Alicante, 1808
News of Wellington’s magnificent victory over Marmont’s army at Salamanca arrived at Suchet’s headquarters at much the same time as that informing him that Maitland’s force had arrived over the horizon on the Levante coast. With only 8,000 available men left in his field army he realized his options were limited. Following Salamanca the Army of Portugal had withdrawn north, but the consequences of the battle and Wellington’s follow-up on the armies of the Centre and South were yet to become manifest. Suchet, therefore, decided to concentrate his field army north of the River Júcar and await the outcome of the inevitable French withdrawal. Suchet was well aware that if Joseph fell back east instead of north-east (which he did) and was pursued by Wellington that the the main theatre of operations would move to eastern Spain. Maitland, meanwhile, was trying to tackle a well trodden Iberian dilemma, a lack of local transport and supplies. While he tried to resolve the problem, he postponed any notion of taking the offensive and merely deployed the force to hold a line about 20 kilometres north of Alicante. Woollcombe recorded that ‘they were disembarked, and the regiments of the line were ordered to proceed out of the town into the villages. The artillery and staff only remained.’1
Some British and Spanish cavalry probed the French positions on the River Júcar but, with events moving fast in the rest of the country, it was prudent to wait. Wellington moved towards Madrid, liberating the city on 12 August, and forcing Joseph into making a decision to either withdraw north-east towards the French armies of Portugal and the North or fall abck eastwards and link up with Suchet’s outposts at Almansa. Joseph’s Army of the Centre numbered about 14,000 and consisted of the Royal Guard, Darmagnac’s division of infantry, Anne-François-Charles Trelliard’s division of cavalry (which had held up Wellington’s entry to Madrid at Majadahonda), Palombini’s Italian division and Maupoint’s brigade. These latter two formations were from Suchet’s forces in Aragón which Joseph had had ordered to the capital in mid-July to assist in its defence. As he departed Madrid, Joseph sent orders to Soult to move with his Army of the South and concentrate around Valencia. On this singular occasion, with his right flank now dangerously exposed, Soult complied without question. Soult gave orders for the siege at Cádiz to be lifted and for his three corps to move east without delay. Soult’s evacuation of Andalusia placed the small allied concentration in Murcia and Alicante at considerable peril. The combined armies of Joseph, Suchet and Soult would number in excess of 80,000 men. Furthermore, it was entirely conceivable that Soult would pull back and besiege both Cartagena and Alicante en route. Wellington sensed the danger and suggested, in three letters in August and September, that Maitland concentrate in Alicante and make preparations to hold the place but to keep his transports to hand and to re-embark if the situation became critical:
29 August: It does not appear to me to be probable that the King and Suchet, even when joined will make any attack upon you at Alicante, and you should endeavour to maintain yourself at a distance from the town, so as to draw supplies of provisions from the country as long as you may find it to be possible, particularly for the Spanish troops.2
2 September: I beg you will understand that I propose that the troops under your command should occupy the heights outside Alicante, which are to the southward and westward of the town, to rest your left on the sea.3
20 September: ... it appears to be the opinion of the admiral [Hallowell] that the troops can be embarked as long as your extensive line can be maintained; but that the communication with the sea would be difficult and uncertain, and probably only partially practicable ... It appears to me that as long as you can maintain the castle of Alicante, and the hills to the south, your communication with the sea would be easy and certain ... I assure you that your facilities for embarkation are much greater, and your prospects better, even if left by yourself, than mine were in the year 1810. 4
Captain Thomas Scott RA, the adjutant to the Commander Royal Artillery, wrote arguably the best personal account of life in the Anglo-Sicilian force. A few days after he landed he went to examine the fortifications at Alicante and noted that ‘Williamson and I, after flogging a man by a drum-head Court Martial, rode thro’ the town, which is fortified by works lately erected. The Castle is the strongest situated place by nature I almost ever saw, must either be starved or taken by a coup de main, not otherwise certainly. A large town outside had been destroyed by the Spaniards, so as not to allow an allogement [sic] to be made. The country is wretchedly parched up and appears very barren, altho’ flat. The road as far as we went was tolerably good and I understand it is so for miles, this will be very good for our horses.’5 Alicante had been fortunate, the conflict had been raging in Iberia for four years and, other than Montbrun’s brief folly to the area earlier in the year, it had thus far escaped the rigours and ravages of war. The Alicantinos had not been idle and in March 1809 plans were submitted to drastically increase the defences in and around the city.6José Vallejo was commissioned by the Valencian government to oversee the work. The walls were expanded and strengthened, particularly around the district outside the city walls to the south-west. The entire district of San Anton was completely flattened to deny an attacker cover, and a castle was constructed on the Monte Tosul which overlooked the city from the north-west: ‘The work was directed by the engineer Ordovas and the castle received the name of San Fernando, in honour of the saint who gave his name to the King by whom the Spaniards fought against the Napoleonic army.’7
The defences were completed at about the time Maitland’s force arrived. Wellington’s assessment, based upon these new defences (about which he was apprised) was therefore accurate. General orders were given to the force to establish their defences and cantonments in and around the city. The infantry and cavalry found themselves on the arid wastelands while the general officers, staff, artillery and commissariat personnel were billeted, along with those of the Royal and Merchant Navy, within the confines of the city walls. Those new to the theatre struggled with the oppressive heat but the distractions of the pretty local girls more than compensated. Tom Scott was particularly taken with the local women; on the day he landed he wrote that ‘the women appeared to me very pretty and wicked eyes laughed and tittered exceedingly through the blinds’.8 He was soon engaged in a fairly lively flirtation with a Louisa but was reluctant to become too seriously involved. Such interaction inevitably caused friction with the local men but relations between the Spanish and British troops were little better. Scott noted in his diary on 11 September that ‘a row took place between some Spanish officers and those of the 81st in consequence of some insult or fancied one at the billiard table ... a cadet was well served by being kicked down the stairs and the maitre d’hotel confined by the governor in the jail – his house shut up in consequence’.9
Alicante, 1808
Alicante, 1812
For the month of September, Maitland and Elio on the one hand, and Joseph and Suchet on the other, were waiting on Soult’s next move. In fact Soult had hung on in Andalusia in the hope that events in the north might swing back sufficiently to enable him to reconsider a withdrawal. He finally stirred from Granada on 17 September and then, with confirmed reports of a new outbreak of yellow fever, he decided to move his army through the interior via Huescar to Chinchilla. By so doing he avoided Murcia and Cartagena and by-passed the concentration of allied forces around Alicante. The fever was rampant in and around Cartagena and General Ross who had gone back to the town in early September had succumbed by the 26th of the month. Despite this, the allied troops were ordered to stay in the town for fear that they might spread the contagion if they were to move to Alicante or back to Cádiz. At the end of October HMS Thunder came up from Cartagena and collected the regimental surgeon of the 58th Foot and some medical staff as all those back in the southern port had reported sick. There were some cases of the fever in Alicante itself but by early 1813 the worst of the epidemic had passed across the region.
Soult arrived in the area on 2 October and the three armies were in communication. Soult’s forces were cantoned in Yecla, Albacete, Almansa and Jorquera. While Soult’s force rested the French commanders conferred. Should they move against Wellington or strengthen their hold on the east coast? While Soult rested and Joseph pondered, Suchet pushed his divisions back towards the south and west:
The combined Spanish and Anglo-Sicilian corps, which the Army of Aragon had in front of it, was instantly reduced to impotence. Marshal Suchet pushed on his divisions, occupied Fuente de la Higuera [La Font de la Figuera], Moxente, Alcoy and Denia. Paris’s brigade, which had come down from Aragon, covered the right flank of the army at Requena, against Bassecourt, Villacampa and El Empecinado, combined.10
While considering their options, it came to Joseph’s attention that Soult had written a despatch (dated 12 August) to the minister of war in Paris accusing him of entering secret negotiations with the Spanish executive at Cádiz. It was entirely fictitious and caused considerable acrimony between the two commanders at a critical moment. Joseph, already convinced that Soult’s failure to move in support of him in July and August had led to the loss of Madrid, was determined to expose Soult’s duplicity and have him removed from Iberia. He realized he would need Napoleon’s approval and wrote to him accordingly. While waiting for the reply the king and the two marshals discussed options. Soult was all for moving on Madrid with the combined armies of the Centre and South, supported by elements of Suchet’s force. However, the latter commander was dead set against removing any of his already overstretched force. Joseph agreed with Suchet but was nevertheless keen for an advance on Madrid and suggested troop readjustments to make the armies of the Centre and the South numerically balanced. It was Soult’s turn to protest loudly. Then in late October a reply came (via Heni Clarke, minister of war) from the emperor in Moscow:
An aide-de-camp from the King of Spain has brought letters to me dated the first week of September. You are aware that at this distance I can do nothing for the armies of Spain. Let the King of Spain and the Duke of Dalmatia know how little help they are to expect, and how necessary their present situation makes it that they should unite, and diminish as much as in their power to disasters caused by a pernicious system.11
In fact both Soult and Joseph had begun their independent movements west towards Madrid on 15 and 17 October respectively. The next day Wellington’s force at Burgos was attacked by the armies of Portugal and the North. It was a most uncertain situation; both Hill at Madrid and Wellington at Burgos were each being pursued by two French armies. However, by 8 November the crisis appeared to have passed when the two allied forces joined at Salamanca. Caffarelli had already retreated back north but the other three French armies arrived in front of Wellington’s force on 10 November. Once again, they argued as to how best to proceed. Wellington took advantage of the deliberations and ordered a general retreat, only Soult’s forces pursuing with any gusto and within days he also broke off the chase. As Joseph and Soult had pushed west and north the Spanish forces of Ballesteros had reoccupied Cuenca; there were no French soldiers in the region of New Castile and all communication between Joseph and Soult on the one hand, and Suchet on the other, were severed. Consequently, in late October, Suchet found himself in much the same situation as he had been the previous August.
Meanwhile command of the Anglo-Sicilian force had changed a number of times. Maitland resigned in early October from ill-health and was succeeded by Major General John Mackenzie, the senior divisional commander, who, in turn, was replaced by Major General William Clinton on 20 November. His tenure was to last only a few days, being outranked by Major General James Campbell who arrived from Sicily with a large body of reinforcements on 2 December. He himself was replaced on 25 February 1813 by Lieutenant General Sir John Murray who had been selected by Horse Guards and sent out from England. Murray was the 8th Baronet of Clermont, Fifeshire, and was appointed ensign in the 3rd Foot Guards on 24 October 1788. He served in Flanders in 1793 and 1794 as ADC to the Duke of York and on return assumed command of the 2nd Battalion, 84th Foot, and commanded the battalion during the capture of the Cape of Good Hope two years later. After a spell in the Arabian Gulf he was appointed quarter-master general of the Indian Army under General David Baird. It was in India that he rubbed shoulders with Arthur Wellesley. During the 2nd Anglo-Maratha War the move to neutralise the troublesome Jeshwant Rao Holkar resulted in the humiliating retreat by Colonel Manson and an unhappy performance by Colonel Murray. Indeed the retreat by Monson has been called one of the greatest and most disgraceful setbacks to the British military reputation in India. As the campaign had been initiated on Arthur Wellesley’s suggestion, he lost patience with Murray who questioned every order, and eventually Wellesley wrote to his brother’s Confidential Secretary recommending that Murray be relieved of his command:
I have long been of the opinion that Colonel Murray ought to be relieved from his command; and his letter to Mr. Duncan, of the 19th July, renders it absolutely necessary now either to reinforce him with regular cavalry, which is impossible; to withdraw his corps entirely from Malwa, which, unless it be to supply it with provisions, would be fatal to the operations of the war; or to relieve him in the command by another officer. If one of these measures be not adopted, the Government, and not Colonel Murray, will be responsible for the misfortunes that may happen. I therefore recommend that Mr. Duncan may be ordered to send Major General Jones to relieve Colonel Murray without loss of time.12
As it turned out Murray was not relieved of command and he did advance to Kota. The following year on promotion to major general he returned home before joining Sir John Moore’s force destined for operations in Sweden. In 1809 he was part of Arthur Wellesley’s army in Portugal and played a major role, commanding the largest brigade, during the legendary recapture of the city of Porto. However, Murray’s failure to cut off, or even hinder, Soult’s retreat from the city prompted Napier to record that ‘it was an opportunity that would have tempted a blind man to strike; the neglect of it argued want of military talent and of military hardihood’.13 Harsh words indeed, although Wellesley wrote the event up very differently, noting that ‘the enemy’s left flank was turned by a movement well executed by Major Gen. Murray, with Brig Langwerth’s brigade KGL’.14 Despite this plaudit it was generally accepted that Murray could have done much more to interdict and destroy Soult’s forces as they escaped the city. In fact Murray hastily departed the Iberian theatre soon after this questionable performance, but not because of it – he was concerned that he might have to serve under William Carr Beresford. This latter officer was junior in British rank to Murray but bore the rank of Marshal of the Portuguese Army, which outranked Murray in the field. Murray was, therefore, a controversial choice for this independent command on the east coast and, given his prior record it is somewhat surprising that Wellington agreed to his appointment. Of course it must be remembered that Napier’s words were penned long after the war when the full spectrum of Murray’s feats were known. In contrast, Woollcombe recorded the character of Sir John Murray, on the commander’s arrival, as ‘being a great martinet but a good officer’.
In fact, throughout this period it was expected that Bentinck would come over to assume command. For some his reluctance to depart Sicily and come to Spain was considered a merciful release in so much as it was likely that he would be accompanied by Lady Bentinck. Woollcombe considered this a particular blessing as Lady Mary ‘was always a politician and may be coming to take command of the army. The command of its commander has long been vested in her hands. Nothing like petticoat government; it ensures the good opinion of all the Amazons engaged in the contest, which, at present, are not a few.’15 Many months before Murray arrived, however, Bentinck was under pressure from Whitehall to send more troops to the region. Concerned that Bentinck had failed to understand the greater game and, following Wellington’s victory in July (but before his debacle in front of Burgos in October) he received two letters from Bathurst with some very clear direction. The first was sent in October:
Your Lordship will by this instruction observe with what anxiety His Majesty’s Servants look to their fate of the contest of the Peninsula, and how strongly they are impressed with the opinion that every possible exertion must be made to bring it to a successful termination. The victories obtained by His Majesty’s Arms, and the actual diversion in the north of Europe afford the fairest hopes which have hitherto existed of rescuing the Spanish and Portuguese nations from the yoke of France, while the resources this country, whether of Men or Money are not sufficient to make two separate exertions ... His Majesty’s Servants have felt the less difficulty in deciding thus to direct all the disposable force of the country to the Peninsula, from observing that the accounts from Italy by no means represent the state of the country to be as prepared for concerted action ... if therefore your Lordship should be able to detach any further aid to the Eastern Coast of Spain consistent with the Security of Sicily, to which you are in the first instance to look.16
Bathurst went on to suggest that Bentinck might perhaps feel that he would be disposed to command the force but, again, that decision was left to his judgement. The second, rather more direct letter, was sent on 2 December:
It is the desire of His Majesty’s Government to strengthen as much as circumstances will permit the Corps acting upon the East Coast of Spain, which it is hoped will have been reinforced by this time by further detachments from the Allied Army under your Lordship’s command in Sicily.17
A number or reinforcements had indeed arrived from Sicily and Lisbon during the winter months, bringing the total of Murray’s force up to well over 20,000 men (see Appendix I). This included the two Spanish divisions under Whittingham and Roche, even though the latter was technically still part of Elio’s 2nd Army. This reorganized Spanish force numbered nearly 30,000 and consisted of six divisions. Roche was with Murray’s force near to Alicante, three other divisions (under Villacampa, Miyares and Sarsfield) were positioned on the Murcian border about two days march from Alicante. The remaining two divisions were really groupings of the guerrilla bands of El Empecinado and Duran, both of which were essentially operating in southern Aragón. In essence, therefore, Elio really only had about 15,000 men at his immediate disposal. Nevertheless, this provided a total force of some 35,000 available to tackle Suchet, a point the French Commander made clearly and repeatedly to Paris and Madrid at every opportunity. Despite this, it was unlikely either Berthier or Joseph paid much heed to Suchet’s overtures for, on paper at least, his force numbered 75,000 men. However, with his extended area of operations, beset with effective guerrilla groups, and the numerous garrisons he had to maintain, his effective attacking strength on the Júcar was no more than 15,000 men.
Numbers alone, however, rarely tell the whole story. The foreign elements (Germans aside) within the Anglo-Sicilian force were questionable indeed, consisting of mainly Italians but also French and Swiss deserters and a small number of Poles, Croats and the odd Dutchman. A troop return sent by James Campbell in early January 1813, listed 5,840 British, 2,000 German, 2,000 Calabrian, 9,882 Spanish and 5,494 other ‘Foreign’ troops.18 The Italians, in particular, were prone to abscond and in early February, 86 men of the 2nd Italian Levy had gone over to the French lines taking their officer with them as a prisoner. Woollcombe recalled a month earlier a story of nine Italians who intended to desert but who met an Italian deserter from Suchet’s army who made a comparison of their particular circumstances. He cited that in ‘four years in Spain during the last two of which he received neither clothes, rations, money nor shoes, that he had been obliged to rob for his subsistence and plunder in order to obtain the common necessities in life ... if under these circumstances you can conceive you can better your condition ... proceed and join the army I have just left, but take the advice of an older soldier ... and return with me to the English.’19 Campbell had been forced to disarm the Italian Levy and place it on board the transports in Alicante Bay under the guns of the Royal Navy ships.20 The battalion had been sorted out in time for the campaign in 1813 but the questionable nature of some of his troops will have done little to inspire a naturally cautious officer like Murray.
There was, however, another impediment which prevented Murray taking the operational initiative. His force was almost devoid of transport; carts, wagons and the horses and mules to move them. It had been the intention to procure these resources, along with the requisite provisions, in-country. However, as had been witnessed on numerous occasions with Wellington’s army in other parts of Iberia, the local military commanders were reluctant to provide either supplies or the means to transport them, for there was barely sufficient of either resource for their own indigenous purposes. Food was, accordingly, being shipped from Sicily and Algeria and the few carts and animals that were available were procured at high prices from Spanish locals. Campbell had written to Bentinck about the problem on his arrival in December 1812:
My first attention shall be directed to put the troops I brought hither upon a similar footing of preparation for field movements with those I found here – in doing which I already foresee the principle difficulty will be conveyance of Commissariat stores and ammunition, the Country not being well able, and I apprehend likewise not very willing to furnish requisitions of draft or carriage cattle, we shall do all we can however, by the aid and coercion of the Magistrates and other authorities of the Country.21
Although this uncooperativeness was not unique to Valencia the fact remained that the inhabitants of the region had not witnessed the horrors of war in quite the same way as other parts of the nation. For the most part they had not seen French troops and many were uninspired by the exploits of the Spanish armies and the newly arrived expeditionary force and were, accordingly, less inclined to offer and extend help. Rather than evoking insurrection there was a general apathy amongst the Valencianos and a broad submission to the French yoke, a large number becoming afrancesados. Joseph’s troops had been astounded at how well they had been received during their brief spell in the region and for Suchet’s men they were quite clear that operations on the east coast of Spain were spared, to a major extent, the atrocities of guerrilla warfare which were so prevalent in other parts of the country. The terrain was hilly but not mountainous and did not therefore support guerrilla operations in quite the same way as the mountainous regions of Aragón or Navarre. However, there was one guerrilla group that operated in Alicante and Valencia; its leader was Augstin Nebot known otherwise known as ‘The Friar’ (El Fraile). At its height, Nebot’s force numbered about 4,000 men and they became known as ‘Tupper’s Rifles’ after Peter Charles Tupper (see chapter 4). He established his headquarters in the northern interior of Valencia near the small village of Vistabella, where he purportedly erected a number of factories which manufactured arms, ammunition and military equipment. He was so successful that by 1813 he had captured nearly 500 French soldiers which he incarcerated in a prison near his hideout. Following his successful attack on a French group escorting Spanish prisoners and French artillery at Torreblanca on 16 October 1811, Suchet ordered Harispe to destroy Nebot and his guerrilla force.22 The commander of the 114th Line regiment formed a column and it had some success but the guerrillas dispersed and the French were only partially successful.23 Mazzuchelli (then the governor in Valencia) offered three prisoners, who had been condemned to death, their liberty and 5,000 pesetas each if they would join Nebot’s band and murder him. The three confessed on arrival at one of Nebot’s hideouts and join his partida.24
In February 1813, Tupper wrote to Wellesley and informed him that Nebot had handed over 40 mules captured from the French to the garrison at Alicante. The letter was forwarded to Wellington and he wrote to Tupper:
As I do not have the opportunity of writing to that chief, I beg that you will tell him how much I am obliged for his attention. I have heard of his successful endeavours against the enemy with the utmost interest, and I sincerely congratulate him upon them; and I shall be happy to be able to communicate with him more closely.25
Despite Wellington’s plaudit he never communicated directly with the Valencian friar. If it is difficult to divide fact from fiction with regard to the guerrillas generally, it is particularly so in the case of Nebot. Despite Tupper’s endorsement it is clear that some, if not all, of Nebot’s exploits were the product of enthusiastic coverage in the liberal press.26 Indeed the Spanish military authorities were particularly scathing about his exploits (amongst others) and Wellington’s insistence that free and liberated areas must be placed under rule by the army at local level, threatened the very principles that the liberals held sacred. It is difficult, therefore, to state with any certainty what impact Nebot and his band had in the region at this time; it was certainly enough to merit a military response from Suchet but the small scale of that rejoinder is perhaps the best gauge as to Nebot’s real influence and effect.