The literature reviewed thus far consists of the primary texts of recollection often referred to as mūlasmṛti, the foundational treatises. Their discussions of the epistemological issues relating to law and dharma are concise and declarative. There is little or no discussion about problems inherent in the epistemology they espouse, no window into the deliberations and debates that must have taken place among scholars of the time. We see just the tip of the iceberg; what lies below the surface has to be mined through careful analysis of the texts, often by reading between the lines. Consequently, my own introductions to and commentaries on these texts tended to be overly long. I have tried to reveal what may lie hidden behind the straightforward statements of these authors.
The second half of the first millennium
C.E., in contrast, was the age of commentators. They engaged directly, forcefully, and in great detail with the theoretical issues connected to the epistemology of dharma. This was the golden age of Indian scholasticism when authors in numerous systems of knowledge, including philosophy, logic, and exegesis, engaged in written debate with their opponents.
1 These discussions generally had the format of presenting the views and objections of opponents, technically called
pūrvapakṣa, and then responding to those objections, thereby establishing the doctrine supported by the author. In presenting these texts, I have distinguished typographically the views of the opponents, given in italics, and the doctrinal positions of the authors, given in roman type. These theoretical writings bring to the surface the debates and disagreements underlying the texts of the earlier period.
The earliest of these commentarial writings come from the school of Vedic exegesis. The concept of dharma was at the heart of such exegesis, because Vedic in
junctions that laid the foundation of the ritual system were considered to be also the foundation of dharma. For Vedic exegesis, dharma is basically ritual activity. The foundational text of this school, the
Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (
PMS 1.1.2), gives the definition of dharma at the very outset (see
ch. 6.1: #1).
In this chapter are samples from two early writers of the school, Sabara and Kumarila. Their writings are extensive and, given the limits of this volume, I can only present brief extracts that are hopefully representative of their views on the epistemology of dharma. Several issues occupy the foreground in their discussions.
First, is dharma based solely on Vedic injunctions? And do all Vedic injunctions constitute dharma? This is the first topic taken up by Sabara. Second, is all of dharma found explicitly in the Veda? If not, what are the additional sources of dharma? This brings up the issue of texts of recollection and their relationship to the Veda. Even though Manu explicitly equates the category of texts of recollection with treatises on dharma, the former often included other authoritative texts. If all these texts are based on the Veda, then how can we exclude from this authoritative corpus texts such as those of the Buddhists that also can claim to be texts of recollection?
Vedic exegesis provided theoretical infrastructure to scholars working within the legal tradition of the science of dharma. We will see in the next chapter how these jurists integrate exegetical categories and theories while at the same time departing from them, because for the jurists dharma was not simply ritual but pervaded all areas of human and social life, especially law, statecraft, and legal procedure.
We have no credible information about Sabara’s life, even about when and where he lived and worked. The text on which he wrote his great commentary, the
Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, is likewise of uncertain date. Some have dated it to between the fourth and second century
B.C.E., while others place it in the second century
C.E. There appears to be a scholarly consensus that Sabara himself should be dated to the fifth century
C.E., even though this is simply a reasonable conjecture.
2I give here three extracts from Sabara’s commentary. The first deals with the definition of dharma and its foundation in the Veda. A noteworthy point is that, for Sabara, not all Vedic prescriptions constitute dharma, because some of them are detrimental (
anartha). The second is a long argument on the authority of texts of recollection. It starts with an extended objection that includes the aphorism 1.3.1 of the
PMS. The opponent argues a conservative position, namely, that only the Veda can provide a secure foundation for dharma and anything other than the Veda must be rejected. Sabara’s response takes up the remainder of this extract. He finds many injunctions in texts of recollection, such as constructing
water reservoirs and going behind a teacher, to have visible purposes (
dṛṣṭārtha) and to be authoritative simply on that basis. But precisely because of this, they do not constitute dharma, which, by definition, must have an invisible purpose (
adṛṣṭārtha). The final extract deals with the authority of customary practice with respect to dharma. It rejects the notion, already present in Baudhayana (see
ch. 2.2: #3) that some practices are authoritative only in particular regions (
deśadharma). For Sabara, dharma and injunctions that form its basis should be universally valid.
Sabara is comfortable with the fact that some texts of recollection, when they are in conflict with available Vedic texts, may be erroneous and, therefore, without authority. This view will be contested by Kumarila, who wants to preserve the authority of all texts of recollection.
1
Dharma is something beneficial disclosed by a Vedic injunction. (PMS 1.1.2)
The beneficial and the detrimental
3—both are here disclosed by injunctions. What is that which is beneficial? It is what leads to ultimate felicity, such as the standard Soma sacrifice. What is that which is detrimental? It is what leads to perdition, such as the Hawk, Thunderbolt, and Arrow sacrifices.
4 In order to preclude the possibility that what is detrimental be taken as dharma, the author uses there the expression “something beneficial.”
How is that detrimental?
Because it involves killing, and killing is prohibited.
How is it that something detrimental is taught as something that must be performed?
We respond: the Hawk sacrifice and the like are never prescribed as things that must be performed. For they are taught in the following manner: “This is the means for someone who desires to kill.” For the scripture lays down: “A man intent on doing sorcery should offer the Hawk sacrifice,” and not: “He should perform sorcery.”
But surely, this aphorism is unable to express both these points: (a) dharma is disclosed by Vedic injunctions and not by sense organs and the like; and (b) dharma is what is beneficial and not what is detrimental. For this is a single sentence, and, if we follow this, it will be split.5
We respond: that would be true in the case of a statement from which an act is learned. That, however, happens in the case of Vedic statements and not aphorisms. Once an act has already been learned from elsewhere, one learns that this aphorism presents that specific act. And therefore, an aphorism gets its name from the fact that it strings
6 together individual parts of sentences. In this aphorism, it should be understood that these two individual parts pertain to two distinct sentences.
Now in what preceded, we have demonstrated that the entire Veda is authoritative. So, now the question arises: When we do not find a Vedic text with regard to something, while texts of recollection state that this act should be performed in this manner and for this purpose, is that so, or not? Here are some examples: “One should perform the Eighth-Day rite”;7 “One should walk behind one’s teacher”;8 “One should dig reservoirs”;9 “One should establish watering places”;10 “One should perform the rite of fashioning a topknot on the head”;11 and so on.
Because Vedic texts are the foundation of dharma, anything lying outside the Vedic texts should be disregarded. (PMS 1.3.1)
It was already stated that dharma is disclosed by Vedic texts in the statement: “Dharma is something beneficial disclosed by a Vedic injunction” (
PMS 1.1.2).
Such an act,13 therefore, should be disregarded, because it lacks that foundation.
Surely, when they knew that this enjoined act should be performed in this manner, how could they in fact say that it should not be performed at all?
Because in such a case recollection is impossible, for one does not recall something one has neither experienced nor heard of. And it is not possible to recall this thing that is found neither in the Vedas nor in the world,14 because a cause that would generate a prior cognition is absent. For if a barren woman were to recall: “This was done by my daughter’s son,” realizing, “I do not have a daughter,” she would recognize that it was in no way a correct cognition.
Nevertheless, just as the recollection of these individuals is authoritative when they say, “This is the Veda,” because that recollection has come down in an unbroken line through the generations, so also this recollection of theirs must be authoritative.
That is not so. Because the text of the Veda is cognized by perception, it is not impossible to have a prior cognition of it. In the case of the Eighth-Day rite and the like that do not have a visible purpose, however, we must assume that it is simply an erroneous recollection, because in their case a cause that would generate a prior cognition is absent. It is like this. Some individual who was born blind may say: “I recall this specific form.” When he is questioned: “Where did you get this prior cognition?” he would point to another man who was also born blind. And where did he get it? From someone else born blind. Thus, even if there is a continuous line of people born blind, learned men will never conclude: “This is a correct observation.” Therefore, these kinds of things should not be treated seriously; they should be disregarded.
Or rather, recollection is authoritative insofar as there is an inference because of the identity of the performers. (PMS 1.3.2)
The expression “or rather” overturns the above viewpoint. Recollection is authoritative, for it is a cognition. How can a cognition become erroneous? Should you argue—
There is no prior cognition of it, because of the absence of a cause.
We must infer a cause for the stability of this very recollection. But it is not experience, because that is impossible, for human beings are unable to experience this kind of act in this very birth, and they do not remember what they experienced in previous births. A text, however, could be inferred, “because of the identity of the performers” of the acts enjoined in the Vedas and in texts of recollection. Therefore, the connection to the Veda made by people of the three social classes is quite appropriate.
15Surely, people don’t perceive this kind of text.16
Even though they do not perceive it, they can infer it, given that forgetting is also a distinct possibility.
17 Therefore, because of the possibility of prior knowledge on the part of the people of the three social classes who have this recollection, and because of the possibility of forgetting, it is indeed possible to infer the text. Hence, texts of recollection are authoritative.
Further, in the Veda one sees mantras with indicators that point to the Eighth-Day sacrifice, such as: “The night whom people welcome joyfully like an approaching cow, the night who is the wife of the year—may she be propitious to us.
Svāhā.”
18 Likewise, practices that are adhered to as the occasion demands are authoritative simply because they have visible purposes. Someone thinks that, because he goes behind the teacher, the teacher, being pleased, will teach him, and, being extremely pleased, will explain the rules of interpretation that would cut through the knotty problems found in texts. Likewise, a text points out: “Therefore, the lesser follows from behind the superior as he goes in front” (
TS 5.1.2.3). Watering places and reservoirs also, it is clearly understood, are for the benefit of others, not for the sake of dharma. And accordingly, there is the textual reference: “You are like the first drink in a wasteland, O fire, for Pūru who seeks to attain you, you age-old king.”
19 And likewise: “They surround the water with a dike” (
TS 1.6.10.5).
20 The fashioning of a topknot identifies one’s Vedic branch. And the textual reference is: “Where arrows fall together like boys with unraveled topknots” (
ṚV 6.75.17). Therefore, those with visible purposes are authoritative precisely because of that. With regard to those with invisible purposes, however, one must infer a Vedic text.
When a text of recollection conflicts with a Vedic statement, however, the former should be disregarded, for only when they do not conflict is there an inference. (PMS 1.3.3)
In a situation, however, where a text of recollection conflicts with a Vedic statement, how should one proceed? Here are some examples. The complete wrapping of the Udumbara post conflicts with the Vedic statement: “He should sing the Sāman chant after touching the Udumbara post.”
21 Living as a Vedic student for forty-eight years conflicts with the Vedic statement: “A man who has fathered a son should establish his sacred fires while his hair is still black” (see
BDh 1.2.3.5). A man who has purchased Soma being a person whose food may be eaten (see
BhārŚr 10.9.4) conflicts with the Vedic statement: “Therefore, after the animal dedicated to fire and Soma has been sacrificed, one may eat at the house of the patron of the sacrifice” (
MS 3.7.8).
Given that the authors of these texts are the same, these are authoritative.
With regard to this conclusion, we say: because it is impossible to carry out these acts, one must conclude that it is an erroneous recollection.
Why is it impossible?
Because touching the post is enjoined, it is not possible both to wrap it completely and for the singer of the Sāman to touch it. Once we recognize that the post should be touched while he is singing the Sāman, what would make us nullify this conviction?
The recollection relating to the complete wrapping, we say.
Surely, that recollection is erroneous because it lacks a foundation.
A Vedic statement must be its foundation.
Yes, a Vedic statement could be the foundation if the injunction to touch is erroneous. If it is not erroneous, however, such a recollection would be inadmissible, because then it would be impossible to touch the post. Just as one cannot assume that a direct perception is inadmissible, so also one cannot assume that a Vedic text is inadmissible.
22Then, what do you make of the recollection regarding wrapping the post completely?
It is erroneous.
For what reason do you assume that it is erroneous?
Because it conflicts with a cognition derived from the Veda.
Then, why isn’t there an option between these two injunctions, in the same way as between “rice and barley” or between “Bṛhad Sāman and Rathantara Sāman”?23
No. An option arises only when there is no erroneous cognition. If the cognition relating to wrapping the entire post is authoritative, then touching it is erroneous; and if the touching is authoritative, then the recollection is erroneous. When you posit an option, however, you then admit in part the authority of the touching, and its foundation is a Vedic statement. If that statement is admitted to be authoritative, then it cannot be partial. The recollection relating to wrapping the entire post, furthermore, is partly authoritative, and with regard to that part, it is not possible to
presuppose a Vedic statement, because such a course is blocked by the cognition relating to touching the post. And therefore, so long as the latter is not erroneous, it is not possible to presuppose a Vedic text. And it is impossible to say that it is not erroneous in one part and erroneous in another part, for the same foundation has to be posited for the one part as for the other. If it is not erroneous in one part, then it should also be not erroneous in the other, because the authority of the Vedic text is the same in both. Further, that Vedic text does not work only in one part, for it is composed of specific syllables, and it is not possible to claim that it is an incorrect reading. Therefore, one cannot conclude that the erroneousness of cognition in one part is transferred to the other part. In the case of the former, however, one assumes that wrapping the entire post is based on a cognition resulting from poor learning, a dream, and the like, because it conflicts with a Vedic text. For there is no authority that would permit one to acknowledge its authoritativeness when it is in conflict with a Vedic text. Therefore, just as in one part one cannot assume a Vedic text, so also in the other part, because the reason for such an assumption is the same in the case of both parts; as also, given their mutual interdependence, because the one is defined by something other than itself.
What is this mutual interdependence?
If the text of recollection is authoritative, then touching the post is erroneous; and if the touching is authoritative, then the text of recollection is erroneous. This is what constitutes mutual interdependence. Between them, the foundation of touching is already established, while that of the text of recollection has yet to be established.
24 The latter is thus defined by something other than itself. Because its foundation has yet to be established, the authoritativeness of the text of recollection is not fully established. Because the latter is not authoritative, touching the post is not erroneous. And because it is not erroneous, the assumption of a Vedic text in support of that text of recollection is untenable, because that text lacks any authority.
If that is the case, is it then not true that, because the cognition of rice as the sacrificial material is also not erroneous, the Vedic text about barley would be untenable?
True, it would be untenable if that Vedic text were not directly perceivable; but it is directly perceivable. For what is directly perceivable cannot in any way be untenable. Because both Vedic texts exist, however, both of them are clearly distinct sentences. Of these two, through one we ascertain that the sacrificial material is only barley, while through the other we ascertain that the sacrificial material is only rice. And an act ascertained through a sentence cannot be rejected. Therefore, it is proper to have an option between rice and barley, as also between the Bṛhad Sāman and the Rathantara Sāman.
Therefore, it has been declared that a text of recollection in conflict with a Vedic statement is without authority. For the same reason, moreover, such injunctions as wrapping the entire post should be disregarded.
And because there is reference to motives. (PMS 1.3.4)
This topic relates to the greater strength of Vedic texts.
25Some, yearning to get the cloth out of greed, wrapped the entire Udumbara post. That is the origin of this recollection. Others, yearning to eat, took to the practice of eating the food of a man who has just purchased Soma. Some, trying to hide their lack of virility, took to practicing Vedic studentship for forty-eight years. So we surmise that it is from these that the recollections originated.
Or this aphorism may constitute a separate topic.
“The offering priest takes the cloth used at the Vaisarjana offering”26 and “They practice the gifting of the cloth wrapped around the post” 27 are authoritative, because their performers are the same.28
With regard to this conclusion, we say that this recollection is not authoritative. It has a different foundation: some undertook these practices because of greed, and from that is derived this recollection. And this is a more appropriate explanation.
3
Because inference has a specific scope, the authority is limited by that. (PMS 1.3.15)
The authority of recollection and of practices is regarded as based on inference. They should be deemed to have authority only when they have the same restricted scope as the cause on the basis of which their authority was established. Therefore, the Holākā rite and the like are to be practiced only by easterners; the Āhnīnaibuka and the like only by southerners; the Udvṛṣabha sacrifice and the like only by northerners.29 This is similar to the specific arrangements of the hair tufts, some having three tufts and others five tufts.30
Or rather, it is the dharma for all, because that is the general rule with respect to an injunction. (PMS 1.3.16)
The expression “Or rather” overturns the previous position. This kind of practice is dharma for all. Why? Because that is the general rule with respect to an injunction. The term “injunction” is derived from “It is enjoined by this,” and means a Vedic text.
It is inferred on the basis of a recollection. It goes against the rule to make it refer to a class or to an individual. There is no single common element among all the performers that could be indicated by some authoritative Vedic text and could be inferred. Therefore, it is the rule that the dharma enunciated by an injunction pertains to all. Why? Its authority consists of the statement: “Enjoined acts should be carried out.” With regard to restricting its scope, on the other hand, there is absolutely no authority.
Kumarila Bhatta was perhaps the greatest theorist of the school of Vedic exegesis and one of the intellectual giants of ancient India. He wrote the most influential treatise of Vedic exegesis, which was, however, a subcommentary on Sabara’s commentary on the
Pūrva-
Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. Kumarila’s treatise is divided into three parts: the
Ślokavārttika covering the first section (
pāda) of the first chapter (
adhyāya) of the
Mīmāṃsā Sūtra; the
Tantravārttika covering the rest of the first chapter, as well as
chapters 2 and
3; and the
Ṭupṭīkā on
chapters 4 through
12.
Although it is technically a subcommentary explaining Sabara’s work, it is much more than that, and Kumarila frequently disagrees with Sabara’s interpretations and presents his own ideas independently. In the extracts here, I give Kumarila’s own views with regard to the authority of texts of recollection, which he takes to be on par with the authority of Vedic texts. On this he disagrees with Sabara, who is willing to reject some texts of recollection that are in opposition to extant Vedic texts as lacking authority. For Kumarila, all traditional texts of recollection must be viewed as authoritative and as based on Vedic texts. He also rejects the view, already found in Apastamba, that some texts of recollection are based on lost Vedic texts. He finds the whole notion of a lost Veda repugnant.
31 When actual Vedic texts cannot be found for a particular text of recollection, Kumarila assumes that there must be such a Vedic text found in various Vedic branches spread across the vast subcontinent (
viprakīrṇaśākhā). Our inability to find them should not have any impact on their authority. The inference of the existence of a Vedic text as the foundation of a text of recollection relates to these dispersed Vedic branches, not to any hypothetical lost Veda.
Thus, Kumarila is against dismissing as unauthoritative any text of recollection that may contradict provisions of available Vedic texts. In such cases, we must assume that the text of recollection has the backing of a Vedic text still to be discovered. Thus, both are of equal authority, giving rise to an option. The only concession that Kumarila is willing to make is that one may opt to follow the provision of the extant Vedic text in preference to that of the text of recollection.
Kumarila, however, is willing to interpret
PMS 1.3.3–4 as teaching that a text of recollection contradicting an extant Vedic text lacks authority, but for him these texts are not the Brahmanical texts such as the treatises on dharma but texts of groups outside the Vedic pale, such as the Buddhists.
(PMS 1.3.3–4: pp. 104–15) First Interpretation: All Texts of Recollection Are Authoritative
Here, we must express the following with respect to both these two topics.
32Given that the Vedic foundation of texts of recollection has been firmly established above, even when they are in conflict with a Vedic text, how is it possible to recognize a different foundation for them?
33For Vedic statements are scattered across different Vedic branches and are only directly perceived by different individuals; they are not recited according to the order in which the dharmas of individuals are performed. So, fearing the loss of the fulsome Vedic tradition, texts of recollection were composed without quoting the Vedic texts in their original form, the Vedic texts being identified by means of writing down their content. These texts of recollection collect in one place the Vedic texts that are not directly perceived but are being disclosed by that very writing down of their content, which takes the place of the specific sounds of the original.
34 Here we have this analogy. When the teacher says, “This is stated in this text,” whether it is actually recited or not, students accept it as true because of their confidence in that trustworthy person. In the same manner, the words of the authors of aphoristic texts, which take the place of a teacher’s words, complete their task after simply presenting the Vedic texts that correspond to them. Thus one should not repudiate them simply because they have human authors, just as one does not when pointing out that sounds are produced from the palate and the like.
35For when men disclose the Veda, saying: “Such indeed is this Veda,” it is just the same whether it is disclosed by men who actually recite or by men who recollect.
Further, at a time when actual recitation is not taking place, the Veda remains in the reciters either as mental impressions alone or as recollections produced by that recitation.
Therefore, when those who express the content and thereby express the Vedic text covering the content of that text of recollection, that Vedic text is equal to a Vedic text that is actually recited. Based on what exegetical rule is it invalidated?
If, furthermore, there is a solitary text of recollection that is un-Vedic in its entirety—discarding just that one, texts other than that become integral parts of everyday practice.
All texts of recollection, my dear fellow,
36 when dealing with rites such as Vedic initiation, are seen to be founded on Vedic texts recited in the
Kaṭha,
Maitrāyaṇīya,
37 and the like.
Then, if among these is found one solitary statement that is a dubious recollection, our tongue finds it impossible to say that it originates from a different foundation (see
ch. 6, note 32).
When an expert in exegesis, furthermore, has invalidated a certain text of recollection, and soon thereafter a Vedic text belonging to another Vedic branch supporting it is discovered, then what will be the color of your face, you who take yourself to be an expert exegete?
In this way, that text will undoubtedly be caught in an unsettled condition of being both validated and invalidated.
38Let us take up this text of recollection regarding wrapping the sacrificial post completely (
pariveṣṭana) that has been presented as an example of a text that contradicts a Vedic text enjoining the touching of the post.
39 Jaimini himself, in the
Chāndogya-Anuvāda,40 has explained (i) that this text of recollection is founded on a Vedic text contained in the
Śāṭyāyani Brāhmaṇa, and (ii) in its chapter on the Udumbara post, that the cloth wrapping the Udumbara post is clearly founded on an explicit Vedic text as a result of the following: “Among people belonging to the Śāṭyāyani branch, one shows the post having the cloth at both ends with its hem above,” and it is shown with the formula: “Vaiṣṭuta is indeed the cloth. Śrī is indeed the cloth. Śrī is the Sāman chant.”
41Therefore, that is not an example of texts subject to invalidation, because it is founded on a Vedic text; for only an option is proper in this case, because the authority of both is equally strong.
Invalidation takes place, moreover, only when there is a contradiction. And there is no contradiction here, for the mere act of wrapping, to our mind, is not contradicted by the Vedic text regarding touching.
If, leaving aside two or three inches in the middle, the Udumbara post is wrapped around the other parts, why would the touching not take place there?
For the author of the aphorism does not say that the entire post should be wrapped; surely no one does the wrapping at the bottom of its ears.
42Even if the prefix
pari, “completely,”
43 points to the wrapping of the post all around, still the injunction would be meaningful if it is done without wrapping it completely.
As to the assumption that the wrapping completely is based on greed, their greed would be even more satisfied with two cloths wrapping the bottom and the top halves.
And the text of recollection would have laid down two cloths of a silken variety, like the ones women use to cover their lower and upper bodies, and not a single cloth without specifications of quality that the chanting priest takes.
[Section from 106, line 7 until p. 110, line 15 is omitted]
Being a Vedic student for forty-eight years also does not contradict a Vedic text because in that self-same text of recollection
44 it is presented as an alternative course, or rather because it is possible to take it as referring to another order of life.
45 Accordingly,
The statement “After studying the Vedas, or two Vedas, or even one Veda in the proper order” (MDh 3.2) is made after taking into account the capacity of the individual or his suitability for a particular order of life.
Gautama also presents the first alternative for those intending to assume the household life quickly: “To study a single Veda, he should live as a student for twelve years” (GDh 2.45), and then, in the context of the second alternative, gives the total of forty-eight years: “Or, in the case of all the Vedas, twelve for each Veda” (GDh 2.46).
With regard to the latter, we can say this. This rule is intended for people who are blind, lame, and the like and are thus incapable of undertaking the life of a householder.
They are forced to embrace either perpetual studentship or the life of a wandering ascetic. For that reason, this is stated at the beginning.
[Section from p. 111, line 1 until line 14 is omitted]
Therefore, we never see much of a contradiction between a Vedic text and a text of recollection, for it is between two Vedic texts that we see such contradiction; or rather, even that is never encountered anywhere.
Therefore, here either the aphorism describes the employment of a rite or else, with respect to the texts of recollection of excluded people, it states that they are to be invalidated.
46Jaimini, indeed, who imparts extremely beneficial instruction, has taught this to those who seek knowledge.
When one rite is found in a text of recollection and another in a Vedic text, then, given that they are in conflict, it is preferable to perform the rite given in the Vedic text.
Even in the case of injunctions given in perceptible Vedic texts, such as that pertaining to rice and barley, if someone carries out his activities throughout his life following just one alternative, he will never become the object of reproach.
47Therefore, even if a text of recollection has an equivalent authority, nevertheless people following an act laid down by a Vedic text do not incur any fault.
Let us take the statements in texts of recollection, which complete their task after teaching just the enjoined acts without having cited the Vedic texts that provide their foundation. Given that to be authoritative, those statements require the manifestation through inference of corresponding Vedic texts, one should place much greater trust in an actual statement of the Veda because it has greater force, insofar as it is independently authoritative. Because of the resultant abundance of faith, one recognizes the act that should be more readily followed.
The meaning of the aphorism also should be construed in this manner. When there is a conflict between the provisions of Vedic texts and texts of recollection, what is “nondependent”—whether this is read as what is without dependence or as what does not need anything else to depend on—is, indeed, authoritative. This is done by supplying the word “authoritative” from the previous aphorism to both these readings.
48 Thus what is stated is only for the purpose of acknowledging simply the course of action to be followed at that time.
And, therefore, we will not accept the notion of an absolute rejection of such texts of recollection, given the distinct possibility that they may be based on Vedic texts found in a different Vedic branch. Nor would this hurt the performance of an act enjoined by a perceptible Vedic text. When, however, a Vedic text also comes to light somewhere within a different Vedic branch, a Vedic text that provides the basis for that text of recollection, then an option will, indeed, result, because both of them have equal force.
Is it not true, then, that, applying this very rule, one should not accept a provision in another Vedic branch that conflicts with a provision enjoined in one’s own Vedic branch?
Yes, that is true—
As long as it is known only through reports, it will not be accepted at all. When, however, one actually hears it, then it is not distinguished from that of one’s own Vedic branch.
In this way, therefore, this aphorism points out the distinction between a Vedic text and a text of recollection. The latter is not to be totally invalidated by the former, nor are they entirely equal.
Second Interpretation: Texts of Outsiders Are Unauthoritative
Alternatively, these aphorisms teach that those texts not accepted by experts in the triple Veda should be disregarded, by pointing out that they contradict Vedic texts and that there is reference to motives.
These include, first, the texts dealing with dharma and adharma accepted by Samkhya, Yoga, Pancaratra, Pasupata, Buddhists, and Jains.
49 They take cover in the shadow of the cloak of dharma mixed to a degree with Vedic material. Their sole purpose is to obtain obeisance, benefits, honor, and fame from people; they are compositions founded on reasoning—for the most part, perception, inference, analogy, and circumstantial inference—and containing features such as being contrary to the triple Veda, being incoherent, and apparent beauty. Because of their power demonstrated by the occasional success of a few mantras and medicines of theirs that are able to cure poison, to bring a person under one’s control, to drive away someone,
50 to make someone mad, and the like, they teach various things mostly to earn a living, but that are scented by the perfume of a few things consonant with Vedic texts and texts of recollection, acts such as not injuring, speaking the truth, controlling the self, giving gifts, and showing compassion.
They include, second, texts that are completely outside and that contain eating practices mixed with the customs of barbarians.
Furthermore, this issue is not dealt with under another topic; nor is it an issue that does not need to be addressed, because it is something that is exceedingly well known, just like the cognition of the signification of words such as
gavī.51For if we do not assert that these texts are unauthoritative because we pay no heed to them, others, thinking that we are clearly unable to do so, would consider them all to be of equal authority.
They will fall into the error of abandoning the killing of animals and the like prescribed for sacrifices, because of the beauty and easiness of those texts, their rational arguments, and the powerful influence of the Kali Age.
Or else, given that there is no difference insofar as they have been composed by Brahmans or Kshatriyas, even intelligent people, claiming that these texts are based on
Vedic texts in the same way as the text of Manu and the like, may acknowledge a clear option between their prescriptions and those enjoined by Vedic texts and texts of recollection.
52Therefore, even if some text of recollection of theirs is found to be in conflict with what has been enjoined by Manu and the like, nevertheless one may, in that matter, simply follow the former.
For, without refuting all those that totally contradict the established path of the triple Veda, the purity of dharma will not be achieved.
In support of their viewpoint, they also do, indeed, assert that it is accepted by great people; that, among other things, it has come down from their father and so forth; and that it is esteemed in distant lands.
53In this regard, the only reason for following a particular norm is simply one’s faith in it, because all people follow customs of their fathers, grandfathers, and so forth. Now, with regard to those who acknowledge that texts of recollection, such as that of Manu, also have as their foundation lost Vedic branches, the Buddhists and others might easily say that their own texts are founded precisely on such Vedic branches. For who is able to limit the scope of statements in lost Vedic branches to just those texts? Therefore, so long as some people have adhered to something for a certain length of time and it has gained renown, it may appear to have the same authority when one perceives
54 it as having a foundation in lost Vedic branches, even when it may conflict with perceptible ones. For this reason the author states: “When a text of recollection conflicts with a Vedic statement, however, the former should be disregarded” (
PMS 1.3.3).
First, because these texts were composed by particular men who were making the recollections, they themselves acknowledge that the texts are dependent on something external to themselves. And people who are close to them also know it, because they subscribe to teachings such as the contingent nature of words.
55 Furthermore, these people, like evil sons who detest their father and mother, do not acknowledge that their texts have the Veda as their foundation, simply because they cannot bear to concede that their texts are founded on the same authority,
56 and because they are ashamed to do so.
And one more thing—there may be a solitary statement in a text of recollection that would conflict with a single Vedic statement. All the statements of the Buddhists and the like, on the contrary, with the exception of a few statements dealing with self-control, giving gifts, and the like, are in conflict with all the fourteen repositories of knowledge.
57 They have been composed by people such as the Buddha, who
have deviated from the path of the triple Veda and whose practices are opposed to it. And they have been handed over to deluded men who are outside the pale of the triple Veda and who have for the most part been banished into the fourth social class.
58 Thus they cannot be considered as being founded on the Veda. Besides, who can place his trust in a man who, being a Kshatriya, has undertaken teaching and accepts gifts in contravention of his own dharma, thinking that he will teach the unsullied dharma? And it has been said:
One should shun from afar a man who performs actions that thwart one’s prospects in the next world. How can a man who defrauds his own self do what is beneficial to someone else?
For the Buddha and someone like him, moreover, this very transgression is thought to be an ornament, for which reason he says this:
Whatever acts in the world are done due to the squalor of the Kali Age, may they fall on me; but may the people attain liberation.
59He is praised for precisely these kinds of virtues: “For the benefit of the world, first he assumed the role of teacher that is the province of a Brahman, thus transgressing the dharma of a Kshatriya; then he took upon himself also the violation of dharma by giving instruction on dharma to outsiders, which Brahmans, unable to transgress a prohibition, had not done. Thus did he show his loving kindness to others.” All the people who have been instructed by and follow him, furthermore, act in contravention of what has been prescribed by Vedic texts and texts of recollection and are recognized by their deviant conduct.
Therefore, given that the authors of the books, as well as those who accept them and those who follow them, contradict perceptible Vedic texts, the authority of these books is negated.
For, in the case of these texts that, in the manner already stated, are excluded from the Veda, it is not possible to infer a Vedic text as their foundation.
Moreover, we never find that a particular Vedic branch has become extinct; and because, as explained above, the Veda is eternal, these books do not possess the foundation that these people seek.
For, unlike texts of recollection on Vedic initiation and the like, where there is unanimity among Vedic texts actually found in various Vedic branches, such unanimity is absent in the case of activities such as building Buddhist shrines, worshiping them, and giving gifts to Shudras, and we have already refuted the assumption that they have a different foundation.
With respect to these documents, furthermore, we recognize quite a lot of other causes, such as greed. Once these causes are seen close at hand, there is no possibility of inferring another foundation.
And when Buddhists and others engage in preaching dharma everywhere, they never present that preaching free of a web of reasons.
Furthermore, unlike Gautama and others,
60 they do not acknowledge a foundation in the Veda, and they present reasons that are far removed from dharma.
These are, indeed, people who “should not be shown respect even by word.” For these are “ascetics of heretical sects, individuals engaging in improper activities, and sophists.”
61These very kinds of books, furthermore, have been spoken of by Manu and others as texts that must be shunned:
The texts of recollection that are outside the Veda, as well as every kind of fallacious doctrine—all these bear no fruit after death, for tradition takes them to be founded on darkness. (MDh 12.95)
Therefore, it is established that these kinds of texts that are outside the Veda should be disregarded in terms of their authoritativeness with respect to dharma.
