A Dharma Reader: Classical Indian Law

Manu introduced three major innovations in comparison to the previous literature of the dharma tradition, at least two of which had a direct impact on the epistemology of law. First, he composed his text entirely in simple thirty-two-syllable verses called śloka. Second, he created a narrative structure that consists of a dialogue between a divine and transcendent being in the role of teacher and others desiring to learn from him. Third, he incorporated into his text a long exposition on the king, state administration, and especially judicial procedure derived at least partly from Kautilya’s Treatise on Politics.

Late Vedic texts, especially the early prose upaniṣads, regularly cite verses in support of statements and viewpoints. It appears that these verses were somehow viewed as having greater authority than prose and therefore as lending greater support to the author’s views, much like citations from scripture. This practice was continued by the authors of the aphoristic texts on dharma, who also cite verses to support or confirm views they have already presented in prose and often introduce them with “Now, they also quote” (athāpy udāharanti), indicating that these verses were well-known sayings that experts would use in support of a particular practice or viewpoint.²

It appears, then, that during the last few centuries prior to the Common Era śloka verses had assumed an aura of authority, and proverbial wisdom was transmitted as memorable verses. The logical outcome of this tendency was for important texts themselves to be composed in verse, lending authority to a text by its very literary genre. We see this already in some of the earliest Buddhist texts, such as the anthologies of the Suttanipāta and the Dhammapada and in the verses of the Jataka tales. The same process was probably responsible for the fact that the early prose upaniṣads, such as the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya, are followed by a series of upaniṣads composed entirely in verse, such as the Kaṭha, the Muṇḍaka, and the Śvetāśvatara. The parallel between the older and the later upanisads is true of the dharma literature as well. Whereas the earlier texts are in prose with verse citations, the later ones are composed entirely in verse. The first such text was that of Manu. His use of verse for the composition of his treatise must have been part of a deliberate plan to lend the kind of authority to his text that would come only through this literary genre. Most later authors of treatises on dharma followed Manu’s example.

The second innovation in his composition is its narrative structure. An anonymous group of seers approaches Manu and asks him to teach them dharma. Manu accedes to their wishes. He narrates the creation of the world up to the emergence of human society hierarchically arranged into the four social classes. Then he asks his pupil Bhrigu to teach them the rest (1.59). Bhrigu takes up the task in earnest; the rest of the book is his oral teaching. Although the text is mediated by a series of tellers and hearers, its ultimate authority lies in its original promulgator, the Creator himself. Paralleling the Buddhist doctrine of buddhavacana, the words of the Buddha, and doing one better than that, Manu’s text grounds its authority (pramāṇa) on the svayambhūvacana, the words of the Self-Existent One, the very ground of creation. This appeal to a single source of authority stands in sharp contrast to the traditional source of authority for and means of knowing dharma, namely the Veda supplemented by texts of recollection (smṛti) and the practices (ācāra) of authoritative communities. Indeed, Manu presents the latter doctrine when he discusses the sources of dharma in chapter 2. There is thus a disjuncture between the narrative structure of chapter 1 and the body of the text. The author is a traditional pandit, and his habitual methods of reasoning, argumentation, and public presentation take over in the substantive parts of the text.

The third innovation of Manu is the incorporation of the duties of the king and judicial procedure (chapters 7–9). These subjects were treated perfunctorily by the earlier aphoristic texts on dharma, but Manu deals with them in detail. They were borrowed from the tradition of political science, and there is clear evidence that Manu had the original version of Kautilya’s work before him when he composed these sections.³

Even though Brahmanical exceptionalism is present in the aphoristic texts on dharma we have examined, this ideology takes center stage in Manu, as seen in selection #1. His entire treatise is organized around the Brahman and his central and exceptional position within society. The Brahman is the subject of the first six chapters, whereas the next three chapters are devoted to the duties of the king. The other two social classes, Vaishya and Shudra, are discussed summarily in just ten verses at the very end of chapter 9.

In selection #2, Manu presents a more traditional discussion of the epistemology of law. We can detect three sections within this discussion, and the author appears to move from more general or traditional doctrines to his own specific view. The first paragraph gives five sources of dharma, the first three taken from Gautama and the fourth from sources that advocate the primacy of practice (ācāra), while the fifth appears to be something novel and perhaps the author’s own contribution: what is pleasing to oneself (ātmatuṣṭi).⁴

The second paragraph is a eulogy of Manu and his legal treatise: everything laid down there is based on the Veda. This paragraph ends with the compound śrutismṛti (Veda and recollection) that was articulated by Vasistha; these are the primary foundations of dharma. The third paragraph is a gloss on the second and explains the precise meanings of the two terms śruti and smṛti. For the first time smṛti is defined not just as text but as treatise on dharma. It also appears that here this treatise is identified with the specific one authored by Manu.

The third and final paragraph provides the final and concise view regarding the epistemic sources of dharma. They are now reduced to just four: Veda, texts of recollection, practice of good people, and what is pleasing to oneself. Here we find “conduct” (śīla) of Gautama silently eliminated and absorbed into “practice” (ācāra). Manu’s innovation, what pleases oneself, was recorded by his successor, Yajnavalkya (ch. 4.1: #2), but gradually faded away in later epistemological discourse.

In selection #3, Manu deals briefly with the situation when two sources of law are in conflict, but his discussion, unlike that of Gautama (ch. 2.1: #1), is limited specifically to conflicts among Vedic injunctions rather than among diverse sources. The example is the Vedic texts that enjoin that the morning fire sacrifice be performed before sunrise, after sunrise, and at daybreak. All these are authoritative. In Vedic hermeneutics, such a conflict gives rise to an option; a person may follow any one of these injunctions.

Having defined the meanings of śruti and smṛti, Manu turns in selection #4 to the third significant category, sadācāra, the practice of good people. In defining this category, he resorts to the sacred geography already described by his predecessors. He expands their taxonomy to a broader region extending at its largest to almost the entirety of northern India. However, it is the practices of good people living in two more restricted regions— the Brahma land and the region of Brahman seers—that become an authoritative source of dharma. The old Arya land becomes now a larger region stretching from the eastern to the western sea.

The centrality accorded to the Veda in the three texts presented in the previous chapter is taken to a new level by Manu (selection #5). The movement away from the multiplicity of the Veda with respect to individuals in different Vedic branches (śākhā) is continued. In this passage that comes at the conclusion of the treatise, Manu uses for the first time the expression vedaśāstra (scientific treatise of Veda), presenting the Veda as a singular scholarly treatise on dharma. It is from this treatise that everything, including the physical universe, the human society, and the laws governing it, has come into being.

Here we also encounter a statement that comes close to recognizing competing scriptural traditions, which would become a concern for later authors such as Kumarila and Visvarupa (chs. 6.2 and 7.3). Manu talks about the scriptures that are outside the Veda (vedabāhyāḥ śrutayaḥ), a veiled reference to the scriptural traditions of the new religions, especially Buddhism. In some of his manuscripts and commentaries the term smṛtayaḥ is used in place of śrutayaḥ, pointing to texts of recollection that fall outside the Vedic tradition.

At the conclusion of his work (selection #6), Manu turns to the question of those areas of dharma that may not be addressed in the normal sources such as the Veda and texts of recollection, much like Apastamba at the end of his work (ch. 1.1: #3). But unlike Apastamba, Manu points to a much more restricted set of resources for resolving such problems, all centered on the Brahman. The first such resource is the “cultured elite” (śiṣṭa), but for Manu he is simply a very learned Brahman without any reference to his place of residence; Arya land is removed from the definition. The second resource is the legal assembly (pariṣad), and the third is simply a learned Brahman.

Like Vasistha (ch. 2.3: #6), Manu in selection #7 extolls ācāra, again interpreted not simply as the normative practices of a community but with a deeply moral connotation as good conduct of virtuous people. Here Manu returns to the two other sources of dharma, scripture and texts of recollection (śrutismṛti), but gives pride of place to good conduct. In the second of the two passages, he appears to claim that the root of dharma is actually good conduct, and it is this good conduct that is set forth in the Veda and the texts of recollection.

In selection #8, we have for the first time a clear articulation of the theory of world ages (yuga), whose use as an interpretive tool to make some rules and practices found in ancient text obsolete and nullified for contemporary society I have discussed in the introduction.

Manu was seated, absorbed in contemplation, when the great seers came up to him, paid homage to him in the appropriate manner, and addressed him in these words: “Please, Lord, tell us precisely and in the proper order the dharmas of all the social classes, as well as of those born in between;⁵ for you alone, Master, know the true meaning of the duties contained in this entire ordinance of the Self-Existent One, an ordinance beyond the powers of thought or cognition.”

So questioned in the proper manner by those noble ones, that Being of boundless might paid honor to all those great seers and replied: “Listen!” (1.1–4)

“After composing this treatise, he himself⁶ in the beginning imparted it according to rule to me alone; and I, in turn, to Marici and the other sages.⁷ Bhrigu here will relate that treatise to you completely, for this sage has learned the whole treatise in its entirety from me.”

To determine which activities are proper to him ⁸ and which to the remaining classes in their proper order, Manu, the wise son of the Self-Existent, composed this treatise. This should be studied diligently and taught to his pupils properly by a learned Brahman, and by no one else.

When a Brahman who keeps to his vows studies this treatise, he is never sullied by faults arising from mental, oral, or physical activities; he purifies those alongside whom he eats,⁹ as also seven generations of his lineage before him and seven after him; he alone, moreover, has a right to this entire earth.

This treatise is the best good-luck incantation; it expands the intellect; it procures everlasting fame; and it is the ultimate bliss. In this, dharma has been set forth in full—the good and the bad qualities of actions and the timeless normative practices— for all four social classes. (1.102–107)

Whatever dharma Manu has proclaimed with respect to anyone, all that has been taught in the Veda, for it contains all knowledge. After subjecting all this to close scrutiny with the eye of knowledge, a learned man should apply himself to the dharma proper to him on the authority of scripture, for by following the dharma proclaimed in scripture and texts of recollection, a man achieves fame in this world and unsurpassed happiness after death.

“Scripture” should be recognized as “Veda” and “text of recollection” as “treatise on dharma.” These two should never be called into question in any matter, for it is from them that dharma has shined forth. If a twice-born man disparages these two by relying on the science of logic, he ought to be ostracized by good people as an infidel and a denigrator of the Veda.

Veda, texts of recollection, the practice of good people, and what is pleasing to oneself—these, they say, are the four visible marks of dharma. The knowledge of dharma is prescribed for people who are unattached to wealth or pleasures; and for people who seek to know dharma, scripture is the highest authority. (2.6–13)

The region created by the gods and lying between the divine rivers Sarasvati and Drisadvati is called “Brahmavarta”—the Brahma land. The practice in that region handed down from generation to generation among the social classes and the intermediate classes is called the “practice of good people.”

Kuruksetra and the countries of the Matsyas, Pancalas, and Surasenakas constitute “Brahmarsidesa”—the region of Brahman seers, which borders on the Brahma land. All the people on earth should learn their respective customs from a Brahman born in that region.

The region between the Himalaya and Vindhya ranges, to the east of Vinasana and west of Prayaga, is known as “Madhyadesa”—the middle region.

The region between the same mountain ranges extending from the eastern to the western sea is what the wise call “Aryavarta”—the Arya land.

The natural range of the black antelope is to be recognized as the region fit for sacrifice; beyond that is the land of barbarians.

Twice-born people should diligently settle in these lands; but a Shudra, when he is starved for a livelihood, may live in any region at all. (2.17–24)

The Veda is the eternal eyesight for ancestors, gods, and humans, for the Vedic treatise is beyond the powers of logic or cognition—that is the settled rule. Those scriptures that are outside the Veda, as well as every kind of fallacious doctrine—all those bear no fruit after death, for texts of recollection take them to be founded on darkness. All those different from the Veda that spring up and then flounder—they are false and bear no fruit, because they belong to recent times.

The four social classes, the three worlds, and the four orders of life, the past, the present and the future—all these are individually established by the Veda. Sound, touch, visible appearance, taste, and the fifth, smell, are established by the Veda alone; their origin is according to attribute and action. The eternal Vedic treatise bears all beings; it is the means of success for these creatures; therefore, I consider it supreme.

Alternatively, when a legal assembly with a minimum of ten members, or one with a minimum of three members firm in their conduct, determines something as dharma, no one must question that dharma. Three persons who know the three Vedas, a logician, a hermeneut, an etymologist, a scholar of treatises on dharma, and three individuals belonging to the first three orders of life¹³ —these constitute a legal assembly with a minimum of ten members. A man who knows the Rig Veda, a man who knows the Yajur Veda, and a man who knows the Sāma Veda—these should be recognized as constituting a legal assembly with a minimum of three members for settling doubts regarding dharma. When even a single Brahman who knows the Veda determines something as dharma, it should be recognized as the highest dharma, and not something uttered by myriads of ignorant men. Even if people who have not kept the vows or studied the Veda and who use their caste only to make a living come together in their thousands, they do not constitute a legal assembly. When fools, befuddled by darkness, make a pronouncement without knowing dharma, that sin, compounded a hundredfold, stalks those who proclaim it.¹⁴ (12.108–115)

Good conduct is the highest dharma, both what is declared in scriptures and what is given in texts of recollection. Applying himself always to this treatise, therefore, let a twice-born man remain constantly self-possessed. When a Brahman has fallen away from good conduct, he does not reap the fruit of the Veda; but when he holds fast to good conduct, texts of recollection say, he enjoys its full reward. Seeing thus that dharma proceeds from good conduct, the sages understood good conduct to be the ultimate root of all ascetic toil. (1.108–110)

He should tirelessly follow the root of dharma, namely, the conduct of good people, which is well set forth in scriptures and texts of recollection and is closely tied to the activities proper to him. For by good conduct he obtains long life; by good conduct he obtains the kind of offspring he desires; by good conduct he obtains inexhaustible wealth; and good conduct obliterates inauspicious marks. For a man of evil conduct is the object of contempt in the world. Woes follow him at all times—afflicted with sicknesses and living a short life. Even if he lacks any auspicious mark, a man of good conduct, full of generosity and free from envy, will live a hundred years. (4.155–158)

In the Krita Age, dharma is whole, possessing all four feet; and so is truth. People never acquire any property through adharmic means. By acquiring such property, however, dharma is stripped of one foot in each of the subsequent ages; through theft, falsehood, and fraud, dharma disappears a foot at a time. (1.81–82)

There is one set of dharmas for men in the Krita Age, another in the Treta, still another in the Dvapara, and a different set in the Kali, in keeping with the progressive shortening¹⁵ taking place in each age. Ascetic toil, they say, is supreme in the Krita Age; knowledge in the Treta; sacrifice in the Dvapara; and gift-giving alone in the Kali. (1.85–86)