French Advance 10 - 13 April 1813
At the end of 1812 French higher command had been at a quandary as to how to re-establish their occupation of Spain. The recapture of Andalusia was out of the question and expansion back into Estremadura decidedly imprudent. In the end Joseph decided to move back south, recapture Madrid and once again hold the Spanish capital as his political and military centre of power. His Army of the Centre retook the city from El Empecinado and his irregular force while the Army of the South took possession of the region of La Mancha (south of the capital) and spread west to Avila and to the boundaries of the Army of Portugal, which were allotted the provinces of Zamora, Leon, Salamanca, Palencia and Valladolid. The three armies numbered less than 100,000 men. Napoleon’s celebrated 29th Bulletin of 3 December, detailing the destruction of the French army as a result of the disastrous Russian campaign, had reached Madrid in early January 1813. A follow-up letter to Joseph on 4 January 1813 made it clear that all other operations were now subordinate to the rebuilding the Grande Armée for the defence of France.1 Great emphasis was placed on keeping open the lines of communication with the homeland and to that end Joseph was ordered to reinforce the Army of the North, while maintaining a credible deterrence in front of the Anglo-Portuguese army in Leon. In addition, Napoleon ordered that each regiment in Spain having three or more battalions should send back a cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers to establish new battalions in France. This commitment, in the main, fell upon the armies of South and Catalonia. Suchet’s Army of Aragón was not greatly affected, but any hope that his field army might be increased for the assault on Alicante was quickly dispelled.2
Suchet retained his three divisions facing south: Musnier’s division (temporarily commanded by Robert) formed the right wing at Moxente; Harispe was at Xativa with a forward brigade at Alcoy; while Habert remained at Denía. In anticipation of renewed hostilities Suchet put into place a number of defensive measures and reactionary contingency plans. Moxente was fortified; the passes in the region were blocked; a second bridge of boats was constructed over the Guadalaviar at Valencia; Sagunto was repaired and a massive food store established within it; Peñiscola was resupplied and reinforced and the siege artillery train was moved to Tortosa.3 The fact that included in the French commander’s plans was the return of his wife from Valencia to France is perhaps the most significant indicator that Suchet now considered his force to be on the back foot.4
In January 1813 Wellington, who had been made Generalissimo of the Spanish Army following his victory at Salamanca and the subsequent liberation of Madrid, was at Cádiz discussing how best to conduct operations with the Spanish forces. He wrote to Campbell in Alicante:
It is evident, however, that until the allied, British and Portuguese Army, under my immediate command, will again take the field, no operation of any consequence can be undertaken by any of the allied corps in other parts of the Peninsula. In the meantime I have come here to endeavour to organise the Spanish armies, and to come to an understanding with the Government regarding the means of their support in the field ... I will send you directions respecting the operations which you are to undertake when the campaign shall commence, and the period at which you are to undertake them. If, however, before you shall receive these directions, you should consider yourself sufficiently strong, and circumstances should enable you to strike an important blow against the French force opposed to you, or against their possessions on the east coast, I beg that you will strike it.5
Murray assumed command at the end of February and Campbell briefed the new commander on the contents of Wellington’s letter. Murray was also apprised of the location of his forces, which essentially consisted of Whittingham’s division holding a forward line at Biar, Castalla and Jijona while the balance was in and around Alicante. Finally, he was given a full intelligence brief on the location and strengths of Suchet’s troops to his front. He immediately decided to try and encircle and capture the exposed brigade at Alcoy. The operation was badly handled and the French brigade was easily able to slip away. The execution had overtones of O’Donnell’s efforts the previous July: Murray’s forces advancing on four separate routes with the flanking groups failing to arrive in time. Murray then pondered his next move and, after a week, he sent Whittingham forward unsupported to probe and drive in the French positions at Cocentaina, a few kilometres north of Alcoy. Whittingham later wrote of the operation:
In consequence of orders from Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray directing me to make a strong reconnaissance on the enemy’s force near Concentayna, I advanced at 3 o’clock yesterday morning [15 March] with the greater part of the division of Majorca. I also directed... the 1st Italian regiment ... to occupy Alcoy ... having situated the regiments of Murcia and Cordova with two four-pounders, and a howitzer in a position previously marked out, about half a league beyond Alcoy on the Concentayna road. On arriving at Concentayna, I posted the grenadier battalion on the rising ground commanding the entrance to the town; the advance guard entered it; and Colonel Campbell formed the rest of his regiment in close column ... Lieutenant-Colonel Mouet passed through the town, and proceeded by the high road ... and fell in with the advance post of the enemy ... about half a mile from Concentayna ... there was a warm fire kept up on both sides, during which Mouet drove the enemy before him for more than a mile.6
Whittingham’s Spaniards had acquitted themselves well but a weak brigade, consisting of two British battalions under Major General Rufane Donkin, which was sent to support the operation by way of a distraction on a left flanking manoeuvre towards Onteniente, was less successful. Donkin had, for some time, been rubbing people up the wrong way in his capacity as the force quartermaster general. Scott had earlier recorded that ‘Gen Donkey appears to instigate and lead men to foolish actions, demonstrating cunning on one side and weakness on the other. Gen D had his horse shot thro’ the neck, pity not a little behind. One general opinion reigns thro’ out the Army respecting him and that is universal discontent. He had his way much too long in this Army.’7
Suchet thought the action was a precursor to a full scale allied attack and ordered Habert to give ground. However, Murray was planning an altogether different operation, a seaborne landing of Roche’s division directly into Valencia in an attempt to capture the city. It was a bold plan which may have succeeded if executed in tandem with a land thrust of all available Anglo-Spanish troops from the south but no such supporting action was contemplated and, as such, the plan was hazardous in the extreme. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how it might have succeeded. In the end, it was called off when Bentinck made noises about recalling the 6th Line KGL and some of the British grenadier companies to deal with growing problems in Sicily (see Chapter 9). A few days later, when the crisis in Sicily abated, Bentinck reversed the order; even so, Murray’s attack on Valencia was not reinitiated, which was probably most fortuitous. At the end of March Murray received a detailed letter from Wellington which outlined that he would not commence his new campaign until ‘the green forage shall have appeared’.8 He went on to outline his initial ideas for Murray’s force in greater campaign plan, which essentially elaborated upon Murray’s own idea in an earlier letter to Wellesley that the advantageous use of the force would be an attack in Suchet’s rear on Tarragona.9 As there was no definite timetable or mission Murray was compelled to wait.
Suchet was somewhat baffled by Murray’s inactivity and his failure to follow-up the action at Alcoy; furthermore, he was unclear as to Murray’s and Elio’s future intentions. Two isolated allied divisions had remained inactive in front of the French for nearly a month: Whittingham north of Alcoy and Miyares at Yecla. These two formations were 50 kilometres apart and 20 to 30 kilometres from the balance of Murray’s force at Castalla. In early April the French commander could not stand the temptation any longer and chose to strike; recording that he ‘resolved not to wait till the forces which threatened him should be augmented or united’.10 He covertly concentrated his strike force at Fuente la Higuera between Almansa and Xativa, leaving only a token force in front of Whittingham. Early on 10 April he advanced in two columns. Harispe’s division, supported by two cavalry regiments moved towards Miyares at Yecla, while the balance, led by Habert’s division, moved to capture Villena and deny any move west by Murray in support of the Spanish. It was brilliantly executed and delivered and caught both Elio and Murray off-guard. Miyares fled west towards Jumilla losing two battalions (1st Burgos and Cádiz) that were cut off while attempting to provide a rearguard. Meanwhile Habert closed on Villena where, it transpired, Elio and Murray were meeting having agreed to discuss rumours of a French concentration to the north. Murray had taken Colonel Frederick Adam’s light brigade as protection but wisely elected not to make a stand. He withdrew back to Castalla and deployed Adam in a blocking position at the Biar pass, while Elio headed south and recalled his cavalry deployed as a forward screen and tried to rally the dispersed units from Miyares’ division. Elio incongruously decided to leave a single Spanish battalion (Vélez-Málaga) in Villena Castle. Habert occupied the town without a struggle and bombarded the castle, blowing the gates on the morning of 12 April. The unfortunate Spanish battalion commander surrendered and the battalion was lost, having been needlessly sacrificed for no tactical benefit.
French Advance 10 - 13 April 1813
Murray, meanwhile, had recalled Whittingham from Alcoy and Roche from around Alicante and concentrated his forces around Castalla. Suchet concentrated his forces at Villena; Harispe was recalled to the main body and he immediately vacated Yecla (which two of Miyares’ battalions reoccupied) and moved east. Once Suchet’s force was complete he advanced east towards Murray’s force at Castalla. He arrived in front of the town of Biar around midday and, following a perfunctory reconnaissance, tasked General Robert with the 1st Light and the 14th Line, along with General Isidore Lamarque (not to be confused with Jean Maximilien Lamarque) with the 3rd Light and the 114th and 121st Line, to drive in the forces from Adam’s brigade in and around the town. At Biar these included the Calabrian Battalion and the light companies of the 2/27th and 3rd KGL; the balance of the brigade was deployed on the western part of the pass along with four light 4-pounder guns under Captain Frederic Arabin. The two French formations flanked the town and the allied troops fell back but the French came under heavy and sustained fire from the hills above and their advance was checked. Suchet was irritated at this delay and hastened the infantry to reorganize for a second major attack. The French were, once again, severely mauled as they closed in on the allied forces strung across the pass. Arabin’s guns, despite only being light 4-pounders, wreaked havoc firing canister at a commendable rate. Suchet fed more infantry battalions into the fight until, at one stage, nine battalions were in the process of fighting to dislodge two battalions and two companies. Captain Molley was with the 2/27th and recalled the engagement.
The 1st and 3rd Regts of French Light Infantry en Tirailleur led the attack on our position – the left of which they turned with astonishing rapidity, whilst our whole front, and Right were amused by a most lively fire from the Enemy’s Voltigeurs, who at the same time ascended the front; and endeavoured to gain the hills on the right on which they were anticipated by the Calabrese Light Infantry under Colonel Carey. The head of the Enemy’s supporting column now shewed itself debouching from the village of Biar and was immediately cannonaded by our mountain guns.11
Two of Arabin’s guns had lost their wheels manoeuvring into position. It did not stop them firing but when the crest was vacated the guns were abandoned, the gunners fighting them to the last before leaving them to their fate. Adam began a slow and deliberate withdrawal. He anticipated a cavalry charge, which was executed by Lieutenant Brosse of the 4th Hussars. The French cavalry received a very warm reception from three skilfully deployed companies of the 2/27th who dropped a considerable numbers of riders from close range flanking fire as the cavalry moved down the road from the crest between the rocks: ‘The Line accordingly fell back slowly covered by the 8th and Light Companies of the 2/27th closely pursued by the Enemy’s Light Troops; and an incessant & destructive fire was kept up on both sides ... thus for 7 miles the action continued without interruption.’12 Murray had sent three battalions forward to assist the brigade in their withdrawal across the plain towards Castalla. About two kilometres from Castalla the relatively ineffective French pursuit was called off and Adam’s brigade took their positions in the defensive line.
Adam’s brigade had managed to hold up Suchet’s three divisions for nearly five hours and it was late in the day when the French commander finally emerged from the pass. Whittingham witnessed the latter stages of this coordinated withdrawal and noted that:
Our advanced guard under Brigadier Adam was driven through the pass of Biar upon our main body at Castalla. But the retreat was a beautiful field-day, by alternate battalions. The volleys were admirable, and the successive passage of several ravines conducted with perfect order and steadiness. From the heights occupied by my troops it was one of the most delightful panoramas that I ever beheld!13
Sir Charles Oman was to call it one of the most creditable rearguard actions fought during the whole war.14 Suchet was irritated at the delay and was, most certainly, having second thoughts about tackling Murray’s forces now clearly visible on the hillside to the southwest of Castalla. Conscious there were more troops to the rear and east of the feature that he could not see, he urged caution and called a halt to the day’s proceedings. He ordered a full reconnaissance to be conducted and hastened the arrival of Harispe’s column to the valley. Suchet did not give his orders that evening and, uncharacteristically, took a considerable time to determine his plan of action and issue instructions the next morning. He was clearly unsure and the events of the previous day, and the obvious strength of the allied positions to his front, urged caution. His lieutenants, on the other hand, were quick to dispel the quality of the Spanish and Sicilian troops and advocated a rapid attack. Suchet despatched Boussard’s cavalry well out to the left to reconnoitre the Castalla feature and to get an idea of the forces hidden behind the hill. Reports soon confirmed that there was a considerable body of both infantry and cavalry in reserve. In fact, behind the town of Castalla was half of Roche’s division, the bulk of Clinton’s division (the 58th were in the castle) and the 20th Light Dragoons. To the right of the town were two well-sited batteries, the other half of Roche’s division and the Spanish and Sicilian cavalry. Reports also confirmed the technical difficulty of the ground for large scale cavalry operations, the only arm with which Suchet enjoyed superiority in both numbers and ability.
After deliberating for some time Suchet decided to throw caution to the wind and attack. His plan was quite simple. Harispe’s division, which was now up, was to remain at the Biar pass to act as a reserve, block any attempt by Elio to reinforce the allies from Sax and to protect the French line of retreat; the cavalry was to act on the French left and contain Murray’s reserve. Habert was to move towards the town on the Biar-Castalla road and contain Mackenzie’s division. Robert, meanwhile, was the main effort, on the French right against Whittingham’s Spaniards. At about 10 am Robert moved the 1st Light to secure the first line of hills, the Cabezo de Pellicer (this is the modern name), and then personally led the six battalions of the 3rd Light, 114th Line and 121st Line against the strong line of skirmishers deployed in front of Adam’s and Whittingham’s main positions at the top of the Guerra Heights. The light troops were then given the task of advancing up the steeper hill on the French right, while the 114th were in the centre and the 121st on the French left.
Habert moved up the road and was soon embroiled with Mackenzie’s troops. Despite General Valée moving three of the French batteries to support operations in this sector, it was readily apparent that this was not going to develop into a major attack and the two commanders satisfied themselves with small scale, low-level actions for the rest of the battle. At the other end of the line, Whittingham found himself in a somewhat frenzied scramble to re-establish his position to meet the advance of the 3rd Light and 114th Line. Soon after Robert had commenced his advance and established the 1st Light on the Cabezo de Pellicer, Whittingham had received an order to try and outflank the French on their extreme right: ‘About ten o’clock on the next morning, I received orders from Sir John Murray, through Lieutenant-Colonel Catanelli [an Italian officer on the staff of William Bentinck] to take ground to my left till I should reach the head of a ravine in that direction, then to bring my left shoulder forwards, descending the valley, and form perpendicularly to the right of Suchet’s line.’15 There is some controversy as to the source and accuracy of this order as Murray appears to have denied to Whittingham all knowledge about it after the affair. However, despite this rather unsatisfactory recollection of events, Whittingham had to think and act quickly. It was fortunate that the battalions earmarked to execute the flanking manoeuvre had not moved far. His anchor battalions were able to hold the line of voltigeurs long enough to enable the flanking battalions to move to their rear and then come forward to reinforce their lines. At several points the French reached the crest, and the fighting was intense along the length of the line, but Whittingham’s ability to trickle-feed reserves from the back of the hill enabled him to counter each successive French advance. Suchet’s forces had seldom met with such resistance from the Spanish throughout their long campaigning in Aragón, Catalonia and Valencia and, accordingly, it took longer for them to admit defeat.
At about the same time Lieutenant Colonel Reeves, the commanding officer of the 2/27th, executed a bayonet charge on the 121st Line and drove them downhill. This acted as the catalyst for Robert’s other two regiments to recoil. Suchet, positioned on top of the Cabezo de Pellicer, realized that the attack had failed; he had no intention of throwing more troops into the fray and, at about 4 pm, ordered a general withdrawal. Murray is almost universally criticised for not ordering an immediate follow-up. Woollcombe, among others, noted that ‘never perhaps during the present war was there such an opportunity as the present moment for a Commander-in-Chief to have displayed his abilities. But Sir John Murray did not take advantage of it, and surely he must have good reasons for the cautious movement which followed ... [it was] the received opinion of the whole army that had General Whittingham’s corps advanced rapidly and turned the French right (which was easily to be done) whilst a strong column attacked them in front and the 1st [Mackenzie’s] Division moved on their left, at least one half of the French army would have fallen.’16 Judgementally it was, perhaps, another of Napier’s circumstances that would have ‘tempted a blind man to strike’ and Oman and Fortescue have been equally quick to find fault in Murray’s lack of action. However, a closer examination of the facts provides quite considerable mitigation for Murray’s caution. It was late in the day; the French were far from a beaten force; Harispe’s division, consisting of over 4,000 men, was firmly anchored at the opening to the pass towards Biar; the French cavalry, which outnumbered Murray’s was still on the plains – the very plains upon which they had destroyed O’Donnell’s force by swift and offensive action the previous year. Furthermore, it is worth recalling that Wellington had made one thing clear to Roche, ‘I only request that you may not be defeated again; and to accomplish this object you must not attack the French if success is not quite certain’.17 Murray was correct to display caution. Clinton in his letter and report to Bentinck certainly made no suggestion that Murray should have followed the French into the Biar pass.18 Sergeant Norbert Landsheit of the 20th Light Dragoons, who had been heavily involved over the two days, was clear that it was a welcome decision:
At the same time a hearty cheer caused us to look about, and we beheld the whole line of British infantry advancing with levelled bayonets down the slope, before who the enemy were fleeing in the utmost confusion, while over their heads our own cannon continued to fire. This was the last I could distinguish of the battle, for it was already dark when we made our charge, and night set in so rapidly that we were compelled, in order to secure the prisoners already taken, to check the pursuit … never has an order to halt arrived either to man or beast more seasonably than this, for I may say with truth, that during two whole days, we had been continually marching, without being allowed as much time or leisure as would suffice to allay the common wants of nature.19
Murray decided not to move until the reserve behind Castalla had deployed and the army had descended from the heights and paraded on the plain. By which time the French had made good their retreat. Only Habert’s men were forced to fight during their withdrawal as Mackenzie had largely ignored Murray’s lack of orders to the contrary and continued to press the French division to his front. The French pulled back in order and moved back down the road towards the sanctuary of Harispe’s rearguard and the defile of the Biar pass. By the time Murray’s main body advanced, the French were beyond the rearguard and the line of the French guns deployed at the mouth of the pass. Suchet, somewhat relieved and with his invincibility badly dented, extracted his force during the night and made best speed back to Fuente la Higuera.
French losses are difficult to calculate. Suchet reported about 800 men and played the whole affair down generally; his rather prolific memoirs dedicating a mere couple of pages to the advance and battle. Murray’s losses were about 670 and he had every reason to be upbeat in his post-battle despatch:
Lieutenant-General Sir John Murray congratulates the army he has the honour to command, on the result of the action which took place yesterday. Marshal Suchet collected his whole force, for the express purpose of destroying this army; trusting to the good fortune which had hitherto attended his arms. He has been defeated, and forced to retreat, by a small portion of it.
The Lieutenant-General requests the officers and soldiers of the corps engaged to accept his best thanks for their gallantry; and assures them, that he will not fail to draw the attention of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and of the Spanish Government, to the bravery, spirit and discipline displayed.
As the reports from the officers commanding divisions, of what immediately passed under the their direction, have not yet reached the Lieutenant-General, he is obliged to defer the just tribute of applause to those corps and individuals who have been fortunate enough to find an opportunity of distinguishing themselves. But from Sir John Murray’s own observation, he is fully authorized to hold up to every army in Europe the conduct of Colonel Adam and his brave corps, on the 12th and 13th instant, as an example worthy of applause and imitation; and he has the satisfaction of expressing a no less degree of approbation of the conduct of Major-General Whittingham and his gallant troops in the action of the 13th....20
Murray also made light of the loss of Arabin’s guns and this was perhaps a warning that he did not consider the loss of ordnance in quite the same way as Wellington. Murray added as a mere postscript to his post-battle report that ‘I have omitted to mention, that in retiring from Biar, two of the mountain guns fell into the hands of the enemy’.21 Wellington prided himself on not having lost a gun in any action he had fought in the Peninsula to date. Murray quite clearly did not see the Royal Artillery’s colours in quite the same light. Notwithstanding this view, Murray had beaten Suchet at Castalla and had taken the right decision not to pursue Suchet late on 13 April. However, his decision to follow Suchet the next day was less easily dismissed. Wellington wrote to Earl Bathurst that ‘.it appears that Suchet took his position in the Puerto de Biar on the evening of the 13th, not more than 2 miles from the scene of action, I cannot conceive what could have induced Sir J. Murray to follow his march afterwards, not having felt sufficiently strong to attack him before’.22 In many ways this decision dulled his achievement.