Operations in Catalonia, July – September 1813
Suchet received the disappointing news of the loss of Paris’s 5,000 troops on 14 July and decided to pull back into Catalonia, where, on arrival, he established his headquarters at Tarragona. Robert was left to garrison Tortosa with nearly 5,000 men; Lamarque was sent to Lérida with 2,000 (replacing the ailing General Henriot) and a battalion was despatched to Mequinenza. To be precise, these locations already had garrisons, Suchet merely enhanced their strengths but, in so doing, he frittered away a further 3,000 men from his main army. He assumed, as directed, full command of the Army of Catalonia and so, in a sense, received another 25,000 men, although most of these, as we have seen, were tied to respective garrisons throughout the region. His first task to Decaen, now his second in command, was to organize and put into the field a force of 10,000 (from the army in Catalonia) to join his active field force of 18,000. This combined force was to prepare for the inevitable allied attack from the south or, conceivably, the west. Suchet was, by now, well aware that the allies had lost a vital siege train at Tarragona and he estimated that there was not another to be had within easy reach. However, while this was a comfort on the one hand it did free the allies from having to constrain their operations to the coast and thereby opened other lines of advance which Suchet now had to be prepared to counter. Indeed, Bentinck had written to Wellington on the issue at the end of June and suggested quitting the coast and turning Suchet’s right from the interior. Wellington had responded quickly advising against the idea:
The great difficulty I have always found in the Peninsula has been the subsistence of the army; and in order to supply this want, and the various others of the army, I have never ventured to risk even the communication with the sea. The troops under your Lordship’s command are not so numerous as those I have; but still, including Sicilians, they are so numerous as to render it not an easy task to provide for them in the Peninsula, even when the harvest is on the ground; and it will be very difficult afterwards. Your Lordship must observe that you will get nothing without money; and your first want, when you shall lose your communication with the sea, will be money.
On these grounds, and because I know the corps under your command cannot be supplied as it ought to be with means of transport, and as I have always understood it to be the wish of your Lordship, as well as of the government, that the Anglo-Sicilian army should be in a situation to return to Sicily at short notice; I have considered it to be essential in every plan of operations for that army, that it should not be separated from the sea coast.1
It was a (by now) characteristic Wellingtonian communication, which confirmed and encapsulated his absolute awareness of the government’s politico-strategic direction, his undeniable grasp of the operational situation in the peninsula (and, one could argue, the wider Mediterranean) and his unquestionable sense of the art of the possible with regard to the tactical difficulties in a country short on honouring commitment while being equally short on the facility to do so. A few days later, amidst considerable wrangling with the Cortes over his command relationship with Spanish officers and troops under his direct command, he wrote again to offer Bentinck guidance and reassurance on the matter. In light of this advice, Bentinck drew up a detailed plan of action with Elio and Del Parque on 13 July. Elio, with the divisions of Roche, Miyares and Sarsfield (but not Villacampa) was given an independent task of dealing with the French garrisons in the region and to man and repair the city walls of Valencia; meanwhile the combined forces of Bentinck, Del Parque and Villacampa were to head north and confront Suchet. However, before they had set off Bentinck was to experience the frustrations alluded to in Wellington’s letter. His army numbered some 16,000 men, as he now had under command the Sicilian cavalry and Whittingham’s Spanish cavalry that had not gone with Murray to Tarragona (see Appendix I). However, he lacked all forms of land transport to provide for such a force. Furthermore, obtaining supplies from local sources was practically impossible and Del Parque announced that he was unable to move forward for want of provisions. Bentinck arranged to send him 100,000 rations of flour to induce him to cooperate. Rafael Zurita in his study of the impact of this war on Valencian society is clear that provisions were in short supply throughout the east coast region but he also acknowledges that the authorities could have done more to prioritise the distribution.2 Such behaviour is difficult to comprehend and both the Cortes and the regional government at Valencia deserve rich censure for their failure to support the cause at a critical juncture. Indeed the situation became so bad that Whittingham was forced to resign a second time for ‘high-placed Spanish officials were often very jealous of the Englishman, who by his own zeal and energy appeared to put to shame their own lack of such qualities’.3 Wellington, not surprisingly, refused to accept his resignation but it was additional evidence, if any were needed, of an almost unforgivable lack of Spanish resolve.
In consequence, it was not until 16 July before Bentinck’s force finally set off from Valencia and they reached Vinaròs four days later. The Spanish troops were some days behind so Bentinck waited for them to catch up and spent the delay trying to get a better intelligence picture as to Suchet’s whereabouts and intentions. The fact was that letters and reports from Wellington’s headquarters had dried up and Bentinck was unsighted as to how best to proceed in unison and independently from Wellington’s main effort.4 There were rumours that Suchet and Decaen were quitting Spain altogether and additional rumours that Wellington was already on French soil. In essence Bentinck had three choices: to continue to advance north overland, to undertake a similar amphibious landing to that attempted in June, or a combination of the two. Under the misinformation that Suchet was quitting Catalonia, he decided on the third option. His plan was as follows. He would embark an infantry division on the naval transports to land at Tarragona while, at the same time, he would advance north overland with the balance of the Anglo-Sicilian force and Whittingham’s Spaniards. Del Parque would, simultaneously, move to the west and encircle and besiege Tortosa, thereby neutralising the 5,000 men located there. Finally, Copons would be enticed south to join the amphibious force at Tarragona. It was a most hazardous scheme. It was also put into execution before Wellington’s revised direction had reached Bentinck from a despatch dated 4 August:
Mina ... sends me intelligence from Catalonia, stating that a detachment of 1500 men had been sent from Tortosa to Tarragona, about 24th or 25th. I should be inclined, therefore, to doubt the truth of the intelligence of the intention of Suchet to destroy the port; but if he should destroy it, I acknowledge that I am still inclined to adhere to the plan of attacking Tortosa, and of obtaining possession of the Ebro before you shall go farther north.5
Following reports of Clausel’s withdrawal to France, the loss of Paris’s strong brigade and unaware that Joseph had been replaced by Marshal Soult (12 July), Suchet had considered his options for his not inconsiderable force of more than 50,000 men. He could move on Wellington’s extended right flank; he could withdraw back to France and move to support the main army; he could withdraw to northern Catatonia behind the River Llobregat; or he could defend as far forward to retain access to the Ebro valley and his garrisons at Lérida and Tortosa. Not surprisingly, given the large numbers of troops he had ensconced in the various garrisons throughout Aragón, Valencia and Catalonia, he elected for the latter. His loss of Aragón was considered an irreparable misfortune but his greatest concern was that Wellington would detach a force down the Ebro valley to link up with Bentinck and the Spanish. Although Suchet’s decision was about to wrong-foot Bentinck, it played directly into Wellington’s hands. For the arrival of another 50,000 men on the Western Pyrenees, to supplement the 80,000 of Soult’s newly styled Army of Spain would, almost certainly, have derailed Wellington’s planned invasion of France. Nevertheless, Suchet decided to establish his field army of 15,000 around Vilafranca, a central location from where they could move south, north or west as the situation dictated. They could be quickly reinforced by another 10,000 from Decaen, who had been instructed to have the force earmarked, collected at Barcelona and for it to be able to move at short notice against just such an eventuality.
Bentinck was, however, blind to Suchet’s plans and intentions and on 21 July Clinton’s division was loaded onto the naval transports, which had been called forward from Alicante and pre-loaded with the artillery train and siege supplies. They sailed immediately to Tarragona in the hope of taking control of the city which, according to recent accounts, had been abandoned and blown up by the French. Clinton arrived in the Bay of Tarragona three days later and observed not only a number of French baggage trains heading north but also large numbers of French soldiers and Spanish civilians working to repair the bastions. That was not part of the script and Clinton wisely elected to sail back south. Meanwhile, Bentinck had crossed the Ebro by the ferry bridge at Amposta and was heading north. Poorly resourced with carts, wagons and animals it took several days for the group to reach the Col-de-Balaguer where Clinton’s division rejoined them from the sea. Del Parque’s army and Villacampa’s division were still some days to the south and had not yet reached Tortosa. On 30 July Bentinck continued his advance towards Tarragona as, fortunately, Suchet had not manned the small Fort San Filipe. However, rather like Maurice Mathieu’s advance the month before, he was blissfully unaware of just how precarious the situation was. Suchet took Bentinck’s advance as indicative of far greater strength; lacking accurate intelligence and ever conscious of Copons’ force on his right flank, he decided to wait for Decaen’s arrival before grasping the nettle.
Operations in Catalonia, July – September 1813
Bentinck advanced up the coast road and arrived near Tarragona on 1 August. He cut the roads to the north and south and situated his force around, but out of reach, of the guns on the ramparts of Tarragona. He then waited a full two weeks for all of Del Parque’s Spanish forces to close up, although one division was left to cordon Tortosa. Throughout this period Suchet’s and Bentinck’s forces were numerically balanced and one eyed the other, both waiting for reinforcements before committing. However, when Del Parque and Villacampa arrived in the vicinity of Tarragona, it was impossible to keep them concentrated as there were insufficient resources to sustain so many men in such a confined area. Bentinck, well aware of Wellington’s stinging rebuke to Murray about the loss of the siege guns, considered it prudent to delay the landing of the siege train. Copons, still smarting from Murray’s behaviour in June, was somewhat loath to commit to combined operations under Bentinck. While the allies dithered, Suchet struck. Decaen had joined Suchet on 13 August having returned with speed from northern Catalonia, where he had been escorting prisoners and the sick and wounded back to Gerona and France. On 14 August Suchet advanced with six divisions: Habert and Severoli on the interior road towards Whittingham; Harispe and Musnier via the coast road towards Bentinck; and Decaen’s two divisions under Maurice Mathieu and Lamarque through the Col de Santa Cristina, intending to come in to the south and rear of the forces at Tarragona. Both Whittingham and Bentinck fell back to the Col-de-Balaguer where Suchet found them on 17 August in a strong position and ready to give battle. Del Parque’s forces were a few kilometres further south, but still in touching distance of Bentinck. Suchet realized the position was strong and that he could ill-afford casualties or even worse a check. He satisfied himself with having raised the cordon at Tarragona and, leaving a cavalry screen to cover the allies, he withdrew. Back at Tarragona he carried out his initial plans with regard to the place. Sergeant Landsheit recalled what happened:
We fell back, in consequence, immediately after nightfall, and never came to a halt till we reached a position which we had formerly occupied between Tarragona and Cabrils. Here the whole army halted, leaving Suchet free to deal with Tarragona and its garrison ... we took up our ground at Cabrils ... and kept a sharp lookout to our front, when on the night of the 18th, an explosion took place that shook the very earth beneath our feet. The sound was louder than the loudest thunder; and the effect upon all living and dead substances, within easy reach of its influence, resembled that of an earthquake. We were utterly at a loss to conjecture to what cause the event ought to be attributed, and put to one another a thousand questions which nobody could answer.6
Suchet had ordered Tarragona to be evacuated and destroyed. The bastions were blown and Decaen’s two divisions were sent back north, fuelling renewed rumours that Suchet was poised to leave Spain. Wellington, on receipt of a report from one of his intelligence officers, had anticipated such a move and had written with alacrity to Bentinck:
It was reported that Suchet was coming with his force from Catalonia also through France. I am not so certain of the truth of this report ... but if it should be true, the enemy will become too strong for me, as they have already been reinforced from the interior of France. I beg therefore that if you find that Marshal Suchet marches himself, or detaches any considerable part of his force into France, you will likewise detach to join me as follows: 1st; the infantry of the 3rd army; their cavalry are to be left with the 2nd army; and their field pieces with the 1st army. Their artillerymen must march with the infantry. If your Lordship should find that the enemy weaken their disposable force in Catalonia, so considerably as that you will have the means of taking the strong place, and of covering your operations against them with the 1st and 2nd armies and the Anglo-Sicilian corps without Whittingham’s division, I would them request you to send likewise the infantry of Whittingham’s division. The cavalry and artillery are to remain with the Anglo-Sicilian corps. But you will keep Whittingham’s division if you should think that you will be cramped in Catalonia without them. The troops that will march are to come by Zaragoza [Saragossa] on Tudela, where they will receive further orders.7
Bentinck, concerned that Suchet’s actions and movements signalled the French marshal’s intent to march in support of Soult, and conscious of Wellington’s instructions to try and prevent such a union, despatched Del Parque to Tudela. This, as it turned out, merely served to reduce Bentinck’s numbers and his options in the weeks ahead. In fact, Del Parque’s army was to play no further part in the war, only one of its divisions being called forward to assist in the blockade of Pamplona. As it was Wellington’s intelligence officer’s report had been entirely accurate. Soult, at the head of the Army of Spain in south-western France, had proposed two such plans. The first was for Suchet to threaten Wellington’s right flank by marching on Saragossa. Suchet was quick to counter such a proposal to General Henri Clarke in Paris, pointing out that France’s borders would then be open to Bentinck’s forces. Soult, having been informed of Napoleon’s wishes, wasted no time in submitting a second proposal in which he suggested that Suchet should march via France to join him and their combined armies would than fall on Wellington in Navarre. Suchet countered that by suggesting that this scheme was even more dangerous than the former as his withdrawal would pull Bentinck’s forces, and arguably those of Copons as well, into the southern provinces of France. He was on safe ground, any question of French soil being sacrificed in the execution of a combined operation was out of the question. Considering he was now holding the trump card Suchet now proposed a plan of his own. He would march between the Ebro and the Pyrenees with a force escorting 100 pieces of field artillery and 30 mountain guns which would rendezvous with Soult’s army that had marched south over the pass at Jaca. As this pass was not suitable for artillery it was only lightly screened by Wellington’s army, which was already fully committed and deployed widely conducting the siege at San Sebastian, the cordon at Pamplona and covering in strength the passes between the Bay of Biscay and St. Jean Pied-de-Port. It was a good plan and came with two caveats from Suchet: firstly, that he would receive 30,000 conscripts which he could use to replace his garrisons and release his better trained soldiers for the second pre-condition which was that he be allowed, after reinforcement, to be able to defeat the Anglo-Sicilian-Spanish force to his front before making his westward movement. Paris and Soult, not surprisingly, did not see things in quite the same way.8
In the interim, Bentinck remained cautious and did not resume his advance until late August. By 29 August he was at Tarragona and making plans for the repair of the main fortress, and for improvements to the port, in order to be able to use it as a major naval base and logistic hub. Copons paid him a flying visit and plans were drawn up for a combined operation against the French at Barcelona. Copons reinforced the intelligence Bentinck had received that Decaen had withdrawn north with 10,000 men and Suchet had done likewise with another 15,000 men.9 If accurate this would have left Suchet with a few thousand men and no reserve to call upon. Bentinck agreed to advance towards Barcelona, however, of his original force the formations were spread widely. For Del Parque had long departed; Villacampa was observing Tortosa; Duran’s division was blockading Lérida and Mequinenza; El Empecinado’s was near Madrid; and the two divisions from Elio’s army, Roche’s and Mijares’, were besieging Sagunto and Peñiscola respectively. Whittingham’s and Sarsfield’s divisions were with Bentinck in the environs of Tarragona but he was unable to take them for want of transport for their provisions. Both divisions remained on call and would be able to reach Bentinck’s force in two days if required. Consequently, on 5 September Bentinck left Tarragona with only 12,000 men of the Anglo-Sicilian force.
There were three routes from Tarragona to Barcelona: the coast road, the main road and the interior road. Bentinck could ill-afford to advance on one while leaving one or more of the others open. The coast road was covered by the Royal Navy and Copons forces at Torredembarra on the Gaya River. The interior route was covered by two of the Catalan commanders, Baron d’Eroles and the guerrilla chief Josep Manso i Solà and they were reinforced by a small group of Calabrese. Along the main road Colonel Frederick Adam was despatched with the force advance guard. On the morning of 12 September, he was ordered to occupy the defile at Ordal a few kilometres north of Vilafranca. Adam’s group numbered just over 1,500 men, including a troop of Brunswick Hussars, and included four light artillery guns (see Appendix I). Bentinck accompanied Adam and conducted a reconnaissance of the position and personally deployed the forces utilising the three old ruined entrenchments that spanned the road. Later that afternoon, the leading brigade of Sarsfield’s division came up, their arrival provided another 2,300 troops and Adam adjusted his deployment accordingly. The position was strong, there were some old spoilt fieldworks overlooking and dominating the road and, less than a kilometre to the front, there was a steep defile. The only way across this significant obstacle was the narrow bridge of Lledoner or by a small goat track which traversed the precipitous and difficult terrain. However, for no apparent reason, Adam did not deploy any sentinels or cavalry pickets forward observing the bridge and defile, furthermore, he made no attempt to block the road with barricades of abattis. He was expecting Bentinck to arrive with the balance of the force at any time but that in no way mitigates the error.
Combat at Ordal, 13 September 1813
Suchet was well aware that Bentinck had advanced and had time to concentrate a large force at Molins de Rey just outside Barcelona. By 12 September he had assembled a force of 20,000. He was aware that Bentinck’s force was at Vilafranca but was unaware that Adam had advanced up to and beyond Ordal. He split his force, sending Decaen with 7,000 men on the interior road while taking the balance down the main road. His aim was to get Decaen in behind Bentinck’s force to cut off their retreat and then attack them from the front with his main force. It was a risky operation and a difficult approach as the precipitous terrain dictated an advance in Indian file, a situation which prevented the attacker deploying his force and which considerably aided the defender. Suchet recalled that ‘this very steep position presented serious obstacles to our progress, as we could only reach it by marching through a defile nearly three leagues in length’.10 The entire force was on the road with the exception of the 2/116th Line who were deployed to the south on a goat track. Having left the start point at 8 pm they made good speed arriving short of the bridge at about half an hour before midnight. They crept up to the bridge and were astounded to find their progress uncontested; they pushed across the bridge and defile and were only discovered when a Spanish cavalry patrol came down the road. Within minutes the entire hillside was a theatre of flashing muzzles, sharp detonations and acrid smoke:
General Mesclop, who led the column of General Harispe’s division, after having dispersed with grape-shot a squadron which was advancing along the road, sent forwards the voltigeurs of the 7th, and caused them to be supported by the remainder of the regiment, whilst the 44th was proceeding in another direction against the first redoubt.11
The defenders in the leading entrenchment were quickly overwhelmed and they fell back to the second line of trenches which were slightly elevated, enjoying a dominating fire over the trenches now filling with French infantry. A counter-attack by the Spanish infantry succeeded in driving the French back out of the forward trench but their success was to be short-lived. Suchet fed more and more troops forward and they began moving around the flanks. Adam was wounded and command devolved to Colonel George Reeves, the commanding officer of the Inniskillings, before he too fell wounded. In the dark, confusion quickly took hold and the sight of Captain Frederick Arabin limbering up his four light guns under French musket fire was enough to shatter allied resolve. Darkness provided the opportunity for small groups to melt away into the night and before long the troops were haemorrhaging across the front. Some escaped down the road towards Vilafranca but the majority headed over the hills to the north. Most of these latter battalions reached Manso’s defensive position astride the track at San Sadurini but the unfortunate battalion of Calabrese emerged on the track in front of Decaen’s force and had to turn south again and strike for the coast. Their commanding officer Colonel Carey, managed to get boats from the fishing village near Sitjes and they returned, after an eventful night, to Tarragona. The gunners and the Spanish cavalry were less fortunate being overtaken on the road to Vilafranca by the French hussars. For the third time in a matter of months four more guns had been lost. But the losses to the Inniskillings were significant, with eight officers and 300 other ranks killed or wounded.12 In total, nearly a quarter of Adam’s force had been killed, wounded or was missing.
Suchet allowed his exhausted force some rest before pushing on to Vilafranca. His cavalry had forged ahead and reported that there was no sign of Decaen’s column but that the allies were drawn up in front of Vilafranca. Suchet held his force a couple of kilometres from Bentinck’s position and waited for Decaen’s column to close. Manso’s irregulars had fallen back precipitously as Decaen’s infantry advanced and the Spaniard reported to Bentinck’s headquarters the strength of the French forces descending on Vilafranca by the interior road. Bentinck now realized he was heavily outnumbered and in danger of being surrounded and cut off. He gave the order for the force to pull back to Tarragona with battalions passing through those anchored providing cover before they themselves took up similar positions to their rear. Suchet somewhat frustrated to see the allied force pulling back tried to delay them by sending his cavalry forward: the 4th Hussars and the 13th Cuirassiers advanced with a horse artillery battery in support and began to shell the centre of Bentinck’s line. When the French charged they were met by the German hussars and the 20th Light Dragoons and a fierce cavalry engagement ensued. Sergeant Landsheit recalled the moment:
Lord Frederick Bentinck, with a staff officer, came round the elbow of the hill waving his hat, and we, the Brunswickers, and the 20th, getting our horses into a trot, were in the heart of the French columns in a moment ... Many gallant exploits were performed in that charge, which Lord Frederick led with a recklessness of danger that could not but inspire his troops with the utmost confidence. Yet had Lord Frederick well-nigh fallen victim to his own intrepidity. He was in the heart of the enemy’s hussars, laying about him, when a Frenchman made a cut at his head, which, but that a sergeant named Dickson, pushed between him and the blow, must have proved fatal ... Poor Dickson was almost immediately afterwards slain himself, so that Lord Frederick never had an opportunity of thanking him for his chivalrous devotion.13
The French cavalry had also got in amongst the infantry and the 10th Foot had formed square and emptied a number of French saddles with their volley fire. The counter-charge had bought time for Bentinck’s main force to pull back to a second position. Suchet tried again with the cavalry and Bentinck responded with the Foreign Hussars and two Sicilian squadrons who held off the by-now exhausted French cavalry and prevented them getting in among the allied infantry. Bentinck pulled back to a third position and nearly lost two of his Portuguese guns as he fell back:
The two guns to which we were attached, after keeping up their fire until the French were close upon them, limbered up and moved to the rear. Repeatedly the enemy formed as if to charge them; but the bold front which our squadron presented struck them with awe, and they held back. Away, therefore, we went, till we had come within a short distance of the bridge, which to our horror and amazement ... was on fire. The fascines that filled up the space between the double layer of boards was blazing terribly and the smoke gathering in a cloud overhead ... What then were we to do? With our tumbrils [sic] full of ammunition and our heavy pieces, could we venture to pass between two volumes of flame, or were we to halt on this side and die with our arms in our hands, or be taken? Captain Jacks, fortunately for us, was a man of decision, and the officer commanding the artillery proved equally intrepid. “Dash at it, men” was the cry, and we did dash at it. With the very flames curling up on both sides, and the smoke meeting in an arch over our heads, we galloped across bearing off our guns, tumbrils, and all our people safely. Yet scarcely were we across when a loud crash gave notice that the planks had failed. The bridge was broken, and multitudes of those who were crossing at the moment perished in the ruins.14
The collapsed bridge provided the proverbial line in the sand at which Suchet called off the pursuit. As it happened, this rather unsatisfactory action brought large-scale combat operations on the east coast to an end. Suchet withdrew and dispersed his army and Bentinck returned to Sicily, handing over command to Clinton, the senior divisional commander. Indeed Bentinck had already decided to return to Sicily as early as 1 September and had written to Wellington:
As it is important that I should be in Sicily as soon as possible, I hope you will not disapprove my going before I receive your answer. I shall leave the command with Lieutenant-General Clinton. I have just seen that officer who begs me to request your Lordship to send a senior officer to him to command the army. This so unusual request proceeds from a diffidence of his own abilities. He thinks that this complicated machine would be better kept in order by an officer having more reputation and weight in Spain than himself.15
If Bentinck’s decision to return at this critical moment was not enough what on earth Wellington made of Clinton’s request is anyone’s guess. With Wellington’s army poised for the invasion of French the prospect of sending another senior officer over to the east coast was out of the question. For the French, too, the situation was critical and following the invasion in early October, Suchet received instruction from Napoleon to abandon the Ebro fortresses at Lérida, Tortosa and Mequinenza, which were destroyed on evacuation. He then concentrated his army around Barcelona and in December decided to make one last attack on the Anglo-Sicilian force and drive it back beyond the Ebro. He moved against Clinton’s force at Vilafranca but the British commander had early warning of Suchet’s movements and fell back to a strong defensive position in front of the village of Arbos (L’Arboç). On arrival Suchet could see the advantages of the position and Clinton’s force lined up to receive the French, and with Castalla still fresh in his memory, he declined to attack and fell back to Barcelona. Copons had tried to move on Barcelona in Suchet’s absence but he soon beat a hasty retreat when he discovered Suchet was on his way back.
Suchet’s last few months in 1813 were taken up with Napoleon’s rather erroneous Treaty of Valençay, named after Talleyrand’s château where Ferdinand VII had been held in captivity since 1808. The basis of this treaty was a union of Spain and France through the release of Ferdinand VII in order to drive a wedge between the Anglo-Spanish coalition. The king accepted the terms with no intention of honouring them. In Napoleon’s view this optimistic plan would enable the French garrisons along the east coast to march unhindered back to join Suchet who, in turn, could be used to influence events in eastern France or to join Soult and thwart Wellington’s future attentions in the south of the country. Wellington was concerned that some of the Spanish commanders would be tempted to allow the French garrisons to walk free in exchange for Ferdinand and he had to warn them that no capitulation with French garrisons was to be sanctioned unless they surrendered as prisoners of war. In fact the Treaty of Valençay misfired from the start and the Spanish government and senior military commanders were not taken with it for one moment. Napoleon, by contrast, was utterly convinced of the plan’s success. Suchet received orders from Paris in early January 1814 to prepare for his withdrawal from Spain. He was delighted at the prospect of vacating Catalonia and joining the emperor on operations in the defence of France as it had been many years since he had served directly under Napoleon. He complied with the order but within weeks it was apparent that the Treaty of Valençay had failed and the Catalan forces moved against the remnants of his force with renewed vigour. Furthermore, Suchet received orders to send back nearly all his cavalry and a strong division of infantry to France whilst he, however, was to remain and maintain Barcelona. It was a bitter blow.
Then, unexpectedly, on 16 January, Suchet was attacked. Clinton, convinced that the French had already reduced their forces in the region, moved the Anglo-Sicilians north to conduct combined operations with Copons against the French on the outskirts of Barcelona. Somewhat predictably it was another badly orchestrated operation as the separate attacks were mistimed and the allies found themselves facing Suchet’s still intact field force of some 25,000 men. Clinton, ever conscious of Wellington’s instruction not to risk losing the force, felt compelled to withdraw after realising the strength of the Suchet’s army drawn up and offering battle. His report to Wellington was long and full of justification for his actions but displayed magnanimity for the failure:
It is to be lamented that the column of the 1st army led by Colonel Manso, but commanded by general Copons in person, could not execute that part of the movement allocated to it. I am convinced every possible exertion was made by Colonel Manso, and that the failure is to be imputed to the difficulty, or rather impossibility, of making such a march during the night, in the time which it was deemed proper to allot for the operation. Had the troops been posted as agreed on between Colonel Manso and myself, there was, I think, no doubt but that 1500 to 2000 men must have fallen into our hands, which I trust your Lordship will think worthy the attempt that was made ... If the movement here reported to your Lordship has not had a happy issue, it may at least be considered as having tended to give the Spanish troops confidence in themselves, and that they may have judged from it that with steadiness and good discipline in the day of action, they have a right to expect to see the French retire before them as they witnessed on the present occasion.16
It was the last operation the Anglo-Sicilians were to fight in the battle for the east coast and in many ways that was of some relief to Wellington who was, by now, completely embroiled in events in central Europe and in bringing Soult’s army to heel in southern France. It prompted Wellington to say, sometime after the war, that Clinton ‘did nothing in particular – and did it pretty well’.