[8] 58Finally, someone could also object to us that there are many [15] things which we will and do not will, e.g., to affirm something of a thing and9 not to affirm it, to speak the truth, and not to speak it, etc.
But this [objection] arises because Desire is not sufficiently distinguished from Will. For according to those who posit the Will, Will is [20] only that action of the intellect by which we affirm or deny something of a thing,10 without regard to good or bad. But Desire is a form in the soul to acquire or do something, with regard to the good or bad which are seen in it. So even after the affirmation or denial which we [25] have made of a thing, the Desire still remains; that is, after we have found or affirmed a thing to be good (which, according to them, is the Will), only after that does one acquire the Desire, that inclination to pursue the thing. So according to their own statements, the Will can indeed exist without the Desire, but the Desire cannot exist without [30] the Will, which must have preceded it.
[9] All the actions, then, which we have spoken of above (since they are either done by reason, as seeming good, or prevented by reason, as seeming evil), can only be conceived under those inclinations which are called Desires, and only most improperly under the name of Will.
[1]1 Because it is now clear that we have no Will to affirm or to deny, [5] let us see the correct and true distinction between Will and Desire, or what that Will may really be which the Latins called voluntas.
[2] According to Aristotle’s definition, Desire seems to be a genus comprising under it two species.2 For he says the Will is that appetite or tendency which one has for what seems good. From this it seems [10] to me that he thinks Desire (or cupiditas) includes all inclinations, whether to good or bad.
But when the inclination is only to the good, or the man who has such inclinations has them for what seems good, he calls that voluntas, or good will.
[15] But if it is bad, i.e., if we see in someone else an inclination toward something that is bad, he calls that voluptas, or bad will. So the inclination of the soul is not to affirm or to deny something, but only an inclination to acquire something that seems good, and to avoid something that seems bad.
[20] [3] It remains now to 59examine whether this Desire is free or not. Besides what we have already said, viz. that Desire depends on the perception of things, and that the intellect must have an external cause, and also what we have said about the Will, it remains to be shown that Desire is not free.
[25] [4] Though many men see, indeed, that the knowledge man has of various things is a means by which his appetite or tendency passes from one thing to another, nevertheless they do not consider what it might be that happens to draw the appetite from the one to the other in this way.
[30] But to show that in our view this inclination is not free, and to make quite vivid what it is to pass over and be drawn from one thing to the other, we shall imagine a child who comes to perceive a certain thing for the first time. For example, I hold before him a little bell [I/86] which makes a pleasant sound in his ears, by which he acquires an appetite for it. Let us see now whether he could omit having this appetite or Desire? If you say yes, I ask: by what cause? Not by [5] something he knows to be better, for this is all he knows. Nor because it seems bad to him, for he knows nothing else, and that pleasure is the best that has ever come to him.
But perhaps he has a freedom to put aside that appetite which he has? From this it would follow that this appetite could indeed begin [10] in us without our freedom, but that we would equally have a freedom in us to put it aside. But this freedom cannot stand up to examination. For what would it be that would destroy this appetite? The appetite itself? Certainly not. For nothing by its own nature seeks its own destruction.
[15] What, then, might it finally be that could lead him away from this appetite? Nothing else except that by the order and course of Nature he is affected by something that is more pleasant to him than the first thing.
[5] And therefore, as we said in treating of the Will, that the Will in [20] man is nothing but this or that Will, so also is there in him nothing but this or that Desire, which is caused by this or that perception. That [universal] Desire is not something that is really in Nature, but is only abstracted from this or that particular desire. Not really being something, it cannot really cause anything.
[25] So if we say that the desire is free, it is just as if we said that this or that Desire was a cause of itself, i.e., that before it was, it brought it about that it would exist. This is absurdity itself, and cannot be.
[1] We see then that because man is a part of the whole of Nature, depends on it, and is governed by it, he can do nothing, of himself, [I/87] toward his salvation and well-being. So let us see what advantages there are for us in these propositions of ours. This is all the more necessary, because we have no doubt that they will seem rather shocking to some people.
[5] [2] First, it follows from this that we are 60truly God’s servants—indeed, his slaves—and that our greatest perfection is to be such necessarily. For if we were left to ourselves, and so did not depend on God, there would be very little, or nothing, that we could accomplish, and we would rightly find in that a cause of sadness. But that would [10] be quite the contrary to what we now see, viz. that we depend on what is most perfect in such a way that we are a part of the whole, i.e., of him, and so to speak contribute our share to the accomplishment of as many well-ordered and perfect works as are dependent on [15] him.
[3] Second, this knowledge also has the result that after the accomplishment of something excellent 61we do not pride ourselves on this. Such pride causes us—when we think ourselves to be something great already, and to not require anything further—to stand still. So it is [20] directly contrary to our perfection, which consists in this, that we must always strive to attain more and more. But on the contrary, [if we have this knowledge,] we ascribe everything we do to God, who is the first and only cause of all that we accomplish.
[25] [4] 62Third, in addition to the true love of one’s fellow man which this knowledge gives us, it disposes us so that we never hate him, or are angry with him, but are instead inclined to help him and bring him to a better condition. Those are the actions of men who have a [30] great perfection or essence.
[5] 63Fourth, this knowledge also serves to further the common Good, for through it a judge will never be able to favor one more than another, and being required to punish one in order to reward the other, [35] he will do this with insight, so as to help and improve the one as much as the other.
[I/88] [6] 64Fifth, this knowledge frees us from sadness, despair, envy, fright, and other evil passions, which, as we shall say later,1 are the real hell itself.
[5] [7] 65Sixth, this knowledge brings us to the point where we do not fear God, as others fear the devil, whom they have feigned, so that he will not do anything evil to them. For how could we fear God, who is himself the greatest good, and through whom all things that [10] have any essence—and we who live in him—are what they are?
[8] [Finally], this knowledge 66also brings us to the point where we attribute everything to God, love him alone, because he is most magnificent and supremely perfect, and offer ourselves entirely to him. For that is what true religion and our eternal salvation and happiness [15] really consist in. For the only perfection and the final end of a slave and an instrument is to fulfill properly the task imposed on them.
For example, if a carpenter, in making some work, finds himself well-served by his axe, that axe has thereby attained its end and perfection. [20] But if he should think, this axe has now served me so well that I shall let it rest and exact no more service from it, then the axe would be separated from its end, and would no longer be an axe.
[9] Similarly, man, so long as he is a part of Nature, must follow [25] the laws of Nature. That is [true] religion.2 So long as he does this, he has his well-being. But if God, so to speak, willed that man should no longer serve him, that would be just as if he were to deprive him of his well-being and destroy him. For all that he is consists in this, that he serves God.
[1]a Having seen the advantages of this true belief, we shall now strive [I/89] to fulfill the promise we have made: to investigate whether, through the 67knowledge we already have (such as, what good and evil are, what truth and falsity are, and what, in general, the advantages of all [5] these are) we can attain our well-being, i.e., the Love of God, which, as we have observed, is our greatest blessedness, and also how we can be free of those passions which we have judged to be evil?b
[2] To speak first to the second question, whether we can become free of the passions, I say that if we suppose that they have no other [10] causes than those we have posited, then if only we use our intellect well—as we can very easilyc do, now that we have a measure of truth and falsity—we shall never fall into them.
[3] 68But what we must now prove is that they have no other causes; [15] for this it seems to me to be required that we investigate ourselves completely, both with respect to the body and with respect to the mind.
And 69first [we have] to show that there is in Nature a body by whose form and actions2 we are affected, so that we perceive it. We [20] do this because if we come to see the actions of the body and what [I/90] they produce, we shall then also find the first and principal cause of all these passions, and at the same time, the means by which all these passions can be destroyed. From this we can then see whether that [5] can possibly be done through reason. Then we shall go on to speak of our Love of God.
[4] To show, then, that there is a body in Nature cannot be difficult for us, since we know already that God is, and what God is. For we [10] have defined him as a being of infinite attributes, of which each is infinite and perfect. And since extension is an attribute which we have shown to be infinite its kind, it must also, necessarily, be an attribute of that infinite being. And because we have also proven already that this infinite [15] being is real, it follows at the same time that this attribute is also real.
[5] Moreover, since we have also shown that apart from Nature, which is infinite, there is and can be no further being, it is evident [20] that this effect of body through which we perceive [it] can come from nothing other than extension itself, and not from anything else that (as some maintain) has that extension eminently. For as we have already shown in the first Chapter,3 this does not exist.
[6]d So we should note that all the effects which we see depend [25] necessarily on extension must be attributed to this attribute, e.g., Motion and Rest. For if the power to produce these effects were not in Nature, it would be impossible for them to be able to exist (even though many other attributes might also be in Nature). For if one [30] thing produces another, there must be some being in it through which it can produce that rather than something else.
What we say here about extension, we say also about thought, and everything there is.
[7] We must note further that nothing is in us unless there is a [I/91] power in us to be aware of it. So if we find nothing else to be in us but the effects of the thinking thing, and those of extension, we may say with certainty that nothing more is in us.
[5] To understand clearly the actions of both of these, we shall take each of them, first separately, and then together, along with the effects of each.
[10] [8] 70When we consider extension alone, we perceive nothing else in it except motion and rest, from which we find that all its effects derive. 71And such are these twoe modes in body, that there can be no other thing which can change them, except themselves. E.g., if a stone [15] is lying at rest, it is impossible that it should be able to be moved by the power of thinking, or anything else but motion, as when another stone, having more motion than this has rest, makes it move. Similarly, a stone in motion will not come to rest except through something [20] else that moves less. So it follows, then, that no mode of thinking will be able to produce either motion or rest in the body.
[9] 72But according to what we perceive in ourselves,4 it can indeed happen that a body which is now moving in one direction comes to move in another direction—e.g., when I stretch out my arm, and [25] thereby bring it about that the spirits, which previously were moving in a different direction, now however have this one—though [this does] not always [happen], but according to the constitution of the spirits, as will be said later.
The cause of this is, and can only be, that the soul, being an Idea [30] of this body, is so united with it, that it and this body, so constituted, together make a whole.
[I/92/27] [12] 74Furthermore, the soul’s power to move the spirits can also be hindered, either because the motion of the spirits is much decreased, or because it is much increased. It is decreased, for example, when [30] we have run a great deal. In doing this, we bring it about that the spirits give so much more motion than usual to the body, and lose so much motion, that they are necessarily much weakened. This can also happen through taking too little food. It is increased, for example, when we drink too much wine or other strong drink, thereby becoming merry, or drunk, and destroying the soul’s power to govern the [I/93/2] body.
[I/91/32] [10] 75The principal effect of the other attribute is a perception of things which, depending on the way that [the soul] comes to conceive [I/92] them, generates love or hate, etc. This effect, then, since it does not involve any extension, can also not be ascribed to extension, but only [5] to thought. So the cause of all the changes which arise in these modes must be sought only in the thinking thing, not in extension.
We can see this in love; for whether it is to be destroyed or to be aroused, such a change must be produced through the perception itself, which happens (as we have already said) because one comes to [10] know either that there is something bad in the object or that something else is better.
[11] So when these attributes come to act on one another, there arises from this a passion produced in the one by the other; e.g., through the determination of motion, which we have the power to [15] make go where we will. The actions, then, by which the one comes to be acted on by the other, are as follows: the soul [acting] on the body,5 as we have already said, can bring it about that the spirits which would otherwise have moved in one direction, should now, however, move in another.
And because these spirits can also be moved by the body, and so [20] determined [in their direction], it can often happen that having their motion in one direction because of the body, and in another because of the soul, they bring about those anxieties which we often perceive [25] in ourselves, without knowing the reasons why we have them. For otherwise the reasons are usually well known to us.
[I/93/3] [13] Having said this much about the actions of the soul on the body, let us now examine the actions of the body on the soul. We [5] maintain that 76the principal one is that it causes the soul to perceive it, and thereby to perceive other bodies also. This is caused only by Motion and Rest together. For there are no other things in the body through which it could act.
[10] [14] So whatever else apart from this perception happens to the soul cannot be produced through the body. And because the first thing the soul comes to know is the body, the result is that the soul loves the body and is united to it. But since, as we have already said, the cause [15] of love, hate, and sadness must be sought not in the body, but only in the soul (for all the actions of the body must proceed from motion and rest), and because we see clearly and distinctly that the one love is destroyed by the perception of something else that is better, it follows [20] from this clearly that if we once come to know God (at least with as clear a knowledge as we have of our body), we must then come to be united with him even more closely than with our body, and be, as it were, released from the body.
[25] I say more closely, for we have already proven before that without him we can neither be nor be understood. This is because we know him, and must know him, not through anything else (as is the case with all other things), but only through himself (as we have already said before). Indeed, we know him better than we know ourselves, [30] because without him we cannot know ourselves at all.
[15] From what we have so far said, it is easy to infer what are the principal causes of the passions. For regarding the body, and its effects, Motion and Rest, they cannot act on the soul otherwise than to make themselves known to it as objects. And according to the appearances [I/94] they present to it, whether of good or bad,f so the soul is also affected by them, not insofar as [the body] is a body (for then the body would be the principal cause of the passions), but insofar as it is [5] an object, like all other things, which would also have the same effects if they presented themselves to the soul in the same way.
[16] (But by this I do not mean that the love, hate, and sadness which proceed from the consideration of incorporeal things would have [10] the same effects as those which arise from the consideration of corporeal things. For as we shall say later, the former have still other effects, according to the nature of the thing whose conception arouses the love, hate, sadness, etc., in the soul considering the incorporeal things.)
[15] [17] So, to return to our previous topic, if something else should present itself to the soul more magnificently than the body does, it is certain that the body would then have no power to produce such effects as it now does.
From this it follows not only that the body is not the principal cause of the passions,g but also that even if there were something else in us, [I/95] apart from what we have now considered to be capable of producing the passions, such a thing, if it existed, would be able to act on the soul neither more, nor differently than the body now does. For it [5] could never be other than such an object as would be completely different from the soul, and consequently it would show itself to be such, and not otherwise (as we have also said of the body).
[18] So we may conclude truly that love, hate, sadness, and the [10] other ‘passions’ are produced in the soul in various ways, according to the kind of knowledge the soul has each time, And consequently, if it can once come to know also the most magnificent being of all, it will then be impossible for any of these passions to produce the least disturbance in it.
[1] The following difficulties could be raised against what we have said in the preceding chapter:
77First, if motion is not the cause of the passions, how can one [20] nevertheless drive out sadness by [certain] means, as is often accomplished by wine?
[2] To this we may reply that a distinction must be drawna between the perception of the soul when it first becomes aware of the body [25] and the judgment it directly makes as to whether it is good or bad for it.
The soul, then, being constituted as has now mediately been said,1 we have shown before that [it] has [the] power to move the [animal] spirits where it will; but this power can nevertheless be taken from it, [I/96] as when, through other causes, arising from the body in general, the proportion [of motion of rest] established in the spirits is taken from them, or changed; and when the soul becomes aware of this, a sadness arises in it, according to the change the spirits then receive. This sadnessb [5] results from the love and the union it has with the body.
That this is so can easily be inferred from the fact that the sadness can be relieved in one of two ways: either by restoration of the spirits to their original form, i.e., by freeing him of that pain, or by being [10] convinced by good reasons to make nothing of this body. The first is temporary and [the pain always threatens] to come again. But the second is eternal, constant, and immutable.
[3] The 78second possible objection is this: we see that the soul, [I/97] though it has nothing in common with the body,c nevertheless can bring it about that the spirits, which would have moved in one direction, now however move in another direction—why, then, could they [5] not also make a body which is completely at rest begin to move? Similarly, why could it not also move wherever it will all other bodies that already have motion?
[4] But if we recall what we have already said about the thinking [10] thing, we will be able to remove this difficulty very easily. We said then that although Nature has different attributes, it is nevertheless only one [I/98] unique Being, of which all these attributes are predicated. We added that the thinking thing is also unique in Nature and that it is expressed in infinite Ideas, according to the infinite things that are in Nature. For [5] if the body receives one mode, such as, for example, Peter’s body, and again another, such as Paul’s body, the result of this is that there are two different ideas in the thinking thing: One Idea of Peter’s body, which makes the soul of Peter, and another of Paul[’s body], which [10] makes Paul’s soul. So then, the thinking thing can indeed move Peter’s body, through the Idea of Peter’s body, but not through the Idea of Paul’s body. So Paul’s soul can indeed move his own body, but not [15] that of someone else, such as Peter.d
And for this reason it also cannot move a stone which is at rest. For the stone makes another Idea again in the thinking thing.8 Hence it is no less clear that it is impossible for a body completely at rest to be [20] able to be moved by any mode of thought, for the reasons given above.
[5] The third possible 79objection is this: we seem to be able to see clearly that we can nevertheless produce a certain rest in the body. [I/99] But after we have moved our spirits a long time, we find that we are tired. This is nothing but a rest in the spirits, brought about by us.
[6] We answer that the soul is indeed a cause of this rest, but only [5] indirectly. For it does not bring the motion to rest immediately, but only through other bodies which it has moved, and which must have lost as much rest as they communicated to the spirits. So it is clear on all sides that in Nature there is one and the same kind of motion.
[1] Now we have to inquire how it is that sometimes, 80though we see that a thing is good or bad, we nevertheless find no power in ourselves [15] to do the good, or omit the bad, while at other times we do [find this power in ourselves].
[2] We can easily grasp this, if we take into consideration the causes we have given of opinions, which we said were the causes of all the passions. These [causes] we said, are either report or experience. And [20] because whatever we find in ourselves has more power over us than anything which comes from outside, it follows that Reason can be a cause of the destruction of those opinionsa which we have only from report (because Reason has not come to us from outside), but not [a cause of the destruction] of those which we have through experience.
[25] [3] For the power the thing itself gives us is always greater than that we get as a result of a second thing. We noted this difference when speaking of reasoning and of clear understanding [I/54] where we illustrated it with the rule of three. For we have more power if we [I/100] understand the proportion itself than if we understand the rule of proportion. That is why we have already said so often that one love is destroyed by another that is greater, because by that we did not at [5] all want to refer to the desire which proceeds from reasoning.
[1] Since reason,1 then, has no power to bring us to our well-being, it [10] remains for us to investigate whether we can attain it by the fourth and 81last kind of knowledge.
We have said that this kind of knowledge is not a consequence of anything else, but an immediate manifestation of the object itself to the intellect. And if the object is magnificent and good, the soul necessarily [15] becomes united with it, as we have also said of the body.
[2] From this it follows incontrovertibly that this knowledge is what produces love; so if we come to know God in this way, then we must necessarily unite with him, for he cannot manifest himself, or be known [20] by us, as anything but the most magnificent and best of all. As we have already said, our blessedness consists only in this union with him.
I do not say that we must know him as he is;2 it is enough for us to know him to some extent in order to be united with him. For even in [I/101] the knowledge we have of the body we do not know it as it is, or perfectly. And yet, what a union! what a love!
[3] That this fourth [kind of] knowledge, which is the knowledge of God, is not the consequence of anything else, but immediate, is evident [5] from what we have previously proven, viz. that he is the cause of all knowledge which is known through itself alone, and not through any other thing. But in addition to that, it is also evident from the fact that by Nature we are so united with him that without him we [10] can neither be nor be understood. For this reason, then, because there is so close a union between God and us, it is evident that we can only understand him immediately.
[4] We shall now try to explain the union we have with him by [15] Nature and by love. We have already said that there can be nothing in Nature of which there is not an idea in the soul of the same thing.a And as the thing is more or less perfect, so also are the union of the Idea with the thing, or with God himself, and the effect [of that union] [20] more perfect.3 [5] For since the whole of Nature is one unique substance, whose essence is infinite, all things are united through Nature, and united into one [being], viz. God.
And because the body is the very first thing our soul becomes aware of—for as we have said, there can be nothing in Nature whose Idea [25] does not exist in the thinking thing, the idea which is the soul of that thing—that thing must, then, necessarily be the first cause of the idea.b
[I/102] But this Idea cannot find any rest in the knowledge of the body, without passing over into knowledge of that without which neither the body nor the Idea itself can either exist or be understood. Hence, [5] as soon as it knows that being, it will be united with it by love.
[6] To grasp this union better and infer what it must be, we must consider the effect [of the union] with the body. In this we see how, by knowledge of and passions toward corporeal things, there come to arise in us all those effects which we are constantly aware of in our [10] body, through the motion of the spirits; and so (if once our knowledge and love come to fall on that without which we can neither exist nor be understood, and which is not at all corporeal) the effects arising from this union will, and must, be incomparably greater and more [15] magnificent. For these [effects] must necessarily be commensurate with the thing with which it4 is united.
[7] 83When we become aware of these effects, we can truly say that we have been born again. For our first birth was when we were united with the body. From this union have arisen the effects and motions of [20] the [animal] spirits. But our other, or second, birth will occur when we become aware in ourselves of the completely different effects of love produced by knowledge of this incorporeal object. This [love of God] is as different from [love of the body] as the incorporeal is from [25] the corporeal, the spirit from the flesh.
This, therefore, may the more rightly and truly be called Rebirth, because, as we shall show, an eternal and immutable constancy comes only from this Love and Union.
[1] If we once consider attentively what the Soul is, and where its change and duration arise from, we shall easily see whether it is mortal or immortal.
[I/103] We have said, then, that the Soul is an Idea which is in the thinking thing, arising from the existence of a thing which is in Nature. From this it follows that as the duration and change of the thing are, so also [5] the duration and change of the Soul must be. Moreover, we have noted that the Soul can be united either with the body of which it is the Idea or with God, without whom it can neither exist nor be understood.
[2] From this, then, one can easily see that:
1. if it is united with the body only, and the body perishes, then [10] it must also perish; for if it lacks the body, which is the foundation of its love, it must perish with it; but that
2. if it is united with another thing, which is, and remains, immutable, then, on the contrary, it will have to remain immutable [15] also. For through what would it then be possible that it should be able to perish? Not through itself, for as little as it was able, when it did not exist, through itself to begin to exist, so little is it able, now that it exists, [through itself]1 to change or perish. So what alone is the cause of [the Soul’s] existence [i.e., God], would [20] also, when [the Soul] came to perish, have to be the cause of its nonexistence, because it [i.e., God] changed or perished.2
25 [1] So far we think we have sufficiently shown what our love of God is, and its effect, our eternal duration. 85So we do not consider it necessary to say anything here about other things, such as joy in God, peace of mind, etc., since from what has been said one can easily see what should be said about them.
[30] [2] But1 since we have spoken up to now only of our love for God, it remains to be seen whether there is also a love of God for us. 86I.e., whether God also loves men, and whether he does this when they love him?
[I/104] First, we have said that no modes of thought can be ascribed to God except those which are in creatures, so that it cannot be said that God loves men, much less that he loves them because they love him, [5] and hates them because they hate him. For if that were so, one would have to suppose that men do such a thing freely and that they do not depend on a first cause. This we have already proven to be false. Moreover, this would also have to produce a great mutability in God. [10] Where previously he had neither loved nor hated, he would now begin to love and to hate, and would be caused to do this by something that would be outside him. But this is absurdity itself.
[3] When2 we say, however, that God does not love man, that must [15] not be understood as if he left man, as it were, to proceed on his own; [we mean] rather, that because man, together with all there is, is so in God, and God so consists of all of these, there cannot be in him any real love toward something else, since everything consists in one unique thing which is God himself.
[20] [4] From3 this it follows also that God does not give man laws in order to reward him when he fulfills them. To put it more clearly, God’s laws are not of such a nature that they could ever be transgressed. For the rules that God has established in Nature, according [25] to which all things come to be and endure—if we want to call them laws—are such that they can never be transgressed. E.g., that the weakest must yield to the strongest, that no cause can produce more than it has in itself, etc., are of such a kind that they never change, never begin, but that everything is disposed and ordered under them.
[30] [5] To say something about them briefly, 88all laws that cannot be transgressed are divine laws. For whatever happens is, not contrary to, but according to his own decree. All laws that can be transgressed are human laws. For everything that man decides for his own well-being [I/105] is not necessarily for the well-being of the whole of Nature also. On the contrary, it may be destructive of many other things.
[6] 89When the laws of Nature are more powerful, the laws of man are destroyed.4 90The divine laws are the ultimate end, on account of [5] which they exist, and are not subordinated. Not so human laws. For notwithstanding the fact that men make laws for their own well-being, and have no other end than to advance their own well-being thereby, this end of theirs—being subordinated to other ends, which another [10] has in view, who is above them and lets them so act, as being parts of Nature—can also serve the end that it concurs with those eternal laws that God has established from eternity and that in this way it contributes to produce everything.
For example, bees, in all their work, and in the order they maintain [15] among themselves, have no other end in view than to provide a certain supply for the winter. Nevertheless, man, who is above them, has a completely different end in maintaining and caring for them, viz. to get honey for himself.
[20] So also man, as a particular thing, has no further purpose than his limited essence can attain; but as a part and instrument of the whole of Nature, this end of his cannot be the ultimate end of Nature, because it is infinite and must use man, along with all other things, as its instrument.
[25] [7] So far, then, we have spoken of the law established by God. 91But we should also note that man is also aware of two kinds of law in himself (I mean the man who uses his intellect properly, and comes to knowledge of God): one produced by the community he has with God, the other by the community he has with the modes of Nature.
[30] [8] Of these, the one is necessary, the other not.
For regarding the law arising from community with God, because he cannot fail to be always necessarily united with God, he has, and must always have before his eyes, the laws according to which he must live for and with God.
[I/106] But as for the law arising from community with modes, since he can separate himself from men,5 this is not so necessary.
[9] Because we maintain such a community between God and man, [5] one might rightly ask how God can make himself known to man, and whether this happens, or could happen, through spoken words, or immediately, without using any other thing to do it?
[10] We answer: not in any case by words. For then man would [10] have had to know already the meanings of those words before they were spoken to him. For example, if God had said to the Israelites: I am Jehovah your God,6 they must have known previously, without the words that he was God, before they could be sure that it was he.7 For [15] they knew that that voice, thunder and lightning were not God, though the voice said that it was God.
And what we say here about words, we want applied to all other external signs. So we consider it impossible that God could make himself [20] known to men by means of any external signs.
[11] 93We also consider it unnecessary that this should happen through anything other than God’s essence alone and man’s intellect. For since that in us which must know God is the intellect, and the intellect is [25] so immediately united with him that it can neither exist nor be understood without him, it is incontrovertibly clear that no thing can ever be joined to the intellect as God himself is.
[12] 94It is also impossible to be able to know God through anything [30] else:8
1. Because such a thing would then have to be better known to us than God himself, which is plainly contrary to everything which we have clearly shown up to this point, viz. that God is a cause both of our knowledge and of all essence, and that all particular things not only cannot exist without him, but also cannot even be understood.
[I/107] 2. That we can never attain to the knowledge of God through any other thing whose being is necessarily limited, even if it was better known to us. For how is it possible that we could infer an [5] infinite and unlimited thing from one that is limited?
[13] For though we observed some effects or some work in Nature whose cause was unknown to us, nevertheless, it is impossible for us to infer from that that there must be an infinite and unlimited thing [10] in Nature to produce this effect. For how can we know whether many causes concurred to produce it, or there was only one? Who will tell us that? So we conclude, finally, that to make himself known to man, God neither can, nor need, use words, miracles, or any other created [15] thing, but only himself.
[1] 95We shall now say something briefly about whether or not there are Devils:
[20] If the Devil is a thing that is completely contrary to God and has nothing from God, then he agrees precisely with Nothing, of which we have already spoken previously.
[2] If, as some do, we maintain that he is a thinking thing that neither wills nor does anything at all that is good, and so completely [25] opposes himself to God, then certainly he is quite miserable, and if prayers could help, we should pray for his conversion.
[3] But let us just see whether such a miserable thing could exist for even a single moment. If we consider this, we shall immediately find [30] that it cannot. For all the duration of a thing arises from its perfection, and the more essence and divinity they have in them, the more constant they are.1 Since the Devil has the least perfection in himself, how, I wonder, could he exist? Moreover, constancy or duration in [I/108] the mode of the thinking thing only arise through the union which such a mode has with God, a union produced by love. Since the exact [5] opposite of this is posited in Devils, they cannot possibly exist.
[4] But because there is no necessity to posit Devils, why should they be posited? 96For we have no need, as others do, to posit Devils in order to find causes of hate, envy, anger, and such passions. We [10] have come to know them sufficiently without the aid of such fictions.
[1] By what we have maintained in the preceding, we wanted to indictate not only that there are no devils, 97but also that the causes (or to [15] put it better, what we call sins) which prevent us from attaining our perfection are in ourselves.
[2] We have also shown in the preceding how, both by reason1 and by the fourth kind of knowledge, we must attain our blessedness, and [20] how the passions must be destroyed: not in the way commonly said, that they must be subdued before we can attain to the knowledge, and consequently to the love, of God—that would be like maintaining that someone who is ignorant should first put aside his ignorance before he [25] could arrive at knowledge—on the contrary, only knowledge [of God] is the cause of the destruction [of the passions],2 as is evident from everything we have said.
Similarly, it may also be inferred clearly from the preceding that without virtue, or to put it better, without being governed by the [30] intellect, everything leads to ruin, without our being able to enjoy any peace, and we live as if out of our element.
[3] So even if the power of knowledge and divine love did not bring the intellect to an eternal peace, as we have shown, but only to a [I/109] temporary one, it is our duty to seek even this, since it is such that one who enjoys it would not want to exchange it for anything else in the world.
[5] [4] Since this is so, we can, with reason, regard as most absurd what is said by many, who are otherwise considered great theologians: that if the love of God did not lead to eternal life, they would then seek what is best for themselves. As if they could find anything better than [10] God! This is as silly as if a fish (which cannot live outside the water) should say: if no eternal life is to come to me after this life in the water, I want to leave the water for the land.3 But what else can those who do not know God say to us?
[5] So we see that to reach the truth of what we maintain as established [15] regarding our salvation and peace, we need no principle other than that of seeking our own advantage, something which is very natural in all things. And since we find that pursuing sensual pleasures, lusts, and worldly things leads not to our salvation but to our destruction, [20] we therefore prefer to be governed by our intellect.
But because this can make no progress unless we have first arrived at the knowledge and love of God, it is most necessary to seek him. [25] And because, after the preceding reflections and considerations, we have found him to be the greatest good of all goods, we must stand firm here, and be at peace. For we have seen that outside him, there is nothing that can give us any salvation. True freedom is to be and [30] to remain bound by the lovely chains of the love of God.4
[6] Finally, we see also that reasoning is not the principal thing in us, but only like a stairway, by which we can climb up to the desired place, or like a good spirit which without any falsity or deception brings tidings of the greatest good, to spur us thereby to seek it, and [I/110] to unite with it in a union which is our greatest salvation and blessedness.
[7]5 To bring this work to an end, it remains now to indicate briefly [5] what human freedom consists in. To do this, I shall use the following propositions as things which are certain and proven.
1. The more essence a thing has, the more it also has of action [10] and the less of passion. For it is certain that the agent acts through what he has, and that the one who is acted on is acted on through what he does not have.
2. All passion, whether it is from not being to being, or from being to not being, must proceed from an external agent, and not from an internal one. For no thing, considered in itself, has in [15] itself a cause enabling it to destroy itself (if it exists) or to make itself (if it does not exist).
3. Whatever is not produced by external causes can also have nothing in common with them, and consequently will not be able [20] to be changed or transformed by them.
From these last two [propositions], I infer the following fourth proposition.
4. No effect of an immanent or internal cause (which is all one, according to me) can possibly perish or change so long as its cause [25] remains. For just as such an effect has not been produced by external causes, so also it cannot be changed [by them] (by the third proposition). And because nothing can be destroyed except through external causes, it is impossible that this effect should be able to perish so long as its cause endures (by the second proposition).[30]
5. The freest cause of all, and the one most suited to God, is the immanent. For the effect of this cause depends on it in such a way that without it, [the effect] can neither exist nor be understood; [I/111] nor is [the effect] subjected to any other cause. Moreover, [the effect] is also so united with [the cause] that together they form a whole.
[8] So let us see now what we have to conclude from these propositions. First, then,
[5] 1. Since God’s essence is infinite, it has an infinite action, and an infinite negation of passion (by the first proposition); consequently, the more things, through their greater essence, are united with God, the more they also have of action, and the less of [10] passion, and the more they are also free of change and corruption.
2. The true intellect can never come to perish, for in itself it can have no cause to make itself perish (by the second proposition). And because it has not proceeded from external causes, but from [15] God, it cannot receive any change from him (by the third proposition). And since God has produced it immediately, and he alone is an internal cause, it follows necessarily that it cannot perish, so long as this, its cause, remains (by the fourth proposition). [20] Now this, its cause, is eternal. Therefore, it too [is eternal].
3. All the effects of the intellect which are united with him are the most excellent, and must be valued above all others. For because they are internal effects, they are the most excellent of all (by the fifth proposition); moreover, they also must be eternal, [25] for their cause is eternal.
4. All the effects which we produce outside ourselves are the more perfect the more they are capable of being united with us to make one and the same nature, for in this way they are nearest [30] to internal effects. For example, if I teach my fellow men to love sensual pleasure, esteem, and greed, then whether I also love these things or not, I am hacked or beaten.6 This is clear. But [this will] not [be the result] if the only end I strive to attain is to be able to taste union with God, produce true ideas in myself, and make all [I/112] these things known to my fellow men also.7 For we can all share equally in this salvation, as happens when this produces in them the same desire that is in me, bringing it about thereby that their will and mine are one and the same, and producing one and the [5] same nature, agreeing always in all things.
[9] From all that has been said, it can now be very easily conceived what human freedoma is. I define it as follows: it is a firm existence, which our intellect acquires through immediate union with God, so [10] that it can produce ideas in itself, and outside itself effects agreeing well with its nature, without its effects being subjected, however, to any external causes by which they can be changed or transformed.
At the same time, from what has been said it is also clear which [15] things are in our power and are subjected to no external causes; similarly we have also proven here, and in a different way than before, the eternal and constant duration of the intellect, and finally, which effects we have to value above all others.
[20] [10]8 To bring all this to an end, it remains only for me to say to the friends to whom I write this: do not be surprised at these novelties, for you know very well that it is no obstacle to the truth of a thing that it is not accepted by many.
[25] And as you are also aware of the character of the age in which we live, I would ask you urgently to be very careful about communicating these things to others. I do not mean that you should keep them altogether to yourselves, but only that if you ever begin to communicate [30] them to someone, you should have no other aim or motive than the salvation of your fellow man, and make as sure as possible that you will not work in vain.
[I/113] Finally, if in reading through this you encounter any difficulty regarding what I maintain as certain, I ask you not to hasten, on that account, immediately to refute it before you have given enough time [5] and reflection to meditating on it. If you do this, I feel sure you will attain the enjoyment of the fruits you promise yourselves from this tree.
THE END
A1: Substance is, by its nature, prior to all its modifications.2
[5] A2: Things that are different are distinguished either really or modally.
A3: Things that are distinguished really either have different attributes, like thought and extension, or are related to different attributes, [10] like understanding and motion, of which the one belongs to thought, the other to extension.
A4: Things that have different attributes, as well as those that belong to different attributes, have nothing in themselves the one from the other.3
[15] A5: What has nothing in itself from another thing can also not be the cause of the existence of such another thing.
A6: What is a cause of itself could not possibly have limited itself.
[20] A7: That by which things are distinguished4 is by its nature prior to such things.
P1: To no substance which really exists can we relate the same attribute that [25] is related to another substance, or (what is the same) in Nature there cannot be two substances unless they are distinguished really.5
[I/115] Dem.: If the two substances are two, they are different. And consequently (by A2) are distinguished, either really or modally. Not modally, for then (by A7)6 the modifications by their nature would be [5] prior to the substance (contrary to A1). Therefore, really. Hence what can be said of the one cannot (by A4) be said of the other. This is what we were trying to prove.
[10] P2: One substance cannot be the cause of the existence of another substance.
Dem.: Such a cause can have nothing in itself of such an effect (by P1), for the difference between them is real, and consequently (by A5) [15] it cannot produce it (existence).
P3: Every attribute, or substance, is by its nature infinite, and supremely perfect in its kind.
[20] Dem.: No substance is produced by another (P2); consequently, if it exists, it is either an attribute of God or it has been a cause of itself outside God. If the first, then it is necessarily infinite and supremely [25] perfect in its kind, as are all God’s other attributes. If the second, it also must be such; for (by A6) it could not have limited itself.
[I/116] P4: Existence belongs, by nature, to the essence of every substance, so much so that it is impossible to posit in an infinite intellect the idea of the essence of [5] a substance which does not exist in Nature.
Dem.: The true essence of an object is something which is really distinct from the Idea of that object, and this something (by A3)7 [10] either exists really, or is contained in another thing which exists really and from which one cannot distinguish this essence really, but only modally; such are all the essences of things we see which, when they [15] did not previously exist, were contained in extension, motion and rest, and which, when they do exist, are distinguished from extension not really, but only modally. And also it involves a self-contradiction to maintain that the essence of a substance is contained in another thing [20] in this way, since in that case it would not be distinguished from it really (contrary to P1); also, it could then be produced by the subject which contains it (contrary to P2); and finally, it could not be infinite through its nature and supremely perfect in its kind (contrary to P3). [25] Therefore, because its essence is not contained in any other thing, it must be a thing that exists through itself.
Cor.: Nature is known through itself, and not through any other thing. It consists of infinite attributes, each of which is infinite and [30] perfect in its kind. Existence belongs to its essence, so that outside it there is no essence or being. Hence it agrees exactly with the essence of God, who alone is magnificent and blessed.
[1] Since man is a created, finite thing, etc., it is necessary that what he has of thought, and what we call the soul, is a mode of that attribute [5] we call thought, without any thing other than this mode belonging to his essence; so much so that if this mode perishes, the soul is also destroyed, although the preceding attribute remains immutable.
[2] Similarly, what he has of extension, which we call the body, is [10] nothing but a mode of the other attribute we call extension. If this mode too is destroyed, the human body no longer exists, though the attribute of extension remains immutable.
[3] To understand now what this mode is, which we call soul, how [15] it has its origin from the body, and also how its change depends (only) on the body (which I maintain to be the union of soul and body), we must note:
1. That the most immediate mode of the attribute we call thought [20] has objectively in itself the formal essence of all things, so that if one posited any formal things whose essence did not exist objectively in the above-named attribute, it would not be infinite or supremely perfect in its kind (contrary to P3).
[25] [4] And since Nature or God is one being, of which infinite attributes are said, and which contains in itself all essences of created things, it is necessary that of all this there is produced in thought an infinite Idea, which contains in itself objectively the whole of Nature, as it is in itself.1
[30] That is why I have also called this Idea (in I, ix) a creature created immediately by God, since it has in itself objectively the formal essence of all things, without omission or addition. And this is necessarily only one, taking into consideration that all the essences of the [I/118] attributes, and the essences of the modes contained in those attributes, are the essence of only one infinite being.2
[5] 2. It should also be noted that all the remaining modes, such as [5] Love, Desire, and Joy, have their origin in this first immediate mode, so that if it did not precede them, there could be no Love, Desire, etc.
[6] From this it may clearly be concluded that the Natural love which is in each thing for the preservation of its body3 can have no [10] other origin than in the Idea, or the objective essence of such a body, which is in the thinking attribute.
[7] Furthermore, since for the existence of an Idea (or objective essence) nothing is required other than the thinking attribute and the object (or formal essence), it is certain, as we have said, that the Idea, [15] or objective essence, is the most immediatea mode of the attribute. And consequently there can be, in the thinking attribute, no other mode which would belong to the essence of the soul of each thing, except the Idea, which must be of such a thing as really existing, and [20] which must exist in the thinking attribute. For such an Idea brings with it the remaining modes of Love, Desire, etc.
Now since the Idea proceeds from the existence of the object, then if the object changes or is destroyed, the Idea itself also changes or is [25] destroyed in the same degree; this being so, it is what is united with the object.4
[8] Finally, if we should wish to proceed to ascribe to the essence of the soul that by which it can exist, we would not be able to find anything other than that attribute, and the object of which we have [30] just spoken, and neither of these can belong to the essence of the soul. For the object has nothing of thought, and is really distinct from the [I/119] soul. And as for the attribute, we have already proven that it cannot belong to the above-mentioned essence. From what we have subsequently said, this should be seen even more clearly; for the attribute, as attribute, is not united with the object, since it neither changes nor [5] is destroyed, though the object changes or is destroyed.
[9] Therefore, the essence of the soul consists only in the being of an Idea, or objective essence, in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact exists in Nature. I say of an [10] object that really exists, etc., without further particulars, in order to include here not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have a soul just as much as those of extension do.5
[10] To understand this definition in more detail, it will help to [15] consider what I have already said in speaking of the attributes. I have saidb that the attributes are not distinguished according to their existence, for they themselves are the subjects of their essences;6 that the essence of each of the modes is contained in the attributes just mentioned; and finally, that all the attributes are attributes of One infinite [20] being.
[11] But it should be noted in addition that these modes, when considered as not really existing, are nevertheless equally contained in their attributes. And because there is no inequality at all in the attributes,7 nor in the essences of the modes, there can be no particularity [25] in the Idea, since it is not in Nature. But whenever any of these modes put on their particular existence, and by that are in some way distinguished from their attributes (because their particular existence, which they have in the attribute, is then the subject of their essence), then a [30] particularity presents itself in the essences of the modes, and consequently in their objective essences, which are necessarily contained in the Idea.
[12] This is why we have used these words in the definition, that [I/120] the soul is an Idea arising from an object which exists in Nature. And with this we consider that we have sufficiently explained what kind of thing the soul is in general, understanding by this expression not only the [5] Ideas that arise from corporeal modes, but also those that arise from the existence of each mode of the remaining attributes.
[13] But since we do not have, of the remaining attributes, such a knowledge as we have of extension, let us see whether, having regard [10] to the modes of extension, we can discover a more particular definition, which is more suited to express the essence of our soul. For this is our real intention.
[14] Here, then, we shall suppose as a thing proven, that there is no other mode in extension than motion and rest, and that each particular [15] corporeal thing is nothing but a certain proportion of motion and rest, so much so that if there were nothing in extension except motion alone, or nothing except rest alone, there could not be, or be indicated, in the whole of extension, any particular thing. The human [20] body, then, is nothing but a certain proportion of motion and rest.
[15] So this existing proportion’s objective essence in the thinking attribute is the soul of the body. Hence when one of these modes (motion or rest) changes, either by increasing or by decreasing, the [25] Idea also changes correspondingly. For example, if the rest happens to increase, and the motion to decrease, the pain or sadness we call cold is thereby produced. On the other hand, if this [increase] occurs in the motion, then the pain we call heat is thereby produced.
[30] [16] And so when the degrees of motion and rest are not equal in all parts of our body, but some have more motion and rest than others, there arises a difference of feeling (e.g., from this comes the different kind of pain we feel when we are struck with a little stick in the eyes or on the hands).
When the external causes which bring changes about differ in themselves, [I/121] and do not all have the same effects, there arises a difference of feeling in one and the same part (e.g., the difference of feeling from a blow with a piece of wood or iron on the same hand).
[5] And again, if the change which happens in a part is a cause of its returning to its original proportion, from this there arises the joy we call peace, pleasurable activity, and cheerfulness.
[17] Finally, because we have now explained what feeling is, we can [10] easily see how from this there arises a reflexive Idea, or knowledge of oneself, experience, and reasoning.
And from all of this (as also because our soul is united with God, and is a part of the infinite Idea arising immediately from God) we can see clearly the origin of clear knowledge, and the immortality of [15] the soul. But for the present what we have said will be enough.