CHAPTER EIGHT

Medieval Commentators and Systematizers

With the dawn of the second millennium, we enter a new era in the long history of legal literature in India. As already noted, and as we will see from the samples presented in this chapter and in the companion chapter (13) in part II of this study, the interests and focus of the authors in this period were quite different from those of the authors in the second half of the first millennium. In addition to the traditional commentary, furthermore, a new genre of composition was introduced during this period. It was called dharmanibandha or simply nibandha, legal digest. Texts of this genre were not tied to any particular root text but presented the various areas of dharma in a systematic way, citing extensive extracts from numerous authoritative texts of recollection. They thus became anthologies, probably used by jurists or as instructional manuals for students.

The authors of this period were not particularly interested in the epistemological issues of primary concern to their predecessors. If we compare the commentaries on MDh 2.6 of three representative authors of this period, given in section #1, with that of Medhatithi, given in chapter 7, there is a stark difference. These newer commentaries are skimpy and merely explain the grammar and syntax of the verse.

Even as prominent a scholar as Vijnanesvara, in his commentary on YDh 1.7, shows little inclination to deal seriously with the epistemological issues raised by this verse. A comparison with his predecessor, Visvarupa (ch. 7.2), bears this out. Only Apararka appears willing to take the time to comment, but even he simply wants to eliminate the authority of sacred texts of certain sectarian groups of his time. Also, the Buddhists have simply disappeared from the discussions. The issue of how one keeps spurious or non-Vedic texts from being regarded as texts of recollection (smṛti) was now reduced to excluding entire texts rather than individual provisions, a process already started by Kumarila.¹ This view may have given authors the impetus to present normative lists of authoritative texts of recollection, thus creating a canon, as seen below in section 3.1. As we will see in chapter 13, the topic that interested these authors most and on which they wrote elaborate comments was legal procedure, that is, the actual conduct of a case within a court of law.

A significant aspect of the reflections on the epistemology of dharma during this period is the expansion of the category of texts of recollection (smṛti) to include other kinds of religious texts, especially the Puranas. In the early literature, there is no mention of Puranas being included in this broad class of literature. Manu (2.10), as we have seen, explicitly equates it with treatises on dharma. Even though Yajnavalkya includes Purana within the fourteen “repositories of knowledge” (vidyāsthāna), he does not count Puranas as texts of recollection. An occasional reference, most often in the singular, is made by Visvarupa and Medhatithi,² but they never cite Puranas as authoritative sources of dharma. That to do so was controversial is demonstrated by the declaration at the beginning of Yadava Prakasa’s Yatidharmasamuccaya. Yadava was the teacher of the great Vaishnava theologian Ramanuja and can be dated to the second half of the eleventh century. After listing the major authors of treatises on dharma, Yadava declares: “The dharma that I present here has been gathered solely from those sections of their books devoted to the topic of renunciation and not from other sections of those books or from the epics (itihāsa) and the Puranas.”³ At least in Yadava’s eyes, not using Puranas and drawing material exclusively from treatises on dharma enhanced the authority of his composition.

All this changed within a century or so. Puranas figure prominently in the literature of the twelfth century: Vijnanesvara, Apararka, and the voluminous legal digest Kṛtyakalpataru of Laksmidhara. These texts cite the Puranas frequently, especially when they are dealing with topics ignored by early treatises on dharma, such as temple worship, installation of images, and pilgrimage. Apararka (see section 2.2) makes a distinction between a higher form of dharma and a lower, depending on their sources: “Therefore, the highest dharma is what is learned from the Veda. Texts of recollection, however, state that what is given in the Puranas and the like is inferior.” Nandana, the commentator of Manu (see section 1.2), boldly asserts that “Recollection (smṛti) consists of treatises on dharma, epics, and Puranas.” The prominent jurist of the thirteenth century Devanna Bhatta (see section 3) openly states: “In the same way it is established that the Puranas also are both authoritative and useful.”

8.1 COMMENTATORS OF MANU

1. Govindaraja (Eleventh–Twelfth Century C.E.)

Govindaraja was probably the oldest commentator of Manu after Medhatithi. Given that he is cited or referred to in works belonging to the twelfth century, such as Laksmidhara’s Kṛtyakalpataru and Jimutavahana’s Dāyabhāga, he probably lived in the eleventh or early twelfth century. One other work of his is known, a legal digest called Smṛtimañjarī. The area of Govindaraja’s activities was probably north India somewhere in the Gangetic plain.

Now, in order to give an exhaustive listing of the epistemic sources of dharma, he states:

The root of dharma is the entire Veda; and the recollection and conduct of those who know the Veda; and the practice of good people; and contentment of the self. (MDh 2.6)

“Veda” is defined as Ṛc, Yajus, and Sāma. “Entire” means total, because that term is used also with reference to explanatory statements and so forth insofar as they form single syntactic units with injunctions.⁴ “The root,” that is, the epistemic source, “of dharma,” because there is no suspicion that it would contain wrong knowledge and because it is inherently authoritative. This is established by reasoning.⁵ This is repeated here so as to teach that texts of recollection and so forth are authoritative insofar as they are rooted in the Veda. Likewise, written scientific treatises of Manu and the like constitute the recollection of “those who know the Veda” that something should be done or should not be done; “and conduct” where love and hatred have been abandoned; “and the practice,” consisting of practices such as tying a bracelet at occasions such as a marriage; “of good people,” that is, of virtuous people; “and contentment of the self,” consisting of the total mental satisfaction while performing an act that has an unperceived purpose and pertaining to acts that are optional—these are also epistemic sources with regard to dharma, because all these are rooted in the Veda.

2. Nandana

Little is known about this author, and only one of his works, his commentary Nandinī on Manu, is extant.⁶ His dates are unknown, but my guess is that he must be older than many of the other commentators on Manu. I base this on the fact that he seems much more familiar with the vocabulary of political science than any of the others, including Medhatithi. For example, he and Bharuci are the only commentators who understood the meaning of the technical term pravāsayet (Manu 8.123) as judicial execution. In my critical edition and translation of Manu (Olivelle 2005), I have found Nandana’s interpretations to be quite often correct. I also assume that Nandana was a native of the south, where the tradition of political science was better cultivated than in other parts of India.

Next, he points out the epistemic sources of dharma:

The root of dharma is the entire Veda; and the recollection and conduct of those who know it; and the practice of good people; and contentment of the self. (MDh 2.6)

“Veda” is used in the singular with reference to a class.⁷ “The root of dharma” means the epistemic source of dharma. The term “entire” is used because not just the statements containing injunctions constitute the epistemic source of dharma, but also mantras and explanatory statements. “Those who know it” means those who know the meaning of the Veda. “Recollection” consists of treatises on dharma, epics, and Puranas. “Conduct” also, being the root of dharma, is a reason for an assumption.⁸ Conduct consists of the exemplary qualities of the self.⁹ This has been stated in the Mahābhārata: “A man should perform that act in such a way that he will be praised in a public assembly. You have been given this brief summary of conduct, O you who bring joy to the Kurus” (MBh 12.124.66). An example of this is Yudhisthira, who, disregarding his uterine brothers, requested from Dharma in the guise of a demon that Nakula should live.¹⁰ The practice of those who know it is also a root of dharma. “Practice” has already been explained. “Of good people” means of those who are the most virtuous; “contentment of the self” means the gratification of the mind. That is also a root of dharma. The meaning is this. Among those acts with regard to which there is a doubt as to whether they are dharma, because they are not included within any epistemic source, when an act gratifies the mind of good people as they take it to be dharma, that act is dharma.

3. Kulluka (Fourteenth Century C.E.)

Kulluka is the best-known commentator of Manu in modern scholarship, due primarily to the historical accident that many of the early editions of Manu were printed along with his commentary. Kane (I: 756) calls his Manvarthamuktāvalī “the most famous of all commentaries on Manu.” This praise is largely undeserved, because a close comparison of Kulluka’s work with that of Govindaraja, whom he has the temerity to criticize frequently, shows that Kulluka has plagiarized wholesale Govindaraja’s work. Indeed, a brief look at their commentaries on Manu 2.6, reproduced here, shows the dependence, often verbatim, of Kulluka on Govindaraja.

Now he states the epistemic sources of dharma:

The root of dharma is the entire Veda; and the recollection and conduct of those who know the Veda; and the practice of good people; and contentment of the self. (MDh 2.6)

“Veda” is defined as Ṛc, Yajus, Sāma, and Atharva. All that, consisting of injunctions, explanatory statements, and mantras, is, with regard to dharma, “the root,” that is, the epistemic source, because explanatory statements also, insofar as they form a single syntactic unit with injunctions, are authoritative with regard to dharma as laudatory statements. This is stated by Jaimini: “Because they form a syntactic unit with an injunction, however, they function as laudatory of injunctions” (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.2.7). Mantras and explanatory statements also, insofar as they form syntactic units with injunctions, are authoritative with regard to dharma; and they remind us of what must be carried out at the time of performance.

The authority of the Veda with regard to dharma, an authority consisting of instrumentality with regard to perceiving what is true, is established by reasoning. It is reiterated in order to teach the authoritativeness of texts of recollection and so forth, only insofar as they are rooted in the Veda.¹¹

The recollection of those who know the Veda, such as Manu, moreover, is authoritative with regard to dharma. Because the attribute “of those who know the Veda” is mentioned, the authoritativeness of texts of recollection and so forth is acknowledged only insofar as they are rooted in the Veda.

“Conduct” consists of such things as loyalty to Brahmans. This has been stated by Harita: “Loyalty to Brahmans, devotion to gods and ancestors, gentleness, not causing pain to others, not being envious, kindness, not being harsh, friendliness, speaking amiably, gratefulness, providing shelter, compassion, and tranquility— these are the thirteen kinds of conduct.” Govindaraja, on the other hand, states that conduct is the abandonment of love and hatred. “Practice” consists of practices such as using a woolen shawl or a bark garment. “Of good people” means of virtuous people. “And contentment of the self” is also authoritative with regard to dharma when it refers to optional acts. That is stated by Garga: “In optional matters, the contentment of the self is authoritative.”

8.2 COMMENTATORS OF YAJNAVALKYA

1. Vijnanesvara (fl. 1100–1125 C.E.)

Vijnanesvara wrote his commentary Mitākṣarā, “with measured syllables,” on Yajnavalkya’s treatise on dharma sometime in the early decades of the twelfth century. It has been acclaimed as the most celebrated commentary on a treatise on dharma, mostly because of his extended treatment of legal procedure. The British colonial admistrators, mistakenly, talked about the “Mitākṣarā school of law” (Rocher 1972) that prevailed over most of peninsular India, especially in matters of inheritance, while the school of Jimutavahana’s Dāyabhāga had authority over Bengal. Vijnanesvara lived during the time of the Calukya king Vikramaditya in the western Deccan.

Vijnanesvara’s treatment of the epistemology of dharma, however, pales in comparison to the learned disquisition of his predecessor Visvarupa; he was probably not very interested in the topic. His comments occupy all of five and a half lines on a printed page. This stands in sharp contrast to his learned commentary on legal procedure (given in chapter 13) and to the commentary on this verse of Yajnavalkya by his near contemporary, Apararka.

Scripture, text of recollection, practice of good people, what is pleasing to oneself, and desire arising out of right intention—that, texts of recollection say, is the root of dharma. (YDh 1.7)¹²

“Scripture” is the Veda. “Text of recollection” is treatise on dharma. Accordingly, Manu states: “Scripture should be recognized as Veda and texts of recollection as treatise on dharma” (MDh 2.10). “Practice of good people”—“of good people” means the cultured elite; “practice” means performance. “What is pleasing to oneself”—that is, with reference to optional acts. So, for example, in rules such as: “in the eighth year from conception or in the eighth year from birth”¹³ (YDh 1.14), the restriction is totally according to one’s wish. A desire born from right intention is one that is not in conflict with authoritative texts, as for example: “I shall not drink water outside the time of meals.” These constitute the root, that is, the epistemic source, of dharma. When these are in conflict, each previous one is stronger than each succeeding one.

2. Apararka (First Half of the Twelfth Century C.E.)

Apararka, also known as Aparaditya (“The Western Sun”), was a king in the Silahara dynasty that ruled for several centuries in southwestern India. Although technically a commentary on the text of Yajnavalkya, his work is voluminous, being roughly double the size of Vijnanesvara’s Mitākṣarā, and is also styled a nibandha, that is, a legal digest.

The relationship between these two major commentaries on Yajnavalkya has been a disputed issue among scholars. Kane (I: 720) is certain that Apararka knew the Mitākṣarā and is therefore to be dated later than Vijnanesvara. However, even Kane does not put them at a great distance in time from each other; they can be considered near contemporaries.

Apararka clearly articulates the position that the epics and especially the Puranas are genuine epistemic sources of dharma, just like the texts of recollection. He, however, presents the curious distinction between a higher and pure dharma given in the Vedas and texts of recollection and an inferior and mixed dharma found in the Puranas. This idea is articulated in a verse ascribed to Vyasa, pointing to the manufacture of individual verses ascribed to different texts of recollection supporting various and novel ideas. Apararka’s argument in favor of the authority of Puranas is helped by Yajnavalkya’s (1.3) verse dealing with the fourteen repositories of knowledge (vidyāsthāna), including Purana, a verse he interprets as presenting the sources of dharma. His lead is followed by Devanna Bhatta, who places this verse at the very beginning of his discussion of the topic (see ch. 8.3: #2).

The main argument of Apararka, however, which takes about three-quarters of his commentary on YDh 1.7, concerns the authority of the various scriptural texts (āgama s, saṃhitās) of the Saiva and Vaisnava sects of his day. He does not mention Buddhists at all. In rejecting the authority of these sectarian works as epistemic sources of dharma, Apararka makes an interesting distinction between adūṣyatva and anuṣṭheyatva. The first refers to texts that are not reprehensible and whose reading does not cause one to be polluted. The second refers to texts that lay down obligatory rites and activities. Apararka takes sectarian texts as belonging to the first category and not the second. We can assume that it is within the context of this kind of onslaught on the validity of sectarian scriptures that sectarian theologians wrote tracts defending the authority of their respective scriptures. One prominent example that deals directly with this issue is the Āgamaprāmāṇya of Yamuna, where the Vaishnava theologian mounts a detailed and spirited defense of the authority of Pancaratra scriptures.¹⁴

Now he states the epistemic sources of dharma:

Scripture, text of recollection, practice of good people, what is pleasing to oneself, and desire arising out of right intention—that, texts of recollection say, is the root of dharma. (YDh 1.7; see n. 12)

Scripture and the rest, each individually, is “the root of dharma,” that is, the cause of the certain determination of dharma. In the verse “The Vedas coupled with Puranas, logic, hermeneutics, treatises on dharma, and supplements—these are the fourteen sites of the sciences, and of the dharma” (YDh 1.3; ch. 5.1: #1), the fact that scripture and texts of recollection are the root of dharma was stated in a general way. Here, on the other hand, the fact that they are the root of dharma is stated after singling them out.¹⁵ The circumstantial inference is that the other repositories of knowledge are helpful in understanding the Veda. Unlike grammar and the like, texts of recollection are not meant to help in the understanding of the Veda; on the contrary, they are meant to help in inferring Vedic texts. Hence, they are mentioned separately. Practice and so forth are given here only as the root of dharma. Hence, there is no tautology.

“Scripture” means Veda. “Text of recollection” is an authoritative treatise that, in terms of dharma, has the Veda as its root. “Practice of good people” means the practice of the cultured elite. “What is pleasing to oneself” means what brings satisfaction to one’s mind. The term “oneself” here indicates the mind, and the term “pleasing” indicates satisfaction. Therefore, here the satisfaction of the mind points out the cessation of the desire to carry out an activity. Intention is the mental act: “Being proper—that is, keeping the eye on the object of the treatise—I will accomplish this by means of this.”¹⁶ Desire arising out of it refers to the desire to carry out dharma. All this is the root, that is, the cause, of the certain determination of dharma. That is the meaning. The word dharma is indicative of its certain determination.

Of these, scripture is the root of the certain determination of the daily fire sacrifice and the like; texts of recollection, of matters such as the dharma of social classes and orders of life; and the practice of good people, of matters such as the Holākā rite;¹⁷ and mental satisfaction, of an activity that is enjoined as circumscribed by mental satisfaction. For example:

If someone’s mind is not at ease with respect to a particular act he has committed, he should practice ascetic toil for it until his mind is assuaged. (MDh 11.234)

With respect to a specific time, it is desire arising out of intention. For example: “Whenever he initiates him with faith, at that very time he should put wood on the fire.” Or else: “Whenever there is a longing for an ancestral offering” (YDh 1.218).¹⁸ Vyasa states:

Those who desire the purity of dharma do not want anything other than the Veda. It is the pure source of dharma; others are said to be mixed. (See DhKo V: 163)

“Purity” means not being intermingled. “Of dharma” means “of the certain determination of dharma.” “Pure” means without faults. “Mixed” means having possible faults.

Therefore, the highest dharma is what is learned from the Veda. Texts of recollection, however, state that what is given in the Puranas and the like is inferior.

One should diligently carry out the activities that have been formerly laid down in texts of recollection by sages who were most proficient in the Veda, and avoid what they have forbidden.

Whatever dharma those men who knew the true meaning of the Veda have pointed out in their desire to benefit the people, one should not subject that to investigation.

Ignorance may well lurk in a meaning of the Veda that a man has come to know by himself. What doubt could there be among wise men in the case of something that has been determined by seers?

Whatever there is other than these¹⁹ calling itself “dharma,” know that it should be kept very far away. Resorting to it is regarded as folly. (See DhKo 5: 163)

“One should not subject that to investigation” means one should not suspect that it is not authoritative. “Other than these”—that is, other than the treatises on dharma and the like; one should reject any other thing having a human author.

[Here begins an excursus on non-Vedic scriptures.]²⁰

Is it not true, moreover, that works such as the authoritative treatises of the Shaivas, Pasupatas, and Pancaratras are, indeed, not authored by men? And therefore, in adhering to their practices there is only felicity, and never any fault, because they cause final liberation?

That is not so, (i) because this statement of the Svayambhu and the like—

A person in the two orders of life should first sip water and then perform the Vedic twilight worship. A person in the other order of life, however, whose self is detached and who shuns worldly aims, may either perform the Vedic twilight worship or not, but he must necessarily perform the Shaiva twilight worship.

Shaiva on the inside; Kaula on the outside; but Vedic with respect to worldly practice—taking the essence, he should remain like a coconut fruit.²¹

—insofar as it provides delight to ineligible people, contains the fault of claiming that Vedic rites that have been enjoined do not bear fruit; and (ii) because, with respect to people who are experts in the triple Veda and are totally and wholeheartedly dedicated to the performance of the dharma enjoined by Vedic texts and texts of recollection, performing what is given in the sacred texts of the Shaivas and the like is not proven to be the cause of final liberation. Nor is there any harm in their not performing what is given in the authoritative treatises of Shaivas and the like. For only rites connected with orders of life enjoined by Vedic texts and texts of recollection such as the following are beneficial to them, and nothing else:

He should offer the fire sacrifice as long as he lives. (VarŚr 1.1.1.86)

And he should always offer the fire sacrifice at the beginning and end of each day and night. (MDh 4.25)

The reason for this is the fact that one incurs sin by transgressing acts enjoined by Vedic texts and texts of recollection. Accordingly, a Vedic text states:

A man who extinguishes the fire is truly a killer of the hero among gods. (TS 1.5.2.5)

So also a text of recollection:

If a Brahman who has established his sacred fires abandons his fires deliberately, he should perform the lunar penance²² for one month, for it is equal to killing a hero. (MDh 11.41)

One should not, moreover, make the following argument.

By the very fact of nonperformance they stand implicitly reproached, because the following verses, the Devī Purāṇa and the Yoga-Yajnavalkya, state authoritatively that these texts are irreproachable and are not to be investigated through logical arguments:

Those who hate the Shaiva treatises and those who disparage the Vedas stand miserable with their mouths full of molten tin.²³

Samkhya, Yoga, Pancaratra, Vedas, and Pasupata—these are exceedingly authoritative and one should not investigate them through logical arguments. (BṛYogYSm 12.4)

Simply on the basis of this, one should not argue that there is no fault at all in performing them, for the following reasons. (i) According to the maxim “The authority of a text extends only to what it expressly states,”²⁴ it is improper to perform too little or too much simply through one’s own conjecture. (ii) It is impossible to carry out the activities of all the irreproachable scriptures. (iii) According to passages such as the following, when someone assenting to the Shaiva treatises performs Vedic rites, he will incur evils leading to hell:

It is extremely loathsome, furthermore, for an initiate to perform the ancestral offering enjoined by the Veda. As such, the Vedic rite of ancestral offering should not be offered on behalf of initiates even by people who are noninitiates; it leads both to hell.

(iv) While in statements such as:

One’s own dharma, though imperfect, is better than another’s dharma carried out well. Better to die within one’s own dharma than to prosper in another’s dharma. (BhG 3.35)

texts such as the Mahābhārata point out the superiority of one’s own practice even though it may be defective, and, given that the performance of all irreproachable scriptures is beset with mutually contradictory activities, one would never arrive at steadfastness of knowledge.

Accordingly, the Shaiva adherents affirm the Lord as distinct, stating: “The Lord is the overseer of primal matter and spirit and is only the efficient cause. Primal matter, spirit, and the Lord are by nature different from each other.”

The Samkhya adherents affirm that there is no Lord.

The adherents of Patanjali’s Yoga, on the other hand, affirm the Lord, stating: “The Lord is a special spirit who is not the maker of creatures; is untouched by defilements, acts, results, and latent impressions; and is all-knowing because he knows all the authoritative treatises.”²⁵

The Pancaratrins consider the Lord as having a nondual nature: “Lord Vasudeva is the supreme primal nature, abiding as four selves insofar as he is differentiated as tranquil, manifested, displayed, and indefinable.”

The Pasupatas, on the other hand, subscribe only to the doctrine of the Lord as distinct: “The five categories—effect, cause, union, rules, and end of suffering—have been taught by Lord Pasupati for the sake of freeing the soul from its snare.”

So, because they are thus inconsistent, and because when everyone accepts the knowledge given in all the scriptures doubt is not removed, it is exceedingly difficult to obtain correct knowledge. If one accepts them as options, moreover, it would result in a state similar to that of a lunatic.

Is it not true that this is the case also with the Veda, because, just as the Shaiva scriptures and the like are authoritative simply because they are irreproachable, so also the Veda is authoritative because in texts of recollection it is said to be irreproachable, and hence there is no distinction between the two?

That is true. According to the text: “Those who hate the Shaiva treatises and those who disparage the Vedas stand miserable with their mouths full of molten tin”²⁶; the authoritativeness of the Veda is similar to that of the scriptures of the Shaivas and the like simply because they are irreproachable. In passages such as the following from Manu’s text, however, only the Veda is said to be the highest means of accomplishing one’s goals here and in the hereafter, not the authoritative treatises of the Shaivas and the like:

The Veda is the eternal eyesight for ancestors, gods, and humans; for Vedic teaching is beyond the power of logic and cognition—that is the settled rule. (MDh 12.94)

On the contrary, the words such as the following addressed by Rudra to Agastya in the Varāha Purāṇa teach that, insofar as such scriptures are meant to bewilder, they are totally deceptive:

Simply in order to delude those who have abandoned the path of the Veda, formerly I communicated the body of works bearing the name Siddhanta.²⁷

Since the domestic animal, not adhering to his nature as a domestic animal, has become a fallen outcaste, so this body of works that delude the whole world is known as “Pasupata.”²⁸ (VarP 70.42–43)

For it is I who will have bewildered these future people, O Brahman. Men, longing for lust, will compose further treatises in the Kali Age.

The Niḥśvāsa Saṃhitā is indeed one hundred thousand verses in extent. Only that contains the Pasupata method; from it have arisen the various divisions of Pasupatas.²⁹

Whatever originates from this text that is different from the path of the Veda and so forth, that should be considered a vile rite, cruel, and devoid of purity. (VarP 71.51–54)

The meaning is that scriptures of the Shaivas and the like are totally deceptive because they are intended to bewilder all the people. And in the same text there is, further, the statement of Krishna addressed to Lord Rudra:

Here I am quickly creating bewilderment that will bewilder people. You too, O great-armed Rudra, compose treatises that bewilder.

Show them how a little effort can bring long-lasting results. But showing trickery, illusions, and wrongful practices, O Mahesvara, quickly bewilder all the people. (VarP 70.35–37)

For this very reason, moreover, Manu states:

All those different from the Veda that spring up and then flounder—they are false and bear no fruit, because they belong to recent times. (MDh 12.96)

And for this very reason, Apastamba has shown that practices prescribed in the authoritative treatises of the Shaiva and the like are not authoritative:

Vedas are the ultimate authority: that is the firm conclusion. In that regard, rites using rice, barley, animals, ghee, milk, and potsherds and involving the participation of the wife that are prescribed in the Vedas must be performed with the loud and soft recitation of mantras. They hold that any practice opposed to those rites is devoid of authority. (ĀpDh 2.23.10)

Is it not true, further, that words of the Lord such as the following given in the Varāha Purāṇa show that the Pancaratra is not different from the Veda, because a text of recollection presents the Pancaratra as a substitute for the Veda?

When Vedic mantras are unavailable, those men who follow the practice enjoined by Pancaratra will attain me.

The Pancaratra is prescribed for Brahmans, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas; it will not reach within the range of the ears of Shudras. (VarP 66.11–12)

True, there is no difference. Nevertheless, there is a difference between their respective areas of reference. Accordingly, the above statement should not be heeded by Brahmans who have not lapsed, because it pertains to Vratyas, who somehow, due to fate, have not performed their expiatory rites. That being the case, the term “unavailable” in this statement is validated, because the acquisition of the Veda is precluded to such Vratyas. Accordingly, Manu’s treatise states:

Even in a time of adversity, a Brahman should never establish Vedic or matrimonial links³⁰ with such people, unless they have been cleansed according to rule. (MDh 2.40)

In this way, furthermore, the eligibility of twice-born people with respect to Pancaratra is also totally demolished. Therefore, because the cited text refers to Vratyas who have not performed their expiation by the power of fate, there is a distinction between the Veda and the Pancaratra.

For this very reason, moreover, when the Yoga-Yajnavalkya states that the Pancaratra is equal to the Pasupata and the like insofar as they are all Siddhantas, it in fact reveals that they are outside the Veda:

Only one, however, should be recognized as the means of effecting yogic union, and that is the mystic syllable OṂ. This has been accepted by adherents of the seven Siddhantas, as well as by other knowers of Brahman—by the adherents of these seven Siddhantas: Hairanyagarbhas, Kapilas, Apantaratamas, Sanatkumaras, Brahmisthas, Pasupatas, and Pancaratras.³¹ (BṛYogYSm 2.66–68)

In this way, we indeed conclude that the Pancaratra is authoritative only insofar as it is irreproachable, but not insofar as it must be practiced.

Is it not true, further, that just as authoritative treatises such as the Veda arose with reference to a particular well-demarcated group of people, so we can assume that authoritative treatises such as the Shaiva operate with reference to high-caste Saivas and the like?³²

That is not true, because in statements such as the following, Manu and others have demonstrated that only twice-born people have competence with regard to their own treatises, not that Shaiva Brahmans and the like have competence with regard to Shaiva treatises and the like:

A man for whom it is prescribed that the rites beginning with the impregnation ceremony and ending with the funeral are to be performed with the recitation of Vedic formulas—no one but he is to be recognized as competent with regard to this treatise. (MDh 2.16)

Then let us assume that it is the Shudras who are competent with regard to Shaiva treatises and the like.

That is not true, because it is not accepted by texts of recollection and other authoritative treatises. Furthermore, there is no one who is a Shaiva by birth to whom the Shaiva treatises and the like may be addressed. Conversely, “Shaiva” is a treatise declared by Shiva, with the addition of the aṇ affix according to the rule: “Declared by him” (Panini 4.3.101).³³ And, further, “Shaiva” is derived from “Shaiva,” meaning that one knows or recites the Shaiva treatise, according to the grammatical rules: “The affix aṇ after a word denoting the subject of study in the sense of ‘he recites it,’ ‘he knows it’” (Panini 4.2.59), once the luk elision has been performed according to the rule: “After the title of a work, which is named after the one who declared it, the affixes denoting ‘he recites it’ or ‘he knows it’ are elided by luk” (Panini 4.2.64).³⁴ The same is true with regard to the terms “Pasupata” and the like.

Because, in this manner, the Shaiva treatises and the like originated without any reference to a certain group of people who are by nature clearly demarcated, so it is established that they are like pictures drawn in the sky. That being the case, in actual practice such treatises should be totally rejected.

One should not argue, moreover, that simply because these scriptures are well known as irreproachable, to follow them becomes incumbent on those belonging to the orders of life. For the mere fact that they are irreproachable does not make them capable of forcing people to follow their contents in the same way as the Vedic texts. The reason is that passages such as the following of Manu and others forbid people to follow them by such means as teaching their uselessness with respect to the hereafter:

The scriptures that are outside the Veda, as well as every kind of fallacious doctrine— all these are said to bear no fruit after death, for texts of recollection take them to be founded on darkness. (MDh 12.95)

And therefore, in rituals of divine worship and the like, one should accept only the procedure that is well known from the Narasiṃha Purāṇa and the like, and not anything else. The same should be understood also with regard to the initiatory rite; for in the initiatory rite well known from the Puranas there is no cleansing away of castes. Because in the Shaiva scriptures and the like, however, passages such as the following show that they are cleansed away, the result is the loss of eligibility to perform Vedic rites:

The first caste³⁵ is the immobile; the next is considered the creeping creatures; the third is the bird caste; the fourth is the wild animal caste; the fifth is the domestic animal caste; the sixth is said to be the lowest-born; the seventh is the Shudra caste; the eighth is the Vaishya caste; the ninth is the Kshatriya caste; and the tenth is named Brahman. These castes, however, should be cleansed away by the Lord of castes or by Shiva.

Texts such as the following show that the Vedic rites originated specifically with respect to high-caste people: “A Brahman should establish the fires” (TB 1.1.2.6); “A king should perform the rite of royal consecration” (ŚB 5.3.1.13); and “A Vaishya should offer the Vaishyastoma rite” (TāṇB 18.4.5). How can that happen when castes have been eliminated?

Similarly, in the installation of divine images only the procedure given in the Puranas and the like is to be accepted, not anything else, because in the Bhaviṣyat Purāṇa only these are recognized as having a mixed authoritativeness³⁶ with respect to dharma. Accordingly, the Bhaviṣyat Purāṇa states:

The eighteen Puranas; the life story of Rama; authoritative treatises such as the Viṣṇudharma; the Śivadharmas, O Bharata; the fifth Veda of Krishna, which is said to be the Mahābhārata; Sauras, O best of dharmic kings, declared by Manu, O king—wise men give these the name Victory.³⁷ (BhaviP 1.4.86–88)

In the same text also, statements such as “Pour down liquor, O king, with the exception of the Madya liquor” should be understood to refer to a time other than the Kali Age, because in passages such as the following from the Brahma Purāṇa and the like, Madya liquor and so forth are presented as things to be generally shunned:

Living as a Vedic student for a long time, carrying a water pot, marrying someone from one’s own lineage or ancestry, slaughtering cows, human and horse sacrifices, Madya liquor—these should be shunned by twice-born people during the Kali Age.³⁸

This also explains offerings to Candika and the like.

With regard to what is stated in the Kālikā Purāṇa about the rule regarding collyrium, such as:

Having placed a large quantity of sesame oil and ghee in a skull bowl, and taking lampblack during the eclipse of the moon and the sun, a wise man should anoint his two eyes with it; he will subjugate Indra.

that is absolutely adharma, just like:

Then, someone who wishes to kill his enemy should kindle a fire with wood from a cremation ground and offer in that fire one thousand offerings of ghee mixed with poison and blood. Thus he will immediately kill his enemy.

or like:

One who is performing sorcery should offer the Hawk sacrifice. (ṢaḍBr 4.2.1–2)

The reason is that, just like killing, ritual subjugation and the like are forbidden in various texts. Accordingly, Manu enumerates ritual subjugation within secondary sins causing loss of caste: “injuring plants, living off one’s wife, sorcery, and root witchcraft”³⁹ (MDh 11.64).

What, moreover, is stated in the Devī Purāṇa—

Someone who knows the left-handed and right-handed scriptures and is an expert in the meaning of the mother and the Veda—he is a Sthapaka, the highest among goddesses and mothers.⁴⁰

Someone who is proficient in the meaning of Pancaratra, an authority on mother’s Tantra—that man, if he is a householder, is praised by Vishnu, and if he is a celibate student, bestows peace.

Someone who knows the Shaiva doctrine and knows the meaning of planets and groups of mothers—that man, whether he is a householder or a celibate student, is celebrated as a Sthapaka for Shiva.

Someone who knows the meaning of Saura is a Sthapaka for Surya, the sun, and an auspicious worshiper.

—that also does not constitute an indicator for following outside scriptures, because following them is prohibited in the Matsya Purāṇa. Accordingly, the Matsya Purāṇa states:⁴¹

Listen to a brief definition of a Sthapaka, O Twice-Born Ones: he is an authority in Vedic mantras along with all the limbs,⁴² knows the Puranas, understands dharma, is free from pride and greed, is born in the region where the black buck roams,⁴³ has pleasant features, is always devoted to the practice of purification, has no yearning for heretical ascetic groups, is the same to enemy and friend, and loves Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva.

A Teacher, however, is always someone who knows the true meaning derived from rational analysis,⁴⁴ is an expert in the science of architecture, and is free from all faults.

The Protectors of Images, moreover, are of the same kind; they are honest and from good families.

Further, as in this statement of the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitā,

Fourteen repositories of knowledge are to be recognized. They are: Rig Veda, Yajur Veda, Sāma Veda, Atharva Veda, epics, Puranas, logic, exegesis, phonetics, ritual, grammar, etymology, astronomy, and metrics. Here too there is a lack of eligibility. On the contrary, there is indeed eligibility.⁴⁵

only the knowledge found in the triple Veda and so forth is admissible, so here⁴⁶ also only the knowledge found in the left-handed and right-handed scriptures is admissible. Accordingly, the Yoga-Yajnavalkya states:

For in order to obtain the knowledge of the self, one should investigate the Siddhantas. When a twice-born man studies them exclusively, he is placed outside the Veda. (BṛYogYSm 12.35)

Studying exclusively means practicing another’s dharma by abandoning one’s own dharma, because passages such as the following of the Skanda Purāṇa and the like forbid that kind of practice:

When someone abandons his own dharma and becomes enamored with another’s dharma, he is a Shudra thief, like the two eyes of a partridge resembling the moon.⁴⁷

The knowledge of the left-handed and right-handed scriptures and the like, furthermore, is for the purpose of appropriating some elements that are anticipated by one’s own authoritative texts and are not opposed to what is stated in those. This is stated by Manu:

Even when it is anticipated, the anticipation extends only to the anticipated epistemic source. That much only should be taken from another source, and nothing else, because of its uncertainty.

What is opposed, however, should be totally abandoned. For this very reason, moreover, the Mahābhārata, in its section on the king’s dharma, with the intention of preventing the mixture of dharma, states:

The dharmas of the four social classes, furthermore, should be safeguarded by the king, for the protection of dharma from mixture is the eternal dharma of kings. (MBh 12.57.15)

And one should not argue:

The knowledge of the left-handed and right-handed scriptures by someone like a Sthapaka, who performs the Tantric embellishments such as installation of images according to his own dharma, takes place only after he has undergone the initiatory rite prescribed in those scriptures.

The reasons for this are: (i) that is not accepted as such in authoritative texts such as texts of recollection; (ii) it is not established, moreover, that treatises such as the left-handed and the right-handed, as presented, are restricted to individuals such as Sthapakas; and (iii) treatises such as the left-handed and the right-handed, being examined wholeheartedly after such things as scrutinizing their commentaries, are considered to be well embellished through numerous repositories of knowledge. Therefore, by explaining them completely, one eliminates just the embellishments, such as the Tantric installation of images, as simply playful frivolity.

With reference to the statement of the Lord to Daksa contained in the Mahābhārata and the like—

I will grant you again an outstanding wish. Accept it, O you of good vows, with a pleasant face. Listen to it here attentively.

Immense and difficult ascetic toil has been well practiced by gods and demons after extracting it from the Veda, from the Vedic supplements,⁴⁸ from Samkhya, and from Yoga according to ability.

Unprecedented, auspicious on all sides, facing all sides, imperishable, composed of the fifteen categories,⁴⁹ hidden, disparaged by the ignorant, and different from— but in some aspects similar to—the dharmas performed by the social classes and the orders of life—this is stated in texts of recollection to be another order of life undertaken by people who have attained the inner self.

In the beginning I created first this Pasupata method. The copious fruit attained by a person who has properly performed it, may that be yours, O Illustrious One; give up your mental fever. (MBh 1, Appendix 28, 399–409)

—that does not indicate an obligation on the part of people belonging to the orders of life to follow the Pasupata treatise, because what the passage intends to say is simply that their results are the same. For there are statements such as the following in Pasupata scriptures: “He will obtain the fruit of performing the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice.” But this does not demonstrate eligibility to perform that sacrifice. Nor is the following passage of the Atharvaśiras Upaniṣad an indication of the obligation to perform the acts prescribed in the Pasupata treatises, because here one only learns about the restrictive rule pertaining simply to the rubbing of ash on the body:

This is the vow. He should rub the body with ash. Therefore, this is the Pasupata vow for the liberation of the soul from its snare.⁵⁰

Now, some state the following:

Because bathing with one’s clothes on is prescribed in texts of recollection when a person touches a Pasupata and the like, moreover, one should not suppose that the intention is to state that their treatises cause pollution to people in the orders of life. The reason is that in the Krita Age, during a Soma sacrifice and the like, a bath is prescribed even for touching the brick altar that has been consecrated with numerous mantras. Furthermore, the minds of people like us do not bother to plunge into the following inquiry with respect to a matter that is within the sole province of scripture: “Is the untouchability of the brick altar due to its defilement or, like the faded flowers offered to Rudra, due to its sacredness?”

In reality, however, in texts such as the following, Shaiva adherents and the like display an aversion to experts in the triple Veda who have not undergone initiation, just as toward people of the lowest caste:

When a Brahman, even though he may know the four Vedas, has not been initiated into the Shaiva ritual, he should be considered a Shudra and should not be given instruction.

In the same manner, experts in the triple Veda think that Shaivas and the like, who acknowledge Shaiva and other scriptures, pollute by their sight and touch, just like outcastes, because it is so stated in a text of recollection:

Kapalikas, Pasupatas, and Shaivas, along with Karukas⁵¹—if someone is seen by them, he should look at the sun, and if someone is touched by them, he should bathe.

This alone is the most appropriate position, for authoritative texts also support this. Therefore, only by examining closely arguments such as those given in the Puranas should one pay heed to their performance.

One should not suppose, moreover, that the scriptures of outsiders have the same goal as the Vedas simply because here and there one finds similarities in the performances prescribed by each. Even where there is an apparent similarity in the performances prescribed by the scriptures of outsiders, such as:

Whether she is ugly or beautiful, auspicious or inauspicious, good or evil, one should never despise a woman.

even there one should conclude that they are restrictive rules applicable only to initiated individuals in the manner stated in texts such as the Devī Purāṇa.

Therefore, it is settled that (i) texts of the Shaivas and the like are authoritative only insofar as they are irreproachable; and (ii) with regard to the obligation to follow them, only certain parts of them in some areas may be accepted as subsidiary elements, but they should not be followed in their entirety. Even there, it is established not only that what has been humanly authored should not be followed but also that it is to that extent without any authority and thus should be discarded.

For this very reason, teachers have stated:

An authoritative text composed by human beings should not be followed, and it should be recognized as unauthoritative, for it resulted from human intelligence.

That’s enough; let us not be long-winded!

[Here ends the excursus on non-Vedic scriptures.]

We⁵² have stated that “practice of good people” means the practice of the cultured elite. In this regard, Baudhayana gives the definition of the cultured elite:

Now, the cultured elite are those who are devoid of envy and without pride, who possess just a jarful of grain and are without covetousness, and who are free of hypocrisy, greed, folly, and anger.

The cultured elite are those who have studied the Veda together with its amplifications⁵³ in accordance with dharma, know how to draw inferences from them, and adduce Vedic texts as perceptible proof. (BDh 1.1.5–6)

“Who possess just a jarful of grain” in intended as an implicit reference to a restricted livelihood. The amplifications of the Veda are the epics, Puranas, and the like, because of Manu’s statement:

He should augment the Veda with epics and Puranas.⁵⁴

and, because of their invariable connection, also grammar and the like. Those who “know how to draw inferences from them” means those who know the texts of recollection, for these constitute the inference, that is, the invariable mark, of the respective Vedic text. “Adduce Vedic texts as perceptible proof”: such people are those who accept Vedic texts as constituting perceptible proof. Statements in texts of recollection and practice are also perceptible, because they lead to the perceptible.⁵⁵ Manu states:

A practice in that region handed down from generation to generation among the social classes and the intermediate classes is called the “practice of good people.” (MDh 2.18)

thinking that practices in regions such as the Brahmavarta are for the most part founded on the Veda, and not, however, thinking that the practice of good people is found only in Brahmavarta. If that were the case, even a practice of Brahmavarta that is founded on greed would be authoritative with respect to dharma, while a practice prevalent in another region, even though it is founded on the Veda, would not be authoritative.

Vasistha also states:

The dharmas and the practices of the region to the east of Adarsa, west of the Kalaka forest, north of Pariyatra, and south of the Himalayas—north of the Vindhya— all those should be accepted; but not others, the depraved dharmas of the jungle.⁵⁶ (VaDh 1.8–11)

Here also the word “all” is used to mean “for the most part.” In the statement “but not others, the depraved dharmas of the jungle” also, the meaning should be ascertained as follows. Not all dharmas and practices of other regions are to be accepted. The reason is that in those regions practices are for the most part based on greed and the like; only some are based on Vedic texts. Otherwise, a practice found in another region regarding which a basis such as greed is impossible would be without any foundation.⁵⁷

8.3 LEGAL DIGESTS: NIBANDHAS

Devanna Bhatta (Circa 1200 C.E.)

Devanna Bhatta is one of the earliest writers of a legal digest covering all or most of the topics of dharma whose work has survived. Little is known about his biography, but he probably lived in southern India. Compared to other writers of this genre, however, he is clearly one of the most gifted. It is with reason that Duncan Derrett (1968: 167) calls him “a front-rank jurist.” While most authors of legal digests are content with citing mechanically, one after the other, verses from texts of recollection and Puranas without any serious attempt to present their own argument, Devanna’s Smṛticandrikā (“Moonlight of Texts of Recollection”) integrates the texts he cites into a coherent narrative that is his own. This trait is clear here and in a special way in his discussion of legal procedure in chapter 13.

In these selections from his extensive survey of the epistemology of dharma, Devanna introduces some striking innovations. First, he gives several canonical lists of texts of recollection at the very beginning of his discussion. Clearly, these lists were important to him, perhaps not so much because of what they included but because of the range of texts that they excluded. In this context, Devanna introduces for the first time the classification of these treatises into major (smṛti) and minor (upasmṛti) texts, probably in imitation of Puranas and Upa-Puranas.

He also presents a hierarchy among these treatises, with Manu outranking all the others. This is, of course, in sharp contrast to Medhatithi’s view that Manu is not someone very exceptional. Thus, if any provision in a text of recollection contradicts what is stated in Manu’s text, it loses all validity. Although the theory of world ages (yuga) and the dharmas specific to each was already known, Devanna elevates it here to a new level of importance and visibility.

[Saṃskārakāṇḍa, pp. 1–32]⁵⁸

1. AUTHORITATIVE TEXTS

Only the treatises on dharma that Manu and the like have authored are based on the Veda. Precisely for this reason, only they are authoritative with respect to dharma. So, as a help to understanding them, their authors are presented at the outset. In this regard, Paithinasi states:

Of these, the following thirty-six seers are said to be the authors of texts on dharma: Manu, Angiras, Vyasa, Gautama, Atri, Usanas, Yama, Vasistha, Daksa, Samvarta, Satatapa, Parasara, Visnu, Apastamba, Harita, Sankha, Katyayana, Guru, Pracetas, Narada, Yogin, Bodhayana, Pitamaha, Sumantu, Kasyapa, Babhru, Paithinasi, Vyaghra, Satyavrata, Bharadvaja, Gargya, Karsnajini, Jabali, Jamadagni, Logaksi, and Brahmasambhava.⁵⁹

The question may be raised as to whether this is an exhaustive list. Not at all, for if that were the case the authorship of treatises on dharma would be denied to Vatsa, Marici, Devala, Paraskara, Pulastya, Pulaha, Kratu, Rsyasrnga, Likhita, Chagaleya, and so forth. Nor should one say: “Let it be so!” The reason is that they are no different from Manu and the like with regard to their authorship of treatises of recollection founded on the Veda. For this very reason, Sankha has used the term “and so forth”:

Manu, Yama, Daksa, Visnu, Angiras, Brihaspati, Usanas, Apastamba, Gautama, Samvarta, Atreya, Harita, Katyayana, Sankha, Likhita, Parasara, Vyasa, Satatapa, Pracetas, Yajnavalkya, and so forth.

Therefore, the proper course is to take the purpose of the list as simply illustrative. In this regard, Angiras states:

Jabali, Naciketas, Skanda, Logaksi, Kasyapa, Vyasa, Sanatkumara, Santanu, Janaka, Vyaghra, Katyayana, Jatukarna, Kapinjala, Bodhayana, Kanada, and Visvamitra—the wise call these minor texts of recollection.

Next, the Puranas:

Brāhma, Pādma, Vaiṣṇava, Śaiva, Bhāgavata, yet another, the Nāradīya, the seventh Mārkāṇḍeya, the eighth Āgneya, the ninth Bhaviṣya, the tenth Brahmavaivarta, the eleventh Laiṅga, the twelfth Vārāha, the thirteenth Skānda, the fourteenth Vāmana, the fifteenth is said to be Kaurma, Mātsya, Gāruḍa, and the last Brahmāṇḍa.

The Veda, furthermore, is authoritative insofar as it has no dependence on an author. And so are texts of recollection and practices insofar as they are based on the Veda. That they are based on the Veda, moreover, results from the fact that they expound acts taught in the Veda. Accordingly, Bhrigu states:

Whatever dharma Manu has proclaimed with respect to anyone, all that has been taught in the Veda, for it contains all knowledge. (MDh 2.7)

Sankha also states: “Of these, texts of recollection are founded on Veda.” This too refers only to those texts that have an unperceived purpose and not to those that have a perceived purpose. Accordingly, a Purana states:

All these are founded on the Veda, excluding, however, those that have a perceived purpose.

Surely, if the treatises of recollection are founded on the Veda insofar as they focus on acts taught in the Veda, then the Veda itself is sufficient. What is the use of treatises on dharma?

Fearing such an objection, Marici states:

Vedic statements are difficult to understand and, because they are scattered, they are fragmented. Those who know them have set down the same texts securely in the treatises of recollection, making their meanings clear.

In the same way it is established that the Puranas also are both authoritative and useful. For this very reason, a Vedic text, after enumerating the four Vedas, says: “The fifth is Itihasa and Purana” (ChUp 7.1.2). One should not suspect, moreover, that the Vedas and so forth are not authoritative by force of arguments based on such facts as that they are humanly authored, because such arguments are unfounded and because their faults have been pointed out. Accordingly, Manu states:

If a twice-born man disparages these two by relying on the science of logic, he ought to be ostracized by good people as an infidel and a denigrator of the Veda. (MDh 2.11)

“These two” refers to the Vedas and texts of recollection. Yama also states:

The treatises on dharma authored by these in former times are authoritative, and they should not be undermined by logical reasoning. Anyone who undermines them through logical reasoning sinks into blind darkness.

The use of “treatises on dharma” is intended to indicate also Puranas and the like. For this very reason, Vishnu states:

Purana, treatise on dharma of Manu, Veda along with the supplements, and medicine—these four have been established by command and should not be undermined by logical reasoning.⁶⁰

In the same manner, moreover, the authority of the authors of the aphoristic texts on the domestic ritual is not incompatible, because the texts are of benefit by showing how mantras taught in one’s own Vedic branch are employed in the set of life-cycle rites authored by Manu and the like. Likewise, Devala states:

Manu and the like are proclaimed as composers of treatises on dharma. The authors of the aphoristic texts on the domestic ritual are regarded as those who composed their works based on what Manu and the like composed.

2. EPISTEMIC SOURCES OF DHARMA

Next, the epistemic sources of dharma. On this, Yajnavalkya states:

The Vedas coupled with Puranas, logic, hermeneutics, treatises on dharma, and supplements—these are the fourteen sites of the sciences, and of the dharma. (YDh 1.3)

Purana consists of Brahma and so forth.⁶¹ Logic is argumentation. Exegesis is investigation into Vedic sentences. Treatises on dharma are the texts of recollection by Manu and so forth. The four Vedas are coupled with Vedic supplements such as gram mar. These fourteen are the repositories, that is, causes or epistemic sources, of knowledge systems, that is, of various kinds of knowledge,⁶² as well as of dharma by way of the knowledge systems. Manu also states:

The entire Veda is the root of dharma, as also the recollection and conduct of those who know it; likewise the practice of good people, and satisfaction of oneself. (MDh 2.6)

This is its meaning. “Veda is the root of dharma,” that is, the epistemic source with regard to dharma. So also the recollection and conduct of those who know the Veda; “conduct” refers to the avoidance of lust, hatred, and the like. “Practice” refers to such things as tying a bracelet.⁶³ “Satisfaction of oneself”: this shows that in the case of optional activities, when something pleases oneself as it is being carried out, this pleasure is also an epistemic source. Vyasa also states:

They say that the root of dharma is the Veda, which is a collection of texts that is not produced,⁶⁴ as also the recollection and conduct of those who know it, the practice of good people, and what pleases the mind.

“Good people” refers to the cultured elite. Accordingly, Manu states:

The practice of the cultured elite, texts of recollection, and the Vedas are the threefold characteristic of dharma.⁶⁵

“Characteristic” means the epistemic source. Manu himself gives the essential character of the cultured elite:

Those Brahmans who have studied the Veda together with its amplifications in accordance with dharma and are able to adduce as proofs express Vedic texts should be recognized as the cultured elite. (MDh 12.109)

Epics, Puranas, and the supplements are the amplifications of the Veda. Accordingly, Brihaspati states:

One should amplify the Veda by means of epics and Puranas. The Veda fears a man of little learning, thinking: “This man will lead me astray.”

The expression “able to adduce as proofs express Vedic texts” refers to people for whom, in learning dharma, Vedic texts are the direct cause.

Surely, if the practice of those who know the Veda is authoritative, then sex with Ahalya, Tara, and so forth on the part of Indra, Candra, and so forth should also be authoritative. But that is not the case. So, how can practice be authoritative? This has been stated by Gautama: “Transgression of dharma is seen, as also violence, in great men” (GDh 1.3). “Transgression” refers to such things as the cutting of his mother’s head by Parasurama.

To this we reply. It is true that Indra and others had sex with Ahalyā. Nevertheless, those yogins incurred no sin on account of their extraordinary power generated through ascetic toil. People like us do indeed incur sin in doing such things, because we lack that power. This is stated by Apastamba:

They incurred no sin on account of their extraordinary power. A weak man born at a later time who, observing that, does the same, perishes.⁶⁶ (ĀpDh 2.13.8–9)

Manu also states:

Transgression of dharma is seen, as also violence, in great men. A weak man born at a later time who, observing that, does the same, perishes.⁶⁷

Manu states that with respect to issues not addressed by his text of recollection and the like, the word of a legal assembly is authoritative:

If it be asked: what happens in cases where specific dharmas have not been scripturally laid down? What Brahmans who are cultured elite state is the undisputed dharma. (MDh 12.108)

The term “dharmas” has the meaning “epistemic sources of dharma.” These cultured elite, moreover, should number a minimum of ten. This is stated by Gautama:

In a matter that is not scripturally laid down,⁶⁸ one should do what is commended by a minimum of ten persons who are cultured elite, skilled in reasoning,⁶⁹ and free from greed. (GDh 28.48)

The meaning is that one should follow what they state is commendable. Baudhayana also says:

In the absence of these, there should be a legal assembly with a minimum of ten members.⁷⁰ (BDh 1.1.7)

“In the absence of these” means in the absence of Vedic texts and so forth. Yajnavalkya also states:

Four who know the Veda and dharma or three who know the triple Veda constitute a legal assembly. What it declares is dharma; or just one person who is the most eminent among knowers of the highest self. (YDh 1.9)

Here “dharma” refers to treatises on dharma…. The intended meaning is that, alternatively, three individuals who know the three Vedas beginning with the Rig Veda and who know dharma constitute a legal assembly. Accordingly, Manu states:

A man who knows the Rig Veda, a man who knows the Yajur Veda, and a man who knows the Sāma Veda—these should be recognized as constituting a legal assembly with a minimum of three members for settling doubts regarding dharma. (MDh 12.112)

The expression “the most eminent among knowers of the highest self” means the best among those who know the highest self, who also knows dharma. What even a single individual like that pronounces to be dharma, that also is dharma. Vasistha also states:

What men who have mastered the three Vedas and know dharma declare to be dharma, that is dharma for cleansing and for administering cleansing: in this there is no doubt. (VaDh 1.16)

That also, Yama states, is authoritative just as Vedic texts and the like are:

Vedas are authoritative. Texts of recollection are authoritative. A statement containing the meaning of dharma is authoritative. One should not take the words of a man as authoritative who does not accept these authorities as authoritative.

When a man does not regard the Vedas and the like as authoritative, a statement of his is not authoritative. Therefore, the intended meaning is that one should discard such a statement. Precisely because of this, Pracetas states:

Outside scriptural texts should not be examined, as also others that reject the Veda— one should not do what they say. Dharma is set forth from the Veda.

Likewise, Manu states that tradition is also authoritative in some areas:

The path trodden by his fathers, the path trodden by his grandfathers—let him tread along that path of good people; no harm will befall him when he travels by that path. (MDh 4.178)

“Tradition” is the practice that has come down the generations in one’s own family. This too should be considered applicable when scriptural texts are in disagreement. Accordingly, Sumantu states:

When the course given in scriptural texts is divergent with respect to any rite, O Bharata—as the divergence with respect to the fire offering, stating that it should be offered after sunrise and before sunrise⁷¹—in such a situation, however, a wise man should follow the practice that has come down successively in his family. That practice is even superior, O great-armed one, to what is taught in any scriptural text.

Likewise, Apastamba states that agreement among those who know dharma also is authoritative:

The authority is the agreement among those who know dharma; and the Vedas. (ĀpDh 1.1.2–3)

Furthermore, Manu states that, because a treatise on dharma is also of benefit with regard to dharma and because we hear of rewards for studying it, it should be studied:

A Brahman who desires heaven should study this treatise on dharma constantly, just as he does the Veda. (MDh 1.103; additional verse)

Yama also states:

Retaining the treatise on dharma, as also the Vedas, in the mind leads to wealth, fame, long life, merit, and heaven. By understanding the treatise on dharma, a man attains the world of Brahman.

Brihaspati also states:

Vedic texts and texts of recollection are viewed as the two ultimate eyes of Brahmans. A man who lacks one of them is called one-eyed, and a man who lacks both is called blind. (BṛSm, Saṃskāra, 228)

People who have studied the four Vedas along with the six supplements, the Pada text, and the Krama text,⁷² but lack the texts of recollection do not shine bright, like a star-spangled night sky without the moon. (BṛSm, Saṃskāra, 227)

Manu also states:

When a Brahman who keeps his vows studies this treatise, he is never sullied by faults arising from mental, oral, or physical activities. (MDh 1.104)

Here the term “Brahman” is used as a synecdoche for twice-born people. For this very reason, Yama states:

When a Brahman, Kshatriya, or Vaishya studies this treatise, he purifies seven generations of ancestors who went before him, as also seven generations who come after him.

The following statement of Manu, however, is intended to deny this right to Shudras:

This should be studied diligently by a learned Brahman, and it should be explained properly by learned men and by no one else. (MDh 1.103)

For this very reason, while presenting the topic of a Shudra’s eligibility, Yama states:

Therefore, his eligibility does not extend to the Vedas or to texts of recollection.

Therefore, it is established that the eligibility to study extends only to twice-born individuals. The same, one must recognize, applies also to the performance of acts enjoined by them. For this very reason, Manu states:

A man for whom it is prescribed that the rites beginning with the infusion and ending with the cemetery are to be performed with the recitation of mantras—no one but he is to be recognized as having the eligibility to study this treatise. (MDh 2.16)

“Infusion” refers to the impregnation ceremony, and “cemetery” refers to the funeral. Vyasa also states:

Therefore, those who desire to maintain the purity of dharma declare that the performance of rites, with the exception of those given in texts of recollection and in the Vedas, pertains to persons who are not twice-born.⁷³

Texts composed by the Buddhists and other such people, on the other hand, should never be followed, because they are not founded on the Veda. This has been stated in the Caturviṃśatimata:

The statements of Arhat and Carvaka,⁷⁴ and the declarations of the Buddha and the like are deceitful statements. A man should shun all of them.

Vyasa also states:

Whatever there is other than these⁷⁵ calling itself “dharma,” know that it should be kept very far away. Resorting to it is regarded as folly. (see DhKo 5: 163)

What, then, should a man perform? Anticipating this question, Vyasa himself states:

The rites that have been set forth in texts of recollection formerly by sages who knew best the meaning of the Vedas—these a man should perform diligently, and avoid anything that they prohibit.

Whatever these best knowers of the meaning of the Vedas, desiring the welfare of the people, have ordained as dharma—one should not cause a deviation from that dharma.

[pages 12–15 have been omitted]

3. RELATIVE STRENGTH OF AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES

Next, we deal with the relative strength of Vedic texts and so forth. With reference to this, Manu states:

When there are two contradictory Vedic texts on some issue, however, texts of recollection state that both are dharma with respect to it, for wise men have correctly pronounced them both to be dharma. (MDh 2.14)

When there is disagreement between two Vedic texts because they contradict each other on a particular issue, what is taught in both Vedic texts is dharma with regard to it, because they both have been declared to be dharma even by those who are earlier than Manu and so forth. The intention is to point out that there is an option between the two, because they have equal authority. This very statement intends to affirm an option also when there is a conflict between two texts of recollection. For this very reason, while dealing with the authority of texts of recollection, Gautama states:

When those of equal power are in conflict with each other, there is an option. (GDh 1.4)

When there is a conflict between a Vedic text and a text of recollection, the text of recollection is, indeed, annulled. Accordingly, Logaksi states:

When there is a conflict between a Vedic text and a text of recollection, however, it is the Vedic text that has greater force. When they are not in conflict, what is ordained in the text of recollection should always be performed, just like what is ordained in the Vedic text.

In the same manner, a practice also is, indeed, annulled when it is in conflict with a text of recollection, because of Vasistha’s text of recollection:

Dharma is laid down in Vedic texts and texts of recollection. In the absence of these, the practice of the cultured elite is authoritative. (VaDh 1.4–5)

The same should be regarded as applying also to any pronouncement of a legal assembly. This is stated in the Caturviṃśati:

Just as a text of recollection should be repudiated when it is in conflict with a Vedic text, so also a worldly pronouncement should be repudiated when it is contradicted by a text of recollection.

When on a particular issue, however, Manu’s text is contradicted by some other text of recollection, what is ordained by Manu is, indeed, superior. This is affirmed by Angiras:

Any statement made in contravention of the supreme treatise on dharma declared formerly by Manu is not beneficial to oneself.

Any other statement that contradicts what is ordained by Manu does not promote what is beneficial to oneself. Brihaspati also states:

Manu’s text of recollection is paramount, because its composition is taken directly from the Veda. Any text of recollection opposed to the tenor of Manu, however, is not approved. (BṛSm, Saṃskāra, 13)

A Vedic text also states:

Whatever Manu has ordained is medicine. (TS 2.2.10.2)

Vyasa has stated, moreover, that when there is a conflict between two dharmas, the weaker one is annulled:

A dharma that contradicts a dharma is not a dharma at all. When a dharma is not contradicted, however, it is called dharma by good people.

Therefore, when there is a contradiction, after ascertaining the relative strength of the dharma, a wise man should determine the one that has the greater preponderance to be dharma.

[section from page 17, line 14 until page 24, line 7 is omitted]

4. DHARMAS OF DIFFERENT REGIONS

Next, the dharmas of regions. On this point, Bodhayana states:

There are five areas in which there is disagreement with respect to the south: eating in the company of an uninitiated person, eating in the company of one’s wife, eating stale food, and marrying the daughter of the mother’s brother or the father’s sister.

Likewise with respect to the north: selling wool, drinking spiritous liquor, trafficking in animals with teeth in both jaws, making a living as a soldier, and traveling by sea.

If the former does it in the latter, and the latter does it in the former, he becomes defiled. The authority of the region applies solely to each respective area.⁷⁶ (BDh 1.2.1–6)

This is its meaning. If “the former,” that is, a southerner, does such things as eating in the company of an uninitiated person in “the latter,” that is, in the northern region, he is defiled; but not if he does so in his own region. Likewise, if a northerner does such things as selling wool in “the former,” that is, in the southern region, he is defiled; but not if he does so in his own region. Why is this so? Because of the authority of the region, that is, because the authority is restricted to the respective region. That is the meaning. Brihaspati also states:

Twice-born people of the south marry the daughters of their maternal uncles; in the Middle Region they work as laborers, craftsmen, and leather workers; in the east men eat fish and the women delight in adultery; in the north the women drink liquor, men touch menstruating women, and a uterine brother takes his brother’s wife who has lost her husband. (BṛSm, Saṃskāra, 401–3)

Brihaspati himself states the authoritative nature of these practices on the basis of the norms of each region:

Those dharmas of regions, castes, and families that are prevailing in them—they should be maintained as they are; otherwise the subjects will become agitated. (BṛSm 1.126–27)

Devala also states:

Whichever gods, Brahmans, water, soil, purification, and the practice of dharma there are in whichever region—one should never treat them with contempt; such is the dharma in each of those regions.

Whichever dharma is enjoined in whichever region, city, village, or town of people learned in the three Vedas, one should never cause a deviation from that dharma.

Likewise, with regard to adherence in general to the authoritativeness of the dharmas of regions, Manu states:

He should endorse the practices of virtuous men and righteous twice-born individuals, if such practices do not conflict with those of a particular region, family, or caste. (MDh 8.46)

The meaning of this is as follows. The practices of virtuous men that do not conflict with authorities such as Vedic texts, these he should endorse as having the character of dharma for regions, families, and castes. Likewise, Gautama states:

The dharmas of regions, castes, and families are also authoritative if they are not in conflict with the sacred scriptures. (GDh 11.20)

[page 26, lines 5 to 17 is omitted]

In the same manner, indeed, whatever goes against the norms of the world also should be rejected. This is stated by Varahamihira:

Now, one should consider at the outset the practice of the region. Whatever the norm is in whichever region, that alone should be followed. Learned men avoid what people abhor; those who are astrologers follow the ways of the people. (Vivāhapaṭala 72)

5. DHARMAS OF WORLD AGES

Next, the dharmas of world ages. With regard to this, Manu states:

There is one set of dharmas for men in the Krita Age, another in the Treta, still another in the Dvapara, and a different set in the Kali, in keeping with the progressive shortening taking place in each age. Ascetic toil, they say, is supreme in the Krita Age; knowledge in the Treta; sacrifice in the Dvapara; and gift giving alone in the Kali.⁷⁷ (MDh 1.85–86)

“Ascetic toil” means painful fasts, lunar fasts,⁷⁸ and the like; “supreme” means primary. Brihaspati also states:

Ascetic toil is stated to be the dharma in the Krita Age; knowledge in the Treta Age; sacrifice in the Dvapara; and gift giving, compassion, and self-control in the Tisya. (BṛSm, Saṃskāra, 4)

“Tisya” means Kali. Parasara also states:

In Krita Age, however, the dharmas are said to be those of Manu; in Treta those of Gautama; in Dvapara those of Sankha-Likhita; and in Kali those of Parasara.

In the Krita Age a man should abandon the region; in Treta, the village; in Dvapara, just the family; and in the Kali Age the doer.

In Krita one falls from caste by simply speaking; in Treta, by touching; in Dvapara, by accepting food; and in Kali, by action.⁷⁹ (PārSm 1.1.24–26)

Brihaspati also states:

The dharma⁸⁰ produced in a year in the Krita Age is produced in three seasons in the Treta, in three fortnights in the Dvapara, and in one day in the Kali. (BṛSm, Saṃskāra, 5)

In the Viṣṇu Purāṇa also it is stated:

What is produced in ten years in the Krita Age is produced in one year in the Treta, in one month in the Dvapara, and within a day and a night in the Kali. (ViP 6.2.15)

In the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa also it is stated:

The dharma produced in a year in Treta, texts of recollection say, is produced in a month in the Dvapara; and in Kali, a wise man performing it according to his ability achieves it in one day. (BraṇḍaP 1.31.72)

In the Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa also it is stated:

In the Krita a man should visit Puskara; in the Treta, Naimisa; in the Dvapara, Kuruksetra; and in the Kali one should resort to Ganga.

6. DHARMAS OF THE KALI AGE

Next, the dharmas of the Kali Age. With regard to this, Vyasa states:

What a man obtains in the Krita by meditation, in the Treta by offering sacrifices, and in the Dvapara by performing worship—the same one obtains in the Kali by praising Kesava.

Even with little effort, men who know dharma obtain here in the Kali Age a great increase of dharma. In the Kali, I am pleased by that.

In the Ādi Purāṇa also it is stated:

The dharma of the Krita Age should not be performed in the Kali Age, because in the Kali both men and women are addicted to sin.

Because in the Kali there is no erudition, no pure wealth, and no purity of the mind, truth alone is beneficial to men.

The same text, likewise, gives also the forbidden dharmas:

Vedic studentship lasting a long time, the carrying of a water pot, marrying someone from one’s lineage or from the ancestry of one’s mother, killing cows, human sacrifice, horse sacrifice, and liquor—twice-born people should avoid these during the Kali Age.

Kratu also states:

In the Kali one should not father a child through a brother-in-law, give in marriage a girl who has already been given, kill a cow in a sacrifice, or carry a water pot.

In the Brahma Purāṇa it is stated:

Remarriage of a married woman, special share of the eldest brother, killing cows, fathering a child through the wife of one’s brother, and carrying a water pot—one should not do these five things in the Kali.

Similarly, others also present this authoritative statement based on the agreement of those who know dharma:

The appointment of a brother-in-law to father offspring through a widow; marriage of a child or one who is still a virgin to another suitor; marrying virgins of a different social class by twice-born men; killing in a righteous fight a Brahman who is attacking someone; associating with a twice-born who has traveled by a ship in the sea even though he has been purified; consecrating all people for a sacrificial session; carrying a water pot; going on the great journey;⁸¹ killing a cow during the Gosava sacrifice; associating with someone who takes liquor even during a Sautrāmaṇī ritual; accepting communal licking of the sacrificial spoon; entering the forest hermit’s order of life even when rules prescribe it; restricting the period of impurity depending on livelihood and Vedic recitation; penitential procedures for Brahmans that end in death; guilt of associating with people such as thieves; the expiation of great sins causing loss of caste; the rite of killing an animal for a bridegroom, guest, and ancestors; accepting as sons those other than an adopted son and a natural son; association on the parts of people of the same social class with sinners even though they may have been purified; the abandonment of the wife of an elder when sexual intercourse other than in the vagina has taken place; touching someone’s body after the collection of bones; Brahmans acting as butchers; selling Soma; after fasting for six mealtimes,⁸² accepting food from a man who performs base activities; taking the following among Shudras as people whose food may be eaten: servant, cowherd, family friend, and sharecropper; a householder going to a very distant place of pilgrimage; the prescription that a pupil should behave toward his teacher’s wives just as toward his teacher; living according to rules for times of adversity on the part of Brahmans; the mode of life where one does not store food for the next day; Brahmans taking a surrogate woman to bear a child; sending Brahmans into exile; blowing on a fire with the mouth; having sex as prescribed with a sinful woman by force; an ascetic begging according to rule from all social classes; not using new water for ten days;⁸³ a fee solicited by the teacher; a Shudra doing cooking and the like for Brahmans and the like; people such as the aged killing themselves by jumping from a height or into fire; the cultured elite doing the rite of sipping using water left over from a cow slaking its thirst; imposing punishment on witnesses in conflicts between fathers and sons; staying in a house where they happen to be in the evening by sages devoted to truth—in the beginning of the Kali Age great and wise men, in order to protect the people, have put a stop to these activities, after first establishing a norm. The agreement of good people is authoritative just like the Veda.

Apastamba also states:

The authority is the agreement among those who know dharma; and the Vedas. (ĀpDh 1.1.2–3)