jacob traveled between Mesopotamia and Bethel for eight or ten years—smacks of foolishness. I might have said this, with all due respect to Ibn Ezra. For Jacob hurried as much as he could, not only because of the desire to see his parents which no doubt possessed him, but also to fulfill the vow he had made (see Gen. 28:20 and 31:13).

But if these seem to be conjectures rather than reasons, let’s grant that, by a fate worse than that which befell Ulysses, Jacob spent eight or ten additional years on this short journey—or more, if you like. Certainly they will not be able to deny that Benjamin was born in the last year of this travel [35:16–18], i.e., according to their hypothesis, in about the fifteenth or sixteenth year after Joseph was born. For Jacob said good-bye to Laban in the seventh year after the birth of Joseph. But from Joseph’s seventeenth year to the year in which the patriarch himself went to Egypt, there were not more than twenty-two years, as we have shown in this chapter [§9]. And so Benjamin was twenty-three or twenty-four at most when he went to Egypt. But though he was thus in the flower of his youth, it is established that he had grandchildren (see Genesis 46:21, and compare it with Numbers 26:38–40 and 1 Chronicles 8:1ff.). This, of course, is no less unreasonable than to maintain that Dinah was raped at the age of seven, and the other things we have deduced from the order of this history. So it is plain that when inexperienced men try to solve these difficulties, they fall into others, and complicate and mangle the situation more.

14. The point in this paragraph seems to be, not so much that the narrative contains inconsistences in the strict sense, as that it contains serious improbabilities. A very old man acts with the passion we might more naturally expect of a very young man; preadolescent boys talk and act in a way we might find more credible in adults; and a very young girl is the victim of a sexual assault. Perhaps not all of these things are quite as improbable as Spinoza thinks, but taken collectively they seem a lot to swallow.

Spinoza’s estimate of Jacob’s age at the time of his marriage to Leah is based on the following calculations. First, he assumes, on the basis of the data presented in §9 of the text, that Jacob grieved twenty-two years because of Joseph’s absence. Given that Jacob was 130 when Joseph presented him to the Pharaoh (47:9), if we subtract the twenty-two years of grief, plus the seventeen years of Joseph’s age when sold into slavery, and the seven years Jacob served Laban between his marriage to Leah and the birth of Joseph, we get eighty-four. Genesis Rabbah (II, 618) had already reached this result by a different route.

We must not suppose, as some do, that Jacob had to wait seven years between his marriage to Leah and his marriage to Rachel. Gen. 29:26–30 says he waited only a week. He was permitted to marry Rachel before he served his second seven years of service. But Rachel was barren for several years before she had Joseph. The traditional assumption was that the twelve children born to Jacob in Paddan-Aram were all born during the second seven-year period. See Ibn Ezra 1988, I, 288 (and Seder Olam 2005, 23). Spinoza is content to make the traditional assumption. As Ibn Ezra had pointed out, counting the two handmaidens, there were four women involved, some of whom may have been pregnant concurrently. To account for the birth of twelve children in seven years, it is not necessary to assume that all the children were born prematurely.

Spinoza’s estimate of the ages of Dinah, Simeon, and Levi at the time of the rape is the estimate Ibn Ezra makes of their ages when they arrived in Shechem. See his commentary on Gen. 33:20 (1988, I, 326). But Ibn Ezra assumes that Jacob and his family stayed in Shechem for many years before proceeding on to Bethel. He does not say why, but presumably thought this assumption was necessary to explain the events of Gen. 34. ADN. XIV is designed to block this move.

15. The recognition that the scriptural text often contains alternate versions of the same story—as, for example, the two separate versions of the creation story in Gen. 1–2:4a and Gen. 2:4b–3:24, or the two blended versions of the flood story in Gen. 6:5–8:22—was an important step in the development of the Documentary Hypothesis. On this see Friedman 1989, ch. 2, or Coogan 2006, chs. 1 and 2. Spinoza is keenly aware of the existence of these “doublets” and the inconsistencies between them. He would have found the inconsistencies between the various accounts of the creation and the flood, for example, discussed in Manasseh’s Conciliator, questions 3, 5, 9, 12, 28, 29, and 31. The Joseph-Jacob stories are another example where two different stories have been blended. Cf. Anchor Genesis, xxxiii.

16. The discontinuities and repetitions which occur in the passages connecting Joshua to Judges (from Josh. 24:29 through Judg. 2:10) have led the most recent twentieth-century editor to propose that the central portions of Judges (2:6–15:20) are an eighth-century editor’s collection of old stories, which later editors have embedded in a Deuteronomic or Deuteronomistic framework. See Anchor Judges, 29–38, and its comments on Judges 1–2.

17. **[ADN. XV] That is, in other terms and in another order than are found in the book of Joshua. [This adnotation occurs only in two of our sources, Saint-Glain and KB. Its authenticity is doubtful.]

18. On the relation between these two versions of a story in which David spares Saul’s life, see Anchor Samuel, I, 385–87, 409–10.

19. By the time of Manasseh ben Israel’s Conciliator there had been a long history of attempts to reconcile the numbers. Cf. his comment on Judges 11:26 (1842/1972, II, 29–34). Though Spinoza never explicitly mentions Manasseh, it seems clear that Proietti 1997 is right to argue that he has him in mind in this passage. Manasseh’s way of setting up the problem is very close to the one Spinoza uses in §17. He then canvasses several possible solutions before proposing his own, which makes what sometimes seem to be rather arbitrary assumptions about how long those judges governed whose periods of government Scripture does not specify. He does not consider the difficulties Spinoza raises in §§18–26.

20. See, for example, Num. 32:13 or Josh. 5:6.

21. See Josephus, Antiquities V, i, 29 (which, however, gives 25 as the number of years Joshua ruled).

22. See Judg. 3:8.

23. **[ADN. XVI] Rabbi Levi ben Gerson and others believe that these forty years, which Scripture says passed in freedom [Judges 3:11], nevertheless begin with the death of Joshua, and so include the preceding eight years, in which the people were subject to Cushan-rishathaim, and that the eighteen years which followed [Judges 3:14] are also to be included in the eighty years that Ehud and Shamgar judged. Thus they believe that remaining years of bondage are always included under those Scripture says passed in freedom. But because Scripture expressly reckons how many years the Hebrews spent in bondage and how many in freedom, and in Judges 2:18 expressly tells us that the Hebrews always flourished under the judges, it is quite evident that this Rabbi (otherwise a very learned man) and those who follow in his footsteps are correcting Scripture, rather than explaining it, when they try to resolve such difficulties.

So do those who maintain that in that general calculation of years Scripture wanted to indicate only the periods when there was a Jewish state, and could not have included in the general account the years of anarchy or of bondage, as being inauspicious and, as it were, interruptions of the government. For indeed, Scripture usually does pass over in silence periods of anarchy; but it usually treats years of bondage no less than those of freedom, nor is it accustomed, as they fancy, to delete them from the annals.

That Ezra meant to include, in that general summing up of years in 1 Kings [6], absolutely all the years from the exodus from Egypt is a thing so manifest that no one practiced in Scripture has ever questioned it. For to pass over now the words of the text itself, the Genealogy of David given at the end of Ruth [4:18–22] and in 1 Chronicles 2[:11–15] hardly allows so large a sum of years. For Nahshon was the leader of the tribe of Judah in the second year after the exodus from Egypt (see Numbers 7:11–12). So he died in the wilderness, and his son Salmon crossed the Jordan with Joshua. But this Salmon, according to the Genealogy of David, was David’s great-great-grandfather. If we subtract from this sum of 480 years the four years of Solomon’s reign, the seventy years of David’s life, and the forty passed in the desert, we will find that David was born in the 366th year after the crossing of the Jordan and consequently, that it is necessary that his father, grandfather, great-grandfather and great-great-grandfather fathered children when each of them was ninety years old.

24. See Judg. 3:11.

25. See Judg. 3:14.

26. Spinoza’s basis for this is presumably Judg. 3:30–31, though those verses suggest that the period of 80 years mentioned in 3:30 counts only the period when Ehud was a judge. The text gives no information about the length of time Shamgar was a judge.

27. See Judg. 4:3.

28. This would be during the period when Deborah and Barak were judges. Judg. 4–5.

29. See Judg. 6:1.

30. See Judg. 8:28.

31. See Judg. 9:22.

32. Judg. 10:2.

33. Judg. 10:3.

34. Judg. 10:7–8.

35. Judg. 12:7.

36. Judg. 12:9.

37. Judg. 12:11.

38. Judg. 12:14.

39. Judg. 13:1.

40. **[ADN. XVII] Samson was born after the Philistines had subjugated the Hebrews. [Saint-Glain: One might doubt whether these twenty years should be counted under the years of freedom or whether they are included in the forty immediately preceding years, during which the people were under the yoke of the Philistines. For myself, I confess that I find it more probable and credible that the Hebrews recovered their freedom when the leaders of the Philistines perished with Samson. Also, I have counted these twenty years of Samson among those during which the yoke of the Philistines lasted only because Samson was born after the Philistines had subjugated the Hebrews, besides the fact that in the treatise on the Sabbath there is mention of a certain book on Jerusalem, where it is said that Samson judged the people forty years. But it is not a question only of these years.]

41. Judg. 15:20.

42. 1 Sam. 4:18.

43. 1 Sam. 7:2.

44. 1 Kings 2:11.

45. 1 Kings 6:1.

46. In his Antiquities VIII, iii, 1, Josephus had given a figure of 592 years between the exodus and the building of the temple, but had not discussed the inconsistency between that figure and 1 Kings 6:1.

47. The presence of multiple authors/editors in the first three chapters of Judges makes the chronology of the events described there very unclear, but Spinoza’s verdict seems reasonable. See §14 and the annotation there.

48. Modern translations acknowledge the defectiveness of the text. The NRSV translation reads as follows: “Saul was . . . years old when he began to reign; and he reigned . . . and two years over Israel.” The HCSB annotation comments that in the first lacuna the number is lacking in the Hebrew text, and that in the second, “two is not the entire number; something has dropped out.” Similarly in the NJPS edition and Anchor Samuel. The problem is not just the improbability of Saul’s beginning his reign at the age of one, but, as Manasseh puts it, that “so many events took place during Saul’s reign, that it seems incredible that they could have occurred in the small space of two years” (1842/1972, II, 46). When Manasseh discusses this passage (in Part II, questions 8 and 12), rather than question the integrity of the text, he proposes metaphorical interpretations of the passage.

49. Josephus, Antiquities VI, xiv, 9. This quotation indicates that Spinoza is reading Josephus in the Latin translation made by the order of Cassiodorus. The Greek text says that Saul reigned for twenty-two years after the death of Samuel. For further discussion, see ALM.

50. The reference is to 1 Sam. 7:13–14, verses whose inconsistency with other parts of the narrative troubled commentators as long ago as Kimchi, who interpreted the phrase “all the days of Samuel” to mean “all the years in which Samuel exercised sole authority, before he became old and delegated his duties to his sons.” The consensus of modern editors is to regard them as insertions of the Deuteronomic editor. Cf. Anchor Samuel, I, 147.

51. That is, the years following the death of Samson, in which no king ruled, and no judge is mentioned.

52. Spinoza explains the inconsistency between 2 Kings 1:17 and 2 Kings 8:16 by contending that the editors of 2 Kings relied on inconsistent sources, now lost, without eliminating the inconsistency. Kimchi had explained the inconsistency by supposing that Jehoram, the son of Jehoshaphat, began to reign while his father was still alive, but did not officially become king until his death, which was in the fifth year of the reign of Jehoram, the son of Ahab. Some later commentators accepted this solution (ALM).

53. In his discussion of 1 and 2 Kings in his Conciliator Manasseh identifies nearly two dozen passages where the accounts in those books are prima facie inconsistent with those in 1 and 2 Chronicles.

54. By contrast, 2 Kings 8:26 gives Ahaziah’s age as twenty-two at the beginning of his reign. In Part II, qu. 41, Manasseh discusses this problem (recognized as early as Seder Olam) and ascribes the solution Spinoza rejects to Gersonides. For the proposals of Rashi and Kimchi, see ALM.

55. **[ADN. XVIII] Otherwise they correct the words of Scripture rather than explain them.

56. Literally, “he will be a great Apollo for me,” echoing a line from Virgil’s Eclogues III, 404.

57. A rare and important autobiographical statement, which unfortunately presents translation problems. I have rendered imbutus fuerim as I was instructed in; Elwes has I was imbued with. Either is possible; Elwes’ rendering suggests that for a long time Spinoza accepted the views he was taught; mine allows the possibility that Spinoza may have become skeptical about those teachings at an early age.

58. This was, for example, the view of the Westminster Confession. See ch. I, sec. viii.

59. Later (in ix, 63) Spinoza will give Gen. 4:8 as an example.

60. ALM note that Johannes Buxtorf seems to be among those under attack here.

61. Possibly a reference to Manasseh ben Israel, though he would not have been the only Kabbalist in the Amsterdam Jewish community. See Katchen 1984, ch. 2. And on the Kabbalah generally, see Scholem 1974. ALM note that Spinoza possessed works by Joseph del Medigo and doubtless knew Abraham Herrera’s Puerta del Cielo.

62. **[ADN. XIX] Kirjath-jearim is also called Baale-judah. So Kimchi and others think that baale yehudah, which I have here translated from the people of Judah, is the name of the town. But they are mistaken, because baale is plural in number. Again, if we compare this text of Samuel with the one in 1 Chronicles [13:6], we shall see that David did not get up and go from Baale, but that he went to there. For if the author of 2 Samuel were concerned to at least indicate the place from which David carried off the ark, then to speak proper Hebrew he would have said: and David arose, and set out etc. from Baale-judah, and from there he carried off the ark of God.

63. Here the judgment of modern scholarship would seem to be that Spinoza is right to think the Masoretic text corrupt, but wrong in his conjecture about how the text should read. Cf. Anchor Samuel, II, 162–63.

64. **[ADN. XX] Those who have been involved in commenting on this text have corrected it in the following way: and Absalom fled, and went to Talmai, the son of Ammihud, king of Geshur, where he stayed for three years, and David mourned his son all the time he was at Geshur. But if that’s what they call interpretation, and if we’re permitted to give ourselves such license in the explanation of Scripture, and to transpose in that way whole phrases, either by joining them or by cutting something out, I acknowledge that we are permitted to corrupt Scripture, and to give it as many different forms as we like, as if it were a piece of wax. [Spinoza’s judgment that the received text is corrupt is evidently correct, though the comment in the annotation may be unduly harsh. See Anchor Samuel, II, 332.]

65. Printed Hebrew Bibles typically contain more than a thousand marginal notes reflecting differences between the consonantal text and the version of the text read in services. The latter is known as the qere (what is to be read), whereas the text is known as the kethib (what is written). Sometimes these notes seem clearly intended to correct textual errors; in other cases, they clearly give variant readings. Sometimes their purpose is not clear. See NJPS, p. xii, n. 5. ALM note that the danger of confusing similar letters was a common theme among Hebraists in this period.

66. So the NJPS edition normally bases its translation on the qere, noting that although the qere was preserved only in the margin, the Masoretes gave it greater weight than the kethib. The quotation from Judges 21 at the end of §37 is an instance of this.

67. The omission of the final consonant changes the meaning of the word from young woman to young man.

68. In the unpointed scrolls read in the Synagogues, although the kethib is retained in the text, the qere is not given in the margin. The reader is expected to know when to read the qere instead of the kethib.

69. Although it is difficult to date the earliest parts of the Hebrew Bible, there is apparently a consensus that they go back at least to some time in the tenth century B.C.E., and possibly considerably earlier. The latest parts can be more confidently dated to the early second century B.C.E. (see Kugel 2007, 5). This offers considerable scope for linguistic change.

70. Latin: superstitiosus, which can, of course, mean superstitious, but may also mean nothing more than a blind adherence to rules.

71. Daniel Bomberg, one of the earliest printers of Hebrew-language books, published the first Rabbinic Bible (Mikra’ot Gedolot), consisting of the Hebrew text with Targums and the standard commentaries (including those of Rashi and Ibn Ezra) in 4 volumes, in 1517–18. Spinoza’s superstitiosus corrector was R. Jacob ben Hayyim, who edited the second edition of the Bomberg Bible, which appeared in 1524–25. According to the Encyclopaedia Judaica, R. Jacob believed in the importance of the masorah as the guarantor of the correct text, and “went to great pains . . . to secure as many codices with a masorah as possible.” But as he discovered that “the masorah did not harmonize with the majority of the codices,” he had to exercise his discretion. Later Bibles in the sixteenth century tend to follow his text. The Bible on which Spinoza primarily relied was the four-volume rabbinic Bible published by Buxtorf in 1618. The Bibles produced by Buxtorf were modeled on the Bomberg Bible, but were influenced by Sephardic, rather than Ashkenazic, traditions.

72. Spinoza is referring to an extra-canonical treatise, added at the end of the order Nezikin in the Babylonian Talmud. In ch. 6, §4 we read: “R. Simeon ben Lakish says they discovered three books in the Temple.” He tells how they compared their texts, and in each case preferred the reading given by two manuscripts over that given by only one (ALM).

73. The texts cited describe the attempt of Antiochus in the second century B.C.E. to destroy Judaism by having copies of the Bible burned and those found possessing them killed.

[III/141] CHAPTER X

The Remaining Books of the Old Testament
Examined in the same way as above

[1] I pass to the remaining books of the Old Testament. About the two books of Chronicles I have nothing certain and worth noting, except that they were written long after Ezra,2 and perhaps after Judas Maccabee [20] restored the temple.3** For in 1 Chronicles 9 the Historian relates which families first (i.e., in the time of Ezra) lived in Jerusalem.⁴ And again in 1 Chronicles 9:17 he gives information about the gatekeepers, two of whom are also mentioned in Nehemiah 11:19. This shows that these books were written long after the rebuilding of the city.⁵

[25] [2] However that may be, nothing is apparent to me about the true Writer of these books, nor about their authority, utility and teaching. Indeed, I cannot sufficiently wonder that they have been accepted as Sacred by the people who removed the book of wisdom, Tobias, and the rest of the so-called apocrypha from the canon of the sacred books.6 Nevertheless, it is not my intent to lessen their authority; since everyone [30] has accepted them, I too leave them as they are.

[3] The Psalms were also collected, and divided up into five books, in the time of the second temple.7 For according to the testimony of Philo Judaeus, Psalm 88 was edited while King Jehoiakin was still kept [III/142] in captivity in Babylon, and Psalm 89 when the same King obtained his freedom. I don’t believe Philo would ever have said this unless either it was the received opinion in his time or he had accepted it from others worthy of trust.8

[4] I believe the Proverbs of Solomon were also collected at the same time, or at the earliest, in the time of King Josiah, because the [5] last verse of ch. 24 says, These also are the Proverbs of Solomon, which the men of Hezekiah, king of Judah, transcribed.9 [5] But here I cannot pass over in silence the boldness of the Rabbis, who wanted this book, along with Ecclesiastes, excluded from the canon of Sacred books, and wanted to keep it under guard, along with other books we are now lacking.10 They would simply have done this, if they had not found [10] certain passages which commended the law of Moses. It is surely a cause of grief that sacred and noble matters depended on the choice of these men. All the same, I thank them for having been willing to share these books too with us—though I cannot help doubting whether they have handed them down in good faith.11 But I don’t want to subject this to a strict examination here.

[15] [6] So I proceed to the books of the Prophets.12 When I pay close attention to these books, I see that the Prophecies in them have been collected from other books, and that they aren’t always written down in the same order in which the Prophets themselves spoke or wrote them. Moreover, they don’t even contain all the [Prophecies], but only those [the editors] were able to find here and there. So these books are only the fragments of the Prophets.

[20] [7] For Isaiah began to prophesy in the reign of Uzziah, as the transcriber himself tells us in the first verse. But he not only prophesied at that time, he also recorded all the deeds of this King (see 2 Chronicles 26:22). This book is now lost. What we have, we have shown to have been copied out from the Chronicles of the Kings of [25] Judah and of Israel.13 [8] Add to this that the Rabbis maintain that this Prophet prophesied also in the reign of Manasseh, by whom, in the end, he was killed. And although they seem to be relating a legend, still they seem to have believed that not all of his Prophecies were extant.14

[9] Second, the Prophecies of Jeremiah, which are narrated in an historical manner, have been gathered and assembled from various [30] chroniclers. For not only are they piled up confusedly, without attention to chronological order, but the same story is repeated in different ways. Ch. 21 explains the reason for Jeremiah’s imprisonment: when Zedekiah consulted him, he predicted the destruction of the city. Ch. 22 interrupts this story to relate his declamation against Jehoiakin, [III/143] who reigned before Zedekiah,15 and his prediction of the King’s captivity. Then ch. 25 describes things revealed to the Prophet before these, in the fourth year of the reign of Jehoiakim [Jehoiakin’s father and predecessor as king]. [In ch. 26] we find things which happened in the first year of this King. [10] And so, without any chronological [5] order, [the editor] proceeds to pile up Prophecies, until finally ch. 38 returns to what ch. 21 began to narrate, as if these fifteen chapters were spoken parenthetically.16 For the conjunction with which ch. 38 begins¹⁷ is related to 21:8–10. And then it describes very differently the final imprisonment of Jeremiah and gives a very different reason for his long detention in the guard’s court than the reason narrated in [10] ch. 37. You can see clearly that all these [passages] are collected from different Historians, and that [their disorder] cannot be excused by any other reason.

[11] As for the rest of the Prophecies, contained in the remaining chapters, where Jeremiah speaks in the first person, they seem to have been copied out from the scroll Baruch wrote at Jeremiah’s own dictation. [15] For it’s apparent from Jeremiah 36:2 that that scroll contained only the things revealed to this Prophet from Josiah’s time down to the fourth year of Jehoiakim, when this book begins. The materials from 45:2 to 51:59 also seem to have been copied out from that scroll.

[20] [12] The first verses of Ezekiel indicate very clearly that it too is only a fragment. Who does not see that the conjunction the book begins with 18 is related to other things already said, and connects them with the things to follow? But it’s not only the conjunction; the whole context of the statement presupposes other previous writings. [13] For this book begins with a reference to the thirtieth year,19 which shows [25] that the Prophet is continuing his narration, not beginning it. The Writer himself also notes this when he adds parenthetically in v. 3, the word of God often came to Ezekiel, the priest, the son of Buzi, in the land of the Chaldeans, etc., as if to say that the words of Ezekiel which he had recorded up to that point were related to other things, which had been revealed to him before this thirtieth year. Further, in his Antiquities [30] (X, vii, [2]) Josephus relates that Ezekiel predicted that Zedekiah would not see Babylon, which we do not read in our book—i.e., the book we have.20 On the contrary, one reads there (in 17:[16–21]) that he would be led as a captive to Babylon.²¹**

[14] Concerning Hosea we cannot say with certainty that he wrote more things than are contained in the book attributed to him. Still, I am amazed that we do not have more writings of his, since the Writer [III/144] testifies that he prophesied more than 84 years.22

[15] We can, at least, know this in general: that the Writers of these books did not collect all the prophecies of all the Prophets, nor even all the prophecies of the Prophets we have. For of the Prophets who prophesied during the reign of Manasseh (mentioned generally in 2 [5] Chronicles 33:10, 18 and 19), we have no prophecies at all. Nor do we have all the prophecies of these twelve Prophets.23 For of Jonah’s Prophecies, only those about the Ninevites are recorded, though he also prophesied to the Israelites (see 2 Kings 14:25).

[10] [16] Concerning the book of Job, and Job himself, there has been much controversy among the Writers.24 Some people think Moses wrote this book, and that the whole story is only a parable. Some of the Rabbis in the Talmud hand down this view; Maimonides too leans toward it in his Moreh Nevuchim. Others have believed the story to be [15] true. Of these, some thought that this Job lived in the time of Jacob, and that he married Jacob’s daughter, Dinah. [17] But as I’ve already said [vii, 64], Ibn Ezra asserts in his commentaries on this book that it was translated into Hebrew from another language.

I wish he had shown us this more clearly. If he had, we could infer [20] that the gentiles too had sacred books. [But since he didn’t,] I leave the matter in doubt. Nevertheless, I do conjecture that Job was a gentile 25 whose heart was very constant, and whose affairs at first prospered, then went very badly, and finally were very fortunate. For Ezekiel 14:14 names him among others [as a righteous man]. [18] And I believe that the changes in Job’s fortunes, and the constancy of his heart, gave many [25] people an occasion for arguing about God’s providence—or at least gave the author of this book an occasion to compose this Dialogue. For the things in it, as well as the style, seem to be, not those of a man suffering among the ashes, but those of a man reflecting at leisure in his study.26 And here I would believe, along with Ibn Ezra, that this book really was translated from another language, because [the author] seems [30] to aspire to the poetic art of the Gentiles. For twice the Father of the Gods calls a council, and Momus (here called Satan) criticizes God’s dictates with the greatest freedom, etc. But these are only conjectures, and are not sufficiently firm.

[19] I pass to the book of Daniel. From ch. 8 on, this book no doubt contains Daniel’s own writings. But where the first seven chapters were [III/145] copied from, I don’t know. Except for the first, they were written in Chaldean.27 So we can suspect that they were taken from the Chronicles of the Chaldeans. [20] If this were clearly established, it would be most splendid evidence to persuade us that Scripture is sacred only insofar as by Scripture we mean the things signified in Scripture, not insofar as we [5] mean by Scripture the words, or the language and utterances, by which things are signified. It would show, further, that the books teaching and relating excellent things are equally sacred, whatever language they were finally written in, and whatever nation wrote them. [21] Nevertheless, we can at least note this: these chapters were written in Chaldean and, notwithstanding that, are as sacred as the rest of the Bible.

[10] The first book of Ezra 28 is so connected to this book of Daniel that it is easy to see that the Writer is the same person, who is continuing to relate the affairs of the Jews in sequence, from the first part of the captivity.²⁹

[22] And I don’t doubt that the Book of Esther is connected with the first book of Ezra. For the conjunction with which this book begins 30 can’t be related to any other book. Furthermore, it is not credible that [15] Esther is the book Mordecai wrote.31 For in 9:20–22 another person relates, concerning Mordecai, that he wrote Letters, and what they contained. Moreover, in 9:31[–32], [the narrator relates] that queen Esther established by edict matters pertaining to the festival of Lots (Purim), and that this was written in a book. It sounds in the Hebrew [20] as though this was a book known to everyone at that time—viz. the time in which the things [in the book of Esther] were written. And Ibn Ezra confesses, as everyone is bound to confess, that this [book] perished with the others. Finally, [in 10:2] the Historian sends us to the Chronicles of the Kings of Persia for the rest of Mordecai’s story.

[23] There is thus no doubt that the same Historian who related the affairs of Daniel and Ezra also wrote this book, as well as the book of [25] Nehemiah 32* (called the second book of Ezra). So we maintain that one and the same Historian wrote these four books: Daniel, Ezra, Esther and Nehemiah. But who he was, I cannot even conjecture.

[24] How did this person, whoever he was, acquire knowledge of [30] these accounts, and perhaps also copy down most of them? Like the Kings in the first temple, the governors, or princes, of the Jews in the second temple had scribes or historiographers who wrote annals, or their Chronicles, in sequence. The Chronicles of the Kings, or their annals, are cited throughout the books of Kings. Those of the Princes [III/146] and priests of the second temple are first cited in Nehemiah 12:23, and next in 1 Maccabees 16:24. [25] No doubt this is the book we just spoke about (see Esther 9:31[–32]), which gave accounts of Esther’s edict and Mordecai’s deeds, and which (with Ibn Ezra) we have said perished. It [5] seems, then, that all the things contained in these [four books] have been selected or copied out from this book. For the Writer of these books does not cite any other book, and we do not know any other book whose authority is generally recognized.

[26] That neither Ezra nor Nehemiah wrote these books is evident from the fact that Nehemiah 12:10–11 traces the descendants of the [10] high priest, Jeshua, down to Jaddua, the sixth high priest, who went out to meet Alexander the Great when he had nearly subjugated the Persian empire 33* (or as Philo Judaeus says in the book of times,³⁴ the sixth and last priest under the Persians). [27] Indeed, Nehemiah 12:22 indicates this clearly: In the time of Eliashib, Joiada, Johanan and Jaddua, says the Historian, the Levites were recorded on35* the reign of Darius the Persian, i.e., in the Chronicles. I believe no one will think that either Ezra³⁶** or Nehemiah was so long-lived that they survived fourteen Kings of Persia. For Cyrus was the first to give the Jews permission to rebuild the temple, and from his time until that of Darius, the fourteenth and last of the Persian Kings, we count more than 230 years.³⁷

[28] So I do not doubt that these books [Daniel, Ezra, Esther and Nehemiah] were written long after Judas Maccabee restored worship in the temple,38 because at that time the false books of Daniel, Ezra and Esther³⁹ were circulated by certain malevolent people who no doubt belonged to the Sect of the Sadducees. For so far as I know, the Pharisees never accepted those books. And although we find in the book called 4 Ezra certain tales which we also read in the Talmud, that is still no reason to attribute them to the Pharisees. If you discount the most foolish of them, there is none of them who does not believe [30] that those legends were added by some trifler.40 I also believe that some [Sadducees] did this to make the traditions [of the Pharisees] laughable to everyone. [29] Or if you prefer, perhaps [those books] were copied out and published at that time to show the people that the Prophecies of Daniel were fulfilled and in this way to strengthen them in religion, [III/147] so that in such great calamities they would not despair of having better times and of their future salvation.

[30] But though these books 41 are so much later and more recent, many errors have crept into them. If I’m not mistaken, this happened because they were copied out hastily. For in these books, as in the others, [5] we find marginal notes of the kind we treated in the last Chapter, but more of them than in the others. Moreover, there are also certain passages which cannot be explained in any other way, as I shall shortly show.

First, though, I want to note this regarding the marginal readings of these books: even if we must grant the Pharisees that these readings go back to those who wrote the books themselves,42 then we must say [10] that the Writers (if, by chance, there was more than one) made a note of these readings because they found that the Chronicles they were transcribing were not written accurately enough, and that, though certain errors were clear, they still did not dare to correct the writings of the ancients and of their predecessors. There is no need now for me to treat these matters more fully here again.

[15] [31] So I proceed to point out things not noted in the margin. First, I don’t know how many errors have crept into Ezra 2. For in v. 64 the total of all those who have been numbered in the various families is given as 42,360. Nevertheless, if you add the subtotals for each family, you will not find more than 29,818. Something is wrong here, either [20] in the total or in the subtotals.43 But it seems we ought to believe that it is the overall total which is given correctly. No doubt everyone had an accurate recall of something so memorable, whereas the subtotals are not so memorable. If an error were to slip into the overall total, it would immediately be evident to everyone, and would easily be corrected.

[25] [32] There is complete confirmation of this in Nehemiah 7, where this chapter of Ezra (called the letter on genealogy) is copied out (as is expressly said in v. 5), the overall total [given in Nehemiah 7:66] agrees completely with that of the book of Ezra, whereas the subtotals differ greatly. You will find that some subtotals are larger, and others smaller, than they are in Ezra.44 Together they all add up to 31,089. [30] So no doubt many errors have crept into both the book of Ezra and that of Nehemiah, but only in the subtotals.

[33] As for the commentators who try to reconcile these evident contradictions, each one invents what he can, according to the power of his mentality. In the meantime, while they worship the letters and words of Scripture, the only effect of their actions, as we already warned [III/148] above [III/134/25–135/1], is to expose the Writers of the Bible to contempt, so that they seem not to know how to speak, or how to order the things they have to say. All they do is obscure completely what is clear in Scripture. If it were permissible to interpret Scripture [5] everywhere in their way, there would be absolutely no utterance whose true meaning we could not doubt.

[34] But there’s no reason to go on at length about these matters. I’m convinced that if some Historian wanted to imitate everything they, in their devotion, permit the Writers of the Bible to do, they would ridicule him on many grounds. If they think it blasphemous [10] to say that Scripture is faulty somewhere, tell me what I should say about people who ascribe to Scripture whatever invention they please? or who so dishonor the Sacred Historians that they are believed to babble and to confuse everything? or who deny the clear and most evident meanings of Scripture? [35] For what is clearer in Scripture than that in the Letter on Genealogy copied out in ch. 2 of the [15] book attributed to him, Ezra (with his colleagues)45 included in his enumeration of the families all those who set out for Jerusalem? Among them he gives both the number of those who could show their Genealogy, and the number of those who could not [Ezra 2:59–63]. What is clearer from Nehemiah 7:5, I ask, than that Nehemiah simply [20] copied out this Letter?

[36] So those who explain these passages differently are only denying the true meaning of Scripture, and consequently, denying Scripture itself. As for their thinking it pious to accommodate some passages of Scripture to others,46 it is a ridiculous piety to accommodate the clear passages to the obscure, the correct to the faulty, and to corrupt the [25] sound passages with the rotten. Still, I won’t call them blasphemers; they don’t intend any evil. To err is indeed human.47

But I return to my point. [37] In addition to the errors which must be conceded to exist in the sums of the Letter on Genealogy, both in Ezra and in Nehemiah, there are many also in the names of [30] the families, still more in the Genealogies, in the histories and, I’m afraid, even in the Prophecies themselves. For certainly the Prophecy of Jeremiah 22 concerning Jeconiah does not seem to agree at all with his history. Compare particularly the words of the last verse of that chapter with the end of 2 Kings, and of Jeremiah, and 1 Chronicles 3:17–19.48

[38] Nor do I see how he could say of Zedekiah, whose eyes were [III/149] gouged out as soon as he had seen his sons put to death [2 Kings 25:7], you will die in peace etc. (see Jeremiah 34:5).49 If Prophecies are to be interpreted according to the outcome, these names would have to be changed and it would seem that for Zedekiah we should read Jeconiah, and conversely. But this would be too great a paradox; and so I prefer to [5] leave the matter as one which cannot be perceived—especially because, if there’s some error here, it must be attributed to the Historian, not to a defect in the copies.

[39] As for the other errors I’ve mentioned, I don’t think it worthwhile to identify them here. I couldn’t do that without wearying the reader—and others have already noted them. [40] Because of the very [10] manifest contradictions Rabbi Schlomoh 50 observed in the genealogies related, he was forced to burst out in these words:

That Ezra (who he thinks wrote the books of Chronicles) calls the sons of Benjamin by different names, treats his genealogy differently than we have [15] it in the book of Genesis, and finally, indicates most of the cities of the Levites differently than Joshua did, results from the fact that he found the originals inconsistent.51*

and a bit further on:

That the Genealogy of Gibeon and of others is described twice and differently comes from his having found several different Letters giving each Genealogy, and in copying them out he followed the greatest number of copies; but when [20] the number of inconsistent copies was equal, then he copied both of them.

[41] So saying, he grants, without reservation, that these books were copied out from originals which were neither correct enough nor certain enough. Indeed, this is what usually happens: when the commentators devote themselves to reconciling passages, they don’t do anything more than indicate the causes of the errors. I don’t think anyone of sound [25] judgment believes that the Sacred Historians deliberately wanted to write so that they would seem to contradict one another throughout.

[42] But perhaps someone will say that in this way I overthrow Scripture completely—for in this way everyone can suspect that it is faulty everywhere. But that would be wrong. I have shown that in this way I am consulting the interests of Scripture, to prevent the clear and [30] uncontaminated passages from being accommodated to, and corrupted by, the faulty ones. The fact that some passages are corrupt does not license suspicion of them all. No book has ever been free of error. Has anyone ever, for this reason, suspected faults everywhere? Of course not, especially when the statement is clear, and we see plainly what the author’s intention is.

[43] With this I have finished the things I wanted to mention about [III/150] the history of the Books of the Old Testament. From them we readily infer that before the time of the Maccabees there was no canon of the Sacred Books,52** but that the ones we now have were selected from many others by the Pharisees of the second temple, who also instituted the formulas for prayers, and that these books were accepted only [5] because of their decision.53 [44] So those who want to demonstrate the authority of Holy Scripture are bound to show the authority of each book; proving the divinity of one is not enough to establish the divinity of all. Otherwise we would have to maintain that the council of Pharisees could not have erred in this choice of books, something no one will ever demonstrate.

[10] [45] The reason which compels me to maintain that only the Pharisees chose the books of the Old Testament and placed them in the canon of Sacred texts is that Daniel 12:2 predicts the resurrection of the dead, which the Sadducees denied. The Pharisees themselves reveal this clearly in the Talmud. For in the Treatise on the Sabbath, II, 30b, it is said

[15] אמר רבי יהודה משמיה דרב בקשו חכמים לגנוז ספר קהלת מפני שדבריו סותרין דברי תורה ומפני מה לא גנזוהו מפני שתחילתו דברי תורה וסופו דברי תורה R. Jehuda said in Rav’s name that the wise men tried to hide the book of Ecclesiastes because its words were contrary to the words of the law (NB: to the book of the law of Moses) But why did they not hide it? because it began according to the law [20] and ended according to the law.54

[46] And a bit further on:

ואף ספר משלי בקשו לגנוז and they also tried to hide the book of Proverbs etc.

And finally, in the Treatise on the Sabbath I, 13b:

ברם זכור אותו האיש לטוב נחניה בן חזקיה שמו שאלמלא הוא נגנז ספר יחזקאל שהיו [25] דבריו סותרין דברי תורה call him a man, surely, because of his beneficence, he who is called Neghunja, son of Hezekiah; for if it had not been for him, the book of Ezekiel would have been hidden, because its words are contrary to the words of the law.55

[47] From these passages it follows clearly that those who were learned in the law summoned a council to determine which books were to be received as sacred and which were to be excluded. So whoever wants to [30] be certain of the authority of all the books should call a council again and require a reason for each one.

[48] Now it would be time to examine the books of the New Testament in the same way. But because I hear that this has been done by men who are most learned both in the sciences and especially in the languages,56 because I do not have such an exact knowledge of the Greek language that I might dare to undertake this task,⁵⁷ and finally, because we lack the original texts of the books written in the Hebrew [III/151] language 58 I prefer to refrain from this difficult business. Nevertheless, I consider that in what follows I indicate the things which contribute most to my plan.

1. Modern editions vary in their treatment of this case, sometimes indicating the omission in the Masoretic text with an ellipsis and a note (as in the NJPS translation), sometimes inserting the missing words in brackets, from the Septuagint (as in HCSB). What Cain said to Abel was “Let us go out to the field.” In this case the lacuna would be quite obvious even without the empty space.

2. Talmudic tradition made Ezra the author of the genealogies of 1 Chronicles “up to his own time” and attributed the rest of Chronicles to Nehemiah. See Baba Bathra 15a. Ezra 7:1–7 identifies Ezra as a scholarly priest, contemporary with Artaxerxes (probably Artaxerxes I, who reigned from 465 to 424), who went up to Jerusalem in the seventh year of Artaxerxes’ reign. Nehemiah was a Jewish official in the service of Artaxerxes, charged in 445 with rebuilding the wall of Jerusalem. Spinoza mistakenly thinks Ezra and Nehemiah were sixth-century figures. See below, n. 3, and ADN. XXIV at x, 27.

3. **[ADN. XXI] This suspicion—if what is certain can, indeed, be called a suspicion—is inferred from the Genealogy of King Jeconiah, which is given in 1 Chronicles 3 from vs. 17, and carried on as far as the sons of Elioenai, who were thirteenth in line from him. It should be noted that when Jeconiah was put in prison, he did not have children, but seems to have fathered children in prison, insofar as we may conjecture from the names he gave them. As for grandchildren, as far as we may again conjecture from their names, he seems to have had them after he was freed from prison. So Pedaiah (which means God has freed), who is said in this chapter to have been [Saint-Glain: the father of Zerubbabel, was born] in the 37th or 38th year of Jeconiah’s captivity, i.e., thirty-three years before Cyrus ended the Babylonian Captivity. Zerubbabel, whom Cyrus put in charge of the Jews, seems thus to have been thirteen or fourteen at most.

But I have preferred to pass over these things in silence, for reasons which the oppressiveness of our times does not permit me to explain. For the wise a hint is enough. Anyone who is willing to carefully review the account of all of Jeconiah’s descendants in 1 Chronicles 3:17–24, and to compare the Hebrew text with the Septuagint version, will be able to see without difficulty that these books were published after the second restoration of the city by Judas Maccabee, at a time when the descendants of Jeconiah had lost the rule, not before.

[At the beginning of the last paragraph Marchand’s version of this note has: “reasons which the injustices and reigning superstition oppressiveness of our times . . .”

Jeconiah (aka Jehoiachin) was the king of Judah who was taken into captivity in Babylon in 597 BCE, and kept under house arrest until he was released by King Evil-merodach thirty-seven years later (see 2 Kings 24:8–12, 25:27–30). Spinoza evidently inferred from Pedaiah’s name that he was born around the time of Jeconiah’s release, and assumed that Pedaiah would not have fathered Zerubbabel before he was around twenty. Spinoza’s calculations assume that the captivity lasted seventy years. (This was based on a tradition going back to Jer. 25:11–12.) Modern research indicates that the captivity was somewhat shorter than that, lasting from 597 to 538.

Spinoza arrived at the count of thirteen generations from Jeconiah to the sons of Elioenai by following the Septuagint translation, which renders verse 21 differently than the Masoretic text. The latter yields only nine generations from Jeconiah to the sons of Elioenai, not thirteen. (Recent English translations—the NRSV and NJPS—also follow the Septuagint.)

There are still puzzles about this note. Why is Spinoza so certain in the note that the books of Chronicles were written after the Maccabean restoration of the temple (i.e., after 164 BCE)? Modern scholars put the date of Chronicles much earlier than that (though not so early as to permit Ezra to have been the author). Anchor Chronicles, I, 101–17, argues for a date in the late fourth or early third century (though it allows that Chron. 3:17–24 may be a late addition to an earlier text).

The solution here seems to be that Spinoza is assuming, not only that twelve generations passed after Jeconiah went into captivity, but also that on average the gap between generations was in excess of thirty-five years. There is precedent for this. Some biblical scholars have assumed as many as forty years per generation. Modern scholars favor an average of twenty-five or even twenty years. (On this see Anchor Chronicles, I, 329–30.)

More difficult is the question why Spinoza thinks the oppressiveness (or injustices and superstition) of his times will not permit him to do more than hint at conclusions he passes over in silence. ALM (followed by Totaro) suggest that perhaps the problem is that the genealogy in Chronicles is inconsistent with that given in Matt. 1:12–16. But reaching this conclusion would not require comparison of the Masoretic text with the Septuagint. The differences between the Masoretic genealogy and that in Matthew are obvious enough. (So for that matter, are the differences between the genealogies in Matthew 1 and Luke 3.) Perhaps more relevant is the fact that Matt. 1:17 claims that only fourteen generations passed between Jeconiah and the Messiah. This would make one of the sons of Elioenai, and not Joseph, the father figure in the household in which Jesus grew up.]

4. Spinoza quotes 1 Chron. 9:2–3, with some omissions. Why does he place Ezra in the time of the first return from Babylon? Partly, it seems, because Ezra is listed at Neh. 12:1 as among those who returned with Zerubbabel. Cf. ADN. XXIV at x, 27. And partly also, it seems, because he took Ezra 7:1 to indicate that the events described in that and succeeding chapters of Ezra happened soon after the sixth-century events described in preceding chapters. (Suggested by Gary Knoppers in personal communication.) Apparently there was confusion in the rabbinic tradition about the chronology of the Persian kings. (Certainly there is confusion about this in Josephus, Antiquities XI, v.)

5. Huet complained in his Demonstratio (207) that it was not clear why Spinoza thought these passages supported his conclusion. Droetto/Giancotti suggest that ADN. XXI is intended to reply in advance to such critics.

6. Cf. ix, 28, where Spinoza comments on the discrepancies between the narratives in Kings and those in Chronicles. The book of wisdom he refers to is the work now known as “The Wisdom of Solomon.” Cf. also xviii, 16, where Spinoza expresses skepticism about the Chronicler's account of a battle.

7. The Talmud ascribed primary authorship of the Psalms to David—though it credited him with also collecting the work of earlier authors, going back as far as Adam, Abraham and Moses (Baba Bathra 14b). Augustine at one time argued that David was the author of all 150 psalms, explaining those which, like 137, seemed to date from a later time as having been written through the gift of prophecy (City of God XVII, xiv). Spinoza’s conclusion here focuses on the final editing and would be generally accepted now (cf. Kugel 2007, ch. 26). Even in Spinoza's own day Huet seems to accept that some of the Psalms date from the post-exilic period (Demonstratio, 226–28).

8. Spinoza refers here to the work he will cite in x, 26, under the title The Book of Times. This is not, as he seems to think, a genuine work of Philo’s, but a forgery by a fifth-century Dominican monk, Annius of Viterbo. For details, see ALM. It’s odd that Spinoza should appeal here to the authority of Philo and the consensus in his time, when he generally attaches little weight to authority or consensus. This seems particularly surprising, since he had better and more characteristic arguments available to him, as the preceding note may suggest.

9. In English translations the verse quoted is Prov. 25:1. The text also ascribes its proverbs to Solomon in 1:1 and 10:1. Huet greeted these ascriptions with glee. At last we find a biblical book which says who its author was (Demonstratio, 234). Modern scholars regard these passages as later editorial additions, and date the earliest of the proverbs to the period of the divided monarchy, with the final stages of composition and editing occurring in the late Persian or Hellenistic period (HCSB 849). Although tradition is often said to have ascribed Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon to Solomon, the Talmud ascribes all three works to “Hezekiah and his colleagues,” that is, to the late eighth or early seventh century (Baba Bathra 15a). Manasseh ascribed them to Solomon.

10. For more on the process of canon selection, see below, §§43–47. On the controversy over the canonicity of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, see Leiman 1976, 72–86. It was objected against both works that their words were self-contradictory, and against Ecclesiastes that its teaching was heretical. One objection to its orthodoxy was that some of its passages seem to deny the immortality of the soul. Cf. Manasseh (1842/1972, II, 312–15) on the prima facie conflict between Eccles. 3:19 and 12:7.

11. The conclusion of Ecclesiastes in particular (12:9–14) is widely thought to be a later interpolation. See Seow 1997, 391–96.

12. Spinoza has already discussed six books which the Jewish tradition counted as books of prophecy: the sequence from Joshua through 2 Kings. Spinoza’s classification reflects his view that these works are more properly classed with the five books of Moses, as part of an extended historical narrative. Cf. viii, 42.

13. See above, ix, 4.

14. For the tradition of Isaiah’s murder by Manasseh, see the Talmud, Yebamoth 49b, Sanhedrin 103b.

The annotation of Baba Bathra 15a, explaining why the Talmud ascribes the book of Isaiah to Hezekiah and his colleagues, reports that “according to Rashi, Isaiah was executed by Manasseh before he could reduce his own prophecies to writing.”

15. Jehoiachin reigned briefly, in the winter of 598–597, after which he was taken into exile in Babylon, and Nebuchadnezzar placed his uncle, Zedekiah, on the throne. He reigned for ten years.

16. It would seem that sixteen chapters intervened between Jer. 21 and Jer. 38.

17. A literal translation of the first phrase in Jer. 38 would read: “And he [Shephatiah] heard” (my emphasis). Modern translations often do not make explicit this connection to preceding material.

18. A literal translation of the first phrase in Ezek. 1 would read: “And it was” or “And it came to pass.”

19. Probably a reference to Ezekiel’s age when he had the vision described in the first chapter (HCSB).

20. In the passage cited from the Antiquities, Josephus is concerned about an apparent contradiction between prophecies in Jeremiah (in 32:2–5 and 34:2–5, which say that the king of Babylon will take Zedekiah in captivity to Babylon) and the prophecy in Ezekiel (12:8–13, which says that Zedekiah will be taken in captivity to Babylon, but will not see that city). According to Josephus, Zedekiah took the fact that these prophecies seemed to conflict in one respect as a reason to disbelieve the prophets altogether, even on the matters where they agreed. Later (in X, viii, 2) Josephus points out that the prophecies were not inconsistent: Nebuchadnezzar did capture Zedekiah and take him to Babylon; but he blinded him first. So though Zedekiah was taken to Babylon as a captive, he never saw the city where he was imprisoned (2 Kings 25:7, Jer. 39:7).

Consistently with his contention that our present book of Ezekiel is only a fragment of the prophet’s writings, Spinoza seems to hypothesize here that Josephus may have had a different (presumably fuller) text of Ezekiel than we do, since he does not find in Ezekiel a prophecy that Zedekiah would not see Babylon, but only the prophecy of 17:16–21, which just says that Zedekiah will be taken as a captive to Babylon.

Spinoza’s hypothesis that Josephus may have had a different text of Ezekiel does not seem necessary to explain why he might have been concerned to remove the apparent contradiction. Josephus does not identify the passages in Jeremiah and Ezekiel which are in prima facie conflict. Apparently when Spinoza looked for a passage in Ezekiel which predicted Zedekiah’s future, he found 17:16–21 (which does not say Zedekiah will not see Babylon), but missed 12:13 (which does).

21. **[ADN. XXII] And so no one could have suspected that [Ezekiel’s] prophecy contradicted Jeremiah’s prediction—as everyone did from Josephus’ account (until they knew from the outcome of the affair that both [prophets] predicted the truth).

22. It’s not clear how Spinoza arrives at 84 years as the minimum length of Hosea’s prophetic career. But that his career must have lasted for at least several decades does seem to be a fair inference from Hosea 1:1, where the editor declares that Hosea prophesied in the reigns of four kings of Judah, the earliest of whom, Uzziah (or Azariah), is now thought to have reigned c. 783–742 B.C.E. and the last of whom, Hezekiah, is thought to have reigned c. 715–687/6 B.C.E. For the reigns of these kings, see 2 Kings 15–18 and the annotation of those chapters in HCSB.

23. The twelve “minor” prophets, whose writings were so short that originally they were all contained on one scroll. This series of prophets, beginning with Hosea and ending with Malachi, concludes the section of the Hebrew Bible devoted to the prophets.

24. For the Talmud, see Baba Bathra 14b–16b; for Maimonides, see his Guide III, 22. Spinoza mentioned the controversy over Job’s historicity earlier, in ii, 55. For a modern discussion of issues about the dating of Job, see Pope’s introduction to Anchor Job.

25. Kugel discusses reasons for holding that Job was a gentile in Kugel 2007, ch. 34.

26. Spinoza’s comment on the style of Job echoes Hobbes’ observation in Leviathan xxxiii, 12.

27. “Chaldean” is one of the terms Spinoza uses to refer to the language now generally referred to as Aramaic, which is the language used in Daniel from 2:4b to the end of ch. 7. The rest of Daniel is in Hebrew. Cf. viii, 25–26. Spinoza also refers to Aramaic as Syriac in ADN. XXVI (at xi, 3).

28. I.e., the book now known simply as Ezra. The book now usually called Nehemiah was called 2 Ezra in the Latin Vulgate. The prevailing view among modern scholars is that the Ezra-Nehemiah sequence was written as a continuation of 1 and 2 Chronicles, by an author whose style and interests were very similar to those of the author of Chronicles (though he was not the author of Chronicles). Both authors are thought to have been Jerusalem clergy of the fourth century BCE (HCSB, 646). Although much of the material in the first six chapters of Daniel is also thought to come from the fourth century, some portions of the last six chapters are now dated to the early second century (HCSB, 1168).

29. Daniel begins by relating events supposed to have happened to young Jewish members of the royal family and nobility during the first years of the Babylonian captivity (c. 597–590). Later chapters pass to events supposed to have happened during the reign of Darius I (or Darius the Great, 522–486), the Persian emperor said in Ezra 6 to have authorized the rebuilding of the temple (c. 520). Ezra begins by describing the return of the exiles to Jerusalem (c. 538) and concludes with Artaxerxes commissioning Ezra to establish pentateuchal law as state law in Judea. The Artaxerxes in question is apparently Artaxerxes I, who reigned from 465 to 424. Like Daniel, Ezra also contains a substantial portion written in Aramaic.

30. A literal translation of the first phrase of Esther would read: “And it was” or: “And it came to pass.”

31. As Rashi (1960) held, on the basis of Esther 9:20.

32. **[ADN. XXIII] The historian himself testifies in 1:1 that most of this book is taken from one Nehemiah himself wrote. But no doubt the historian, who lived after Nehemiah, added the things related from 8[:1]–12:26, as well as the last two verses of ch. 12, which are inserted parenthetically in the words of Nehemiah. [Nearly all of the first seven chapters of Nehemiah are written in the first person, and look as though they may have been taken from Nehemiah’s own account of what he did. Most of the next six chapters are written in the third person, though there are two stretches of text (from 12:27–43 and from 13:4–31) where the editor seems to have inserted passages from Nehemiah’s memoirs (HCSB, 647).]

33. *See Josephus, Antiquities XI, viii. [A reference Spinoza gives in the text is here made a note.]

34. On this work, wrongly attributed to Philo, see above, n. 8 in x, 3.

35. *Unless על [the word translated on in the text] means beyond, there has been a copyist’s error, which has put על, on, in place of עד, until. [The use of the preposition על has puzzled other readers besides Spinoza. Albright suggested reading מעל, from, and Myers follows him. See Myers Ezra-Nehemiah, pp. 194–95, 198–99, and below, n. 36.]

36. **[ADN. XXIV] Ezra was the uncle of the first high priest, Jeshua (see Ezra 7:1 and 1 Chronicles 6:13–15). Together with Zerubbabel he set out from Babylon to Jerusalem (see Nehemiah 12:1). But it seems that when he saw that the affairs of the Jews were in disarray, he returned to Babylon. Others also did this, as is evident from Nehemiah 1:2. He stayed there until the reign of Artaxerxes when, having obtained what he wanted, he set out for Jerusalem a second time. Nehemiah also left for Jerusalem with Zerubbabel in the time of Cyrus. See Ezra 2:2 and 63, and compare with Nehemiah 10:1 and 9. For the interpreters who render התרשתא hatirshata as governor do not prove this by any example, whereas it is certain that new names were given to the Jews who had to frequent the court. So Daniel was called Belteshazzar, Zerubbabel was called Sheshbazzar (see Daniel 1:7, Ezra 1:8 and 5:14), and Nehemiah was called Hatirshata. But by reason of his office he used to be called פחה, administrator or governor. See Nehemiah 5:14 and 12:26. [The Artaxerxes referred to in the fifth sentence is probably Artaxerxes I, who reigned from 465 to 424 B.C.E. Spinoza is apparently unclear about his dates, since he places Ezra and Nehemiah in the sixth century. There is much disagreement in the manuscripts about the scriptural references given in the seventh sentence. I follow Akkerman and Totaro.]

37. The Cyrus referred to here is Cyrus II (or Cyrus the Great), who reigned c. 550–530. Spinoza, following the chronology in Pereira’s Commentariorum in Danielem (Gebhardt V, 71), takes “Darius the Persian” to be Darius III, who reigned from 336 to 330. On the Albright-Myers reading (mentioned above in n. 35), “Darius the Persian” will be Darius I, who reigned from 521 to 486. The reference to Jaddua, however, will still entail that (at least this passage in) Nehemiah was written no earlier than the time of Alexander. Though Totaro does not consider Albright’s emendation, her annotation of this passage is still helpful.

38. For the modern view of the dating of these works, see above, n. 28, at x, 21.

39. Spinoza refers here to the additions to the books of Daniel and Esther, and to the book now most commonly known as 4 Ezra (a portion of 2 Esdras). For discussion of these works, see the section on Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books in HCSB.

40. Gebhardt (V, 71) notes that although Manasseh ben Israel acknowledged that 4 Ezra was apocryphal, he thought it constituted evidence that the American Indians were descendants of the lost tribes of Israel. His taking this work seriously thus would make him among the most foolish of the Pharisees.

41. I.e., the canonical Daniel, Ezra, Esther, and Nehemiah.

42. As maintained in the Talmud, Nedarim 37b–38a (Gebhardt V, 71).

43. Cf. Manasseh, 1842/1972, II, 327–28, who adopts a solution advocated as early as Seder Olam (2005, 247). Myers comments that “various attempts have been made to interpret the discrepancies, but none is quite satisfactory” (Anchor Ezra-Nehemiah, 20–21).

44. Cf. Ezra 2:5 with Neh. 7:10 or Ezra 2:35 with Neh. 7:38. These are among the inconsistencies discussed by Manasseh (1842/1972, II, 328–29), who accepted Ibn Ezra’s explanation of the discrepancies, viz. that Nehemiah’s list represents a new count made some years later, by which time the numbers had changed. Though Spinoza does not mention this explanation, a number of the points he makes count against it: that the overall total is the same in each account, that some of the individual figures are larger and some smaller in the supposedly later list, and that Neh. 7:5 gives the impression of an intention to reproduce Ezra’s account.

45. Totaro suggests that Spinoza is probably referring here to the colleagues who are said in Neh. 8:4 to have stood on the platform with Ezra when he read the book of the law to the people.

46. Appuhn and others have suggested that we have here a clear allusion to Manasseh ben Israel’s Conciliator. But seeking such reconciliations was standard procedure for medieval commentators.

47. Another allusion to the line from Terence previously quoted in the final paragraph of the Preface (where Spinoza had applied it to himself).

48. Jer. 22:24–30 prophesies a harsh fate for Jeconiah (Jehoiachin) in Babylon. Verse 22:30 says he will be childless, and that none of his offspring will sit on the throne of David. But 2 Kings 25:27–30 reports that in the thirty-seventh year of his captivity, when Evil-merodach succeeded Nebuchadnezzar, the new king released Jeconiah from prison and treated him kindly. (The closing verses of Jeremiah repeat the closing verses of 2 Kings.) 1 Chron. 3:17–19 reports that he had seven children, and lists as one of his grandchildren Zerubbabel, whom Cyrus appointed to rule in Jerusalem when the Israelites were released from captivity. Cf. ADN. XXI, at III/141.

49. The problem of reconciling this prophecy with history is discussed in the Talmud, Moed Katan 28b, where it is argued that because Zedekiah survived Nebuchadnezzar, he had the satisfaction of outliving the man who had caused his eyes to be gouged out.

50. Rabbi Shlomoh ben Yitzchak (1040–1105), the French commentator better known as Rashi, perhaps the most highly esteemed of the medieval Jewish commentators.

51. *See his commentary on 1 Chronicles 8. [A reference Spinoza gives in the text is here made a note. ALM note that the commentary on Chronicles in Buxtorf’s edition is no longer attributed to Rashi.]

52. **[ADN. XXV] The so-called great Synagogue did not begin until after Asia was conquered by the Macedonians. Moreover, what Maimonides, R. Abraham ben David and others maintain—that those who presided at this council were Ezra, Daniel, Nehemiah, Haggai, Zechariah, etc.—is a ridiculous invention. Its only basis is a rabbinic tradition which teaches that the reign of the Persians lasted 34 years, not more. They do not have any other argument to prove that the decisions of that great Synagogue, or Synod, held only by the Pharisees, were received from the Prophets, who received them from other Prophets, and so on back to Moses, who had received them from God himself, and handed them down to posterity orally, not in writing. Although the Pharisees may, with their usual stubbornness, believe these things, the wise, who know what causes Councils and Synods, and are familiar with the controversies of the Pharisees and Sadducees, have easily been able to guess why that great Synagogue or Council was convened. This is certain: that no Prophets were present at that council, and that the decisions of the Pharisees, which they call traditions, received their authority from the same Council. [On the history of the idea of a “Great Synagogue” in the Jewish tradition, see Daniel Sperber, “The Great Synagogue,” Encyclopaedia Judaica, 2nd ed., ed. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 19:383–85. The figure of 34 years for the period of Persian rule (which in fact lasted some 200 years) goes back to Seder Olam. See Stanley Isser, “Chronology,” Encyclopaedia Judaica 4 (2007): 704–7.]

53. Gebhardt (V, 73) notes that Uriel da Costa had also raised the issue of the Pharisees’ role in deciding on the canon, and had in particular questioned the provenance of Daniel. See Gebhardt 1922, 51–52, 59–60.

54. Spinoza returns to an issue first discussed in x, 5. Gebhardt pointed out (V, 73–74) that Spinoza misquotes the Talmud here. The passage should read: “The Sages wished to hide the Book of Ecclesiastes, because its words are self-contradictory; yet why did they not hide it? Because its beginning is religious teaching [Torah] and its end is religious teaching [Torah].” So what the Talmud makes a charge of internal inconsistency in Ecclesiastes Spinoza makes a charge of inconsistency between Ecclesiastes and the Torah. Gebhardt thinks this was a failure of memory. ALM suggest that Spinoza has confused the passage concerning Ecclesiastes with the one concerning Ezekiel cited immediately below. Leiman (1976, 175, n. 322) points out that elsewhere the rabbinic literature indicates other grounds for the withdrawal of Ecclesiastes. Specifically, Leviticus Rabbah says that “The Sages wished to withdraw Ecclesiastes because they found in it matters which smacked of heresy” (28:1).

55. Spinoza discussed this passage previously in ii, 49, where he identified Ezekiel’s contradiction of the law as his denial (18:19–20) that God will punish the son for the transgressions of his father. The annotation of this passage in ALM is helpful.

56. Since Spinoza’s method of interpretation—his demand for a “history of scripture” in the sense defined above in vii, 14–23—is apparently original with him, it seems doubtful that any previous writer would have done the necessary work on the NT in the way he would think it should have been done.

57. ALM point out that Spinoza generally quotes Greek texts (the NT, Josephus, pseudo-Philo) in a Latin or Aramaic translation, and that except in ADN. XXVI he does not give any citations in Greek. It does, however, appear from ADN. XXI that he is able to consult the Septuagint when there is a question about the Hebrew text. Gebhardt notes that in addition to several works he possessed which gave the Greek text along with a Latin translation, he also had some which gave only the Greek text (e.g., Epictetus, Lucian, and Homer), a Greek grammar and two Greek dictionaries.

58. At vii, 64, Spinoza identified the gospel of Matthew and the Epistle to the Hebrews as having been written originally in Hebrew. But it appears from ADN. XXVI, at xi, 3, that Spinoza in fact thought the original language of much, if not all, of the New Testament was what we would now call Aramaic. See the Editorial Preface to the TTP, p. 64.

[III/151] CHAPTER XI

Whether the Apostles wrote their Letters
as Apostles and Prophets, or as Teachers.
On the function of the Apostles1

[1] No one who has read the New Testament can doubt that the Apostles were Prophets. But the Prophets did not always speak from [10] a revelation. On the contrary, they did that very rarely (as we showed at the end of Chapter 1). So we can raise the question: whether the Apostles wrote their Letters as Prophets—from a revelation and by an express command (as Moses, Jeremiah and the other Prophets did)—or whether they wrote them as private persons, or teachers. This question [15] arises particularly because in 1 Corinthians 14:6 Paul indicates two kinds of preaching, one from revelation, the other from knowledge.2 That’s why, I say, we must wonder whether the Apostles prophesy or teach in their Letters.

[2] If we’re willing to attend to the Apostles’ style, we’ll find it most unlike that of Prophecy. The most common practice of the Prophets was to testify everywhere that they were speaking according to God’s [20] edict: thus says God, the God of hosts says, God’s edict etc. And this seems to have held good not only when the Prophets spoke in public assemblies, but also in the Letters containing revelations. This is evident from the Letter Elijah wrote to Jehoram (see 2 Chronicles 21:12), which also begins כה אמר יהוה, thus says God.

[25] [3] In the Letters of the Apostles, on the other hand, we read nothing like this. On the contrary, in 1 Corinthians 7:40 Paul speaks according to his own opinion.3 Indeed, in a great many passages there occur ways of speaking characteristic of a mind undecided and perplexed, as (in Romans 3:28) we think, therefore, [that a person is justified by faith apart from works prescribed by the law] and (in Romans 8:18) for I think,⁴** [that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory about to be revealed to us] and many [30] other passages in this manner. In addition to these, we find other ways of speaking completely removed from Prophetic authority, e.g., but I say this as one without authority, not as a command (see 1 Corinthians [III/152] 7:6),5 I give advice as a man, who, by God’s grace, is trustworthy (see 1 Corinthians 7:25),⁶ and similarly, many other passages. And it should be noted that when he says in the chapter cited that he has or does not have God’s precept or command, he does not mean a precept or command revealed to him by God, but only the teachings Christ imparted to his disciples on the mount.

[5] [4] Moreover, if we attend also to the way the Apostles hand down the Gospel teaching in these Letters, we shall see that it differs greatly from the way of the Prophets. For the Apostles are always reasoning, with the result that they seem to debate, not to prophesy. Prophecies, on the other hand, contain only bare authoritative judgments and [10] decrees, because in them God is introduced as speaking, and he does not reason, but decides in accordance with the absolute sovereignty of his nature, and also because the authority of the Prophet is not subject to reasoning. For whoever would confirm his authoritative judgments by reason thereby submits them to the discretionary judgment of anyone. This Paul seems to have done, because he reasons, saying (1 Corinthians [15] 10:15) I speak as to wise men; judge for yourselves what I say. Finally, [prophecies contain only bare authoritative judgments and decisions] because the Prophets did not perceive the things revealed to them by the power of the natural light. That is, they did not perceive them by reasoning, as we showed in Ch. 1.

[5] In the Pentateuch some conclusions seem to be drawn by inference. [20] But anyone who pays attention will see that they cannot in any way be taken as decisive arguments. When Moses said to the Israelites (Deuteronomy 31:27) if you have been rebels against God while I lived with you, you will be much more rebellious after I am dead, he wasn’t trying to [25] convince them by reason that after his death they would necessarily turn aside from the true worship of God. For that argument would be mistaken, as we could also show from Scripture. The Israelites persevered steadfastly during the lives of Joshua and the Elders,7 and afterward also during the lives of Samuel, David, Solomon, etc.

[6] So those words of Moses are only a figurative expression, in which [30] he predicts the future defection of the people rhetorically, as he was able to imagine it more vividly. Why don’t I say that Moses spoke these things on his own authority, to make his prediction probable to the people, and not as a prophet, in accordance with a revelation? Because Deuteronomy 31:21 relates that God revealed this very thing to Moses in other words. It was certainly not necessary to render Moses more [III/153] certain of this prediction and decree of God by probable reasons. But it was necessary that it be represented vividly in his imagination, as we have shown in Ch. 1. There was no way this could be better done than by imagining the present stubbornness of the people, which he had often experienced, as future.

[5] [7] This is the way we must understand all the arguments we find Moses using in the Pentateuch. They’re not taken from the storehouse of reason, but are only ways of speaking he used to express God’s decrees more effectively and imagine them vividly. Nevertheless, I don’t wish to deny absolutely that the Prophets were able to argue from revelation. [10] I only say this: that the more the Prophets argue in due form, the more the knowledge they have of the matter revealed approaches natural knowledge; that their possession of supernatural knowledge is best seen from the fact that they speak simple authoritative judgments, whether decrees, or statements; and thus that the greatest of [15] the Prophets, Moses, did not make any argument in due form. On the other hand, I grant that Paul’s long deductions and arguments, as we find them in his Letter to the Romans, were not in any way written from a supernatural revelation.

[8] So the ways the Apostles both spoke and discussed things in their Letters indicate most clearly that they did not write them from [20] revelation and a divine command, but only from their natural judgment. They contain nothing but brotherly advice, mixed with a politeness which Prophetic authority is completely opposed to—as when Paul excuses himself in Romans 15, v. 15: I have written a bit more boldly to you, brothers.

[25] We can also infer this from the fact that we do not read anywhere that the Apostles were commanded to write, but only to preach wherever they went and to confirm what they said by signs. For their presence and signs were absolutely required for converting the nations to religion and strengthening them in it, as Paul himself explicitly indicates [30] in Romans 1, v. 11: because I long to see you, so that I may impart to you the gift of the Spirit, that you may be strengthened.

[9] But here someone may object that the same reasoning could equally justify the conclusion that the Apostles did not even preach as Prophets. For when they went about preaching, they didn’t do this by an express command, as the Prophets used to. When we read in the Old Testament that Jonah went to Nineveh to preach, we read at the [III/154] same time that he was explicitly sent there, and that it was revealed to him what he had to preach there. Similarly, we’re told in detail that Moses set out for Egypt as God’s representative, and told at the same time what he was required to say to the people of Israel and to King Pharaoh, and what signs he was to perform in their presence, in [5] order to win their trust. Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel were expressly ordered to preach to the Israelites. And finally, the Prophets preached nothing which Scripture does not testify that they received from God. [10] But we don’t read anything like this in the New Testament, when the Apostles went about preaching. Or if we do, it’s very rare.8 On [10] the other hand, we find some passages which indicate explicitly that the Apostles chose places for preaching according to their own plan. This is illustrated by that well-known disagreement between Paul and Barnabas, which ended in their parting (see Acts 15:37–[40]). Often they also tried in vain to go somewhere, as that same Paul witnesses in Romans 1, v.13: I have wanted to come to you these many times, but I [15] was prevented, and Romans 15, v. 22: because of this I have been hindered many times from coming to you. And finally, 1 Corinthians 16, v. 12: as for my brother, Apollos, I strongly urged him to go to you with the brothers, but he was not at all willing; however, when he has the opportunity etc.

[20] [11] So [the objection continues] from all these things – their ways of speaking, the dispute between the Apostles, and the fact that when they went somewhere to preach, Scripture does not testify (as it does concerning the Prophets of old) that they did so from a command of God—I ought to have concluded that the Apostles preached as teachers, and not as Prophets.

[25] But we’ll settle this question easily if we attend to the difference between the calling of the Apostles and that of the Old Testament Prophets. The latter were not called to preach and prophesy to all nations, but only to certain particular ones. For this they required an explicit and special command for each nation. But the Apostles were [30] called to preach to absolutely everyone and to convert everyone to religion. So wherever they went, they were carrying out Christ’s command and there was no need for them to have the things they were to preach revealed to them before they went—not those disciples of Christ to whom he himself had said: but when they hand you over, do not be anxious about how you are to speak or what you are to say; for what [III/155] you shall say will be given to you in that hour etc. See Matthew 10:19–20.

[12] We conclude, then, that the Apostles had from a special revelation only the things they preached orally, and at the same time confirmed with signs (see what we’ve shown at the beginning of Chapter 2 [§4]). But what they taught simply, without using any signs as witnesses, [5] whether in writing or orally, they spoke or wrote from knowledge (i.e., natural knowledge). On this see 1 Corinthians 14:6.

It’s no objection to this that all the Letters begin with an affirmation of [the writer’s] status as an Apostle.9 For as I shall soon show, the Apostles were granted not only the power to prophesy, but also the [10] authority to teach. [13] For this reason we grant that they wrote their Letters as Apostles, and that this was the reason each one began with an affirmation of his being an Apostle. Or perhaps—to reconcile the reader’s heart to them more easily and to get the reader’s attention—they wanted above all to testify that they were the ones who had become [15] known to all the faithful by their preaching and who had then shown by clear testimonies that they taught the true religion and the way to salvation. For whatever discussion I see in these Letters concerning the calling of the Apostles and the Holy and divine Spirit they had, I see to be related to their preachings.

[20] The only exceptions are those passages where the Spirit of God and the Holy Spirit (which we spoke about in Chapter 1 [§§25ff.]) are taken for a sound mind, blessed and devoted to God, etc. For example, in 1 Corinthians 7:40 Paul says: but in my opinion she is blessed if she remains as she is; moreover, I think also that the Spirit of God is in me. By Spirit of God [25] here he means his own mind, as the context of the statement indicates. For he means: I judge a widow who does not wish to marry a second husband blessed; that is according to my opinion, I who have decided to live celibate and who think that I myself am blessed. And we find many other things in this manner, which I judge it superfluous to mention here.

[30] [14] So, since we must maintain that the Apostles composed their Letters only according to the natural light, we must now see how the Apostles could teach, solely on the basis of natural knowledge, things which don’t fall under it. But if we attend to what we’ve said in Chapter 7 about the interpretation of Scripture, there will be no difficulty for us here. For though the things contained in the Bible for the most part [III/156] surpass our grasp, nevertheless we can discuss them safely, provided the only principles we admit are sought from Scripture itself. And in this same way also the Apostles were able to infer and extract many things from the things they’d seen, the things they’d heard, and finally the [5] things they’d had from revelation. They were also able to teach men these things, as they pleased.

[15] Next, although religion, as the Apostles preached it, by relating the simple story of Christ, does not fall under reason, nevertheless, by the natural light everyone can easily appreciate its most important themes, which, like the whole of Christ’s teaching,10** consist chiefly of [10] moral lessons. Finally, the Apostles did not need a supernatural light to accommodate to men’s common power of understanding the religion they had previously confirmed by signs, so that each one would easily accept it from the heart. Nor did they need it to advise men about that religion.

[15] [16] That’s what the Letters were for: to teach and advise men in the way each Apostle judged best for confirming them in religion. Here we must note what we said a little while ago: that the Apostles received not only the power to preach the story of Christ as Prophets, [20] confirming it with signs, but also the authority to teach and advise in the way each one judged best. In 2 Timothy 1:11 Paul 11 indicates each of these gifts clearly: for this [gospel] I have been appointed a preacher and [25] an Apostle and a teacher of the nations. Similarly in 1 Timothy 2, v. 7: for this I have been appointed a preacher and an Apostle (I speak the truth through Christ, I do not lie), a teacher of the nations with faith (NB) and truth. [17] With these words, I say, he clearly indicates a confirmation of each status: being an Apostle and being a teacher.

But he signifies the authority to advise whomever and whenever he wished in these words (Philemon 8): although I have much freedom in [30] Christ to command you to do what is proper, nevertheless, [I prefer to appeal to you on the basis of love]. Here it should be noted that if Paul had received from God, as a Prophet, the things it was proper to command Philemon, and if he was supposed to command them as a Prophet, then surely it would not have been permissible for him to change God’s command into an entreaty. So he must be understood to speak of a freedom to advise, which was his as a Teacher, and not as a Prophet.

[III/157] [18] Nevertheless, unless we want to appeal to the argument that he who has the authority to teach also has the authority to choose the way he wants to teach, it doesn’t yet follow clearly enough that the Apostles could choose the way of teaching each of them judged best, [5] but only that in virtue of their office as Apostles, they were not only Prophets, but also Teachers.

[19] It will be better to demonstrate the whole matter from Scripture alone. For from Paul’s words in Romans 15:20 it is clearly established that each of the Apostles chose his individual way: taking care anxiously that I should not preach where the name of Christ had been invoked, so as [10] not to build on another man’s foundation. [20] Surely if they all had the same way of teaching, and all built the Christian religion on the same foundation, Paul could have no reason to call another Apostle’s foundations another man’s, since they were the same as his. But since he [15] does call them another man’s, we must conclude that each built religion on a different foundation, and that the same thing happened to the Apostles in their teaching as happens to other teachers who have their own individual methods of teaching: they would always rather teach those who are completely uneducated and have not begun to learn languages or sciences from anyone else (or even mathematics, whose [20] truth no one doubts).

[21] Again, if we survey these Letters with some attention, we shall see that in religion itself the Apostles indeed agree, but that they differ greatly in the foundations. For to strengthen men in religion, and to show them that salvation depends only on God’s grace, Paul taught [25] them that no one can boast of his works, but only of his faith, and that no one is justified by works (see Romans 3:27–28). At the same time, he taught the whole doctrine of predestination.12 James, on the other hand, taught in his letter that man is justified by works and [30] not by faith alone (see James 2:24); setting aside all those arguments of Paul, he expressed in a few words the whole doctrine of religion.

[22] Finally, there is no doubt that the fact that the Apostles built religion on different foundations gave rise to many disputes and schisms, which have tormented the church incessantly from the time of the Apostles to the present day, and will surely continue to torment it [III/158] forever, until at last someday religion is separated from philosophic speculations and reduced to those very few and very simple doctrines Christ taught his followers.

[23] This was impossible for the Apostles, because the Gospel was unfamiliar to men. Lest the novelty of its doctrine greatly offend men’s [5] ears, they accommodated it as much as they could to their contemporaries’ mentality (see 1 Corinthians 9:19–20)13 and constructed it on the foundations which were most familiar and accepted at that time. [24] That’s why none of the Apostles philosophized more than Paul, who was called to preach to the nations. But the others, preaching to [10] the Jews, who disdained Philosophy, also accommodated themselves to the mentality of their audience (on this see Galatians 2:11[–14]) and taught a religion devoid of philosophic speculations. How happy our age would surely be now, if we saw religion again free of all superstition!

1. ALM note that in this chapter Spinoza generally relies on Tremellius’s Latin translation of the Aramaic version of the New Testament. (There are some exceptions.) On Tremellius, see the Editorial Preface, p. 64, the title page, p. 65, n. 1, and ADN. XXVI.

2. 1 Cor. 14:6 reads: “Now brothers and sisters, if I come to you speaking in tongues, how will I benefit you unless I speak to you in some revelation or knowledge or prophecy or teaching?”

3. Speaking of the right of a widow to remarry, Paul says that although she is free to do so, “in my judgment she is more blessed if she remains as she is” (NRSV).

4. **[ADN. XXVI] The interpreters of this passage [Rom. 8:18] translate logizomai as concludo, I conclude, and contend that Paul uses it instead of sullogizomai [I conclude] whereas logizomai in Greek means the same as חשב in Hebrew, to calculate, to think, to judge, in which meaning it agrees best with the Syriac text. For the Syriac translation—if indeed it is a translation, which is doubtful, since we don’t know the translator, or when [this text] was circulated, and the native language of the Apostles was Syriac—renders this text of Paul thus: methrahgenan hachil, which Tremellius translates very well: we think, therefore. For the noun formed from this verb, rehgjono, signifies judgment; for rehgjono in Hebrew is רעותא, will; therefore, methrahgenan is we will or we judge. [The editions attach this note to the quote from Rom. 3:28, but since the verb there is plural, whereas that in Rom. 8:18 is singular, attaching it to the latter quote probably accords better with Spinoza’s intention. The Adnotation uses Syriac script for the Syriac words Spinoza uses. I give only the transliteration provided in Gebhardt and Totaro. Spinoza is apparently wrong in thinking that the Syriac version gives the original of the NT. It is now thought to be a 5th Century translation of the Greek text. See Metzger and Ehrman, pp. 98–99. For more on this, see the Editorial Preface, pp. 64–65.]

5. The NRSV renders this text: “This I say by way of concession, not command.” (Paul is recommending that married couples not deprive one another of their conjugal rights.) As ALM note, Spinoza seems to have misread Tremellius’s translation, which has infirmis (suggesting weakness on the part of the Corinthians to whom the recommendation is given) where Spinoza has infirmus (implying a lack of authority on Paul’s part).

6. A fuller quotation, in the NRSV, reads: “Now concerning virgins, I have no command of the Lord, but I give my opinion as one who by the Lord’s mercy is trustworthy.” (Paul thinks virgins would do best to remain as they are, but that they do not sin if they marry.) Gebhardt and Van Vloten-Land wrongly follow the first edition here, reading: quia Dei gratia. ALM correct to: qui a Dei gratia.

7. That is, the Judges who ruled Israel after the death of Joshua.

8. There’s an example in Acts 16:9 (ALM).

9. Not quite true. The letters traditionally ascribed to Paul standardly begin with some such formula as Paul, a servant of Christ, called to be an apostle. Similarly for most of the other letters. But the formula is not universal. Hebrews and the letters of John are exceptions.

10. **[ADN. XXVII] That is, what Jesus taught on the mount and what St. Matthew mentions in chapter 5ff. [This note appears only in Saint-Glain’s translation and seems unlikely to be genuine. See the discussion in ALM, 31.]

11. Although both the letters addressed to Timothy purport to be by Paul, “very few scholars now accept that claim” (HCSB, 2015).

12. E.g., in Rom. 8:28–39, 9:11–29, 11:1–10.

13. “For though I am free with respect to all, I have made myself a slave to all, so that I might win more of them. To the Jews I became as a Jew, in order to win Jews. To those under the law I became as one under the law (though I myself am not under the law) so that I might win those under the law. To those outside the law I became as one outside the law (though I am not free from God’s law but am under Christ’s law) so that I might win those outside the law” (NRSV).

[III/158] CHAPTER XII

On the true original text of the divine Law, Why Scripture can be called Sacred, and Why it can be called the Word of God. Finally it is shown that insofar as it contains the Word of God, it has reached us uncorrupted

[1] Those who consider the Bible, just as it is, as a Letter God has sent men from heaven,1 will no doubt cry out that I have committed a sin against the Holy Ghost,² because I’ve maintained

that the word of God is faulty, mutilated, corrupted, and inconsistent; [25] that we have only fragments of it, and finally, that the original text of the covenant God made with the Jews has been lost.

[2] But I don’t doubt that if they were willing to weigh the matter carefully, they would immediately stop protesting. For both reason itself and the statements of the Prophets and Apostles clearly proclaim that [30] God’s eternal word and covenant, and true religion, are inscribed by divine agency in men’s hearts, i.e., in the human mind, and that this is the true original text of God, which he himself has stamped with his seal, i.e., with the idea of him, as an image of his divinity.

[III/159] [3] To the first Jews Religion was imparted as a law, handed down in writing, because then they were considered as like infants. But later Moses (Deuteronomy 30:6) and Jeremiah (31:33) proclaimed to them a time to come, when God would inscribe his law in their hearts. So at one time it was appropriate to contend for a law written in tablets [5] (but only for the Jews, and particularly the Sadducees). It is not suitable at all for those who have it written in their minds.

[4] Anyone who’s willing to attend to these things will find nothing in what I’ve said above which is contrary to God’s word, or to true Religion and faith, nor anything which could weaken it. On the contrary, he’ll find that we strengthen it, as we’ve shown also toward the end of [10] Chapter 10 [§42]. If this weren’t the case, I would have decided to be completely silent about these matters. Indeed, to escape all difficulties, I would have gladly conceded that the most profound mysteries are hidden in Scripture. But because that has given rise to an intolerable superstition and to the other ruinously bad consequences we spoke about in the preamble to Chapter 7 [§§1–6], I thought I ought not to [15] refrain from saying these things, especially because religion does not require any superstitious embellishments. On the contrary, its splendor is diminished when it’s adorned with such inventions.

[5] But [my critics] will say that, though the divine law is inscribed in our hearts, Scripture is nonetheless the word of God; so, it’s no more permissible to say that Scripture is mutilated and distorted than it is to [20] say this of the Word of God. I, on the other hand, fear that in their excessive zeal to be holy they may turn Religion into superstition, and indeed, may begin to worship likenesses and images, i.e., paper and ink, in place of the Word of God.

[6] This I know: I’ve said nothing unworthy of Scripture or the word [25] of God. For I’ve maintained nothing which I have not demonstrated to be true by the most evident arguments. And for this reason I can also affirm with certainty that I have said nothing impious, nor anything which smells of impiety.

I confess that certain profane men, to whom religion is a burden, will be able to take what I have said as a license to sin, and without any reason, but only to surrender to their sensual pleasure, infer from this [30] that Scripture is everywhere faulty and falsified, and so of no authority. [7] But there’s no remedy against people like that. As the old adage goes, you can’t say anything so correctly that someone can’t distort it by misinterpretation.3 Anyone who wants to indulge in sensual pleasures can easily find a reason for doing so wherever he likes. Those men long ago who had the original texts, and the ark of the covenant—indeed, the [III/160] Prophets and Apostles themselves—were no better or more obedient. Everyone, Jew and Gentile alike, has always been the same; in every age virtue has been extremely rare.4

[8] Nevertheless, to remove every scruple, we must show here in [5] what way Scripture and any other silent thing ought to be called sacred and divine; next, what the word of God really is, and that it isn’t contained in a certain number of books; and finally, that insofar as Scripture teaches the things necessary for obedience and salvation, it couldn’t have been corrupted. From this everyone will easily be able to judge that we’ve said nothing against the word of God, and haven’t [10] given any opening for impiety.

[9] What is called sacred and divine is what is destined for the practice of piety and religion. It will be sacred only so long as men use it in a religious manner. If they cease to be pious, at the same time it too ceases to be sacred. And if they dedicate the same thing [15] to impious purposes, then what before was sacred is made unclean and profane.

[10] For example, the Patriarch Jacob called a certain place בית אל, the house of God [Genesis 28:16–19], because it was there he worshipped the God who had been revealed to him. But the Prophets called that very place בית און, the house of iniquity (see Amos 5:5 and Hosea 10:5), because the Israelites, in accordance with the practice established by [20] Jeroboam [1 Kings 12:27–33], used to sacrifice to idols there.

[11] Here’s another example, which illustrates the point very clearly. Words have a definite meaning only from their use. If they should be so organized that, according to their usage, they move the people reading them to devotion, then those words will be sacred. So will [25] a book written with the words organized that way. But if, afterward, the usage should be lost, so that the words have no meaning, or if the book should be completely neglected, whether from malice or because men no longer need it, then neither the words nor the book will be of any use. They will lose their holiness. Finally, if the same words should be organized in another way, or a usage should prevail according to which they are to be taken in an opposite meaning, then the words and the book which were previously sacred will be unclean [30] and profane.

[12] From this it follows that nothing is sacred or profane or impure in itself, outside the mind, but only in relation to the mind. Many passages in Scripture establish this with utmost clarity. To mention one or two, Jeremiah says (7:4) that the Jews of his time wrongly called the temple of Solomon the temple of God. For as he goes on to say [III/161] in the same chapter, the name of God could be associated with that temple only so long as it was frequented by men who worship God and preserve justice. But if it was frequented by murderers, thieves, idolaters, and other wicked men, then it was rather a den of criminals.

[5] [13] What became of the ark of the covenant? I’ve often wondered at the fact that nowhere does Scripture tell us. This much is certain: it perished, or was burned with the temple,5 even though the Hebrews had nothing more sacred, nothing they had greater reverence for. In the same way, also, Scripture is sacred and its statements divine just as [10] long as it moves men to devotion toward God. But if they completely neglect it, as the Jews once did, it’s nothing but paper and ink. They completely profane it, and leave it subject to corruption. So if it’s then corrupted, or perishes, it’s then false to say that the word of God is corrupted or perishes, just as it would also have been false to say in [15] the time of Jeremiah that the temple, which then was the temple of God, perished in flames.

[14] Jeremiah says the same thing about the law itself. For he reproaches the impious people of his time in the following terms: איכה תאמרו חכמים אנחנו ותורת יהוה אתנו הלא לשקר עשה עט שקר סופרים, why do you say, we are wise and the law of God is with us. Certainly it was prepared in [20] vain; in vain did the pen of the scribes write.6 That is, even though you have Scripture, you are wrong to say that you have the law of God after you have made it null and void.

[16] So it’s no wonder that Moses’ first originals are also not now [30] extant and that the things we described above have happened to the books we do have, when the true original of the divine covenant, the holiest thing of all, could totally perish. Let our critics, then, stop accusing us of impiety. We have said nothing against the word of God and have not debased it. If they have any just anger, let them turn it against those ancients whose wickedness took away the religious status [III/162] of God’s ark, temple, law, and every other sacred thing, and made them liable to corruption.

[17] Again, if, in accordance with what the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 3:3, they have in themselves the Letter of God, written not in ink, but with the Spirit of God, and not on tablets of stone, but on the fleshly tablets of the heart, let them stop worshipping the letter [5] and being so anxious about it.

With this I think I’ve explained sufficiently in what way Scripture is to be considered Sacred and divine. [18] Now we must see how to rightly understand the expression דבר יהוה, debar Yahweh (the word of Yahweh). דבר, dabar, of course, means word, utterance, edict, and thing. [10] Moreover, in Ch. 1 [§§29–31], we showed why a thing is said in Hebrew to be of God and is referred to God. From these considerations we can easily understand what Scripture means by God’s word, utterance, edict, and thing. So it’s not necessary to repeat all these things here, nor to repeat what we showed regarding miracles, in Ch. 6 [§§39–51]. [19] It will be enough just to call attention to the main points, so that what [15] we want to say about these matters here may be better understood.

[First,] when “the word of God” is predicated of some subject which is not God himself, it means properly the Divine law we treated in Ch. 4, that is, the religion common to the whole human race, or universal religion. On this see Isaiah 1:10, where he teaches the true way of living, [20] which does not consist in ceremonies, but in loving-kindness and a true heart, which he calls, indifferently, God’s law and God’s word.

[20] Secondly, “the word of God” is taken metaphorically for the very order of nature and fate (because it really depends on and follows from the eternal decree of the divine nature), and especially for what the Prophets had foreseen of this order. It has this meaning because [25] they did not perceive future things through natural causes, but as decisions or decrees of God.

[21] Finally, “the word of God” is also taken for every proclamation of a Prophet, insofar as he has perceived it by his own special power, or Prophetic gift, and not by the natural light common [to all]. It has this meaning chiefly because the Prophets were in fact accustomed to [30] perceive God as a lawgiver, as we showed in Ch. 4 [§§38–50].

[22] For these three reasons, then, Scripture is called the word of God: because it teaches the true religion, whose eternal author is God; because it relates predictions of future things as God’s decrees; and, finally, because those who were really its authors mostly taught, not [III/163] by the common natural light, but by a certain special light, and introduced God as speaking these things. And though Scripture contains in addition many things which are merely historical, and are perceived by the natural light, nevertheless it takes its name [“Word of God”] from what is more precious.

[23] From this we easily see why God should be understood to be [5] the author of the Bible: because of the true religion taught in those books, not because he wanted to communicate to men a certain number of books.

[24] And from this we can also know why the Bible is divided into the books of the Old Testament and the New: before the coming of Christ the Prophets were accustomed to preach religion as the [10] law of their Country and by the power of the covenant entered into in the time of Moses; but after the coming of Christ the Apostles preached the same [religion] to everyone as a universal law, solely by the power of the passion of Christ. [The books of the New Testament are] not [new] because they are different in doctrine, or because they were written as original texts of a covenant, or because the universal religion was new. That religion, which is most natural, [15] was new only in relation to those who had not known it. He was in the world, says John the Evangelist (John 1:10), and yet the world did not know him.

[25] So even if we had fewer books than we do, either of the Old Testament or of the New, we would still not be deprived of the word of God, by which we ought to understand the true religion (as we’ve [20] already said)—no more than we think now that we are deprived of God’s word, even though we lack many other most important writings, like the book of the Law, which was guarded scrupulously in the temple as the original text of the covenant, and the books of the Wars, the Chronicles, and many others, from which the books we have of the Old Testament were gathered and assembled. This conclusion is confirmed [25] by many additional arguments.

[26] First, because the books of each Testament weren’t written by an explicit command, at one and the same time, for all ages, but by chance, by certain men, as the time and their particular situation required. This is clearly shown by the callings of the Prophets (who [30] were called to warn the impious people of their time), and also by the Letters of the Apostles.

[27] Second, because it’s one thing to understand Scripture and the mind of the Prophets, and another to understand the mind of God, i.e., the truth of the matter itself. This follows from what we showed in Ch. 2 about the Prophets.8 And in Ch. 6 we showed that it also applies [35] to Histories and miracles.9 But in no way can we say this about those passages which treat true religion and true virtue.

[III/164] [28] Third, because the Books of the Old Testament were chosen from many [candidates], and in the end, were assembled and approved by a council of Pharisees, as we showed in Ch. 10 [§45]. Moreover, the books of the New Testament too were added to the Canon by the decisions of certain Councils, which also rejected as illegitimate [5] other books many people considered sacred. Now the members of these Councils—both of the Pharisees and of the Christians—were not Prophets, but only Learned and wise men. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that in this choice they had the word of God as a standard. So, before they approved all the books, they must have had knowledge [10] of the word of God.

[29] Fourth, because the Apostles did not write as Prophets, but (as we said in the preceding Chapter) as Learned men, and chose the manner of teaching they judged would be easier for the disciples they wanted to teach at that time, it follows (as we also concluded at the [15] end of that Chapter) that their letters contain many things which we can now do without in the matter of religion.

[30]10 Fifth, and finally, because there are four evangelists in the New Testament. Who will believe that God wanted to tell Christ’s story four times over, and communicate it to men in writing? It’s true that some things are contained in one gospel which are not there in another, so that [20] one often aids in understanding the other. Still, we should not conclude from that that everything related in these four works was necessary for men to know, and that God chose the evangelists to write their works so that the Story of Christ would be better understood. [31] For each preached his own Gospel in a different place, and each wrote what he [25] preached, simply, to tell the Story of Christ clearly, not to explain the others. If now we sometimes understand them more easily and better by comparing them with one another, that happens by chance and only in a few passages. Even if we knew nothing about those passages, the story would still be equally clear, and men no less blessed.

[32] By these arguments we’ve shown that Scripture is properly called [30] the word of God only in relation to religion, or in relation to the universal divine law. Now it remains to show that, insofar as it is properly so-called, it is not faulty, distorted, or mutilated. But what I here call faulty, distorted and mutilated, is what is written and constructed so incorrectly that the meaning of the statement cannot be worked out [III/165] from linguistic usage or gathered solely from Scripture. [33] For I don’t want to claim that Scripture, insofar as it contains the Divine law, has always preserved the same accents, the same letters and the same words. I leave this to be demonstrated by the Masoretes and those who superstitiously [5] worship the letter. I claim only that the meaning—the only thing in a statement which gives us a reason for calling it divine—has reached us without corruption, even though we may suppose that the words by which it was first signified have very frequently been changed. For as we have said, this does not take anything at all away from the divinity of Scripture. Scripture would be equally divine even if it were written in other words or another language.

[10] [34] So no one can doubt that we have received the divine law without its being corrupted in this way. From Scripture itself we have perceived its most important themes without any difficulty or ambiguity: to love God above all else, and to love your neighbor as yourself.11 But this cannot be forged, nor can it be something written by a hasty or erring pen. For if Scripture ever taught anything other than this, it would also [15] have had to teach everything else differently, since this is the foundation of the whole religion. If it were taken away, the whole structure would collapse in a moment. [35] Such a Scripture would not be the same book we are speaking about here; it would be a totally different [20] book. That Scripture has always taught this, that here no error which could corrupt the meaning has crept in, is indisputable. That would be noticed immediately by everyone; no one could have distorted this without his wickedness being obvious.

[36] Since, then, we must maintain that this foundation is uncorrupted, we must also grant the same about those other [teachings] [25] which uncontroversially follow from it, and are equally fundamental: that God exists; that he provides for all; that he is omnipotent; that in accordance with his decree, things go well with the pious, but badly with the wicked; and that our salvation depends only on his grace. For Scripture everywhere teaches all these things clearly, and must always have taught them. Otherwise all its other teachings would be hollow and without foundation.12

[30] [37] The remaining moral precepts must be held to be no less uncorrupted, since they follow with utmost clarity from this universal foundation: to defend justice, to aid the poor, to kill no one, to covet nothing belonging to another, and so on. No man’s wickedness could corrupt any of these things; time could not obliterate them. For if any of these teachings were destroyed, their universal foundation [III/166] would have immediately taught them again, especially the teaching of loving-kindness, which both Testaments commend everywhere, in the strongest terms.

[38] What’s more, though you can’t invent any crime so detestable that no one has ever committed it, still, no one tries to destroy the [5] laws to excuse his own crimes, or to introduce anything impious as an eternal and salutary teaching. For we see that man’s nature is such that anyone who does something shameful, whether he be a King or a subject, is eager to embellish his deed with such circumstances that he is believed not to have done anything contrary to justice or propriety. [10] We conclude, then, without exception, that the whole universal divine law which Scripture teaches, has reached our hands uncorrupted.

[39] In addition to these, there are also other things we can’t doubt have been handed down to us in good faith: the main points of the Historical [15] Narratives in Scripture. These were quite well known to everyone. The common people among the Jews had long been accustomed to sing the past history of their nation in Psalms. Also, the main points of Christ’s deeds and passion were immediately spread throughout the whole Roman Empire.13 So it’s not at all credible that later generations handed down the most important part of these narratives in a form different from that [20] in which they had received them from the first generations—not unless most men agreed in this deception, which is incredible.

[40] So whatever has been corrupted or is faulty could have happened only in other matters: for example, in some circumstance of a narrative or a Prophecy, to move the people to greater devotion, or in some miracle, to torment the Philosophers, or, finally, in speculative [25] matters, after schismatics had begun to introduce these into religion, so that everyone might prop up his own inventions by abusing divine authority.14 But it matters little, for our salvation, whether such things have been perverted or not. I shall show this in detail in the following Chapter, though I think it is already established by what I’ve previously said, especially in Chapter 2.

1. See, for example, Maimonides’ eighth fundamental principle of Judaism, Maimonides Reader, 420–21. Droetto/Giancotti cite Augustine (Exposition 2 of Psalm 30, §2: “The author is the prophet, but more truly the Holy Spirit who spoke through the prophet”) and Gregory the Great (Epistola XXXI, Ad Theodorum medicum, PL 77, 706A: “What is Sacred Scripture if not a letter from God omnipotent to his creature?”).

2. An allusion to Matt. 12:31–32, which says that one who speaks against the Son of Man will be forgiven, but that one who speaks against the Holy Spirit will not.

3. An allusion to Terence’s Phormio 696–97 (ALM).

4. Perhaps alluding to, but if so, moderating, Rom. 3:9–12. Cf. Preface, §14; TP vi, 6.

5. 1 Kings 8:6–8 reports that when the temple was dedicated, the priests placed the ark of the covenant in its inner sanctuary; 2 Chron. 36:15–21 describes the fall of Jerusalem and the burning of the temple (ALM). But Nebuchadnezzar did take some of the treasures of the temple to Babylon.

6. Where Spinoza has הלא, the Masoretic text has אכן הנה. The reference is to Jer. 8:8, whose translation varies widely, both in ancient and in modern versions. For discussion, see Holladay 1986, 281–83.

7. The new tablets whose making is recorded in Exod. 34.

8. See particularly ii, 52–53, for a crisp summary of the conclusions of Ch. ii.

9. See particularly vi, 52–64.

10. Although Spinoza had disavowed any intention of examining the books of the New Testament as he had those of the Old Testament (x, 48), here he does raise critical questions about the gospels: why do we have four different accounts of the life of Jesus? is everything in them necessary for our salvation? if one gospel contains teachings not present in the others, is its teaching essential?

11. Cf. Deut. 6:4–9, 10:12–22; Lev. 19:18; Matt. 22:34–40; Mark 12:28–34; Luke 10:25–28.

12. Cf. vii, 27, and the annotation there.

13. Some Spinoza scholars take this argument for the reliability of the gospel accounts at face value. Cf. Matheron 1971, p. 85. But Spinoza greatly exaggerates the speed with which the story of Jesus spread throughout the Roman empire, and it seems that he ought to have realized, from his knowledge of Josephus and Tacitus, that even late in the first century knowledge of the life and teachings of Jesus was at best sketchy among non-Christians. See Meier 1991, Chh. 3 and 4.

14. On this subject, see Ehrman 1993.

[III/167] CHAPTER XIII

That Scripture teaches only the simplest matters, that it aims only at obedience, and teaches nothing about the divine Nature, except what men can imitate by a certain manner of living

[1] In Ch. 2 of this Treatise we showed that the Prophets had only a special power to imagine things, not a special power to understand them, that God didn’t reveal to them any secrets of Philosophy, but only the simplest matters, and that he accommodated himself to their preconceived opinions.

[10] [2] Next, in Ch. 5 we showed that Scripture imparts and teaches things in the way which enables each person to most easily perceive them. It does not deduce them from axioms and definitions and connect them with one another. It just speaks simply. To create trust it confirms what it says only by experience—that is, by miracles and historical [15] narratives, relating these matters in a style and with expressions most apt to move ordinary people’s hearts. On this see Ch. 6, regarding the things demonstrated under heading 3 [§§39–51].

[3] Finally, in Ch. 7 we showed that the difficulty of understanding Scripture lies only in its language, not in the loftiness of its theme.

To these considerations we may add that the Prophets did not preach [20] to the wise, but to all Jews, without exception, and that the Apostles customarily taught the doctrine of the Gospel in the Churches, places where everyone met.

[4] From all this it follows that the doctrine of Scripture does not contain lofty speculations, or philosophical matters, but only the simplest [25] things, which anyone, no matter how slow, can perceive.1 I can’t wonder enough at the mentality of the people I spoke about above,² who see in Scripture mysteries so profound that no human language can explain them, and who have then introduced into religion so many matters of philosophic speculation that the Church seems to be an Academy, and Religion, science, or rather, a disputation.

[30] [5] But why should I wonder that men who boast that they have a supernatural light are unwilling to grant superiority in knowledge to Philosophers, who have nothing but the natural light? What would really be wonderful would be if they taught anything new which was a matter of pure speculation, and had not previously been a commonplace [III/168] among the pagan Philosophers—whom they nevertheless say have been blind. If you ask what mysteries they see hidden in Scripture, you will find nothing but the inventions of Aristotle or Plato or someone else like that.3 Often it is easier for any Layman to dream these things up, [5] than it is for a learned man to find them in Scripture.

[6] Of course we don’t want to maintain without qualification that nothing which is a matter of pure speculation pertains to the teaching of Scripture. In the preceding Chapter we cited a number of things of this kind as fundamentals of Scripture [xii, 34–36]. All I maintain is this: there are very few such things, and they’re very simple. [7] Moreover, [10] I’ve resolved to show here which these are and how they are determined. This will be easy for us now that we know that the purpose of Scripture was not to teach the sciences. From this we can easily judge that it requires nothing from men but obedience, and condemns only stubbornness, not ignorance.

[15] [8] Next, obedience to God consists only in the love of your neighbor—for as Paul says in Romans 13:8, he who loves his neighbor in order that he may obey God has fulfilled the Law. From this it follows that the only 'knowledge Scripture commends is that necessary for all men if they are to be able to obey God according to this prescription, [20] and without which men would necessarily be stiff-necked, or at least lacking in the discipline of obedience. It also follows that Scripture does not touch on speculations which do not tend directly to this end, whether they are concerned with the knowledge of God or the knowledge of natural things. So such speculations ought to be separated from revealed Religion.

[25] [9] But even though everyone, as we’ve said, can now easily see these things, still, because the judgment of the whole of Religion depends on this, I want to show the whole matter more carefully and to explain it more clearly. For this it’s necessary to show, before anything else, that the intellectual, or, exact, knowledge of God is not a gift common to all the faithful, as obedience is. Next, we must show that the knowledge [30] God, through the Prophets, has demanded of everyone, without exception, the knowledge everyone is bound to have, is nothing but knowledge of his Divine Justice and Loving-kindness. Both these things are easily demonstrated from Scripture itself.

[10] The first point [that Scripture teaches only a few, very simple truths about the nature of God] follows with utmost clarity from Exodus 6:3, where God says to Moses, to show the special grace he has given [III/169] to him: וארא אל אברהם אל יצחק ואל יעקב באל שדי ושמי יהוה לא נודעתי להם, and I was revealed to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as El Shaddai, but by my name Yahweh I was not known to them.4 To understand this passage better, note that El Shaddai in Hebrew means “God who suffices,” because he gives [5] to each person what suffices for that person. And though Shaddai by itself is often used for “God,” still, there is no doubt that the name El, God, should always be understood.

[11] Next, note that there is no name in Scripture except Yahweh which makes known the absolute essence of God, without relation to created things.5 And therefore the Hebrews contend that only this [10] name of God is peculiarly his, the others being common nouns.6 [12] And really, the other names of God, whether they are substantives or adjectives, are attributes which belong to God insofar as he is considered in relation to created things or is manifested through them. E.g., אל, El, or (with the paragogic letter ה, he) אלה, Eloah, means nothing [15] but “the powerful,” as we know. And this name belongs to God only in virtue of his excellence, as when we call Paul “the Apostle.” Otherwise the virtues of his power are explained, as El (the powerful one) the great, the awe-inspiring, the just, the merciful, etc., or to refer comprehensively to all his virtues at once, this name is used in the plural number,7 with a singular meaning, a very frequent occurrence in Scripture.

[13] Now, since God says to Moses that he was not known to his forefathers by the name Yahweh, it follows that they did not know any attribute of God which explains his absolute essence, but only attributes which explain his effects and promises, i.e., his power, insofar as it is manifested through visible things. [14] But God does not say this to Moses to accuse the patriarchs of lacking faith; on the contrary, his purpose is to praise their trustingness and faith, which led them to believe God’s promises to be valid and lasting, even though they did not have a knowledge of God as special as that of Moses. (Although Moses had more lofty thoughts about God, nevertheless he doubted the divine promises, and complained to God that, instead of the promised deliverance, he had changed the Jews’ affairs for the worse).8

[15] Therefore, since the Patriarchs did not know God’s special name, and God tells Moses this fact to praise their simplicity of heart and faith, and at the same time to put on record the special grace granted to Moses, from this our first conclusion follows with utmost clarity: [III/170] men are not obliged by a command to know God’s attributes; this is a special gift granted only to some of the faithful.

To show this by many Scriptural testimonies would not be worth the trouble. [16] Who doesn’t see that knowledge of God was not equal in all the faithful? who doesn’t see that no one can be wise on command, any more than he can live on command, or exist on command? Men, women, children, everyone in fact, is equally able to obey on command. But not everyone is equally able to be wise.

[17] Someone may say: indeed, it’s not necessary to understand God’s attributes, but it’s quite necessary to believe in them, simply, without any demonstration. But anyone who says this is talking nonsense. Invisible things, and those which are the objects only of the mind, can’t be seen by any other eyes than by demonstrations.9 Someone who doesn’t have demonstrations doesn’t see anything at all in these things. If they repeat something they’ve heard about them, it no more touches or shows their mind than do the words of a Parrot or an automaton, which speaks without a mind or without meaning.

[15] [18] Before I go any further, I need to show why it’s often said in Genesis that the Patriarchs taught in the name Yahweh, which seems completely contrary to what we just said.10 If we attend to what we showed in Ch. 8, we’ll easily be able to reconcile these statements. For in that Chapter we showed that the writer of the Pentateuch does [20] not indicate things and places by precisely the same names they had in the time he’s speaking about, but by the names they were better known by in his own time. [19] So the God the Patriarchs taught in Genesis is indicated by the name Yahweh, not because the forefathers knew him by this name, but because the Jews accorded this name the greatest reverence.

[25] We must say this, I maintain, because our passage from Exodus says explicitly that the Patriarchs did not know God by this name, but also because in Exodus 3:13 Moses wants to know God’s name. If it had been known before then, Moses too, at least, would have known it. We [30] must, then, draw the conclusions we were arguing for: that the faithful Patriarchs did not know this name of God, and that the knowledge of God was a gift of God, not a command.

[20] It’s time now to pass to the second point, to show that God through the Prophets asks no other knowledge of himself from men than the knowledge of his divine Justice and Loving-kindness, i.e., such attributes of God as men can imitate in a certain way of life. Jeremiah [III/171] teaches this most explicitly. [21] For in 22:15[–16], speaking of King Josiah, he says, אביך הלא אכל ושתה ועשה משפט וצדקה בארץ אז טוב לו דן דין עני ואביון אז טוב לו הלא היא הדעת אותי נאם יהוה וגו,11 Your father, indeed, ate, [5] and drank, and passed judgment, and did justice, and then (it was) well with him; he judged the right of the poor and the needy, and then (it was) well with him; for (NB) this is to know me, said Yahweh.

No less clear is the passage in 9:23:12 אך בזאת יתהלל המתהלל השכל וידוע אותי כי אני יהוה עשה חסד משפט וצדקה בארץ כי באלה חפצתי נאם יהוה, let each [10] one glory only in this, that he understands me and knows me, that I Yahweh practice loving-kindness, judgment and justice on the earth, for I delight in these things, says Yahweh.

[22] We infer this also from Exodus 34:6–7. There, when Moses wants to see and to come to know him, God reveals only those attributes which display divine Justice and Loving-kindness.

[15] Finally, we should note especially that passage in John which we’ll discuss later,13 where, because no one has seen God, he explains God only through loving-kindness, and concludes that whoever has loving-kindness really has and knows God.

[23] We see, then, that Jeremiah, Moses and John sum up the knowledge of God each person is bound to have by locating it only (as we [20] maintained) in this: that God is supremely just and supremely merciful, or, that he is the unique model of the true life.

[24] To this we may add that Scripture does not give explicitly any definition of God, does not prescribe embracing any other attributes of God beyond those just mentioned, and does not explicitly commend [25] any as it does these. From all this we conclude that the intellectual knowledge of God, which considers his nature as it is in itself (a nature men cannot imitate by any particular way of life and cannot take as a model for instituting the true way of life), does not in any way pertain [30] to faith or to revealed religion. So men can be completely mistaken about this without wickedness.

[25] It’s not at all surprising, then, that God accommodated himself to the imaginations and preconceived opinions of the Prophets, and that (as we showed in Ch. 2 with many examples) the faithful have cultivated different opinions about God.

[26] Again, it’s not at all surprising that the Sacred books everywhere [III/172] speak so improperly about God, and attribute to him hands, feet, eyes, ears, a mind, and local motion, as well as emotions, like Jealousy, compassion, etc., or that they depict him as a Judge, and as sitting in the heavens on a royal throne, with Christ at his right hand. They speak [5] according to the power of understanding of the common people, whom Scripture is concerned to make obedient, not learned.

[27] Nevertheless, the general run of Theologians have contended that if they could see by the natural light that any of these things did not agree with the divine nature, they would have to be interpreted metaphorically (whereas what escaped their grasp must be taken literally). [10] But if everything in Scripture which is found to be of this kind necessarily had to be interpreted and understood metaphorically, Scripture would be written not for ordinary people—and the uneducated common people—but only for the wisest, and especially for Philosophers.

[28] Indeed, if it were impious to believe about God the things we have just mentioned—piously and with simplicity of heart—the [15] Prophets would surely have been obliged to take the greatest care not to use such expressions, if only out of consideration for the weakness of the common people. On the contrary, they would have, above all, to teach, clearly and explicitly, God’s attributes, as each person is bound to accept them. In fact they haven’t done this anywhere.

[29] So we must not for a moment believe that opinions, considered [20] in themselves and without regard to works, have any piety or impiety in them. Instead we should say that a person believes something piously only insofar as his opinions move him to obedience, and impiously only insofar as he takes a license from them to sin or rebel. So, if anyone becomes stiff-necked by believing truths, he is really impious; on the other hand, if he becomes obedient by believing falsehoods, he has a [25] pious faith. For we have shown that the true knowledge of God is not a command, but a divine gift, and that God asks of man no other knowledge [of himself] than knowledge of his divine Justice and Loving-kindness. This knowledge is not necessary for the sciences, but only for obedience.14

1. ALM note the similarity here between Spinoza and Hobbes, Leviathan viii, 26. The issue there is the interpretation of passages in Scripture which seem, on a literal reading, to oppose Copernican astronomy. See also Galileo’s Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, in Finocchiaro 1989.

2. See, for example, the Preface, §§15–19, or ix, 33–34.

3. Cf. Manasseh’s commentary on the creation story of Genesis (1842/1972, I, 1–26), which is heavily influenced by Neoplatonic ideas. Note particularly that Manasseh justifies interpreting Mosaic theology in Platonic terms by accepting the theory that Plato had a better knowledge of Mosaic theology than Aristotle did because he had been a disciple of the Jewish elders (I, 8). As late as the nineteenth century Lindo will accept as probable that Plato received instruction from Jeremiah. ALM suggest that Spinoza may also have been thinking of Leo Hebraeus’s Dialogues of Love, a work which was in his library.

4. In English translations of the Hebrew Bible “El Shaddai” is commonly rendered “God Almighty.” Genesis does in fact represent all three of the patriarchs as using the name “Yahweh.” See, for example, Gen. 12:8, 15:2, 24:3, 26:22, 27:7, 28:13, 32:10, and 49:1–28. Modern scholarship takes the inconsistency of these passages with Exodus 6:3 as an important indication that they reflect different traditions. Cf. Anchor Genesis, xxii–xliii. Spinoza will offer a different explanation in §§18–19.

5. Cf. the discussion of the divine name in ii, 36, where Spinoza takes Exod. 3:13–15 as his text. Ashkenazi, 25n, suggests that Ibn Ezra’s commentary on Exodus 3:15 may be the most direct source of what Spinoza says here. Manasseh 1842/1972, I, 103–11, provides a useful survey of medieval Jewish commentary on this topic, citing particularly Halevi 1964, II, 2, and Maimonides Guide I, 61–63. See also the discussion of this passage in Zac 1965, 79–84.

6. See Spinoza’s classification of the different kinds of noun in ch. 5 of his Compendium of Hebrew Grammar. Spinoza uses the term “noun” (nomen) quite broadly, classing as nouns “any word by which we signify or indicate something which falls under the intellect” (Gebhardt I, 303). This category includes not only “substantive nouns” (our proper and common nouns), but also adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, participles, and infinitives.

7. A reference to the term Elohim, which is plural in number, but only sometimes plural in meaning, sometimes being used as a proper name for God.

8. The reference seems to be to Exod. 5:22–23.

9. Cf. E V P23S. The metaphor is also found in Leo Hebraeus, Dialogues on Love, 3rd Dialogue (ALM).

10. The prima facie inconsistency between Exod. 6:3 and passages like Gen. 15:7 was a traditional problem in Jewish biblical commentary, discussed by Manasseh 1842/1972, I, 55–56. See also xiii, 10.

11. The Hebrew text reproduced here (and in the first edition, Gebhardt, and ALM) contains two variations from the Masoretic Text.

12. Verse 9:24 in some Bibles. The Hebrew follows the first edition and ALM, which vary from MT and Gebhardt.

13. The reference is to 1 John 4:12–16, used as a motto on the title page of the TTP, and discussed in xiv, 17.

14. In Colerus’s biography of Spinoza there is an anecdote about a conversation he had with his landlady which has seemed to many apt here: “One day his landlady asked him whether he believed that she could be saved in the religion she professed. He answered: ‘Your religion is a good one, you need not look for any other, nor doubt that you may be saved in it, provided, whilst you apply yourself to piety, you live at the same time a peaceable and quiet life.’” Colerus 1706, 41. Spinoza’s landlady was a Lutheran. For an illuminating discussion of this incident, see Cook 1995.

[III/173] CHAPTER XIV

What is faith, who are the faithful, what the foundations of faith are, and finally, that it is separated from Philosophy

[1] For a true knowledge of faith the chief thing to know is that Scripture [5] is accommodated to the grasp, not only of the Prophets, but also of the fluctuating and inconstant common people of the Jews. No one who pays even a little attention can fail to know that. Anyone who indiscriminately accepts everything contained in Scripture as its universal and unconditional teaching about God, and doesn’t know accurately what [10] has been accommodated to the grasp of the common people, will be unable not to confuse the opinions of the common people with divine doctrine, hawk human inventions and fancies as divine teachings, and abuse the authority of Scripture.

[2] Who doesn’t see that this is the principal reason why the sectaries [15] teach as doctrines of the faith so many and such contrary opinions, and confirm them by many examples from Scripture? That's why it long ago became a Proverb among the Dutch that geen ketter zonder letter [There is no heretic without a text.] For the Sacred Books were written not by one person only, nor for the common people of one age, but by many men, of different mentalities, and of different ages. [20] If we calculate how long these ages lasted, we will find it to be about two thousand years—possibly much longer.

[3] Still, we don’t want to accuse the sectaries of impiety just because they accommodate the words of Scripture to their own opinions. For as Scripture was accommodated to the grasp of the common people, so everyone is permitted to accommodate it to his own opinions, if he [25] sees that in that way he can obey God more wholeheartedly in matters of justice and loving-kindness. [4] We do censure them, though, for being unwilling to grant this same freedom to others, and for persecuting, as God’s enemies, everyone who does not think as they do, even though they are very honest and obedient to true virtue. On the other [30] hand, they still love, as God’s elect, those who give lip service to these opinions, even if they are most weak-minded. Nothing more wicked or harmful to the republic can be imagined.

[5] To establish, then, how far each person has the freedom to think [III/174] what he wishes with respect to faith, and whom we are bound to consider faithful, even though they think differently, we must determine what faith and its fundamentals are. I’ve resolved to do that in this Chapter, and at the same time to separate faith from Philosophy, which was the [5] main purpose of this whole work. To show these things in an orderly way, let’s review the chief purpose of the whole of Scripture. That will show us the true standard for determining what faith is.

[6] We said in the preceding Chapter that the purpose of Scripture is only to teach obedience. No one can deny this. Who does not see [10] that each Testament is nothing but a training in obedience, and that neither Testament has any other aim than that men should obey from a true heart? [7] Not to mention now what I showed in the preceding Chapter [§§1–6], Moses did not try to convince the Israelites by reason, but was concerned only to bind them by a covenant, oaths [15] and benefits. Next, he threatened the people with punishment if they did not obey the laws and urged them to obedience with rewards. All these are means only to obedience, not 'knowledge. [8] As for the teaching of the Gospel, it contains nothing but simple faith: to trust in God, and to revere him, or (what is the same thing), to obey [20] him.1 To demonstrate a matter so obvious, I don’t need to heap up Scriptural texts which commend obedience. There are a great many in each Testament.²

[9] Next, Scripture also teaches, very clearly and in many places, what each person must do to obey God. The whole law consists only in this: [25] loving one’s neighbor. So no one can deny that one who, according to God’s command, loves his neighbor as himself is really obedient, and according to the law, blessed. But one who hates or fails to care for his neighbor is a stiff-necked rebel.

[10] Finally, everyone agrees that Scripture was written and published, [30] not only for the learned, but for all people, of every age and kind.3 From these [three]⁴ considerations alone it follows very clearly that the only beliefs we are bound by Scriptural command to have are those which are absolutely necessary to carry out this command. So this command itself is the unique standard of the whole universal faith. Only through it are we to determine all the doctrines of that faith, the beliefs everyone is bound to accept.

[III/175] [11] Since this is very plain, and since everything can be deduced legitimately from this foundation alone, by reason alone, everyone may judge for himself how so many disagreements could have arisen in the Church. Could they have had other causes than the ones we mentioned [5] at the beginning of Ch. 7?

[12] These very disagreements, then, force me to show here how to determine the doctrines of the faith from the foundation we’ve discovered. Unless I do this, and determine the matter by definite rules, people will rightly think I’ve done little to advance the discussion. Everyone will be able to introduce whatever he wishes, on the pretext [10] that it’s necessary as a means to obedience. This will be especially true when the question concerns the divine attributes.

[13] To show all this in an orderly way, I’ll begin with a definition of faith. According to the foundation we’ve given, faith must be defined as follows:

[Faith is] thinking such things about God that if you had no knowledge of them, obedience to God would be destroyed, whereas if you are [15] obedient to God, you necessarily have these thoughts.5

This definition is so clear, and follows so plainly from the things just demonstrated, that it needs no explanation. [14] Now I’ll briefly show what follows from it:

I. Faith is not saving by itself, but only in relation to obedience.

[20] Or as James says (James 2:17), faith by itself, without works, is dead. On this, see the whole second chapter of this Apostle’s letter. It follows that

II. If someone is truly obedient, he must have a true and saving faith.

[15] For as we’ve said, if obedience is present, faith is also necessarily present. The same Apostle also says this explicitly in 2:18, viz.: show [25] me your faith without works and I shall show you my faith from my works. And John says (in 1 John 4:7–8): whoever loves (i.e., loves his neighbor) is born of God and knows God; whoever does not love does not know God, for God is Loving-kindness. [16] From these things it follows next that

III. We can judge no one faithful or unfaithful except from their works.

[30] If the works are good, they are still faithful, however much they may disagree with other faithful people in their doctrines. Conversely, if the works are bad, they are unfaithful, however much they may agree in words with other faithful people. For where there is obedience, there faith is also, and faith without works is dead.6

[17] John teaches the same thing explicitly in v. 13 of the same chapter: by this, he says, we know that we remain in him and that he [III/176] remains in us, because he has given us of his spirit,7 viz. Loving-kindness. For he had said previously that God is Loving-kindness, from which (according to his principles, accepted at that time) he infers that he who has Loving-kindness really has the Spirit of God. Indeed, because no one has seen God, he infers from that that no one is aware of God, [5] or acknowledges God, except by Loving-kindness toward his neighbor, and that in fact no one can come to know any other attribute of God beyond this Loving-kindness, insofar as we participate in it.

[18] If these arguments are not decisive,8 still they explain John’s intention clearly enough. But much clearer is 1 John 2:3–4, where he [10] teaches in the most explicit terms what we maintain here. And by this, he says, we know that we know him, if we keep his commandments. Whoever says he knows him and does not keep his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him. From these propositions it follows next that [19]

IV. the real Antichrists are those who persecute honest men who love Justice, [15] because they disagree with them, and do not defend the same doctrines of faith they do.

For we know that loving Justice and Loving-kindness are enough to make a man faithful; and whoever persecutes the faithful is an Antichrist.

[20] Finally, it follows that

V. faith requires, not so much true doctrines, as pious doctrines, i.e., doctrines [20] which move the heart to obedience, even if many of them do not have even a shadow of the truth.

This is true provided the person who accepts them does not know they are false. If he did, he would necessarily be a rebel. For how could someone who is eager to love Justice and to obey God worship as divine something he knows to be foreign to the divine nature? [21] But men [25] can err from simplicity of heart; and as we have shown, Scripture does not condemn ignorance; it condemns only stubbornness.

Indeed, this must follow just from the definition of faith, all of whose elements must be sought from the universal foundation already shown and from the single purpose of the whole of Scripture—unless we want to mix in our own fancies. This definition does not explicitly require [30] true doctrines, but only such doctrines as are necessary for obedience, which strengthen our hearts in love toward our neighbors. It is only because of this love that each of us (to speak with John) is in God and that God is in each of us.9

[22] The faith of each person should be considered pious or impious only on account of his obedience or stubbornness, not on account of its truth or falsity. No one doubts that the common mentality of men [III/177] is extremely variable, and that not everyone is equally satisfied by all things. Opinions govern men in different ways: those which move one person to devotion, move another to laughter and contempt.

From this it follows that no doctrines belong to the catholic, or [5] universal, faith which can be controversial among honest men. [23] Since doctrines must be judged only by the works [they encourage], controversial doctrines can be pious in relation to one person and impious in relation to another. Only those doctrines belong to the catholic faith, then, which obedience to God absolutely assumes, and [10] ignorance of which makes obedience absolutely impossible.10 As for the rest, since each person knows himself better [than anyone else does], he must think as he sees will be better for him, to strengthen himself in his love of Justice. [24] In this way, I think, no room is left for controversies in the Church.

Now I shall not hesitate to enumerate the doctrines of the universal [15] faith, or the fundamental principles aimed at by the whole of Scripture, all of which (as follows with utmost clarity from what we have shown in these two Chapters)11 must tend to this point: that there is a supreme being, who loves Justice and Loving-kindness, and whom everyone, if he is to be saved, is bound to obey and to worship by practicing Justice and Loving-kindness toward his neighbor. From this it is easy to [20] determine what the doctrines are. They are just these:

[25] I. God exists, i.e., there is a supreme being, supremely just and merciful, or a model of true life. Anyone who doesn’t know, or doesn’t believe, that God exists cannot obey him or know him as a Judge.

II. He is unique. No one can doubt that this too is absolutely required for [25] supreme devotion, admiration and love toward God. For devotion, admiration and love arise only because the excellence of one surpasses that of the rest.

[26] III. He is present everywhere, or everything is open to him. If people believed some things were hidden from him, or did not know that he sees all, they would have doubts about the equity of the Justice by which he directs all things—or at least they would not be aware of it.

[30] IV. He has the supreme right and dominion over all things, and does nothing because he is compelled by a law,12 but acts only according to his absolute good pleasure and special grace. For everyone is absolutely bound to obey him, whereas he is not bound to obey anyone.

[27] V. The worship of God and obedience to him consist only in Justice and Loving-kindness, or in love toward one’s neighbor;

[III/178] VI. Everyone who obeys God by living in this way is saved; the rest, who live under the control of pleasures, are lost. If men did not firmly believe this, there would be no reason why they should prefer to obey God rather than pleasures; and

[5] [28] VII. Finally, God pardons the sins of those who repent. No one is without sin.13 So if we did not maintain this, everyone would despair of his salvation, and there would be no reason why anyone would believe God to be merciful. Moreover, whoever firmly believes that God, out of mercy and the grace by which he directs everything, pardons men’s sins, and who for this reason is more inspired by the love of God, that person really knows [10] Christ according to the Spirit, and Christ is in him.

[29] No one can fail to be aware that it is especially necessary to know all these things for men to be able, without exception, to obey God according to the command of the Law explained above. If any of these doctrines is taken away, obedience also is destroyed.

[30] As for the rest, it doesn’t matter, as far as faith is concerned, [what anyone believes about such matters as]:

[15] [i] what God (or that model of true life) is, whether he is fire, spirit, light, thought, etc., or

[ii] how he is a model of true life, whether because he has a just and merciful heart, or because all things exist and act through him (and hence that we too understand through him, and see through him, what is truly right, and good).

[20] It’s all the same, whatever each person maintains about these things.

[31] Again, it also doesn’t matter, as far as faith is concerned, if someone believes

[iii] that God is everywhere according to his essence or according to his power, or

[iv] that he directs things from freedom or by a necessity of nature, or

[v] that he prescribes laws as a prince or teaches them as eternal truths, or

[25] [vi] that man obeys God from freedom of the will or from the necessity of the divine decree, or finally,

[vii] that the reward of the good and punishment of the evil are natural or supernatural.

[32] It doesn’t matter, I say, as far as faith is concerned, how each person understands these and similar things, provided he doesn’t conclude that he may take a greater license to sin, or that he should become [30] less obedient to God. In fact, as we’ve already said, each person is bound to accommodate these doctrines of faith to his own power of understanding, and to interpret them for himself, as it seems to him easier for him to accept them without any hesitation, with complete agreement of the heart, so that he may obey God wholeheartedly. [33] For as we’ve already noted, the faith was originally revealed and written [III/179] according to the grasp and opinions of the Prophets, and of the common people of that time. In the same way, everyone now is bound to accommodate it to his own opinions, so that he can accept it without any mental conflict and without any hesitation. For we’ve shown that [5] faith requires piety more than it does truth, and that it’s pious and saving only because of the person’s obedience. So no one is faithful except by reason of obedience. The person who displays the best arguments is not necessarily the one who displays the best faith; instead it’s the one who displays the best works of Justice and Loving-kindness.

[10] [34] How salutary this Doctrine is, how necessary in the republic, if people are to live peacefully and harmoniously, how many, and how great, are the causes of disturbance and wickedness it prevents—these things I leave everyone to judge for himself.

[35] But before I go any further, we should note here that from what we’ve just shown we can easily reply to the objections raised in Ch. 1 [15] [§§13–18], when we discussed God’s speaking to the Israelites from Mt. Sinai. [36] Though the voice the Israelites heard could not give them any philosophical or mathematical certainty about God’s existence, still, it was enough to make them wonder at God, insofar as they had previously known him, and to motivate them to obedience. That was the [20] purpose of that manifestation. God did not want to teach the Israelites the absolute attributes of his essence. (He did not reveal any of them at that time.) He wanted to break their stubborn heart and win them over to obedience. So he addressed them with the sound of trumpets, with [25] thunder, and with lightning, not with arguments. See Exodus 20:[18–21].14

[37] What remains now is for me to show, finally, that there are no dealings, or no relationship, between faith, or Theology, and Philosophy. No one can fail to see this now, who knows that these two faculties aim at, and are based on, completely different things. [38] For the goal [30] of Philosophy is nothing but truth. But the goal of Faith, as we’ve shown abundantly, is nothing but obedience and piety. Furthermore, the foundations of Philosophy are common notions, and [its truth] must be sought only from nature. But the foundations of Faith are histories and language, and [those foundations] must be sought only from Scripture and revelation, as we showed in Ch. 7.

[39] Faith, therefore, grants everyone the greatest freedom to philosophize, [III/180] so that without wickedness he can think whatever he wishes about anything. Faith condemns as heretics and schismatics only those who teach opinions which encourage obstinacy, hatred, quarrels and anger. On the other hand, it considers faithful only those who encourage [5] Justice and Loving-kindness as far as the powers of their reason and their faculties permit.

[40] Finally, since the things we have shown here are the main points I have been aiming at in this treatise, before I go any further I want to ask the reader most earnestly to take the time to read these two Chapters quite carefully, to weigh them again and again, and to be [10] persuaded that we did not write them with the intention of introducing any novelties, but only to correct distortions, which we hope someday, finally, to see corrected.15

1. Note that in the TTP Spinoza never cites any of those passages from John which provide a foundation in the gospels for Christian exclusivism by seeming to make acceptance of theological propositions about Jesus the path to salvation, such as John 3:16–18, 3:36, 11:25–26, 14:6, or 20:31. Cf. his account of Paul’s teaching in xi, 21.

2. Cf. above xii, 34, and the passages cited in the note there. See also below, xix, 4.

3. Cf. above xiii, 16.

4. That is, the considerations adduced in §§6–8 (that the only purpose of Scripture is to teach obedience), §9 (that obedience requires only the love of one’s neighbor), and §10 (that the commands of Scripture are directed to everyone).

5. Dan Garber, commenting on an earlier draft of this passage, suggested that quibus ignoratis, here translated “if you had no knowledge of them,” should be rendered “if the person disregards them.” This is possible linguistically, but I think xiv, 20–23, indicates that it is a question, not of failing to take note of what you know, or failing to act on what you know, but of not knowing (in a broad sense of “know,” where the bar for knowledge is not set high).

6. Spinoza’s use of 1 John to support his reduction of faith to obedience apparently aligns the author of this epistle with James rather than Paul in the dispute over justification described in xi, 21–24. If the author of this epistle was also the author of the fourth gospel, and if the author of the fourth gospel is properly aligned with Paul rather than James, Spinoza’s alignment will be puzzling. This may be a reason for questioning the traditional ascription of the epistle to the author of the fourth gospel. (There are other reasons, as Brown 1997, 389–91, explains.)

7. 1 John 4:13, Spinoza’s motto for the TTP. Cf. the title page.

8. Bennett described the argument of §17 as “convoluted.” It does appear that Spinoza is not entirely confident that his reasoning is clear and compelling.

9. Alluding again to 1 John 4:13.

10. Bennett notes that here Spinoza seems to take the relevant beliefs to be both necessary and sufficient for obedience, and to think that his definition in xiv, 13, says as much. He objects that it doesn’t (since the second clause of the definition is the contrapositive of the first, not its converse). Spinoza’s use of 1 John 2:3–4 suggests that he does indeed intend to assert a biconditional; xiv, 29, seems particularly clear that the beliefs are necessary for obedience. That they should also be sufficient for obedience, though, seems inconsistent with Spinoza’s teaching in the Ethics concerning weakness of will. Cf. E IV P17S.

11. That is, as I take it, from what has been shown in Chs. xii and xiii.

12. That is (as Matheron suggests in ALM), by a law someone else imposes on him.

13. ALM mention Eccles. 7:20, previously cited in iii, 38. We might add John 8:7 or Rom. 3:9–20. But Spinoza’s reading of Eccles. 7:20 seems less bleak than Paul’s, whose paraphrase of Eccles. in Rom. 3:10 (possibly influenced by the Septuagint translation) is quite harsh. See iii, 38, and TP, ii, 8.

14. Spinoza has Exod. 20:20, but the reference is clearly to the verses numbered 18–21 in the NRSV (and 15–18 in the NJPS translation).

15. In the TTP Spinoza pursues two lines of argument to show that we should be free to philosophize: one via considerations about the nature of religion and the nature of philosophy, the other via considerations about the state. Chs. xiii and xiv represent the culmination of the first of these lines of argument.

[III/180] CHAPTER XV

Showing that Theology should not be the handmaid of Reason, nor Reason the handmaid of Theology, and the reason which persuades us of the authority of Holy Scripture

[1] Those who don’t know how to separate Philosophy from Theology debate whether Scripture should be the handmaid of reason, or reason should be the handmaid of Scripture—that is, whether the meaning of [20] Scripture ought to be accommodated to reason, or reason ought to be accommodated to Scripture. The skeptics, who deny the certainty of reason, defend the accommodation of reason to Scripture. The dogmatists defend the accommodation of Scripture to reason.

[2] But what we’ve already said shows that both parties are completely mistaken. Whichever opinion we follow, we must corrupt either reason or Scripture. We’ve shown that Scripture does not teach philosophic [25] matters, but only religious duty, and that everything contained in it was accommodated to the grasp and preconceived opinions of the common people. [3] So those who want to accommodate it to Philosophy ascribe to the Prophets many things they did not think of even in their dreams, and interpret their meaning wrongly. On the other hand, those who [30] make reason and Philosophy the handmaid of Theology are bound to admit as divine teachings the prejudices of the common people of long ago, to fill their minds with those prejudices, and to blind themselves. Each is insane, the former with reason, the latter without it.1

[4] The first person among the Pharisees who openly maintained that [III/181] Scripture must be accommodated to reason was Maimonides, whose opinion we reviewed in Ch. 7, and refuted by many arguments. Though this author had great authority among [the Pharisees], nevertheless most of them part from him in this matter, and follow the opinion of [5] a certain R. Judah Alfakhar,2 who, in his desire to avoid Maimonides’ error, fell into the opposite mistake.

[5] Alfakhar maintained 3* that reason should be the handmaid of Scripture and should be made completely subordinate to it. He did not think that anything in Scripture should be explained metaphorically merely because the literal meaning was contrary to reason, but only [10] because it was contrary to Scripture itself, i.e., to its clear doctrines. From this he forms a universal rule: whatever Scripture teaches as doctrine,4** and affirms in explicit terms, must be admitted unconditionally as true, simply in virtue of the authority of Scripture.⁵ No other doctrine will be found in the Bible which is directly contrary to it, though some may be found which are contrary to it by implication. [15] Scripture’s ways of speaking often seem to presuppose something contrary to what it has explicitly taught. For that reason, only those passages [which seem contrary to Scripture’s explicit teachings] are to be explained metaphorically.

[6] For example, Scripture teaches clearly that God is unique (see Deuteronomy 6:4), and you do not find any other passage, anywhere, directly affirming that there is more than one God.6 But there are [20] numerous passages where God speaks of himself, and the Prophets speak of God, in the plural number.7 It’s only this manner of speaking which presupposes that there is more than one God; it does not show that this was the speaker’s intent. So all these passages are to be explained metaphorically—not because it’s contrary to reason that there is more than one God, but because Scripture itself directly affirms that God is unique.

[25] [7] Similarly, because Scripture (in Deuteronomy 4:15) directly affirms (as he thinks) that God is incorporeal,8 we are therefore bound to believe that God does not have a body—solely on the authority of this passage, not on the authority of reason. So, it’s only by the authority of Scripture that we are bound to explain metaphorically all the passages [30] which attribute to God hands, feet, etc.9 [On this view] it is only a manner of speaking in these passages which seems to presuppose that God has a body.

[8] That’s the opinion of this author. Insofar as he wants to explain Scripture by Scripture, I praise him. But I’m amazed that a man endowed [III/182] with reason should be so eager to destroy reason. It’s certainly true that Scripture ought to be explained by Scripture, so long as we’re only working out the meaning of the statements and the Prophets’ intention. But once we’ve unearthed the true meaning, we must, necessarily, use judgment and reason to give it our assent. [9] If reason must still [5] be made completely subordinate to Scripture, however much it may protest against it, I ask whether we ought to subordinate it with reason or without it, like blind men? If without reason, then of course we’re acting foolishly and without judgment. If with reason, then we embrace Scripture only by the command of reason. We would not, therefore, embrace it if it were contrary to reason.

[10] I ask you, who can embrace something in his mind in spite of [10] the protests of reason? What else is denying something in your mind but the fact that reason protests against it? I can find no words to express my amazement that people should want to make reason, [God’s] greatest gift, a divine light, subordinate to dead letters—which men’s wicked conduct could have corrupted—that it should be thought no crime to speak unworthily against the mind, the true original text of [15] God’s word, and to maintain that it is corrupt, blind, and lost, but that it should be considered the greatest crime to think such things about the letter, the image of God’s word.10

[11] They think it pious to trust nothing to reason and their own judgment, but impious to doubt the good faith of those who handed down the Sacred Books to us. That’s just folly, not piety. What are they [20] worried about? What are they afraid of? Can’t Religion and faith be defended unless men deliberately make themselves ignorant of everything, and say farewell to reason completely? If that’s what they believe, they’re more fearful for Scripture than trusting in it. [12] But it’s far from true that Religion and piety want reason to be their handmaid, or that reason wants Religion to be its handmaid. Each can maintain [25] control of its own domain with the utmost harmony. More on this shortly. First, I want to examine here the Rule of that Rabbi.

[13] As we’ve said, [Alfakhar] holds [i] that we’re bound to accept as true whatever Scripture affirms, and reject as false whatever it denies; and [ii] that Scripture never explicitly affirms or denies anything contrary [30] to what it’s affirmed or denied in another passage.11 No one can fail to see how rash it is to say these things. [14] For—not to mention now that he hasn’t paid attention to the fact that Scripture is made up of different books, written at different times, by different authors, for different men—or that he says these things on his own authority [III/183] (since reason and Scripture say nothing of the kind)— he ought to have shown that all the passages which are contrary to others only by implication can be suitably explained, from the nature of the language and the purpose of the passage, as metaphors. And he ought also to have shown that Scripture has reached our hands uncorrupted.

[15] But let’s examine the matter in an orderly way. About his first [5] claim, [i], I ask: what if reason protests? are we still bound to accept as true what Scripture affirms and reject as false what it denies? Perhaps he will add that there is nothing in Scripture contrary to reason. But I insist that it explicitly affirms and teaches that God is jealous (e.g., [10] in the Decalogue itself [Exodus 20:5, Deuteronomy 5:9], in Exodus 34:14,12 in Deuteronomy 4:24, and in numerous other places).¹³ But this is contrary to reason. Still [by Alfakhar’s principles] it must be asserted as true. Indeed, if certain passages are found in Scripture which presuppose that God is not jealous, they would have to be explained metaphorically, so that they did not seem to presuppose any such thing.

[15] [16] Similarly, Scripture says explicitly that God came down upon mount Sinai (see Exodus 19:20),14 and attributes other local motions to him.¹⁵ Nowhere does it explicitly teach that God does not move. So everyone must admit that this too is true [i.e., that God moves from one place to another]. When Solomon says (1 Kings 8:27) that God is [20] not contained in any place, since he has not explicitly maintained that God does not move, but it only follows from that that he doesn’t, this will have to be explained in a way that does not seem to take local motion away from God.

[18] Next, [Alfakhar] is just wrong when he claims that one passage is contrary to another only by implication, never directly. For Moses [30] affirms directly that God is a fire (see Deuteronomy 4:24) and denies directly that God has any likeness to visible things (see Deuteronomy 4:12).17 If he should reply that the latter passage does not deny directly that God is a fire, but only denies it by implication, and hence that the latter passage must be accommodated to the former—all right! Let us grant that God is a fire. Or rather, so as not to rave with him, let us [III/184] set these examples to one side and bring forward another.

[19] Samuel 18** directly denies that God repents of his judgment (see 1 Samuel 15:29), whereas Jeremiah, on the contrary, affirms that God repents of the good and of the evil which he had decreed (Jeremiah [5] 18:8–10). Are these passages not directly opposed to one another? Which of the two does he want to explain metaphorically? Each statement is universal and contrary to the other. What the one directly affirms, the other directly denies. So [Alfakhar] himself, according to his own rule, is bound to embrace as true what he is also bound to reject as false.

[20] Another point: what does it matter if one passage is not directly [10] contrary to the other, but only contrary to the other by implication, if the principle of inference is clear and the circumstances and nature of the passage do not allow metaphorical explanations? There are a great many such passages in the Bible. See Ch. 2, where we showed that the Prophets had different and contrary opinions. See especially [15] all the contradictions we showed in the Histories (see Chs. 9 and 10). [21] I don’t need to review all these matters here. What I’ve already said is enough to show the absurdities which follow from this position and rule, to show its falsity and its author’s rashness.