The Collected Works of Spinoza Volume I and II

Finally, since Hate and Love are themselves affects of Sadness or of Joy, it follows in the same way that the striving, appetite, or Desire which arises from Hate or Love will be greater as the Hate and Love are greater, q.e.d.

[5] P38: If someone begins to hate a thing he has loved, so that the Love is completely destroyed, then (from an equal cause) he will have a greater hate for it than if he had never loved it, and this hate will be the greater as the Love before was greater.

[10] Dem.: For if someone begins to hate a thing he loves, more of his appetites will be restrained than if he had not loved it. For Love is a Joy (by P13S), which the man, as far as he can (by P28), strives to preserve; and (by the same scholium) he does this by regarding the [15] thing he loves as present, and by affecting it, as far as he can, with Joy (by P21). This striving (by P37) is greater as the love is greater, as is the striving to bring it about that the thing he loves loves him in return (see P33). But these strivings are restrained by hatred toward [20] the thing he loves (by P13C and P23); therefore, the lover (by P11S) will be affected with Sadness from this cause also, and the more so as his Love was greater. I.e., apart from the Sadness that was the cause of the Hate, another arises from the fact that he loved the thing. And consequently he will regard the thing he loved with a greater affect of [25] Sadness, i.e. (by P13S), he will have a greater hatred for it than if he had not loved it. And this hate will be the greater as the love was greater, q.e.d.

[P39]: He who Hates someone will strive to do evil to him, unless he fears that a greater evil to himself will arise from this; and on the other hand, he who [30] loves someone will strive to benefit him by the same law.

[II/170] Dem.: To hate someone (by P13S) is to imagine him as the cause of [NS: one’s] Sadness; and so (by P28), he who hates someone will [5] strive to remove or destroy him. But if from that he fears something sadder, or (what is the same) a greater evil to himself, and believes that he can avoid this sadness by not doing to the one he hates the evil he was contemplating, he will desire to abstain from doing evil (by the same P28)—and that (by P37) with a greater striving than that by which he was bound to do evil. So this greater striving will prevail, [10] as we maintained.

The second part of this demonstration proceeds in the same way. Therefore, he who hates someone, etc., q.e.d.

Schol.: By good here I understand every kind of Joy, and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever [15] that may be. And by evil [I understand here] every kind of Sadness, and especially what frustrates longing. For we have shown above (in P9S) that we desire nothing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary, we call it good because we desire it. Consequently, what we are averse to we call evil.

[20] So each one, from his own affect, judges, or evaluates, what is good and what is bad, what is better and what is worse, and finally, what is best and what is worst. So the Greedy man judges an abundance of money best, and poverty worst. The Ambitious man desires nothing so much as Esteem and dreads nothing so much as Shame. To the [25] Envious nothing is more agreeable than another’s unhappiness, and nothing more burdensome than another’s happiness. And so, each one, from his own affect, judges a thing good or bad, useful or useless.

Further, this affect, by which a man is so disposed that he does not will what he wills, and wills what he does not will, is called Timidity, [30] which is therefore nothing but fear insofar as a man is disposed by it to avoid an evil he judges to be future by encountering a lesser evil (see P28). But if the evil he is timid toward is Shame, then the timidity is called a Sense of shame. Finally, if the desire to avoid a future evil is restrained by [II/171] Timidity regarding another evil, so that he does not know what he would rather do, then the Fear is called Consternation, particularly if each evil he fears is of the greatest.

[5] P40: He who imagines he is hated by someone, and believes he has given the other no cause for hate, will hate the other in return.

Dem.: He who imagines someone to be affected with hate will thereby also be affected with hate (by P27), i.e. (by P13S), with Sadness accompanied [10] by the idea of an external cause. But (by hypothesis) he imagines no cause of this Sadness except the one who hates him. So from imagining himself to be hated by someone, he will be affected with Sadness, accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him [as a cause of the sadness] or (by the same Scholium) he will hate the [15] other, q.e.d.

Schol. If he imagines he has given just cause for this hatred, he will be affected with Shame (by P30 and P30S). But this rarely happens (by P25). Moreover, this reciprocity of Hatred can also arise from the [20] fact that Hatred is followed by a striving to do evil to him who is hated (by P39). He, therefore, who imagines that someone hates him will imagine the other to be the cause of an evil, or Sadness. And so, he will be affected with Sadness, or Fear, accompanied by the idea of the one who hates him, as a cause. I.e., he will be affected with hate [25] in return, as above.

Cor. 1: He who imagines one he loves to be affected with hate toward him will be tormented by Love and Hate together. For insofar as he imagines that [the one he loves] hates him, he is determined to [30] hate [that person] in return (by P40). But (by hypothesis) he nevertheless loves him. So he will be tormented by Love and Hate together.

[II/172] Cor. 2: If someone imagines that someone else, toward whom he has previously had no affect, has, out of hatred, done him some evil, he will immediately strive to return the same evil.

[5] Dem.: He who imagines someone to be affected with Hate toward him, will hate him in return (by P40), and (by P26) will strive to think of everything that can affect [that person] with Sadness, and be eager [10] to bring it to him (by P39). But (by hypothesis) the first thing he imagines of this kind is the evil done him. So he will immediately strive to do the same to [that person], q.e.d.

Schol.: The striving to do evil to him we hate is called Anger; and the striving to return an evil done us is called Vengeance.

[15] P41: If someone imagines that someone loves him, and does not believe he has given any cause for this,b he will love [that person] in return.29

[20] Dem.: This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the preceding one. See also its scholium.

Schol.: But if he believes that he has given just cause for this Love, he will exult at being esteemed (by P30 and P30S). This, indeed, [25] happens rather frequently (by P25) and is the opposite of what we said happens when someone imagines that someone hates him (see P40S).

Next, this reciprocal Love, and consequent (by P39) striving to benefit one who loves us, and strives (by the same P39) to benefit us, is called Thankfulness, [30] or Gratitude.

And so it is evident that men are far more ready for Vengeance than for returning benefits.

[II/173] Cor.: He who imagines he is loved by one he hates will be torn by Hate and Love together. This is demonstrated in the same way as P40C1.

[5] Schol.: But if the Hate has prevailed, he will strive to do evil to the one who loves him. This affect is called Cruelty, especially if it is believed that the one who loves has given no ordinary cause for Hatred.

[10] P42: He who has benefited someone—whether moved to do so by Love or by the hope of Esteem—will be saddened if he sees his benefit accepted in an ungrateful spirit.

[15] Dem.: He who loves a thing like himself strives, as far as he can, to be loved by it in return (by P33). So he who has benefited someone from love does this from a longing by which he is bound that he may be loved in return—i.e. (by P34), from the hope of Esteem or (by [20] P30S) Joy; so (by P12) he will strive, as far as he can, to imagine this cause of Esteem, or to regard it as actually existing. But (by hypothesis) he imagines something else that excludes the existence of this cause. So (by P19) he will be saddened by this.

[26] P43: Hate is increased by being returned, but can be destroyed by Love.

Dem.: He who imagines one he hates to be affected with Hate toward him will feel a new Hate (by P40), while the first (by hypothesis) continues. If, on the other hand, he imagines that the one he [30] hates is affected with love toward him, then insofar as he imagines this, he regards himself with Joy (by P30) and will strive to please the [II/174] one he hates (by P29), i.e. (by P41), he strives not to hate him and not to affect him with Sadness. This striving (by P37) will be greater or lesser in proportion to the affect from which it arises. So if it is [5] greater than that which arises from hate, and by which he strives to affect the thing he hates with Sadness (by P26), then it will prevail over it and efface the Hate from his mind, q.e.d.

P44: Hate completely conquered by Love passes into Love, and the Love is [10] therefore greater than if Hate had not preceded it.

Dem.: The proof of this proceeds in the same way as that of P38. For he who begins to love a thing he has hated, or used to regard with Sadness, rejoices because he loves, and to this Joy which Love involves [15] (see its definition in P13S) there is also added a Joy arising from this—the striving to remove the Sadness hate involves (as we have shown in P37) is wholly aided by the accompaniment of the idea of the one he hated, [who is regarded] as a cause [of joy].

[20] Schol.: Although this is so, still, no one will strive to hate a thing, or to be affected with Sadness, in order to have this greater Joy, i.e., no one will desire to injure himself in the hope of recovering, or long to be sick in the hope of getting better. For each one will strive always [25] to preserve his being, and to put aside Sadness as far as he can. But if, on the contrary, one could conceive that a man could desire to hate someone, in order afterwards to have the greater love for him, then he would always desire to hate him. For as the Hate was greater, so [30] the Love would be greater, and so he would always desire his Hate to become greater and greater. And by the same cause, a man would strive to become more and more ill, so that afterwards he might have the greater joy from restoring his health; and so he would always strive to become ill, which (by P6) is absurd.

[II/175] P45: If someone imagines that someone like himself is affected with Hate toward a thing like himself which he loves, he will hate that [person].

[5] Dem.: For the thing he loves hates in return the one who hates it (by P40), and so the lover, who imagines that someone hates the thing he loves, thereby imagines the thing he loves to be affected with Hate, i.e. (by P13S), with Sadness. And consequently (by P21), he is saddened, [10] and his Sadness is accompanied by the idea of the one who hates the thing he loves—[this other being regarded] as the cause [of the Sadness]. I.e. (by P13S), he will hate him, q.e.d.

P46: If someone has been affected with Joy or Sadness by someone of a class, or nation, different from his own, and this Joy or Sadness is accompanied by the [15] idea of that person as its cause, under the universal name of the class or nation, he will love or hate, not only that person, but everyone of the same class or nation.

Dem.: The demonstration of this matter is evident from P16.

[20] P47: The Joy which arises from our imagining that a thing we hate is destroyed, or affected with some other evil, does not occur without some Sadness of mind.

[25] Dem.: This is evident from P27. For insofar as we imagine a thing like us to be affected with sadness, we are saddened.

Schol.: This Proposition can also be demonstrated from IIP17C. [II/176] For as often as we recollect a thing—even though it does not actually exist—we still regard it as present, and the Body is affected in the same way [NS: as if it were present]. So insofar as the memory of the thing is strong, the man is determined to regard it with Sadness. While the image of the thing still remains, this determination is, indeed, [5] restrained by the memory of those things that exclude its existence; but it is not taken away. And so the man rejoices only insofar as this determination is restrained.

So it happens that this Joy, which arises from the misfortune occurring to the thing we hate, is repeated as often as we recollect the [10] thing. For as we have said, when the image of this thing is aroused, because it involves the existence of the thing, it determines the man to regard the thing with the same Sadness as he used to before, when it existed. But because he has joined to the image of this thing other images that exclude its existence, this determination to Sadness is immediately [15] restrained, and the man rejoices anew. This happens as often as the repetition occurs.

This is also the cause of men’s rejoicing when they recall some evil now past, and why they enjoy telling of dangers from which they have been freed. For when they imagine a danger, they regard it as [20] future, and are determined to fear it. This determination is restrained anew by the idea of freedom, which they have joined to the idea of the danger, since they have been freed from it. This renders them safe again, and they rejoice again.

[25] P48: Love or Hate—say, of Peter—is destroyed if the Sadness the Hate involves, or the Joy the Love involves, is attached to the idea of another cause, and each is diminished to the extent that we imagine that Peter was not its only cause.

[30] Dem.: This is evident simply from the definitions of Love and Hate—see P13S. For this Joy is called Love of Peter, or this Sadness, Hatred of Peter, only because Peter is considered to be the cause of the one affect or the other. If this is taken away—either wholly or in part—the [II/177] affect toward Peter is also diminished, either wholly or in part, q.e.d.

[P49]: Given an equal cause of Love, Love toward a thing will be greater if we [5] imagine the thing to be free than if we imagine it to be necessary. And similarly for Hate.

Dem.: A thing we imagine to be free must be perceived through itself, without others (by ID7). So if we imagine it to be the cause of [10] Joy or Sadness, we shall thereby love or hate it (by P13S), and shall do so with the greatest Love or Hate that can arise from the given affect (by P48). But if we should imagine as necessary the thing that is the cause of this affect, then (by the same ID7) we shall imagine it [15] to be the cause of the affect, not alone, but with others. And so (by P48) our Love or Hate toward it will be less, q.e.d.

Schol.: From this it follows that because men consider themselves to be free, they have a greater Love or Hate toward one another than [20] toward other things. To this is added the imitation of the affects, on which see P27, 34, 40 and 43.

[P50]: Anything whatever can be the accidental cause of Hope or Fear.

[25] Dem.: This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as P15. Consult it together with P18S2.30

Schol.: Things which are accidental causes of Hope or Fear are called good or bad omens. And insofar as these same omens are causes [30] of Hope or Fear, they are causes of Joy or Sadness 31 (by the definitions [II/178] of hope and fear—see P18S2); consequently (by P15C), we love them or hate them, and strive (by P28) either to use them as means to the things we hope for, or to remove them as obstacles or causes of Fear.

[5] Furthermore, as follows from P25, we are so constituted by nature that we easily believe the things we hope for, but believe only with difficulty those we fear, and that we regard them more or less highly than is just. This is the source of the Superstitions by which men are everywhere troubled.

For the rest, I do not think it worth the trouble to show here the [10] vacillations of mind which stem from Hope and Fear—since it follows simply from the definition of these affects that there is no Hope without Fear, and no Fear without Hope (as we shall explain more fully in its place). Moreover, insofar as we hope for or fear something, we love it or hate it; so whatever we have said of Love and Hate, anyone [15] can easily apply to Hope and Fear.

P51: Different men can be affected differently by one and the same object; and one and the same man can be affected differently at different times by one and the same object.

[20] Dem.: The human Body (by IIPost. 3) is affected in a great many ways by external bodies. Therefore, two men can be differently affected at the same time, and so (by IIA1” [II/99]) they can be affected differently by one and the same object.

[25] Next (by the same Post.) the human Body can be affected now in this way, now in another. Consequently (by the same Axiom) it can be affected differently at different times by one and the same object, q.e.d.

[30] Schol.: We see, then, that it can happen that what the one loves, the other hates, what the one fears, the other does not, and that one and the same man may now love what before he hated, and now dare what before he was too timid for.

Next, because each one judges from his own affect what is good [II/179] and what is bad, what is better and what worse (see P39S) it follows that men can vary c as much in judgment as in affect. The result is that when we compare one with another, we distinguish them only by a difference of affects, and call some intrepid, others timid, and [5] others, finally, by another name.

For example, I shall call him intrepid who disdains an evil I usually fear. Moreover, if I attend to the fact that his desire to do evil to one he hates, and good to one he loves, is not restrained by timidity regarding an evil by which I am usually restrained, I shall call him [10] daring. Someone will seem timid to me if he is afraid of an evil I usually disdain. If, moreover, I attend to the fact that his Desire [to do evil to those he hates and good to those he loves] is restrained by timidity regarding an evil which cannot restrain me, I shall call him cowardly. In this way will everyone judge.

Finally, because of this inconstancy of man’s nature and judgment, [15] and also because he often judges things only from an affect,33 because the things which he believes will make for Joy or Sadness, and which he therefore strives to promote or prevent (by P28), are often only imaginary—not to mention the other conclusions we have reached in Part II about the uncertainty of things—we easily conceive that a man [20] can often be the cause both of his own Sadness and his own Joy, or that he is affected both with Joy and with Sadness, accompanied by the idea of himself as their cause. So we easily understand what Repentance and Self-esteem are: Repentance is Sadness accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause, and Self-esteem is Joy accompanied by the idea of oneself [25] as cause. Because men believe themselves free, these affects are very violent (see P49).

P52: If we have previously seen an object together with others, or we imagine [30] it has nothing but what is common to many things, we shall not consider it so long as one which we imagine to have something singular.

[II/180] Dem.: As soon as we imagine an object we have seen with others, we shall immediately recollect the others (by IIP18 & P18S), and so from considering one we immediately pass to considering the other. [5] And the reasoning is the same concerning the object we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many things. For imagining that is supposing that we consider nothing in it but what we have seen before with others.

But when we suppose that we imagine in an object something singular, [10] which we have never seen before, we are only saying that when the Mind considers that object, it has nothing in itself which it is led to consider from considering that. And so it is determined to consider only that. Therefore, if we have seen, etc., q.e.d.

[15] Schol.: This affection of the Mind, or this imagination of a singular thing,34 insofar as it is alone in the Mind, is called Wonder. But if it is aroused by an object we fear, it is called Consternation, because Wonder at an evil keeps a man so suspended in considering it that he cannot think of other things by which he could avoid that evil. But if what [20] we wonder at is a man’s prudence, diligence, or something else of that kind, because we consider him as far surpassing us in this, then the Wonder is called Veneration. Otherwise, if what we wonder at is the man’s anger, envy, etc., the wonder is called Dread.

Next, if we wonder at the prudence, diligence, etc., of a man we [25] love, the Love will thereby (by P12) be greater and this Love joined to Wonder, or Veneration, we call Devotion. In this way we can also conceive Hate, Hope, Confidence, and other Affects to be joined to Wonder, and so we can deduce more Affects than those which are usually [30] indicated by the accepted words. So it is clear that the names of the affects are found more from the ordinary usage [of words] than from an accurate knowledge [of the affects].35

To Wonder is opposed Disdain, the cause of which, however, is [II/181] generally this: because we see that someone wonders at, loves or fears something, or something appears at first glance like things we admire, love, fear, etc. (by P15, P15C, and P27), we are determined to wonder [5] at, love, fear, etc., the same thing; but if, from the thing’s presence, or from considering it more accurately, we are forced to deny it whatever can be the cause of Wonder, Love, Fear, etc., then the Mind remains determined by the thing’s presence to think more of the things that are not in the object than of those that are (though the object’s [10] presence usually determines [the Mind] to think chiefly of what is in the object).

Next, as Devotion stems from Wonder at a thing we love, so Mockery stems from Disdain for a thing we hate or fear, and Contempt from Disdain for folly, as Veneration stems from Wonder at prudence. Finally, [15] we can conceive Love, Hope, Love of Esteem, and other Affects joined to Disdain, and from that we can deduce in addition other Affects, which we also do not usually distinguish from the others by any single term.

P53: When the Mind considers itself and its power of acting, it rejoices, and [20] does so the more, the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting.

Dem.: A man does not know himself except through affections of his Body and their ideas (by IIP19 and P23). So when it happens that [25] the Mind can consider itself, it is thereby supposed to pass to a greater perfection, i.e. (by P11S), to be affected with joy, and with greater joy the more distinctly it can imagine its power of acting, q.e.d.

[30] Cor.: This Joy is more and more encouraged the more the man imagines himself to be praised by others. For the more he imagines himself to be praised by others, the greater the Joy with which he [II/182] imagines himself to affect others, a Joy accompanied by the idea of himself (by P29S). And so (by P27) he himself is affected with a greater Joy, accompanied by the idea of himself, q.e.d.

[5] P54: The Mind strives to imagine only those things that posit its power of acting.

Dem.: The Mind’s striving, or power, is its very essence (by P7); but the Mind’s essence (as is known through itself) affirms only what [10] the Mind is and can do, not what it is not and cannot do. So it strives to imagine only what affirms, or posits, its power of acting, q.e.d.

[15] P55: When the Mind imagines its own lack of power, it is saddened by it.

Dem.: The Mind’s essence affirms only what the Mind is and can do, or it is of the nature of the Mind to imagine only those things that [20] posit its power of acting (by P54). So when we say that the Mind, in considering itself, imagines its lack of power, we are saying nothing but that the Mind’s striving to imagine something that posits its power of acting is restrained, or (by P11S) that it is saddened, q.e.d.

[25] Cor.: This Sadness is more and more encouraged if we imagine ourselves to be blamed by others. This is demonstrated in the same way as P53C.

[30] Schol.: This Sadness, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness is called Humility. But Joy arising from considering ourselves, is called Self-love [II/183] or Self-esteem. And since this is renewed as often as a man considers his virtues, or his power of acting, it also happens that everyone is anxious to tell his own deeds, and show off his powers, both of body [5] and of mind—and that men, for this reason, are troublesome to one another.

From this it follows, again, that men are by nature envious (see P24S and P32S), or are glad of their equals’ weakness and saddened by their equals’ virtue. For whenever anyone imagines his own actions, [10] he is affected with Joy (by P53), and with a greater Joy, the more his actions express perfection, and the more distinctly he imagines them, i.e. (by IIP40S1), the more he can distinguish them from others, and consider them as singular things. So everyone will have [15] the greatest gladness from considering himself, when he considers something in himself which he denies concerning others.

But if he relates what he affirms of himself to the universal idea of man or animal, he will not be so greatly gladdened. And on the other hand, if he imagines that his own actions are weaker, compared to others’ actions, he will be saddened (by P28), and will strive to put [20] aside this Sadness, either by wrongly interpreting his equals’ actions or by magnifying his own as much as he can. It is clear, therefore, that men are naturally inclined to Hate and Envy.

Education itself adds to natural inclination. For parents generally spur their children on to virtue only by the incentive of Honor and Envy.

[25] But perhaps this doubt remains—that not infrequently we admire and venerate men’s virtues. To remove this scruple, I shall add the following Corollary.

Cor.: No one envies another’s virtue unless he is an equal.

[30] Dem.: Envy is Hatred itself (see P24S), or (by P13S) a Sadness, i.e. (by P11S), an affection by which a man’s power of acting, or striving, is restrained. But a man (by P9S) neither strives to do, nor desires, anything unless it can follow from his given nature. So no man desires [II/184] that there be predicated of him any power of acting, or (what is the same) virtue, which is peculiar to another’s nature and alien to his own. Hence, his Desire is restrained, i.e. (by P11S), he cannot be saddened because he considers a virtue in someone unlike himself. [5] Consequently he also cannot envy him. But he can, indeed, envy his equal, who is supposed to be of the same nature as he, q.e.d.

Schol.: So when we said above (in P52S) that we venerate a man [10] because we wonder at his prudence, strength of character, etc., that happens (as is evident from the proposition itself) because we imagine these virtues to be peculiarly in him, and not as common to our nature. Therefore, we shall not envy him these virtues any more than we envy trees their height, or lions their strength.

[15] P56: There are as many species of Joy, Sadness, and Desire, and consequently of each affect composed of these (like vacillation of mind) or derived from them (like Love, Hate, Hope, Fear, etc.), as there are species of objects by which we [20] are affected.36

Dem.: Joy and Sadness—and consequently the affects composed of them or derived from them—are passions (by P11S). But we are necessarily [25] acted on (by P1) insofar as we have inadequate ideas, and only insofar as we have them (by P3) are we acted on, i.e. (see IIP40S), necessarily we are acted on only insofar as we imagine, or (see IIP17 and P17S) insofar as we are affected with an affect that involves both the nature of our Body and the nature of an external body. Therefore, [30] the nature of each passion must necessarily be so explained that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed.

For example, the Joy arising from A involves the nature of object [II/185] A, that arising from object B involves the nature of object B, and so these two affects of Joy are by nature different, because they arise from causes of a different nature. So also the affect of Sadness arising from one object is different in nature from the Sadness stemming from [5] another cause. The same must also be understood of Love, Hate, Hope, Fear, Vacillation of mind, etc.

Therefore, there are as many species of Joy, Sadness, Love, Hate, etc., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.

But Desire is the very essence, or nature, of each [man] insofar as it [10] is conceived to be determined, by whatever constitution he has, to do something (see P9S). Therefore, as each [man] is affected by external causes with this or that species of Joy, Sadness, Love, Hate, etc.—i.e., as his nature is constituted in one way or the other, so his Desires vary and the nature of one Desire must differ from the nature of the [15] other as much as the affects from which each arises differ from one another.

Therefore, there are as many species of Desire as there are species of Joy, Sadness, Love, etc., and consequently (through what has already been shown) as there are species of objects by which we are affected, q.e.d.

[20] Schol.: Noteworthy among these species of affects—which (by P56) must be very many—are Gluttony, Drunkenness, Lust, Greed, and Ambition, which are only notions of Love or Desire which explain the nature of each of these affects through the objects to which they are [25] related. For by Gluttony, Drunkenness, Lust, Greed, and Ambition we understand nothing but an immoderate Love or Desire for eating, drinking, sexual union, wealth, and esteem.

Moreover, these affects, insofar as we distinguish them from the others only through the object to which they are related, do not have [30] opposites. For Moderation, which we usually oppose to Gluttony, Sobriety which we usually oppose to Drunkenness, and Chastity, which we usually oppose to Lust, are not affects or passions, but indicate the power of the mind, a power that moderates these affects.

I cannot explain the other species of affects here—for there are as many as there are species of objects. But even if I could, it is not [35] necessary. For our purpose, which is to determine the powers of the [II/186] affects and the power of the Mind over the affects, it is enough to have a general definition of each affect. It is enough, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the affects and of the Mind, so that we can determine what sort of power, and how great a power, [5] the Mind has to moderate and restrain the affects. So though there is a great difference between this or that affect of Love, Hate or Desire—e.g., between the Love of one’s children and the Love of one’s wife—it is still not necessary for us to know these differences, nor to investigate [10] the nature and origin of the affects further.

P57: Each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one from the essence of the other.37

[15] Dem.: This Proposition is evident from IIA1″ [II/99]. But nevertheless we shall demonstrate it from the definitions of the three primitive affects.

All the affects are related to Desire, Joy, or Sadness, as the definitions [20] we have given of them show. But Desire is the very nature, or essence, of each [individual] (see the definition of Desire in P9S). Therefore the Desire of each individual differs from the Desire of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other.

[25] Next, Joy and Sadness are passions by which each one’s power, or striving to persevere in his being, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained (by P11 and P11S). But by the striving to persevere in one’s being, insofar as it is related to the Mind and Body together, we understand [30] Appetite and Desire (see P9S). So Joy and Sadness are the Desire, or Appetite, itself insofar as it is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, by external causes. I.e. (by the same scholium), it is the very nature of each [individual]. And so, the Joy or Sadness of each [II/187] [individual] also differs from the Joy or Sadness of another as much as the nature, or essence, of the one differs from the essence of the other. Consequently, each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much, etc., q.e.d.

[5] Schol.: From this it follows that the affects of the animals which are called irrational (for after we know the origin of the Mind, we cannot in any way doubt that the lower animals feel things) differ from men’s affects as much as their nature differs from human nature. Both the [10] horse and the man are driven by a Lust to procreate; but the one is driven by an equine Lust, the other by a human Lust. So also the Lusts and Appetites of Insects, fish, and birds must vary. Therefore, though each individual lives content with his own nature, by which he is constituted, and is glad of it, nevertheless that life with which [15] each one is content, and that gladness, are nothing but the idea, or soul, of the individual. And so the gladness of the one differs in nature from the gladness of the other as much as the essence of the one differs from the essence of the other.

Finally, from P57 it follows that there is no small difference between the gladness by which a drunk is led and the gladness a Philosopher [20] possesses. I wished to mention this in passing.

This will be enough concerning the affects that are related to man insofar as he is acted on. It remains to add a few words about those that are related to him insofar as he acts.

[25] P58: Apart from the Joy and Desire that are passions, there are other affects of Joy and Desire that are related to us insofar as we act.

Dem.: When the Mind conceives itself and its power of acting, it [30] rejoices (by P53). But the Mind necessarily considers itself when it conceives a true, or adequate, idea (by IIP43). But the Mind conceives some adequate ideas (by IIP40S2). Therefore, it also rejoices insofar [II/188] as it conceives adequate ideas, i.e. (by P1), insofar as it acts.

Next, the Mind strives to persevere in its being, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas (by P9). But by striving we understand [NS: here] Desire (by P9S). [5] Therefore, Desire also is related to us insofar as we understand, or (by P1) insofar as we act, q.e.d.

P59: Among all the affects that are related to the Mind insofar as it acts, [10] there are none that are not related to Joy or Desire.

Dem.: All the affects are related to Desire, Joy, or Sadness, as the definitions we have given of them show. But by Sadness we understand the fact that the Mind’s power of acting is diminished or [15] restrained 38 (by P11 and P11S). And so insofar as the Mind is saddened, its power of understanding, i.e. (by P1), of acting, is diminished or restrained. Hence no affects of Sadness can be related to the Mind insofar as it acts, but only affects of Joy and Desire, which (by [20] P58) are also so far related to the Mind, q.e.d.

Schol.: All actions that follow from affects related to the Mind insofar as it understands I relate to Strength of character, which I divide into Tenacity [25] and Nobility. For by Tenacity I understand the Desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to preserve his being. By Nobility I understand the Desire by which each one strives, solely from the dictate of reason, to aid other men and join them to him in friendship.

Those actions, therefore, which aim only at the agent’s advantage, [30] I relate to Tenacity, and those which aim at another’s advantage, I relate to Nobility. So Moderation, Sobriety, presence of mind in danger, etc., are species of Tenacity whereas Courtesy, Mercy, etc., are species of Nobility.

[II/189] And with this I think I have explained and shown through their first causes the main affects and vacillations of mind which arise from the composition of the three primitive affects, viz. Desire, Joy, and [5] Sadness. From what has been said it is clear that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and that, like waves on the sea, driven by contrary winds, we toss about, not knowing our outcome and fate.

But I said that I have shown only the main [NS: affects], not all the conflicts of mind there can be. For by proceeding in the same way as [10] above, we can easily show that Love is joined to Repentance, Contempt, Shame, etc. Indeed, from what has already been said I believe it is clear to anyone that the various affects can be compounded with one another in so many ways, and that so many variations can arise from this composition that they cannot be defined by any number. But it was sufficient for my purpose to enumerate only the main affects. [To consider] those I have omitted would be more curious [15] than useful.

Nevertheless, this remains to be noted about Love: very often it happens that while we are enjoying a thing we wanted, the Body acquires from this enjoyment a new constitution, by which it is differently determined, and other images of things are aroused in it; and at the same time the Mind begins to imagine other things and desire other things.

[20] E.g., when we imagine something that usually pleases us by its taste, we desire to enjoy it—i.e., to consume it. But while we thus enjoy it, the stomach is filled, and the Body constituted differently. So if (while the Body is now differently disposed) the presence of the food or drink encourages the image of it, and consequently also the [25] striving, or Desire to consume it, then that new constitution will be opposed to this Desire, or striving. Hence, presence of the food or drink we used to want will be hateful. This is what we call Disgust and Weariness.

As for the external affections of the Body, which are observed in the affects—such as trembling, paleness, sobbing, laughter, etc.—I [30] have neglected them, because they are related to the Body only, without any relation to the Mind. Finally, there are certain things to be noted about the definitions of the affects. I shall therefore repeat them here in order, interposing the observations required on each one.

[II/190] DEFINITIONS OF THE AFFECTS 39

I. Desire is man’s very essence, insofar as it is conceived to be determined, from any given affection of it, to do something.

[5] Exp.: We said above, in P9S, that Desire is appetite together with the consciousness of it. And appetite is the very essence of man, insofar as it is determined to do what promotes his preservation.

[10] But in the same scholium I also warned that I really recognize no difference between human appetite and Desire. For whether a man is conscious of his appetite or not, the appetite still remains one and the same. And so—not to seem to commit a tautology—I did not wish to explain Desire by appetite, but was anxious to so define it that I would [15] comprehend together all the strivings of human nature that we signify by the name of appetite, will, desire, or impulse. For I could have said that Desire is man’s very essence, insofar as it is conceived to be determined to do something. But from this definition (by IIP23) it [20] would not follow that the Mind could be conscious of its Desire, or appetite. Therefore, in order to involve the cause of this consciousness, it was necessary (by the same proposition) to add: insofar as it is conceived, from some given affection of it, to be determined etc. For by an affection of the human essence we understand any constitution of that [25] essence, whether it is innate [NS: or has come from outside], whether it is conceived through the attribute of Thought alone, or through the attribute of Extension alone, or is referred to both at once.

Here, therefore, by the word Desire I understand any of a man’s strivings, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary as the man’s constitution varies, and which are not infrequently so opposed to one [30] another that the man is pulled in different directions and knows not where to turn.

[II/191] II. Joy is a man’s passage from a lesser to a greater perfection.

III. Sadness is a man’s passage from a greater to a lesser perfection.

[5] Exp.: I say a passage. For Joy is not perfection itself. If a man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess it without an affect of Joy.

This is clearer from the affect of Sadness, which is the opposite of joy. For no one can deny that Sadness consists in a passage to a lesser [10] perfection, not in the lesser perfection itself, since a man cannot be saddened insofar as he participates in some perfection. Nor can we say that Sadness consists in the privation of a greater perfection. For a privation is nothing, whereas the affect of Sadness is an act, which [15] can therefore be no other act than that of passing to a lesser perfection, i.e., an act by which man’s power of acting is diminished or restrained (see P11S).

As for the definitions of Cheerfulness, Pleasure, Melancholy, and Pain, I omit them, because they are chiefly related to the Body, and [20] are only Species of Joy or Sadness.

IV. Wonder is an imagination of a thing in which the Mind remains fixed because this singular imagination has no connection with the others. (See P52 and P52S.)

[25] Exp.: In IIP18S we showed the cause why the Mind, from considering one thing, immediately passes to the thought of another—because the images of these things are connected with one another, and so ordered that one follows the other. This, of course, cannot be conceived [30] when the image of the thing is new. Rather the Mind will be detained in regarding the same thing until it is determined by other causes to think of other things.

So the imagination of a new thing, considered in itself, is of the same nature as the other [imaginations], and for this reason I do not [II/192] number Wonder among the affects. Nor do I see why I should, since this distraction of the Mind does not arise from any positive cause which distracts the Mind from other things, but only from the fact that there is no cause determining the Mind to pass from regarding [5] one thing to thinking of others.

So as I pointed out in P11S, I recognize only three primitive, or primary, affects: Joy, Sadness, and Desire. I have spoken of Wonder only because it has become customary for some 40 to indicate the affects [10] derived from these three by other names when they are related to objects we wonder at. For the same reason I shall also add the definition of Disdain to these.

V. Disdain is an imagination of a thing which touches the Mind so [15] little that the thing’s presence moves the Mind to imagining more what is not in it than what is. See P52S.

I omit, here, the definitions of Veneration and Contempt because no affects that I know of derive their names from them.

[20] VI. Love is a Joy, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Exp.: This definition explains the essence of Love clearly enough. But the definition of those authors 41 who define Love as a will of the lover to join himself to the thing loved expresses a property of Love, not [25] its essence. And because these Authors did not see clearly enough the essence of Love, they could not have any clear concept of this property. Hence everyone has judged their definition 42 quite obscure.

But it should be noted that when I say it is a property in the lover, that he wills to join himself to the thing loved, I do not understand [30] by will a consent,43 or a deliberation of the mind, or free decision (for we have demonstrated that this is a fiction in IIP48). Nor do I understand [II/193] a Desire of joining oneself to the thing loved when it is absent or continuing in its presence when it is present.44 For love can be conceived without either of these Desires. Rather, by will I understand a Satisfaction in the lover on account of the presence of the thing [5] loved, by which the lover’s Joy is strengthened or at least encouraged.

VII. Hate is a Sadness, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Exp.: The things to be noted here will be perceived easily from what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition. See [10] also P13S.

VIII. Inclination is a Joy accompanied by the idea of a thing which is the accidental cause of Joy.

IX. Aversion is a Sadness accompanied by the idea of something [15] which is the accidental cause of Sadness. On this see P15S.

X. Devotion is a Love of one whom we wonder at.

Exp.: That Wonder arises from the newness of the thing we have shown in P52. So if it happens that we often imagine what we wonder [20] at, we shall cease to wonder at it. And so we see that the affect of Devotion easily changes into simple Love.

XI. Mockery is a Joy born of the fact that we imagine something we disdain in a thing we hate.

[25] Exp.: Insofar as we disdain a thing we hate, we deny existence to it (see P52S), and so far we rejoice (by P20). But since we suppose that man nevertheless hates what he mocks, it follows that this Joy is not enduring. (See P47S.)

[II/194] XII. Hope is an inconstant Joy, born of the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt.

XIII. Fear is an inconstant Sadness, born of the idea of a future or [5] past thing whose outcome we to some extent doubt. See P18S2.

Exp.: From these definitions it follows that there is neither Hope without Fear, nor Fear without Hope.45 For he who is suspended in Hope 46 and doubts a thing’s outcome is supposed to imagine something [10] that excludes the existence of the future thing. And so to that extent he is saddened (by P19), and consequently, while he is suspended in Hope, he fears that the thing [he imagines] will happen.

Conversely, he who is in Fear, i.e., who doubts the outcome of a thing he hates, also imagines something that excludes the existence of [15] that thing. And so (by P20) he rejoices, and hence, to that extent has Hope that the thing will not take place.

XIV. Confidence is a Joy born of the idea of a future or past thing, concerning which the cause of doubting has been removed.

XV. Despair is a Sadness born of the idea of a future or past thing [20] concerning which the cause of doubting has been removed.

Exp.: Confidence, therefore, is born of Hope and Despair of Fear, when the cause of doubt concerning the thing’s outcome is removed. This happens because man imagines that the past or future thing is [25] there, and regards it as present, or because he imagines other things, excluding the existence of the things that put him in doubt. For though we can never be certain of the outcome of singular things (by IIP31C), it can still happen that we do not doubt their outcome. As we have shown (see IIP49S), it is one thing not to doubt a thing, and another [30] to be certain of it. And so it can happen that we are affected, from the image of a past or future thing, with the same affect of Joy or [II/195] Sadness as from the image of a present thing (as we have demonstrated in P18; see also its [first] scholium).47

XVI. Gladness is a Joy, accompanied by the idea of a past thing that has turned out better than we had hoped.48

[5] XVII. Remorse is a Sadness, accompanied by the idea of a past thing that has turned out worse than we had hoped.

XVIII. Pity is a Sadness, accompanied by the idea of an evil that has happened to another whom we imagine to be like us. (See P22S and P27S.)

[10] Exp.: There seems to be no difference between Pity and Compassion, except perhaps that Pity concerns the singular affect, whereas Compassion concerns the habitual disposition of this affect.

[15] XIX. Favor is a Love toward someone who has benefited another.

XX. Indignation is a Hate toward someone who has done evil to another.

Exp.: I know that in their common usage these words mean something [20] else.49 But my purpose is to explain the nature of things, not the meaning of words. I intend to indicate these things by words whose usual meaning is not entirely opposed to 50 the meaning with which I wish to use them. One warning of this should suffice. As for the cause [25] of these affects, see P27C1 and P22S.

XXI. Overestimation is thinking more highly of someone than is just, out of Love.

XXII. Scorn is thinking less highly of someone than is just, out of Hate.

[II/196] Exp.: Overestimation, therefore, is an effect, or property, of Love, and Scorn an effect of Hate. And so Overestimation can also be defined as love insofar as it so affects a man that he thinks more highly than is just of [5] the thing loved. On the other hand, Scorn can be defined as Hate insofar as it so affects a man that he thinks less highly than is just of him he hates. See P26S.

XXIII. Envy is Hate insofar as it so affects a man that he is saddened [10] by another’s happiness and, conversely, glad at his ill fortune.

Exp.: To Envy one commonly opposes Compassion, which can therefore (in spite of the meaning of the word)51 be defined as follows.

XXIV. Compassion is Love, insofar as it so affects a man that he is [15] glad at another’s good fortune, and saddened by his ill fortune.

Exp.: As far as Envy is concerned, see P24S and P32S. These are the affects of Joy and Sadness that are accompanied by the idea of an [20] external thing as cause, either through itself or accidentally. I pass now to the others, which are accompanied by the idea of an internal thing as cause.

XXV. Self-esteem is a Joy born of the fact that a man considers himself and his own power of acting.

[25] XXVI. Humility is a Sadness born of the fact that a man considers his own lack of power, or weakness.

Exp.: Self-esteem is opposed to Humility, insofar as we understand [II/197] by it a Joy born of the fact that we consider our power of acting. But insofar as we also understand by it a Joy, accompanied by the idea of some deed which we believe we have done from a free decision of the [5] Mind, it is opposed to Repentance, which we define as follows.

XXVII. Repentance is a Sadness accompanied by the idea of some deed we believe ourselves to have done from a free decision of the Mind.

[10] Exp.: We have shown the causes of these affects in P51S, P53, P54, P55, and P55S. On the free decision of the Mind, see IIP35S.

But we ought also to note here that it is no wonder Sadness follows absolutely all those acts which from custom are called wrong, and Joy, [15] those which are called right. For from what has been said above we easily understand that this depends chiefly on education. Parents—by blaming the former acts, and often scolding their children on account of them, and on the other hand, by recommending and praising the latter acts—have brought it about that emotions of Sadness were joined to the one kind of act, and those of Joy to the other.

[20] Experience itself also confirms this. For not everyone has the same custom and Religion. On the contrary, what among some is holy, among others is unholy; and what among some is honorable, among others is dishonorable. Hence, according as each one has been educated, so he either repents of a deed or exults at being esteemed for it.

[25] XXVIII. Pride is thinking more highly of oneself than is just, out of love of oneself.

Exp.: The difference, therefore, between Pride and Overestimation is that the latter is related to an external object, whereas Pride is related to the man himself, who thinks more highly of himself than is [30] just. Further, as Overestimation is an effect or property of Love, so Pride is an effect or property of Self-love. Therefore, it can also be defined as Love of oneself, or Self-esteem, insofar as it so affects a man that he thinks more highly of himself than is just (see P26S).

[II/198] There is no opposite of this affect. For no one, out of hate, thinks less highly of himself than is just. Indeed, no one thinks less highly of himself than is just, insofar as he imagines that he cannot do this or that. For whatever man imagines he cannot do, he necessarily imagines; [5] and he is so disposed by this imagination that he really cannot do what he imagines he cannot do. For so long as he imagines that he cannot do this or that, he is not determined to do it, and consequently it is impossible for him to do it.

But if we attend to those things that depend only on opinion, we [10] shall be able to conceive it possible that a man thinks less highly of himself than is just. For it can happen that, while someone sad considers his weakness, he imagines himself to be disdained by everyone—even while the others think of nothing less than to disdain him. Moreover, it can happen that a man thinks less highly of himself than is just, if in the present he denies something of himself in relation to [15] a future time of which he is uncertain—e.g., if he denies that he can conceive of anything certain, or that he can desire or do anything but what is wrong or dishonorable. Again, we can say that someone thinks less highly of himself than is just, when we see that, from too great a fear of shame, he does not dare things that others equal to him dare.

[20] So we can oppose this affect—which I shall call Despondency—to Pride. For as Pride is born of Self-esteem, so Despondency is born of Humility. We can therefore define it as follows.

XXIX. Despondency is thinking less highly of oneself than is just, out of Sadness.

[25] Exp.: We are, nevertheless, often accustomed to oppose Humility to Pride. But then we attend more to the effects than to the nature of the two. For we usually call him proud who exults too much at being esteemed (see P30S), who tells of nothing but his own virtues, and the [30] vices of others, who wishes to be given precedence over all others, and finally who proceeds with the gravity and attire usually adopted by others who are placed far above him.

On the other hand, we call him humble who quite often blushes, who confesses his own vices and tells the virtues of others, who yields to all, and finally, who walks with head bowed, and neglects to adorn himself.

[II/199] These affects—Humility and Despondency—are very rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strains against them, as far as it can (see P13 and P54). So those who are believed to be most despondent [5] and humble are usually most ambitious and envious.

XXX. Love of esteem is a Joy accompanied by the idea of some action of ours which we imagine that others praise.

XXXI. Shame is a Sadness, accompanied by the idea of some action [NS: of ours] which we imagine that others blame.

[10] Exp.: On these, see P30S. But the difference between Shame and a Sense of Shame should be noted here. For Shame is a Sadness that follows a deed one is ashamed of; whereas a Sense of Shame is a Fear of, or Timidity regarding, Shame, by which man is restrained from [15] doing something dishonorable. To a Sense of Shame is usually opposed Shamelessness, but the latter is really not an affect, as I shall show in the proper place.52 But as I have already pointed out, the names of the affects are guided more by usage than by nature.

And with this I have finished what I had set out to explain concerning the affects of Joy and Sadness. So I proceed to those I relate [20] to Desire.

XXXII. Longing is a Desire, or Appetite, to possess something which is encouraged by the memory of that thing, and at the same time restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the thing wanted.

[25] Exp.: When we recollect a thing (as we have often said before), we are thereby disposed to regard it with the same affect as if it were present. But while we are awake, this disposition, or striving, is generally restrained by images of things that exclude the existence of what [30] we recollect. So when we remember a thing that affects us with some [II/200] kind of Joy, we thereby strive to regard it as present with the same affect of Joy—a striving which, of course, is immediately restrained by the memory of things that exclude its existence.

Longing, therefore, is really a Sadness which is opposed to that Joy [5] which arises from the absence of a thing we hate (see P47S). But because the word longing seems to concern Desire, I relate this affect to the affects of Desire.

XXXIII. Emulation is a Desire for a thing which is generated in us [10] because we imagine that others have the same Desire.

Exp.: If someone flees because he sees others flee, or is timid because he sees others timid, or, because he sees that someone else has burned his hand, withdraws his own hand and moves his body as if [15] his hand were burned, we shall say that he imitates the other’s affect, but not that he emulates it—not because we know that emulation has one cause and imitation another, but because it has come about by usage that we call emulous only him who imitates what we judge to be honorable, useful, or pleasant.

[20] As for the cause of Emulation, see P27 and P27S. And on why envy is generally joined to this effect, see P32 and P32S.

XXXIV. Thankfulness, or Gratitude, is a Desire, or eagerness of Love, by which we strive to benefit one who has benefited us from a [25] like affect of love. See P39 and P41S.

XXXV. Benevolence is a Desire to benefit one whom we pity. See P27S.

XXXVI. Anger is a Desire by which we are spurred, from Hate, [30] to do evil to him we hate. See P39.

[II/201] XXXVII. Vengeance is a Desire by which, from reciprocal Hate, we are roused to do evil to one who, from a like affect, has injured us. See P40C2 and P40C2S.

[5] XXXVIII. Cruelty, or Severity, is a Desire by which someone is roused to do evil to one whom we love or pity.53

Exp.: To Cruelty is opposed Mercy, which is not a passion, but a [10] power of the mind, by which a man governs anger and vengeance.

XXXIX. Timidity is a Desire to avoid a greater evil, which we fear, by a lesser one. See P39S.

XL. Daring is a Desire by which someone is spurred to do something [15] dangerous which his equals fear to take on themselves.

XLI. Cowardice is ascribed to one whose Desire is restrained by timidity regarding a danger which his equals dare to take on themselves.

[20] Exp.: Cowardice, therefore, is nothing but Fear of some evil, which most people do not usually fear. So I do not relate it to affects of Desire. Nevertheless I wished to explain it here, because insofar as we attend to the Desire, it is really opposed to daring.

[25] XLII. Consternation is attributed to one whose Desire to avoid an evil is restrained by wonder at the evil he fears.

Exp.: Consternation, therefore, is a species of Cowardice. But because Consternation arises from a double Timidity, it can be more [30] conveniently defined as a Fear that keeps a man senseless or vacillating so [II/202] that he cannot avert the evil. I say senseless insofar as we understand that his Desire to avert the evil is restrained by wonder, and vacillating insofar as we conceive that that Desire is restrained by Timidity regarding [5] another evil, which torments him equally, so that he does not know which of the two to avert. On these see P39S and P52S. As for Cowardice and Daring, see P51S.

XLIII. Human kindness, or Courtesy, is a Desire to do what pleases [10] men and not do what displeases them.

XLIV. Ambition is an excessive Desire for esteem.

Exp.: Ambition is a Desire by which all the affects are encouraged and strengthened (by P27 and P31); so this affect can hardly be overcome. [15] For as long as a man is bound by any Desire, he must at the same time be bound by this one. As Cicero says,54 Every man is led by love of esteem, and the more so, the better he is. Even the philosophers who write books on how esteem is to be disdained put their names to these works.

[20] XLV. Gluttony is an immoderate Desire for and Love of eating.

XLVI. Drunkenness is an immoderate Desire for and Love of drinking.

XLVII. Greed is an immoderate Desire for and Love of wealth.

[25] XLVIII. Lust is also a Desire for and Love of joining one body to another.

Exp.: Whether this Desire for sexual union is moderate or not, it is usually called Lust.

Moreover, these five affects (as I pointed out in P56S) have no opposites. [30] For Courtesy is a species of Ambition (see P29S), and I have [II/203] already pointed out also that Moderation, Sobriety, and Chastity indicate the power of the Mind, and not a passion. And even if it can happen that a greedy, ambitious, or timid man abstains from too much food, drink, and sexual union, still, Greed, Ambition, and [5] Timidity are not opposites of gluttony, drunkenness, or lust.

For the greedy man generally longs to gorge himself on another’s food and drink. And the ambitious will not be moderate in anything,55 provided he can hope he will not be discovered; if he lives among the drunken and the lustful, then because he is ambitious, he will be the more inclined to these vices. Finally, the timid man does what he does not wish to do. For though he may hurl his wealth into the sea to [10] avoid death, he still remains greedy. And if the lustful man is sad because he cannot indulge his inclinations, he does not on that account cease to be lustful.

Absolutely, these affects do not so much concern the acts of eating, drinking, etc., as the Appetite itself and the Love. Therefore, nothing can be opposed to these affects except Nobility and Tenacity, which [15] will be discussed later on.

I pass over in silence the definitions of Jealousy and the other vacillations of mind, both because they arise from the composition of affects we have already defined, and because most of them do not have names. This shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to know [20] them only in general. Furthermore, from the definitions of the affects which we have explained it is clear that they all arise from Desire, Joy, or Sadness—or rather, that they are nothing but these three, each one generally being called by a different name on account of its varying relations and extrinsic denominations. If we wish now to attend [25] to these primitive affects, and to what was said above about the nature of the Mind, we shall be able to define the affects, insofar as they are related only to the Mind,56 as follows.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE AFFECTS

An Affect that is called a Passion of the mind is a confused idea, by [30] which the Mind affirms of its Body, or of some part of it, a greater or lesser force of existing than before, which, when it is given, determines the Mind to think of this rather than that.

[II/204] Exp.: I say, first, that an Affect, or passion of the mind, is a confused idea. For we have shown (P3) that the Mind is acted on only insofar as it has inadequate, or confused, ideas.

[5] Next, I say by which the mind affirms of its body or of some part of it a greater or lesser force of existing than before. For all the ideas that we have of bodies indicate the actual constitution of our own Body (by IIP16C2) more than the nature of the external body. But this [idea], which [10] constitutes the form of the affect, must indicate or express a constitution of the Body (or of some part of it), which the Body (or some part of it) has because its power of acting, or force of existing, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained.

But it should be noted that, when I say a greater or lesser force of existing than before, I do not understand that the Mind compares its [15] Body’s present constitution with a past constitution, but that the idea which constitutes the form of the affect affirms of the body something which really involves more or less of reality than before.

And because the essence of the Mind consists in this (by IIP11 and P13), that it affirms the actual existence of its body, and we understand [20] by perfection the very essence of the thing, it follows that the Mind passes to a greater or lesser perfection when it happens that it affirms of its body (or of some part of the body) something which involves more or less reality than before. So when I said above that the Mind’s power of Thinking is increased or diminished, I meant [25] nothing but that the Mind has formed of its Body (or of some part of it) an idea which expresses more or less reality than it had affirmed of the Body.

Finally, I added which determines the Mind to think of this rather than [30] that in order to express also, in addition to the nature of Joy and Sadness (which the first part of the definition explains), the nature of Desire.

[II/205] Fourth Part Of the Ethics On Human Bondage, or the Powers of the Affects

PREFACE

Man’s lack of power to moderate and restrain the affects I call Bondage. For the man who is subject to affects is under the control, not of [10] himself, but of fortune, in whose power he so greatly is that often, though he sees the better for himself, he is still forced to follow the worse.1 In this Part, I have undertaken to demonstrate the cause of this, and what there is of good and evil in the affects. But before I begin, I choose to say a few words first on perfection and imperfection, [15] good and evil.

If someone has decided to make something, and has finished it, then he will call his thing perfect 2—and so will anyone who rightly knows, or thinks he knows, the mind and purpose of the Author of the work. For example, if someone sees a work (which I suppose to be not yet [20] completed), and knows that the purpose of the Author of that work is to build a house, he will say that it is imperfect. On the other hand, he will call it perfect as soon as he sees that the work has been carried through to the end which its Author has decided to give it. But if someone sees a work whose like he has never seen, and does not know [25] the mind of its maker, he will, of course, not be able to know whether [II/206] that work is perfect or imperfect. And this seems to have been the first meaning of these words.

But after men began to form universal ideas, and devise models of houses, buildings, towers, etc., and to prefer some models of things [5] to others, it came about that each one called perfect what he saw agreed with the universal idea he had formed of this kind of thing, and imperfect, what he saw agreed less with the model he had conceived, even though its maker thought he had entirely finished it.

[10] Nor does there seem to be any other reason why men also commonly call perfect or imperfect natural things, which have not been made by human hand. For they are accustomed to form universal ideas of natural things as much as they do of artificial ones. They regard these universal ideas as models of things, and believe that nature [15] (which they think does nothing except for the sake of some end) looks to them, and sets them before itself as models. So when they see something happen in nature which does not agree with the model they have conceived of this kind of thing, they believe that Nature itself has failed or sinned, and left the thing imperfect.

[20] We see, therefore, that men are accustomed to call natural things perfect or imperfect more from prejudice than from true knowledge of those things. For we have shown in the Appendix of Part I, that Nature does nothing on account of an end. That eternal and infinite being we call God, or Nature,3 acts from the same necessity from [25] which he exists. For we have shown (IP16) that the necessity of nature from which he acts is the same as that from which he exists. The reason, therefore, or cause, why God, or Nature, acts, and the reason why he exists, are one and the same. As he exists for the sake of no [II/207] end, he also acts for the sake of no end. Rather, as he has no principle or end of existing, so he also has none of acting. What is called a final cause is nothing but a human appetite insofar as it is considered as a [5] principle, or primary cause, of some thing.

For example, when we say that habitation was the final cause of this or that house, surely we understand nothing but that a man, because he imagined the conveniences of domestic life, had an appetite to build a house. So habitation, insofar as it is considered as a final [10] cause, is nothing more than this singular appetite. It is really an efficient cause, which is considered as a first cause, because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites. For as I have often said before, they are conscious of their actions and appetites, but not aware of the causes by which they are determined to want something.

[15] As for what they commonly say—that Nature sometimes fails or sins, and produces imperfect things—I number this among the fictions I treated in the Appendix of Part I.

Perfection and imperfection, therefore, are only modes of thinking, [20] i.e., notions we are accustomed to feign because we compare individuals of the same species or genus to one another. This is why I said above (IID6) that by reality and perfection I understand the same thing. For we are accustomed to refer all individuals in Nature to one genus, which is called the most general, i.e., to the notion of being, [25] which pertains absolutely to all individuals in Nature. So insofar as we refer all individuals in Nature to this genus, compare them to one another, and find that some have more being, or reality, than others, we say that some are more perfect than others. And insofar as we attribute something to them that involves negation, like a limit, an [II/208] end, lack of power, etc., we call them imperfect, because they do not affect our Mind as much as those we call perfect, and not because something is lacking in them which is theirs, or because Nature has sinned. For nothing belongs to the nature of anything except what [5] follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause. And whatever follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause happens necessarily.

As far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything [10] other than modes of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to one another. For one and the same thing can, at the same time, be good, and bad, and also indifferent. For example, Music is good for one who is Melancholy, bad for one who is mourning, and neither good nor bad to one who is deaf.

[15] But though this is so, still we must retain these words. For because we desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human nature which we may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same words with the meaning I have indicated. In what follows, therefore, I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by which we [20] may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves. By evil, what we certainly know prevents us from becoming like that model. Next, we shall say that men are more perfect or imperfect, insofar as they approach more or less near to this model.

But the main thing to note is that when I say that someone passes [25] from a lesser to a greater perfection, and the opposite, I do not understand that he is changed from one essence, or form, to another. For example, a horse is destroyed as much if it is changed into a man as if it is changed into an insect. Rather, we conceive that his power of acting, insofar as it is understood through his nature, is increased or diminished.

[II/209] Finally, by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, understand reality, i.e., the essence of each thing insofar as it exists and produces an effect, having no regard to its duration. For no singular thing can [5] be called more perfect for having persevered in existing for a longer time. Indeed, the duration of things cannot be determined from their essence, since the essence of things involves no certain and determinate time of existing. But any thing whatever, whether it is more perfect or less, will always be able to persevere in existing by the same [10] force by which it begins to exist; so they are all equal in this regard.

DEFINITIONS

D1: By good I shall understand what we certainly know to be useful to us.

D2: By evil, however, I shall understand what we certainly know [15] prevents us from being masters of some good.

Exp.: On these definitions, see the preceding preface [208/18-22].

D3: I call singular things contingent insofar as we find nothing, while we attend only to their essence, which necessarily posits their existence [20] or which necessarily excludes it.

D4: I call the same singular things possible, insofar as, while we attend to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know whether those causes are determined to produce them.

In IP33S1 I drew no distinction between the possible and the contingent, [25] because there was no need there to distinguish them accurately.

D5: By opposite affects I shall understand, in what follows, those [II/210] which pull a man differently, although they are of the same genus—such as gluttony and greed, which are species of love, and are opposite, not by nature, but accidentally.

D6: I have explained in IIIP18S1 and S2 what I shall understand by [5] an affect toward a future thing, a present one, and a past.

But here it should be noted in addition that just as we can distinctly imagine distance of place only up to a certain limit, so also we can distinctly imagine distance of time only up to a certain limit. I.e., we usually imagine all those objects which are more than 200 feet away [10] from us,4 or whose distance from the place where we are surpasses what we can distinctly imagine, to be equally far from us; we therefore usually imagine them as if they were in the same plane; in the same way, we imagine to be equally far from the present all those objects whose time of existing we imagine to be separated from the present [15] by an interval longer than that we are used to imagining distinctly; so we relate them, as it were, to one moment of time.

D7: By the end for the sake of which we do something I understand appetite.

D8: By virtue and power I understand the same thing, i.e. (by IIIP7), [20] virtue, insofar as it is related to man, is the very essence, or nature, of man, insofar as he has the power of bringing about certain things, which can be understood through the laws of his nature alone.

AXIOM

[25] [A1:]5 There is no singular thing in nature than which there is not another more powerful and stronger. Whatever one is given, there is another more powerful by which the first can be destroyed.

[II/211] P1: Nothing positive which a false idea has is removed by the presence of the true insofar as it is true.

[5] Dem.: Falsity consists only in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas involve (by IIP35), and they do not have anything positive on account of which they are called false (by IIP33). On the contrary, insofar as they are related to God, they are true (by IIP32). So if what a false idea has that is positive were removed by the presence [10] of the true insofar as it is true, then a true idea would be removed by itself, which (by IIIP4) is absurd. Therefore, Nothing positive which a false idea has, etc., q.e.d.

Schol.: This proposition is understood more clearly from IIP16C2. [15] For an imagination is an idea which indicates the present constitution of the human Body more than the nature of an external body—not distinctly, of course, but confusedly. This is how it happens that the Mind is said to err.

For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about [20] 200 feet away from us. In this we are deceived so long as we are ignorant of its true distance; but when its distance is known, the error is removed, not the imagination, i.e., the idea of the sun, which explains its nature only so far as the Body is affected by it. And so, although we come to know the true distance, we shall nevertheless [25] imagine it as near us. For as we said in IIP35S, we do not imagine the sun to be so near because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the Mind conceives the sun’s size insofar as the Body is affected by the sun. Thus, when the rays of the sun, falling on the surface of the water, are reflected to our eyes, we imagine it as if it [30] were in the water, even if we know its true place.

And so it is with the other imaginations by which the Mind is deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the Body, or that its power of acting is increased or diminished: they are not [II/212] contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence.

It happens, of course, when we wrongly fear some evil, that the fear disappears on our hearing news of the truth. But on the other hand, it also happens, when we fear an evil that is certain to come, [5] that the fear vanishes on our hearing false news. So imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true insofar as it is true, but because there occur others, stronger than them, which exclude the present existence of the things we imagine, as we showed in IIP17.

[10] P2: We are acted on, insofar as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived through itself, without the others.

Dem.: We say that we are acted on when something arises in us of which we are only the partial cause (by IIID2), i.e. (by IIID1), something [15] that cannot be deduced from the laws of our nature alone. Therefore, we are acted on insofar as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived through itself without the others, q.e.d.

P3: The force by which a man perseveres in existing is limited, and infinitely [20] surpassed by the power of external causes.

Dem.: This is evident from A1. For given a man, there is something else, say A, more powerful. And given A, there is something else again, say B, more powerful than A, and so on, to infinity. Therefore [25] the power of man is limited by the power of another thing and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, q.e.d.

P4: It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature, and that he should be able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood [30] through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause.

[II/213] Dem.: [i] The power by which singular things (and consequently, [any] man) preserve their being is the power itself of God, or Nature (by IP24C), not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained [5] through the man’s actual essence (by IIIP7). The man’s power, therefore, insofar as it is explained through his actual essence, is part of God or Nature’s infinite power, i.e. (by IP34), of its essence. This was the first point.

[ii] Next, if it were possible that a man could undergo no changes except those which can be understood through the man’s nature alone, [10] it would follow (by IIIP4 and P6) that he could not perish, but that necessarily he would always exist. And this would have to follow from a cause whose power would be either finite or infinite, viz. either from the power of the man alone, who would be able to avert from himself other changes which could arise from external causes, or from the [15] infinite power of Nature, by which all singular things would be directed so that the man could undergo no other changes except those which assist his preservation.

But the first is absurd (by P3, whose demonstration is universal and can be applied to all singular things).

Therefore, if it were possible for a man to undergo no changes [20] except those which could be understood through the man’s nature alone, so that (as we have already shown) he would necessarily always exist, this would have to follow from God’s infinite power; and consequently (by IP 16) the order of the whole of Nature, insofar as it is conceived under the attributes of Extension and Thought, would have [25] to be deduced from the necessity of the divine nature, insofar as it is considered to be affected with the idea of some man. And so (by IP21) it would follow that the man would be infinite. But this (by part [i] of this demonstration) is absurd.

Therefore, it is impossible that a man should undergo no other changes except those of which he himself is the adequate cause, q.e.d.

[30] Cor.: From this it follows that man is necessarily always subject to passions, that he follows and obeys the common order of Nature, and accommodates himself to it as much as the nature of things requires.

[II/214] P5: The force and growth of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are not defined by the power by which we strive to persevere in existing, but by [5] the power of an external cause compared with our own.

Dem.: The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our essence alone (by IIID1 and D2), i.e. (by IIIP7), the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power by which we strive to persevere [10] in our being; but (as has been shown in IIP16) it must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own, q.e.d.

P6: The force of any passion, or affect, can surpass the other actions, or power, [15] of a man, so that the affect stubbornly clings to the man.

Dem.: The force and growth of any passion, and its perseverance in existing, are defined by the power of an external cause compared with our own (by P5). And so (by P3) it can surpass the power of a [20] man, etc., q.e.d.

P7: An affect cannot be restrained or taken away except by an affect opposite to, and stronger than, the affect to be restrained.

[25] Dem.: An affect, insofar as it is related to the Mind, is an idea by which the Mind affirms of its body a greater or lesser force of existing than before (by the general Definition of the Affects [II/203/29-33]). When, therefore, the Mind is troubled by some affect, the Body is at the same time affected with an affection by which its power of acting is increased or diminished.

[II/215] Next, this affection of the Body (by P5) receives from its cause its force for persevering in its being, which therefore, can neither be restrained nor removed, except by a corporeal cause (by IIP6) which affects the Body with an affection opposite to it (by IIIP5), and stronger than it (by A1).6

[5] And so (by IIP12), the Mind will be affected with the idea of an affection stronger than, and opposite to, the first affection, i.e. (by the general Definition of the Affects), the Mind will be affected with an affect stronger than, and opposite to, the first affect, which will exclude or take away the existence of the first affect.

Therefore, an affect can neither be taken away nor restrained except [10] through an opposite and stronger affect, q.e.d.

Cor.: An affect, insofar as it is related to the Mind, can neither be restrained nor taken away except by the idea of an opposite affection of the Body stronger than the affection through which it is acted on. For an affect through which we are acted on can neither be restrained [15] nor taken away except by an affect stronger than it and contrary to it (by P7), i.e. (by the general Definition of the Affects), except by an idea of an affection of the Body stronger than and contrary to the affection through which we are acted on.

[20] P8: The knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an affect of Joy or Sadness, insofar as we are conscious of it.

Dem.: We call good, or evil, what is useful to, or harmful to, preserving our being (by D1 and D2), i.e. (by IIIP7), what increases or [25] diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting. Therefore (by the Definitions of Joy and Sadness in IIIP11S), insofar as we perceive that a thing affects us with Joy or Sadness, we call it good or evil. And so knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an idea of Joy or Sadness [30] which follows necessarily from the affect of Joy or Sadness itself (by IIP22).

But this idea is united to the affect in the same way as the Mind is united to the Body (by IIP21), i.e. (as I have shown in IIP21S), this idea is not really distinguished from the affect itself, or (by the general [II/216] Definition of the Affects) from the idea of the Body’s affection; it is only conceptually distinguished from it. Therefore, this knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the affect itself, insofar as we are conscious of it, q.e.d.

[5] P9: An affect whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present is stronger than if we did not imagine it to be with us.

Dem.: An imagination is an idea by which the Mind considers a [10] thing as present (see its definition in IIP17S), which nevertheless indicates the constitution of the human Body more than the nature of the external thing (by IIP16C2). An affect, therefore (by the general Definition of the Affects), is an imagination, insofar as [the affect] indicates the constitution of the body. But an imagination (by IIP17) [15] is more intense so long as we imagine nothing that excludes the present existence of the external thing. Hence, an affect whose cause we imagine to be with us in the present is more intense, or stronger, than if we did not imagine it to be with us, q.e.d.

[20] Schol.: I said above (in IIIP18) that when we imagine a future or past thing, we are affected with the same affect as if we were imagining something present; but I expressly warned then that this is true insofar as we attend to the thing’s image only. For it is of the same nature whether we have imagined the thing 7 as present or not. But I [25] did not deny that it is made weaker when we consider as present to us other things, which exclude the present existence of the future thing. I neglected to point this out then, because I had decided to treat the powers of the affects in this Part.

[30] Cor.: Other things equal, the image of a future or past thing (i.e., of a thing we consider in relation to a future or past time, the present being excluded) is weaker than the image of a present thing; and consequently, [II/217] an affect toward a future or past thing is milder, other things equal, than an affect toward a present thing.

P10: We are affected more intensely toward a future thing which we imagine [5] will quickly be present, than if we imagined the time when it will exist to be further from the present. We are also affected more intensely by the memory of a thing we imagine to be not long past, than if we imagined it to be long past.

[10] Dem.: Insofar as we imagine that a thing will quickly be present, or is not long past, we thereby imagine something that excludes the presence of the thing less than if we imagined that the time when it will exist were further from the present, or that it were far in the past (as is known through itself). And so (by P9), to that extent we will be [15] affected more intensely toward it, q.e.d.

Schol.: From what we noted at D6, it follows that we are still affected equally mildly toward objects separated from the present by an interval of time longer than that we can determine by imagining, even [20] though we may understand that they are separated from one another by a long interval of time.

P11: An affect toward a thing we imagine as necessary is more intense, other things equal, than one toward a thing we imagine as possible or contingent, [25] or not necessary.

Dem.: Insofar as we imagine a thing to be necessary, we affirm its existence. On the other hand, we deny its existence insofar as we [30] imagine it not to be necessary (by IP33S1), and therefore (by P9), an [II/218] affect toward a necessary thing is more intense, other things equal, than toward one not necessary, q.e.d.

P12: An affect toward a thing which we know does not exist in the present, [5] and which we imagine as possible, is more intense, other things equal, than one toward a contingent thing.

Dem.: Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are not affected by any image of another thing that posits the thing’s existence [10] (by D3); but on the other hand (according to the hypothesis), we imagine certain things that exclude its present existence. But insofar as we imagine a thing in the future to be possible, we imagine certain things that posit its existence (by D4), i.e. (by IIIP18), which encourage Hope or Fear. And so an affect toward a possible thing is more violent [15] [, other things equal, than one toward a contingent thing], q.e.d.

Cor.: An affect toward a thing which we know does not exist in the present, and which we imagine as contingent, is much milder than if we imagined the thing as with us in the present.

[20] Dem.: An affect toward a thing which we imagine to exist in the present is more intense than if we imagined it as future (by P9C), and [an affect toward a thing we imagine to exist in the future is] much more violent if we imagine the future time to be not far from the [25] present (by P10).8 Therefore, an affect toward a thing which we imagine will exist at a time far from the present is much milder than if we imagined it as present. And nevertheless (by P12), it is more intense than if we imagined that thing as contingent. And so an affect toward a contingent thing will be much milder than if we imagined the thing to be with us in the present, q.e.d.

[II/219] P13: An affect toward a contingent thing which we know does not exist in the present is milder, other things equal, than an affect toward a past thing.

[5] Dem.: Insofar as we imagine a thing as contingent, we are not affected by any image of another thing that posits the thing’s existence (by D3). But on the other hand (according to the hypothesis), we [10] imagine certain things that exclude its present existence. Now insofar as we imagine a thing in relation to past time, we are supposed to imagine something that brings it back to our memory, or that arouses the image of the thing (see IIP18 and P18S), and therefore brings it about that we consider it as if it were present (by IIP17C). And so [15] (by P9) an affect toward a contingent thing which we know does not exist in the present will be milder, other things equal, than an affect toward a past thing, q.e.d.

P14: No affect can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar [20] as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.9

Dem.: An affect is an idea by which the Mind affirms of its Body a greater or lesser force of existing than before (by the general Definition of the Affects). So (by P1), it has nothing positive which could be [25] removed by the presence of the true. Consequently the true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as it is true, cannot restrain any affect.

But insofar as it is an affect (see P8), it can restrain the affect, if it is stronger than it (by P7), q.e.d.

[II/220] P15: A Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or restrained by many other Desires which arise from affects by which we are tormented.

[5] Dem.: From a true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this is an affect (by P8), there necessarily arises a Desire (by Def. Aff. I), which is the greater as the affect from which it arises is greater (by IIIP37). But because this Desire arises (by hypothesis) from the fact that we [10] understand something truly, it follows in us insofar as we act (by IIIP3).10 And so it must be understood through our essence alone (by IIID2), and consequently (by IIIP7), its force and growth can be defined only by human power alone.

Next, Desires which arise from affects by which we are torn are [15] also greater as these affects are more violent. And so their force and growth (by P5) must be defined by the power of external causes, which, if it were compared with ours, would indefinitely surpass our power [20] (by P3). Hence, Desires which arise from such affects can be more violent than that which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, and can therefore (by P7) restrain or extinguish it, q.e.d.

P16: A Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as [25] this knowledge concerns the future, can be quite easily restrained or extinguished by a Desire for the pleasures of the moment.

Dem.: An affect toward a thing we imagine as future is milder than one toward a present thing (by P9C). But a Desire which arises from [30] a true knowledge of good and evil, even if this knowledge concerns things which are good now, can be restrained or extinguished by some [II/221] rash Desire (by P15, whose demonstration is universal). Therefore, a Desire which arises from the same knowledge, insofar as this concerns a future thing, can be quite easily restrained or extinguished, etc., q.e.d.

[5] P17: A Desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, insofar as this concerns contingent things, can be restrained much more easily still by a Desire for things which are present.