Albritton, Rogers 84
analogies 100–101, 265, 267, 268–269; language 265, 268–269; and metaphors 268; between philosophy and psychotherapy 269–271, 280–282
animal minds 7 – 8, 48, 92, 102, 177–180, 191–192, 196–197
anti-representationalism 288, 289, 292–301, 303, 306
authority 6, 97, 116, 126–127, 311, 313, 322, 324–326
automatic cognition 271–274, 276–282; see also intuitions
Bar-On, Dorit 97n1, 225, 227, 231, 232, 233
behaviorism 8, 53, 96, 98, 100–101, 212
Bouwsma, O.K. 245n7
Brandom, Robert 1, 2n4, 181, 181n24, 184, 312, 313, 323n27
Burge, Tyler 87n16, 105n25, 181n24, 185, 185n39
Canberra plan 5, 290, 291, 294, 303
Carnap, Rudolf 289, 296, 298, 299
Cartesianism 8, 53, 209, 211–214, 216, 217; see also Descartes, Rene
causation 35, 37, 39–41, 62n23, 92–93, 100n8
Cavell, Stanley 1, 1n2, 35n7, 42–43, 59
Chomsky, Noam 148, 289, 303–305
cognitive science 209
Collins, John 304
common sense 8, 44, 85, 88, 92–93, 209, 216
consciousness 2–3, 26–29, 79–80, 82–85, 91, 94, 102, 107, 124–125, 135; see also sensations
continuity: human-animal 223–227, 231–235
Crary, Alice 1, 8, 224, 225, 227, 228n12, 231, 233, 233n20
Davidson, Donald 7, 41n26, 53n78, 178, 179–181, 181n24, 182–187, 193–197, 199, 319n23
deflationism (semantic) 60, 103, 287, 291, 292, 295, 297–299
Dewey, John 39, 311, 312, 313, 315, 316, 317, 325
Drury, Maurice O’Connor 250n34
epistemology 31, 34, 37n16, 38, 96–98, 104–106, 108, 116–117; self-knowledge 96–98, 114, 116; see also inferences: inferential model of self-knowledge; skepticism: mathematical
experimental philosophy 9, 260, 261; sources Project in 262, 266–267, 271, 279, 282; and warrant project in 261–264
experiments 35, 261, 270, 276–278
expressive behavior 48–51, 90–92, 96, 103, 120, 178, 187–197, 199–200
expressivism 2n4, 97–98, 100, 112–113, 116; global 288, 289, 292, 294, 299, 300, 303, 305, 315n15, 321
externalism 21–22, 87n16, 105n25
Ford, Anton 233, 234, 234n25, 237
Frege, Gottlob 4, 4n8, 6, 26–28, 119–132, 135–137, 139–142, 146–149; Begriffsschrift 128, 148; Der Gedanke 4n8, 119, 124, 131, 135, 138n18, 142; Sinn 119–120, 123, 125–127, 129–131, 136; third realm 4, 119, 124–125, 127, 131, 136, 147–148; Vorstellungen 119, 125, 135, 138
generality: 128–130, 138; categorical 232–234, 234n25, 237, 238
Gier, Nicholas F. 251n34
Goldfarb, Warren 245
grammar 48, 65, 96, 101, 102n14, 107–110, 127–128, 154, 168
Hacker, Peter M.S. 151–155, 165, 169, 243, 244n4
hallucination 263; argument from 264, 273–276
Hanfling, Oswald 243n1, 249n28, 252, 253n46, 255
Hawthorne, John 323n28
Hornsby, Jennifer 59
Horowitz, Alexandra 206–210, 214
Horwich, Paul 1, 9, 287–289, 292–295, 297, 299, 301–304
Hume, David 9, 243–245, 247, 249, 251–258
illusion 263; argument from 264, 273–276
inferences: contextually inappropriate 275–279, 281; inferential model of self-knowledge 96, 10, 104, 111, 116; stereotypical 274–279
introspection 80–82, 85, 98, 100, 114–115
intuitions 88–89, 261–264, 272–274, 279, 281–282; evidentiary value of 261–262, 264, 273–274
Jackson, Frank 2, 36, 38–41, 290
Jones, Peter 244n2
Kierkegaard, Soren 53
Kitcher, Philip 10, 311–314, 317, 322, 324–327
Lewis, David K. 5–6, 79n1, 85, 153n11, 290
Loeb, Louis 251n36
logic 49, 119–121, 126, 145–146, 148, 151n2
Macarthur, David 58–60, 62, 70n64, 74n86, 315n15
Maddy, Penelope 1, 3, 151n2, 170n58, 171
mathematics 7, 19, 37, 88, 113, 148, 151–160, 164–171; see also skepticism: mathematical
McDowell, John McDowell 1, 5, 8, 23n22, 41n26, 49, 59, 61–62, 65–71, 170n57, 181, 181n24, 183n31, 184n74, 233–235, 235n27, 237, 237n31
McGinn, Colin 323n28
McGinn, Marie 1, 33n2, 65–66, 69–70, 72, 317, 318
meaning: as use 20, 29–31, 45, 80, 103, 104n21, 113
mental: capacities 221; contents 66–67; descriptions 219; expression 219; predicates 218, 219; properties 83, 90; states 96–101, 105, 111, 116, 216
metacognitive insight 261, 264, 276, 280–288
metaphor 9, 22–23, 265, 267–268, 275–277
metaphysics 10, 36–39, 41–42, 60, 64n38, 85–87, 313, 315, 316, 320–325
Misak, Cheryl 313
Monk, Ray 251n34
Moore, G.E. (Moore’s Paradox) 112–114, 117
Munson, Thomas N. 251n34
naturalism 2–3, 16, 21, 29, 33–36, 96, 98, 149; compatible with therapeutic philosophy 263–267, 273–276; metaphilosophical 261–263, 266; methodological 260, 262–263, 266; methodological vs. metaphysical 38, 57–58, 260; natural properties 5–6, 79–86; object 289–294, 297–302; orthodox 318–321; pragmatic 309, 310, 312, 313, 320, 325, 326; strict vs. liberal 4–5, 45–46, 56–62, 65–66, 70, 117; subject 287, 292, 300, 303, 304, 320–322
necessity 110, 126, 151–157, 159, 161, 163, 165–171
norm 2, 152–154, 156–157, 160–161, 163–165, 167, 170–171
normativity 40–41, 61, 68–70, 314, 318n19
pain 44, 48–49, 79–87, 90–94, 98–109; see also sensations
paradox 43, 263–265, 273, 279, 281
Peacocke, Christopher 82–86, 90–94, 106n29
Pears, D.F. 1, 17–19, 244, 248–249, 251
perception 124; problem of 263–264, 273–276, 279
philosophy: as continuous with science 56–57; diagnostic approaches in 264–265, 279, 281; therapeutic conception of 261, 268–273, 279–282; see also Wittgenstein, Ludwig, conception of philosophy
Plato 37n16
platonism/anti-platonism 5–7, 67–69, 79, 81–82, 85, 88–89, 153, 156, 169
Price, Huw 1, 1n4, 9–10, 59, 287–305, 311, 314, 317, 319–322, 324–326
private language 6, 22, 79–81, 98–100, 104, 123–124, 153n10; see also sensations: privacy of
pseudo-problems 265–266, 272; dissolving of 96, 265–266, 273–274, 279
psycholinguistics 261, 263–264, 274–279, 282
Putnam, Hilary 22, 41n26, 59, 79n1
Quine, Willard V.O. 4, 36, 38n19, 131, 244–245, 298–300, 304, 305
realism/anti-realism 17–18, 68, 83n8, 87–89, 91, 93–94
regularity: empirical 155–156, 161, 164–166, 169–71
representation 10, 120–123, 126–127, 152–153; representing-as 123, 132, 142
representationalism 69, 315, 316, 319n22, 320, 321n25, 325
Rorty, Richard 10, 311–318, 320–325
rule 7, 99, 109, 152, 154–157, 160, 163–170
rule-following 20, 25–28, 31–32, 66–67, 72, 97n2, 99, 170
Russell, Bertrand 38, 99n6, 119–121, 123–133, 147–148; Russellian propositions 119, 123
Ryle, Gilbert 8, 216, 220, 221
science 2–5, 17, 33–41, 56–62, 71–74, 309, 310, 315, 318–320, 322, 323, 324; physics 33–35, 46n46, 57, 73, 146; unity of 39
Sellars, Wilfrid 74
sensations 6, 17, 19, 22–23, 44, 48, 50, 79–83, 85–87, 92–93, 98–109; first-person (self-ascription) vs. third-person ascriptions 81–82, 84, 92–93, 96–98, 103–104, 106–108, 111–112, 115–116; privacy of 22, 79–81, 98–99, 124; see also pain
skepticism: continuity 7–8, 177, 179–182, 184–185, 187, 189, 192, 196–197, 199; mathematical 152–153, 157, 170–171
Smith, Norman Kemp 251n35, 254n50
soul 51–54, 102, 309, 311, 313, 315, 317, 319, 321, 323, 325
Spiegelberg, Herbert 251n34
Strawson, Peter F. 117, 244, 255
supernatural 5, 39, 42, 46–49, 52–53, 56, 60
theory of mind 216
therapy: cognitive 261, 279–282; concept of 268–269; and philosophy 9, 45, 261, 268–273, 279–282
Thomasson, Amie 289, 294–296, 299
truth 58, 82, 84, 103, 119–122, 124–127, 129–132; correspondence theory of 131, 135–141, 145, 148–149; truth-bearer 131, 135, 138–139; truth-maker 319, 322
unity: conceptual 232, 235, 237, 237n31, 238
urge to misunderstand 261, 270, 276
Williams, Bernard 8, 244n2, 245–247, 249, 256n60, 257
Williamson, Timothy 58
Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1–3, 223, 225, 226, 227, 227n10, 230–232, 235–238; On Certainty 105, 107, 109; his conception of philosophy 22–25, 43–48, 56, 63–68, 149, 261, 263–267, 269–271, 313–318, 320–323, 325; his conception of religion 52–54; and forms of life 6, 167–169; and metaphilosophical naturalism 33–34, 263–267; his own experiments 270; and pragmatism 314, 315; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 34n5, 36, 38n18, 43, 119–120, 123, 131–132, 137, 142–149