Notes

Chapter 1

1. Concerning ideological workers, today a substantial majority of employers of entry-level television and radio reporters, newspaper and magazine editors and writers, many types of advertising specialists, public relations personnel (or, to use the currently preferred term, “public communication” experts) require new hires to arrive with advanced degrees in one of several varieties of mass communication study. See W. W. Schwed, “Hiring, Promotion, Salary, Longevity Trends Charted at Dailies,” Newspaper Research Journal (October 1981); Lee Becker, J. W. Fruit, and S. L. Caudill, The Training and Hiring of Journalists (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1987).

2. Albert Biderman and Elizabeth Crawford, The Political Economics of Social Research: The Case of Sociology (Springfield, VA: Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technological Information, 1968).

3. On BASR, see Jean Converse, Survey Research in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 269, 275–76, 506–7 notes 37 and 42. On Cantril’s IISR, see John Crewdson and Joseph Treaster, “The CIA’s 3-Decade Effort to Mold the World’s Views,” New York Times, December 25, 26, and 27, 1977, with discussion of Cantril and the IISR on December 26. For Cantril’s version, which conceals the true source of his funds, see Hadley Cantril, The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967). On CENIS, see Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, The Center for International Studies: A Description, (Cambridge: MIT, July 1955); U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Problems of Development and Internal Defense, Report of a Country Team Seminar, June 11–July 13, 1962; (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, 1962); and Ithiel de Sola Pool, “The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments,” Background 10, no. 2 (August 1966): 111–22. Other major communication research projects that depended heavily on funding from U.S. government psychological warfare agencies included the National Opinion Research Center, the Survey Research Center (now named the Institute for Social Research), and the Bureau of Social Science Research. The text that follows discusses these in greater detail.

4. For details on the Department of State contracts, which produced a scandal when they were uncovered in 1957, see House Committee on Government Operations, State Department Opinion Polls, 85th Cong., 1st sess., June–July 1957 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1957).

5. Albert Biderman, “Social-Psychological Needs and ‘Involuntary’ Behavior as Illustrated by Compliance in Interrogation,” Sociometry 23, no. 2 (June 1960): 120–47; Louis Gottschalk, The Use of Drugs in Information-Seeking Interviews, Bureau of Social Science Research report 322, December 1958, BSSR Archives, series II, box 11, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park; and Albert Biderman, Barbara Heller, and Paula Epstein, A Selected Bibliography on Captivity Behavior, Bureau of Social Science Research report 339–1, February 1961, BSSR Archives, series II, box 14, also at the University of Maryland. Biderman acknowledges the Human Ecology Fund—later revealed to have been a conduit for CIA funds—and U.S. Air Force contract no. AF 49 (638)727 as the source of his funding for this work. For more on the CIA’s use of the Human Ecology Fund and of the related Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, see John Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate”: The CIA and Mind Control (New York: Times Books, 1979), pp. 147–63.

6. Jesse Delia, “Communication Research: A History,” in Charles Berger and Steven Chaffee (eds.) Handbook of Communication Science (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987), pp. 20–98.

7. Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 504–5, discusses Lazarsfeld’s and Merton’s own views. On this point see also Theodore Adorno, “Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America,” in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (eds.), The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America 1930–1960 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 343; and Willard Rowland, The Politics of TV Violence (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983).

8. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 10.

9. Biderman and Elisabeth Crawford, The Political Economics of Social Research. For related texts concerning political and economic aspects of social science research, see Albert Biderman and Elisabeth Crawford, “The Basis of Allocation to Social Scientific Work,” paper presented to American Sociological Association, September 1969, now at BSSR Archives, series V, box 3, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park; Albert Biderman and Elisabeth Crawford, “Paper Money: Trends of Research Sponsorship in American Sociology Journals,” Social Sciences Information (Paris), 9, no. 1 (February 1970):51–77; Elisabeth Crawford and Gene Lyons, “Foreign Area Research: A Background Statement,” American Behavioral Scientist 10 (June 1967):3–7; Elisabeth Crawford and Albert Biderman, Social Science and International Affairs (New York: Wiley, 1969); James McCartney, “On Being Scientific: Changing Styles of Presentation of Sociological Research,” American Sociologist (February 1970):30–35; Pool, “The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments”; Gene M. Lyons, The Uneasy Partnership; Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969); House Committee on Government Operations, The Use of Social Research in Federal Domestic Programs, 4 vols., 90th Cong. 1st sess. January–December 1967 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1967). For more recent analysis, see Richard Nathan, Social Science in Government: Uses and Misuses (New York: Basic Books, 1988); and Otto Larsen, Milestones and Millstones: Social Science at the National Science Foundation, 1945–1991 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1992). More critical texts on this issue include Ralph Beals, Politics of Social Research (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); Irving Louis Horowitz and James Everett Katz, Social Science and Public Policy in the United States (New York: Praeger, 1975); Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), The Use and Abuse of Social Science (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1971); Irene Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1985).

10. Steven Chaffee and John Hochheimer, “The Beginnings of Political Communications Research in the United States: Origins of the ‘Limited Effects’ Model,” in Michael Gurevitch and Mark Levy (eds.), Mass Communications Yearbook, Vol. 5 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1985), pp. 75–104, quote on p. 77.

11. Quoted in John Hughes, “‘Free Radio’ for China,” Christian Science Monitor, July 30, 1992.

12. Pool, “The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments.”

13. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science (Washington, DC: GPO, 1953), pp. 35–48; and “The Federal Government in Behavioral Science,” special issue of The American Behavioral Scientist 7, no. 9 (May 1964), William Ellis (study director).

14. James Burnham, Containment or Liberation? (New York: John Day, 1953), p. 188. For fragmentary, but supporting data see also Comptroller General of the United States (General Accounting Office), U.S. Government Monies Provided to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972), with a classified annex obtained via the Freedom of Information Act; Sig Mikelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983); Larry D. Collins, “The Free Europe Committee: American Weapon of the Cold War,” Ph.D. diss., Carlton University, 1975, Canadian Thesis on Microfilm Service call no. TC20090; James R. Price, Radio Free Europe: A Survey and Analysis (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Document No. JX 1710 U.S. B, March 1972); and Joseph Whelan, Radio Liberty: A Study of Its Origins, Structure, Policy, Programming and Effectiveness (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1972).

15. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science, and American Behavioral Scientist.

16. Biderman and Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research, pp. 20–26. For a detailed discussion of the role of the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation, see Chapter 4.

17. See, for example, Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, The Academic Mind: Social Scientists in a Time of Crisis (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958); or Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

18. Daniel Lerner with Lucille Pevsner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958).

19. William Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (eds.), A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins [for U.S. Army Operations Research Office], 1958), p. 12; their reference is to Ladislas Farago, German Psychological Warfare (New York: Putnam, 1941).

20. Daugherty and Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pp. 12–35.

21. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Military Agency for Standardization, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions for Military Use (unclassified) (Belgium: NATO, 1976), pp. 2–206 and Appendix J-1; on “public diplomacy,” see Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, “Iran–Contra’s Untold Story,” Foreign Policy 72 (Fall 1988):3–30.

22. V. I. Lenin, What Is to Be Done? (1902; rpt. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978), pp. 199–211; Mao Tse Tung (Mao Zedong), Mao Tse Tung on Literature and Art (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), pp. 1–44, 142–62.

23. The principal British psychological warfare agency during World War II, for example, was called the Political Warfare Executive; see Robert H. Bruce Lockhardt, “Political Warfare,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (London) (May 1950); Harold D. Lasswell, “Political and Psychological Warfare,” in Daniel Lerner (ed.), Propaganda in War and Crisis (New York: George Stewart, 1951), pp. 261–66.

24. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, translated by John Chamberlain (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939); see also Arno Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The Final Solution in History (New York: Pantheon, 1988), pp. 95–103.

25. U.S. Department of the Army General Staff, Plans and Operations Division, Psychological Warfare Study for Guidance in Strategic Planning (originally top secret, now declassified), March 11, 1948, U.S. Army P&O 091.42 TS (section I, cases 1–7), RG 319, U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC. Emphasis in original.

26. U.S. Department of the Army, Joint Strategic Plans Committee, JSPC 862/3 (originally top secret, now declassified), August 2, 1948, Appendix “C,” P&O 352 TS (section I, case 1), RG 319, U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC.

27. Ibid. Emphasis in original.

28. U.S. Department of the Army General Staff, Psychological Warfare Study for Guidance in Strategic Planning. Emphasis in original.

29. U.S. National Security Council, NSC 10/2: Office of Special Projects (originally top secret, now declassified), June 15, 1948, RG 273, U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC.

30. U.S. Department of the Army General Staff, Psychological Warfare Study for Guidance in Strategic Planning.

31. Ibid. For a more recent example of the same phenomena, see Parry and Kornbluh, “Iran–Contra’s Untold Story.”

Chapter 2

1. Margaret Mead, “Continuities in Communication from Early Man to Modern Times,” in Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier (eds.), Propaganda and Communication in World History, 3 vols. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980), Vol. 1, pp. 21–49.

2. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 63–84.

3. Josephina Oliva de Coll, Resistencia Indigena ante la Conguista, 4th ed. (Mexico City: Siglo Vientiuno Editores, 1983).

4. L. H. Butterfield, “Psychological Warfare in 1776: The Jefferson–Franklin Plan,” in William Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (eds.) A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins [for U.S. Army Operations Research Office], 1958), pp. 62–72.

5. M. Andrews, “Psychological Warfare in the Mexican War,” in Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, pp. 72–73.

6. Morris Janowitz, “The Emancipation Proclamation as an Instrument of Psychological Warfare,” pp. 73–79, and B. J. Hendrick, “Propaganda of the Confederacy,” pp. 79–84, both in Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook.

7. Harold Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War (1927; rpt. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 14–26, quote on p. 18.

8. Ibid., p. xxxi.

9. Alfred Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 8.

10. Ibid.

11. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, p. xxxii.

12. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922).

13. Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925).

14. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in the World War, p. xxxii; D. Steven Blum, Walter Lippmann Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 49–64.

15. Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 29.

16. Ibid., pp. 31, 32.

17. See, for example, book reviews by J. M. Lee, Yale Review 12 (January 23, 1922: 418; R. E. Park, American Journal of Sociology vol. 28 (September 1922):232; W. C. Ford, Atlantic (June 1922); or C. E. Merriam, International Journal of Ethics (January 1923):210. In contrast, John Dewey wrote that Lippmann’s writing style was so accomplished that “one finishes the book almost without realizing that it is perhaps the most effective indictment of democracy as currently conceived ever penned.” New Republic 30 (May 3, 1922):286. W. S. Myers commented that Lippmann “is essentially a propagandist, and his work is influenced by this characteristic attitude of approach toward any subject.” 55 Bookmark (June 1922):418.

18. Harold Lasswell, Ralph Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith, Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography (1935; rpt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 43.

19. Harold Lasswell, “Propaganda,” Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 11 (New York: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 524–25. See also Harold Lasswell, “Political and Psychological Warfare,” in Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, pp. 21–40. Although Lasswell’s importance as a theoretician of social control has been long recognized, it has been brought to renewed public attention in the United States in recent years largely through Noam Chomsky’s media studies. See Noam Chomsky, Intellectuals and the State (Leiden, Netherlands: Johan Huizinga-lezing, 1977), pp. 9–10, and “Democracy and the Media,” in Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Boston: South End Press, 1989).

20. Robert Barnhart (ed.), The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology (New York: Wilson, 1988), p. 195.

21. Willard Rowland, Politics of TV Violence (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1983), pp. 53–59.

22. My thinking on this point was spurred by Oskar Negt’s discussion of Horkheimer and Adorno in “Mass Media: Tools of Domination or Instruments of Liberation? Aspects of the Frankfurt School’s Communications Analysis,” New German Critique (Spring 1978): 61–79. 61ff.

23. Chomsky, Intellectuals and the State, pp. 9–10.

24. Joseph Goebbels, Goebbels-Reden, 1932–1945, 2 vols. (Düsseldorf: Drost, 1972); and Joseph Goebbels Tagebuecher von Joseph Goebbels, Saemtliche Fragments, 4 vols., edited by Elke Froehlich (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1987). For a guide to microfilmed collections of Goebbels’ Reichministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, see U.S. National Archives, Records of the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, No. 22 in the Guide to German Records series, Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Service, 1960.

25. L. D. Stokes, “The Sicherheitsdienst (SD) of the Reichsführer SS and German Public Opinion, 1939–1941,” Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1972; Aryeh Unger, “The Public Opinion Reports of the Nazi Party,” POQ 29, no. 4 (Winter 1965–66): 565–82; Arthur Smith, Jr., “Life in Wartime Germany: Colonel Ohlendorf’s Opinion Service,” POQ 36, no. 1 (Spring 1972): 72; Heinz Boberach, “Chancen eines Umsturzes in Spiegel der Berichte des Sicherheitsdienstes,” in Juergen Schmaedeke and Peter Steinback (eds.), Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus (Munich: Piper, 1989). For an extensive collection of captured reports from Ohlendorf’s project, see Sicherheitspolizei des SD, Meldungen aus dem Reich, in U.S. National Archives microfilm of captured German records No. T-71, reel 5.

26. Carsten Klingemann, “Angewandte Soziologie im Nationalsozialismus,” 1999: Zeischrift für Sozialgeshichte des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts (January 1989): 25; Christoph Cobet (ed.), Einführung in Fragen an die Soziologie in Deutschland nach Hitler, 1945–1950 (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Christoph Cobet, 1988). For an examination of interlocking problems concerning German geographical studies of the same period, which overlapped in certain respects with communication studies, see Mechtild Roessler, Wissenschaft und Lebensraum: Geographische Ostforschung in Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1990).

27. Chris Raymond, “Professor Is Accused of Promulgating Anti-Semitic Views as Journalist in Germany and U.S. in World War II,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 38, no. 16, December 11, 1991, P.A–10. For Noelle’s own 1939 description of her relationship with Nazism, see Elisabeth Noelle, “Fragebogen zur Bearbeitung des Ausnahmeantrages für die Reichsschrifttumskammer,” May 15, 1939, in the collection of the Berlin Document Center.

28. Brett Gary, “Mass Communications Research, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Imperatives of War 1939–1945,” Research Reports from the Rockefeller Archive Center (North Tarrytown, NY, Spring 1991), p. 3; and Brett Gary, “American Liberalism and the Problem of Propaganda,” Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1992. Gary’s work is the first thorough study, so far as I am aware, of the important role of the Rockefeller Foundation in crystallizing paradigms for communication studies.

29. John Marshall (ed.), “Needed Research in Communication” (1940), folder 2677, box 224, Rockefeller Archives, Pocantico Hills, NY, cited in Gary, American Liberalism.

30. Gary, “American Liberalism and the Problem of Propaganda.”

31. Ladislas Farago, German Psychological Warfare (New York: Putnam, 1941). For a history of the origin of the term, see William Daugherty, “Changing Concepts,” in Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. 12.

32. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 5–8, 23–37.

33. Ibid., p. 6.

34. Anthony Cave Brown (ed.), The Secret War Report of the OSS (New York: Berkeley, 1976), pp. 42–63. There is a large literature on the OSS. For a reliable overview of the agency’s activities, including basic data on its establishment and leadership, see Richard Harris Smith, OSS (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

35. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 7–14; and Edward Lilly, “The Psychological Strategy Board and Its Predecessors: Foreign Policy Coordination 1938–1953,” in Gaetano Vincitorio (ed.), Studies in Modern History (New York: St. Johns University Press, 1968), p. 346.

36. Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J. McCloy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

37. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 8–18; for an extended discussion, see Daniel Lerner, Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day (New York: George Stewart, 1948).

38. On Poole’s role in the establishment of Public Opinion Quarterly, see Harwood Childs, “The First Editor Looks Back,” POQ, 21, no. 1 (Spring 1957): 7–13. On Poole’s work at the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the OSS, see (Anthony Cave Brown (ed.), Secret War Report of the OSS (New York: Berkley, 1976), chapter 2. On Leighton, see Alexander Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World (New York: Dutton, 1949). On Mead, see Carleton Mabee, “Margaret Mead and Behavioral Scientists in World War II: Problems of Responsibility, Truth and Effectiveness,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 23 (January 1987). On Stouffer, see note 49 below. On Cantril, see Hadley Cantril, “Evaluating the Probable Reactions to the Landing in North Africa in 1942: A Case Study,” POQ, 29, no. 3 (Fall 1965): 400–410.

39. On Roper and on Elmo Wilson, also of the Roper organization, see Jean Converse, Survey Research in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 171–72. On Doob and Leites, see Daniel Lerner (ed.), Propaganda in War and Crisis (New York: George Stewart, 1951), pp. vii–viii. On Kluckhohn, Leighton, Lowenthal, and Schramm, see Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, pp. xiii–xiv. On Speier, Contemporary Authors, Vol. 21–24, p. 829. On Barrett, Edward Barrett, Truth Is Our Weapon (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953), pp. 31–32. After his death, the Associated Press identified Barrett as a former member of the OSS, though Barrett omitted that information from biographical statements published during his lifetime; see “Edward W. Barrett Dies; Started Columbia Journalism Review,” Washington Post, October 26, 1989. For more on the OWI, see also Allan Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942–1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978); and Leonard Doob, “Utilization of Social Scientists in the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information,” American Political Science Review, 41, no. 4 (August 1947): 649–67.

40. Converse, Survey Research in the United States, pp. 163, 172.

41. Ibid., p. 309.

42. On Leites and Eulau, see Wilbur Schramm, “The Beginnings of Communication Study in the United States,” in Everett Rogers and Francis Balle (eds.), The Media Revolution in America and Western Europe (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1985), p. 205; and Harold Lasswell and Nathan Leites, Language of Politics (New York: George Stewart, 1949), p. 298.

43. Nathan Leites and Ithiel de Sola Pool, “The Response of Communist Propaganda,” in Lasswell and Leites, Language of Politics, pp. 153, 334.

44. Roger Wimmer and Joseph Dominick, Mass Media Research (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1987), p. 165.

45. On Paley, Jackson, Padover, Riley, Janowitz, Lerner, and Gurfein, see Lerner, Sykewar, pp. 439–43. On Davison, see Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. xii. On Shils, see Lerner, Propaganda in War, p. viii.

46. On Davison and Padover, see Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, pp. xii–xiii. On Gurfein and Janowitz, see Smith, OSS, pp. 86, 217.

47. On Langer, Cater, and Marcuse, see Smith, OSS, pp. 17, 23, 25, 217. On Barrett, see “Edward W. Barrett Dies; Started Columbia Journalism Review.” On Becker and Inkeles, see Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, pp. xi–xii. For a fascinating early memoir of the role of psychology and social psychology in OSS training and operations, see William Morgan, The OSS and I (New York: Norton, 1957).

48. Robin Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 (New York: Morrow, 1987), pp. 43–44, 79.

49. On Samuel Stouffer’s Morale Branch, see Samuel Stouffer, Arthur Lumsdaine, Marion Lumsdaine, Robin Williams, M. Brewster Smith, Irving Janis, Shirley Star, and Leonard Cottrell, The American Soldier (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 3–53; and John Clausen, “Research on the American Soldier as a Career Contingency,” Social Psychology Quarterly 47, no. 2 (1984): 207–13. On the OSS, see Barry Katz, Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1952–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989): and Bernard David Rifkind, “OSS and Franco-American Relations 1942–1945” Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 1983, pp. 318–36. On psychological operations in the Pacific theater, see Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World.

50. Clausen, “Research on the American Soldier.”

51. Ibid., p. 210.

52. Ibid., p. 212.

53. Barrett, Truth, p. 31fn.

54. “Edward W. Barrett Dies; Started Columbia Journalism Review.”

55. Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research, 1923–1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); and Katz, Foreign Intelligence, pp. 29ff.

Chapter 3

1. Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Hearings on Science Legislation (S. 1297), 79th Cong. 1st sess., October–November 1945, Part 4, pp. 899–902.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. On the continuum from hot war to cold war in the eyes of leaders of the U.S. intelligence community, particularly as it pertained to covert operations and psychological warfare, see testimony by Allen Dulles, John V. Grombach, Rear Adm. Thomas Inglis, Brig. Gen. Hayes Kroner, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and Peter Vischer. House Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, National Security Act of 1947. June 27, 1947; published 1982 by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982).

4. Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Vintage, 1982), pp. 775–84.

5. Jean Converse, Survey Research in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 180–82.

6. Ibid., pp. 175–85; Samuel Stouffer et al., The American Soldier (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 28–29.

7. Alfred Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), p. 40.

8. John Prados, interview with author, December 12, 1989.

9. Maj. Gen. W. G. Wyman, letter to Asst. Chief of Staff G-2, War Department General Staff, “Project to Combat Subversive Activities [in the] United States,” January 15, 1946, U.S. Army P&O 091.412 (section IA, case 7), RG 319, U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC; see also Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 42–43.

10. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 55–56.

11. Converse, Survey Research in the United States, p. 182. For background on Allied polling in occupied Germany, see Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt (eds.), Public Opinion in Occupied Germany (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970); and Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merritt (eds.), Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980).

12. Allan Robert Adler, Litigation under the Federal Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act (Washington, DC: American Civil Liberties Foundation, 1990), pp. 42–44.

13. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, pp. 69–71.

14. Ibid., pp. 46–47.

15. John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars (New York: Morrow, 1986), pp. 20–21.

16. Ibid., pp. 20, 27–29.

17. U.S. National Security Council, NSC 4: Coordination of Foreign Information Measures (confidential), December 9, 1947, RG 273, U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC.

18. Edward Barrett, Truth Is Our Weapon (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953).

19. U.S. National Security Council, NSC 4-A: Psychological Operations (top secret), December 9, 1947, RG 273, U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC.

20. U.S. National Security Council, NSC 10/2: Office of Special Projects (originally top secret, now declassified), June 18, 1948, RG 273, U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC.

21. Intricate and seemingly contradictory conceptual structures of this type are far more common in affairs of state than is generally recognized; indeed, they are probably inherent in modern political communication systems. A particularly grotesque example of this can be seen in Nazi Germany’s sublanguages used to manage the extermination of Jews. There, the state employed massive public information campaigns to mobilize the German bureaucracy and public for persecutory operations such as expropriation of Jewish property, “petty” (i.e., nonlethal) discrimination, and mass roundups of Jews for deportation. The truth—that the deportees were to be murdered—was aggressively denied by the Nazi information authorities, however, who claimed that the deportees were simply being relocated to work camps.

But despite the denials, small armies of personnel were required to actually manage the death camps, deliver the railroad shipments of Jews, make use of data derived from fatal experiments on work camp prisoners, and so on. These groups soon developed complex, specialized vocabularies of euphemisms and rationalizations in order to discuss their work without directly contradicting the official claim that deported persons were surviving and even prospering.

In time, knowledge of the exterminations seeped through German society, spread by rumors, jokes, foreign radio broadcasts, and the accidental revelations inherent in any large-scale program. The net result was both widespread knowledge of the genocidal efforts of Hitler’s government and, simultaneously, an institutionalized and internalized denial of precisely the same knowledge. For many Germans, this belief structure proved to be quite ornate and resilient.

Roughly similar psychological and linguistic structures seem to have played a role in certain phases of Turkish Ittyhad efforts to exterminate Armenians during World War I, in atrocities during Stalin’s rule in the Soviet Union, and in U.S. exploitation of former Nazis in intelligence operations. There are many obvious differences, of course, between the psychological and linguistic dynamics of atrocities and those of psychological warfare projects. Nonetheless, there are enough similarities to suggest that euphemistic “cover stories” are integral to much of modern political communication.

22. U.S. National Security Council, NSC 10/2 On the importance of euphemism during mass crimes, see Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (New York: Harper, 1961), pp. 216, 566, 652.

23. Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, p. 33.

24. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence, 94th Cong. 2nd sess., Part 4 Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), pp. 29–31. Hereinafter cited as Senate Select Committee.

25. Ibid., pp. 29–36; Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars, p. 81.

26. Col. S. F. Griffin, “Memorandum to the Record: NSC 10 (Psychological Warfare Organization)” (top secret), June 3, 1948; quote concerning mission from U.S. National Security Council, NSC 10/2.

27. Senate Select Committee, pp. 128–32.

28. Quoted in Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, p. 75.

29. See, for example, “U.S. Rejects Charges of Anti-Polish Acts,” Department of State Bulletin (February 23, 1953): 304–5.

Chapter 4

1. Examples of articles with this characteristic include John A. Pollard, “Words Are Cheaper Than Blood,” POQ 9, no. 3 (Fall 1945): 283ff. (review of the work of the Office of War Information); Mrs. R. Hart Phillips, “The Future of American Propaganda in Latin America,” POQ 9, no. 3 (Fall 1945): 305ff. (plea for expanded U.S. propaganda operations in the region); and Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” POQ 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948): 280 (elaboration of reference group theory on the basis of evidence drawn from psychological operations against enemy military forces). Public Opinion Quarterly’s annual index typically appears as an unpaginated annex to the bound annual volumes of the journal. Unless otherwise noted, all unattributed articles in this chapter appeared in POQ.

For background on DeWitt Poole, see Who Was Who, Vol. 3, p. 692; and Sig Mickelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 24, 41, 60, 259. Poole eventually became president of the Central Intelligence Agency–sponsored National Committee for a Free Europe.

2. See, for example, Warren B. Walsh’s reviews of M. Sayers and A. Kahn’s text The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War against Russia, 10, no. 4 (Winter 1946): 596–97, or of Henry Wallace’s text Soviet Asia Mission, 11, no. 1 (Spring 1947): 135.

3. As used here, “financially dependent” upon psychological warfare contracting means deriving a substantial fraction of one’s personal income or the backing for important professional projects from government efforts to apply social science to national security missions. Examples from Public Opinion Quarterly’s board of editors (later called its advisory board) include Hadley Cantril, Leonard Cottrell, W. Phillips Davison, George Gallup, Harold Lasswell, Paul Lazarsfeld, Rensis Likert, DeWitt Poole, Elmo Roper, Wilbur Schramm, Frank Stanton, Frederick Stephan, Samuel Stouffer, and Elmo Wilson. See the text and notes in Chapters 5, 6, and 8 of this book for specific projects and sources.

4. Major Paul C. Bosse, “Polling Civilian Japanese on Saipan,” 9, no. 2 (Summer 1945): 176.

5. Pollard, “Words Are Cheaper Than Blood,” p. 283.

6. Lt. Andie Knutson, “Japanese Opinion Surveys: The Special Need and the Special Difficulties,” 9, no. 3, (Fall 1945): 313.

7. Phillips, “The Future of American Propaganda in Latin America,” p. 305.

8. Nat Schmulowitz and Lloyd Luckmann, “Foreign Policy by Propaganda Leaflets,” 9, no. 4 (Winter 1945): 428, and Jacob Freid, “The OWI’s Moscow Desk,” 10, no. 2 (Summer 1946): 156.

9. Ferdinand Hermens, “The Danger of Stereotypes in Viewing Germany,” 9, no. 4 (Winter 1945): 418, M. I. Gurfein and Morris Janowitz, “Trends in Wehrmacht Morale,” 10, no. 1 (Spring 1946): 78, Herbert von Strempel, “Confessions of a German Propagandist,” 10, no. 2 (Summer 1946): 216, Elizabeth Zerner, “German Occupation and Anti-Semitism in France,” 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948): 258, Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948): 280, Morris Janowitz (reviewer), “Attitudes of German Prisoners of War” and “Observations of the Characteristics and Distribution of German Nazis,” 13, no. 2 (Summer 1949): 343, 346.

10. Nat Schmulowitz and Lloyd Luckmann, “Foreign Policy by Propaganda Leaflets,” 9, no. 4 (Winter 1945): 428, Boris Joffe, “The Post Card—A Tool of Propaganda,” 11, no. 4 (Winter 1947): 613, Marin Hertz, “Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda in World War II,” 13, no. 3 (Fall 1949): 471.

11. Capt. John Jamieson, “Books and the Soldier,” 9, no. 2 (Summer 1945): 320, Arnold Rose, “Bases of American Military Morale in World War II,” 9, no. 4 (Winter 1945): 411, Karl Ettinger, “Foreign Propaganda in America” 10, no. 3 (Fall 1946): 329, Leo Crespi and G. Schofield Shapleigh, “‘The’ Veteran—A Myth,” 10, no. 3 (Fall 1946): 361, John Jamieson, “Censorship and the Soldier,” 11, no. 3 (Fall 1947): 367, Paul Lazarsfeld, “The American Soldier: An Expository Review,” 13, no. 3 (Fall 1949): 377.

12. Reviews of The Great Conspiracy 10, no. 4 (Winter 1946): 596, Weapon of Silence, 11, no. 1 (Spring 1947): 133, Mass Persuasion: The Social Psychology of a War Bond Drive, 11, no. 2 (Summer 1947): 266, Paper Bullets: A Brief History of Psychological Warfare in World War II, 11 no. 3 (Fall 1947) Rebel at Large [George Creel memoirs] 11, no. 4 (Winter 1947): 626, Psychological Warfare, 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948): 331, Public Opinion and Pro paganda 12, no. 3 (Fall 1948): 496, The Goebbels Diaries, 12, no. 3 (Fall 1948): 500, Persuade or Perish, 12, no. 3 (Fall 1948): 511, Overseas Information Service of the United States Government, 13, no. 1 (Spring 1949): 136, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, 13, no. 3 (Fall 1949): 524, Publizistik im Dritten Reich, 13, no. 4 (Winter 1949): 692.

13. Jacob Freid, “The OWI’s Moscow Desk,” 10, no. 2 (Summer 1946): 156, George Counts, “Soviet Version of American History,” 10, no. 3 (Fall 1946): 321, Martin Kriesberg, “Soviet News in the New York Times,” 10, no. 4 (Winter 1946): 540, Dick Fitzpatrick, “Telling the World about America,” 10, no. 4 (Winter 1946): 582; “Public Opinion Inside the USSR,” 11, no. 1 (Spring 1947): 5, Alexander Dallin, “America Through Soviet Eyes,” 11, no. 1 (Spring 1947): 26, W. Phillips Davison, “An Analysis of the Soviet-Controlled Berlin Press,” 11, no. 1 (Spring 1947): 40, O. W. Riegel, “Hungary: Proving Ground for Soviet–American Relations,” 11, no. 1 (Spring 1947): 58, H. M. Spitzer, “Presenting America in American Propaganda,” 11, no. 2 (Summer 1947): 213, Richard Burkhardt, “The Soviet Union in American School Textbooks,” 11, no. 4 (Winter 1947): 567, Hans Speier, “The Future of Psychological Warfare,” 12, no. 1 (Spring 1948): 5, Jan Stapel and W. J. deJonge, “Why Vote Communist?” 12, no. 3 (Fall 1948): 390, Whitman Bassow, “Izvestia Looks Inside USA,” 12, no. 3 (Fall 1948): 430, Martin Kriesberg, “Cross Pressures and Attitudes: A Study of the Influence of Conflicting Propaganda on Opinions Regarding American–Soviet Relations,” 13, no. 1 (Spring 1949): 5, Henry Halpern, “Soviet Attitudes Toward Public Opinion Research in Germany,” 13, no. 1 (Spring 1949): 117, Louis Nemzer, “The Soviet Friendship Societies,” 13, no. 2 (Summer 1949): 265, Kenneth Olson, “The Development of the Czechoslovak Propaganda Administration,” 13, no. 4 (Winter 1949): 607, Leonard Doob, “The Strategies of Psychological Warfare,” 13, no. 4 (Winter 1949): 635.

14. “Book Reviews,” 10, no. 1 (Spring 1946): 99–103, with quotes drawn from p. 100.

15. Speier, “The Future of Psychological Warfare,” pp. 5–18.

16. See index entries for “Propaganda” and “Psychological Warfare” in the unnumbered index pages appended to the bound volumes of POQ.

17. Donald McGranahan, “U.S. Psychological Warfare Policy,” 10, no. 3 (Fall 1946): 446–50.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. U.S. National Security Council, NSC 4 and NSC 4-A. On Wisner’s role in development of psychological warfare policy while serving as chief of the Occupied Areas Division at the Department of State, see SANACC Case No. 395, “Utilization of Refugees from the USSR in the US National Interest,” March–July 1948 (top secret, now declassified and available on microfilm from Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, DE). On Speier’s post at the Occupied Areas Division at the Department of State, see Contemporary Authors, Vol. 21–24, pp. 829–30, and Contemporary Authors, New Revision Series, Vol. 9, pp. 463–64.

21. Speier, “The Future of Psychological Warfare,” pp. 5, 8.

22. Ibid., pp. 11, 14, 18.

23. U.S. National Security Council, NSC 4 and NSC 4-A; see also House Select Committee on Intelligence, in Village Voice, “Special Supplement: The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read,” February 16 and 22, 1976.

24. Warren B. Walsh’s reviews include those of M. Sayers and A. Kahn’s text The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War Against Russia, 10, no. 4 (Winter 1946): 596–97, of Henry Wallace’s Soviet Asia Mission, 11, no. 1 (Spring 1947): 135, of William van Narvig’s East of the Iron Curtain, 11, no. 2 (Summer 1947): 269, of John R. Deane’s The Strange Alliance, 11, no. 3 (Fall 1947): 463, and of George Moorad’s Behind the Iron Curtain, 11, no. 3 (Fall 1947): 463–64.

25. P. Luzzatto Fegiz, “Italian Public Opinion,” 11, no. 1 (Spring 1947): 92–96.

26. Felix Oppenheim, “The Prospects of Italian Democracy,” 11, no. 4 (Winter 1947): 572–580.

27. Charles A. H. Thompson, review, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 13, no. 2 (Summer 1949): 330; and C. Edda Martinez and Edward A. Suchman, “Letters from America and the 1948 Election in Italy,” 14, no. 1 (Spring 1950): 111–25.

28. Psychological Strategy Board, Panel C. Reduction of Communist Strength and Influence in France and Italy (top secret), October 26, 1951, records of the Psychological Strategy Board, Harry S. Truman Library, In dependence, MO; James Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” Diplomatic History, 7, no. 1 (Winter 1983): 35–55; James Miller, The United States and Italy, 1940–1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); James Miller, “Roughhouse Diplomacy: The United States Confronts Italian Communism, 1945–58,” Storia della Relazioni Internazionali 5, no. 2 (1989):279–311; Arnaldo Cortesi and “Observer,” “Two Vital Case Histories,” in Lester Markel (ed.), Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper Brothers/Council on Foreign Relations, 1949), pp. 197–212 (sanitized, but with contemporary Italian and French case studies).

29. Counts, “Soviet Version of American History,” 321–28; and Alfred McClung Lee, “Are Only the Russians Guilty?” 11, no. 1 (Spring 1947): 173. Lee cites as evidence of his assertion data in Kriesberg’s “Soviet News in the New York Times,” p. 540.

30. W. Phillips Davison, “Preferences of POQ Readers,” 12, no. 3 (Fall 1948): 579–80.

31. Frederick W. Williams, “Regional Attitudes on International Cooperation,” 9, no. 1 (Spring 1945): 38–50.

32. Ibid., p. 38.

33. Jean Converse, Survey Research in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 152–54, 165. Converse also notes an earlier example of the role of these confidential surveys in shaping the president’s highly controversial strategy for promoting U.S. support for England in the years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

34. For background on Poole, see Who Was Who, Vol. 3, p. 692; Mickelson, America’s Other Voice, pp. 24, 41, 60; and Christopher Simpson, Blowback (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), pp. 134, 217–34 passim. See also Harwood Childs, “The First Editor Looks Back,” 21, no. 1 (Spring 1957): 7, for Child’s recollections on Poole’s role in the founding of Public Opinion Quarterly.

35. For source material on Stanton’s role with Radio Free Europe, see Mickelson, America’s Other Voice, p. 124; and U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Government Monies Provided to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, report no. 173239, May 25, 1972, p. 79.

36. On Free’s wartime career, see Converse, Survey Research in the United States, pp. 152–54; on his Central Intelligence Agency grant, see John Crewdson and Joseph Treaster, “Worldwide Propaganda Network Built by CIA,” New York Times, December 26, 1977.

37. Association officers or editorial panel members who served with both groups included Samuel Stouffer, John W. Riley, and Leonard Cottrell.

38. Herbert Goldhamer, “Public Opinion and Personality” (p. 346), Hans Speier, “Historical Development of Public Opinion” (p. 376), Samuel Stouffer, “Some Observations on Study Design” (p. 355), and Leo Lowenthal, “Historical Perspectives of Popular Culture” (p. 323); each in American Journal of Sociology 56, no. 1 (January 1950). Lowenthal specifically cites his Voice of America work in support of his thesis; see p. 324.

39. Albert Bidernian and Elizabeth Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research: The Case of Sociology (Springfield, VA: Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technological Information, 1968), p. 5.

Chapter 5

1. Calculated from figures reported in National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science (Washington, DC: GPO, 1953), pp. 39–40.

2. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science (Washington, DC: GPO, 1960), pp. 66–67. One 1962 survey of approximately two hundred sociologists and anthropologists found that 44 percent answered affirmatively when asked whether any part of their research, teaching, study, or consulting during the previous year had been underwritten by the government. Harold Orlans, The Effects of Federal Programs on Higher Education (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1962), p. 98. By the 1960s, the federal government had become virtually the sole source of funding for large-scale social research in the $100,000 and over range. Albert Biderman and Elizabeth Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research: The Case of Sociology (Springfield, VA: Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technological Information, 1968), p. 9.

3. Harry Alpert, “Opinion and Attitude Surveys in the U.S. Government,” POQ 16, no. 1 (Spring 1952): 33–41. Alpert states in the introduction of this article that virtually all military intelligence–and propaganda-related studies have been excluded from the scope of his article. For data concerning military contracting, see Lyle Lanier, “The Psychological and Social Sciences in the National Military Establishment,” American Psychologist 4, no. 5 (May 1949): 127–47. George Croker (U.S. Air Force Human Resources Research Institute), “Some Principles Regarding the Utilization of Social Science Research Within the Military,” pp. 112–25, and Howard E. Page (Psychological Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research), “Research Utilization,” pp. 126–35, both in Case Studies in Bringing Behavioral Science into Use (Stanford: Institute for Communication Research, 1961), pp. 112–35; Erin Hubbert and Herbert Rosenberg, Opportunities for Federally Sponsored Social Science Research (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Maxwell Graduate School, 1951); Raymond Bowers, “The Military Establishment,” in Paul Lazarsfeld, William Sewell, and Harold Wilensky (eds.), The Uses of Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1967), pp. 234ff; Leonard Mead, “Psychology at the Special Devices Center, Office of Naval Research,” American Psychologist 4, no. 4 (April 1949): 97ff (see pp. 98–100 for discussion of television-based experiments with “rapid mass learning”); Charles Bray, “The Effects of Government Contract Work on Psychology,” and John T. Wilson, “Government Support of Research and Its Influence on Psychology,” both in American Psychologist 7, no. 12 (December 1952): 710–18; Gene Lyons, “The Growth of National Security Research,” Journal of Politics 25, no. 3 (1963): 489–508; Irving Louis Horowitz, “Why the DOD Is No. 1,” Trans-Action 5, no. 6 (May 1968): 32.

4. Jean Converse, Survey Research in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 340–41.

5. Ibid., pp. 353, 357.

6. Clyde Kluckhohn, Alex Inkeles, and Raymond Bauer, Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social System (Cambridge, MA: Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1954; USAF contract no. 33 [038]-12909), pp. 20–22, and Annex 1 (on ISR role) and pp. 360–68 (on use in strategic air offensive on the Soviet Union). See also Tami Davis Biddle, “Handling the Soviet Threat: Arguments for Preventative War and Compellence in the Early Cold War Period,” paper presented at the annual convention of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, 1988; and Christopher Simpson, Blowback (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), p. 138.

7. Quoted in Converse, Survey Research in the United States, pp. 353, 531 note 17.

8. Ibid., pp. 309, 327. See also National Opinion Research Center (Charles Mack), Bibliography of Publications, 1941–1960 (Chicago: NORC, 1961), and Supplement 1961–1971 (Chicago: NORC, 1972); James Davis, Studies of Social Change Since 1948, 2 vols. (Chicago: NORC, 1976).

9. Converse, Survey Research in the United States, pp. 321–22. For details on the Department of State affair, see House Committee on Government Operations, State Department Opinion Polls, 85th Cong., 1st sess., June–July 1957 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1957). For an example of the impact of these studies, see the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff internal discussion concerning U.S. public opinion on atomic warfare in the wake of the first Soviet atomic weapons test. Carlton Savage to George F. Kennan, untitled memo regarding first use of atomic bomb, December 21, 1949 (top secret), in Paul Nitze Papers, Policy Planning Staff files, box 50, RG 59, U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC.

10. Converse, Survey Research in the United States, pp. 309, 327.

11. Charles Fritz and Eli Marks, “The NORC Studies of Human Behavior in Disasters,” Journal of Social Issues 10, no. 3 (1954): 26–41; Rue Bucher, “Blame and Hostility in Disaster” American Journal of Sociology 62, no. 5 (1957); Elihu Katz, “The Night the Sirens Wailed in Chicago,” Chicago Sun-Times, April 24, 1960. For an example of BASR studies in the same area, see Fred Ikle, “The Social Versus the Physical Effects from Nuclear Bombing,” Scientific Monthly 78, no. 3 (March 1954): 182–87.

12. For discussion of these studies as elements in nuclear war planning, see Jack Hirshleifer, Disaster and Recovery: A Historical Survey (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, RM-3079-PR, 1963).

13. Converse, Survey Research in the United States, pp. 269, 506–7 note 42.

14. Ibid., pp. 275–76, 506 note 37.

15. Ibid., p. 506 note 37.

16. Kluckhohn, Inkeles, and Bauer, Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths and Vulnerabilities, p. 402.

17. On VOA study history, see Daniel Lerner with Lucille Pevsner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958), pp. 79–80. On U.S. psychological warfare in the Middle East, see William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History (London: Zed, 1986), pp. 31–36, 67–76, 96–107; and Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1979), pp. 106, 161, 431.

18. John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars (New York: Morrow, 1986), pp. 94–98 (on Iran); Myron Smith, The Secret Wars, Vol. 2 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1981), pp. xxxiii, xxxv (on Egypt).

19. Converse, Survey Research in the United States, p. 290.

20. Lerner and Pevsner, Passing of Traditional Society, pp. 81, 449 notes 1–5.

21. Lanier, “The Psychological and Social Sciences,” pp. 131–33; and “Psychological News and Notes,” American Psychologist 3, no. 12 (December 1948): 559.

22. Lanier, “The Psychological and Social Sciences,” pp. 131–32.

23. The precise figure apparently remains classified at this writing, and its size obviously depends in part on how broadly the Department of Defense defined “social science” in 1949. The figure reported here is calculated from data presented by Lanier, who was at that time chair of the Committee on Human Resources’ Panel on Human Engineering and Psychophysiology. Lanier’s data were cleared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense prior to release (ibid., p. 131). Lanier’s estimate is considerably higher than that offered by some other contemporary authors, notably Hubbert and Rosenberg, Opportunities for Federally Sponsored Social Science Research. It is, however, roughly consistent with figures offered by John Wilson of the National Science Foundation in “Government Support of Research,” p. 715.

24. Lanier, “The Psychological and Social Sciences,” p. 132.

25. On panel membership, see “Psychological News and Notes,” p. 559. On Speier, see Hans Speier, “Psychological Warfare Reconsidered,” RAND paper no. 196, February 5, 1951; Hans Speier, “International Political Communication: Elite and Mass,” World Politics (April 1952 [RAND paper no. P-270]); Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, “Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy,” RAND paper no. P-615, December 15, 1954. On RAND’s origins see Fred Kaplan, “Scientists at War: The Birth of the RAND Corporation,” American Heritage 34 (June–July 1983): 49–64.

26. Alexander Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World (New York: Dutton, 1949).

27. Carl Hovland, Arthur Lumsdaine, and Fred Sheffield, Experiments in Mass Communication (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949). This is the third volume in the American Soldier series.

28. “Psychological News and Notes.”

29. Ibid.

30. On Dollard’s and Gardner’s roles with committee, ibid. On Gardner’s role at Carnegie Corporation, see Who’s Who, 1974–1975, p. 1099. On the Carnegie role in the American Soldier series, see Samuel Stouffer et al., The American Soldier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 26.

31. Charles O’Connell, “Social Structure and Science: Soviet Studies at Harvard,” Ph.D. diss. UCLA, 1990, pp. 178–79.

32. John Clausen, “Research on the American Soldier as a Career Contingency,” Social Psychology Quarterly 47, no. 2 (1984): 212.

33. For Cantril’s version, see Hadley Cantril, The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967), pp. 131–32, 145. For the New York Times version, see John M. Crewdson and Joseph Treaster, “Worldwide Propaganda Network Built by the CIA,” New York Times, December 26, 1977.

34. Thomas Sorenson, The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda (New York: Harper, 1968), p. 46.

35. Clausen, “Research on the American Soldier,” p. 212.

36. “Cottrell, Leonard Slater,” Contemporary Authors, Vol. 107, p. 100.

37. Leonard Cottrell, “Social Research and Psychological Warfare,” Sociometry 23, no. 2 (June 1960): 103–19, with quote at p. 119.

38. See, for example, Wilbur Schramm’s work for the National Security Council’s highly secret Operations Coordinating Board, mentioned in Robert Holt, Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 236. For related material, see “Briefing Paper—Schramm Meeting,” August 1, 1956 (formerly secret, declassified 1991), Wilbur Schramm files, USIA Library Historical Collection, Washington, D.C.

39. Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 504–5.

Chapter 6

1. John Riley and Wilbur Schramm, The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation of Seoul (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1951); John Riley, Wilbur Schramm, and Frederick Williams, “Flight from Communism: A Report on Korean Refugees,” POQ 15, no. 2 (Summer 1951): 274 (unless otherwise noted, all unattributed articles in this chapter appeared in POQ); Wilbur Schramm, F.E.C. Psychological Warfare Operations: Radio (Washington and Baltimore: Operations Research Office, John Hopkins University, 1952, ORO-T-20 [FEC], secret security information). On USIA translation and distribution of the Reds Take a City text, see Raymond Bowers, “The Military Establishment,” in Paul Lazarsfeld, William Sewell, and Harold Wilensky (eds.), The Uses of Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 245.

Several other prominent communication researchers drew on the same body of refugee interviews to prepare domestic propaganda during the Korean conflict. See W. Phillips Davison, “The Lesser Evil,” Reader’s Digest 58 (June 1951): 97–100. Davison’s article was first prepared as RAND Corporation study no. P-194 (1951).

2. J. Mayone Stycos, “Patterns of Communications in a Rural Greek Village” 16, no. 1 (Spring 1952): 59–70, J. Mayone Stycos, “Interviewer Training in Another Culture” 17, no. 2 (Summer 1952): 236–46, Benjamin Ringer and David Sills, “Political Extremists in Iran: A Secondary Analysis of Communications Data” 17, no. 4 (Winter 1952–53): 689–702, J. Mayone Stycos, “Further Observations on the Recruitment and Training of Interviewers in Other Cultures” 19, no. 1 (Spring 1955): 68–78, Patricia Kendall, “The Ambivalent Character of Nationalism among Egyptian Professionals” 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956): 277, Morroe Berger (review), The Passing of Traditional Society 22, no. 3 (Fall 1958): 425.

3. For example, Eric Marder, “Linear Segments: A Technique for Scalogram Analysis” 16, no. 3 (Fall 1952): 417–31, Samuel Stouffer, Edgar Borgatta, David Hays, and Andrew Henry, “A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales” vol. 16, no. 2 (Summer 1952): 273–90, Andrew Henry, “A Method for Classifying Non-Scale Response Patterns in a Guttman Scale” 16, no. 1 (Spring 1952): 94–106, Edgar Borgatta and David Hays, “The Limitations on the Arbitrary Classification of Non-Scale Response Patterns in a Guttman Scale” 16, no. 3 (Fall 1952): 410–16, Edgar Borgotta, “An Error Ratio for Scalogram Analysis” 19, no. 1 (Spring 1955): 96–99.

4. See Brutus Coste, “Propaganda to Eastern Europe,” 14, no. 4 (Winter 1950): 639–66. Coste was an employee of the National Committee for a Free Europe and later of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, both of which were financed almost exclusively by the CIA.

5. Sorenson, The Word War, pp. 21–30.

6. Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1987), p. 5.

7. Edith Bjorklund, “Research and Evaluation Programs of the U.S. Information Agency and the Overseas Information Center Libraries,” Library Quarterly (October 1968): 414; and Herbert Schiller, The Mind Managers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 140, 205.

8. “Proceedings of the American Association for Public Opinion Research at the Sixth Annual Conference on Public Opinion Research, Princeton, June 22–25, 1951,” 15, no. 4 (Winter 1951–52): 768ff. For Davison panel, see AAPOR Conference Proceedings, “Contributions of Opinion Research to Psychological Warfare,” 15, no. 4 (Winter 1951–52): 801–5. (Not to be confused with the Klapper and Lowenthal article with a very similar title elsewhere in the same issue.)

9. AAPOR Conference Proceedings, “Contributions of Opinion Research to Psychological Warfare,” p. 802.

10. Joseph Klapper and Leo Lowenthal, “The Contributions of Opinion Research to the Evaluation of Psychological Warfare,” 15, no. 4 (Winter 1951): 651.

11. AAPOR Conference Proceedings, “Contributions of Opinion Research to Psychological Warfare,” p. 804.

12. AAPOR Conference Proceedings, “Opinion and Communications Research in National Defense,” 15, no. 4 (Winter 1951–52): 794.

13. AAPOR Conference Proceedings, “Presidential Session,” 15, no. 4 (Winter 1951–52): 795.

14. For overviews of Lowenthal’s life and writings, see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute for Social Research 1923–1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), passim; Leo Lowenthal, An Unmastered Past: Autobiographical Reflections of Leo Lowenthal Martin Jay (ed.), (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Leo Lowenthal, Literature and Mass Culture (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1984); and Hanno Hardt, “The Conscience of Society: Leo Lowenthal and Communication Research,” Journal of Communication 41, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 65–85.

15. Richard Crossman (ed.), The God That Failed (New York: Harper Brothers, 1949).

16. On disillusionment, see Crossman, The God That Failed, essays by Arthur Koestler, Richard Wright, Stephen Spender, etc.; John P. Diggins, Up from Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), on Max Eastman, Sidney Hook, James Burnham, and others; Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe (New York: Free Press, 1989), on Jay Lovestone and CIA-sponsored propaganda operations aimed at intellectuals.

17. Joseph Klapper and Leo Lowenthal, “Contributions of Opinion Research to Psychological Warfare,” 15, no. 4 (Winter 1951) 651–62.

18. Lowenthal, An Unmastered Past, pp. 93–94.

19. Ibid., pp. 81–110 passim.

20. Hardt, “The Conscience of Society.”

21. Charles Glock, “The Comparative Study of Communication and Opinion Formation,” 16, no. 4, (Winter 1952–53): 512–26.

22. Bureau of Social Science Research (Stanley Bigman, project director), “An Outline for the Study of National Communication Systems,” prepared for the Office of Research and Evaluation, USIA, November 1953, BSSR Archives, series II, box 4, project no. 642, p. 1. University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park.

23. Glock, “The Comparative Study of Communication,” p. 522.

24. Bureau of Social Science Research, “An Outline for the Study of National Communication Systems.”

25. Bureau of Social Science Research, “Mass Communication in Eastern Europe,” BSSR Archives, series II, box 10, project no. 303, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park. See also BSSR, “Hungary,” series II, box 11, project no. 303, in the same archive.

26. Bureau of Social Science Research, “Public Opinion in Philippines Survey,” BSSR Archives, series II, box 3, project no. 627, University of Maryland Special Libraries Collections, College Park.

27. Bureau of Social Science Research (Lawrence Krader and Ivor Wayne, project directors), “The Kazakhs: A Background Study for Psychological Warfare” (Task KAZPO, technical report no. 23, November 1955), BSSR Archives, series II, box 4, project no. 649, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park.

28. Ringer and Sills, “Political Extremists in Iran.” On the coup d’état in Iran, see John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 260–64.

29. Alex Inkeles, “Soviet Reactions to the Voice of America,” pp. 612–17; Paul Massing, “Communist References to the Voice of America,” 618–22; Peter Rossi and Raymond Bauer, “Some Patterns of Soviet Communications Behavior,” pp. 653–65—all in 16, no. 4 (Winter 1952–53).

30. Harold Mendelsohn and Werner Cahnman, “Communist Broadcasts to Italy,” 16, no. 4 (Winter 1952–53): 671–80.

31. Richard Sheldon and John Dutkowski, “Are Soviet Satellite Refugee Interviews Projectable?” 16, no. 4 (Winter 1952–53): 579–94.

32. Daniel Lerner, “International Coalitions and Communication Content: The Case of Neutralism,” 16, no. 4 (Winter 1952): 681–88, with quotes drawn from pp. 687, 684, 688, respectively.

33. Marjorie Fiske and Leo Lowenthal, “Some Problems in the Administration of International Communications Research,” 16, no. 2 (Summer 1952): 149–59, with quote drawn from p. 150.

34. “Special Issue on International Communications Research; Leo Lowenthal, Guest Editor,” 16, no. 4 (Winter 1952–53). POQ’s indexes are not paginated; for article counts see under “Propaganda.” No index term for “Psychological Warfare” appears in the 1952 index, although the journal employs that term during both previous and later years.

35. Wilbur Schramm (ed.) The Process and Effects of Mass Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954).

36. Ibid., p. 469 (for Glock). See also chapters by Bruce Lannes Smith, Ralph White, and W. Philips Davison and Alexander George, each of which first appeared in the Lowenthal special issue of POQ.

37. University of Maryland, College Park Libraries, Historical Manuscripts and Archives Department, Guide to the Archives of the Bureau of Social Science Research (College Park: University of Maryland, n.d. [1987?]).

38. Account list cards, BSSR Archives, series I, box 13; Bureau of Social Science Research (Robert Bower), “Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs: Targets and Vulnerabilities in Psychological Warfare,” working paper for Psychological Warfare Division, Human Resources Research Office, December 1954, BSSR Archives, series II, box 5, project 649; Lawrence Krader and Ivor Wayne, “The Kazakhs: A Background Study for Psychological Warfare.”

On prisoner interrogation, see Albert Biderman, Barbara Heller, and Paula Epstein, A Selected Bibliography on Captivity Behavior, BSSR Research report 339-1, February 1961, U.S. Air Force contract no. AF 49(638)727, BSSR Archives, series II, box 14, project 339; Bureau of Social Science Research (Louis Gottschalk, MD). “The Use of Drugs in Information-Seeking Interviews,” December 1958, BSSR Archives, series II, box 11, project 322, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park.

39. Account list cards, BSSR Archives, series I, box 13; and Albert Biderman, “Social-Psychological Needs and ‘Involuntary’ Behavior as Illustrated by Compliance in Interrogation,” 23, no. 2 Sociometry (June 1960): 120. For CIA role of Human Ecology Fund, see John Marks, Search for the “Manchurian Candidate”: The CIA and Mind Control (New York: Times Books, 1979), pp. 147–63.

40. Account list cards, BSSR Archives, series I, box 13: Stanley Bigman, Are We Hitting the Target?: A Manual of Evaluation Research Methods for USIE (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State [Official Use Only], 1951), BSSR Archives, series II, box 3, project no. 627; “Public Opinion in the Philippines,” BSSR Archives, series II, box 3; “International Seminar to Be Held in Saigon,” Times of Vietnam, December 13, 1958, p. 2, BSSR Archives, series I, box 13. The BSSR Archives is held by University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park.

41. Author’s estimate based on BSSR Account list cards.

42. BSSR, Are We Hitting the Target? BSSR, “Public Opinion in the Philippines.”

43. BSSR, Are We Hitting the Target? pp. 13–20.

44. Glock, “The Comparative Study of Communications and Opinion Formation,” pp. 512–23. Bigman, in the BSSR proposal on national communication systems detailed in the next note, attributes this article jointly to Lazarsfeld and Glock, although only Glock’s byline appears in POQ. Lazarsfeld had a second article on a closely related topic in the same issue of the journal.

45. Account list cards, BSSR Archives, series I, box 13; BSSR (Stanley Bigman), “An Outline for the Study of National Communication Systems.”

46. Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955).

47. BSSR, Are We Hitting the Target?

48. Daniel Lerner with Lucille Pevsner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958), p. 79; Bruce Lannes Smith, “Trends in Research in International Communication and Opinion, 1945–1955,” 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956): 182–95.

49. BSSR (Stanley Bigman), “An Outline for the Study of National Communication Systems”; “Questionnaire for Opinion Leaders—Form B,” BSSR Archives, series II, box 3, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park.

50. Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

51. Katz and Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence.

52. Joseph Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: Ballantine, 1976), p. 84. Smith was a CIA officer in the agency’s Far Eastern division during the early 1950s, with responsibilities for political and psychological warfare in the Philippines. On counterinsurgency in the Philippines, see also Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft (New York: Pantheon, 1992), pp. 85–120 passim; D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Walden Bello, “Counterinsurgency’s Proving Ground: Low Intensity Warfare in the Philippines,” in Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluh (eds.), Low Intensity Warfare (New York: Pantheon, 1988) 158–82.

53. William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History (London: Zed, 1986), pp. 40–43.

54. Smith, Portrait, pp. 74–104, concerning Paul Linebarger and the Philippines campaign.

55. Blum, The CIA, pp. 40–43.

56. Sorenson, The Word War, p. 65.

57. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The U.S. Ideological Effort: Government Agencies and Programs 88th Comp., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1964), pp. 62–63.

58. On country plans, see ibid., pp. 62–63; on coordination with NSC and CIA, see NSC 10/2: Office of Special Projects, June 15, 1948, and NSC 5412/2: Covert Operations, March 12, 1955, both in U.S. National Security Council Policy Papers File, RG 273, U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC; Sorenson, The Word War, p. 28; John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars (New York: Morrow, 1986), pp. 84–87, 109.

59. Sorenson, The Word War, p. 46.

60. Shearon Lowery and Melvin De Fleur, Milestones in Mass Communication Research (New York: Longman, 1983), pp. 205–31.

61. Stuart Dodd, “Testing Message Diffusion from Person to Person,” 16, no. 2 (Summer 1952): 247–62. Dodd does not acknowledge his sponsors here. Instead, he notes hypothetically, “Suppose that our Air Force wishes to drop leaflets on an enemy or a neutral population, whether civilian or military, or on our own population” (see p. 247).

62. Stuart Dodd, “Formulas for Spreading Opinions,” 22, no. 4 (Winter 1958): 537, where Dodd notes that U.S. Air Force contract AF 13(038)-27522 underwrote the research. See also Lowery and De Fleur, Milestones, pp. 207–8.

63. Lowery and De Fleur, Milestones, p. 208.

64. Ibid.

65. On the U.S. Air Force interest, ibid., pp. 207–8; on the CIA interest, see Sig Mickelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 56; on air-dropped leaflets’ role in strategic war plans: author’s interview with Fletcher Prouty, April 12, 1984.

66. Lowery and De Fleur, Milestones, pp. 205–31, with summary of important contributions at pp. 229–31; see also Dodd, “Formulas for Spreading Opinions,” pp. 537–54.

67. Dodd, “Formulas for Spreading Opinions,” pp. 551–54.

68. On the “bomber gap” affair, see John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial, 1982), pp. 38–50.

69. Mikelson, America’s Other Voice, p. 56.

70. Information on Cantril in this paragraph is from “Cantril, [Albert] Hadley,” National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. 55, pp. 211–12.

71. See, for example, William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1972), pp. 91–101; or Hadley Cantril, The Politics of Despair (New York: Basic Books, 1958).

72. “Cantril, [Albeit] Hadley. See also collection of Psychological Strategy Board correspondence with Cantril, including Cantril’s oblique reference to what appears to be clandestine CIA sponsorship and editing of his pamphlet The Goals of the Individual and the Hopes of Humanity (1951; published by Institute for Associated Research, Hanover, NH) in Cantril note of October 22, 1951; in Hadley Cantril correspondence, Psychological Strategy Board, Truman Library, Independence, MO.

73. John M. Crewdson and Joseph Treaster, “Worldwide Propaganda Network Built by the CIA” New York Times, December 26, 1977.

74. Hadley Cantril, The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967), pp. 131–32, 145.

75. Crewdson and Treaster, “Worldwide Propaganda Network.”

76. Hadley Cantril and David Rodnick, Understanding the French Left (Princeton: Institute for International Social Research, 1956).

77. Cantril, The Human Dimension, pp. 134–43.

78. Cantril, The Politics of Despair; Cantril, The Human Dimension, pp. 1–5, 144.

79. Lloyd Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967). On the question of legality, note that the CIA’s charter bars the agency from “police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal security functions,” a phrase that most observers contend prohibits the CIA from collecting intelligence on U.S. citizens inside the United States. On this point, see Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1979), pp. 315–17, 367–70, concerning the CIA’s Operation Chaos.

80. For an example of a similar, later technique, see “Redefining the American Electorate,” Washington Post, October 1, 1987, p. A12, with data provided by the Times Mirror–Gallup Organization.

81. On CIA funding of CENIS, see Victor Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Dell, 1974), p. 181; and David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Government (New York: Vintage, 1974), p. 244. On CIA funding of studies, see Marchetti and Marks, The CIA, p. 181. For an example of a major study reported to have been underwritten by the CIA, see W. W. Rostow and Alfred Levin, The Dynamics of Soviet Society (New York: Norton, 1952). On CENIS as a conduit of CIA funds, see Wise and Ross, The Invisible Government, p. 244. On Millikan’s role, see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, “Problems of Development and Internal Defense” (Country Team Seminar, June 11, 1962).

82. Ithiel de Sola Pool, “The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments,” Background 10, no. 2 (August 1966): 114—15.

83. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, A Plan for Research in International Communications World Politics, 6, no. 3 (April 1954): 358–77; MIT, CENIS, The Center for International Studies: A Description (Cambridge: MIT, July 1955).

84. Don Price Oral History, pp. 61–70, and Don Price memo, May 21, 1954 (appendix to oral history), Ford Foundation Archives, New York. The archival evidence concerning this aspect of the Ford Foundation’s relationship with the CIA was first brought to light by Kai Bird.

85. On Shils, see Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 98–209 passim. On Speier, see, Hans Speier, “Psychological Warfare Reconsidered,” RAND paper no. 196, February 5, 1951; Hans Speier, “International Political Communication: Elite and Mass,” World Politics (April 1952 [RAND paper no. P-270], Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison, “Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy,” RAND paper no. P-615, December 15, 1954. Speier’s other contemporary work that has since come to light includes several studies of Soviet response to West German rearmament, Soviet political tactics involving nuclear threats, a report on the American Soldier series, and a commentary on political applications of game theory. Speier died February 17, 1990, in Sarasota, Florida; see “Hans Speier, Sociologist,” Washington Post, March 2, 1990. On Carroll, see Wallace Carroll, The Army’s Role in Current Psychological Warfare (top secret, declassified following author’s man datory review request), February 24, 1949, box 10, tab 61, entry 154, RG 319, U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC; Wallace Carroll, “It Takes a Russian to Beat a Russian,” Life, December 19, 1949, pp. 80–86; “CIA Trained Tibetans in Colorado, New Book Says,” New York Times, April 19, 1973.

86. Ithiel de Sola Pool and Frank Bonilla (eds.), “A Special Issue on Studies in Political Communication,” 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956); Daniel Lerner (ed.), “Special Issue: Attitude Research in Modernizing Areas,” 22, no. 3 (Fall 1958).

87. In 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956): Harold Isaacs, “Scratches on Our Minds,” p. 197; Y. B. Damle, “Communication of Modern Ideas and Knowledge in [East] Indian Villages,” p. 257; Claire Zimmerman and Raymond Bauer, “The Effect of an Audience upon What Is Remembered,” p. 238; Suzanne Keller, “Diplomacy and Communication,” p. 176; and Harold Isaacs, “World Affairs and U.S. Race Relations: A Note on Little Rock,” 22, no. 3 (Fall 1958): 364.

88. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Suzanne Keller, and Raymond Bauer, “The Influence of Foreign Travel on Political Attitudes of U.S. Businessmen,” p. 161; Frank Bonilla, “When Is Petition ‘Pressure’?” p. 39; Daniel Lerner, “French Business Leaders Look at EDC,” p. 212—all in 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956); and Daniel Lerner, “Editors Introduction,” p. 217; Ithiel de Sola Pool and Kali Prasad, “Indian Student Images of Foreign People,” p. 292; Frank Bonilla, “Elites and Public Opinion in Areas of High Social Stratification,” p. 349; all in 22, no. 3 (Fall 1958).

89. Ivor Wayne, “American and Soviet Themes and Values: A Content Analysis of Themes in Popular Picture Magazines,” p. 314; Patricia Kendall, “The Ambivalent Character of Nationalism among Egyptian Professionals,” p. 277—all in 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956).

90. Guy Pauker, “Indonesian Images of Their National Self,” p. 305; Lucian Pye, “Administrators, Agitators and Brokers,” p. 342; Alain Girard, “The First Opinion Research in Uruguay and Chile,” p. 251; Kurt Back, “The Change-Prone Person in Puerto Rico,” p. 330; Robert Carlson, “To Talk with Kings,” p. 224; Herbert Hyman et al., “The Values of Turkish College Youth,” p. 275; Raymond Gastil, “Middle Class Impediments to Iranian Modernization,” p. 325;Gorden Hirabayashi and M. Fathalla El Khatib, “Communication and Political Awareness in the Villages of Egypt,” p. 357; A. J. Meyer, “Entrepreneurship and Economic Development in the Middle East,” p. 391; Richard Robinson, “Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization,” p. 397; Lincoln Armstrong and Rashid Bashshur, “Ecological Patterns and Value Orientations in Lebanon,” p. 406—all in 22, no. 3 (Fall 1958).

91. Isaacs, “World Affairs and U.S. Race Relations,” p. 364.

92. Lerner, “Editor’s Introduction,” pp. 218, 219, 221.

93. Lerner and Pevsner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 396. Emphasis added.

94. Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, pp. 59–63, 69–77; Blum, The CIA, pp. 133–62.

95. On communications theorists’ contributions to counterinsurgency, see Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, pp. 159–69 (Pye) and 199ff (Pool). See also Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), Social Science Research and National Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution [Office of Naval Research Project], 1963), pp. 1–25 (Pool), 46–74 (Schramm), 148–66 (Pye).

96. Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, pp. 282ff; see also U.S. Department of the Army, Art and Science of Psychological Operations, pp. xvii, 47–53.

97. The Camelot Affair precipitated the first genuinely public discussion of the collision between the professed humanitarian values of modern social science and the actual ends to which it had been put in the world political arena. In 1964, the U.S. Army hired private U.S. social scientists to conduct a series of long-term inquiries into the social structures, political and economic resources, ethnic rivalries, communication infrastructures, and similar basic data concerning developing countries considered likely to see strong revolutionary movements during the 1960s. The project exploded when nationalist and left-wing forces in Chile and other targeted countries protested, labeling Camelot a de facto espionage operation. Camelot contractors, notably sociologist Jesse Bernard of American University, replied that the criticism was “laughable” because Camelot’s had been “designed as a scientific research project” in which the countries selected for study made “no difference.” The argument escalated from there. See House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Behavioral Sciences and the National Security, Report No. 4, 89th Cong. 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1965); Jesse Bernard, “Conflict as Research and Research as Conflict,” in Irving Louis Horowitz, The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1974), p. 129n.

98. Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, pp. 282ff; see also U.S. Department of the Army, Art and Science of Psychological Operations, pp. xvii, 47–53.

99. For example, Executive Office of the President, “NSAM No. 308: A Program to Promote Publicly U.S. Policies in Vietnam” (June 22, 1964); McGeorge Bundy, “NSAM No. 328: Military Actions in Vietnam” (April 6, 1965); “NSAM No. 329: Establishment of a Task Force on Southeast Asian Economic and Social Development” (April 9, 1965); and “NSAM No. 330: Expanded Psychological Operations in Vietnam” (April 9, 1965); each was obtained via the Freedom of Information Act from the U.S. Office of the Comptroller General.

100. On Lerner, Riley, Davison, Cottrell, and Pool, see Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, pp. xvi, 151–59, 199–202, 282–86. On Pool, Davison, and Schramm, see Pool, Social Science Research and National Security, pp. 1–74. On Lasswell, see Harold Lasswell, World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cam bridge: MIT Press, 1966).

101. Jesse Delia, “Communication Research: A History,” in Charles Berger and Steven Chaffee (eds.), Handbook of Communication Science (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987), p. 59.

102. BSSR, Chitra Smith, International Propaganda and Psychological Warfare: An Annotated Bibliography, BSSR Archives, series II, box 7, project 819, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park.

103. Bruce Lannes Smith and Chitra Smith, International Communication and Political Opinion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

104. Clyde Kluckhohn, Alex Inkeles, and Raymond Bauer, Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet System (Cambridge, MA: Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1954).

105. Raymond Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works (1956; rpt. New York: Vintage, 1961).

106. Reported in Delia, “Communication Research,” p. 59.

107. Leo Bogart, “Operating Assumptions of the U.S. Information Agency,” 19, no. 4 (Winter 1955–56): 374.

108. L. John Martin, International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 205–6. See also: B.S. Murty, The International Law of Propaganda (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

109. American Association for Public Opinion Research conference proceedings, “Propaganda Analysis,” 18, no. 4 (Winter 1954–55): 445–46.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid.

112. W. Phillips Davison, “A Review of Sven Rydenfelt’s Communism in Sweden,” 18, no. 4 (Winter 1954–55): 375–88, with quote drawn from p. 377.

113. American Association for Public Opinion Research conference proceedings, “Propaganda and People in the Cold War,” 20, no. 4 (Winter 1956–57): 757–60, with quote drawn from p. 757.

114. Ibid., p. 758.

115. William Albig, “Two Decades of Opinion Study: 1936–1956,” 21, no. 1 (Spring 1957): 14–22.

116. Bernard Berelson, “The State of Communication Research,” 23, no. 1 (Spring 1959): 1–6, with quote drawn from p. 6. Berelson’s comments do not specify which “great ideas” he had in mind. The context of his comments suggests, however, that he was referring to use of interdisciplinary communication studies as a window on social behavior generally, Lippmann’s concept of stereotype, the quantitative and methodological innovations associated with Lasswell’s “who says what to whom” formulation, and similar basic concepts. Berelson’s comments were delivered at the 1958 AAPOR conference. Wilbur Shramm, David Riesman, and Raymond Bauer, in comments on the Berelson analysis in the Spring 1959 issue, vigorously dissented; see pp. 6–17.

117. John Riley and Leonard Cottrell, “Research for Psychological Warfare,” 21, no. 1 (Spring 1957): 147–58.

118. Irene Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World (Boulder, CO Westview Press, 1985); see also Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission; Rohan Samarajiva and Peter Shields, “Integration, Telecommunication and Development: Power in the Paradigms,” Journal of Communication 40, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 84–105; Rohan Samarajiwa, “The Murky Beginnings of the Communication and Development Field,” in N. Jayaweera and S. Amunugama (eds.), Rethinking Development Communication (Singapore: Asian Mass Communication Research and Information Centre, 1987).

119. “Images, Definitions and Audience Reactions in International Communications,” 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956): 197.

120. Ithiel de Sola Pool, “Communication in the Global Conflict,” 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956): 313.

121. These sentiments are implicit in the articles in the Spring 1956 special issue, but they are perhaps most concisely stated in the editor’s introductions to each section of the issue; see pp. 2, 5, 49, 103, 143, 197, 249, 299.

122. W. Phillips Davison, “On the Effects of Communication,” 23, no. 3 (Fall 1959): 343–60; and author’s interview with W. Phillips Davison, November 14, 1990.

123. Davidson, “On the Effects of Communication,” pp. 344–55, with quotes drawn from pp. 347, 349.

124. Ibid., p. 360.

125. Ibid., pp. 353–54.

126. Ibid., pp. 355, 348. Lloyd Free, Six Allies and a Neutral (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 350, 357, 360.

Chapter 7

1. Jean Converse, Survey Research in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 305, 308. On reformist orientation of much social research prior to 1940, see also Albert Biderman and Elisabeth Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research: The Case of Sociology (Springfield, VA: Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technological Information, 1968), p. 18.

2. Biderman and Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research, p. 30.

3. Ibid., p. 31.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 32.

6. Converse, Survey Research in the United States, pp. 212, 484 notes 92–94. See Alexander Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World (New York: Dutton, 1949), pp. 58–95, for an extended discussion of the measurement of the impact of conventional and atomic bombing on civilian morale in Japan.

7. See Edward Suchman, Samuel Stouffer, Leland DeVinney, and Irving Janis, “Attitudes Toward Leadership and Social Control,” in Samuel Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, Vol. 1, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 362–429. On propaganda effects, see Carl Hovland, Arthur Lumsdaine, and Fred Sheffield, Experiments on Mass Communication (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949). The same theme was later explored in considerable depth in studies by Irving Janis such as “Effects of Fear-Arousing Propaganda” (with Seymour Feshbach), Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology 48, no. 1 (1953): 78–92.

8. Biderman and Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research. See endpapers of study for contract data.

9. Ibid., pp. 46–47.

10. Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1965), p. 121; cited in Biderman and Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research, cited in p. 46.

11. Quoted in Biderman and Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research, pp. 45–46.

12. Samuel Stouffer, “1665 and 1954” (AAPOR Presidential Address), POQ 18, no. 3 (Fall 1954): 233. Unless otherwise noted, all unattributed articles in this chapter appeared in POQ.

13. See, for example, Hadley Cantril, “Psychology Working for Peace,” American Psychologist 4, no. 3 (March 1949): 69–73.

14. L. John Martin interview with the author, December 6, 1989.

15. Stouffer, “1665 and 1954.”

16. Samuel Stouffer Edgar Borgatta, David Hays, and Andrew Henry, “A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales,” 16, no. 2 (Summer 1952): 273–91; Andrew Henry, “A Method for Classifying Non-Scale Response Patterns in a Guttman Scale,” 16, no. 1 (Spring 1952): 94–106; Edgar Borgatta and David Hays, “The Limitations on the Arbitrary Classification of Non-Scale Response Patterns in a Guttman Scale,” 16, no. 3 (Fall 1952): 410–16; Edgar Borgatta, “An Error Ratio for Scalogram Analysis,” POQ 19, no. 1 (Spring 1955): 96–99. Each of these papers was underwritten by U.S. Air Force contract no. AF 33 (038)-12782 from the Human Resources Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; they constitute the basis of Stouffer’s well-known “H-Technique.”

17. Clyde Kluckhohn, Alex Inkeles, and Raymond Bauer, Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet System (Cambridge, MA: Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1954).

18. Stouffer et al., “A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales.”

19. Eric Marder, “Linear Segments: A Technique for Scalogram Analysis,” 16, no. 3 (Fall 1952): 417–31.

20. Daniel Lerner, “International Coalitions and Communications Content: The Case of Neutralism,” 16, no. 4 (Winter 1952): 681–88, with quotes drawn from pp. 682, 683, 685.

21. Christopher Lasch, “The Cultural Cold War: A Short History of the Congress for Cultural Freedom,” in Barton Bernstein (ed.), Towards a New Past (New York: Pantheon, 1968), pp. 322–59; and Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy (New York: Free Press, 1989).

22. David Rodnick and Elizabeth Rodnick, “Notes on Communist Personality Types in Czechoslovakia,” 14, no. 1 (Spring 1950): 81–88; Jean-Marie Domenach, “Leninist Propaganda,” 15, no. 2 (Summer 1951): 265–73; Herbert Krugman, “The Appeal of Communism to American Middle Class Intellectuals and Trade Unionists,” 16, no. 3 (Fall 1952): 331–55; Morris Janowitz and Dwaine Marvick, “Authoritarianism and Political Behavior,” 17, no. 2 (Summer 1953): 185–201.

23. Gabriel Almond, with Herbert Krugman, Elsbeth Lewin, and Howard Wriggins, The Appeals of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954). See also Gabriel Almond correspondence file, Psychological Strategy Board, Truman Library, Independence, MO, in which Almond requests the Psychological Strategy Board to “monitor this study … and appraise the usefulness of the work we are doing here at Princeton from the point of view of the Psychological Strategy Board” (memo of April 16, 1952).

24. Almond, The Appeals of Communism, pp. 15, 18, 142.

25. On Voice of America hearings, see David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: Free Press, 1983), pp. 266–77 passim; and Robert William Pirsein, The Voice of America (New York: Arno, 1979), pp. 235ff.

26. House Special Committee to Investigate Tax-Exempt Foundations, Tax Exempt Foundations 83rd Cong. 2nd sess., (Washington, DC: GPO, 1954). For an overview of the committee’s investigative thesis, see committee research director Norman Dodd’s testimony (pp. 5–23) and that of his assistant Kathryn Casey (pp. 64–89). For Stouffer’s defense, see Charles Dollard’s (Carnegie Corporation) testimony (pp. 972–74). For Berelson’s defense, see H. Rowan Gaither’s (Ford Foundation) testimony (pp. 1035–36).

27. Ibid. Pendleton Herring testimony (pp. 794–865 passim, with quotes drawn from p. 838).

28. Ellen Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978); Jane Sanders, Cold War on the Campus: Academic Freedom at the University of Washington 1946–1964 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979). Of related interest, see Philip Meranto, Oneida Meranto, and Matthew Lippman, Guarding the Ivory Tower: Repression and Rebellion in Higher Education (Denver: Lucha, 1985); Jonathan Feldman, Universities in the Business of Repression (Boston: South End Press, 1989); John Trumpbour (ed.), How Harvard Rules: Reason in the Service of Empire (Boston: South End Press, 1989); Athena Theodore, The Campus Troublemakers: Academic Women in Protest (Houston: Cap and Gown Press, 1986).

29. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, p. 42.

30. U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Daniel Lerner” FBI file no. 123-10557, correspondence from A. H. Belmont to V. P. Kay, August 3, 1953.

31. Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For a more concise presentation, see Peter Novick, “Historians, ‘Objectivity’ and the defense of the West,” Radical History, No. 40 (January 1988): 7ff; and Jesse Lemisch, On Active Service in War and Peace: Politics and Ideology in the American Historical Profession (Toronto: Hogtown, 1975).

32. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower; Caute, The Great Fear, pp. 403–45.

33. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, pp. 114–15. See Laws of Maryland (1949), Chapter 86, pp. 96ff, for legislative history.

34. Caute, The Great Fear, pp. 174–75.

35. House Committee on Un-American Activities, Hearings Related to H.B. 4700, to Amend Section 11 of the Subversive Activities Control Act (The Fund for Social Analysis), 87th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961).

36. Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, “Petition to the Congress of the United States” (advertisement) Washington Post, May 31, 1961, p. A16. Note signatories on advertisement fail to include prominent U.S. social scientists.

37. Paul Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, The Academic Mind (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1958), pp. 193, 194, 197–204, 218–22, 206, 382.

38. Lerner, “International Coalitions,” p. 681.

39. William Glaser, “The Semantics of the Cold War,” 20, no. 4 (Winter 1956): 691–716.

40. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower, pp. 219–338.

41. See, for example, testimony of A. H. Hobbs in House Committee to Investigate Tax Exempt Foundations, Tax Exempt Foundations, pp. 114–88.

42. As in Stuart Dodd, “Testing Message Diffusion from Person to Person,” 16, no. 2 (Summer 1952): 247–62; or in the Bureau of Applied Social Research’s practice of citing itself as a sponsor for research rather than the original source of the contract, e.g., Patricia Kendall, “The Ambivalent Character of Nationalism among Egyptian Professionals,” 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956): 277.

43. Almond, Appeals of Communism. For an interesting recent critique of the research methodology originally used in Schramm’s studies of broadcasting into eastern Europe, but more recently applied to U.S. propaganda broadcasting to Cuba, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Broadcasts to Cuba: TV Marti Surveys Are Flawed (GAO/NSIAD-90-252, August 1990).

44. Elliot Mishler, review, Character and Social Structure, by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 18, no. 3 (Fall 1954): 323; W. Philips Davison, review, Sociologica: Aufsaetze, Max Horkheimer zum Sechzigsten Geburtstag Gewidmet, introduction by Horkheimer, 20, no. 2 (Summer 1956): 480; Arnold Rogow, review, The Power Elite, by C. Wright Mills, 20, no. 3 (Fall 1956): 613–15.

45. Avery Leiserson, review, The People Don’t Know, by George Seldes, 14, no. 1 (Spring 1950): 156–57; Lloyd Barenblatt, review, The Hidden Persuaders, by Vance Packard, 22, no. 4 (Winter 1958): 579.

Chapter 8

1. Steven Chaffee (ed.), “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm to Mass Communication Research,” Journalism Monographs, No. 36 (October 1974): 1–8.

2. James Tankard, “Wilbur Schramm: Definer of a Field,” Journalism Educator 43, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 11. Schramm’s impact as a definer of ideologically “responsible” analysis extended beyond communication research. See, for example, his role on the editorial board of the Center for Research in International Studies at Stanford University, a post he shared with Gabriel Almond.

3. See, for example, John Riley and Wilbur Schramm, The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation of Seoul (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1951); or Wilbur Schramm, “The Soviet Concept of ‘Psychological’ Warfare,” in Hideya Kumata and Wilbur Schramm (eds.), Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory (Urbana: Illinois Institute of Communications Research, 1955).

4. Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” pp. 4, 5.

5. Wilbur Schramm (ed.), The Process and Effects of Mass Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954), see Foreword for acknowledgment of USIA role. The influence of this text has been such that McLeod and Blumler, among others, date the emergence of communication research “as an autonomous academic discipline” from the publication of the 1954 Schramm text; see Jack McLeod and Jay G. Blumler, “The Macrosocial Level of Communication Science,” in Charles Berger and Steven Chaffee (eds.), Handbook of Communication Science (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987), p. 284.

6. Schramm on rival communications systems, see Schramm, “The Soviet Concept of Psychological Warfare,” and Wilbur Schramm, “Soviet Communist Theory,” in Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the Press (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), pp. 105–46. On Schramm’s sources, Schramm’s footnotes acknowledge his principal sources for his description of the Soviet communications systems are works by Frederick Barghoorn, Raymond Bauer, Merle Fainsod, Alex Inkeles, Paul Kecskemeti, Nathan Leites, and Philip Selznick, each of which was prepared in the Russian Research Project at Harvard; W. W. Rostow and Alfred Levin’s Dynamics of Soviet Society (New York: Norton, 1952), whose production and publication was sponsored by the CIA; a study by Sidney Hook prepared for the U.S. Air Force; and his own work for the USIA and the U.S. Air Force on propaganda in Korea. For a complete list, see Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm, Four Theories, pp. 152–53.

7. On Kirkpatrick, see Christopher Hitchens, “How Neoconservatives Perish: Good-bye to ‘Totalitarianism’ and All That,” Harpers 281, No. 1682 (July 1990): 65. On Schramm’s role in the origin and popularization of the “authoritarian” versus “totalitarian” concept, see Schramm, “Soviet Communist Theory.” For an example of the persistence and gradual modification of this conceptual structure in today’s communication theory, see Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1987), pp. 111–19.

8. Riley and Schramm, Reds; John Riley, Wilbur Schramm, and Frederick Williams, “Flight from Communism: A Report on Korean Refugees,” POQ 15, no. 2 (Summer 1951): 274 (unless otherwise noted, all unattributed articles in this chapter appeared in POQ); See also Wilbur Schramm and John Riley, “Communication in the Sovietized State, as Demonstrated in Korea,” American Sociological Review 16 (1951): 757–66. See also Wilbur Schramm, F.E.C. Psychological Warfare Operations: Radio (Washington and Baltimore: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1952, ORO-T-20[FEC]).

9. Noted in Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” p. 34. Wilbur Schramm (chair), U.S. Information Agency: A Program of Research and Evaluation for the International Information Administration (Washington, DC: USIA, 1953).

10. Robert Holt, Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 236; Joseph Whelan, Radio Liberty: A Study of Its Origins, Structure, Policy, Programming and Effectiveness (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1972), pp. 299–301; see also Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” p. 31.

11. “Schramm, Wilbur Lang,” Contemporary Authors, Vol. 105, p. 432; Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” p. 31.

12. Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” p. 31.

13. Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Communication (see Foreword for acknowledgment of USIA sponsorship). Kumata and Schramm, Four Working Papers (USIA contract 1A-W-362). Wilbur Schramm, The Science of Human Communication (New York: Basic Books, 1963); Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” p. 7.

14. Contemporary Authors, Vol. 105, p. 432.

15. Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” p. 17, 43–44.

16. Tankard, “Wilbur Schramm,” p. 11.

17. W. Brian Arthur, “Positive Feedbacks in the Economy,” Scientific American 262 (February 1990): 92–99, with quotes drawn from p. 99. For related and more detailed presentations, see W. Brian Arthur, “Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics,” in Philip Anderson Kenneth Arrow and David Pines, (eds.), The Economy as an Evolving Complex System (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1988); Paul David, Path Dependence: Putting the Past into the Future of Economics (IMSSS Technical Report No. 533, Stanford University, November 1988); Elhanan Helpman and Paul Krugman, Market Structure and Foreign Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985).

18. Todd Gitlin, “Media Sociology: The Dominant Paradigm,” Theory and Society 6, no. 2 (1978): 205–53.

19. Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” in Preface and p. 1.

20. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

21. John Clausen, “Research on the American Soldier as a Career Contingency,” Social Psychology Quarterly 47, no. 2 (1984): 207–13. Stuart Dodd, “Formulas for Spreading Opinions,” 22, no. 4 (Winter 1958): 537–54. Participation in panels is repeatedly demonstrated in the American Association for Public Opinion Research annual conferences throughout the 1950s, which regularly featured panels reporting on government-funded psychological warfare projects. Summaries of these panels typically appear in the winter issue of each year’s Public Opinion Quarterly. On professional advancement, see, for example, Clausen, “Research,” p. 212.

22. See Samuel Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 3–54, for an extended discussion of the origins and the financing of various stages of the project; p. viii for discussion of IBM punch cards.

23. Ibid. See also frontispiece of text for Carnegie Corporation acknowledgment. On Stouffer, Lumsdaine, and Hovland dependency on federal support, see, for example, Samuel Stouffer et al., “A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales,” 16, no. 2 (Summer 1952): 273–91; in which Stouffer acknowledges U.S. Air Force contract no. AF33 (038)-12782 as the principal underwriter of the development of his well-known “H-technique”; Arthur Lumsdaine and Irving Janis, “Resistance to ‘Counterpropaganda’ Produced by One-Sided and Two-Sided ‘Propaganda’ Presentations,” 17, no. 3 (Fall 1953): 310. Note that Lumsdaine became the “monitor” for the U.S. Air Force contracts provided to Stouffer; and “Psychological News and Notes,” American Psychologist 3, no. 12 (December 1948): 559.

24. See, for example, Lumsdaine and Janis, “Resistance to ‘Counterpropaganda’”; W. Phillips Davison, “On the Effects of Communication,” 23, no. 3 (Fall 1959): 343. Davison writes that Hovland’s “laboratory experiments have made it possible to formulate an impressive number of propositions about the effects of communications.… Attempts to systematize or derive propositions from the relatively small segment of qualitative experience that has been sifted [in this field] have been made largely in the literature of rhetoric, political communication, and psychological warfare.” For examples of USIA application of Hovland’s experimental data, see Ralph White, “The New Resistance to International Propaganda,” 16, no. 4 (Winter 1952–53): 541.

25. Bureau of Social Science Research, “An Outline for the Study of National Communication Systems” (November 1953), series II, box 4, project 642; “Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs: Targets and Vulnerabilities in Psychological Warfare” (December 1954), series II, box 5, project 649; “The Kazakhs: A Background Study for Psychological Warfare” (November 1955), series II, box 4, project 649; and “Mass Communications in Eastern Europe” (January 1958), series II, box 10–11, project 303; each is in the BSSR Archives, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park.

26. Michael Gurevitch and Jay G. Blumler, “Linkages Between Mass Media and Politics: A Model for Analysis of Political Communication Systems,” in James Curran, Michael Gurovitch, and Janet Weellacott (eds.), Mass Communications and Society (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979).

27. On content analysis, see Harold Lasswell and Nathan Leites, The Language of Politics (New York: George Stewart, 1949), for a series of examples of wartime work by Lasswell, Leites, Janis, de Sola Pool, and others. On support of survey organizations and development of techniques, see Jean Converse, Survey Research in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 275–76, 340–41, 353, 357, 506–7 notes 37 and 42, 531 note 17; Carl Hovland, Arthur Lumsdaine, and Fred Sheffield, Experiments in Mass Communication (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949). On support for Likert and the Institute for Social Research, see Converse, Survey Research in the United States, pp. 340–41, 353, 537, 531 note 17; and Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, Vol. I, p. 26. On support for Stouffer, see Stouffer et al., “A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales.” On financing the use of computers, see Stouffer et al., The American Soldier. Vol. I, p. 28.

28. On support for de Sola Pool, see Sig Mickelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 211. On support for Schramm, see Whelan, Radio Liberty, pp. 299–301.

29. Whelan, Radio Liberty; See also House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive (Washington, DC: GPO, 1964), Part 6: “US Government Agencies and Programs,” and Part 7: “Research Studies of the US Information Agency.”

30. Shearon Lowery and Melvin De Fleur, Milestones in Mass Communication Research (New York: Longman, 1983), pp. 204ff. U.S. Air Force contract no. 13(038)-27522 underwrote Dodd’s Project Revere research. On financing, see pp. 207–8.

31. Everett Rogers, “The Passing of the Dominant Paradigm of Development,” in Diffusion of Innovations, 3rd ed. (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1983), p. 121.

32. Ithiel de Sola Pool, “The Mass Media and Politics in the Modernization Process,” in Lucien Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 234–53; Guy Pauker, “Indonesian Images of Their National Self,” 22, No. 3 (Fall 1958): 305–24. Everett Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1962). MIT, CENIS, The Center for International Studies: A Description (Cambridge: MIT, July 1955), pp. 59–60.

33. On Pool’s, Pauker’s, and Hagen’s roles in counterinsurgency, see U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Problems of Development and Internal Defense, Report of a Country Team Seminar (on counterinsurgency), June 11–July 13, 1962 (Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute, 1962), Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), Social Science Research and National Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution [Office of Naval Research Project], 1963). For an elaboration of “development theory” as it applied to U.S. counterinsurgency in Third World countries, see remarks by Daniel Lerner, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Guy Pauker, Lucien Pye, Morris Janowitz, W. Phillips Davison, Hans Speier, and others in Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission.

34. Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” p. 1.

35. On roots of “two-step” and “reference group” theories, see Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955); Robert Merton, “Patterns of Influence” (1949) in Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957); Herbert Hyman and Paul Sheatsley, “Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail,” 11, no. 3 (Fall 1947): 412–23.

36. Bruce Lannes Smith, “Trends in Research in International Communication and Opinion, 1945–1955,” 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956): 182–96, with quotes drawn from p. 191.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Stanley Bigman, Are We Hitting the Target? A Manual of Evaluation Research Methods for USIE (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1951).

40. Leonard Pearlin and Morris Rosenberg, “Propaganda Techniques in Institutional Advertising,” 16, no. 1 (Spring 1952): 5.

41. Herbert Krugman, “An Historical Note on Motivation Research,” 20, no. 4 (Winter 1956): 719–23.

42. Hideya Kumata and Wilbur Schramm, “The Propaganda Theory of the German Nazis,” in Kumata and Schramm, Four Working Papers, p. 37. In Schramm’s original conception, this attribute of propaganda applied simply to “totalitarian” societies. The Propaganda Theory project was prepared under USIA contract 1A-W-362.

43. Albert Biderman and Elisabeth Crawford, The Political Economics of Social Research: The Case of Sociology (Springfield, VA: Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technological Information, 1968), pp. 46–47.

44. For example, Joseph Klapper (chair) “Propaganda and People in the Cold War” (AAPOR panel report), 20, no. 4 (Winter 1956): 757–60.

45. Clausen, “Research on the American Soldier.”

46. Pope John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei Socialis (Encyclical Letter), February 19, 1988; Roberto Suro, “Papal Encyclical Says Superpowers Hurt Third World,” Peter Steinfels, “An Unsparing View of Economic Ills,” and “Excerpts from Papal Encyclical on Social Concerns of Church,” each appearing in New York Times, February 20, 1988.

Bibliographic Essay

1. Among Western observers, see, for example, Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: New American Library, 1969), or James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, edited by Walter Millis (New York: Viking, 1951). For an unusually candid “Soviet line” analysis of these issues, see Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, edited and translated by Strobe Talbot (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 361–62, 367–63, 392–93, 453–60; and Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, edited and translated by Strobe Talbot (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 47–67.

2. John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1950); or William Welch, American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); and Vojtech Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

3. Leaders of the People’s Republic of China were particularly dramatic and consistent advocates of the Manichaean vision from 1949 until the death of Mao Zedong (Mao Tsetung) in 1976. See Mao Tsetung, Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, Vol. 5 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1977): or two pamphlets from the Editorial Department of Renmin Ribao and Honggi, Apologists of Neocolonialism and Peaceful Coexistence—Two Diametrically Opposed Policies (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1963). Among Western observers, see, for example, James Burnham, The Coming Defeat of Communism (New York: John Day, 1950); James Burnham, Containment or Liberation? (New York: John Day, 1953); or House Committee on Un-American Activities, The Communist Conspiracy: Strategy and Tactics of World Communism 84th Cong. 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1956).

4. Typical Western writings include Anthony Bouscaren, A Guide to Anti-Communist Action (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1958); American Security Council, Guidelines for Cold War Victory (Chicago: American Security Council Press, 1964); and Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Communist Infiltration of the United States: Its Nature and How to Stop It (Washington, DC: Chamber of Commerce of the United States, 1946). Soviet writings on this theme include L. Skvortsov, The Ideology and Tactics of Anti-Communism, translated by J. Turner (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969); and Nikolai Yakovlev, CIA Target: The USSR, translated by V. Schneierson and D. Belyavsky (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984); D. Volkogonov, The Psychological War, translated by Sergei Chulaki (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986). On Soviet tactics, see also Paul Lendvai, The Bureaucracy of Truth: How Communist Governments Manage the News (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981).

5. Perhaps the most sophisticated example of this trend has been Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977). Earlier, widely cited “revisionist” writings include William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Delta, 1961); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954 (New York; Harper & Row, 1972); and David Horowitz (ed.), Corporations and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

6. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); or John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). For a sophisticated example of a “postrevisionist” interpretation of Soviet actions from a Western perspective, see Joseph L. Nogee and Robert Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981).

7. Bouscarin, Guide; American Security Council, Guidelines for Cold War Victory.

8. See, for example, David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978); Richard Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Knopf, 1972); or Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis (eds.), The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Franklin Watts, 1974).

9. For an overview, see Edward P. Lilly, “The Psychological Strategy Board and Its Predecessors: Foreign Policy Coordination 1938–1953,” in Gaetano Vincitorio (ed.), Studies in Modern History (New York: St. Johns University Press, 1968), pp. 337–82.

10. For example, portions of the 1940s U.S. Army records known as the “Hot Files” (Record Group 319, entry 154, U.S. National Archives) have been declassified only since 1989 in response to my Freedom of Information Act request, and substantial numbers of these records remain classified. In 1989 the Central Intelligence Agency intervened at the Truman Presidential Library to reseal records of the Psychological Strategy Board that had been declassified and open to the public for almost a decade.

11. John Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate”: The CIA and Mind Control (New York: Times Books, 1979), pp. 204–5; Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA. (New York: Pocket Books, 1979); Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, and Final Report 94th Cong. 2nd Sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1975 and 1976, respectively).

12. Basic policy papers include U.S. National Security Council, NSC 4: Coordination of Foreign Information Measures, December 9, 1947; NSC 4-A: Psychological Operations, December 9, 1947; NSC 10/2: Office of Special Projects, June 18, 1948; NSC 43: Planning for Wartime Conduct of Overt Psychological Warfare, March 9, 1949; NSC 59: The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning, December 20, 1949; NSC 59/1: The Foreign Information Program and Psychological Warfare Planning. (Report to President Truman), March 9, 1950; NSC 59/1: Progress Reports, March 9, 1950, December 26, 1950, July 31, 1952, October 30, 1952, and February 20, 1953; Index to National Psychological Warfare Plan for General War, April 9, 1951; National Psychological Warfare Plan for General War, May 8, 1951; NSC 74: A Plan for National Psychological Warfare, July 10, 1950; NSC 127: Plan for Conducting Psychological Operations During General Hostilities, February 21, 1952; NSC 135, No 6: The National Psychological Warfare Effort; NSC 5412/2: Covert Operations, December 28, 1955. The extent to which the case files associated with these decisions have been declassified varies from case to case. Each of these is held by the U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC.

13. An archival collection of Psychological Strategy Board records is avail able at the Truman Library, Independence, MO. See Dennis E. Bilger, “Records of the Psychological Strategy Board, 1951–1953, Shelf List,” Truman Library, December 1981. For an overview of the board’s activities, see Psychological Strategy Board, “Progress Report on the National Psychological Effort for the Period July 1, 1952, through September 30, 1952,” President’s Secretary’s Files, Truman Library; see also Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, “Emergency Plan for Psychological Offensive (USSR),” April 11, 1951, President’s Secretary’s Files, subject file b. 188, Truman Library. In 1989 the Central Intelligence Agency intervened at the Truman Library to reclassify selected Psychological Strategy Board records that had been opened to the public for a decade or more.

14. See particularly Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, CCS 385 (6-4-46), sections 7, 11, 16–17, 21–26, 31–47, 52–53, 71, 75–76, 79, 86; and Records of U.S. Army Staff Organizations, RG 319, entry 154 “Hot Files” series, particularly P&O 091.412 TS, both of which are now available at the National Archives in Washington, DC. A finding aid exists for psychological warfare records in RG 331 (Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters) covering much of the 1945–60 study period, but unfortunately it remains classified at this writing.

15. Records of U.S. Army Staff Organizations, RG 319, entry 154 “Hot Files” series, particularly P&O 091.412 TS, National Archives, Washington, DC; Records of the Psychological Strategy Board, Truman Presidential Library, Independence, MO.

16. National Security Archive, 1755 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC 20036.

17. Center for National Security Studies, 122 Maryland Ave NE, Washington DC 20002.

18. For an excellent, extended discussion of governmental use of secrecy and disinformation in the United States, see David Wise, The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy and Power (New York: Vintage, 1973).

19. Lilly, “Foreign Policy Coordination”; Alfred Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982); William Daugherty and Morris Janowitz (eds.), A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins [for U.S. Army Operations Research Office], 1958), pp. 12–47. Archival material includes Psychological Warfare Study for Guidance in Strategic Planning; and State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) case file no. 304, “Psychological Warfare: Concepts and Organization” (May 1946–May 1949) available in declassified form via Scholarly Resources microfilm series of State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Commit tee (SANACC) records (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1978).

20. No comprehensive budget of U.S. psychological warfare activities is known to exist. CIA psychological warfare consultant James Burnham, how ever, put the overall figure at over $1 billion annually during its heyday in the early 1950s. See Burnham, Containment or Liberation?, p. 188; see also Comptroller General of the United States (General Accounting Office), U.S. Government Monies Provided to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972) and Victor Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Dell, 1974), pp. 74–78, 174. On personnel, see Daniel Lerner, Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to VE-Day (New York: George Stewart, 1948), which includes an extensive (though not complete) list of U.S. and British personnel during World War II (pp. 438–49); Larry D. Collins, “The Free Europe Committee: American Weapon of the Cold War,” Ph.D. diss., Carlton University, 1975; James R. Price, Radio Free Europe: A Survey and Analysis (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Document No. JX 1710 U.S. B, March 1972); Joseph Whelan, Radio Liberty: A Study of Its Origins, Structure, Policy, Programming and Effectiveness (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1972).

21. John Crewdson and Joseph Treaster, “The CIA’s 3-Decade Effort to Mold the World’s Views, New York Times, December 25, 26, and 27, 1977; House Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings: The CIA and the Media, 95th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978); Peter Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 59–102. For Eastern European reportage, see Vitaly Petrusenko, A Dangerous Game: The CIA and the Mass Media (Prague: Interpress Prague, n.d. [1978?]).

22. Daniel Schorr, “Are CIA Assets a Press Liability?” [More] 8, no. 2 (February 1978). For useful overviews, see Arlene Sanderson, “The CIA–Media Connection,” Freedom of Information Center Report No. 432, University of Missouri School of Journalism, 1981: Loch Johnson, America’s Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 183–203.

23. Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939–1961 (New York: Morrow, 1987); Coleman, The Liberal Conspiracy, pp. 1–12 (summary), 253–76 (tabular presentation of major activities); David Wise and Thomas Ross, The Espionage Establishment (New York: Bantam, 1968).

24. Marchetti and Marks, The CIA, p. 174; Sig Mikelson, America’s Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (New York: Praeger, 1983).

25. “Company-Made Balloons Aid ‘Winds of Freedom’ Effort,” The Modern Millwheel (General Mills employee publication), September 1951.

26. John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 260–69.

27. James Miller, The United States and Italy 1940–1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History (London: Zed, 1986), pp. 23–31, 130–33, 166–70; Arnold Cortesi and “Observer,” “Two Vital Case Histories,” in Lester Markel (ed.), Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1949); Robert Holt and Robert van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 159–205. During 1975 the House Select Committee on Intelligence prepared a highly critical report on the CIA’s clandestine efforts to manipulate elections in Italy and France. The CIA and the White House succeeded in halting official publication of the study, but a copy was leaked to the media and published in supplements to the Village Voice on February 15 and 22, 1976. See p. 86 of the February 16 “Special Supplement: The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read,” for discussion of agency intervention in Italian elections. Important original documentation can be found at the U.S. Psychological Strategy Board files, Italy. Truman Library, Independence, MO.

28. John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars (New York: Morrow, 1986), pp. 40–60. See also Blum, The CIA, and Ranelagh, The Agency.

29. Jay Peterzell, “How U.S. Propaganda Has Fooled Congress,” First Principles 8, no. 3 (1983) 1; Christopher Simpson, Blowback (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987), pp. 125–37, 218–19.

30. Martin Lee and Bruce Shlain, Acid Dreams: The CIA, LSD and the Sixties Rebellion (New York: Grove Press, 1985); and Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate.”

31. Richard F. Staar (ed.), Public Diplomacy: USA versus USSR (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986); and Mikelson, America’s Other Voice. For Soviet commentary on this point, see A. Panfilov, Broadcasting Pirates: Outline of External Radio Propaganda by the USA, Britain and FRG, translated by Nicholas Bobrov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981).

32. John Prados, The Soviet Estimate, U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial, 1982), pp. 38–50; Peterzell, How U.S. Propaganda Has Fooled Congress; Simpson, Blowback; Kurt Glaser, “Psychological Warfare’s Policy Feedback,” Ukrainian Quarterly 9 (1953).

33. Clyde Kluckhohn, Alex Inkeles, and Raymond Bauer, Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social System (Cambridge, MA: Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1954), U.S. Air Force contract no. 33(038)-12909; Alexander Dallin, Ralph Movrogordato, and Wilhelm Moll, Partisan Psychological Warfare and Popular Attitudes under the German Occupation (Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 1954 [published under the auspices of the War Documentation Project, Columbia University]). See also Tami Davis Biddle, “Handling the Soviet Threat: Arguments for Preventative War and Compellence in the Early Cold War Period,” Paper presented at the annual convention of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, 1988.

34. Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Carleton Mabee, “Margaret Mead and Behavioral Scientists in World War II: Problems of Responsibility, Truth and Effectiveness,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 23 (January 1987):3–13; see also Winks, Cloak and Gown.

35. Lerner, Sykewar; Daniel Lerner (ed.), Propaganda in War and Crisis (New York: George Stewart, 1951); Samuel Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, Vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 3–53; see also the War Documentation Project studies cited in note 33 above.

36. Lerner, Sykewar; Kluckhohn, Inkeles, and Bauer, Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths.

37. See, for example, Public Opinion Quarterly’s special issue on international communications research (Winter 1952–53).

38. Major casebook-type texts (in chronological order) include Bruce Lannes Smith, Harold Lasswell, and Ralph Casey, Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946); Paul Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (1948; rpt. Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1956); Lerner, Propaganda; Wilbur Schramm, FEC Psychological Warfare Operations (Baltimore: Operations Research Office, John Hopkins Press, 1952); Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook; Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), Social Science Research and National Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution [Office of Naval Research Project], 1963). For more modern compilations, U.S. Department of the Army, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application, 2 vols., edited by Ronald McLaurin (Washington, DC: Department of the Army contract no. 525-7-1, April 1976); a three-volume study edited by Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and Hans Speier, Propaganda and Communication in World History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1980); Carnes Lord and Frank Barnett (eds.), Political Warfare and Psychological Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989); Paul A. Smith, On Political War (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989).

39. Harold Lasswell, Ralph Casey, and Bruce Lannes Smith, Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography (1935; rpt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). This text goes well beyond strictly “media” conceptions of propaganda to consider applications of violence, social management, and the role of intelligence agencies; see pp. 43–49, 196–203, 230–34.

40. Bureau of Social Science Research, Chitra Smith, International Propaganda and Psychological Warfare: An Annotated Bibliography, BSSR Archives, series II, box 7, project 819, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park. Of related interest is Vera Riley, An Annotated Bibliography of Operations Research (Chevy Chase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1953); and U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of External Research, Government Resources Available for Foreign Affairs Research (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1965).

41. Bruce Lannes Smith and Chitra Smith, International Communication and Political Opinion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

42. Myron J. Smith, The Secret Wars: A Guide to Sources in English, 2 vols. (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1980, 1981).

43. My search of the Sociofile data base for citations concerning “psychological warfare” yielded three recent citations, including one examining the Chilean coup as a “prototype of counterrevolutionary psychological warfare”; see Silvia Molina-Vedia, “El Caso Chileno Como un Prototipo de Guerra Psicologica Contrarevolucionaria,” Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Politicas y Socioles (October–March 1976–77).

44. Neal Peterson, “Recent Intelligence Literature and the History of the Cold War 1945–1960,” paper presented at the annual conference of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, June 1988.

45. Ronald McLaurin, L. John Martin, and Sriramesh Krishnamurthy, “Recent Developments in the Analysis of Audience Effects of Persuasive Communications, A Selected, Annotated Bibliography,” Abbott Associates, Springfield, VA, July 1988 (Undersecretary of Defense for Policy contract no. MDA-903-88-C-0048).

46. Jean Converse, Survey Research in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

47. Albert Biderman and Elisabeth Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research: The Case of Sociology (Springfield, VA: Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technological Information, 1968).

48. See, for example, Denis McQuail, Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1987), with no reference to psychological warfare and passing references to propaganda; or John C. Merrill, Global Journalism: A Survey of the World’s Mass Media (White Plains, NY: Longman, 1983), with no references to either psychological warfare or propaganda. For a recent valuable exception to this trend, see Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 2nd ed. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992).

49. William Albig, “Two Decades of Opinion Study: 1936–1956,” POQ 21, no. 1 (Spring 1957): 14–22. Unless otherwise noted, all unattributed articles in this chapter appeared in POQ.

50. Allen Barton, “Paul Lazarsfeld and Applied Social Research,” Social Science History (October 1979): 4–44.

51. Tony Bennett, “Theories of the Media, Theories of Society,” in Michael Gurevitch and Tony Bennett (eds.), Culture, Society and the Media (London: Methuen, 1982), pp. 30–55.

52. Bernard Berelson, “The Present State of Communication Research,” 22, no. 2 (Summer 1958): 178, and in more developed form, “The State of Communication Research,” 23, no. 1 (Spring 1959): 1–5.

53. Jay Blumler, “European-American Differences in Communication Research,” in Everett Rogers and Francis Balle (eds.), The Media Revolution in America and in Western Europe (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1985), pp. 185–99.

54. Steven Chaffee (ed.), “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm to Mass Communication Research,” Journalism Monographs No. 36 (October 1974).

55. Steven Chaffee and John Hochheimer, “The Beginnings of Political Communications Research in the United States: Origins of the ‘Limited Effects’ Model,” in Michael Gurevitch and Mark Levy (eds.), (Mass Communications Yearbook, vol. 5 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985).

56. Converse, Survey Research.

57. Daniel Czitrom, Media and the American Mind (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 122–46.

58. Jesse Delia, “Communication Research: A History,” in Charles Berger and Steven Chaffee (eds.), Handbook of Communication Science (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987), pp. 20–98.

59. Everette Dennis, “Whence We Came: Discovering the History of Mass Communication Research,” in Nancy Weatherly Sharp (ed.), Communication Research: The Challenge of the Information Age (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988), pp. 3–20.

60. Heinz Eulau, “The Columbia Studies of Personal Influence,” Social Science History 2, no. 4 (May 1980): 207–28.

61. Todd Gitlin, “Media Sociology: The Dominant Paradigm,” Theory and Society 6, no. 2 (1978): 205–53.

62. Stuart Hall, “The Rediscovery of ‘Ideology’: Return of the Repressed in Media Studies,” in Gurevitch and Bennett Cultures, Society and the Media, pp. 56–90.

63. Hanno Hardt, “Comparative Media Research: The World According to America,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 5 (June 1988): 129–46.

64. Elihu Katz, “Communication Research Since Lazarsfeld,” 51 (1987): 525–45.

65. Paul Lazarsfeld, “Historical Notes on the Empirical Study of Action: An Intellectual Odyssey [1958],” in Qualitative Analysis: Historical and Critical Essays (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1972).

66. Shearon Lowery and Melvin DeFleur, Milestones in Mass Communication Research (New York: Longman, 1983).

67. Jack McLeod and Jay Blumler, “The Macrosocial Level of Communication Science,” in Charles Berger and Steven Chaffee (eds.), Handbook of Communication Science (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987), pp. 271–322.

68. Everett Rogers, “Contributions and Criticisms of Diffusion Research,” in Diffusion of Innovations, 3rd ed. (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1983).

69. Wilbur Schramm, “The Unique Perspective of Communication: A Retrospective View,” Journal of Communication 33, no. 3 (Summer 1983); and Wilbur Schramm, “The Beginnings of Communication Study in the United States,” in Everett Rogers and Francis Balle (eds.), The Media Revolution in America and in Western Europe (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1985), pp. 200–211.

70. J. Michael Sproule, “Progressive Propaganda Critics and the Magic Bullet Myth,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 6 (September 1989): 225–46.

71. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, Vol. 1, pp. 3–54, for an extended discussion of Stouffer’s highly influential Research Branch of the U.S. Army.

72. James Tankard, “Wilbur Schramm: Definer of a Field,” Journalism Educator 43, no. 3 (Autumn 1988): 11–16.

73. Ralph Beals, Politics of Social Research (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).

74. Biderman and Crawford, The Political Economics of Social Research; Albert Biderman and Elisabeth Crawford, “The Basis of Allocation to Social Scientific Work,” paper presented to American Sociological Association, September 1969, now at BSSR Archives, series V, box 3, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park: Albert Biderman and Elisabeth Crawford, “Paper Money: Trends of Research Sponsorship in American Sociology Journals,” Social Sciences Information (Paris), (February 1970): 51–77.

75. Elisabeth Crawford and Gene Lyons, “Foreign Area Research: A Back ground Statement,” American Behavioral Scientist (June 1967). See also Elisabeth Crawford and Albert Biderman, Social Science and International Affairs (New York: Wiley, 1969).

76. Irene Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

77. Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), The Use and Abuse of Social Science (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1971); Irving Louis Horowitz (ed.), The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974).

78. Irving Louis Horowitz and James Everett Katz, Social Science and Public Policy in the United States (New York: Praeger, 1975).

79. Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, The U.S. Ideological Effort: Government Agencies and Programs, published as a committee print by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, January 1964).

80. Gene M. Lyons, The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969). For a more recent analysis, see Richard Nathan, Social Science in Government: Uses and Misuses, (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

81. James McCartney, “On Being Scientific: Changing Styles of Presentation of Sociological Research,” American Sociologist 5 (February 1970): 30–35.

82. Ithiel de Sola Pool, “The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments,” Background 10, no. 2 (August 1966): 111–22.

83. The most important social dynamic of theoretical development in social sciences appears to be one of integration and acceptance of theories, rather than “discovery” or simple articulation of new ideas. The distinction is important, in part because the former processes depend to a much greater extent on recognition by established authorities in the field. The “stages” conception tends to downplay the often politicized process involved in the acceptance of theories in favor of assumptions about a normative process of scientific advance on the basis of “truths.” Several examples of the importance of acceptance (rather than simple articulation) can be readily identified. Lowery and De Fleur contend that Lazarsfeld’s famous “1955” theory of the role of primary groups in mass communication was in truth a rediscovery of earlier—but not yet fully integrated—work by Rothlisberger and Dixon and by others. Lowery and Defleur, Milestones, pp. 180–82. Similarly, McLeod and Blumler point out that “mass society” as a term and a theoretical category was never adopted by those theorists who are most often tagged with that name. “Mass society” was in fact a 1959 categorization of earlier theorists with substantially different perspectives, and one that was constructed at least in part for polemical purposes. McLeod and Blumler, “The Macrosocial Level,” p. 282. The category of “mass society” theorists nevertheless remains in wide use in construction of the “stages” of mass communication theory.

84. McLeod and Blumler, “The Macrosocial Level,” p. 282.

85. Ibid.

86. Gitlin, “Media Sociology.”

87. Czitrom, Media and the American Mind, pp. 131–39; Delia, “Communication Research,” pp. 54–73; McLeod and Blumler, “The Macrosocial Level,” p. 284.

88. John Dewey cited in James Carey, Communication as Culture (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 22.

89. Ibid., pp. 13–68.

90. Hall, “The Rediscovery of ‘Ideology,’” pp. 59–65.

91. Biderman and Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research, pp. 29–55.

92. Hall, “The Rediscovery of ‘Ideology,” pp. 59–62.

93. Biderman and Crawford, Political Economics of Social Research, pp. 32–38, 45–46; National Science Foundation, Federal Funds 1953, pp. 37–40.

94. Cited in Carey, Communication, p. 22.

95. Ibid., and, from a different perspective, Hall, “The Rediscovery of ‘Ideology,’” pp. 59–62.

96. This total is derived from listings of Cantril’s works in Who Was Who, Vol. 5, p. 113, in National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. 55, pp. 211–12, and the University of Maryland’s GEAC computerized bibliographic reference system. Texts that focus substantially on questions of psychological warfare, propaganda, or mass media theory include The Psychology of Radio (with Gorden Allport, 1935); The Invasion from Mars (1940); The Psychology of Social Movements (1941); Gauging Public Opinion (contributing editor, 1944); Understanding Man’s Social Behavior (1947); The “Why” of Man’s Experience (1950); Public Opinion, 1935–1946 (1951); How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion (with William Buchanan, 1953); The French Left (with David Rodnick, 1956); The Politics of Despair (1958); Soviet Leaders and Mastery over Man (1960); Human Nature and Political Systems (1961); The Pattern of Human Concerns (1965); The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research (1967); and The Political Beliefs of Americans (with Lloyd Free, 1967).

97. “Cantril, [Albert] Hadley,” National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. 55, p. 212.

98. Hadley Cantril, The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967).

99. Obituaries on File (1979), Vol. 1, p. 93; Who Was Who, Vol. 5, p. 113; National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. 55, pp. 211–12.

100. Converse, Survey Research.

101. Ibid. See also Howland Sargeant, “Oral History Interview, December 15, 1970,” Columbia University Library.

102. Free and Cantril The Political Beliefs of Americans. Lloyd Free also was a joint author or credited by Cantril as a major contributor to a number of Institute for International Social Research studies, including Attitudes, Hopes and Fears of Nigerians (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) and Six Allies and a Neutral (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1959), as well as Cantril’s own The French Left (1956), The Politics of Despair (1958), and Soviet Leaders and Mastery over Man (1960).

103. The total of works reported here is derived from listings of Lasswell’s works in Current Biography (1947), pp. 75–77, Who’s Who (1976–77), pp. 1833–34, and the University of Maryland’s GEAC computerized bibliographic reference system. Texts that focus substantially on questions of psychological warfare, propaganda, or mass media theory include Propaganda Technique in the World War (1927); Psychopathology and Politics (1930); Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography (with Bruce Lannes Smith and Ralph Casey, 1935); Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (1936); Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion (with Bruce Lannes Smith and Ralph Casey, 1946); Study of Power (1950); World Revolution in Our Time (1951); National Security and Individual Freedom (1951); Comparative Studies of Elites (1952); Comparative Studies of Symbols (with Ithiel de Sola Pool and Daniel Lerner, 1952); The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method (with Daniel Lerner, 1951); World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (with Daniel Lerner, 1966); World Revolutionary Propaganda (1970); Propaganda and Communication in World History, 3 vols. (edited, with Daniel Lerner and Hans Speier, 1980). Books that appeared in multiple editions include Propaganda Technique in the World War (1927, 1938, 1971, 1972); Psychopathology and Politics (1930, 1934, 1960, 1969); and Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (1936, 1950, 1958).

104. For example, “Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How” and “Mass communication research is the study of who says what through what channel to whom, with what effect” (a formulation Lasswell continued to favor at least as late as 1980). Note also Lasswell’s contribution to the classic functionalist description of the “tasks,” or functions, of the media noted in McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, pp. 70, 191. For a concise summary of Lasswellian media theory, see Propaganda and Communication in World History, Vol. I, “Introduction.”

105. McQuail, Mass Communication Theory, pp. 70, 191; Roger Wimmer and Joseph Dominick, Mass Media Research (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1987), pp. 6, 16; Current Biography (1947), pp. 375–77.

106. Lerner’s work with Lasswell includes Comparative Studies of Symbols (with Ithiel de Sola Pool, 1952); The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method (1951); World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (1966); and Propaganda and Communication in World History, 3 vols. (edited, with Hans Speier, 1980).

107. This figure derived from listings in Contemporary Authors (New Revision Series), Vol. 6, p. 292, and the University of Maryland’s GEAC computerized bibliographic reference system.

108. Contemporary Authors. Vol. 6, p. 292.

109. Ibid.

110. Examples include Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany (1949, reissued 1971); Propaganda in War and Crisis (editor, 1951); Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (with Lucille Pevsner, 1958).

111. Tankard, “Wilbur Schramm,” pp. 11–16; Chaffee, “Contributions of Wilbur Schramm.”

112. For the U.S. Air Force: John W. Riley and Wilbur Schramm, The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation of Seoul (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1951); John Riley, Wilbur Schramm, and Frederick Williams, “Fight from Communism: A Report on Korean Refugees,” 15, no. 2 (Summer 1951): 274–86; and Wilbur Schramm and John Riley, “Communication in the Sovietized State, as Demonstrated in Korea,” American Sociological Review 16 (1951): 757–66. The POQ text (p. 274) acknowledges sponsorship by the Human Resources Research Institute of the U.S. Air Force’s Air University.

For the USIA: Wilbur Schramm, “The Soviet Concept of ‘Psychological’ Warfare,” in Hideya Kumata and Wilbur Schramm, Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory (Urbana, IL: Institute of Communication Research, 1955). See cover statement for acknowledgment of USIA contract 1A-W-362 as sponsor; Wilbur Schramm (chair), U.S. Information Agency: A Program of Research and Evaluation for the International Information Administration (Washington, DC: USIA, 1953); Wilbur Schramm (ed.), The Process and Effects of Mass Communication (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1954); see Foreword for acknowledgment of USIA sponsorship of this text. The influence of this text has been such that McLeod and Blumler, among others, date the emergence of communication research “as an autonomous academic discipline” from the publication of the 1954 Schramm text (“The Macrosocial Level,” p. 284). Wilbur Schramm, The Science of Human Communication (New York: Basic Books, 1963) (Voice of America lecture series); see also Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” p. 34.

For the Department of Defense: Schramm, FEC Psychological Operations; see also Chaffee, “The Contributions of Wilbur Schramm,” p. 31.

For Radio Free Europe: Robert Holt, Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), p. 236; Whelan, Radio Liberty, pp. 299–301.

113. Bureau of Social Science Research (Kurt Back), Information Transmission and Interpersonal Relations, Technical Report No. 1, U.S. Air Force contract no. AF 18(600)1797; now in BSSR Archives, series II, project 322, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park.

114. Edward Barrett, Truth Is Our Weapon (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1953). Barrett was an OSS veteran, assistant secretary of state for U.S. foreign propaganda programs, founder of the Columbia Journalism Review, and dean of Columbia Graduate School of Journalism; see “Edward W. Barrett Dies; Started Columbia Journalism Review,” Washington Post, October 26, 1989.

115. Kluckhohn, Inkeles, and Bauer, Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths, U.S. Air Force contract no. 33(038)-12909. This text was eventually published with an expurgated title as Raymond Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works: Cultural, Psychological and Social Themes (New York: Vintage, 1956), and has been widely used as a college text.

116. Bureau of Social Science Research (Robert Bower), “Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs: Targets and Vulnerabilities in Psychological Warfare,” working paper for Psychological Warfare Division, Human Resources Research Office, December 1954, BSSR Archives, series II, box 5, project 649, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park.

117. Albert Biderman, “Social-Psychological Needs and ‘Involuntary’ Behavior as Illustrated by Compliance in Interrogation,” Sociometry (June 1960): 120–47 (U.S. Air Force contract no. AF 18 [600]1797). Biderman acknowledges this study was also supported in part by the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, which has been reported to have served as a conduit for Central Intelligence Agency-funded psychological research; see Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate,” pp. 133n, 137, 139n, 147–67. On Biderman, see also Bureau of Social Science Research (Albert Biderman et al.), A Selected Bibliography on Captivity Behavior, BSSR Research Report 339–1 (U.S. Air Force contract no. AF 49[638]727), now at BSSR Archives, series II, box 14, project 339, University of Maryland Libraries Special Collections, College Park.

118. Bureau of Social Science Research (Stanley Bigman, project director), “An Outline for the Study of National Communications Systems,” prepared for the Office of Research and Evaluation, USIA, November 1953, BSSR Archives, series II, box 4, project no. 642, University of Maryland Special Collections, College Park.

119. Leonard Cottrell served as 1952–53 chair of the Advisory Committee on Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, U.S. Department of Defense (see Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. xi). See also John Riley and Leonard Cottrell, “Research for Psychological Warfare,” 27, no. 1 (Spring 1957): 147–58; and Leonard Cottrell, “Social Research and Psychological Warfare,” Sociometry 23, no. 2 (June 1960): 103–19.

120. Leo Crespi, “Some Social Science Research Activities in the USIA (Unclassified Abstract),” in Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research (symposium proceedings, March 1962), pp. 317–18; Crespi served as chief of the USIA survey research division.

121. Daugherty and Janowtiz, Casebook. For a fuller biography of Daugherty’s extensive psychological warfare experience, see U.S. Department of the Army, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations, p. xi.

122. Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, pp. xvi, 157ff. See also W. Phillips Davison, “Alliances,” in Ithiel deSola Pool (ed.), Social Science Research and National Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1963), pp. 26–44; Office of Naval Research contract no. 1354(08). Davison was employed throughout the 1950s by the RAND Corporation; see, for example, “Some Observations on the Role of Research in Political Warfare” (RAND P-226); “Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy” (with Hans Speier, P-615); “The Role of Mass Communications During the Berlin Blockade” (P-665); “A Note on the Political Role of Mass Meetings in a Mass Communications Society” (P-812): and “Power—The Idea and Its Communication” (P-1869). Also: author’s interview with W. Phillips Davison, November 14, 1990.

123. Leonard Doob, “The Utilization of Social Scientists in the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information,” American Political Science Review, 41, no. 4 (August 1947): 649–67; Leonard Doob, “The Strategies of Psychological Warfare,” POQ 13, no. 4 (Winter 1949): 635–44.

124. Murray Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959). Dyer was an employee of the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University.

125. Harry Eckstein, “The Internal War: Problem of Anticipation,” in Ithiel deSola Pool (ed.), Social Science Research and National Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1963), pp. 102–47. Eckstein was a specialist in counterinsurgency warfare employed by the Center for International Studies at MIT.

126. Lloyd Free “General Premises for VOA,” in U.S. Department of the Army, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations, pp. 364–68. See p. xiii for biographical details concerning Free’s work.

127. George Gallup, “The Challenge of Ideological Warfare,” in John Boardman Whitton (ed.), Propaganda and the Cold War (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1963), pp. 54–56.

128. Alexander George, Propaganda Analysis: A Study of the Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1959).

129. Holt, Radio Free Europe; Holt and van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations; Robert Holt, “A New Approach to Political Communication,” in John Boardman Whitton (ed.), Propaganda and the Cold War (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1963), pp. 41–53.

130. For Hovland’s role in the oversight of military psychological warfare contracting, see “Psychological News and Notes,” American Psychologist 3, no. 12 (December 1948): 559; for more detail on the Committee on Human Resources, see Lyle Lanier, “The Psychological and Social Sciences in the National Military Establishment,” American Psychologist 4, no. 5 (May 1949): 127ff, 131–33.

131. Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950). See also Kluckhohn, Inkeles, and Bauer, Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths; Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. xii.

132. Irving Janis, “Persuasion,” in U.S. Department of the Army, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations, pp. 609–24. See p. xvi for biographical details.

133. Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook.

134. Joseph Klapper and Leo Lowenthal, “Contributions of Opinion Research to Evaluation of Psychological Warfare,” 15, no. 4 (Winter 1951–52): 651–62. Klapper was an employee of the USIA Research and Evaluation staff under Lowenthal.

135. Kluckhohn, Inkeles, and Bauer, Strategic Psychological and Sociological Strengths. For discussion of the psychological warfare role of the Russian Research Center that Kluckhohn directed, see Biddle, “Handling the Soviet Threat.”

136. Klaus Knorr, “The Intelligence Function,” in Ithiel deSola Pool (ed.), Social Science Research and National Security (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1963), pp. 75–101, Knorr was a nuclear weapons specialist with the Center for International Studies at MIT.

137. Kumata and Schramm, Four Working Papers on Propaganda Theory. See cover statement for acknowledgment of USIA contract 1 A-W-362 as sponsor. Kumata also served as an instructor at the Green Berets’ Psychological Warfare School at Fort Bragg, NC; see Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. xiii.

138. On Lazarsfeld’s role in USIA and Office of Naval Research Projects projects, see Converse, Survey Research, p. 290; Bruce Lannes Smith, “Trends in Research in International Communication and Opinion,” 20, no. 1 (Spring 1956): 191; Bureau of Social Science Research (Stanley Bigman), “An Outline for the Study of National Communications Systems”; Robert Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld, “Studies in Radio and Film Propaganda,” in Robert Merton (ed.), Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957), pp. 509–28; Paul Lazarsfeld, “An Episode in the History of Social Research: A Memoir,” in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America 1930–1960 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 270ff; Paul Lazarsfeld, “The Policy Science Movement (An Outsiders View),” Policy Sciences 6 (September 1975): 211–22; Paul Lazarsfeld Oral History, Columbia University Library, recorded November 1961–August 1962. See also Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet Russia, p. xiii.

139. Alexander Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World (New York: Dutton, 1949).

140. Nathan Leites, “The Third International on Its Change of Policy” and Nathan Leites and Ithiel de Sola Pool, “The Response of Communist Propaganda to Frustration,” both in Harold Lasswell and Nathan Leites, The Language of Politics (New York: George Stewart, 1949). Nathan Leites and Ernst Kris, “Trends in Twentieth Century Propaganda,” in Lerner, Propaganda in War, pp. 39–54; and Nathan Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1953). Leites was on the social science staff of the RAND Corporation.

141. Paul Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1954); Paul Linebarger, “Warfare Psychologically Waged” in Lerner, Propaganda in War, pp. 267–73; Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, pp. xvi, 79. Linebarger became professor of Asiatic studies at the School of Advanced International Studies, Princeton; see Lerner, Propaganda in War, p. viii. See Joseph B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: Ballantine, 1976), pp. 74–103, concerning Linebarger’s psychological warfare training projects for CIA agents.

142. Leo Lowenthal (guest editor), “Special Issue on International Communications Research,” 16, no. 4 (Winter 1952–53); Joseph Klapper and Leo Lowenthal, “Contributions of Opinion Research to Evaluation of Psychological Warfare,” 15, no. 4 (Winter 1951–52): 651–62. For Lowenthal’s own version, see Leo Lowenthal, An Unmastered Past: Autobiographical Reflections of Leo Lowenthal, edited by Martin Jay (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 81–110.

143. L. John Martin, International Propaganda (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969); L. John Martin (ed.), “Propaganda in International Affairs,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (special issue) 398 (1971); L. John Martin, Ronald D. McLaurin, and Sriramesh Krishnamurthy, Psychological Operations Program Evaluation, and Ronald D. McLaurin, L. John Martin, Sriramesh Krishnamurthy, et al., Recent Developments in the Analysis of Audience Effects of Persuasive Communications: A Selected Annotated Bibliography, both prepared for the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), contract no. MDA-903–88-C-0048, 1988. See also Martin’s contributions to Lasswell, Lerner, and Speier, Propaganda, Vol. 3 pp. 249–94. Martin served in a number of posts at USIA, including coordinator of overseas research and chief of the Program Analysis Division; see U.S. Department of the Army, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations, p. xix, for biographical data.

144. Mabee, “Margaret Mead,” pp. 3–13.

145. Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, p. xvi.

146. Saul Padover and Harold Lasswell, Psychological Warfare and the Strategy of Soviet Propaganda (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1951); Saul K. Padover, “Psychological Warfare in an Age of World Revolution,” Columbia Journal of International Affairs 5 (1951): 3–12. Padover served as an Office of Strategic Services officer assigned to psychological warfare duty in Europe during World War II and subsequently became a professor and dean of the School of Politics at the New School for Social Research in New York: see Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. xiii.

147. Nathan Lietes and Ithiel de Sola Pool, “The Response of Communist Propaganda to Frustration,” in Harold Lasswell and Nathan Leites (eds.), Language of Politics (New York: George Stewart, 1949), p. 334; Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, pp. xvi, 199ff; Ithiel de Sola Pool, “Social Science in the Nuclear Age,” in Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), Social Science Research and National Security; pp. 1–25; Ithiel de Sola Pool, “The Changing Soviet Union,” in U.S. Department of the Army, The Art and Science of Psychological Operations, pp. 1043–50, (see p. xxi for biographic data); and Ithiel de Sola Pool, “The Necessity for Social Scientists.”

148. Mikelson, America’s Other Voice, pp. 24, 41, 60, 259; see also “Poole, Dewitt Clinton,” Current Biography 1950, pp. 461–63.

149. Lucian Pye, Guerrilla Communism in Malaya (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956). Pye was a professor at the Center for International Studies at MIT, a frequent consultant to government agencies concerning psychological warfare aimed at Asians, and the beneficiary of a number of government contracts designed to gather intelligence concerning the appeal of communism to Asians in Malaya, Burma, and Southeast Asia; on these points see Pye’s biography in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Problems of Development and Internal Defense. Report of a Country Team Seminar, June 11-July 13, 1962 (Washington, DC: 1962) Foreign Service Institute.

150. Riley and Schramm, Reds; John Riley, Wilbur Schramm, and Frederick Williams, “Flight from Communism: A Report on Korean Refugees,” POQ (Summer 1951): 274; Schramm and Riley, “Communication in the Sovietized State”; Riley and Cottrell, “Research for Psychological Warfare.” Riley also served as vice chair of the secretary of defense’s advisory panel on special operations; see Who’s Who (1974–75), p. 2589.

151. Director of research, Human Resources Research Institute of the U.S. Air Force Air University (1952–53); consultant and contractor to military services (1954–59); chief of psychology and social science division of the Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering of the Department of Defense (1961–64); other posts; see Who’s Who (1974–75), p. 2792. See also Carroll Shartle, “Selected Department of Defense Programs in Social Science,” in Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, pp. xvi, 322ff.

152. Bureau of Social Science Research, Chitra M. Smith, International Propaganda and Psychological Warfare.

153. Hans Speier and Ernst Kris, German Radio Propaganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1944); Hans Speier, “The Future of Psychological Warfare,” 12, no. 1 12 (1948): 5–18; Hans Speier, “Morale and Propaganda,” “War Aims in Political Warfare,” and “Psychological Warfare Reconsidered” in Lerner, Propaganda in War pp. 3–25, 69–89, 463–91; Hans Speier, Psychological Aspects of Global Conflict (Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1955); Lasswell, Lerner, and Speier, Propaganda and Communication. Speier’s RAND Corporation studies pertaining to psychological aspects of international conflict include “Psychological Warfare Reconsidered” (1951, P-196); “International Political Communication: Elite vs. Mass” (1951, P-270); and “Psychological Aspects of Foreign Policy” (with W. Phillips Davison, 1954, P-615). Speier was a founder and eventually director of the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service during World War II, then a senior officer of the Overseas Branch of the Office of War Information: he served as director of social science at the RAND Corporation from 1948 to 1960 and as a member of its research council from 1960 to 1969; see Contemporary Authors, New Revision Series, Vol. 9, pp. 463–64; Vol. 2, p. 530.

154. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier; Stouffer, “A Technique for Improving Cumulative Scales,” Samuel Stouffer, “1665 and 1954,” 18, no. 3 (Fall 1954): 233–38.

155. Ralph K. White, “The New Resistance to International Propaganda,” 16, no. 4 (Winter 1952) 539–50. White later served with the USIA Special Projects Division; see Special Operations Research Office, The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission, p. 338.

156. U.S. Army Operations Research Office psychological warfare research team in Korea (1951–52); William R. Young, “GULAG Slavery Inc.: The Use of an Illustrated Map in Printed Propaganda,” in Daugherty and Janowitz, Psychological Warfare Casebook, pp. xiv, 597–602.

157. Converse, Survey Research, pp. 162–415 passim.

158. RAND Corporation, RAND: 25th Anniversary Volume (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., n.d. [1974?]); Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966); RAND Corporation, Index of Selected Publications of The RAND Corporation, Vol. 1 (Santa Monica, CA: author, 1962); and RAND’s quarterly periodical, Selected Abstracts.

159. Barton, “Paul Lazarsfeld”; Eulau, “The Columbia Studies”; Merton and Lazarsfeld, “Studies in Radio and Film Propaganda”; Judith Barton (ed.), Guide to the Bureau of Applied Social Research (New York: Clearwater, 1984).

160. Charles Fritz and Eli Marks, “The NORC Studies of Human Behavior in Disaster,” Journal of Social Issues 10, no. 3 (1954): 26–41. Charles Mack, National Opinion Research Center Bibliography of Publications 1941–1960 and Supplement 1961–1971 (Chicago: NORC, 1961 and 1972, respectively); Paul Sheatsley, “NORC: The First Forty Years” (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1987); NORC Report 1985–1986 (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1987).

161. Charles Cannell and Robert Kahn, “Some Factors in the Origins and Development of the Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan,” Institute for Social Research Working Papers Series No. 8034, January 1984.

162. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, The Center for International Studies: A Description (Cambridge: MIT, July 1955). See also Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, “A Plan of Research for International Communication: A Report,” World Politics 6, no. 3 (April 1954): 358–77.

163. Biddle, “Handling the Soviet Threat”; Charles O’Connell, “Social Structure and Science: Soviet Studies at Harvard,” Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1990; Harvard University, Russian Research Center, The Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System: Survey of Research Objectives (Cambridge, MA: Russian Research Project, 1951); Russian Research Center, Five Year Report and Current Projects and Ten Year Report and Current Projects 1948–1958 (Cambridge, MA: Russian Research Center, 1953 and 1958, respectively).

164. University of Maryland, College Park Libraries, Historical Manuscripts and Archives Department, Guide to the Archives of the Bureau of Social Science Research (College Park: University of Maryland, n.d. [1987?]).

165. Mikelson, America’s Other Voice; Holt, Radio Free Europe.

166. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, offers perhaps the best available reconstruction of the evolution of U.S. psychological warfare, special warfare, and covert operations capabilities. See also Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of the Special Forces (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986); Charles Simpson, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983). For an excellent recent text that includes considerable historical material, see Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft (New York: Pantheon, 1992). Of related interest, see Edward Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan, The “Terrorism” Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape Our View of Terror (New York: Pantheon, 1989).

167. “Testimony of Ladislav Bittman, former Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department of the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service” and Central Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda,” both in House Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearings: Soviet Covert Action, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1980).

168. For a useful summary of developments concerning access to East bloc archives, see Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No. 1 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Spring 1992).

169. Selected examples include Leites and Pool, “Response of Communist Propaganda”; Lendvai, Bureaucracy of Truth; Roger Beaumont, “Soviet Psychological Warfare and Propaganda,” Signal 42, no. 3 (1987):75–84.

170. Harold Lasswell, “The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda,” Headline Series Pamphlet 86 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1951); Brutus Coste, “Propaganda in Eastern Europe,” 14 (Winter 1950):639–66; Evron Kirkpatrick, Target—The World: Communist Propaganda Activities in 1955 (New York: Macmillan, 1956); John C. Clews, Communist Propaganda Techniques (New York: Praeger, 1964); or Lawrence Eagleburger, “Unacceptable Intervention: Soviet Active Measures,” NATO Review (April 1983).

171. Cyril Barclay, The New Warfare (London: Clowes, 1953); Peter Watson, The War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology (New York: Penguin, 1980); and McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft.

172. Michael McClintock, “Emulating the Europeans: American Counter-insurgency and Unconventional Warfare” (unpublished paper, written in May 1990, in author’s possession); Jacques Ellul, Propaganda (New York: Knopf, 1971); Bennett Clark, “The BBC’s External Services,” International Affairs (London) 35 (April 1959):170–80; or Carey McWilliams, “Knights in Shining Buicks,” Nation 172 (January 6, 1951).