French encirclement of the City of Valencia, December 1811
In July 1811 the Spanish Regency had appointed Captain General Joaquín Blake y Joyes to assume overall command of the Spanish armies of Valencia and Murcia in an attempt to thwart French success in the region. Blake was of émigré Irish parentage, born at Malaga on 19 August 1759, and one of the best Spanish commanders in the war. However, he was also one of the most unlucky. He had fought and beaten Suchet at Alcañiz on 23 May 1809, but the French commander was to turn the tide and defeat Blake at Maria and Belchite, on 15 and 18 June 1809 respectively. Blake subsequently resigned his command of the Army of Catalonia after failing to come to the timely relief of the garrison at Gerona. In April 1810 he was given command of the Army of the Centre at Cádiz, was defeated at Baza in November 1810 but performed well at the battle of Albuera in May 1811. This resulted, two months later, in his appointment as the overall commander of the Eastern Region (from Granada to lower Catalonia) incorporating the armies of Valencia (2nd) and Murcia (3rd).
On assuming his new command Blake immediately encountered hostility from the Marquis del Palacio, the commander-in-chief of the Valencian Army. Palacio was a local man, who questioned the suitability of Blake’s nomination as an ‘outsider’. Myopic regional prioritising over national problems was to blight Spain’s military, political and diplomatic fight throughout the war. The war on the east coast was not exempt from this internecine struggle and it was a weakness that the French commanders were able to exploit frequently with decisive consequences. Palacio was convinced that the two armies should undertake a forward defence in Castellón with a main defensive position astride the road at Sagunto. Blake, conversely, viewed the problem in more national, strategic terms. In 1811 he was well versed with the intentions of Wellington at Badajoz and the dangers of moving the 3rd Murcian Army north, thereby creating a vacuum that Soult would readily fill. In so doing the threat to Cartagena, Alicante and ultimately Valencia would be from the south as well as from the north. Furthermore, he saw the need to maintain contact with the French on the east coast by way of a distraction. He was equally convinced that Suchet, against a backdrop of troop withdrawals to support Napoleon’s Russian campaign, would not commence his planned invasion of Valencia and that the French focus would concentrate on thwarting the main allied effort on the Portuguese/Spanish border. Wellington shared this view, but with Masséna’s invasion of Portugal now underway Napoleon now saw things quite differently and on 25 August he wrote to Berthier:
You will tell him [Macdonald] that I have issued a decree for uniting Catalonia to France (you will receive it in a few days); that Marshal Suchet occupies at present Montserrat; that I have ordered him to place a French division, composed of four regiments and ten pieces of artillery, between Barcelona, Montserrat, Tarragona and Lerida; likewise to garrison Mequinenza and Tortosa with his troops; that both these places will continue to be under the command of Marshal Suchet, who is ordered to march with the remainder of his army upon Valencia.
Despite Blake’s optimistic view of French intentions, he was taking no chances and ‘accelerated the completion of the immense works which the Valencianos were throwing up in defence of their capital, and availed himself of the uninterrupted intercourse by sea, to procure arms, provisions, money, and every kind of assistance of which he stood in need. Taking advantage of the spirit of the inhabitants, he excited them to resist the advance of the French, and called out all the male population, between the ages of fifteen and fifty, for militia duty.’1 Although he was reluctant to establish a forward defence he nevertheless set up outposts at Peñiscola and Oropesa (del Mar) and decided to shield his main line of defence with the ancient, but recently renovated, fort at Sagunto, 30 kilometres north of the city of Valencia. His main defences were positioned on the south bank of the River Guadalaviar, a considerable obstacle on which he pinned his hopes of holding the French forces and attacking them as they tried to cross.
Suchet’s tasks and responsibilities in Aragón and Catalonia grew daily. In addition to providing support to Macdonald against a resurgent army of Catalonia under General Luis de Lacy, he also had to garrison Saragossa, Tortosa, Lérida and Tarragona as well as keep open the lines of communication through his area of responsibility. Berthier wrote immediately to Suchet informing him of the emperor’s intentions:
Everything leads us to believe that Valencia is in a state of panic, and that, when Murviedro [adjacent to Sagunto fort] has been taken and a battle in the open field has been won the city will surrender. If you judge otherwise, and think that you must wait to bring up your siege artillery for the attack on the place, or that you must wait for a better season to commence the operation, I must inform you that, in every case, it is the imperative order of the Emperor that your headquarters are to be on Valencian territory on or about September 15th, and as far forward towards the city as possible.2
This, like so many of Napoleon’s timelines directed from over the horizon, was completely unrealistic. As it transpired, despite furious preparation and concurrent activity, Suchet actually commenced his advance on 15 September from Tortosa; the very day he was supposed to be ensconced north of the Guadalaviar harassing Valencia. From the remaining troops in his large army, he handpicked 26,000 men for the Valencian offensive (see Appendix I) and moved south on three routes. The main body concentrated at Tortosa and moved on the coast road with the field artillery; the second marched on the mountain route through Alcañiz and Morella and then linked up with the coast road at Castellón; and the final group went via Teruel, having departed from upper Aragón and Saragossa. This last group, only 5,000 strong, was taking a fearful risk for had Blake come north in strength and challenged them the upshot would have been an unavoidable defeat. Suchet accompanied the artillery having noted that he ‘had no choice but to resort to the road from Tortosa which runs along the seashore, since the train could not proceed by any other; but the forts of Peñiscola and Oropesa presented two obstacles in the way: the former was, fortunately for us, at some distance from the road, and it was possible to mask it, and thereby to neutralise its influence. But the fort of Oropesa had full command of the road.’3
Suchet tasked the commander of his Neapolitan division, General Louis Compère, to capture the structure and clear the road for the French field artillery train and supply convoys, while he continued south with the balance of his force. Oropesa, in addition to the medieval fort, also had a gun tower (the King’s Tower) about a kilometre to the south-east and directly on the shoreline. Compère blockaded the two defensive structures, cutting their communication, and then conducted a reconnaissance with his engineer officer Major Michaud. Michaud immediately detected a weak point in the fort’s defences: many of the houses lay close to the main gate and were not overlooked by any of the fort’s walls. With the French siege train still some days away (en route from Tortosa) Compère decided to try and exploit this weakness and storm the fortress. Pompei’s battalion, with 130 grenadiers and 30 infantry armed with trenching tools, and a company of sappers entered the village and forced the Spanish defenders back to the fort. Having loopholed the buildings near the main gate, the infantry tried to keep the heads of the defenders down long enough to enable the sappers to lay a charge and blow the gate. However, the attempt failed and many French soldiers were killed in the process.
Compère elected for more traditional methods and work began almost immediately on the trenches and parallels in anticipation of the arrival of the heavy guns. Major Charrue, commanding Compère’s artillery, provided some support with a few field guns but many French soldiers were killed by the sustained and accurate fire from the fort’s ramparts overlooking the road and the French trenches and battery positions. By 9 October the works were complete and three 24-pounder guns, which had only arrived a few hours earlier, were moved into place. Early on 10 October Suchet returned to Oropesa, with 500 Polish soldiers from the Legion of the Vistula, arriving just in time to witness the devastating effect of modern Napoleonic artillery against ancient walls. By midday the north wall had collapsed completely and Major Michalowski readied his Poles for the assault when the white flag appeared. Suchet, content the road was now open, returned to Sagunto with instructions to order the defenders of the King’s Tower to surrender. Lieutenant Campillo, the commander in the tower, refused, and Compère was left with no choice but to begin siege works to batter the young officer and his small garrison into submission. However, before work could commence, HMS Magnificent, a 74-gun warship (commanded by Captain George Eyre) and a number of smaller Spanish vessels hove into view. Compère needed no time to appreciate how naval gunfire could support the tower and its gallant defenders and elected to storm the place that night. The attack by the Poles failed completely and Compère, aware of the risks, decided to move some of the heavy guns onto unprotected platforms to batter the tower. They were ready to open on 12 October but were soon countered by, and suffered from, the naval gunfire of the Magnificent. Nevertheless, the French gunners had achieved enough to convince young Campillo that he had done his duty. The young subaltern ordered the immediate abandonment of the tower and his gallant company were evacuated by small boats from the shore. Oropesa was in French hands and the siege train could now continue south to Sagunto.
Sagunto had been one of the most important towns in ancient and Moorish Spain but during the Middle Ages the city had declined and the fort, which had held up Hannibal during the 2nd Punic Wars, was abandoned. Murviedro, a small town of 6,000 inhabitants, was all that remained. Nevertheless, the citadel remained a naturally strong defensive position, protected by cliffs in many places. Enough remained of the Iberian and Moorish walls to be able to construct a new series of defences and the fortress, renamed San Fernando de Sagunto, had been completely rebuilt. A year’s work had transformed the citadel into a tenable position, even if the design was asymmetrical and somewhat unscientific, although construction was by no means finished by the time Suchet’s force arrived. Colonel Luis Andriani was in command of the garrison which consisted of about 2,500 men, 14 guns and three howitzers. As early as 23 September Suchet’s advance guard, led by Harispe, had taken control of Murviedro, driving the isolated pockets of defenders back into the fortress. General Giuseppe Palombini’s Italian division covered the right flank and took control of Petrés (where Suchet established his headquarters) and Gilet, while Habert’s division crossed the river on the French left flank. Cavalry reconnaissance was sent further south and advanced to within 10 kilometres of Valencia, meeting no resistance for General José Lardizábal and General José San Juan (commanding the Spanish cavalry) had withdrawn in the face of the French advance to their respective positions on the Guadalaviar.
Suchet decided to capture the fort of Sagunto before moving south to engage Blake on his chosen ground. The irregularity of the structure enticed him to attempt an assault without waiting for the capture of the fort at Oropesa and the arrival of his siege artillery. Armed with small arms and ladders the first attack was delivered during the night of 27 September. The main assaulting columns were, however, discovered by a Spanish patrol some time before the prescribed hour of attack and were forced to initiate proceedings prematurely. The attackers had lost surprise and despite the distraction of the two diversionary attacks and the deployment of the French reserve, the assault was a complete failure. Suchet accepted the inevitable and headed back to Oropesa to hurry events there and the movement forward of the siege train. Its arrival was to take another two weeks, during which time Suchet’s force was immobile. Blake now faced a dilemma, with Suchet’s force at a standstill he was under considerable pressure to do something. He had two options: attack the force or penetrate Aragón and cut off Suchet’s lines of communication. Having tried and failed to get British naval support to land a small expeditionary force on the Levante coast, and given the rather questionable morale and operational effectiveness of elements of his force, namely the Murcians under General Nicolás Mahy, Blake was more inclined to the latter option. Ultimately, his plans might have appeared relatively timid and designed more to incite guerrilla support in Aragón than to pose a serious threat to the French rear. However, as it transpired they were a serious threat and a singular distraction to France’s newest marshal. Blake managed to coerce the three guerrilla forces under the commands of Francisco Espoz y Mina, José Duran and Juan Martin Diaz (El Empecinando) to march against and attack Suchet’s depleted forces in Aragón.4 He also appealed to Lacy to step-up attacks on Suchet’s rear in Catalonia.5 Closer to home, he despatched General José Obispo’s division to Segorbe and Charles O’Donnell, with Pedro Villacampa’s infantry and San Juan’s cavalry, was tasked to move to Benaguacil, equidistant between Segorbe and Blake’s main force.
On 26 September the French garrison of some 1,000 men at Calatayud were the first to feel the weight of the attacks by the combined forces (about 6,000 men) of Duran and El Empecinado. The latter chief also attacked a relief column at El Frasno and wiped out the French escort party. Suchet, feeling the pressure, wrote immediately to Paris for the release of two French divisions of General Honoré Reille and General Philippe Severoli operating in neighbouring Navarre. Against the troublesome demonstrations on his right flank, Suchet despatched Palombini’s division and Baron Robert’s brigade to evict Obispo from Segorbe, which they achieved with relative ease. His right flank, now free of Blake’s potentially troublesome demonstrations, but concerned at events to his rear, Suchet turned his attention back to the fort at Sagunto. However, he still had another 10-day wait for the arrival of the siege guns.
Valée and Rogniat arrived on 11 October, a day ahead of the train. They scrutinised the plans of their subordinates and concurred with the arrangement to attack the structure from the west, but making several adjustments in order to provide greater protection to the men digging, riveting and arming the battery positions. They also decided to use the steepness of the hill to their advantage by marking the battery positions well forward, shortening the distance to the walls, but also making it difficult for the defenders to use their guns as a defence against this work as they would have to fire the guns in negative elevation.6 Although the French made full use of this advantage, they too were forced to utilise a number of mortars and howitzers to overcome the problems presented by the significant elevation of the fort’s walls from their battery positions. On the night of 16 October a number of battery positions were ready, and a small number of guns, howitzers and mortars were moved into place. Colonel Sanchez Cicernos, the second in command of the Spanish garrison, recorded that: ‘On the 16th the enemy placed in the batteries, twelve pieces of 24, eight mortars and howitzers and this day they brought up the ammunition. The morning of the 17th at the break of dawn, the enemy greeted us with a terrible discharge of cannon, mortar and howitzer which was extensive and began to cause casualties to various individuals, I received the first, a strong bruise in the right leg from a stone that had already injured the artillery commander.’7
The bombardment continued all day and despite rapidly dislodging some of the more recently repaired works they made little impression on the old Moorish stone walls. Suchet noted that ‘the breach was not much enlarged on the first day, though each of our cannon fired a hundred and fifty balls; we had to renew the fire the following day’.8 Andriani moved seven infantry companies to the west of the fort and they rained constant fire on the heads of the saps from the Dos de Mayo Battery and the Tower of San Pedro. As the assault trenches came closer to the walls and the effective range of the musket, the French began to suffer appreciable casualties. The fire continued throughout 18 October and, late in to the afternoon, Valée and Rogniat reconnoitred the resulting breach and reported to Suchet that it was practicable. The French commander ordered an assault for 5 pm that evening. It was a brave decision, for the breach was still very narrow and the debris, in large stones and slab sections, was liable to hinder rather than help the assaulting infantry. One hundred hand-picked men from the 5th Light, the 114th and 117th Line collected in the late afternoon under Colonel Mathis, and a reserve of 400 men from the Italian division were placed under Major Olini. The Spanish, suspecting an imminent assault, set about reinforcing the retrenchments on the ramparts with sandbags, answering every French shot with a volley of musket fire and taunting their besiegers to ‘come to close quarters with them’. Rogniat recalled that ‘the enemy were presented on the summit with a lot of resolution, neither our rifle bullets nor our canon could dislodge them or impede them in their incessant reestablishment of the walls with sandbags …’9
The assault went in on schedule but was quickly bogged-down. The many officers leading the assaulting parties left the cover of the trenches to cross the remaining 70 metres up to the base of the wall and breach. They were quickly overwhelmed by the weight of the defenders’ fire and, as they could only advance two men abreast, they could not mass sufficient numbers at the base of the opening. The few that arrived could find no solid footing. Habert, an experienced commander, wasted no time in determining that the attack would not succeed once the initial momentum was spent. He ordered the assaulting parties back to the trenches and Suchet pondered his next move. He could not afford to squander soldiers from his minimal invasion force and the two failed attempts had done little for French morale. Nevertheless, the trenches were extended and more batteries established, but Suchet was clear that there would not be another assault until the whole curtain of the Dos de Mayo Battery had been properly breached. That would inevitably take time. This delay in siege operations seemingly played into French hands, for Blake was still under increasing pressure from the Valencianos to relieve the garrison at Sagunto and undertake some form of pre-emptive strike against Suchet’s forces.
The autumn of 1811 was, in point of fact, a turning point in the war. Wellington had recovered from one of his rare miscalculations (resulting in a lucky escape at El Bodón) and the French armies of the North (General Jean-Marie Dorsenne) and Portugal (Marshal Auguste Marmont) had pulled back from the Portuguese frontier. Wellington moved his army back into cantonments and continued to assemble his formidable siege train at Almeida, poised to strike at Ciudad Rodrigo if the opportunity presented itself. That opening was to manifest itself as a direct result of operations on the east coast. Napoleon’s despatch of 18 September instructed Marshal Marmont to venture south, link up with Soult and attack Elvas but two months later that all changed:
The Emperor gives the responsibility to me to make known to you, monsieur the marshal, that the most important object, at this moment, is the capture of Valencia; the Emperor orders that you detach a corps of troops, which will join together with the forces that the king will detach from the Army of the Centre and then move on to Valencia to support the army of the Marshal Suchet, until he is master of the place.10
‘The main object today is Valencia’, wrote Napoleon to his brother. He went on to reinforce the requirement to support the troops of Marmont’s army with some of his Army of the Centre, ordered Soult to send a column to Murcia to conduct a diversion in support, and ordered Reille to move south with Severoli’s division and that of his own (as requested by Suchet in September).11 This was the nightmare scenario for Blake and fearing that Suchet’s forces would receive considerable reinforcement, decided to act. He drew up plans for the divisions of Obispo and Mahy to link up and act as an advance guard, moving down the Segorbe road in order to attack the French rear while Blake, with the balance of his army, moved to attack simultaneously from the south. However, as the formations were manoeuvring to commence the advance, Blake received new intelligence prompting him to change his plan. The attacks on Suchet’s rear and lines of communication, orchestrated by Blake a couple of months previously, were now beginning to bear fruit. A victory by the Navarrese division of Mina y Espoz had inflicted considerable losses on Severoli’s division at Ayerbe in upper Aragón and this triumph had been preceded by two other important victories by Duran and El Empecinado at Calatayud and Almunia respectively, resulting in over 1,000 French casualties. Blake had induced this support with promises of supplies being brought into Valencia, which was largely the result of work by Peter Charles Tupper, the former British Consul and member of the Junta de Valencia (1808), who had managed to arrange shipment of large amounts of supplies and military stores to be sent to Spain. The convoy actually arrived at Cádiz on 19 August but did not set sail for Valencia until 5 October; the exact reason for this delay is unknown but it was fortunate that the supplies, 2,000 muskets and bayonets, 1,000 pistols, 2,000 sabres, 10 light cannons and 8,000 cartridge belts were not purloined by the Cortes and distributed to the Spanish army in defence of Cádiz. Just how much this was due to Tupper’s influence and that of Henry Wellesley, the British envoy to Spain and Wellington’s youngest brother, is unclear. Nevertheless, the supplies were gratefully received by the Valencianos and on 11 September Tupper was received to great acclaim at the town hall amidst emotive proclamations.12
These semi-regular forces were now threatening to capture Teruel, which would have severed the main road through the mountains to Suchet’s headquarters at Saragossa. It would have been an unacceptable development for the French and it would force Suchet’s hand. Palombini’s first brigade and the divisional artillery, Robert’s brigade, and two regiments from General of Brigade André Boussard’s cavalry division were sent north to avert disaster. Intelligence of this northerly movement prompted Blake to change his original plans: Obispo was to move via Sancti-Espiritu by way of a diversion and the Army of Valencia was then to execute a general advance upon the (by now) vastly smaller French force south of Sagunto, in the Val de Jesus.13 It was a reasonable plan and may have succeeded had Palombini not suddenly reappeared the night prior to Blake’s attack. Both Suchet and Blake were unaware that General Musnier (commanding the garrison at Saragossa) had executed a bold manoeuvre by sending General Luigi Mazzucheli with a brigade-sized force to Teruel in order to provide relief to the beleaguered French forces and secure the town. Palombini was thus able to retrace his steps on the eve of battle and provide Suchet the opportunity to strengthen his main force and to despatch an additional brigade (that of Robert) to support Baron Józef Gregorz Chłopicki at Sancti-Espiritu. This latter action was to have significant consequences the following day.
At 2 pm on 24 October a three-cannon salvo was fired from the walls of the city of Valencia. This acted as the signal for the Spanish forces to advance to their initial positions (see Appendix I for the orders of battle of the Spanish and French armies). Blake left his headquarters in the city and took the Camino Real (Royal Road) to El Puig where, arriving at 10 pm, he established his new headquarters in the castle. A makeshift hospital was set up in Rafelbuñol and preparations were made for a number of carts to transport the wounded to hospitals in Valencia and Bétera. By nightfall all the Spanish forces were in place except Obispo who was still heading south after his original mission. Suchet did not hesitate to take up the offer of battle, he left Bronikowski in command of maintaining the siege at Sagunto and then moved with the balance of his force to the north end of the Val de Jesús. During the night Blake had been apprised of Obispo’s failure to appear on the Spanish left wing and had given orders for O’Ronan’s brigade to deploy in his stead. At 6.30 am Blake came down from the castle at El Puig and went to the monastery of Cartuja de Ara Christi, where he delivered the final orders for the advance. It was to commence on the left with San Juan’s all-arms vanguard at 7.30 am followed by the main body of the left wing 30 minutes later. O’Donnell was to advance using the Camino Liria as his axis, with Miranda to his right. The Spanish right wing, which had less distance to travel, was allocated start times of 8.30 am and 9 am for Lardizabal’s and Zaya’s divisions respectively. Caro’s cavalry preceded Lardizabal’s advance by 20 minutes using the Camino Real as his axis. Lardizabal was to take his reinforced battery forward and establish a new battery position from which to engage the French main body. Because of Obispo’s failure to show, O’Ronan had been ordered to move at around 9 am to the defile of Sancti-Espiritu, while Creagh’s division (from Mahy’s reserve) was tasked to replace them on the Cabezbort hill feature. Supporting the force along the Playa del Puig coastline were HMS Magnificent, HMS Minstrel, an 18-gun corvette and six Spanish gunboats. Captain Eyre was however to be frustrated by the shallow nature of the waters off Puzol and a strong westerly, which prevented him being able to manoeuvre the 74-gun ship close enough to be able to provide intricate support to the Spanish as they moved into position and began their advance.
In the centre, the screen of French tirailleurs and a squadron of the 4th Hussars had already been engaged in bickering fire with the Spanish skirmishers and elements of San Juan’s vanguard since about 7 am. Suchet, however, remained confused as to Spanish intentions and just over an hour later decided to move south up the Camino Real to a position just short of the first line at a group of inns and hostelries at ‘Hostalets’ to try and get a better feel for the Spanish dispositions. The area was covered with a combination of olive and carob trees, and visibility on the flat plains was limited, but at least the small hillock of El Hostalet, between the Camino Liria and the hills of Montenegro, was in plain sight. San Juan’s advance guard was unexpectedly taking possession of the hillock after evicting the French cavalry that Suchet had posted there in the early morning. Fully aware of the tactical value of any heights on the otherwise level field, Suchet immediately ordered Harispe to retake the feature, which was by now being reinforced by light infantry from both Villacampa’s and San Juan’s brigades. Two 4-pounder guns were also hauled to the top of the hill and were swiftly in action. Despite this success, Miranda’s division, to the right of O’Donnell, was having considerable difficulty negotiating the terrain that contained several dry irrigation ditches and walls. His forces quickly fell behind those of O’Donnell and mutual support was lost, creating a large gap which dangerously exposed Villacampa’s right flank. This provided Harispe the opportunity to engage the El Hostelet hill from an almost undefended east.
The French generals positioned themselves at the head of their respective columns and advanced at a slow and determined pace, and without firing a shot; they met the most determined resistance, and a sanguinary conflict took place as soon as they reached the summit of the eminence. General Paris was seriously wounded, as well as the aides-de-camp Peridon and Torquereau; General Harispe, Colonel Mesclop, and several officers had their horses killed under them. The gallant 7th regiment commanded by major Durand, after withstanding the enemy’s fire, reached the summit with crossed bayonets, drove back the Spaniards, and compelled them to retreat in disorder.14
Meanwhile, on the Spanish far left, O’Ronan began to move up the defile between the El Caballo and Coll de la Calderona when he was suddenly surprised by two battalions of the 44th Line. The regiment had been positioned in the defile for some weeks, one battalion positioned in a forward camp, the other lodged in the Convent of Sancti-Espiritu. When Robert’s brigade arrived the previous evening, the two battalions had both positioned themselves at the forward camp. At dawn they were drawn-up in formation ready to receive the advancing Spaniards. The first engagement took place at about 9.30 am and after 30 minutes O’Ronan wisely elected to withdraw back the way he had come. Chłopicki had called Robert up from the convent and despatched him (reinforced with a grenadier battalion from his force) to pursue the Spanish while he set off with the remainder of his brigade, plus the three squadrons of Dragoons de Napoleon, and headed south further down the track to a better vantage point, from where he could survey the plains below.
While this minor action had been playing out, both Zayas and Lardizabal (on the Spanish right) had advanced to the areas of Puzol and Hostalets respectively. Suchet was conscious that Zayas was trying, with the aid of the naval gunfire, to get around the French left flank. He resolved to split the Spanish left and right with Palombini’s division, who were now called forward. Back on the French right, Chłopicki arrived at his vantage point and witnessed the struggle for the El Hostalet hillock, which the French 7th Line had just recaptured. O’Donnell reacted by sending Villacampa’s four battalions and four additional guns forward, while the Dragones del Rey advanced to prevent elements of the 116th Line from supporting the 7th Line on the feature itself. Colonel Lanzarote, commanding the Dragones del Rey, considered the ground was completely unsuitable for cavalry, a view that seems to be supported by the fact that the 116th repulsed the Spanish dragoons with ease. Lanzarote, while trying to rally and regroup for a second attempt, was suddenly and unexpectedly charged by the 4th Hussars and then peppered by canister. The Spanish cavalry fled and this seemingly insignificant episode ignited the series of events that led to the collapse of the Spanish left and ultimately the loss of the battle. The rampant French hussars pursued the fleeing Spanish cavalry with characteristic élan, driving a wedge between Lardizabal’s troops and those of Villacampa to their right. This led O’Donnell to believe that his entire right flank was now in jeopardy and he ordered an immediate retreat upon Mahy’s advance guard (Santiago Tereros’s brigade) at the Barranco del Pixador. The touchpaper of collapse had been lit.
The French hussars made better speed than the infantry and soon realized that Villacampa’s men had rallied behind Mahy’s vanguard and that Loy and Caro’s cavalry had taken the bold decision to charge the approaching French cavalry. Harispe, witnessing the sudden change in fortunes, ordered chef d’escadron Duchand, commanding the horse artillery, to deploy forward and once again to engage at close quarters with canister and grape. They had some initial success but were too far advanced and, when the 4th Hussars charge was driven back by the mass of almost 1,000 cavalry, they lost three of their guns to the advancing Spanish. Harispe’s infantry, closely supported by Palombini’s Italians, held their nerve and their ground, the latter defeating the cavalry charge with well-sustained fire. Suchet had returned to this part of the field to witness the Spanish recovery and rallied Boussard’s cuirassiers and threw them into the fight. While he was issuing orders to his cavalry commander, Suchet was injured by a musket ball in his shoulder but the wound was not serious enough to require him to leave the field. Once released, the cuirassiers thundered into the Spanish. Their commander, Colonel de Gonneville, recalled the drama of the moment:
At first I feared that my men would be discouraged by the rout of the 4th Hussars and our first squadron; but I was speedily reassured, and experienced the most intoxicating sensation that it is possible to feel on the field of battle. Not having any one on the spot to give me orders, and perceiving the necessity of stopping this body of cavalry that was coming upon us, I cast a glance upon the squadron behind me with anxiety whether I should find the determination in it that was required under the circumstances. At this glance which was understood, for they were watching me, and looking for the word of command, all the swords were raised and brandished so energetically, and there was something so formidable and intrepid on the bronzed features of the men that I had not a doubt of success, and at the moment I write these lines, fifty years afterwards, I feel my old heart beat again at the remembrance it recalls.
At the signal I gave, the squadron leapt a low wall of dry stone and a ditch before us, and rushed upon the enemy. Everything before us was literally crushed, and for some cause that I never could make out everything that was coming down upon our right began to fly in the oblique direction that we were pursuing, and for half a league we were galloping in the midst of this crowd and decimating it, while they seemed to think of nothing but getting out of a ground that they had been careering over as victors a few minutes before. In this charge we recaptured three of our guns that had fallen into the hands of the enemy, and took five of his that had advanced to support the movement of his cavalry, with the idea that by this movement he would very quickly secure a speedy victory, also rendering the success of his left wing decisive, whereas it also was only temporary. General Caro, commanding the cavalry, received a sword cut on the head, was thrown from his horse and remained in our hands.15
The initiative had now firmly swung back in favour of the French and events on the far left were also about to have a significant impact. Obispo had finally emerged from Naquera just in time to see O’Ronan’s force withdrawing at speed in the face of Robert’s brigade which had emerged from the defile of Sancti-Espiritu. Obispo immediately deployed his numerically superior force and engaged Robert’s four battalions. The French were soon under immense pressure and were forced to fall back and it was during this retrograde movement that Robert’s men were seen bayoneting a number of Spanish prisoners who tried to escape. Obispo gained ground and captured a number of French prisoners (the only French prisoners captured that day) but he decided not to descend to the plain, as events there were clearly not going well for Blake’s army. There can be little doubt that Mahy’s behaviour that day was scandalous. He had nearly 5,000 men under his command acting as the left wing reserve. His initial reaction to the attack against O’Ronan by Robert’s Frenchmen was to despatch Creagh de Lacy’s brigade, however this latter officer seems to have done nothing to assist either O’Ronan or Obispo at any stage, electing instead to remain rooted to the Cabezbort feature. On this part of the battlefield, the combined strengths of Obispo, O’Ronan and Creagh de Lacy was about 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry; more than a match, numerically, to contain the 3,500 men of Chłopicki and Robert. Even after despatching Creagh de Lacy, Mahy’s force still numbered 3,500 infantry and 500 cavalry. His position atop the knolls of Los Germanells was strong and it dominated the road to its front. It should have provided the perfect anchor for O’Donnell’s and Miranda’s 7,000 troops to rally, regroup and counter-attack the French advance by Harispe whose force cannot have been more than 3,500 at this stage. But it appears that Mahy lost his nerve. In fact, the Spanish were able to bring Harispe’s advance to an abrupt halt and some Spanish cavalry had charged and captured the French horse artillery guns of chef d’escadron Duchand but at that point Mahy gave the order to retreat. It was the precursor to disaster.
Creagh de Lacy was ordered to fall back from the Cabezbort feature and Obispo, realising that Mahy and O’Donnell were beaten, fell back towards Naquera. This, in turn, opened the door for Chłopicki who, until this point had been content to watch O’Donnell and Mahy, but with Robert now no longer being pressed by Obispo to his right and Harispe’s obvious success playing out to his front he was (despite orders to the contrary) keen for some of the action. He states in his report that at about noon he advanced upon an impressive array of Spanish troops deployed at the foot of Los Germanells and was intent on attacking them (this contradicts Oman, who accorded considerable praise on Chłopicki’s early attacks on O’Donnell’s flank as significant contributory factors in the subsequent collapse and rout of the Spanish left wing). Chłopicki joined forces with Harispe but Suchet prevented them pursuing the Spanish as he was concerned about events on the French left.
On this side of the field the Spanish divisions of Zayas and Lardizabal had acquitted themselves well. These two formations had been under Blake’s command at Albuera the previous May and had fought with great valour. They had taken their respective objectives of the village of Puzol and the hostelries at Hostalets and were in the process of trying to get around the French left wing when the Spanish left collapsed. Suchet was well aware of the calibre of these Spanish troops and decided to stall the pursuit of the broken Spanish left wing until the right wing had been contained.
General Habert was ordered to attack general Zayas. The latter, although isolated by Lardizabal’s retreat, maintained an obstinate fight in which we suffered a severe loss. The young aide-de-camp had his arm shot off by a cannon ball. General Habert took possession of the village of Puzol, by sending forward general Montmarie with the 5th light regiment and the 116th of the line, and proceeding in person against the enemy with a battalion of the 117th and a troop of dragoons. The Spaniards, being forced from their position in the village, retreated, leaving eight hundred prisoners in our hands. Colonel Delort, having very seasonably proceeded in all haste towards the high road with the principal part of the 24th regiment of dragoons, broke through the fugitives, overtook the infantry under general Lardizabal, attacked it sword in hand, followed in pursuit as far as the Carthusian convent beyond the ravine of the Picador, and took two pieces of cannon.16
Blake was watching the battle from the heights at El Puig and could clearly see his left in full flight and accordingly issued orders for the right wing to withdraw. General Montmarie finally took possession of Puzol after a fierce fight during which the Spanish yielded 800 prisoners. Zayas’s division had to withdraw in contact and was assisted in this by the Walloon Guards and the Legión Extranjera (Foreign Legion) which had been left in reserve by Zayas. Lardizabal’s left flank had been dangerously exposed by the collapse of the Spanish left wing and he began an orderly withdrawal in the face of ruthless harassment by the 24th Dragoons who, fortuitously for the Spanish, were constrained by the dense vegetation and irrigation ditches on either side of the Camino Real. Lardizabal redeployed at the Cartuja, with Liori’s brigade, and together they thwarted further French advances. Blake was able to redeploy Zayas with Velasco at El Puig, he sent an ADC to order Mahy to make a stand behind Los Germanells and ordered Lardizabal to advance against Palombini’s troops to distract them from joining Harispe and Chłopicki. For a while it looked like Blake had stopped the rot but Habert’s troops continued to push forward and tried to get in behind the back of the Spanish right wing and cut off their retreat to Valencia:
Whilst these occurrences were taking place, General Zayas was moving towards the heights of Puig, where General Blake, the commander-in-chief of the Spanish army, had remained during a part of the day, having from thence a full view of his army from one extremity to the other of the field of battle; he had left there a brigade of artillery under brigadier-general Velasco. General Habert was ordered to dislodge Zayas from those heights. General Montmarie advanced in front of them, whilst General Palombini was proceeding along the right. The battalion of the 117th regiment, led by captain Passelac, reached the summit, carried the position, and took five pieces of cannon, which defended it.17
However, long before Montmarie had driven the Spanish from the heights of El Puig, Mahy’s resolve evaporated and he had ordered a full retreat on Bétera. The combined forces of Chłopicki and Harispe were released and they pursued the fleeing Spaniards with vigour. The demoralised Spanish cavalry, convinced that the fighting was over, fled without crossing sabres, leaving the Murcian infantry (in column of route) at the mercy of the rampant French cavalry. Terreros’s entire brigade and half that of Montijo were surrounded and captured. About 100 French hussars and dragoons took nearly 2,000 Spanish prisoners until they were finally stopped by skirmishers of the regiment of Cuenca and Voluntarios de Molina that deployed across the Bétera road. For the balance of the Spanish army, Blake had already ordered a general retreat to Valencia.
French losses in the entire battle amounted to less than 200 while those of the Spanish ‘exceeded a thousand men placed hors de combat. They suffered a further loss of four thousand six hundred and eightyone prisoners, including two generals, forty superior officers, and two hundred and thirty officers of inferior rank, besides four standards, four thousand two hundred muskets, mostly of English manufacture, and twelve pieces of cannon with their caissons.’18 However, it was not so much the losses themselves but the effect on Spanish morale which was to be the most telling consequence of the battle. The following morning Suchet sent in a summons to Andriani and, after a short discussion about terms, the garrison surrendered. The morale of the defenders had been severely shaken by the failure of their countrymen the day before and by the effect that the French siege artillery was now having on the walls of the fortress. The battle fought on the plains south of Sagunto, therefore, not only devastated Spanish resolve but provided the key to the fortress which had hitherto eluded Suchet. The relief in the French camp was palpable. Captain de Gonneville of the 13th Cuirassiers summed up the situation and recorded a rather interesting twist in the tale of the siege of the fort that had frustrated Hannibal 2,000 years earlier:
We returned to our bivouac, and next day the garrison of the fort of Saguntum, eighteen hundred men strong, capitulated, and went to swell the column of prisoners on the road to France.
During the continuance of the siege of this fort, the wife of Marshal Suchet was living in an isolated tower built by the Moors, and this tower was within range of the heavy guns of the fort. After the surrender, the Marshal asked the commander of the garrison why no shot had been fired in that direction; and the reply was, that, knowing his wife was there, the gunners had received orders not to fire any shot in the direction of the tower. This act of courtesy was a rare exception to the usual practice of this war of extermination.19
Following the battle of Sagunto Blake still had 22,000 men under arms but their confidence was irrefutably damaged. For Suchet, an immediate attempt on Valencia was a tempting proposition but when he had counted up his losses, deducted men to garrison Sagunto fort and detached a brigade to escort the prisoners to Tortosa, Suchet was left with only 15,000 combatants. He was reluctant to call up Ficatier’s brigade from Segorbe and Oropesa for to do so would have placed his lines of communication in jeopardy. He decided instead to consolidate his gains and summoned both Severoli and Reille’s divisions from Aragón in anticipation of the next phase of his offensive. However he required Napoleonic approval before he could move them so far south and this was to take time. This delay also allowed Blake to take stock of his position and to strengthen the defensive lines in and around the city of Valencia. Taking the fight to the French was now out of the question. Fortunately, however, that December another shipment of British supplies arrived in the city including 1,500 muskets, 600 sabres, badly needed gunpowder and some footwear.20
The day after Napoleon’s instruction to Marmont in November, Berthier had sent further clarification to the commander of the Army of Portugal with regard to his task to support Suchet:
The following day, 21, he reiterated that the English army has twenty thousand sick, and that there do not remain more than twenty thousand men under arms. He ordered me to detach towards Valencia, not six thousand men, but a body of twelve thousand men supported by a division of three thousand men [from the Army of the Centre], in order to facilitate the operations of marshal Suchet.21
These despatches arrived at Marmont’s headquarters at Salamanca on 13 December 1811 and keen to be seen as complying with Napoleon’s wishes he not only hastened the movement of three of his divisions but decided to lead them personally towards Valencia. The divisions of Maximilian Foy, Jacques Sarrut and Louis-Pierre Montbrun were to link up with Jean Darmagnac and move east. Marmont had made provision to hand over command of the Army of Portugal to General Bertrand Clausel and tasked him to watch Wellington on the Portuguese border. However, before he had set off he received another despatch from Napoleon ordering him to transfer his headquarters from Salamanca to Valladolid. Marmont felt compelled to stay and oversee this order personally and command of the east coast reinforcement force was handed to Montbrun. The troops set off at the end of December. At much the same time, having been given Napoleonic approval to move south, the two French divisions of Severoli and Reille arrived to the north of Valencia increasing Suchet’s force to 33,000 men, about 10,000 more than the remnants of Blake’s combined and defeated armies. On Christmas Day, all Suchet’s divisions advanced south towards the Spanish lines and the city of Valencia. His plan of attack was ambitious: he would force his passage at two points across the River Guadalaviar and trap Blake’s entire force. In essence, it was an encirclement, with one column forcing the crossing to the east between Valencia and the sea and a second to the west. Both columns would then join up, south of the city, completing the closure.
Blake’s plan was to rely on the defensive qualities of the River Guadalaviar but his front was long, almost 20 kilometres from the coast to the fords at Riba Roja. His best option was to screen the obstacle and have a strong mobile reserve with which to strike at the French as and where they attempted to cross. Undeniably his best divisions to form that reserve were those of Zayas and Lardizabal. However, instead he chose to deploy all his divisions in a long line extending 12 kilometres inland from the sea beyond which he deployed San Juan’s cavalry in a long screen. The weaknesses of this plan were readily apparent to Suchet who decided to outflank the Spanish from the west. At dusk on 25 December, hundreds of voltigeurs crossed the river near the village of Riba Roja, driving back the light Spanish piquet and establishing a bridgehead. The French engineers then set about constructing two light bridges for the infantry and a heavier pontoon bridge for the cavalry and artillery. By first light all three bridges were ready and half the French force, consisting of the infantry divisions of Harispe and Musnier, and Boussard’s cavalry, crossed unopposed (Reille’s division was still en route). Anticipating some form of mobile reserve, Suchet had ordered Habert’s division to conduct a diversionary attack on the far (French) left, while Palombini’s Italians were conducting a similar distraction in the centre. The Neapolitan division (now under the command of Ferrier) was in reserve on the north bank able to counter any Spanish attempt to escape and to move in support of either diversionary attack.
Blake’s vedettes were driven-in early during the operation, depriving him of intelligence on French intentions and strengths. Harispe led the advance from the west through difficult terrain, interspersed with trees and irrigation ditches. Visibility was poor and the supporting French cavalry suddenly found themselves embroiled with San Juan’s screen.
The squadron fell into the midst of the main body of the enemy’s cavalry near Aldaya; it was charged and driven back upon our infantry, which was advancing in good order. The charge failed to make any impression upon our compact masses; but the gallant general Boussard, who accompanied the squadron, and had in vain exerted himself to cover the retreat, remained wounded on the field of battle and fell into the enemy’s hands ... our cavalry rushed upon that of the Spaniards, routed and pursued it as far as Torrente, and succeeded in rescuing general Boussard, besides making a few prisoners.22
It soon became apparent to Mahy, commanding the Spanish left wing, that Harispe’s task with one brigade from Musnier’s division and the cavalry in support, was to move with speed to Torrente and cut the road to Murcia and the Spaniards’ withdrawal route (the second of Musnier’s brigades, that of General Robert, was holding the bridge waiting for Reille’s division to cross). This intelligence was fairly conclusive but Blake failed to react upon it, being entirely preoccupied with events to the north-east, where Habert’s column had already crossed the estuary of the River Guadalaviar and was beginning to swing west. Blake considered Habert the real danger and, by the time he realized his mistake, Harispe was poised to join Habert and close the ring. The Spanish divisions of Villacampa and Obispo realized French intentions far earlier than their commander and, recognising that they were about to be surrounded, abandoned their positions, racing south to escape the trap. About half this Spanish force managed to breakout but the others were cut off. Meanwhile, Palombini was attempting to penetrate the Spanish lines at Mislata. His first attack stalled, but the Italian rallied his men and delivered a second, more determined assault, against Zayas whose division had been left exposed by the departure of Villacampa and Obispo.
Blake tried to readjust his defence and recover the situation by turning his left en potence but some of Musnier’s infantry attacked the Spanish before they were formed. Blake realized the situation was hopeless and was compelled to recall both Zayas and Lardizabal back to the confines of Valencia. He was now trapped and surrounded. He had 17,000 men (the divisions of Miranda, Zayas, Lardizabal and what was left of the reserve battalions) but his defensive task was unenviable. Valencia’s walls were extensive and not designed to withstand the rigours of a modern siege. Blake elected to call a council of war which met at 6 pm at the Convent de los Remedios and, having agreed that the city was indefensible, voted unanimously that the armies should try and break out to the north over the bridge of San Jose. The sortie was executed on the night of the 28 December but quickly became bogged down by the mass of irrigation channels which were full and too wide to cross. A few men under Colonel Michelena managed to get through and escape before the French arrived in large numbers and engaged Lardizabal’s troops who were trying to build a bridge. Blake was forced to call off the attempt and both his reputation and his force’s morale plummeted as a result.
French encirclement of the City of Valencia, December 1811
By 1 January most of the French siege guns had arrived from Sagunto and Suchet opened trenches against the Monte Olivete redoubt and the southern point of the suburb of San Vicente. By 4 January seven batteries had been established but Blake did not wait for these guns to open on the inadequate outer defences, instead he withdrew his entire force into the narrow confines of the city itself. Valencia was a very large city with over 100,000 inhabitants and despite having had many weeks to prepare for a possible siege, provisions were already running low. Suchet unaware of the growing discontent within the city confines lost no time building fresh batteries in the newly captured ground and, on 6 January, while the heavy guns battered the walls, the three mortar batteries fired over 1,000 shells into the city. Large numbers of civilians were killed or wounded and the pressure on Blake was mounting; the people grew increasingly hostile to his leadership, blaming him entirely for their plight. Suchet then sent a group to invite Blake to capitulate; he refused and the relentless bombardment continued for another two days.
The consternation in the city reached new heights and the population desired an end to the evils - it was in stark contrast to the resistance and determination of the previous days. During this time they furiously wanted to contribute to the defence of their capital, but that resolution had been replaced by fear, a terror that drove them to rush to the Junta and plead with them to intercede with the General to cease hostilities. They felt obliged to voice the views of the population, with respect and composure to Excmo. Sr. D Joaquín Blake; who, despite being unhappy with this demonstration by the city delegation agreed to capitulate. 23
The indiscriminate bombardment was unethical but Blake realized the situation was hopeless. With both his army and the people of Valencia against him and with supplies dwindling and casualties growing he elected to capitulate on 9 January. Blake, at his own request, was escorted straight to France and did not remain to take part in the formal surrender. Over 16,000 regular troops were made prisoner and transported north across the Pyrenees, marching in two columns under the escort of Pannetier’s brigade. A staggering 374 cannon (mainly heavy guns from the city itself) and 21 colours were taken. It had taken Suchet only 14 days to capture this vital city and associated port. His methods remain open to question but he was a man in a hurry. The French marshal had every reason to be satisfied but, in early January, he would have been unaware that the delay in capturing the second major obstacle was to have far reaching strategic consequences.