A Dharma Reader: Classical Indian Law

Within the literary tradition of the science of dharma, there was a transition during the second half of the first millennium C.E. from composing original legal treatises to writing commentaries on received treatises that had attained a high level of acceptance and authority. The exact dates of the early commentators are difficult to determine, but the best guess is that the extant commentaries were composed between the seventh and tenth centuries C.E. My designation of “early commentators” refers to those who lived during these four centuries.

We know from references in the extant documents of the period, especially in Medhatithi’s extensive commentary on Manu and in later medieval commentaries and legal digests, that a large number of significant commentaries were written during this period. Unfortunately, very few have survived. These works show that this was a vibrant period of intellectual activity, with significant advances in jurisprudence and lively and forthright debates among authors.

The works of only four commentators from this early period have survived: Bharuci and Medhatithi (on Manu), Asahaya (on Narada),¹ and Visvarupa (on Yajnavalkya). With the possible exception of Visvarupa’s, none of these commentaries is intact.

It is, of course, impossible to know the reasons for the disappearance of such a large number of significant works from the medieval manuscript tradition. I can offer a couple of hypothetical reasons, which cannot rise beyond the level of educated guesses. First, as already noted, a new genre of texts within the science of dharma came into being probably around the twelfth century C.E. This genre is generally called Nibandha or legal digest. The aim of the digests was to gather as many discrete texts from the treatises on dharma bearing on different topics as possible, and to arrange them topically. Their encyclopedic nature made it easier for a reader to navigate the various topics of dharma and to find normative texts bearing on each. It also tended to flatten the intellectual landscape, the intent being not to highlight changes, differences of opinion, and conflicts but to give a unified and often uniform theological presentation. The numerous citations are interspersed with sparse comments. These digests may have made the preservation and copying of ancient commentaries less important. Second, many, though certainly not all, of the medieval commentaries appear to be meant for students working their way through the Sanskrit text. They are short and concerned more with grammar and the meaning of individual words than with larger issues of jurisprudence. One can see this starkly by comparing the long and learned commentary of Medhatithi with the parallel medieval commentaries on Manu. The intellectual milieu, with some notable exceptions we will consider below, within the legal tradition was not conducive to heavy intellectual tomes. The manuscript history of Medhatithi’s works itself demonstrates this disregard. In fourteenth-century northern India, it was impossible even for a king to procure a complete or undamaged manuscript of his commentary. The need to be concise and to address an audience not of experts but of the uneducated is illustrated by a verse at the very beginning of Vijnanesvara’s commentary on Yajnavalkya’s treatise. He calls his own commentary one of “measured syllables” (mitākṣarā), intended to enlighten the uneducated and children (bālabodha), and he contrasts his composition to that of his predecessor Visvarupa, whose commentary he calls verbose (vikaṭa).

We can also see the indebtedness of these jurists to the labors of the Vedic exegetes examined in the previous chapter. The arguments about the epistemology of dharma presented by these authors echo those of the exegetes, except that the jurists encounter greater difficulties in maintaining that all dharma should be based on Vedic injunctions. This principle, already hard to maintain within the ritual realm with which the exegetes were concerned, becomes almost impossible to sustain when applied to the broad areas of law and jurisprudence. Medhatithi in particular acknowledges this and concedes explicitly that not all of what is taken to be dharma is actually based on the Veda.² Others, even though they stick to the party line, admit diverse sources of dharma, including the norms of various professional and ethnic groups and even the edicts and orders of the king.

Authors writing in the second half of the first millennium were much more interested in the epistemological issues relating to dharma and law than those writing in the first half of the second millennium. Both Visvarupa and Medhatithi have extended discussions of these issues. Thus, Visvarupa’s commentary on Yajnavalkya 1.7 covers fourteen printed pages, while Vijnanesvara’s commentary is limited to just six lines! Medhatithi’s commentary on the parallel verse of Manu 2.6 covers twelve printed pages, while later commentators spend just a few sentences to explain the grammar of the verse (see ch. 8.1).

In the back of their minds, both Visvarupa and Medhatithi have the Buddhist scriptures in view; they form the subtext to their arguments.³ They have to make room for the authority of texts of recollection, specifically the treatises on dharma, without opening the door to Buddhist and other sectarian scriptures. The authors writing a few centuries later, such as Vijnanesvara and Apararka, hardly mention the Buddhists; they were no longer a living presence.

Bharuci⁴ is the earliest commentator of a treatise on dharma whose work has survived. In fact, until recently his commentary on Manu was known only through references and citations in other works. An incomplete manuscript was discovered in Trivandrum, Kerala, and was translated and edited by Derrett (1975). The extant commentary begins, unfortunately, at chapter 6. Thus we do not have his commentary on the important verses of the second chapter, in which Manu deals with the epistemology of dharma. Fortunately, Medhatithi provides some extracts from Bharuci’s commentary that bear on the epistemology of dharma.

Medhatithi refers to Bharuci as vivaraṇakāra (see Derrett 1975, I: 10) the author of the Vivaraṇa (Exposition), which was apparently the title of Bharuci’s commentary. Medhatithi, explaining the many alternative interpretations of the authoritativeness of acts given in texts of recollection, at one point says that Bharuci has explained this in detail: “These and other alternatives have been examined by the author of the Vivaraṇa” (see p. 130). So it is clear that Bharuci had an extensive commentary on Manu’s verses dealing with epistemological issues. In commenting on MDh 2.6, Medhatithi cites an extended passage from Bharuci’s commentary on this verse. This is given in section #1.

In his commentary on Manu 7.13 (section #2), Bharuci is basically unwilling to accept the literal meaning of Manu’s verse that permits the king to establish a dharma. The alternative interpretation he suggests is interesting in that he accepts the existence of a worldly dharma (laukikadharma) side by side with the Vedic dharma. A similar position is espoused by Medhatithi. Implicitly, then, not all dharma is based on the Veda.

It has been argued that the Hawk rite and the like⁵ are adharma, because they are forbidden. That is true. Nevertheless, even though they are forbidden, for a person who has gone beyond the purview of the prohibition “One should not kill living creatures,” ⁶ because of his excessively fierce hatred, these rites, when they are being performed,⁷ produce the joy linked to the killing of his enemy. To that extent, therefore, one cannot deny that dharma is based on the Veda even with respect to rites such as the Hawk.⁸ Even in the case of prohibitions, it is a man bent on killing out of passion who is directed to heed the prohibition. To implement a prohibition only means not implementing what is being prohibited.

In the case of the animal dedicated to fire and Soma and similar rites, however, there is no prohibition of killing at all, because what the prohibition prohibits is the common killing found in the world that is prompted by hatred. Killing sanctioned by scripture and prompted by injunctions, however, does not fall within the scope of that prohibition, because its objective is achieved in its application to common killing found in the world. It is not possible, furthermore, through inference from the particular to the general⁹ to deduce that Vedic killing causes sin just as common killing found in the world does, insofar as both share the characteristic of killing. This is because the reason something causes sin is not killing as such but the fact that it falls within the scope of a prohibition. And we have already noted that there is no prohibition with respect to Vedic killing. (fragment cited by Medh on MDh 2.6; Jha p. 62)

The king is certainly not the cause with respect to the origin of the dharma of social classes and orders of life, because dharma and adharma are defined by scripture. In that way, furthermore, there would be the absence of a general norm, and there must be a scriptural text that creates general norms.¹¹ Accordingly, this has been repeatedly stated, and anything contrary is untenable. This is because from the context one must understand that the text is aimed at praising the king. Alternatively, this scriptural text should be understood with reference to worldly dharma.¹²

Visvarupa was an expert in Vedic exegesis, and his arguments reflect the thinking of Kumarila, whom he actually cites and with whom he sometimes disagrees. But his language is much more difficult and opaque than that of either Sabara or Kumarila. Ganapati Sastri, the editor of Visvarupa’s commentary, refers to several subcommentaries, none of which has been published. I have been able to obtain copies ¹³ of one, Vacanamālā (Garland of Teachings), which I have used profitably in understanding the argument of Visvarupa. The subcommentary shows that some of Visvarupa’s sentences are so brief as to be almost aphoristic in style. I cannot, nevertheless, claim to have cracked his code completely.¹⁴

At the outset of his commentary Visvarupa presents an extended objection to the authority of texts of recollection by an unnamed opponent. Given the detail and extent of this argument, it is not unreasonable to assume that Visvarupa is here citing or paraphrasing a historical opponent. An interesting aspect of Visvarupa’s response is that one can infer or assume a series of injunctions that are not actually found in the Vedas from a single injunction that is actually found. Thus, from the injunction that one must engage in daily Vedic recitation (svādhyāya), Visvarupa argues the existence of the following injunctions: (1) to teach, because if one is not taught one cannot recite; (2) with respect to qualification, because an unqualified person cannot be taught; (3) to initiate a person, because one cannot teach without initiating the pupil; (4) to produce offspring after learning the Veda; (5) to get married; (6) to have the wife next to oneself in performing rites; and (7) to approach the wife sexually during her fertile season. The opponent actually calls Visvarupa out on this point, saying that if injunctions can be assumed in this way, all the rules found in texts of recollection are nothing but inferences.

You illiterate in sacred scriptures! Don’t speak like that.

For if they had said that texts of recollection and the like are the foundation of dharma without regard to the Veda, then these texts would lack a foundation. When, however, these texts also are not entirely unconnected to the Veda, then talking about the lack of a foundation is idle chatter! They are authoritative, moreover, insofar as they are based on the Veda. Therefore, it is fittingly stated: “that, according to texts of recollection, is the root of dharma.” Accordingly, Manu states, “as also the recollection and conduct of those who know it” (MDh 2.6).

The meanings of “Veda” and “text of recollection” are well known. “Good people” are persons who are free from desire and devoid of pride and the like, and who know the meaning of the Veda and put it into practice. Their practice aimed at an unperceived object is the “practice of good people.” Accordingly, Vasistha states: “Now, the cultured elite are free from desire. Dharma is without a tangible motive” (VaDh 1.6–7). And because it does not form a composed text, it is mentioned as distinct from texts of recollection, like Brahman and wandering ascetic.¹⁶ This fact, however, makes it similar to acts enjoined in sundry texts of recollection.¹⁷ “What is pleasing to oneself” means something that is not in conflict with the Veda and does not involve violence, such as a person taking to renunciation when his family is falling to pieces.¹⁸ Due to fear of uncertainty, however, it has been mentioned as distinct from text of recollection and practice. We will state how this is so when we describe that order of life.¹⁹ “Desire arising out of right intention” is the generation of joy by a person who does not want to harm himself, as, for example, limiting himself to one of two alternative courses. It is mentioned as distinct, however, lest someone suspect that it is of human origin because it proceeds according to one’s desire. The rest is clear.

Alternatively, the term “right” qualifies each term separately. The fact that the Veda is right can be ascertained by analyzing its statements. Texts of recollection are right because of their restriction to those founded on the Veda.²⁰

Alternatively, by the statement “to oneself” is intended the dharma of one’s family, that is, the practice of one’s father and so forth. The qualifications “of good people” and “aimed at an unperceived object” should be applied here also. Accordingly, they say:

“Pleasing to oneself,” however, is “satisfaction of oneself” (MDh 2.6). That also is a foundation of dharma. Now, what precisely is “pleasing to oneself”? It is “desire arising out of right intention.” One man, however, may ascertain the truth merely by being instructed by a reliable person, while another will do so by understanding the foundational authority. As long as such a person has a desire that has undoubtedly arisen out of right intention, then what is pleasing to his self should be recognized as a foundation of dharma. This is unimpeachable even in the case of men with motley thoughts, because desire is restricted by the fact that it must have arisen from right intention. The rest is the same.²¹

Alternatively, the phrase “what is pleasing to oneself” is the defining characteristic of liberation; and the phrase “desire arising out of right intention,” of success and pleasure. That of dharma has already been stated.²² Now, all this is taught in the authoritative texts of recollection. And because the latter are founded on the Veda, intending “Veda alone” it is said: “that, texts of recollection say, is the foundation of dharma.” Further, it is not a fault that the verse presents diverse aims, because they are based on reasoning.

From where,²³ however, is the knowledge derived that texts of recollection are founded on sacred scripture? To begin with, we do not find Vedic statements that provide the foundation for all texts of recollection. Pointing to a few statements, however, is common also to false scriptures.²⁴ Further, the Veda itself is not able to teach that it provides such a foundation. The incapability of inference and so forth, on the other hand, is quite well known. Alternatively, inference and so forth may apply to its opposite, because it is untenable that the Veda in its entirety provides such a foundation.²⁵

First of all, the Veda in the form of injunctions cannot be the foundation, because we do not find such injunctions and because it would make the texts of recollection useless. That is to say—

[section from p. 14, line 11 to p. 17, line 14 is omitted]

Thus, to begin with, the claim that texts of recollection are founded on scattered Vedic injunctions is baseless.²⁹

Mantras and explanatory statements, on the other hand, cannot provide a foundation simply because they are intended for something else.³⁰ Furthermore, a mantra is given within a particular context or outside of such a context. Now, a contextual mantra is clearly intended for something else. The other, the noncontextual, also cannot serve as a foundation, because we do not accept the thesis that indicative signs³¹ lacking an explicit statement contain applicatory injunctions. Given that it is useful in the sacrifice of murmured recitation and the like, the injunction to perform Vedic recitation also is neutral,³² because it does not require anything to supplement it.

Those explanatory statements that are recited without commencing a ritual act, on the other hand, do not provide a basis because (i) before an injunction has been formulated, their reference cannot be ascertained; and (ii) when an injunction has been formulated, they are intended for it.

Someone, however, in order to establish the validity of acts linked to mantras and explanatory statements, could argue that they are founded on sundry injunctions that are presupposed in accordance with them. So, for example, in the mantra devoted to invoking fire, “I begin the sacrifice to you…,” this illustrative statement: “You are like the first drink in a wasteland…,” which cannot be reasonably accounted for according to prevalent usage, formulates another injunction, “Watering places should be created,” in order to establish itself as correct.³³ Likewise, because even in the explanatory statement “Therefore, the lesser follows behind the superior as he goes” (TS 5.1.2.3), a cause is indicated for the donkey following the horse, in order to establish it, they argue that it provides the foundation for the action enjoined by an inferred injunction, such as: “A superior should be followed.”³⁴

That is also unsubstantiated. Even an expression³⁵ originating from a mistake may become the reason to find a basis for an enjoined act. If it is asked how there can be a mistake, we reply that it is caused by this very misapprehension³⁶ of the object of a sentence.

What conflict could there be if it has its basis in reality?

One is forced then to acknowledge the reality even of such things as “a mass of consciousness.”³⁷ And therefore, given that it would result in the denial of an enduring self, it would be difficult to sustain the practices enjoined in the Veda.

Should you argue: “Let it be so!”—who, indeed, would make the Veda unauthoritative by resorting to assumptions, when the authoritativeness of the Veda can be convincingly accounted for without any kind of assumption? Furthermore, as the fact that statements resulting from error and made by those suffering from an eye disease provide a basis for actions is something to be rejected, so also are the statements of these; hence there is no fault.³⁸ Even in the case of an assumption, there is this unavoidable consequence that such statements fall outside the category of texts of recollection as not aimed at the person, because what is included within the words pertaining to a fruitful activity has that itself as its aim.³⁹

The capacity of names to provide a foundation, on the other hand, is totally out of the question, because they are useful simply for the connection between the subsidiary elements and the fruits.⁴⁰

What was stated above also explains the issues relating to taking lost Vedic branches as the foundation, for even those that are lost should necessarily be of the same kind. Furthermore, the loss itself would have to be assumed without any authoritative evidence, for the loss of Vedic branches is not possible, because we do not find any Vedic branch of that sort.⁴¹ In all four Vedas there are some branches that are actually being recited, and in not even one of them do we find anything similar to the dharma prescribed in the texts of recollection. It is improper to take the distinction of Vedic branches to be based on their radical difference from each other. For the Maitrāyaṇī branch is not radically different from the Kāṭhaka.⁴² Or, in making one portion of a Vedic branch the foundation, one would be making an enormous and unprecedented assumption. Making the lost Vedas the foundation, however, is not very smart, given that the four Vedas are well known. Further, it would have the absurd implication that there were no texts of recollection prior to that loss. Or, if the recollecting was carried out from fear of a loss, then even the daily fire sacrifice and the like would have the character of rites based on texts of recollection. Therefore, this view is unsubstantiated.

There are, however, some who think that texts of recollection also are authoritative insofar as they are eternal, just like the Vedas, stating: “They have the appellation of ‘Manu’ and the like only because they were taught by them.” Surely, these unbridled people should keep their mouths shut. For even if they are not subject to annulment, the Veda is the authority because it is not composed by a person, while the claim here that those texts were not so composed is foreign to the whole world. And if that were so, it would be difficult to remove the same characteristic from scriptures of evil people. Should you argue, “Let it be so,” then say good-bye to the authoritative treatises of recollection! The absurd implication would be that even wells, parks, and the like, whose creators are dead, would be similarly without creators simply because they are currently invisible. Further, it would make us conclude that the statements of Manu and others, such as “all that has been taught in the Veda” (MDh 2.7), are lies. Or else, by taking away their fame, one must take these in some way to be explanatory statements through a labored assumption.

Vedic schools⁴³ such as the Kaṭha, furthermore, preserve each its respective Vedic branch, while we have no knowledge of Vedic schools such as the Mānava. Further, it is not possible to say that, like the Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa, the members of these very Vedic branches retain it in their memory, because these schools are not integral to any Vedic branch at all. Anything that we find retained in the memory by people belonging to Vedic branches is there not as the Veda but as a text of recollection, in the same way as a Vedic supplement.⁴⁴ And this gives rise to a lack of regard for vows and recitation.⁴⁵ And one is forced to say that these texts of recollection are not eternal.⁴⁶ Now, if you should argue that only a few authored by Manu and the like are such, the absurd implication would be that those produced by Narada and the like are unauthoritative.⁴⁷ Should you argue, “Let it be so,” then you should point out a specific reason for it. Today, moreover, one would not have regard for a composed text of recollection such as that of Baudhayana, as one would for that of Manu and the like. On the other hand, with regard to the argument that all have emerged without effort from the mouth of Brahman,⁴⁸ it is utterly dense, like the instruction of the Śākya sage!

Furthermore, if we were to grant the eternality of texts of recollection, there would be an interruption of the tradition, because of the absence of an injunction with respect to their study.

Surely, there is: “This⁴⁹ should be studied diligently by a learned Brahman” (MDh 1.103).

That does not enjoin the study of the entire text of recollection, because the term “this” refers to the original text, and one would be incapable of doing this with respect to the original, because it would be contradictory.⁵⁰ And if it be argued that from the meaning of this injunction, “should be studied,” one can make this deduction, then these texts of recollection would not be studied, because (i) an uninitiated person is equal to a Shudra; (ii) it is studied by a person who has been initiated for the sake of the Veda; and (iii) it is said that they teach only a few acts, such as the twilight worship. And for a person who has already studied the Veda, one must expound such things as returning to the teacher’s house. If the study amounts to merely recitation, however, because that also has an invisible purpose, it is difficult to establish a tradition with respect to a text of recollection.

If, however, the texts of recollection were to be founded on the Veda, such study may well come about in some way, because it explicates the injunction regarding engaging in one’s daily Vedic recitation.⁵¹ That this very thing is difficult to establish we have already stated.

In that way, with your broken net of fantasies, the associates with intelligence clever at rebuttal⁵² will not be captured. Now, who could possibly maintain that texts of recollection are authoritative insofar as they are founded on the Veda, in view of the fact that, because they have an unbroken tradition, texts of recollection are also independently authoritative, just like the Veda? Nor can the faults noted above be extended to this case, because one does not accept the eternality of the textual source. Further, textual sources are not all that useful, because there was no time period when the practice of rites enjoined in texts of recollection was nonexistent. The reason is this: in precisely the same manner that agriculture and the like are observed from worldly practice to be associated with specific results and the means to achieve them, so also are the Eighth-Day rite and the like. There is, however, this much of a difference. Agriculture and the like produce results that are imminent but uncertain, while the Eighth-Day rite and the like produce results that are not imminent but certain.⁵³ On the basis of this alone it is not possible to say that the latter belongs to the worldly sphere, because of this very determination of their distinction derived from different epistemic sources. Should you argue that this distinction is an error—we reply: no, it is not an error, because we have eliminated any other epistemic source, and because one recognizes it as firmly established.⁵⁴ And if it is supposed to be an error, one would also have to suspect that what is clearly not Veda has been accepted as Veda. Precisely as the cognition “This is Veda” is not said to be an error even though it pertains to worldly discourse, because it recalls the Veda’s property of signifying, so one must understand also that the results and means presented for rites such as the Eighth-Day rite impose a restriction on their own proper form.

Alternatively, to what does this imperceptibility here pertain? To begin with, the Eighth-Day rite and the like, along with all their subsidiaries, are perceived as they are being performed by other people. And there the terms “Eighth-Day rite” and the like have meanings derived from their etymology, just like the term “Veda.” Further, it is only from their performers that one learns that their performance causes a particular result, in the same way as one learns the particular form of these rites. There is nothing, furthermore, to preclude their application to their correlates as duly postulated due to the impossibility of otherwise accounting for the well-established status of their performance, in the same way that a term has the capacity to bring about the cognition of the meaning associated with it.⁵⁵

Therefore, it was stated that texts of recollection are independently authoritative. Accordingly, he states: “He presented in textual form acts that were not contained in written works.”⁵⁶ Sacred scripture also, after introducing “If from the Ṛc,” and after saying, “from the Yajus; from the Sāman,” states: “If unknown.” And tradition states: “And what is unknown is what is in texts of recollection.”⁵⁷ That is impossible if they were founded on the Veda, because then it is impossible for there to be something totally unknown. For it is not possible to state that something is unknown while describing it as having a known foundation. If, on the other hand, it is viewed as unknown with respect to other people, it is an overextension.⁵⁸ But there would be no conflict under the thesis that texts of recollection are independently authoritative.⁵⁹

Don’t speak like that, you reckless man! The country has a king! Clearly, women married to virtuous men are not independent.⁶⁰ For it cannot be that a worldly practice lacking an authoritative source should support the truth of an act found in texts of recollection, lest such a condition be ascribed also to rites such as the worship of Buddhist shrines. If you object that this is different from the previous because the latter is practiced by those who do not know the Veda—what possibly is the use of those who know the Veda for people who maintain the independence of texts of recollection? The Veda certainly does not become authoritative because it is accepted by those who know it. Nor do agriculture and the like based on worldly activities depend on those who know the Veda. If you argue that these produce visible results—how else could there possibly be a basis in worldly activities? For the world is unable to engage in something that has no visible result without depending on sacred scripture. Now, you may say that it is dependent on worldly practices, just like the words expressive of meaning, but that is untrue. There the impossibility of perceiving a meaning is the basis of the supposition. But here, why would it be impossible, because we notice worldly practice even in such things as the worship of Buddhist shrines? Nor does a difference come about because they are presented in texts of recollection composed by experts such as Manu, because these texts are not different from scriptures of evil people insofar as they are based on worldly practice.

Among people of the three social classes, we see worldly practices that are without visible results, practices that are founded on Vedic injunctions. This ⁶¹ is also of a similar kind. Therefore, here too, we assume, there is a Vedic injunction providing its foundation. It is also not true that, because it would result in a cognition as in the above case, there is thus a conflict with the qualification, because nonperception does not create an obstacle. In the other kind of worldly practice,⁶² however, there is a dissimilarity, because of the absence of invariable concomitance.

Does a Vedic injunction that is not cognized at all promote a worldly practice?

What is the point in this futile deliberation? Of course, it does. And it is not uncognized, because it is inferred generally and specifically. For obligatory acts necessarily presuppose their causes, and precisely in this way they also reveal their respective causes. And in this manner the performance of acts enjoined by injunctions becomes possible. When we take them to be independently authoritative, however, there is the performance of just an activity.⁶³ And in that case, the consequence would be the absence of results of those acts whose results have no connection to their immediate outcome.⁶⁴ One cannot say that the result comes into being at a distant time via the production of mental impressions, because that is obviated by the fact that the activity is said to be worldly, and because of the absence of a cause for that supposition. For this very reason, this viewpoint⁶⁵ is superior. Further, we do, indeed, find actual references that support this.⁶⁶

This viewpoint is indefensible. Clearly the means of proof cannot be gathered from what is to be proven. For how can there be performance in the case of a person who assumes a cause based on the fact that otherwise the performance could not be accounted for? A performance does not take place prior to the assumption of a cause; and when the performance has taken place, it is pointless to assume a cause. If, however, someone should say:

There is no fault when, after seeing the performance carried out by other people, someone infers a cause, because otherwise that performance cannot be accounted for, and on the basis of that starts his own performance.

That is incorrect, for it is not the case that a performance carried out by other people cannot be accounted for, because that has already happened! With respect also to the argument that inference is predicated on the fact that the performers are the same, there too the reason given is of no use. For rites such as the New-and Full-Moon sacrifice do not obtain their character as dharma because they are performed by the three social classes, but because they are enjoined in the Veda. And this latter factor is wanting in the case of the activities under discussion. If someone should argue:

Their performance, insofar as it has no visible motive, makes it dharma.

That also is fallacious reasoning, because even in non-Vedic areas we see the performance of wicked dharma. If you argue—

That is due to error.

If that is the case, it is still fallacious reasoning because here too, the hazard of error is present. If someone should argue:

There is no error because these actions do not face annulment.

That also is unproven, for annulment is demonstrated in the case of actions given in texts of recollection that are opposed to the Veda.⁶⁷ If someone should argue:

Where such an annulment is absent, it is authoritative.

That too is difficult to understand. Every performance, moreover, that is not prescribed by the Veda is, indeed, opposed to the Veda and does have a visible motive.⁶⁸ Therefore, this is also an unsubstantiated viewpoint.

Statements such as “all that has been taught in the Veda” (MDh 2.7) are incoherent. In assuming a cause without a valid means of proof, however, it is like a series of blind men, each following the other. References to authoritative texts⁶⁹ take on validity, however, when they are made in accordance with sound reasoning. This is not the scope of the statement: “The texts are direct injunctions, however, because they refer to what is not already known. Therefore, the eating would be in accordance with direct injunctions” (PMS 3.5.21).⁷⁰ In this manner should one explain in detail all that is to be critically examined.

Texts of recollection, however, are altogether unauthoritative, given that one cannot identify a causal basis for them simply because they have the nature of recollection, just like the recollection of the daughter’s son by a barren woman.⁷¹

“All that has been taught in the Veda” (MDh 2.7).

“Veda is the root of dharma” (GDh 1.1).

“Practice is enjoined with respect to all people, because it is based on the authority of sacred scripture.”⁷²

“Dharma is taught in each Veda. In accordance with that, we will explain it. What is given in texts of recollection is the second” (BDh 1.1.1–3).⁷³

“Veda, text of recollection, practice of good people” (YDh 1.7).

It is, moreover, improper to search for some other foundation by transgressing this kind of agreement. And this agreement is proper with respect to this matter, because there is no other source of knowledge, given that there is the restrictive rule: “Dharma is only that which is disclosed by a Vedic injunction” (see PMS 1.1.2). Assuming an error and the like, furthermore, cannot be accounted for, because that would conflict with the acceptance by those who know the Veda. Nor can their acceptance be accounted for if such practices have a different foundation, like practices such as the worship of Buddhist shrines. Alternatively, if one assumes an error and the like, it would result in even the Veda being not the Veda. Nor is a foundation in the Veda inconceivable, because a text of recollection states: “For Manu and so forth were knowers of the Veda.”⁷⁴ This is also not the result of an error, just like the texts of recollection stating the authorship of texts of recollection.⁷⁵ It is well stated, therefore, that texts of recollection have the Veda as their foundation. He also states:

Did we not say already that it is difficult to account for this very foundation in the Veda? For we have stated the absolute impossibility of accounting for the fact that the Veda is their foundation.

What you said is not right, because the fact that the Veda is the foundation is accounted for through the means of valid cognition. For we discern the fact that texts of recollection are founded on it based on the argument that the acts enjoined by their rules cannot be accounted for otherwise. That is to say, when it is stated, “One should recite the daily Vedic recitation,” given that both that and “One should teach the Veda” cannot be accounted for, one assumes there another injunction.⁷⁷ For the injunction “One should teach the Veda” directs recitation in order to account for itself. The injunction on recitation also, whose practice is accounted for only because of the directive given by the former, would become inoperative without assuming another rule on eligibility.⁷⁸ Further, it is not possible for the teacher to teach the student without first initiating him. Here, in order for the two injunctions to be tenable, one infers another injunction: “One should initiate Brahmans and so forth.” In this manner, at a time after the learning of the meaning of the Veda when the activities of the two injunctions have been carried out, there is the expectation of the injunction with respect to begetting offspring immediately thereafter. Because this cannot take place in the absence of a wife and because sexual pleasure is the only means of accomplishing it, there arises another injunction: “He should marry a woman possessing the proper marks” (YDh 1.52). Further, because the performance of the daily fire sacrifice and so forth requires a wife and her close presence, there arises the injunction about not evading her: “He should offer sacrifice accompanied by her.” So also injunctions such as: “He should approach during her season” (GDh 5.1). Following this very process, one should assume everywhere injunctions that teach a principal act along with those that give the qualifications needed to perform it. Likewise, their connection to subsidiary elements should be ascertained by means of direct statements and so forth, both the perceivable and the inferred.⁷⁹ We will, however, give a meticulous exposition of it in this very commentary on the text.⁸⁰ That being the case, furthermore, there is no difficulty in sustaining the authority of texts of recollection.⁸¹

Is it not true that, if this is the case, it would follow that rules given in texts of recollection are to be understood by implication? Thus, for example, when it is said, “He should make the fire offering with ghee” and “He divides with the Sruva spoon,” there arises another injunction: “He should take the ghee with the Sruva spoon.” For as a fire offering made with ghee containing four portions requires a special instrument capable of dividing, and thus calls for a Sruva spoon and the like, similarly, the injunction regarding the Sruva spoon, “He divides with a Sruva spoon”— an injunction that, by following its own capacity, conforming⁸² to its referent that is a liquid substance, and after taking into account the fact that it is well-adapted to that special quality of ghee—discloses another injunction: “He should take the ghee with the Sruva spoon.” So the implication would be that all injunctions contained in texts of recollection are of this type.⁸³

It is not so, because these rules determine only ritual applications. For only an injunction that is generative or that causes the performance of the enjoined act is the cause of the instruction; not, however, also an injunction that restricts an injunction already generated to just this particular purpose. Thus, there is no contradiction.

In that case, then, the logical consequence would be that even those rules of ritual application given in texts of recollection would become devoid of the character of being given in texts of recollection.

That is not true, because texts of recollection, insofar as they generate ritual acts, are different.

What is the report on the Eighth-Day rite and the like? It is not the case that, in their absence, no injunction at all is possible, because the injunction to recite one’s daily Vedic recitation and the mantras relating to it are established.

To this we say: here also, the injunction to recite one’s daily Vedic recitation containing mantras that name⁸⁴ the Eighth-Day rite and the like is not established. For a naming is not possible when there is an association with the sacrifice of murmured recitation and the like. Nor is there a totally clear cognizance of the rule of ritual application by the strength of which the naming would be obstructed. It is possible, moreover, to teach the connection between the ritual substance and the divinity, and also the fact that a person is entitled to perform the rite, by means of the mantras, while the injunction on Vedic recitation connected to them is not established, and one recognizes that it should be performed. The manner in which the subsidiary elements are connected, however, has already been stated.

Is it not true that, in this way, because there is no distinction of the names, one would infer just the single Eighth-Day rite by means of all the mantras?

It is not so, because of the difference in their capacities.⁸⁵ For mantras teach rites according to their capacity, and there isn’t a capacity that would teach a single rite. Therefore, the distinction among rites such as the Eighth-Day rite is established. Further, this being so, a single person alone is not responsible for performing activities such as the Eighth-Day rite that are learned from all the Vedic branches. It is certainly not the case that when someone performs a rite learned from a single Vedic branch the sin caused by its nonperformance would not be removed. For if the rites were given in textual form, one would not have accomplished one’s task by carrying out one rite among different rites even though they bear the same name. The reason for this is the fact that (i) one recognizes an equal obligation to carry them out; and (ii) one does not recognize that they confer just a single benefit. This would become impossible if they are inferred, because in the case of the Eighth-Day rite and the like that are not connected to different times, when one follows them, they do not produce different benefits. For the benefit should be assumed in a manner that is not in conflict with their known connections to such things as the time. And that is not possible in the performance of diverse rites, for it is not possible to perform diverse rites at a single time. Further, when they are inferred, there is no special attribute created by the subsidiary element of time, such as forenoon, unlike the case when they are given in textual form. A rite given in textual form, moreover, in order to make people carry it out, formulates a sin for its nonperformance.

Duncan Derrett (1967: 19), perhaps the most prominent modern scholar of the Indian legal tradition, calls Medhatithi “probably the greatest jurist of his science: a substantial distinction. Of the hundreds of jurists whose words are available to us none has laboured in quite the same manner as Medhātithi, and many of his qualities are unparalleled.” This praise is well deserved. As we see in these extracts from his great commentary on Manu, he is forthright in his views regarding the nature and the epistemology of dharma. The dharma that he, as a jurist, had to explain and, perhaps, to adjudicate is not one or uniform, nor is it derivable solely from the Veda. The multiplicity of dharma and the sources of dharma, insofar as it is law, that were articulated by Apastamba, Patanjali, and Kautilya many centuries prior to Medhatithi finds a champion in him; and he gave it also a theoretical framework.

Although Kane (I: 575) is correct in his assessment that Medhatithi lived in Kashmir, or at least in northwestern India, he was conversant with legal practices in other parts of the subcontinent, as when he refers to the inheritance practices of the south relating to widows (see ch. 12.2: #1). His date cannot be determined with any certainty, but the second half of the ninth century, a few decades after Visvarupa, appears reasonable.

It is likely that Medhatithi authored several texts. He refers to and cites from one of them, Analysis of Texts of Recollection (smṛtiviveka). Medieval authors refer to and cite from his works. Of these, only his great commentary on Manu has survived. Yet, at least in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Medhatithi’s commentary was not only well known and respected but also referred to as “the Commentary” on Manu. Thus, Devanna Bhatta refers to it simply as bhāṣya, “commentary,” without ascription.⁸⁶ It appears that manuscripts of it were already rare in late medieval India. A verse added at the beginning of the surviving manuscripts states that a king named Madana acquired a copy from another region and undertook what he terms jīrṇoddhāra, the restoration of a decayed or damaged work. This restoration was done probably in the second half of the fourteenth century. We still do not have a good critical edition of this important work.

Medhatithi has, at least from a modern perspective, a refreshingly realistic view of how the treatises on dharma of Manu and others were composed. He does not buy the narrative attached to the beginning of Manu’s text that calls him the son of the creator, from whom he received the treatise on dharma. In his comments on this narrative, he appears to take it as a pedagogical strategy to make people pay attention to and study the treatise. Medhatithi thinks that Manu was simply an entrepreneurial scholar who assembled a team of experts from various disciplines and Vedic schools, gathered material from them, and composed his work. He even claims that a contemporary person can do the same thing: “Even in contemporary times, when a person endowed with the aforementioned qualities and with those very reasons composes a treatise, he becomes authoritative for future generations just as Manu and the like.” For him, therefore, the canonical lists of authoritative texts first listed by Yajnavalkya (1.4–5) and then expanded by later medieval authors (see ch. 8.3: #1) are meaningless.

Medhatithi is equally forthright in the long-standing dispute about how the texts of recollection are related to or based on the Veda. He simply says that there must be a connection, but it is impossible to determine the exact manner in which the two genres of texts are connected.

He acknowledges, moreover, that side by side with the Vedic dharma, there is also a worldly dharma that ordinary people know and that can even be promulgated by a king. He calls such dharma laukika (worldly) or vyāvahārika (conventional) and uses the technical term vyavasthā (norm) to refer to these kinds of norms and laws prevalent in different regions. Such a law can be taught even by an untouchable Candala. At one point, in discussing the dharma of a king, he says candidly that not all dharmas are based on the Veda, and that much of the dharmas relating to king and governance actually have visible goals and motives (dṛṣṭārtha), something that would be anathema to scholars of Vedic exegesis.

Finally, he has a realistic view of texts of recollection and their relation to normative practice (ācāra). There really isn’t much difference between these two sources of dharma in terms of their nature or authority. The only significant difference is that the normative practices are so diverse that they can never be put into textual format.

We see that the term “dharma” is used with reference to what should be done and what should not be done, that is, injunctions and prohibitions that have an unperceived purpose (Introduction, n. 38), as well as with reference to an action falling within their scope. Does the term, however, connote both equally or one of them secondarily? I will not undertake this inquiry here, because I have done so extensively in another book of mine⁸⁸ and because it is of little use here. In both scenarios, nevertheless, in statements such as, “One should perform the Eighth-Day rite” and “One should not eat red garlic,”⁸⁹ we recognize the obligatory nature of performance relating to the Eighth-Day rite and the prohibition relating to the eating of red garlic. Thus, with respect to the result, there is no difference whether dharma is the rite called “Eighth-Day” or the obligatory nature of performance relating to it. And once instruction has been given as to what constitutes dharma, it becomes established by implication that what is contrary to it is adharma. It emerges, therefore, that what is being stated is as follows: the scope of the treatise extends to both dharma and adharma. Of these, carrying out the Eighth-Day rite is dharma, and the avoidance of such acts as killing a Brahman is dharma; not carrying out the Eighth-Day rite is adharma, and carrying out the killing of a Brahman is adharma. That is the distinction between dharma and adharma. (Medh on MDh 1.2; p. 4)

This reinforces that same portrayal of the treatise as comprehensive. The dharmas of regions are those followed in a restricted region and not across the entire earth. The dharmas of castes are those that relate to castes such as Brahmans. The dharmas of families are those instituted within renowned lineages.⁹⁰ “Heretical sects” refers to the practice of prohibited observances; within them, the reference is to the dharmas that derive from texts of recollection of outsiders,⁹¹ mentioned in the statement: “Ascetics of heretical sects, individuals engaging in improper activities” (MDh 4.30). A guild is a company of traders, artisans, performers, and the like. All these dharmas has Lord Manu set forth in this treatise.

How is this verse germane to the treatise, inasmuch as in this work dharma has been announced as the topic to be discussed, and dharma is characterized by injunctions and prohibitions? Here the fact that the Veda is the root of dharma should not be the subject of an injunction such as, “One should recognize the Veda as the root of dharma. One should resort to the Veda as the epistemic source of dharma,” because that is established even without this instruction. For the instructions of Manu and the like are not needed in order to learn that the Veda is the root of dharma. On the contrary, the authoritativeness of the Veda is established as self-evident in the same way as perception, because (i) it is free of any suspicion of presenting falsehoods even by flaws derived from its connection to persons, given that it produces knowledge of an object that is not subject to invalidation and it is not authored by any person;⁹² and (ii) verbal testimony, by itself, is not subject to vitiation. Now, some may object:

After reiterating the authoritativeness of the Veda that is established through reasoning, this verse communicates verbally the fact that texts of recollection, such as that of Manu, have the Veda as their root.

This is also incorrect. Even in this case—given that (i) a recollection necessarily presupposes a prior cognition; (ii) error, deception, and the like are excluded by reasons such as the fact that these texts have been accepted by great men; (iii) it is impossible to perceive acts that transcend sensory perception; and (iv) for a person his own experience is indisputably established—all we are left with is the conclusion that the recollection of acts enjoined in the Veda must be based on the Veda itself. For it is impossible that people who know the Veda would require a recollection relating to an act that they are obliged to perform. And, given that the Veda itself is the root, there is no room to assume some other root. Nor is it correct to say this:

The statement “the recollection and conduct of those who know the Veda” is also a reiteration in order to point out that texts of recollection of outsiders⁹³ lack authority.

The reason is that their lack of authority is established through reasoning alone. For there is no possibility that Buddhists, Bhojakas,⁹⁴ and Jains have any connection to the Veda whereby they would become, by having the Veda as the root, authoritative with regard to matters within their own sphere. This is so also because these people themselves do not claim that, while they do indeed claim that the Veda lacks any authority and they teach things that conflict with perceptible Vedic texts. The impossibility in this case lies in the fact that those texts of recollection forbid the recitation of the Veda. For only if the Buddha and others were reciters of the Veda could the question arise as to whether these texts are rooted in the Veda or not. When, however, their connection to the Veda has been completely discarded, what doubt can there be as to whether their texts are rooted in the Veda? They themselves, furthermore, claim a different root that has come down to us in an uninterrupted succession: “I perceive, O monks, through my divine sight the good and bad courses.”⁹⁵ Likewise, all outsiders without exception, such as the Pacaratrins, Jains, Anarthavadas,⁹⁶ and Pasupatas, claim that the authors of their canonical texts are extraordinary men or special deities who perceive directly the subjects presented in those texts. And they do not even acknowledge that their dharma is rooted in the Veda. In those texts, there are actions taught that are contrary to perceptible Vedic texts. Here are some examples: if people such as Samsaramocakas⁹⁷ state that killing is dharma—such killing is explicitly forbidden in the Veda. Likewise, other traditions hold that bathing at sacred fords is adharma, whereas there is a rule in the Veda: “One should bathe every day. One should visit sacred fords.”⁹⁸ So also some hold that the killing of the animal dedicated to fire and Soma causes sin, which contradicts the Vedic rule regarding the Soma sacrifice. Then there are others who think that all sacrifices and offerings are made for one’s own purpose, which is contrary to what we gather from rules about the distinction between deities, namely, that these sacrifices and offerings are made to different deities.

Now, there are also some who argue:

We see that there are contradictions among perceptible Vedic texts, as in the cases of holding and not holding and of the time for the fire offering as before sunrise or after sunrise.⁹⁹ It is, therefore, quite possible that there is some Vedic branch or other, whether extinct or not extinct, that would provide rules supporting acts that are contrary to perceptible Vedic texts. For the branches of the Veda are innumerable; how can they all be perceptible to any one person? Their extinction is also a possibility. So, among them there may well be a Vedic branch in which these practices, such as eating in a bowl made from human bones and remaining naked-skinned, may be taught.

To this we offer the following reply. We do not say that it is impossible for there to be contradictory teachings in the Veda. On the contrary, there is no obstacle to two optional procedures, because they are of equal weight. In the present case, however, a Vedic text has to be assumed; but there is no room for an assumption that is contrary to a perceptible Vedic text. Further, something cannot be certain merely because it is possible. The rule that contradicts it, however, a rule that is based on a perceptible Vedic text, is certain, and it certainly cannot be annulled by an uncertain rule. And later on, in the context of this same verse, we will discuss extensively the thesis that some Vedic branches have become extinct. Everywhere, furthermore, texts of recollection such as that of Manu are closely connected to perceptible Vedic texts— sometimes to a mantra, sometimes to a deity, and sometimes to rules concerning ritual substances. This is impossible in the case of texts outside the Vedas, and therefore they lack any authority.

The same is true with respect to the contentment of the self.¹⁰⁰

If, furthermore, the authority of the Veda, texts of recollection, and practice is to be gathered through the teaching of Manu and the like, then how do we gather the authoritativeness of Manu and the like? If the answer is that their authority is also gathered from other teachings, such as, “Manu has proclaimed the dharma contained in recollection,”¹⁰¹ then how do we gather the authoritativeness of the latter? Therefore, the judgment that this one is authoritative and this one is not authoritative is to be arrived at through reasoning and not through a teaching. Consequently, this verse is meaningless, as are verses similar to this given later on.

Here the authors of aphoristic texts on dharma, in order to educate uneducated people, have embarked on the composition of their works with the goal of having the enjoined acts carried out. Just as these authors, after they had themselves gathered from the Veda the obligation to perform the Eighth-Day rite and the like, presented those rites in textual form in their aphoristic texts for the purpose of instructing others, so also did they describe such things as the authority of the Veda that are established through other epistemic means. There are some seekers of knowledge who are unable to ascertain the truth through reasoning, because they lack the intellectual abilities, such as rational analysis.¹⁰² With respect to such people, instruction is offered even with regard to acts that are established by reasoning, just like the instruction of a friend. In this connection, the very fact that the Veda is the root of dharma, which is established by reasoning, is simply reiterated in this verse: “The root of dharma is the Veda.” Once the Veda, after due examination, has been established by reasoning as the root of dharma, one should never entertain any doubt with regard to its authoritativeness. There are in the world, furthermore, people who give instruction with respect to matters that are already established through other epistemological means: “You should not eat before your food has been digested, for sicknesses arise from indigestion.” Nor should you claim: “Those who are unable to recognize through reasoning that the Veda is the root of dharma will not comprehend it even through verbal testimony.” And here is the reason: we see that there are some people who consider as authoritative without argument the words of those who are well known as trustworthy individuals.

This Veda¹⁰³—that is, a specific collection of words, without an author, having the appellation “mantra-brāhmaṇa,”¹⁰⁴ and divided according to the distinctions of numerous Vedic branches—is the root of dharma. “Root” means epistemic source, that is, the cause of knowledge.¹⁰⁵ “Root” means cause only insofar as the Veda and texts of recollection cause dharma to be known, not insofar as they produce dharma or cause its stability, as in the case of a tree.

Now, the term “dharma” has already been explained (see selections #1–2). It consists of what a person must do that, insofar as its intrinsic character is different from what can be gathered through perception and the like, is the means of attaining prosperity.¹⁰⁶ Agriculture and the like, indeed, fall within the scope of what a person must do; but its intrinsic character as the means of attaining prosperity can be gathered through positive and negative methods of deduction. With respect to the kind of process through which activities such as agriculture will produce results such as rice, that too can only be gathered through perception and other such means. That sacrifices and the like are means of attaining prosperity, on the other hand, and the manner in which they do so, such as the rise of an unseen effect and its disjuncture from the result¹⁰⁷—all this cannot be gathered through perception and other such means. Prosperity, moreover, is (i) the attainment of a desired object such as heaven and a village, an attainment that is expressed in a general way by the term “happiness”; and (ii) the elimination of the attainment of such results as sickness, poverty, unhappiness, and hell, an attainment that is expressed in a general way by the term “sorrow.” Others, however, think that prosperity consists of such things as ultimate bliss.

This latter dharma is gathered from the statements of the brāhmaṇas containing the verbal forms such as the optative, and in some cases also from mantras such as: “He sacrifices partridges for spring” (VS 24.20). Among these, statements containing the word “desire” teach the performance of something for the sake of that result: “Someone who desires Vedic splendor should offer an oblation of milk rice to the sun” (TS 2.3.2), “Someone who desires a village should offer the Sāṅgrahaṇī sacrifice to the All-gods” (TS 2.3.9). These are not performed by someone who does not desire that result. There are other acts that are presented as always obligatory by the use of such words as “all one’s life.”¹⁰⁸ These are not performed for the sake of a result, because a result is not mentioned in the Vedic text. And one cannot assume a result even though no result is mentioned in the Vedic text, in the same way as in injunctions such as: “One should offer the Viśvajit sacrifice” (ŚB 10.2.1.16).¹⁰⁹ The reason is that through terms such as “all one’s life,” one understands these as acts whose performance is obligatory even without any results. By not performing them, one incurs the sin of transgressing the content of a scriptural text. In these contexts, one performs these acts in order to avoid such a sin. The same course is true also with regard to prohibitions: “One should not kill a Brahman” and “One should not drink liquor.”¹¹⁰ For one avoids what is prohibited not for the sake of a result but in order to avoid a sin.

[section p. 60, line 8 until p. 62, line 18 of Jha’s edition has been omitted]

A cognition whose content is something that has been directly apprehended is called recollection….¹¹¹ The recollection of those who know the meaning of the Veda in the form of “One should do this. One should not do this” is also an authoritative epistemic source.

Surely, there are those who claim that recollection is not an independent epistemic source, for it simply reiterates the object to be known that is already known through another epistemic source. They say that it does not demarcate an act beyond that.

That is true. For those who have the recollection, the epistemic source with respect to what they recalled is verbal authority and the like, which they had at the very outset, not their own recollection. For us, however, it is only the recollection of Manu and the like that constitutes the epistemic source; without that recollection, we will not recognize the obligation to perform the Eighth-Day rite and the like from any other source. And we ascertain that such were the recollections of Manu and the like from the statements authored by them, which have come down to us in an unbroken line of recollection. Further, because of that recollection, we come to the conclusion that Manu and others apprehended this act through some epistemic source. This conclusion is based on the fact that they had this recollection, for a recollection of something that has not been apprehended is not possible.

For the same reason, we do not accept the view that Manu and others came to see the dharmas through direct perception. Perception is the cognition that arises from direct contact of the objects with the sense organs. And it is not possible for dharma to come into direct contact with sense organs, because the essential nature of dharma consists of the obligation to perform an act. What should be performed, however, is something that has not yet come into being, and direct contact happens only with respect to entities that have already come into being. It is true that means such as inference do make known things that are nonexistent at the present moment; for when ants travel carrying their eggs, one infers that rains are on their way.¹¹² Nevertheless, by those means one cannot gather the obligation to perform an act. Therefore, the assumption that there must be a cause comparable to the recollection of what should be performed points only to the Veda. Further, this Veda that is inferred must have been directly perceived by Manu and others.

(ii) Alternatively, these Vedic branches are recited even today. Those dharmas, however, are scattered—in some branch or other there may be the originative rules of rites such as the Eighth-Day; in some other branch the material for the rites may be given; in another the divinities; in yet another the mantras. What Manu and others did was to bring together the individual details of the dharmas that were scattered in this manner so as to make them easy to understand.

(iii) Alternatively, these dharmas may originate simply from indicators found in mantras and explanatory statements.

The following, however, is the extent of our judgment. The performance of these things is based on the Veda, because we see the intrinsic connection of acts enjoined by texts of recollection with Vedic injunctions, and because people who perform them do so after seeing that connection. This intrinsic connection, moreover, was already demonstrated—in one place the Vedic rule is subsidiary and the rule in the text of recollection is primary; in another place the opposite is true; in one place there is an originative rule; in one place, a rule on eligibility; and in another place, an explanatory statement. In this manner, all acts enjoined by texts of recollection have an intrinsic connection to Vedic injunctions. We have provided a comprehensive judgment on this in the Smṛtiviveka:¹¹⁴

(i) It¹¹⁷ is entirely possible that some Vedic branches have become extinct, for we see even today Vedic branches with very few reciters. Some hold that the authors of the texts of recollection composed their texts by extracting from these branches that were probably in imminent danger of extinction just the injunctions, stripped of any explanatory statements. Apastamba says, “Injunctions are given in the brāhmaṇas. Of these, the lost readings are inferred from usage.”¹¹⁸

In the above scenario, however, we must make numerous unprecedented assumptions, such as these: there was an improbable disregard of the very Vedic branch that was most useful and in which all the dharmas given both in texts of recollection and in texts on the domestic ritual pertaining to all the social classes and orders of life were set forth, and all its reciters became extinct.

(ii) It is credible, however, that individuals who are well versed and have arrived at definite conclusions through reasoning should excerpt the practical rules from the scattered dharmas that are cluttered with explanatory statements and that are difficult to differentiate, between which of them pertain to the acts themselves and which to their performers.¹¹⁹

According to this thesis, however, given that both a Vedic text and a text of recollection are based on perceptible Vedic texts, when the two contradict each other there is an option between the two, and the text of recollection is not invalidated. But this is unacceptable to learned people. Authors of the texts of recollection, moreover, have acknowledged that such a text of recollection would be invalidated and that texts of recollection are based on Vedic texts that are inferred. Gautama too has made the same point: “There is, however, only a single order of life, teachers maintain, because the householder’s state is enjoined in perceptible Vedic texts” (GDh 3.36). For if those Vedic branches were perceptible to Manu and the like, how could this statement be appropriate: “because the householder’s state is enjoined in perceptible Vedic texts”? Aren’t all the orders of life enjoined in perceptible Vedic texts? It is really Gautama’s own view that he has presented under the guise of its being the view of the teachers, because after introducing the subject with the statement beginning, “For him, some assert, there is an option among the orders of life” (GDh 3.1), he sums it up with the above statement.

(iii) The fact that mantras and explanatory statements are authoritative epistemic sources is also consistent. Although it is true that the aim of explanatory statements is the illustration and eulogy of injunctions and that they do not have an injunctive function with respect to their subject matter, nevertheless, it is impossible to take some explanatory statements as aimed solely at something other than themselves unless they make us aware of injunctions with respect to their own subject matter. Take, for example, statements such as “One who steals gold; one who drinks liquor” (ChUp 5.10.9). It is impossible for them to be a subsidiary portion of the injunction pertaining to the five fires unless they make us aware of the prohibition of acts such as stealing gold. A person who studies the science of the five fires does not fall even if he commits acts such as stealing gold or associates with people who commit such acts; otherwise, he falls—this interpretation is consistent.

Now, who has contrived this rule of interpretation: “Mentioning an injunction by name is an imparting of that injunction and not an explanatory statement”? In this very text, “these four fall” ( ChUp 5.10.9), we find a finite verb. If you object that verbal endings such as the injunctive are missing, even in the context of the Night sacrifices the statement “They become well established,” the injunctive ending is entirely missing.¹²⁰ If you respond, “In that case we determine it to be an injunction by assuming a verbal ending such as the injunctive, given that there is an expectation of eligibility for the rite and the presence of a syntactic unity of the passage”¹²¹—then the same can be true in the previous case! There are, furthermore, numerous injunctions relating to ritual materials and deities that can only be ascertained by means of explanatory statements. In such cases, when particular explanatory statements are subsidiary portions of a particular injunction—given that this very injunction requires ritual materials and deities—with reference merely to the communication of the ritual particulars, it is not improper that the knowledge of these particulars integral to the ritual performance is dependent on these explanatory statements. In the case at hand,¹²² however, because one would have to seek a different injunction unconnected to the explanatory statement, there will be a syntactical split, and the result is that this explanatory statement cannot be a subsidiary portion of the original statement.¹²³ And if that connection is absent, then there cannot be any notion of a prohibition based on that connection. For this reason, moreover, they say that the situation here is quite dissimilar to the statements: “One puts in pebbles that have been anointed. Ghee is energy” ( TB 3.12.5.12).¹²⁴

That is untrue. Even though an explanatory statement may have a different meaning, yet the objection relating to syntactic split does not arise when we arrive at this understanding, because it is based on the fact that the explanatory statement and the injunction constitute a single syntactic unit.

Mantras, because of their very linguistic form, are recognized as disclosing their ritual application, and, because that application cannot be established by any other means, they lead us to assume the object of this disclosure so as to maintain that disclosing character of theirs. If the originative injunction and the injunction on eligibility were nonexistent, the disclosure of the Eighth-Day rite would be impossible. Therefore, mantras reveal the originative injunction, eligibility, application, and procedure.¹²⁵ In this manner, it is accepted that even injunctions are portrayed by mantras, like the injunction relating to the divinity in the rite of the sprinkled ghee offering.¹²⁶ For it is accepted that dharma has four feet.¹²⁷ There are Vedic prescriptions with regard to only a very small portion of it. The source that reveals all the other portions must certainly be of a similar character, given that they are perceived through a connection to an injunction. So, in one way or another they are necessarily connected to the Veda.

Consequently, even though the Vedic basis is equally present in both, when the two are in conflict it is proper that one is invalidated. When a performance is established by means of a perceptible Vedic text, there is no desire at all to look for another Vedic text. For example, in the case of the Sāmidhenī verses, between sets of seventeen and fifteen verses, the original being contained by the set of fifteen, there is no desire to look for the set of seventeen even though it is given in a perceptible Vedic text.¹²⁸ For what is directly expressed by the words is immediately present, and it invalidates a conception that is to be gathered through an anticipation created by a point directly expressed, a conception that is weaker because it is remote. Yet this does not require the latter to be without authority. The situation here should be considered similar to the following. Supplementary ritual elements of the ritual archetype, although the general rule makes them valid for its ectypes, are rendered invalid when they are in conflict with the elements specific to the ectype.

(iv) The view that there is an unbroken line of tradition entails the logical fault of a continuous line.¹²⁹ For here not a single person becomes invested with authority.

(v) The view according to which Vedic texts were always inferred is also not too different from the view regarding a continuous line. We are engaged in investigating the root of the recollection of Manu and the like. If they also had to infer this Veda just like us, then they would not be people who had those recollections. It is, furthermore, impossible to infer an entity that has never been directly perceived by anyone, because in this case there is no possibility of a positive concomitance.¹³⁰ In motion and the like, one does, indeed, detect a connection through an inference based on a generally observed principle.¹³¹ Or even if motion and the like are to be ascertained through circumstantial inference, yet in the current case the impossibility of an ascertainment by some other means does not obtain.¹³²

Therefore, Manu and others are undoubtedly linked to the Veda with respect to this issue.¹³³ It is, however, impossible to determine the specific nature of that link. When people who know the Veda have the doggedly resolute conviction that something must be carried out, then it is appropriate to assume that it is, indeed, rooted in the Veda and not rooted in something else, such as an error. In this way, an assumption comes to be made with respect to the cause that is in keeping with that conviction. With respect to that, the ability to make an assumption with respect to extinct or scattered Vedic texts and with respect to mantras and explanatory statements is appropriate, because of the existence of causes consisting of perceptible Vedic texts. In some instances we even find a perceptible Vedic injunction serving as the root: “One should not converse with a menstruating woman” (TS 2.5.1.4–5). This injunction is recited at Vedic recitation and at Vedic initiation.

We, however, give the following explanation.¹³⁴ By the term “conduct” is meant concentration. So, for instance, in lists of verbal roots we read: “Conduct with the meaning of concentration.”¹³⁵ Concentration is a quality of the mind. When the mind is totally engaged in explicating the meaning of the scriptural text by avoiding diversions to other objects, it is called “conduct.”

The two elements of this copulative compound, “recollection-conduct,” are mutually interdependent.¹³⁶ Therefore, what is intended is that the mutually interdependent recollection and conduct are authoritative with respect to dharma, not that they are its creators, like the Veda mentioned earlier. This is what it ends up saying: only the recollection that is accompanied by concentration is authoritative, not simple recollection alone. Therefore, even when individuals know the meaning of the Veda, their recollection when they are not intently focused on the Veda does not constitute the root of dharma, given that, when they are not concentrating on the meaning of the scriptural text, it is possible for them to fall into error and the like.

The word “and” is given here,¹³⁷ but it should be understood to come immediately after the words “of those who know the Veda.” It has been placed in this location due to metrical exigencies. The word “and” has a conjunctive meaning. In the previous phrase, however, there is nothing that requires conjoining. Therefore, it conjoins the phrase “of good people” found in the third foot of the verse.

Consequently, there are three qualifications referred to here: (i) those who are learned, that is, those who have acquired learning from a teacher; (ii) those who are totally devoted to rehearsing what they have learned; and (iii) those who are totally devoted to practicing what they have learned. It is the recollection of individuals possessing all three qualifications that is authoritative. It is stated in texts of recollection that all these qualifications were present in persons such as Manu. Otherwise there is no possibility that the treatises composed by them would have found acceptance with the cultured elite.

If that were so, it should have been stated clearly: “The statements of persons such as Manu are the root of dharma.” What purpose does this kind of characterization serve?

That is true. There may be some people who in some way do not agree that these treatises are authoritative. It is with respect to them that this presentation of reasons for their authoritativeness is given, reasons that are well known in the science of logic.¹³⁸ Even in contemporary times, when these reasons are present in an individual, his statements are also to be accepted, just as those of Manu and the like. This happens in the case of learned men who give instructions pertaining to expiations and the like. Only such individuals become authoritative as a legal assembly: “When even a single Brahman who knows the Veda determines something as dharma, it should be recognized as the highest dharma, and not something uttered by myriads of ignorant men” (MDh 12.113). For this very reason, the exhaustive list of authors of the texts of recollection: “Manu, Visnu, Yama, Angiras,…,” is without any basis.¹³⁹ So, for instance, the cultured elite consider Paithinasi, Baudhayana, Pracetas, and the like as having the same status, and these are not contained within that exhaustive list.¹⁴⁰ In all cases, when the cultured elite unanimously recall or state that a particular individual is endowed with the aforementioned qualities, and that he has composed this treatise, then that individual’s statements, even though they are of human origin, should be considered an authoritative epistemic source with respect to dharma. That is the meaning of the phrase: “The recollection and conduct of those who know the Veda.”

Even in contemporary times, when a person endowed with the aforementioned qualities and for those very reasons composes a treatise, he becomes authoritative for future generations just as Manu and the like. In the case of contemporaries, however, the same sources of that person’s knowledge would be available to others as well, and thus they would not derive their knowledge from his statements. For knowledgeable people will not accept the statement of a contemporary as authoritative unless he shows the Vedic root of his knowledge. When that root has been shown, however, and his treatise has been accepted as authoritative, after the lapse of time, if in some way it is considered to have a Vedic root equal to texts presenting the Eighth-Day rite, then it is proper to infer that such treatises have a Vedic root, given that otherwise it would have been impossible for them to have been accepted by the cultured elite.

This sort of practice is also of various kinds depending on the differences in the nature of human beings and on the differences in what is pleasing and displeasing to their minds. Because these practices are without limit with respect to their peculiarities, it is impossible to assemble them in a single book.¹⁴² The same thing that one finds most of the time to be pleasing to a particular individual produces the opposite effect on a different occasion. Similarly, when a householder ministers to a guest, it causes joy to one person: “This man attends to me like a servant!” while another person reacts differently and becomes put off by that very ministration: “With this man always around, I can’t find a moment even to sit down and relax.” With respect to these things, it is not possible to infer a Vedic text either generally or specifically. In the case of the Eighth-Day rite and the like, however, their entire procedure, which is constant and uniform, is given in the texts of recollection. This is the difference between texts of recollection and practice.

Surely, would it not follow that when someone’s mind is pleased with respect to something that is totally prohibited, it would become dharma? Further, someone may have misgivings with respect to something that is enjoined, and that would not be dharma.

That is so. In the case of these kinds of distinguished and wise individuals, the immense power of their mental pleasure is such that it even converts an adharma into dharma and a dharma into adharma—but not in the case of people tainted by flaws such as love and hatred. As every substance that enters the salt mine of Rumā¹⁴³ becomes transformed into salt, so a man who knows the Veda makes everything totally pure by means of his mental pleasure that has arisen spontaneously. Therefore, with regard to the Ṣoḍaśin vessel, even though holding it is prohibited, yet doing so in accordance with the rule does not create a fault.¹⁴⁴ In the present case, however, there is no room for an option as in the case of holding, for the prohibitions are limited in their scope to areas that are different from what gives contentment to the self.

Alternatively, these individuals would never find contentment in adharma, just as a mongoose chews only a plant that destroys poison, and no other. Therefore it is said: “Whichever plant a mongoose chews, it is a plant that destroys poison.”¹⁴⁵

On this, furthermore, distinguished people say the following. With respect to actions that are optional, a person should adopt the course that would sooth his mind. Manu, moreover, will state in the sections on the purification of objects¹⁴⁶ and on penances: “If someone’s mind is not at ease with respect to a particular act he has committed, he should practice ascetic toil for it until his mind becomes content” (MDh 11.234).

Alternatively, Manu here states the lack of eligibility of a man without faith, by reason of the fact that he is a nonbeliever. For the self of a nonbeliever, even while he performs a Vedic rite, does not find contentment. Even though he may perform a rite, therefore, it produces no result at all.

Alternatively, the passage teaches the serenity of mind that pertains to all ritual acts. At the time of their performance, he should abandon hatred, delusion, sorrow, and the like, and keep his mind joyful. And therefore, as in the case of “conduct,” the passage points out that “contentment of the self” is a root of dharma insofar as it is a necessary supplement of all rites.

“A man of the lowest caste” is a Candala. “Farthest dharma” means the worldly dharma that is farthest, namely, different¹⁴⁷ with respect to the one given in the Veda and the texts of recollection. The term “dharma” is employed also with reference to a norm. So, if even a Candala were to say, “This is the dharma in this place”—“Do not stay too long in this region”; “Do not bathe in this body of water”; “Here this is the dharma among the villagers”; or “This is the statute established by the king”—one should not think: “I must follow the words of my teacher. Curse on this wretched Candala who dares to instruct me!”

What should be done consists of things that have a perceived purpose, such as the sixfold strategy,¹⁴⁹ and things that have an unperceived purpose, such as the daily fire sacrifice. Of these, in this section for the most part those that have a perceived purpose are explained; and it is only with respect to these that the expression “dharma of a king” is commonly employed….

For the dharmas explained here have their roots in various epistemic sources; not all of them have the Veda as their root. Even though they may have their roots in other epistemic sources, moreover, the ones explained here are only those that are not in conflict with the treatises on dharma. Accordingly, Katyayana says: “Discarding what is stated in the arthaśāstra, he should follow what is stated in dharmaśāstra”¹⁵⁰ (KātSm 20).

Because the king is made from the energies of them all (MDh 7.11), “therefore,” i.e., for that reason, “for those he favors,” i.e., for his favorites such as his counselors and chaplain, in the course of business he “issues,” i.e., categorically establishes, “a dharma,” i.e., a norm pertaining to duties that is not in conflict with scriptural texts and normative practice; “one should not contravene it,” i.e., this kind of king’s command should not be transgressed—“Today in the city everyone should observe the festival”; “A wedding is taking place in the counselor’s house, and everyone should assemble there.” So also: “Today livestock should not be slaughtered by butchers,¹⁵¹ and birds should not be captured”; “Wealthy people should entertain the dancing girls for this many days.” Likewise, also with regard to “those he does not favor”— “No one should associate with this man”; “This man should not be allowed to enter anyone’s house.”