NOTES

Introduction

1.    The official news service Xinhua maintains a standing page about the Chinese Dream, updating it from time to time as new stories emerge. See “Chinese Dream,” Xinhua, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/chinesedream/.

2.    Xi Jinping explained the relationship between the Chinese Dream and China’s foreign policy at the closely watched Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs held by the CCP leadership November 28–29, 2014. For the official summary of Xi’s speech, see http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml.

3.    State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, January 2017, State Council website, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2017/01/11/content_281475539078636.htm.

4.    “Xi Jinping and the Chinese Dream,” The Economist, May 4, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21577070-vision-chinas-new-president-should-serve-his-people-not-nationalist-state-xi-jinping.

5.    For the full text of Hu Jintao’s speech, see “Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 18th Party Congress,” November 27, 2012, Embassy of China website, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/18th_CPC_National_Congress_Eng/t992917.htm.

6.    Alison A. Kaufman, “Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on ‘China’s Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,’” March 10, 2011, U.S.-China Commission website, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf.

7.    Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017, China Daily website, http://www.chinadaily.com.cnchina/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.

8.    Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society.”

9.    Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society.”

10.  See China Central Television website, http://news.cctv.com/special/dgwj/index.shtml.

11.  See China Central Television website, http://tv.cctv.com/2017/09/03/VIDEbrcb0fgQBrX278PlV9NF170903.shtml.

12.  See, for example, Joe McReynolds, ed., China’s Evolving Military Strategy (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2016).

13.  Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, eds., Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan, 3 vols. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1975), vol. 2, pp. 342, 361. The terms “logic” and “grammar” come from Carl von Clausewitz’s treatise On War and are treated exhaustively in chapter 1.

Chapter 1. Mahan’s Lingering Ghost

1.    Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911; reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 107.

2.    Paul Kennedy, “The Rise and Fall of Navies,” New York Times, April 5, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/05/opinion/05iht-edkennedy.1.5158064.html.

3.    Author discussions with European officials and scholars, “Pioneering for Solutions against Piracy” conference, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, July 8, 2009, http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/events/20090708/.

4.    Jasper Gerard, “Ministers Accused of ‘Sea Blindness’ by Britain’s Most Senior Royal Navy Figure,” Telegraph, June 12, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/5517833/Ministers-accused-of-sea-blindness-by-Britains-most-senior-Royal-Navy-figure.html.

5.    Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon: A History of China’s Quest for Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1982), esp. pp. 28–43; Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–1433 (London: Oxford University Press, 1994).

6.    Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 94; K. M. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance: A Survey of the Vasco da Gama Epoch of Asian History, 1498–1945 (New York: Day, 1954); and K. M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the Influence of Sea Power on Indian History (New York: Macmillan, 1945).

7.    Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, “The Last Days of the Royal Navy: Lessons from Britain’s Strategic Retreat from the Pacific,” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, eds., Asia Looks Seaward: Power and Maritime Strategy (Greenwood, CN: Praeger, 2007), pp. 32–45. See also Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance.

8.    See, for instance, Michael Howard, “Men against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914,” International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 41–57.

9.    Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 26–28.

10.  Geoffrey Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World,” Orbis 51, no. 4 (fall 2007): 569–75; and Geoffrey Till, Seapower (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

11.  Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World,” pp. 569–75.

12.  Banyan [pseud.], “Chasing Ghosts,” The Economist, June 11, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/13825154.

13. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Meridian, 1991), p. 353.

14.  Edward Mead Earle, “Introduction,” in Edward Mead Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), p. viii.

15.  Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 353.

16.  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 605.

17.  Clausewitz, On War, p. 77.

18.  Liddell Hart, Strategy, pp. 321–22.

19.  Liddell Hart, Strategy, p. 353.

20.  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 63.

21.  Clausewitz, On War, p. 97.

22.  Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 191–92.

23.  Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power: 1776–1918 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 203, 217–22.

24.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890; reprint, New York: Dover, 1987), p. 25.

25.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Problem of Asia (1900; reprint, Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1970), p. 124.

26.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (1897; reprint, Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), pp. 65–83, 277–92.

27.  Mahan, Problem of Asia, p. 124.

28.  Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 71.

29.  Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 22–23.

30.  Mahan, Problem of Asia, p. 33.

31.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, Retrospect & Prospect (Boston: Little, Brown, 1902), p. 246.

32.  Mahan, Retrospect & Prospect, p. 246.

33.  Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, pp. 203, 217–22.

34. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812, vol. 1 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1892), p. iv.

35.  Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 138.

36.  Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, pp. 198–199.

37.  Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), esp. pp. 6–13, 29–51.

38.  高兰 [Gao Lan], 中国海洋强国之梦 [China’s Maritime Great Power Dream] (Shanghai: Shanghai Remin Press, 2014), p. 32.

39.  Gao, China’s Maritime Great Power Dream, p. 32.

40.  Gao, China’s Maritime Great Power Dream, p. 35.

41.  Gao, China’s Maritime Great Power Dream, p. 33.

42.  胡波 [Hu Bo], 2049年的中国海上权力 [China’s Maritime Power in 2049] (Beijing: China Development Press, 2015), p. 26.

43.  Hu, China’s Maritime Power in 2049, p. 26.

44.  Hu, China’s Maritime Power in 2049, p. 33.

45.  中国人民解放军军事科学院 [People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Science], 中国人民解放军军语 [People’s Liberation Army Military Terms] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 1997), p. 36.

46.  中国海军百科全书编审委员会 [Editorial Committee of the Chinese Navy Encyclopedia], 中国海军百科全书 [Chinese Navy Encyclopedia] (Beijing: Haichao Press, 1999), p. 1928.

47.  刘一建 [Liu Yijian], “制海权理论及发展趋势 [The Theory of Command of the Sea and Its Development Trends],” 中国军事科学 [China Military Science], no. 1 (January 2005): 43.

48.  Liu, “The Theory of Command of the Sea and Its Development Trends,” p. 43.

49.  黄江 [Huang Jiang], “论现代制海权 [On Modern Command of the Sea],” 中国军事科学 [China Military Science] 16, no. 2 (2003): 25.

50.  Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 91.

51.  纪荣仁 王学进 [Ji Rongren and Wang Xuejin], “试析制交通权与制空权, 制海权的关系 [Assessing the Relationships between Command of Communications, Command of the Air, and Command of the Sea],” 中国军事科学 [China Military Science] 15, no. 4 (2002): 114.

52.  James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan (London: Routledge, 2008).

53.  Handel points out that “one does not necessarily have to read On War to be a Clausewitzian, since most of his ideas can be arrived at independently through the application of logic and common sense.” The same holds true for any strategic thinker. Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 11.

Chapter 2. Economic Geography of Chinese Sea Power

1.    Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890; reprint, New York: Dover, 1987), p. 28.

2.    Edward N. Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce,” National Interest 20 (summer 1990): 17–23.

3.    Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 71.

4.    Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 28.

5.    Jean-Paul Rodrigue, “The Geography of Global Supply Chains,” Journal of Supply Chain Management 48, no. 3 (July 2012):15–23.

6.    International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics, 2017, http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm.

7.    United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2015 (Geneva: United Nations, 2015), p. 66.

8.    UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP] Statistics Division, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific 2015 (Bangkok: United Nations Publication, February 17, 2016), p. 95.

9.    UN Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2015, p. 67.

10.  National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2016, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/indexeh.htm.

11. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2016 (Geneva: United Nations, 2016), p. 69.

12.  UN Conference on Trade and Development, Review of Maritime Transport 2016, p. 71.

13.  Li Yan, “China to Build 3 World-Class Airport Clusters,” People’s Daily Online, May 26, 2017.

14.  Edward Leman, “Can the Pearl River Delta Region Still Compete?” China Business Review, May–June 2003, http://www.chreod.com/assets/Uploads/PRDCBRMay-June03.pdf.

15.  World Bank Group, “East Asia’s Changing Urban Landscape: Measuring a Decade of Spatial Growth,” January 26, 2015, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/urbandevelopment/publication/east-asias-changing-urban-landscape-measuring-a-decade-of-spatial-growth.

16.  J. S. L. Lam and W. Y. Yap, “Container Port Competition and Complementarity in Supply Chain Systems: Evidence from the Pearl River Delta,” Maritime Economics and Logistics 13, no. 2 (2011): 112–13.

17.  World Bank Group, “East Asia’s Changing Urban Landscape,” pp. 77–78.

18.  Zhen Hong et al., “The Competitiveness of Global Port-Cities: The Case of Shanghai,” p. 74, OECD website, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/urban-rural-and-regional-development/the-competitiveness-of-global-port-cities-the-case-of-shanghai-china_5k3wd3bnz7tb-en.

19.  Wang Chengjin and Cesar Ducruet, “New Port Development and Global City Making,” Journal of Transport Geography, November 2012, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257425380_New_port_development_and_global_city_making_Emergence_of_the_Shanghai-Yangshan_multilayered_gateway_hub.

20.  Zhuan Ti, “Ningbo Plans for Belt and Road Construction,” China Daily, November 23, 2015.

21.  See 吴向鹏 [Wu Xiangpeng], “宁波应对 ‘一带一路’ 战略的功能定位和路径创新 [Ningbo’s Functional Position and Innovation Path for the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Strategy],” 港口经济 [Port Economy] 10 (2015): 39–41.

22.  Mahan’s The Gulf and Inland Waters antedates his best-known and most influential work, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783, testifying to the importance he placed on internal maritime geography. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1888).

23.  Mark Goh and Charlene Ling, “Logistics Development in China,” International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management (2003): 899.

24.  Stratfor, “The Geopolitics of the Yangtze River: Wuhan’s Rise,” Stratfor Analysis, April 2, 2013.

25.  Peter Rimmer and Claude Comtois, “China’s Container-Related Dynamics, 1990–2005,” GeoJournal 74, no. 1 (2009): 41–42.

26.  Business Monitor International, China Freight Transport Report, Q2 2013, p. 19.

27.  Business Monitor International, China Freight Transport Report, Q2 2015, pp. 21, 24.

28.  Jason Monios and Yuhong Wang, “Spatial and Institutional Characteristics of Inland Port Development in China,” GeoJournal 78, no. 5 (2013): 901.

29.  A. Beresford et al., “A Study of Dry Port Development in China,” Maritime Economics and Logistics (2012): 84.

30.  胡波 [Hu Bo], 2049 年的中国海上权力 [China’s Maritime Power in 2049] (Beijing: China Development Press, 2015), p. 13.

31.  Geoffrey Till, Seapower, 3rd ed., rev. (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 17.

32.  Hu Bo, China’s Maritime Power in 2049, p. 13.

33.  林宏宇 [Lin Hongyu], “当前中日关系与中国东海防空识别区 [Current Sino-Japanese Relations and China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone],” 当代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations] 1 (2014): 10.

34.  黄费连 王文华 [Huang Feilian and Wang Wenhua], “在实施海洋强国战略中维护我国国防安全 [Defending Our National Security in Implementing Maritime Great Power Strategy],” 海洋信息 [Marine Information] 3 (2016): 59.

Chapter 3. Strategic Geography of Chinese Sea Power

1.    You Ji and You Xu, “In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy’s Maritime Strategy in the 1990s,” Pacific Review 4 (1991): 140.

2.    Alexander Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications,” Naval War College Review 47 (1994): 18.

3.    Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 166.

4.    Office of Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006), p. 15.

5.    Office of Naval Intelligence, The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009), p. 5.

6.    Edward Wong, “China Navy Reaches Far, Unsettling the Region,” New York Times, June 15, 2011, p. 11.

7.    Robert D. Kaplan, “China’s Caribbean,” Washington Post, September 26, 2010, p. A25.

8.    Bernard D. Cole, “Drawing Lines at Sea,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 137 (2011): 51.

9.    Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-First Century, 2nd edition (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p. 177.

10.  Cole, “Drawing Lines at Sea,” p. 51.

11.  Yoji Koda, “Commentary: Japanese Perspectives on China’s Rise as a Naval Power,” Harvard Asia Quarterly 3 (2010): 61–63.

12.  史春林李秀英 [Shi Chunlin and Li Xiuying], “美国岛链封锁及其对我国海上安全的影响 [America’s Island Chain Blockade and Its Influence on Our Nation’s Maritime Security],” 世界 地理研究 [World Geography Research] 22, no. 2 (June 2013): 1–2;杜朝平 [Du Chaoping], “岛链对中国海军的影响有多大? [How Much Influence Does the Island Chain Have on the Chinese Navy?],” 舰载武器 [Shipborne Weapons] 5 (2004): 37.

13.  刘宏 [Liu Hong], “台湾问题的地缘政治思考 [Geopolitical Consideration of the Taiwan Problem],” 扬州教育学院学报 [Journal of Yangzhou College of Education] 21 (2003): 48.

14.  桑红 [Sang Hong], “太平洋与东亚沿海的海洋战略角逐 [The Role of the Pacific and East Asian Littorals in Maritime Strategy],” 海洋世界 [Ocean World] 9 (2008): 43.

15.  陈春根蒋思海 [Chen Chungen and Jiang Sihai], “台湾：美国亚太地缘战略的基点 [Taiwan: The Basis of U.S. Geostrategy in the Asia-Pacific Region],” 江西教育学院学报 [Journal of Jiangxi Institute of Education] 23 (2002): 24.

16.  黄迎旭 [Huang Yingxu], “美国C形包围圈对中国的威胁被夸大 [The Threat of U.S. C-shaped Encirclement to China Being Exaggerated],” 学习时报 [Xuexi Shibao], 154 (2010).

17.  刘华清 [Liu Huaqing], 刘华清军事文选 [Selected Military Writings of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Press, 2008), p. 528.

18.  Liu Huaqing, Selected Military Writings, p. 467.

19.  刘宝银杨晓梅 [Liu Baoyin and Yang Xiaomei], 环中国岛链—海洋地理,军事区位, 信息系统 [Island Chain Surrounding China—Oceanic Geography, Military Location, and Information Systems] (Beijing: Haiyang Press, 2003), p. 3.

20.  Liu and Yang, Island Chain Surrounding China, pp. 6–7.

21.  于开金李光所曹永恒 [Yu Kaijin, Li Guangsuo, and Cao Yongheng], “岛链浅析 [An Analysis of the Island Chain],” 船舶 [Ship and Boat] 5 (2006): 13.

22.  冯梁段廷志 [Feng Liang and Duan Tingzhi], “中国海洋地缘安全特征与新世纪海上安全战略 [Characteristics of China’s Oceanic Geostrategic Security and Maritime Security Strategy in the New Century],” 中国军事科学 [China Military Science] 1 (2007): 24.

23.  彭光谦 任向群 [Peng Guangqian and Ren Xiangqun], “安全形 势: 我们的现况如何? [Security Situation: What Is the Current Status?],” 环球军事 [Global Military] 1 (2002): 8.

24. 王传友 [Wang Chuanyou], 海防安全论 [On Coastal Defense Security] (Beijing: Haiyang Press, 2007), p. 223.

25.  林宏宇 [Lin Hongyu], “当前中日关系与中国东海防空识别区 [Current Sino-Japanese Relations and China’s East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone],” 当代国际关系 [Contemporary International Relations] 1 (2014): 10.

26.  胡波 [Hu Bo], “论中国的重要海洋利益 [On China’s Important Maritime Interests],” 亚太安全与海洋研究 [Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Research] 3 (2015): 22.

27.  Hu Bo, “On China’s Important Maritime Interests,” p. 18.

28.  Shi and Li, “America’s Island Chain Blockade,” p. 22.

29.  Shi and Li, “America’s Island Chain Blockade,” p. 22.

30.  Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2005), p. 443.

31.  Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Destiny, trans. Wang Chung-Hui, intro. Lin Yutang (New York: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 9–10.

32.  寿晓松 [Shou Xiaosong], ed.战略学 [The Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p. 80.

33.  王伟 [Wang Wei], 地缘政治与中国国家安全 [Geopolitics and China’s National Security] (Beijing: Junshi Yiwen Press, 2009), p. 150.

34.  王春永吕雪 [Wang Chunyong and Lu Xue], “台湾问题的地缘战略分析 [A Geostrategic Analysis of the Taiwan Question],” 解放军外国语学院学报 [Journal of PLA University of Foreign Languages] 23 (2000): 114–15.

35.  张仕荣 [Zhang Shirong], “台湾问题是21世纪初中国国家安全的核心内容 [The Taiwan Question Is the Core Content of China’s National Security in the Early 21st Century],” 中共银川市委党校学报 [Journal of Yinchuan Municipal Party College] 39 (2006): 37.

36.  Liu and Yang, Island Chain Surrounding China, p. 52.

37.  李杰 [Li Jie], “捆绑中国的’岛链’ [The ‘Island Chain’ That Ties Up China],” 现代舰船 [Modern Ships] 7 (2001): 37.

38.  朱听昌 [Zhu Tingchang], “论台湾的地缘战略地位 [On the Geostrategic Status of Taiwan],” 世界经济与政治论坛 [Forum of World Economics and Politics] 3 (2001): 67.

39. Shi and Li, “America’s Island Chain Blockade,” p. 5.

40.  Shi and Li, “America’s Island Chain Blockade,” p. 5.

41.  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 216.

42.  张松峰 [Zhang Songfeng], “地缘视角看中国和平崛起过程中的中日关系 [Sino-Japanese Relations in the Process of China’s Peaceful Rise from a Geopolitical Viewpoint],” 现代经济信息 [Modern Economic Information] 23 (2009): 215.

43.  Liu and Yang, Island Chain Surrounding China, p. 17.

44.  Liu and Yang, Island Chain Surrounding China, p. 17.

45.  段廷志冯梁 [Duan Tingzhi and Feng Liang], “日本海洋安全战略:历史演变与现实影响 [Japan’s Oceanic Security Strategy: Historical Evolution and Actual Influence],” 世界经济与政治论坛 [Forum of World Economics and Politics] 1 (2011): 78.

46.  “中国的出海口问题还没有彻底解决 [China’s Sea Exit Problem Has Not Been Completely Resolved],” 水路运输文摘 [Water Transportation Digest] 11 (2004): 27.

47.  张小稳 [Zhang Xiaowen], “近期美国升高西太平洋紧张局势的战略意图及其影响 [The Strategic Intentions behind and Influence of Recent Heightening Tensions in the Western Pacific by the United States],” 东北亚论坛 [Northeast Asia Forum] 1 (2011): 55.

48.  郭亚东 [Guo Yadong], “中国应抵制威胁论噪音坚持打造深蓝海军 [China Must Resist the Noise of Threat Theory; Insist on Forging Blue-Water Navy],” 环球时报 [Huanqiu Shibao], May 5, 2010.

49.  沈伟烈 [Shen Weilie], “琉球岛链大国战略 [Ryukyu, Island Chain, Great Power Strategy],” 领导文萃 [Lingdao Wencui] 5 (2006): 63.

50.  砺志 [Li Zhi], “日,韩航空兵海上作战应用及对中国的影响 [Japanese and South Korean Aviation Units: Application to Naval Operations and Influence on China],” 舰载武器 [Shipborne Weapons] 12 (2007): 50.

51.  高卉 [Gao Hui], “日本驻军与那国岛与中国海洋安全 [Japan’s Military Deployment at Yonaguni Island and China’s Maritime Security],” 舰船知识 [Naval and Merchant Ships] 9 (2009): 26–29.

52.  Banyan [pseud.], “A Shrimp among Whales,” The Economist, October 27, 2016, https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21709317-threat-north-grows-south-korea-finds-itself-lonely-place-shrimp-among-whales.

53.  Henry Gottlieb, “Navy Report Concerns Reagan—Soviet Ships Called Threat to Vital Sea Lanes,” Associated Press, February 17, 1986. The sixteen straits included: Gulf of Alaska; Korea Strait; Straits of Makassar, Sunda, and Malacca; Bab el Mandeb; Suez Canal; Gibraltar; Skagerrak; Kattegat; Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap; Strait of Magellan; Strait of Good Hope; Strait of Hormuz; Panama Canal; and Florida Strait.

54.  郭锐李晓倩 [Guo Rui and Li Qiaoqian], “朝鲜半岛与中国的地缘战略选择 [The Korean Peninsula and China’s Geostrategic Choices],” 朝鲜历史研究 [Korea History Research] 14 (2013): 364.

55.  史春林李秀英 [Shi Chunlin and Li Xiuying], “朝鲜海峡安全问题与中国的战略对策 [The Security Problem of the Korea Strait and China’s Strategic Countermeasures],” 东疆学刊 [Dongjiang Journal] 31, no. 4 (October 2014): 58.

56.  刘霏郭真郑芳 [Liu Fei, Guo Zhen, and Zheng Fang], “美国亚太再平衡战略与黄海争端 [U.S. Asia-Pacific Rebalance Strategy and the Yellow Sea Disputes],” 社科纵横 [Social Sciences Review] 31, no. 2 (February 2016): 82.

57.  李杰 [Li Jie], “台湾岛及周边海区的地理与气候 [Taiwan Island and the Geography and the Climate in the Surrounding Seas],” 现代军事 [Contemporary Military] 5 (2006): 70.

58.  Liu and Yang, Island Chain Surrounding China, p. 96.

59.  迎南 [Ying Nan], “台湾海区水文环境及其对海上行动影响 [The Oceanographic Environment of Taiwan’s Sea Areas and Its Influence on Maritime Operations],” 现代军事 [Contemporary Military] 7 (2006): 69–70.

60.  杜鹏程胡成军 [Du Pengcheng and Hu Chengjun], “台湾岛以东黑潮与潜艇作战 [Kuroshio East of Taiwan Island and Submarine Warfare],” 四川兵工学报 [Journal of Sichuan Ordnance] 31 (2010): 80.

61.  俞风流 [Yu Fengliu], “进出太平洋的最佳海上要道—巴士海峡 [The Best Sea Lane in and out of the Pacific: Strait of Luzon],” 当代海军 [Modern Navy] 5 (2007): 20.

62.  Alan K. Henrikson, “The Map as an ‘Idea’: The Role of Cartographic Imagery during the Second World War,” American Cartographer 2, no. 1 (1975): 19–53.

Chapter 4. China’s Strategic Will to the Sea

1.    Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War (1929; reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp. xxvii, 96–100.

2.    Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 75; Sun Tzu, The Illustrated Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (1963; reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 91; Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890; reprint, Boston: Little, Brown, 1905), pp. 58–81.

3.    “权威解读国民海洋意识指数报告 [Top Expert Explains Report on Public Maritime Consciousness Index],” 海洋世界 [Ocean World] no. 12 (2016): 31–32.

4.    赵宗金 [Zhao Zongjin], “海洋意识是何种意识？ [What Kind of Consciousness Is Maritime Consciousness?],” 中国海洋大学学报 [Journal of Ocean University of China], no. 4 (2016): 62.

5.    For an excellent survey of authoritative sources on Chinese maritime strategy, see Ryan D. Martinson, “Panning for Gold: Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from Primary Sources,” Naval War College Review 69, no. 3 (summer 2016): 23–44.

6.    黄胜天魏慈航朱晓辉 [Huang Shengtian, Wei Cihang, and Zhu Xiaohui], “东海军区海军的创建 [The Founding of the East China Navy],” 军事历史研究 [Military Historical Research]30, no. 1 (January 2016): 116.

7.    吴殿卿 [Wu Dianqing], 蓝色档案—新中国海军大事纪实 [Blue Files—Documentary of Events of the New China’s Navy] (Taiyuan, Shanxi: Shanxi People’s Press, 2015), pp. 26–27.

8. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 5 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1966), pp. 15–18.

9.    韩文琦 [Han Wenqi], “论新中国海军发展战略之演化 [On the Evolution of New China’s Naval Development Strategy],” 西安政治学院学报 [Journal of Xian Politics Institute] 12, no. 3 (June 1999): 67.

10.  陆儒德 [Lu Rude], 江海客毛泽东 [Maritime Advocate, Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2009), p. 223.

11.  温勇 [Wen Yong], “应对新挑战解决新问题—论党的海洋海防海军建设思想 [Facing New Challenges, Solving New Problem—On the Party’s Maritime, Coastal Defense, and Naval Development Thought],” 毛泽东邓小平理论研究 [Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theory Research], no. 6 (2013): 36.

12.  杜一平 [Du Yiping], “党的三代领导核心海军建设思想的历史考察 [A Historical Survey of the Party’s Third Generation Core Leadership Thoughts on Naval Development],” 军事历史 [Military History], no. 4 (2001): 9.

13.  石家铸崔常发 [Shi Jiazhu and Cui Changfa], “60年人民海军建设指导思想的丰富和发展 [60 Years of Enriching and Developing the Guiding Thought on the People’s Navy’s Construction],” 军事历史 [Military History], no. 3 (2009): 23–24. The authors are from the Dalian Naval Academy.

14.  彰克慧 [Zhang Kehui], “邓小平时代中国的海洋战略 [China’s Maritime Strategy during the Deng Xiaoping Era],” 江汉论坛 [Hanjiang Tribune], no. 10 (2015): 61.

15.  高新生 马敬增 董春林 [Gao Xinsheng, Ma Jingzeng, and Dong Chunlin], “论邓小平新时期中国海防建设思想 [On Deng Xiaoping’s Thought on China’s Coastal Defense Construction in the New Era],” 国防 [National Defense], no. 8 (2005): 57. The authors are from the Shenyang Artillery Academy.

16.  陈美惠苏小东 [Chen Meihui and Su Xiaodong], “论邓小 平海军建设思想 [On Deng Xiaoping Thought on Naval Construction],” 军事历史研究 [Military Historical Research], no. 3 (2012): 128.

17.  Chen and Su, “On Deng Xiaoping Thought on Naval Construction,” p. 128.

18. 刘中民薄国旗 [Liu Zhongmin and Bo Guoqi], “试论邓小平的海洋政治战略思想 [On Deng Xiaoping’s Thought on Maritime Political Strategy],” 中国海洋大学学报 [Journal of Ocean University of China] 5 (2005): 13.

19.  宋联江 吴迪明 孟蒙 [Song Lianjiang, Wu Diming, and Meng Meng], “论邓小平建设强大海傘思想 [On Deng Xiaoping’s Thought on Building a Powerful Navy],” 中国军事科学 [China Military Science], no. 5 (2014): 54.

20.  Song, Wu, and Meng, “On Deng Xiaoping’s Thought on Building a Powerful Navy,” p. 54.

21.  Liu and Bo, “On Deng Xiaoping’s Thought on Maritime Political Strategy,” p. 15.

22.  Liu and Bo, “On Deng Xiaoping’s Thought on Maritime Political Strategy,” p. 15.

23.  Han, “On the Evolution of New China’s Naval Development Strategy,” p. 69.

24.  刘杰林世华 [Liu Jie and Lin Shihua], “新中国60年人民海军发展战略的演进与启示 [The Evolution and Lessons of the People’s Navy’s Development Strategy over 60 Years for New China],” 军事历史研究 [Military Historical Research], no. 3 (2009): 17.

25.  Liu and Lin, “The Evolution and Lessons of the People’s Navy’s Development Strategy over 60 Years for New China,” pp. 16–17.

26.  Han, “On the Evolution of New China’s Naval Development Strategy,” p. 69.

27.  Shi and Cui, “60 Years of Enriching and Developing the Guiding Thought on the People’s Navy’s Construction,” p. 24.

28.  Liu and Lin, “The Evolution and Lessons of the People’s Navy’s Development Strategy over 60 Years for New China,” p. 17.

29.  杨怀庆 [Yang Huaiqing], “新时期指导人民海军建设的强大思想武器 [Powerful Theoretical Weapon Guiding the People’s Navy’s Construction in the New Era],” 求是 [Qiushi], no. 15 (2000): 15.

30.  See胡锦涛 [Hu Jintao], “认清新世纪新阶段我军历史使命 [See Clearly Our Military’s Historic Missions for the New Stage in the New Century],” December 24, 2004. Speech was posted on Jiangxi National Defense Education website (江西国防教育网) on April 16, 2010: http://gfjy.jxnews.com.cn/system/2010/04/16/011353408.shtml.

31.  Hu, “See Clearly Our Military’s Historic Missions for the New Stage in the New Century.”

32.  Hu, “See Clearly Our Military’s Historic Missions for the New Stage in the New Century.”

33.  李兵朱俊 [Li Bing and Zhu Jun], “浅析新中国海军战略思想的发展演变 [On the Evolution of New China’s Naval Strategic Thought],” 军事历史 [Military History], no. 6 (2010): 40.

34.  Shi and Cui, “60 Years of Enriching and Developing the Guiding Thought on the People’s Navy’s Construction,” p. 25.

35.  Liu and Lin, “The Evolution and Lessons of the People’s Navy’s Development Strategy over 60 Years for New China,” p. 17.

36.  Shi and Cui, “60 Years of Enriching and Developing the Guiding Thought on the People’s Navy’s Construction,” p. 26.

37.  Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress, Xinhua, November 19, 2012: http://en.people.cn/90785/8024777.html.

38.  Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress, Xinhua, November 19, 2012.

39.  “Xi Jinping: We Must Advance Our Concern for, Understanding of, and Strategic Management of the Ocean,” Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, July 31, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-07/31/content_2459009.htm.

40.  “Xi Jinping: We Must Advance Our Concern for, Understanding of, and Strategic Management of the Ocean.”

41.  “Xi Jinping: We Must Advance Our Concern for, Understanding of, and Strategic Management of the Ocean.”

42.  “Xi Jinping: We Must Advance Our Concern for, Understanding of, and Strategic Management of the Ocean.”

43.  “Xi Jinping: We Must Advance Our Concern for, Understanding of, and Strategic Management of the Ocean.”

44.  王士彬陈国全 [Wang Shibin and Chen Guoquan], “习近平视察海军机关并发表重要讲话 [Xi Jinping Inspects Navy Ministry and Delivers Important Speech],” China Ministry of Defense website, May 24, 2017, http://www.mod.gov.cn/leaders/2017-05/24/content_4781391.htm.

45.  “Xi Jinping Inspects Navy Ministry and Delivers Important Speech.”

46.  “Xi Jinping Inspects Navy Ministry and Delivers Important Speech.”

47.  Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017, China Daily website, http://www.chinadaily.com.cnchina/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm.

48.  Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society.”

49.  Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society.”

50.  The PLAN commanders and their terms of office include: Admiral Zhang Aiping (1949–50), Admiral Xiao Jinguang (1950–80), Admiral Ye Fei (1980–82), Admiral Liu Huaqing (1982–88), Admiral Zhang Lianzhong (1988–96), Admiral Shi Yunsheng (1996–2003), Admiral Zhang Dingfa (2003–6), Admiral Wu Shengli (2006–17), and Admiral Shen Jinlong (2017–present).

51.  海军司令部 [Navy Headquarters], 中国海军军人手册 [Handbook for Officers and Enlisted of the Chinese PLA Navy] (Beijing: Haichao Press, 2012), pp. 7–11.

52.  刘杰闫巍冯婧 [Liu Jie, Yan Wei, and Feng Jing], “党的海军建设指导理论发展的历史回顾与思考 [Historical Review and Thoughts on the Party’s Navy’s Construction Guidance and Theoretical Development],” 军事历史研究 [Military Historical Research], no. 1 (2011): 3.

53.  萧劲光 [Xiao Jinguang], 萧劲光回忆录 [Memoirs of Xiao Jinguang] (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 2013), p. 287.

54.  中国海军百科全书编审委员会 [Editorial Board of the Chinese Navy Encyclopedia], 中国海军百科全书 [Chinese Navy Encyclopedia] (Beijing: Haichao Press, 1999) [hereafter Chinese Navy Encyclopedia], p. 731.

55.  Zhou, “On the Operational Thought of the People’s Navy,” p. 24.

56.  Xiao, Jinguang, Memoirs of Xiao Jinguang, p. 231.

57.  Xiao, Memoirs of Xiao Jinguang, p. 227.

58.  Xiao, Memoirs of Xiao Jinguang, p. 227.

59.  刘华清 [Liu Huaqing], 刘华清回忆录 [Memoirs of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 2004), pp. 350–59.

60.  师小芹 [Shi Xiaoqin], “小型舰艇的历史定位与中国式均衡海军 [The Historical Position of Small Ships and Boats and the Balanced Navy with Chinese Characteristics],” 军事历史 [Military History], no. 1 (2011): 39.

61.  For an early assessment of Liu’s contributions, see You Ji, The Evolution of China’s Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models: 1949–2001, Working Paper Series (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, May 2002), pp. 1–35.

62.  Chinese Navy Encyclopedia, p. 1154.

63.  Liu, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing, p. 434.

64.  中国人民解放军军事科学院 [PLA Academy of Military Science], 中国人民解放军军语 [PLA Military Terms] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1997), p. 440.

65.  Liu, Memoirs of Liu Huaqing, p. 438.

66.  Andrew S. Erickson and Kenneth Allen, “China’s Navy Gets a New Helmsman (Part 2): Remaining Uncertainties,” China Brief 17, no. 4 (March 14, 2017), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-navy-gets-new-helmsman-part-2-remaining-uncertainties/.

67.  吴胜利胡彦林 [Wu Shengli and Hu Yanlin], “锻造适应我军历史使命要求的强大人民海军 [Building a Powerful People’s Navy That Meets the Requirements of the Historical Mission for Our Military],” 求是 [Qiushi], no. 14 (July 2007), http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2007/200714/200907/t20090707_6624.htm.

68.  Wu and Hu, “Building a Powerful People’s Navy That Meets the Requirements of the Historical Mission for Our Military.”

69.  Wu and Hu, “Building a Powerful People’s Navy That Meets the Requirements of the Historical Mission for Our Military.”

70. Wu and Hu, “Building a Powerful People’s Navy That Meets the Requirements of the Historical Mission for Our Military.”

71.  Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 25–89.

72.  吴胜利刘晓江 [Wu Shengli and Liu Xiaojiang], “建设一支与履行新世纪新阶段我军历史使命要求相适应的强大的人民海军 [Building a Powerful People’s Navy Adapted to Requirements of Honoring the New Historic Missions of the Chinese Military in the New Stage of the New Century],” [Qiushi], no. 9 (May 2009), http://www.qstheory.cn/zxdk/2007/200714/200907/t20090707_6624.htmhttp://theory.people.com.cn/GB/136458/9227863.html.

73.  陈万军吴登峰 [Chen Wanjun and Wu Dengfeng], “人民海军60年:走向深蓝—专访中国人民解放军海军司令吴胜利上将 [60th Anniversary of the PLA Navy: Sailing into the Deep Blue—Exclusive Interview with Admiral Wu Shengli, Commander of the Chinese PLA Navy],” 瞭望东方周刊 [Oriental Outlook], no. 17 (April 23, 2009): 38.

74.  “中国海军, 迈向科学发展新航程—中央军委委员, 海军 司令员吴胜利谈录 [Chinese Navy, toward a New Journey of Scientific Development—A Talk with Central Military Commission Member and Commander of the Chinese Navy Wu Shengli],” 环球军事 [Global Military], no. 9 (2009): 9.

75.  杨民青 [Yang Minqing], “人民海军战略历史转变 [The Historic Shift in the People’s Navy’s Strategy],” 瞭望 [Liaowang], no. 16 (April 20, 2009): 37.

76.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2004, December 2004, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm.

77.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2006, December 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194421.htm.

78.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2008, January 20, 2009, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm.

79. State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in 2010, March 2011, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/09/09/content_281474986284525.htm.

80.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, April 2013, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474982986506.htm.

81.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, April 2013.

82.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, April 2013.

83.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy, May 2015, http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm.

84.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy, May 2015.

85.  State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy, May 2015.

Chapter 5. Fleet Building with Chinese Characteristics

1.    U.S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Office of the Commandant, The National Fleet Plan, August 2015, U.S. Navy website, http://www.navy.mil/strategic/Fleet_Plan_Final.pdf.

2.    See Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, eds., China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009).

3.    For a fuller review of these cases, see James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Hardly the First Time,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 139, no. 4 (April 2013), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2013-04/hardly-first-time.

4. Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War, intro. Holger H. Herwig (1929; reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 11.

5.    Paul M. Kennedy, “The Development of German Naval Operations Plans against England, 1896–1914,” in Paul M. Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880–1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1979), p. 171.

6.    Paul G. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), p. 2.

7.    Holger H. Herwig, “Luxury” Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888–1918 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980), pp. 95–110; James R. Holmes, “Mahan, a ‘Place in the Sun,’ and Germany’s Quest for Sea Power,” Comparative Strategy 23 (2004): 27–61.

8.    V. R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), pp. 25–42.

9.    Alfred von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, vol. 1 (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1919), pp. 142–65.

10.  Tirpitz, My Memoirs, vol. 1, pp. 170–77.

11.  Herwig, “Introduction,” in Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, p. xviii.

12.  Holger H. Herwig, “Imperial Germany: Continental Titan, Global Aspirant,” in Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, eds., China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), pp. 172–74.

13.  Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907,” in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914, vol. 3: The Testing of the Entente, 1904–6 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1927), pp. 402–17.

14.  Paul M. Kennedy, “Tirpitz, England and the Second Navy Law of 1900,” Militärgeschichtlische Mitteilungen 8 (1970): 38.

15.  Herwig, “Introduction,” in Wegener, Naval Strategy of the World War, p. xviii.

16. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration, or, the Place of Force in the International Relations of States (New York: Harper, 1912), p. 57.

17.  Theodore Ropp, “Continental Doctrines of Sea Power,” in Edward Meade Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943), pp. 446–56.

18.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (1897; reprint, Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), p. 198.

19.  Tirpitz, My Memoirs, pp. 57–62.

20.  Holger H. Herwig, “The Influence of A. T. Mahan upon German Sea Power,” in John B. Hattendorf, ed., The Influence of History on Mahan (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991), pp. 72–73.

21.  See David G. Muller, China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), pp. 44–56, 111–16.

22.  Ting Yu, “Complete Remake or ‘Old Medicine in New Bottle’? A Brief Discussion of the Role and Application of the Type 022 Stealth Missile Boat,” Xiandai Bingqi [Modern Weaponry], September 2, 2008, pp. 35–43.

23.  Roger Cliff et al., Entering the Dragon’s Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and Their Implications for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), p. 11.

24.  Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, p. 15, U.S. Naval Institute website, https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Print.pdf#viewer.action=download.

25.  U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017, p. 24, U.S. Naval Institute website, https://news.usni.org/2017/06/07/pentagon-report-congress-chinese-military-development.

26.  Michael McDevitt, “Becoming a Great ‘Maritime Power’: A Chinese Dream” (Washington, DC: Center for Naval Analyses, June 2016), p. v.

27. Chi Mo, “Perspective of China’s Formidable Weapons for Attacking Taiwan,” Sing Tao Jih Pao, May 6, 2004, FBIS-CPP20040506000084.

28.  “China Launches New Class of Naval Destroyer,” Reuters, June 28, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-defense-destroyer-idUSKBN19J0GX.

29.  For the commissioning years of these hulls, see Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2017).

30.  “RIM-174 SM-6 Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM),” GlobalSecurity.org, June 12, 2017, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sm-6.htm.

31.  Huang Panyue, “China’s New Type 055 Missile Destroyer to Upgrade Reaction Capability of Weapons, Improve Country’s Navy: Expert,” Global Times, October 10, 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-10/10/content_7780454.htm.

32.  “LRASM Missiles: Reaching for a Long-Range Punch,” Defense Industry Daily, December 15, 2017, https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/lrasm-missiles-reaching-for-a-long-reach-punch-06752/.

33.  Sam LaGrone, “WEST: U.S. Navy Anti-ship Tomahawk Set for Surface Ships, Subs Starting in 2021,” USNI News, February 18, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/02/18/west-u-s-navy-antiship-tomahawk-set-for-surface-ships-subs-starting-in-2021.

34.  Figures as of February 5, 2018. For updates see Naval Vessel Register, http://www.nvr.navy.mil/NVRSHIPS/FLEETSIZE.HTML.

35.  Ronald O’Rourke, Naval Force-Structure Planning: Breaking Old Habits of Thought (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 19, 1993).

36.  Ronald O’Rourke, Naval Force Structure and the Size of the Navy (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 13, 1992).

37.  Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, Notes Verbales CML/17/2009 and CML/18/2009, May 7, 2009, UN website, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf.

38.  The term comes from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “Part V: Exclusive Economic Zone,” UN website, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm.

39.  John Pomfret, “Beijing Claims ‘Indisputable Sovereignty’ over South China Sea,” Washington Post, July 31, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/AR2010073005664.html.

40.  James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Small-Stick Diplomacy in the South China Sea,” National Interest, April 23, 2012, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/small-stick-diplomacy-the-south-china-sea-6831.

41.  任兴平冯水利罗宪芬刘景鸿 [He Zhonglong, Ren Xingping, Feng Shuili, Luo Xianfen, and Liu Jinghong], 中国海岸警卫 队组建 研究 [Research on the Building of the Chinese Coast Guard] (Beijing: Ocean Press, 2007). For much more on China’s coast guard, see Lyle J. Goldstein, Five Dragons Stirring Up the Sea: Challenge and Opportunity in China’s Improving Maritime Enforcement Capabilities, China Maritime Study no. 5 (Newport, RI: Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, April 2010), http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/5/.

42.  Ryan D. Martinson, “From Words to Actions: The Creation of the China Coast Guard,” paper presented at “China as a ‘Maritime Power’ Conference,” Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA, July 28–29, 2015.

43.  Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “Countering China’s Third Sea Force: Unmask Maritime Militia before They’re Used Again,” National Interest, July 6, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/countering-chinas-third-sea-force-unmask-maritime-militia-16860.

44.  John Pomfret, “U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone with China,” Washington Post, July 30, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html.

45. “The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China),” Permanent Court of Arbitration website, http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7.

46.  “PRC SOA Commentary Calls for Strengthening Maritime Sovereignty Protection,” Beijing Zhongguo Haiyang Bao Online, May 8, 2013.

47.  “PRC Commentator Suggests ‘Cabbage’ Strategy on the Second Thomas Shoal,” Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, May 30, 2013, OSC-CPP20130620671001.

48.  “PRC Commentator Suggests ‘Cabbage’ Strategy,” May 30, 2013.

49.  Helmuth von Moltke, in Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993), pp. 68–69.

50.  Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911; reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 73.

51.  Jeff Himmelman, “A Game of Shark and Minnow,” New York Times Magazine, October 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/.

Chapter 6. Fleet Tactics with Chinese Characteristics

1.    Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), pp. 24–26.

2.    See, for instance, J. Noel Williams and James S. O’Brasky, “A Naval Operational Architecture for Global Tactical Operations,” in Sam J. Tangredi, Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_2002/Globalization_and_Maritime_Power_Dec_02/29_ch28.htm.

3.    Mahan had in mind the U.S. Navy’s ability to impose command on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, astride the approaches to the isthmian canal, despite its overall inferiority to European navies. His most exhaustive geopolitical analysis of these waters is in two essays: “The Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean” (Harper’s, 1887) and “The Isthmus and Sea Power” (The Atlantic, 1893).

4. “Document: China’s Military Strategy,” USNI News, May 26, 2015, https://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy#SGA.

5.    James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Navy: A Turn to Corbett?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 12 (December 2010), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2010-12/chinas-navy-turn-corbett.

6.    Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911; reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 310–11.

7.    Martin Andrew, “The Dragon Breathes Fire: Chinese Power Projection,” China Brief 5, no. 16 (July 19, 2005): 5–8.

8.    “China’s Second Aircraft Carrier to Hold First Sea Trials: Expert,” Global Times, January 9, 2018.

9.    Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston: Little, Brown, 1908), pp. 155–56.

10.  Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China’s Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005).

11.  James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “The Influence of Mahan upon China’s Maritime Strategy,” Comparative Strategy 24, no. 1 (2005): 53–71; Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28, no. 4 (spring 2004): 162–94.

12.  Of the Japanese invasion of China, Mao wrote, “Japan, though strong, does not have enough soldiers. China, though weak, has a vast territory, a large population and plenty of soldiers.” Even if strong enemy forces seized key urban areas and communication nodes, China would retain “a general rear and vital bases from which to carry on the protracted war to final victory.” Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War against Japan,” in Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 158.

13.  Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 220, 234.

14.  Wayne P. Hughes Jr., Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018). This work is a revised version of Hughes’ Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986) and Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000). We draw on all three editions.

15.  Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd ed., p. 266.

16.  Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 3rd ed., pp. 262–93.

17.  Chester W. Richards, “A Swift, Elusive Sword: What If Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review?” presentation at Boyd Conference, Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, fall 2001, Defense and the National Interest website, http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/strategy-and-force-employment/boyd-and-military-strategy/.

18.  Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War,” in Mao, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, pp. 113–31.

19.  Ni Lexiong, “Sea Power and China’s Development,” Liberation Daily, April 17, 2005, p. 5, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/translated_articles/2005/05_07_18_Sea_Power_and_Chinas_Development.pdf.

20.  Sun Tzu, The Illustrated Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (1963; reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 125.

21.  Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambhala Pocket Classics, 1991), http://web.mit.edu/~dcltdw/AOW/5.html.

22.  Samuel B. Griffith, “Introduction,” in Sun Tzu, Illustrated Art of War, pp. 17–30.

23.  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 605.

24.  Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, no. 1 (summer 2003): 5–46.

25.  Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy, 3rd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 252.

26.  Brodie, Guide to Naval Strategy, p. 252.

27. Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 3rd ed., pp. 262–93.

28.  Mahan deplored “fortress-fleets,” fleets that operated purely in support of land fortifications (and within range of land-based fire support). Writing today, however, he might amend his analysis. The reach of shore-based weaponry would allow a fortress fleet to roam far more widely than in Mahan’s day, diminishing the distinction between an independent fleet and one dependent on land-based fire support. Russian commanders’ reluctance to challenge Admiral Heihachiro Togo’s IJN too far from Port Arthur sparked Mahan’s ire, but a PLA Navy backed up by ASBMs able to strike at enemy warships 2,500 kilometers away would be a far different creature. Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia,” in Naval Administration and Warfare (Boston: Little, Brown, 1918), pp. 133–73.

29.  Clausewitz, On War, p. 528. See also James R. Holmes, “Roosevelt’s Pursuit of a Temperate Caribbean Policy,” Naval History 20, no. 4 (August 2006): 48–53, which describes Theodore Roosevelt’s attempt to mount a contested zone in the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico.

30.  Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd ed. (reprint; London: Frank Cass, 2004), esp. pp. 119–34.

31.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies,” National Review, July 1902, p. 706.

32.  Mahan saw “capital ships” as the embodiment of offensive strategy: “The backbone and real power of any navy are the vessels which, by due proportion of defensive and offensive powers, are capable of taking and giving hard knocks.” Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown, 1919), p. 198.

33.  Richard W. Turk, The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 1–6, 101–7.

34.  W. S. Sims, “The Inherent Qualities of All-Big-Gun, One-Caliber Battleships of High Speed, Large Displacement, and Gun Power,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1906): 1337–66; Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, pp. 69–70.

35.  Richard A. Hough, Dreadnought: A History of the Modern Battleship (New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 34–37.

36.  Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (summer 1994): 9–18; Jun Zhan, “China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Sea Power Mentality, and the South China Sea,” Journal of Strategic Studies 17, no. 3 (September 1994): 180–208.

37.  Mao, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” pp. 207, 224.

38.  Mao was no doctrinaire on operational matters. The offensive mindset “does not mean … that when we are already locked in battle with an enemy who enjoys superiority, we revolutionaries should not adopt defensive measures even when we are hard pressed. Only a prize idiot would think in this way.” Mao, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” p. 208.

39.  References to U.S. “encirclement” and “containment” are ubiquitous in the Chinese press. See for example Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “Hu’s Central Asian Gamble to Counter the U.S. ‘Containment Strategy,’” China Brief 5, no. 15 (July 5, 2005): 7–8; Mao, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” pp. 205–49.

40.  Such an approach represents a matter of course for Chinese strategists. See, for instance, Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2005), pp. 459–61.

41.  Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” December 1936, in Selected Writings of Mao Tse-tung, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm.

42.  Stefan Halper, ed., China: The Three Warfares (Washington, DC: Office of Net Assessment, May 2013).

43.  Quoted in Saturday Evening Post, March 27, 1954.

44. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 165–68; Jeffrey B. Goldman, “China’s Mahan,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (March 1996): 44–47; Jun, “China Goes to the Blue Waters,” pp. 189–91; Huang, “China’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy,” p. 18.

45.  Author discussion with Dr. Alan Wachman, Newport, RI, September 19, 2006. Chinese commentators sometimes append the reference to a sub tender. Bi Lei, “Sending an Additional Aircraft Carrier and Stationing Massive Forces: The US Military’s Adjustment of Its Strategic Disposition in the Asia-Pacific Region,” People’s Daily Online, August 24, 2004, FBIS-CPP20040823000025. Bi contends that Taiwan constitutes the hub of a latter-day U.S. “containment strategy” vis-à-vis the People’s Republic. According to this view, the “main measures” Washington uses to contain China include “continuing to uphold and tighten up the first island chain with the Japanese archipelago, South Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, the Taiwan-Penchu archipelago, and the Philippine archipelago as the core,” attempting to “return to southeast Asia” by courting ASEAN countries, building theater missile defenses in the region, and prepositioning a range of military hardware in the region.

46.  Quoted in Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in World War II (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1963), p. 476.

47.  Bruce Elleman, “A Comparative Historical Approach to Blockade Strategies: Implications for China,” in Gabriel B. Collins, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and William S. Murray, eds., China’s Energy Strategy: The Impact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), pp. 365–86.

48.  Some 80 percent of China’s oil imports, accounting for 40 percent of total Chinese oil consumption, passes through the strait, giving rise to the “Malacca dilemma.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2005 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2005), p. 33. On China’s demand for petroleum, see David Hale, “China’s Growing Appetites,” National Interest 76 (summer 2004): 137–47.

49.  You Ji, “Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort to Protect Its Energy Supply,” Strategic Analysis 31, no. 3 (May 2007): 467–90.

50.  Xu Zhiliang, “Clearly Delineate PRC Territorial Waters in Map Making,” Nanfang Ribao, April 26, 2001, FBIS-CPP20010 427000033.

51.  “Secret Sanya—China’s New Nuclear Naval Base Revealed,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 21, 2008, http://www.janes.com/news/security/jir/jir080421_1_n.shtml.

52.  Gurpreet Khurana, “New ‘Revelations’ on China’s Nuclear Submarine Base at Hainan: Must India Be Anxious?” South Asia Defense & Strategic Review 2, no. 4 (July–August 2008): 28–29.

53.  Author discussions with U.S. scholars, Newport, RI, September 2008.

54.  James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s ‘Caribbean’ in the South China Sea,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2006): 79–92. Robert Kaplan makes a similar point about the Caribbean in Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Penguin Random House, 2015).

55.  Writes Mao, “A battle in which the enemy is routed is not basically decisive in a contest with a foe of great strength. A battle of annihilation, on the other hand, produces a great and immediate impact on any enemy. Injuring all of a man’s ten fingers is not as effective as chopping off one, and routing ten enemy divisions is not as effective as annihilating one of them.” Mao Zedong, “Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War,” December 1936, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_12.htm.

56.  “Hangzhou Type 956 Sovremennyy,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/haizhou.htm.

57.  Wendell Minnick, “RAND Study Suggests U.S. Loses War with China,” Defense News, October 16, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3774348&c=ASI&s=AIR.

58. Michael Pilger, “China’s New YJ-18 Anti-ship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 28, 2015, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%E2%80%99s%20New%20YJ-18%20Anti-ship%20Cruise%20Missile.pdf.

59.  Amy Chang, “Indigenous Weapons Development in China’s Military Modernization,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 5, 2012, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China-Indigenous-Military-Developments-Final-Draft-03-April2012.pdf.

60.  “DF-26 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile,” GlobalSecurity.org, December 4, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/china/df-26.htm.

61.  Ted Parsons, “China Develops Anti-ship Missile,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 18, 2006, http://www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/jdw/jdw060118_1_n.shtml; Wendell Minnick, “China Developing Anti-ship Ballistic Missiles,” Defense News, January 14, 2008, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3307277.

62.  “J-20—Chinese Stealth Fighter,” GlobalSecurity.org, November 30, 2014, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/j-20-specs.htm.

63.  U.S. Defense Department, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017, Department of Defense website, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF?ver=2017-06-06-141328-770.

64.  For more on the Chinese undersea fleet, see Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, William S. Murray, and Andrew R. Wilson, China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), esp. pp. 59–76, 359–72.

65.  Andrew Hind, “The Cruise Missile Comes of Age,” Naval History 22, no. 5 (October 2008): 52–57; Ramit Plushnick-Masti, “Israel: Iran Aided Hezbollah Ship Attack,” CBS News, July 15, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07/15/ap/world/mainD8ISKVT80.shtml.

66. Zhang Wenmu, “China’s Energy Security and Policy Choices,” Shijie Jingji Yu Zhengzhi 5 (May 14, 2003): 11–16, FBIS-CPP20030528000169. See also Zhang Wenmu, “Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices,” China Security (summer 2006):17–31.

67.  Sam LaGrone, “SECDEF Carter Confirms Navy Developing Supersonic Anti-ship Missile for Cruisers, Destroyers,” USNI News, February 4, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/02/04/secdef-carter-confirms-navy-developing-supersonic-anti-ship-missile-for-cruisers-destroyers; “LRASM Missiles: Reaching for a Long-Range Punch,” Defense Industry Daily, April 5, 2017, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/lrasm-missiles-reaching-for-a-long-reach-punch-06752/; Sam LaGrone, “WEST: U.S. Navy Anti-ship Tomahawk Set for Surface Ships, Subs Starting in 2021,” USNI News, February 19, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/02/18/west-u-s-navy-anti-ship-tomahawk-set-for-surface-ships-subs-starting-in-2021.

68.  “F/A-18 Hornet,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-18-specs.htm; “BGM-109 Tomahawk,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/bgm-109-specs.htm.

69.  “AGM-84 Harpoon; SLAM [Stand-off Land Attack Missile],” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/agm-84-specs.htm.

70.  “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Lightning II,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-specs.htm.

71.  “J-11 [Su-27 FLANKER]; Su-27UBK /Su-30MKK/Su-30MK2,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/j-11.htm.

72.  “RIM-7/-162 Sea Sparrow/ESSM,” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, February 8, 2008; Joris Janssen Lok and Richard Scott, “Navies Face Choice Questions for Defense of Surface Combatants,” International Defense Review, February 1, 2005.

73.  The study was supervised by Wayne Hughes. Chase D. Patrick, Assessing the Utility of an Event-Step ASMD Model by Analysis of Surface Combatant Shared Self-Defense (Monterey: U.S. Navy Postgraduate School, September 2001), pp. 51–54.

74.  “MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS),” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/mk-15-specs.htm.

75.  Sam LaGrone, “Navy Studying Installing SeaRAM on More Destroyers, Other Ship Classes,” USNI News, August 16, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/08/17/navy-studying-installing-searam-destroyers-ship-classes.

76.  Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations, 3rd ed., pp. 280–84.

77.  J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (1967; reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2014), pp. 12–13.

Chapter 7. Chinese Sea Power in the Missile Age

1.    曲东才 [Qu Dongcai], “反舰导弹的突防技术浅析 [Analysis of Penetration Technologies of Antiship Missiles],” 飞航导弹 [Aerodynamic Missile], no. 9 (1997): 1.

2.    陈书海赵永甫姜义庆屈景富 [Chen Shuhai, Zhao Yongfu, Jiang Yiqing, and Qu Jingfu], 近海攻击利器—高速攻击艇 [Near-Seas Attack Weapons—High-Speed Attack Craft] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2004), p. 144.

3.    田武 [Tian Wu], “成也冥王, 败也冥王 [The Successes and Failures of Styx],” 当代海军 [Modern Navy], no. 5 (2005): 29.

4.    刘桐林郑安云丁宝荣程恭 [Liu Tonglin, Zheng Anyun, Ding Baorong, and Cheng Gong], 现代海战的利矛—反舰导弹 [The Spear of Modern Sea Combat—Antiship Missiles] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, 2003), p. 199.

5.    Liu et al., The Spear of Modern Sea Combat, p. 256.

6.    Liu et al., The Spear of Modern Sea Combat, p. 111.

7.    袁健全田锦昌 [Yuan Jianquan and Tian Jinchang], 飞航导弹 [Aerodynamic Missile], (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2013), p. 122.

8.    Liu et al., The Spear of Modern Sea Combat, p. 113.

9.    Liu et al., The Spear of Modern Sea Combat, p. 114.

10. Lyle Goldstein, “China’s Falklands Lessons,” Survival 50, no. 3 (June–July 2008): 65.

11.  Liu et al., The Spear of Modern Sea Combat, p. 163.

12.  Yuan and Tian, Aerodynamic Missile, pp. 125–26.

13.  邵永灵 [Shao Yonglin], 导弹与现代战争 [Missiles and Modern War], (Jinan, Shandong: Shandong People’s Press, 2013), p. 117. The author is a professor at the Second Artillery Command Academy.

14.  严伟江 [Yan Weijiang], “1982:海航第二中队战纪 [1982: The War Record of the Second Naval Aviation Squadron],” 世界展望 [World Outlook] (February 2003): 75.

15.  Liu et al., The Spear of Modern Sea Combat, p. 173.

16.  Chen et al., Near-Seas Attack Weapons, p. 174.

17.  刘章民姜志军 [Liu Zhangmin and Jiang Zhijun, eds.], 海军装备 [Navy Equipment], vol. 2 (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 2007), p. 390. The PLAN’s Equipment Research Academy was the editorial unit that sponsored the compilation of the encyclopedia.

18.  Liu et al., The Spear of Modern Sea Combat, p. 279.

19.  Liu et al., The Spear of Modern Sea Combat, p. 232.

20.  Liu and Zhijun, Navy Equipment, p. 378.

21.  “A Closer Look at Nuclear- and Conventional-Capable Missile Units,” CCTV Online, July 22, 2017, http://m.news.cctv.com/2017/07/22/ARTIdrLpqLlsk2SMiviGrTIK170722.shtml.

22.  王长勤方光明 [Wang Changqin and Fang Guangming], “我们为什么要发展东风-26弹道导弹 [Why We Had to Develop the DF-26 Ballistic Missile],” 中国青年报 [China Youth Daily], November 30, 2015, p. 9, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2015-11/23/nw.D110000zgqnb_20151123_1-09.htm.

23.  The transcript of the announcers as the strategic strike group passed the review stands can be found at CCTV Online, July 30, 2017: http://military.cctv.com/2017/07/30/ARTItCYE8yb3vdrUnMpEPgQ4170730.shtml.

24.  See Mark A. Stokes, China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999), p. 89; and Mark A. Stokes, “Chinese Ballistic Missile Forces in the Age of Global Missile Defense: Challenges and Responses,” in China’s Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, ed. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), p. 114.

25.  颜仲新刘鼎臣湖海 [Yan Zhongxin, Liu Dingchen, and Hu Hai] “反舰导弹飞航弹道探讨 [Exploring the Flight Trajectories of Antiship Missiles],” 飞航导弹 [Aerodynamic Missile], no. 2 (2002): 34.

26.  许诚李永胜孙锦 [Xu Cheng, Li Yongsheng, and Sun Jin], “基于MARKOV过程的反舰导弹突防舰艇编队能力评估 [An Assessment of Antiship Missile Penetration Capabilities against Fleet Formations Based on the MARKOV Process],” 飞行力学 [Flight Dynamics] 27, no. 2 (April 2009): 95.

27.  徐国亮张逊王勇 [Xu Guoliang, Zhang Xun, and Wang Yong], “高速机动反舰导弹防御技术 [High Speed, Maneuverable Antiship Missile Defense Technologies],” 指挥控制与仿真 [Command Control and Simulation], no. 1 (2011): 1.

28.  蔡亚梅汪立萍 [Cai Yamei and Wang Liping], “美国的高超音速飞行器发展计划及关键技术分析 [Analysis of America’s Hypersonic Development Plan and Key Technologies],” 航天制造技术 [Aerospace Manufacturing Technology], no. 6 (2010): 4–5.

29.  王金云魏素军 [Wang Jinyun and Wei Sujun], “美俄未来高超音速飞航导弹技术发展动向 [Technology Development Trends of Future U.S.-Russian Hypersonic Missiles],” 飞航导弹 [Aerodynamic Missile], no. 9 (2012): 28.

30.  房茂燕汪民乐 [Fang Maoyan and Wang Minle], “巡航导弹攻击 航母的可行性与技术需求分析 [Analysis of the Feasibility and Technological Requirements for Cruise Missile Attacks against Carriers],” 飞航导弹 [Aerodynamic Missile], (2010): 70–85.

31.  Wayne P. Hughes Jr., Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 305.

32.  颜仲新王刚杨祖快 [Yan Zhongxin, Wang Gang, and Yang Zukuai], “伯克级驱逐舰抗反舰导弹饱和攻击能力分析 [Analysis of Burke-Class Destroyer’s Counter Antiship Missile Saturation Attack Capabilities],” 飞航导弹 [Aerodynamic Missile], no. 7 (2002): 30.

33.  尤晓航 [You Xiaohang], 国外海军典型C⁴I及武器系统 [Representative C4I and Weapons Systems of Foreign Navies] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2008), p. 231.

34.  沈如松 [Shen Rusong], ed.,导弹武器系统概论 [Introduction to Missile Weapon Systems] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2010), p. 284.

35.  You Xiaohang, Representative C4I and Weapons Systems of Foreign Navies, p. 231.

36.  曾家有钟健林汪浩 [Zeng Jiayou, Zhong Jianlin, and Wang Hao], “全系统对抗条件下反舰导弹突防能力计算模型 [Computer Modeling of Antiship Missile Penetration Capabilities under Conditions of Full-Spectrum Countermeasures],” 系统仿真学报 [Journal of System Simulation] 21, no. 19 (October 2009): 6038.

37.  张永禾 周荣坤鲁伟 [Zhang Yongli, Zhou Rongkun, and Lu Wei], “有人战斗机和无人战斗机打击性能比较分析 [Comparative Analysis of Striking Capability of Manned Fighters and Unmanned Fighters],” 舰船电子对抗 [Shipboard Electronic Countermeasures] 36, no. 6 (December 2013): 87.

38.  于际训 [Yu Jixun], ed.,第二炮兵战役学 [The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), p. 402.

39.  谢晓方孙涛欧阳中辉 [Xie Xiaofang, Sun Tao, and Ouyang Zhonghui], 反舰导弹航路规划技术 [Antiship Missile Navigation Programming Technologies] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2010), p. 179.

40.  张书宇张金春李雪梅 [Zhang Shuyu, Zhang Jinchun, and Li Xuemei], “多方向饱和攻击时反舰导弹航路规划方法 [Methods for Planning Antiship Missile Flight Paths during Multi-direction Saturation Attacks],” 兵工自动化 [Ordnance Industry Automation], no. 11 (2012): 6.

41.  王建国徐晓刚高军亮吴晶 [Wang Jianguo, Xu Xiaogang, Gao Junliang, and Wu Jing], “航路规划技术在反舰导弹远程 打击中的应用 [The Application of Flight Path Programming Techniques in Long-Range Antiship Missile Strikes],” 飞航导弹 [Aerodynamic Missile], no. 9 (2006): 25.

42.  王学宝王士星顾文锦 [Wang Xuebao, Wang Shixing, and Gu Wenjin], “反舰导弹变轨 方式研究 [Research on Changing Flight Paths for Antiship Missiles],” 飞航导弹 [Aerodynamic Missile], no. 2 (2004): 59.

43.  王昌金周立军聂前程刘强昌 [Wang Changjin, Zhou Lijun, Nie Qiancheng, and Liu Qiangchang], “反舰导弹饱和攻击的发射数量分析 [Analysis of Salvo Size of an Antiship Missile Saturation Attack],” 舰船电子工程 [Ship Electronic Engineering] 28, no. 9 (2008): 134.

44.  蒋充剑曾清 [Jiang Chongjian and Zeng Qing], “饱和攻击时 反舰导弹发射数量的计算方法 [The Calculation Methods for the Salvo Size of Antiship Missiles in a Saturation Attack],” 舰船电子工程 [Ship Electronic Engineering] 28, no. 3 (2008): 56.

45.  姚奕聂永芳 [Yao Yi and Nie Yongfang], “提高反舰导弹突防 能力措施研究 [Research on Measures to Enhance Antiship Missile Penetration Capabilities],” 飞航导弹 [Aerodynamic Missile], no. 8 (2008): 27.

46.  谭安胜 [Tan Ansheng], 水面舰艇编队作战运筹分析 [Analysis of Surface Fleet Combat Management] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2009).

47.  Tan Ansheng, Analysis of Surface Fleet Combat Management, pp. 172–73.

48.  张昆薜晓春 [Zhang Kun and Bi Xiaochun], “反舰导弹饱和攻击的组织及实施 [The Organization and Implementation of Antiship Missile Saturation Attacks],” 航导弹 [Aerodynamic Missile], no. 11 (2006): 17.

49.  李军李敏勇刘国林 [Li Jun, Li Minyong, and Liu Guolin], “海上蜂群战探析 [Research on Maritime Swarming Warfare],” 海军大连舰艇学院学报 [Journal of Dalian Naval Academy], no. 1 (2010): 16.

Chapter 8. U.S. Maritime Strategy in Asia

1.    Geoffrey Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World,” Orbis 51, no. 4 (fall 2007): 569–75.

2.    Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game (1995; reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013). The long calm lee to which Gordon refers followed the Battle of Trafalgar. Sensational victory left the Royal Navy intellectually becalmed for the long century from 1805 until the onset of World War I.

3.    Quoted in George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 90.

4.    Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, intro. Eric J. Grove (1911; reprint, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), pp. 167–304.

5.    Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897), p. 198.

6.    John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2008), pp. 46–104; Federation of American Scientists website, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/navy/strategy1980s.pdf.

7.    U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, “… From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century,” September 1992, U.S. Navy website, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/fromsea/fromsea.txt.

8.    U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” October 2007, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=479900; and “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” March 2015, U.S. Navy website, http://www.navy.mil/local/maritime/150227-CS21R-Final.pdf.

9.    U.S. Department of Defense, “Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” January 2012, Defense Department website, http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.

10. For the history of the 1986 strategy we rely heavily on three compendia: John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2004); John B. Hattendorf, ed., U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30 (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2007); and Hattendorf and Swartz, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s.

11.  Samuel Sheetz, “‘We Win; They Lose’: The Staggering Simplicity of Reagan’s Grand Strategy,” Daily Signal, December 10, 2011, http://dailysignal.com/2011/12/10/we-win-they-lose-the-staggering-simplicity-of-reagan%E2%80%99s-grand-strategy/.

12.  Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 136, 139.

13.  Michael Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3d ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 117.

14.  Samuel Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 80, no. 5 (May 1954): 483–93.

15.  Milan L. Hauner, “Stalin’s Big-Fleet Program,” Naval War College Review 57, no. 2 (spring 2004): 87–120.

16.  Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, pp. 395, 398, 420, 422; Robert Waring Herrick, The USSR’s “Blue Belt of Defense” Concept: A Unified Military Plan for Defense against Seaborne Attack by Strike Carriers and Polaris/Poseidon SSBNs (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1973).

17.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with Principles and Practices of Military Operations on Land (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), pp. 385, 391, 393, 397, 403, 441.

18.  James R. Holmes, “A ‘Fortress Fleet’ for China,” Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy (summer–fall 2010): 115–28, https://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/2012/05/009_Holmes_Layout-1a.pdf.

19.  Sergei G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979).

20.  George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, http://www.historyguide.org/Europe/kennan.htm.

21. Norman Friedman, The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000).

22.  Hattendorf, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, pp. 53–101.

23.  James L. Holloway III, Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), p. 31.

24.  William M. McBride, Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865–1945 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), p. 233.

25.  Nathan Miller, The U.S. Navy: A History, 3d ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 273.

26.  Hattendorf, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, pp. 102–33.

27.  Hattendorf, Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, p. 75.

28.  “The Maritime Strategy, 1986,” in Hattendorf and Swartz, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s, pp. 203–58.

29.  Hattendorf, Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, pp. 10–12.

30.  John J. Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe,” International Security 11, no. 2 (autumn 1986): 3–57. For a sampling of other commentary on the Maritime Strategy, see Robert W. Komer, “Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense,” Foreign Affairs 60, no. 5 (summer 1982): 1124–44; Barry R. Posen, “Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment,” International Security 9, no. 3 (winter 1984–85): 47–88; Christopher A. Ford and David A. Rosenberg, “The Naval Intelligence Underpinnings of Reagan’s Maritime Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2 (April 2005): 379–409.

31.  Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

32.  U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, “… From the Sea.”

33.  Carl Schurz, “Armed or Unarmed Peace,” Harper’s Weekly, June 19, 1897, p. 603.

34. Corbett, Some Principles, pp. 91–94.

35.  For Corbett concentration was a “kind of shibboleth” that obscured the lessons of British naval history. “Division,” he maintains, is “bad only when it is pushed beyond the limits of well-knit deployment.” Corbett, Some Principles, pp. 131–32, 134.

36.  Geoff Fine, “‘Global Maritime Partnership’ Gaining Steam at Home and with International Navies,” Defense Daily, October 25, 2006, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/DEFENSE_DAILY_25OCT06_Global_Maritime_Partnership_Gaining_Steam_At_Home_And_With_International_Navies.pdf.

37.  U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “Cooperative Strategy,” 2007.

38.  U.S. Secretary of the Navy, “… From the Sea”; U.S. Secretary of the Navy, “Forward … from the Sea,” 1995, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/navy/forward-from-the-sea.pdf.

39.  Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (1890; reprint, New York: Dover, 1987), p. 76.

40.  Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 39, 53–54, 70–82.

41.  Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, pp. 38, 49, 68–69.

42.  Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, p. 50.

43.  Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2016, Ministry of Defense website, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2016/DOJ2016_Foreword_web.pdf.

44.  John Pomfret, “Beijing Claims ‘Indisputable Sovereignty’ over South China Sea,” Washington Post, July 31, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/AR2010073005664.html.

45.  Joseph S. Nye, “The American National Interest and Global Public Goods,” International Affairs 78, no. 2 (April 2002): 238; Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907,” in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914, vol. 3: The Testing of the Entente, 1904–6 (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1927), pp. 403–17.

46.  U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “Cooperative Strategy,” 2007.

47.  U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “Cooperative Strategy,” 2007.

48.  U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “Cooperative Strategy,” 2007.

49.  U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, “Cooperative Strategy,” 2007.

50.  Department of the Navy, “Cooperative Strategy,” 2015, p. 4.

51.  Department of the Navy, “Cooperative Strategy,” 2015, p. 8.

52.  Department of the Navy, “Cooperative Strategy,” 2015, p. 1.

53.  James R. Holmes, “Rough Waters for Coalition Building,” in Patrick M. Cronin, ed., Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2012), pp. 99–115, https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_CooperationFromStrength_Cronin_1.pdf.

54.  Clausewitz, On War, p. 89.

55.  Chief of Naval Operations Staff, “CNO’s Sailing Directions,” September 27, 2011, U.S. Navy website, http://www.navy.mil/cno/cno_sailing_direction_final-lowres.pdf.

56.  Chief of Naval Operations Staff, “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” January 2016, U.S. Navy website, http://www.navy.mil/cno/docs/cno_stg.pdf.

57.  Commander Naval Surface Forces, “Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control,” January 9, 2017, U.S. Navy website, http://www.navy.mil/strategic/SurfaceForceStrategy-ReturntoSeaControl.pdf.

58.  Christopher P. Cavas, “Interview: Vice Adm. Tom Rowden, Commander, US Naval Forces,” Defense News, January 8, 2017, http://www.defensenews.com/articles/interview-vice-adm-tom-rowden-commander-us-naval-forces; James Fanell, “R-E-S-P-E-C-T … the PLA Navy,” Naval Institute Proceedings 143, no. 5 (May 2017), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-05/r-e-s-p-e-c-t-pla-navy.

Chapter 9. China Dreams On

1.    Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 92.

2.    “Navy Official: China Training for ‘Short Sharp War’ with Japan,” USNI News, February 20, 2014, https://news.usni.org/2014/02/18/navy-official-china-training-short-sharp-war-japan.

3.    Quoted in Winslow T. Wheeler, ed., America’s Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 19.

4.    James E. Fanell and Scott Cheney-Peters, “Maximal Scenario: Expansive Naval Trajectory to ‘China’s Naval Dream,’” in Andrew S. Erickson, ed., Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), pp. 261–73.

5.    Eric Hoffer, The Ordeal of Change (1963; reprint, Titusville, NJ: Hopewell, 2006), pp. 53–59.

6.    Nassim Nicholas Taleb exhorts leaders to go beyond making big institutions tough or resilient and strive to make their organizations “antifragile.” Such organizations derive positive value from a shock to the system rather than merely withstanding it. Taleb’s ideas are worth mulling for the U.S. sea services. Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (New York: Random House, 2012).