The above chapters discussed the governance systems for two types of common-pool resources: forests and fishery stocks. Nine case studies have been conducted which showed different degrees of fulfilling the five preconditions for the proper functioning of property rights. This chapter provides a comparison between the governance systems for forestry and fishery in the different countries studied; it will do so by following the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 2. This chapter is structured as follows: first, a comparative summary of the case studies is provided (5.1), followed by the comparison between them according to the framework presented in Chapter 2. Section 5.2 compares the characteristics of the two types of resources and the accordingly adopted property rights. This is followed by a comparison of public regulation and private regulation used to manage forest and fishery resources (5.3). Section 5.4 investigates the similarities and differences in the interaction between public and private regulation. The five preconditions for the proper functioning of property rights are reviewed in section 5.5. Section 5.6 concludes.
This part provides a short summary of the nine case studies and then conducts the analysis. Recall that five case studies (Indonesia, Bolivia, United States and Canada, and Sweden) focused on forestry, whereas four others (South Africa, Mexico, New Zealand, and Japan) focused on fisheries. The summaries of the case studies provide a general appraisal of the system of public and private regulation in relation to the preconditions determining the proper functioning of the property rights in their protection of the common-pool resources, more particularly forestry and fish stocks. The idea in these summaries is to provide a general appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the regulatory system in each particular country based on the earlier analysis.
Traditionally forests in Indonesia were managed by local communities according to customary law. However, during the colonization period, the colonial government controlled the forests in Java and left forests on outer islands subject to customary law. This approach was accepted by the government after independence. During the Suharto period, the forest management authority was concentrated in the hands of the central government, which claimed control over forests in the whole country. But it could only exert direct control over forests in Java and outsourced forests in other areas to big timber companies with good political connections. The rights of smaller loggers and customary communities were not recognized.
Only after the Reformasi period did rights of the marginalized actors start to become recognized to a limited extent. Another important process which was initiated during the Reformasi period concerns decentralization. The government tried to transfer decision-making power to local governments, closer to where forestry activities take place. However, the self-interest of different levels of government and corruption led to a tug of war between local and central authorities. Departmentalism also caused conflicts between governmental agencies responsible for different sectors related to forestry, agriculture and environmental protection. These conflicts between different levels and sectors of government led to contradictory spatial planning and overlapping or conflicting permits. Therefore the decentralization process became a source of contested property rights which hampered effective forestry management.
International pressure since the 1990s and democratization after the ending of the Suharto government incentivized the active development of forest certification schemes in Indonesia. Several schemes have started to operate since the 2000s, of which the FSC and LEI are the best known. However, so far the coverage of forest certification in Indonesia is still limited, especially for the community-managed forests.
In summary, three layers of forest governance rules exist in Indonesia: customary law (adat), national law and private certification schemes. The interaction between the different levels of the systems has not resulted in the establishment of clear forest tenure and the prevention of deforestation. There are multiple reasons for this.
First, inconsistencies exist in defining property rights over forest in the multi-layered system. Traditionally, most forests were managed by local communities under the adat system. The communal rights, however, have been replaced by state ownership in modern Indonesia. Forest certification schemes require secure land tenure and respect for customary rights. However, the recognition and protection of customary rights under national law have been tortuous. Customary rights were excluded during the New Order regime and got limited acknowledgement in the BFL 1999. The independence of customary forests from state forests has only been acknowledged recently. Moreover, even state forests have continued to be plagued by unclear boundaries, due to a lack of coordination between different levels of government and departments. Private property rights over forests have also continued to face uncertainties due to large numbers of unregistered forests. Certification schemes, which demand clear forest tenure as a criterion for certification, have hardly been a driver to address the problem of the incoherent definitions in law in Indonesia.
Second, the enforcement of property rights also presents challenges. Traditional self-governing institutions have been replaced by public regulation. However, public regulation has not been able to fill the gap left by the dismantled adat systems because of the limited capacity of governmental authorities and corruption. The costly and slow judicial system has also prevented effective private enforcement. Certification schemes have provided an additional layer of oversight, but have limited coverage and have their own limitations as well.
Third, traditional communities used to coordinate their activities via self-governing institutions. Excluding customary communities and promoting commercial interests in the forests traditionally controlled by communities have led to many conflicts between different actors, thereby increasing coordination costs.
In the current governance system, deforestation in Indonesia continues on a large scale.
The first Forestry Law of Bolivia in 1974 declared state ownership of all forests and required the users of forests to obtain permits from the state. Permits were granted only to registered enterprises and local and indigenous communities were excluded. A land and forest law reform was enacted in the mid-1990s due to pressure from indigenous movements, a deteriorating economy, privatization and growing environmental concerns. Under the new land and forest law, the state still owns all forests in Bolivia, but the land on which forests grow could be owned by the state, private parties and indigenous groups (via TCOs). Three types of forest tenure were established on public land: long-term contracting, concessions and ASLs. Reforms that have been implemented since 2006 have further strengthened the rights of indigenous people and have put a halt to issuing new concessions to timber companies.
Similar to Indonesia, a decentralization process and departmentalism have been implemented in Bolivia. As a result, land tenure and forests have been regulated by different agencies authorized by different laws. For example, TCOs and ASLs are granted by different agencies. Out of fear that claims for TCOs endanger the availability of municipal forests reserves, municipalities sometimes oppose the granting of TCOs, further complicating the conflicting land regularization process. The forest law also includes performance standards for both industrial and community-managed forests. Compliance with such standards requires a scientific approach which big companies conducting large-scale forest management have been able to apply, but which has proven challenging for local communities due to organizational, cultural, technical, and funding constraints.
The discourse that has triggered the forest law reform has also influenced the development of forest certification (CFV) in the late 1990s. This explains the similarities between the 1999 Forestry Law and the CFV standard. Only regarding issues like labour rights, community organization and consensus building, the CFV has more stringent standards. Highly compatible standards and governmental support made the certification scheme develop quickly earlier on, reaching a coverage of 2.21 million hectares in 2005. However, most certified forests have been managed by companies and progress in terms of promoting community-based forest management has remained slow. After 2006, when the export market increasingly shifted from North America and Europe to South America and Asia, government support decreased and concessions were reduced due to new reforms, coverage of certified forest areas dropped dramatically.
The interaction between public and private regulation has influenced the proper functioning of property rights and deforestation control in Bolivia.
First, unlike in Indonesia, comparatively clear forest tenure has existed on paper since the 1990s. Until then large-scale ‘land occupation’ movements led to many conflicting claims. From the 1990s onwards efforts have been made to regularize the land tenure and grant titles to private and indigenous people. The establishment of property rights was in line with certification requirements. However, the theoretical clear forest tenure has not had a great spin-off in practice, especially not in the case of private and communal rights, due to the weakening of traditional institutions (via adding an additional layer of institutions, the TCO, on top of traditional governing institutions, the villages), an expensive and slow land titling process, uncoordinated behaviour from different government agencies, and unbalanced agriculture and forestry policies (prioritizing agricultural use rather than forest use in granting land rights). Public property rights have historically been stronger. Public forests have often been exploited by timber companies in the form of concessions. Such concessions have also been actively seeking certification. The 2006 land reform, however, has cancelled the concession system, leading to a sharp decrease in certification coverage.
Second, even after this reform, public enforcement has remained weak, due to budget and staff constraints. Forestry law has remained largely unimplemented. It has therefore been a barrier to certification. Private parties have difficulties in enforcing their property rights, in a context where land conflicts are widespread and illegal logging abounds. For community forests, although they have formally been recognized under the new law and traditional governing institutions have not formally been abandoned, the introduction of an additional level of institutions has weakened traditional social control of forestry. Although certification has provided an additional layer of monitoring, its impact is limited due to the low coverage rate.
Third, traditional governing institutions involve community members in the decision-making and enforcement. They also provide a platform for collective decision-making. However, competition between the newly introduced TCOs and traditional institutions has weakened the traditional collective-choice arrangement. To obtain certification, communities need to either establish a community enterprise or resort to collaboration with companies. Either way, a more complicated governance system is established, which has rendered the coordination between actors more demanding.
The case studies of the US and Canada have focused on how public and private regulation interact to address riparian buffer-zone protection in North America. The discussion focused on public and private forests in Canada and on private forests in the US. In Canada, it is the concessioners of public forests who conduct the daily management and therefore such forests have been treated as private property in the discussion. Comparatively clear forest tenure has been established in both countries, but the non-marketable values of the riparian forests have typically not been considered by private owners or managers. Therefore, regulation of riparian zone protection has been implemented.
When it comes to riparian forest protection, specifically the instalment of riparian buffer zones, research shows that certification schemes closely mimic public regulatory standards. On the one hand this overlap has made it easy to adopt certification. On the other hand it has also made it difficult to promote beyond-compliance protection.
Yet overall, many positive synergies have been shown to exist between public regulation and certification in addressing riparian zone protection. First, certification has made additional information available concerning the forest status and forestry activities. The coordination between public and private regulators in information sharing has also helped to reduce information costs. Second, there is some evidence showing that certification has been helpful in enhancing compliance with riparian buffer-zone rules. The coordination between public and private regulators has also helped to reduce redundancies in monitoring and hence to control monitoring costs. To incorporate considerations at the watershed-scale, however, has proven to be a challenge under both public and private regulation.
The case study of Sweden has examined how public and private regulation interact to address biodiversity protection.
Different layers of rules exist under public regulation: forestry legislation and related regulations issued by the State Forestry Agency, other environmental legislation represented by the Environmental Code, as well as environmental/forestry objectives introduced by the Swedish parliament. To achieve the goals of public regulation, different types of instruments have been adopted, including command and control instruments, suasive instruments and incentive-based instruments, of which the first two types have been most important. The forest regulatory reform in the 1990s has led to a highly deregulated forest policy. The law has prescribed only a minimum level of performance requirements and has left the forest owners ample room to select the concrete measures with which to meet the requirements. Furthermore, the level of coercion has been low, leaving many command and control instruments not being complied with. Moreover, the use of suasive instruments has been reduced since the 1990s reform which has been accompanied by a reduction of the size and budget of the regulatory agency. Although these suasive instruments have enhanced environmental awareness among forest owners they have failed to change their inherent values and preferences.
Environmental campaigns and market demand have led to the quick establishment of forest certification in Sweden. Governmental support of certification schemes’ development, implementation and enforcement has also played an important role in the wide adoption of certification. Two schemes are active there: FSC and PEFC, which cover more than half of the forests in Sweden. The competition between the two schemes and a bridging process have induced convergence of the standards of the two schemes.
The interaction between public and private regulation has influenced biodiversity protection via information generation, monitoring of forest activities and the incorporation of scale considerations. The standards of forest certification schemes and public regulation have been fairly coherent, with the former being more stringent on some issues. The general goals under binding laws and the ‘Sustainable Forest’ goal to a large extent have relied on certification schemes, which contain more specific guidance to operationalize. However, this does not imply that they have been fully compatible. The goals and standards under the Forestry Law, the Environmental Code and certification have not been fully coherent. The different requirements applicable to so-called set-aside areas in the two systems and the requirement to balance timber production and environmental protection with the more far-reaching requirements under certification schemes are examples of incompatible standards. The existence of multiple governance systems has also caused confusion and competing interpretations. Moreover, some scholars have argued that neither legal nor certification standards have sufficiently incorporated the latest scientific insights. In many situations, standards did not reflect the threshold recommended by scientific literature.
Similar to North America, public regulation and certification have contributed to information generation and strengthening of monitoring. Certification has played an even more important role in Sweden, not only because of its wider coverage but also because of its role to complement and specify the general and minimum legal requirements under the legal framework. Moreover, although certification has been an important complement to public regulation in Sweden it has not been its substitute. This is not only because their standards and ways of monitoring differ, but also because public regulation applies to all forest owners while certification applies only to certified forests. In recent years, criticism against forest certification has intensified, claiming that many certified forests have not been managed according to FSC standards and that the accountability mechanism has not been effective. Like the situation in public regulation where non-compliance is seldom followed by sanctions, the suspension of a certificate has rarely been used in practice. Another criticism has been that scientific uncertainties have been insufficiently accommodated in private standards. In addition, this case study has confirmed that certification schemes have difficulty in taking landscape issues sufficiently into consideration.
South Africa faces serious overfishing. The government plays a central role in managing fish resources. Fisheries in South Africa are regulated under the TAC or TAE, which are then allocated to individual rights holders. The government also issues permits, develops management plans (OMPs) and requires compliance with technical standards. At each fishery level, two consultative forums (SWG and RMWG) are established to support the government in management. The existing fishing industry is the main participant of these forums. The TAC and TAE control the volume of catch and the fishing input (entry) respectively. The allocation of the TAC and TAE to individuals is accompanied by two types of fishing rights: individual quotas and limited entry.
During the apartheid period, fishing rights were concentrated in the hands of a few white-owned companies, excluding black and coloured people as well as traditional fishing communities. In the post-apartheid period, the government has tried to redistribute fishing rights to the historically excluded groups. The redistribution, however, has faced boycotts by the existing fishing industry. Critics have argued that the redistribution process has been window dressing, with too small quotas having been transferred to new entrants to support their survival. Concentration of fishing rights has prevailed in many sectors. Moreover, fishing rights have primarily been redistributed to the fishing companies with the best connections to politicians while traditional fishers have remained marginalized. The small fishers have continued to fish illegally.
As for certification, only one fishery has been certified by the MSC: the hake fishery. Hake is exploited by four industrial deep-sea trawlers. The certification is thought to have led to a reduction in seabird deaths. However, other environmental concerns have remained. Moreover, it has helped the deep-sea trawling industry’s organization, the SADSTIA, to consolidate its fishing rights and to avoid further redistribution to historically marginalized groups and longliners.
The comparison between the inshore fishery governance in South Africa in general and the offshore hake fishery in particular has unravelled two striking differences: the first is related to the definition of property rights and the second to enforcement.
For inshore fishery a huge gap exists between the official fishing rights and the de facto property regime. The many traditional fishers, who have been marginalized during the apartheid period and who have not benefited from the post-apartheid redistribution, have formed a large informal sector. Combined with the general low level of enforcement, this has made inshore fisheries de facto open-access resources. Moreover, the late adoption of a limited entry system and the lenient awarding of fishing permits for linefishing have led to a misfit between property rights and the resources’ features. The hake fishery presents a different story. Its most important species, the deepwater hake, has a much shorter commercial fishing history. It is more demanding to fish this species and hence fewer stakeholders are involved. Consequently, in this fishery the de jure fishing rights coincide with de facto ones. However, as mentioned before, in terms of distribution and fairness, this system is far from perfect. As for enforcement, due to the importance of the hake sector, it has been monitored better than inshore fisheries. The MSC has also contributed to further strengthening the enforcement of the hake fishery.
As far as coordination is concerned, the case study shows that the decision-making concerning fishery management has mainly involved the government and the existing fishing industry. New entrants and small-rights holders have hardly been involved. Neither has the MSC included these marginalized parties sufficiently. A general lack of information about fish stocks and catch has existed in South Africa’s fisheries. However, increased governmental monitoring, the availability of a new scientific observer programme and the certification process have made more information available concerning the hake fishery. The certification has also played a role in promoting the internalization of externalities.
Mexico is another country facing high fishing pressure and widespread overexploitation. Small-scale fishery plays a particularly important role in the Mexican fishing sector. It is on the fisheries exploited by small-scale fishers that this case study has focused.
Commercial fisheries have a comparatively short history in Mexico. For most of the nineteenth century, the fish industry was embedded in a state-led development paradigm. The state had ownership over fish resources and promoted fishery exploitation. The governmental promotion policies have led to a large-scale immigration to the fishery areas. Responding to low productivity and overexploitation, the government has shifted towards market-oriented development and privatization in the 1980s and 1990s. These developments have led to the elimination of cooperatives’ exclusive access to many species and to a shift from territorial user rights (concessions of cooperatives) to a limited entry system (permits). Since then, both types of fishing rights have existed in Mexico, although the latter is dominant. Only a few cooperatives have survived the reform and have maintained their territorial user rights.
The institutions regulating fisheries have also changed several times since the 1960s, with the emphasis shifting between fish production and environ mental protection. In the latest reform, environmental and fishery functions have been differentiated between different departments. The frequent institutional changes together with the existence of multiple agencies involved in fishery management have created challenges for coordination. Currently, the main instruments used to regulate fisheries are the National Fishery Chart (information provision) and NOMs (standards for different species). The new Fishery Law also requires the development of fishery management plans.
Mexico is active in fishery certification, with three certified fisheries and more under full assessments or pre-assessment. This case study has focused on two fisheries: the lobster fishery (certified) and the swimming crab fishery (pre-assessment).
A contrast has been found between the studied fisheries under territorial user rights and more common cases where fisheries are managed under a limited entry system. Such differences concern the definition of property rights, enforcement and coordination.
When it comes to property rights, the limited entry system has led permit holders to compete with each other in harvesting. The separation of permit holders and free fishers, together with a lack of public enforcement, has incentivized illegal fishing. This has resulted in a de facto open-access regime. Concessions have the potential to create better incentives, but have been limited to a few fisheries and have relied on the self-enforcement capacity of the concessioners. Successful examples have created opportunities for MSC certification. The case of the Red Rock Lobster Fishery and the Seris’ fishery are such examples. In these cases, clear property rights have been established. The government has admitted exclusive fishing rights and self-governing institutions have developed their own rules in managing the resources. However, the granting of exclusive fishing rights has not automatically led to good performance. The self-governing capacity has only started to develop in response to external pressures. MSC certification has also played an important role in empowering the FEDECOOP and in consolidating the fishing rights. Pre-assessment and FIP have also been crucial in triggering the establishment of a public regulatory system for the crab fishery.
The lack of coordination between governmental agencies has created a gap in enforcement and has weakened enforcement capacity. This has been accompanied by widespread illegal fishing in Mexico. The lobster fishery and fishery of the Seri present two examples with stronger self-enforcement capacity, where the cooperatives’ or Seris’ governing institutions have adopted their own monitoring measures. MSC certification and pre-assessment have also contributed to the strengthening of enforcement capacity in these cases.
As regards coordination, there is a shortage of it among governmental agencies. For fisheries under the permit system, the separation between permit holders and actual fishers has complicated coordination. Only the former have formal legal status and have been involved in fishery management decision-making. Under the territorial user rights, self-governing institutions have provided opportunities for their members to coordinate. The certification has empowered the fishermen’s organization, FEDECOOP, and has strengthened its capacity to further engage in policy-making.
Compared to many other countries, New Zealand presents one of the ‘best practices’ in fishery management. Three sectors are crucial in managing fish resources in New Zealand: the commercial sector, the recreational sector and the Maori.
The fishing rights system has shifted from traditional control by Maori communities to a regulated open-access system after the arrival of European settlers and further to a system represented by individual transferable quotas. Recently, three fishing sectors have been subject to different fishing rights arrangements. For the commercial sector, most economically valuable species have been introduced under the QMS system, in other words, the individual transferable quotas system. The Maori are engaged in both commercial and customary fishing. For commercial fishing, the Maori control more than one third of the fishing quotas. For the customary side, specific legislation defines their rights, but these rights are less clear and secure than commercial rights. Recreational fishing is also important in New Zealand, involving 20 per cent of its population. However, few regulations exist for this sector and people still have free access to fish for recreational use.
Parallel with a fishing rights reform in the 1980s, the New Zealand regulatory system also experienced a reform with the aim of deregulating many sectors, to make the state ‘meaner and leaner’ and to shift responsibilities to the industry. To achieve this goal, the government shifted from resources rental to costs recovery for the fishery exploitation activities and devolved some fishery management responsibilities to the industry (such as permit and trade registries). A co-management system started to develop, where the quota owners’ associations collaborated with the government in deciding how fisheries were to be managed. To reconcile the interests between different fisheries sectors, plans were developed and supervised by the government.
The MSC first certified a fishery in 2011. So far, five fisheries have been certified and two more are under full assessment.
Although some limitations exist, such as spatial conflicts between customary, recreational and commercial fishing, compared to many other countries, the fishery governance, especially of and by the commercial sector is a success. This success is attributed to the clear definition of property rights, strong enforcement capacity and well-regulated coordination created by the co-management system.
First, the commercial rights have been well defined under the QMS system. The shift towards the cost-recovery system and the devolvement of management responsibility have promoted the establishment of self-management institutions. The co-management system, together with the influence of certification has contributed to an extensive definition of property rights. The long history of the entrenchment of the Maori in the market economy has accustomed them to the QMS system, which is a market-based instrument.
Second, the New Zealand government also has a strong capacity to enforce its fishery regulations. High reporting requirements, a sliding-scale system in enforcement, technological development, broad regulatory authority and coordination between different agencies have contributed to a strong enforcement capacity. Moreover, under the co-management system, many quota owners’ associations also have developed their own monitoring programmes. The certification process has also helped to identify the insufficiencies of self-governance and governmental management, leading to further improvement.
Third, the co-management system has also promoted the coordination between various rights holders. However, conflicts between the different fishery sectors and between the fishing industry and environmental NGOs have not been reconciled yet.
Japan is a major fishery country, in terms of production, consumption and import. Japanese fisheries have five sectors: coastal fisheries, offshore, distant-water, marine aquaculture and inland aquaculture. Most fish products are for domestic consumption. The health of coastal fish stocks is better than that of the others.
Japan has the best established network of TUR fisheries: the fishermen’s organizations, FCAs, have been granted exclusive fishing rights in coastal areas. Such fishing rights have evolved historically. Members of FCAs sometimes have divided into smaller groups and have formed FMOs to manage specific species. The offshore areas have been regulated under a limited entry system (via licences), though sometimes, they have functioned de facto as TUR fisheries.
Both central and local governments have played an important role in regulating fisheries. The government has taken different measures to protect fish resources, such as the introduction of resources protection plans, TACs, TAEs and so on. Coordination institutions have been established at different levels. However, cross-prefectural coordination has been limited.
Owing to distrust of NGOs, the peculiar fishery distribution system, the FCAs system and the lack of consumer awareness, MSCs have not rooted in Japan. A domestic, industrial and governmental-led certification scheme, MEL, has been established as a strategic response to the MSC. However, little information is available concerning the influence of MEL on fishery management. Therefore, this case study was limited to the assessment of the interaction between public regulation and property rights in Japan.
First, the species under the TURs system are usually not very migratory, so that clear geographical boundaries have been established. In the offshore areas, a limited entry system has been implemented and setting boundaries for specific migratory species is more difficult. However, sometimes, the fishermen in the same offshore areas are organized under the same FCAs, making self-management possible. The existence of fishermen’s organizations also helps to define the user groups. Sometimes the TAC applies to fisheries managed by the limited entry system. The TAC defines the boundary or rights in terms of volume. In order to achieve the self-sufficiency rate of fishery products in Japan, the government, however, has incentives to set the TAC at too high a level, threatening the sustainability of the stocks.
Second, the co-management system with the involvement of both the government and the fishermen has contributed to information accumulation and has strengthened monitoring. The developed system has been more suitable to coastal areas concerning the definition of property rights and coordination (FCAs and FMOs contribute to the coordination in coastal areas and the less mobile characteristics of the species have also made coordination easier; whereas offshore resources require coordination between geographical areas, which usually has proven to be difficult) and has raised specific issues of scale. These factors probably have contributed to the better protection of coastal resources in comparison to offshore and distant-water fisheries.
Both forests and fish stocks are important common-pool resources, for which the exclusion of others is costly and consumption is rivalrous. The non-excludability and subtractability may lead to ‘the tragedy of the commons’ problem if access is not restricted. Forest comprises 31 per cent of the total land area, providing diversified environmental services.1 Many people depend on forests for their livelihoods, with the estimate varying from a few hundred million up to 1.6 billion.2 These include various groups of people (including indigenous people, communities living in or adjacent to forests, employees) involved in different activities (such as hunting, gathering, producing timber or energy).3 The large number and diversity of user groups make it costly to exclude each other from exploiting the forests. Intensive use can go beyond ecological limits and can lead to deforestation and forest degradation.4 Fishery is also a crucial resource, providing a significant part of animal protein and livelihood for 10 to 12 per cent of the world’s population.5 As these mobile resources are exploited by various types of actors, exclusion is also costly. Overexploitation also puts fishery resources under stress: 28.8 per cent of the resources are overexploited.6
One important difference between these two types of resources is the extent of mobility. Forests can be defined in many different ways, depending on the inclusion or exclusion of factors such as land use, tree height, tree density and so on.7 In spite of the divergence, crucial elements of forests include the trees growing on specific land and land use.8 The non-mobility of the trees and land makes it easy to demarcate their geographical boundaries and they are hence suitable for local level management. As mentioned earlier, forests can have multiple functions9 such as providing a habitat for species, controlling climate and conserving water. Species and water are mobile and their protection requires governance on a large scale.
Fish is a mobile resource living in inland, coastal areas and high seas. Different species have various extents of mobility. Some are highly migratory or straddling and can migrate long distances across national borders. These species usually live in Exclusive Economic Zones or in the high seas.10 There are also more sedentary species for which the demarcation is comparatively easy. Different extents of mobility influence the nature of the desired property rights.
The extent of resources’ mobility influences the possibility to demarcate the boundary of the resources and the users’ rights and the costs to exclude other parties. Therefore, establishment of property rights for forests and fish stocks differs. More complete property rights can be established for forests, for which clear geographical boundaries can be determined. In the five case studies for forests, ownership was established, either of forests (e.g. in the US, Canada, Sweden, and Indonesia) or of the land where forests grow (e.g. Bolivia). Owners have broad rights over their property, including access, harvest, management, exclusion, and alienation. The owners can either be the public/state, private actors or communities. Sometimes, less complete rights are established for forests. For example, private parties can gain rights to access, harvest and manage a specific part of publicly owned forests via permits or concessions.11 In these cases, ownership and less complete users’ rights co-exist in the same forests: ownership is a public property right, while user’s rights are private. This research treats the forests as public, private or communal according to the party in which the management right is vested.12
The migratory nature of fish makes a clear demarcation and the exclusion of other parties from exploiting the same stocks difficult. It creates challenges to the establishment of ownership over fish resources. The state may claim ownership/sovereignty over the resources within its territory (e.g. Mexico). However, it is usually the private parties/communities who harvest the resources. These user rights for fish are less complete than for forests, including only parts of the elements of ownership.13 In the strict legal sense, these rights are not always admitted as property rights.14 However, it does imply some control of the parties over fish resources, such as access, harvest and management. This research does not discuss the legal nature of property rights, but uses the term inclusively, referring to the rights/interests/privileges of the fishing actors.
Even for less complete property rights, their boundaries need to be established. The boundary of forests is decided geographically. As for fishing rights, the boundary can be decided according to geographical scope, species or volume. The territorial user rights are established geographically. Under the territorial user rights, the rights to harvest specific species (and exceptionally all species) in demarcated areas are exclusively vested in individuals or communities. The territorial user rights are more suitable for coastal areas and less migratory species, such as the rights of FCAs in Japan, the rights over Baja California lobster and the Seris’ rights over crab in Mexico. The boundaries of property rights of migratory species cannot be properly established geographically. In these cases, volume and species are often used for defining property rights. For example, under the quotas schemes, the rights to harvest a specific species up to a certain volume are granted to individuals or communities. Individual quotas have been used broadly and individual transferable quotas have been considered an important tool in promoting sustainable fishery management by many scholars.15 In the studied cases, individual quotas were used broadly in South Africa while New Zealand has one of the most comprehensive and best known ITQ systems. In addition to TURs and quotas, a limited entry system also exists broadly in, for example, South Africa and Mexico. In this situation, no quotas are established individually. Each rights holder has the right to harvest specific species. The access is limited in terms of the number of permits, fleets, size of engine and so on.
Property rights for fish are less complete than for forests. This implies that the different elements of ownership, such as the rights to access, harvest, manage, exclude and alienate are vested in different parties, either the fishing rights holders or the owners. The property rights systems examined combine characteristics of public, private and communal property rights. Property rights under limited entry systems are the most vaguely defined. The rights holders can access and harvest specific resources in specific areas. But such rights are not exclusive and many actors operate in the same areas. To manage the fishery, multiple actors need to cooperate. However, since the volume of fish which can be harvested is not restricted individually, actors tend to compete with each other and have little incentive to coordinate in managing the resources. Therefore, in this example, it is often the government which prepares management plans and determines how the resources are to be protected.16 The rights of exclusion and alienation are also vested in the government.17 Therefore, the limited entry system is closest to a public rights system.
Under the individual quotas systems, individuals have rights to access and harvest the resources. Individual quotas take away the incentives for rights holders to ‘race for fish’ and provide incentives to protect the targeted species. However, individuals alone cannot decide how the fishery is managed. In some cases, the government plays a dominant role in deciding how a fishery is managed.18 The fishermen usually do not participate in the decision-making and do not decide the operational rules concerning the use of the fisheries.19 Sometimes, the fishermen self-organize to achieve common goals and the self-governing institutions can share some rights of management with the government.20 Usually, the rights holders have no authority to decide who can access the resources and to alienate their rights. The rights to exclude and to alienate still reside with the government. This system therefore has combined characteristics of different property rights. The individual transferable quota system in New Zealand is an exception. The quotas are granted to individuals permanently and the rights holders can transfer the quotas to other parties; they then also have rights to alienation.
The territorial user rights (TURs) can be granted to both individuals and communities but the latter is more common.21 In this case, the communities have the right to access, harvest and manage fisheries. Moreover, the self-governing institutions have the right to determine who can access their resources and hence have the right to exclude as well. Only the right to alienate is reserved for the government.
This part compares public and private regulatory instruments adopted to address forest and fishery problems. For public regulation, this overview will focus on the national level and examine the specific regulatory instruments used in each country studied. This section compares several commonly used regulatory instruments, such as planning, permits and concessions as well as performance standards. More particularly, the question of what specific instruments are being used to control forest degradation and depletion of fish stocks will be addressed. As far as private regulation is concerned, this research focuses on certification, specifically the FSC, the PEFC and the MSC. The next section will focus on the interaction of public and private regulation (5.3) as well as on the necessary preconditions for the proper functioning of property rights, discussed in the theoretical framework (5.4).
The case studies show that different regulatory instruments are being used to regulate forests and fisheries in different countries. The analysis of North America and Sweden subsequently focuses on riparian forest protection and biodiversity protection. Therefore a limited number of instruments will be discussed: spatial planning of riparian buffer zones in North America and command and control/suasive instruments targeting biodiversity in Sweden. Instruments discussed in other case studies can either influence the establishment of property rights, such as spatial planning and permits, or influence directly how the forests/fisheries are managed, such as more specific performance standards (limits to tree felling, equipment restriction and so on). This part compares these instruments which have been used for forest and fishery regulation.
Both forestry and fishery concern the exploitation of spatial areas. Different actors may use the same or different resources in the same areas, such as timber harvest (either by large companies, private owners or indigenous communities), food collection, plantations, or agriculture in the same forests, or fish capture (either by commercial, recreational or customary users), aquaculture, or marine biodiversity conservation in the same marine areas. The co-existence of multiple activities potentially leads to spatial conflicts. For example, in Indonesia conflicts between commercial timber companies and indigenous people are widespread.22 In addition, the fast expansion of palm oil planting, mining and agriculture led to the conversion of forests.23 The competition between timber harvest, agriculture and cattle farming in Bolivia has also led to rapid deforestation.24 Spatial conflicts may also exist in marine areas. The cases of South Africa and Mexico exemplify that unclear fishing rights lead to conflicts between commercial fishermen and small-scale fishermen operating in the same marine areas. Even in New Zealand where clear commercial fishing rights have been established, conflicts have arisen between different fishing sectors (commercial, recreational and customary), and between fishermen and farmers (who use the marine areas for aquaculture) and environmental groups (who prefer to establish environmental protection areas).25
Spatial planning is an important tool to decide which activities are allowed in specific areas. The permission of actors to harvest forests or to capture fish needs to comply with the spatial planning. Therefore spatial planning and the establishment of property rights are closely linked. However, the coordination of different interests in spatial planning is not easy. The case of Indonesia illustrates this. Both central and regional governments have the authority to plan space at respective levels, often resulting in conflicting plans.26 In addition to the Ministry of Forests which is responsible for deciding the boundary of forested areas, non-forestry agencies also determine the areas for their related activities according to sector-based legislation, such as the areas for agriculture, mining and the establishment of eco-regions. Though the spatial planning law requires coordination among the actors involved in planning land use, it is not actually implemented.27 In summary, the conflicts between different levels of government and different departments have led to incoherent spatial planning. Marine spatial planning is also argued to be an instrument to integrate different marine interests, such as fishery, aquaculture, offshore oil and gas exploitation, ecosystem protection and so on.28 To establish comprehensive marine spatial planning is, however, a difficult task. The area-based management is often conducted from a sectoral perspective. For example, in New Zealand fisheries under QMS systems are managed at the level of quota management areas, determined by the fisheries agency. The establishment of marine protection areas is carried out according to the Marine Protection Act by the Department of Conservation.29 Efforts have been made trying to integrate diverse marine usages, such as developing fisheries’ plans.30 However, the process of establishing fisheries plans has been cumbersome. It concerns only fishery sectors and includes mainly broad management goals rather than strict spatial planning. A comprehensive marine spatial plan is still yet to be developed in New Zealand.31
Permits and concessions are commonly used by the government to restrict access to forest and fish resources. In Indonesia, the Ministry of Forests is responsible for issuing most logging permits. Local governments can issue some ‘lesser’ permits and other authorities can issue permits for mining and estate crops plantation. These different agencies sometimes issue conflicting permits, thereby accelerating deforestation.32 In Bolivia, concessions have been used to authorize private actors and indigenous people to access public forests since 1996. Authorization is also needed to access and harvest private and communal forests. Under the concessions and authorizations, five types of forest tenure have been clearly distinguished on paper, though the institutional arrangement may make some forest tenure difficult to establish and function in practice. In fishery governance, permits/licences/concessions are also broadly used to authorize companies/individuals/communities to harvest specific species in determined areas. For example, in South Africa, one needs to obtain a permit to execute fishing rights. Under the total allowable catch (TAC) system, permit holders are allocated quotas for specific species. Under the total allowable effort (TAE) system, the number of permits or number of vessels, or size of engines is limited. In Japan, access to fish resources is granted in two ways, fishery rights or fishery licences. The fishery rights systems are area-based. With the licences, the fisheries are managed under a limited entry system.
Spatial planning and permits are related to the establishment of property rights. In addition, public regulation can also determine how forests/fisheries are to be managed directly, and hence influence the execution of property rights. These technical standards include, for example the minimum logging cycle, a minimum cut diameter by tree species, the type of fishing gear, fisheries closures and so on. The biodiversity standards in Sweden show both the advantages and the limits of what can be achieved with performance standards. However, the design of such standards is usually based on western science which is more suitable for resource management by commercial parties on a large scale than for small-scale forestry and fishery which are often artisanal, low impact, not capital intensive and often lack information. Using the same standards for commercial and small-scale forestry/fishing has created challenges for the latter, weakening their property rights, as has happened, for example, in Bolivia33 and South Africa.34
The examination of private regulation focuses on certification schemes, specifically FSC and PEFC in forest governance and the MSC in fishery governance. In forest governance, both FSC and PEFC are well-known transnational schemes with broad coverage. The FSC was initiated by environmental NGOs in 1993. Its stringent standards provoked caution in the forest industry, which responded by establishing its own industry-led national certification schemes. These national schemes were later endorsed by the PEFC. The competition between the FSC and PEFC has led to the ratcheting up and convergence of standards.35 The development of national FSC and PEFC standards in Sweden is an example of this.36
A different picture exists for fishery certification: so far the MSC is the most acknowledged and broadly used transnational fishery certification scheme for capturing fish. The FOS, though it has broad coverage as well, is not well accepted because of vague standards and relying only on existing documentation. Some countries have developed their own national schemes as alternatives for the dominant MSC, such as the national scheme in Japan. However, in the international arena, competition between certification schemes, like in forest governance, is not so obvious. Unlike forest certification, which developed in response to an international regulatory gap, the MSC is established in a heavily regulated field. Therefore, it is strongly influenced by international law. The original MSC principles and criteria are based on a 1995 FAO Code of Conduct. The UN General Assembly Resolution 61/105 led to better protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the recent revision of MSC standards.37
The MSC was initiated by the WWF, which was also an initiator of the FSC. The MSC also learnt from the experience with the FSC. However, important differences exist between the two schemes. First, the FSC has its own global standards, the FSC Principles and Criteria. To tailor the general standards to local situations, many national or regional standards have been developed by its national affiliates.38 Such forests are evaluated against the local standards. But if local standards do not exist, forests are evaluated by certifiers against global standards.39 The MSC, however, has only global standards. In the beginning, the evaluation team appointed by certifiers developed ‘an assessment tree’ comprising detailed indicators and scoring guides for the assessment of specific fisheries according to global standards. This led to inconsistencies among certifications for different fisheries. Therefore, since 2008, a ‘default assessment tree’ was introduced by the MSC to apply the same methodology for assessment of different fisheries.40
Second, the governance structure is also different. FSC is a ‘devolved, chamber-based, membership organization’.41 It has three chambers: economic, environmental and social chambers, with equal voting rights. It is open to individuals and organizations and can determine FSC policy through General Assembly meetings or electing international and national board members.42 The membership-based structure allows broad participation in FSC decision-making, but on the other hand, also leads to long procedures. The MSC has chosen deliberately a more efficient, but less participatory approach. It has adopted a streamlined governance structure without members. Its decision power has been placed with the Board of Trustees.43 This structure, however, has been criticized for its lack of democratic accountability.44
Third, they also focus differently on standard setting. The FSC standards require sustainability in terms of environmental, economic and social issues. However, the MSC emphasizes only environmental issues. The protection of economic and social interests does not go beyond legal compliance.45
Another issue concerns the accountability mechanisms of the certification schemes. Public regulation bases its legitimacy and accountability on parliamentary democratic principles. However, ‘how, to whom and against what norms certification programmes are held accountable’ causes more concern.46 Accountability includes both external and internal accountability. External accountability requires the programme to respond to the demands of external parties, such as environmental groups, business and governments, which can be accommodated by the above-mentioned governance structure. Internal accountability needs to ensure compliance with certification standards, which can be achieved via assessment and objection procedures.47 The above analysis shows that the FSC can better address external accountability via more participatory governance structures. As for internal accountability, both schemes have adopted specific objection procedures which allow for the challenging of certified forestry and fisheries. However, both procedures have been criticized in the literature. In addition to the high costs and long procedures which impede the initiation of formal objection procedures, such procedures rarely lead to the revocation of certification in practice.48 The case studies of Sweden and New Zealand provide examples. Dissatisfaction with certification has led to the withdrawal of support of the major ENGOs in Sweden from FSC Sweden. The RFBPS in New Zealand objected to the first two certifications of the hoki fishery. It felt that its concerns were not sufficiently considered. Therefore, it did not participate in the third assessment, but initiated its own buyers’ guide programme.49
The case studies show that public and private regulation often interact in governing forest and fishery problems. This part examines how such interaction plays out similarly or differently in the two examined domains. First, whether certification standards include requirements directly linked to property rights influences interaction in forest and fishery governance. Second, the different characteristics of the resources also influence the role of government in certification. The third section shows that although public and private regulation are complementary, the latter cannot be replaced by the former. The differences between the two regulatory approaches are explored in section 5.5.4.
As mentioned earlier, forest certification includes standards regarding environmental, economic and social issues. Clear forest tenure and respect for the rights of indigenous people are usually preconditions for a forest to obtain certification. Property rights are also regulated under domestic law. The case studies of Indonesia and Bolivia show that many public regulatory instruments, such as spatial planning, permits and CBFM promotion measures, can influence property rights. Here it will be analysed how public and private regulation interact on paper and in practice. The stringency and compatibility of certification standards and domestic law regarding property will be compared. In the case studies of North America and Sweden, the focus will be on the limitation of property rights. The analysis will be on how public and private regulation interact to address subsequently riparian zone protection and biodiversity protection issues. These environmental issues are regulated directly both under certification schemes and public regulation.
MSC standards, however, are deliberately narrowed down to environmental issues. Social issues like property rights are also reflected in terms of legal compliance requirements. Therefore, a direct comparison of the standards regarding property rights under certification and domestic law does not make much sense. The analysis of interaction hence focuses on the practical level: to what extent the interaction between public and private regulation has led to a strengthening or refining of property rights.
Although the government can issue general regulations regarding forest management, it are usually the private parties, such as forest companies, private owners or communities who conduct daily management and develop management plans. These private parties can apply for certification and improve their performance according to the requirements of certification. The government usually does not participate in the certification procedures themselves, but often plays an indirect role in certification, such as providing expertise and financial support in agenda setting. This can be done by providing resources to clients of certification and enacting public procurement.50 Fish resources are migratory and are often exploited by many users in a broad geographical scope. Sometimes, local fishermen or their organizations conduct management themselves. However, it is not uncommon that the government decides how a fishery is to be managed and develops the management plan itself.51 In this case, the government acts as the client of certification.52 Even if private parties are the client, as in the case studies, the government can influence the whole certification process, from nominating the evaluation team, providing financial support, to providing information for assessment and conducting measures to satisfy the conditions required for certification.53 These more direct roles of the government in certification are shown in the examples of certified fisheries in the three case studies.54 Given the fact that the government usually does not participate directly in certification processes of forestry, its influence in this domain is best understood in general terms. On the contrary, the analysis of interaction is based on specific examples when it comes to fishery.
In the studied countries, forestry and fishery are governed by both public and private regulation. The case studies show that the countries scoring high on good governance and public regulation have the most forests and fisheries certified.55 Moreover, certified forests and fisheries in developing countries are usually already better regulated before certification than most other users in the same country. For example, the case study of Indonesia shows that the certified community-managed forests were already managed well due to prior public regulation.56 In South Africa, the certified hake fishery was prioritized in public regulation and hence a higher level of public enforcement already existed in hake fishery before certification compared to other fisheries in that country. The pre-existence of good public regulation made it easier for the hake fishery to obtain certification.57 However, since good public regulation is missing in developing countries, it is more difficult for the majority of forests and fisheries to obtain certification in these countries. However, the case studies also show that sometimes the efforts to obtain certification provide incentives to improve public regulation. The management of swimming crab in Mexico is such an example. Public regulation concerning swimming crab in most areas of the Gulf of California was lacking. These areas were managed under a limited entry system, where resource overexploitation was widespread. The Seri, however, effectively controlled the fisheries in the Infiernillo Channel through self-governance. The early attempts of the Seris’ fishery to be pre-assessed for certification led to the first public management tool, the crab NOM. The increased demand for crab triggered the effort to certify the whole fishery in the Gulf of California in the late 2000s. A fishery improvement project and a pre-assessment were conducted. These efforts have led to the development of many public management measures.58
When public regulation is lacking, certification is most likely to bring public regulation about when financial incentives are present, such as increased demand or a price premium. The example of the crab fishery in Mexico, just presented, showed that there was a desire to have certification, but public regulation was lacking. In that case the demand for certification pushed public regulation. In addition, when public regulation is already in place, certification to some extent accredits public regulation.59 The evaluation and certification process help to expose insufficiencies in public regulation and the triggers to solve them. Sometimes certification leads to changes in legislation. For example, the certification of the Mexico Baja California Red Rock Lobster Fishery identified the insufficiency of the current regime in reducing ecosystem risks. This led to the changes in the lobster NOM and also the inclusion of ecological risk considerations in the General Law on Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture.60 In Sweden, the certification criterion regarding retention of trees was also later incorporated into government regulation.61
Although public and private regulation can be complementary, important differences exist. First, the case studies show that standards under public and private regulation are not always coherent. In North America and Bolivia, certification standards closely mimic public regulation. However, Indonesia provides an example of contradictory norms in public and private regulation regarding indigenous people’s property rights. Public and private regulation of fisheries in Sweden also shows differences in standards.62 As far as fishery governance is concerned, the MSC does not have specific requirements concerning compliance with domestically determined property rights.
Second, and more important, private and public regulation operate in different ways. This can again be illustrated by the case of Sweden: whereas public regulation applies at the national or regional level, certification applies to certified forests/fisheries and operates at the management unit level.63
Third, both public and private regulations are subject to their own limitations. Public regulation requires enforcement capacity. This is a problem for many developing countries, which are subject to staff, financial and expertise scarcity and vulnerable to corruption and elite capture.64 Even in developed countries with stronger governance capacity, limits exist. For example, reduced budgets undermined the usage of suasive instruments in Sweden.65 As far as certification is concerned, insufficiency of accountability mechanisms has been noted. The cases of Sweden and New Zealand show that certifiers are reluctant to revoke certifications when challenged by third parties.66
In Chapter 2 we have indicated that the literature pointed to the fact that the establishment and maintenance of property rights create various transaction costs. After identifying those particular costs (related to the clear definition of property rights, enforcement, coordination, information creation and sharing as well as scaling) we argued that those costs in fact are preconditions for a proper functioning of the various types of property rights. We will now verify in what respects public and private regulation affect those preconditions for a proper functioning of property rights and are able to overcome the limitations of property rights in the cases of forestry and fisheries.
This book examined three types of property rights over common-pool resources: public property rights, private property rights and communal property rights. For forests, these are usually formulated as ownership over forests/the land or less complete forest tenure. Three types of fishing rights were discussed: the limited entry system, individual quotas and territorial user rights. These fishing rights often have combined characteristics of public, private or communal property rights. Some literature argues that either public property rights or private property rights are the only solution to the common-pool resources problem.67 The case studies we conducted do not support these arguments. For example, private forests are more popular in America while public property rights dominate in Canada.68 However, the case studies show that both countries perform relatively well in spite of the different types of property rights adopted. For fishery governance, many have recommended individual quotas, especially individual transferable quotas systems.69 However, the case studies show that territorial user rights (Mexico and Japan) can also induce good performance.70 Moreover, conversely, the individual quotas in South Africa have not been able to guarantee sustainable management.71
The case studies also show that shifts of communal property rights to public or private property rights have been based on unsubstantiated confidence in the effectiveness of the private or public property rights. Nationalization may transform ‘previously limited access common-pool resources into open access resources’ when the government does not have the capacity to enforce its public property rights over vast resources.72 Examples are constituted by the cases of Indonesia and Bolivia. ‘Likewise, the substitution of common property for private ownership has been environmentally and socially deleterious, where privatization has meant the loss of access to critical resources by local populations and private entrepreneurs are motivated solely by short-term profit, discounting the future value of the resource’.73 For example, in Indonesia communal property rights used to be the dominant approach to regulating forests, based on customary law. However, since colonization customary law and communal property rights have been replaced by state ownership of forests.74 Traditional control over forests has hence been dismantled. The government, however, has no capacity to control the vast forests in Indonesia, leading to rampant illegal logging.75 The 1917 Constitution of Mexico established state ownership over natural resources and enshrined state intervention in allocating and safeguarding resources.76 The state-led development policies encouraged outside encroachment and resource poaching. Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, the export-oriented fisheries policies led to large-scale immigration to the fishery areas. Responding to low productivity and overexploitation, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed a shift towards market-oriented development and privatization. It eliminated the cooperatives’ exclusive access to many species, leading to a shift from territorial user rights (concessions of cooperatives) to a limited entry system (permits). This arrangement further aggravated destructive resource use.77
Rather than the type of property rights, it seems that the clear definition of property rights and their content are more important. A comparatively complete property right is crucial to incentivize sustainable behaviour. This is in line with the theoretical literature, more particularly Schlager and Ostrom who argue that at the least, communities need to have rights to access, harvest and manage resources to induce effective communal management.78 The CBFM policies in Indonesia constitute an example. Although aiming at promoting community management of forests, these policies often provided limited rights to the communities, failing to incentivize responsible behaviour.79
In addition to the types of rights awarded, the institutional arrangement is also crucial. For example, in Bolivia, the rights of indigenous people over forests are recognized in law. However, the law also required the establishment of a new institution, the TCO, on top of traditional self-governing institutions (usually the villages) as a precondition of confirming the communities’ property rights. Geographically separated and culturally different villages have been joined by the TCO and thus have weakened the basis of self-governance. The co-existence of different levels of governance has also weakened the capacity to conduct effective control in Indonesia and Bolivia. Therefore, unsuitable institutions can impede the definition of clear property rights.
The case studies have also shown that the match between property rights and the cultural and economic characteristics of the user groups is important. For example, replacing communal property rights with private property rights for indigenous people or local communities is problematic because they are often exploiting natural resources for subsistence use and are not used to large-scale operations, intensive use and commercialized activities. Private forests or ITQ system fisheries are usually regulated by instruments most suitable for large-scale intensive use and for commercial entrepreneurs. Small-scale fisheries that have been defined as a ‘limited commercial sector’ have found it difficult to comply with the same property rights rules and regulations that apply to commercial fishers.80 Another example is that communities in Indonesia and Bolivia have hardly succeeded in obtaining certificates in forest management. The case of New Zealand provides an example where communities have successfully adapted to a private property regime. The Maori have two types of fishing rights: the ITQ as commercial fishing rights and their customary rights. The ITQ is market-based and most suitable for capitalist market economies. The Maori have been well integrated into the market economy and have accommodated the ITQs. They possess more than one third of the quotas and organize their own companies to manage these quotas.81
The establishment of property rights includes some parties and excludes others. How to address the excluded parties, especially those who have historically exploited the resources, is crucial to ensure that de jure property rights are respected. If the historical users are excluded without proper compensation and alternative employment, their exclusion leaves them little choice but to continue exploiting the resources illegally, as shown in the cases of Indonesia, Bolivia and South Africa. The establishment of ITQs in New Zealand has also led many fishermen to lose quotas. However, the existence of alternative employment and allocation based on historical production together with government buy backs has provided fishermen with opportunities to leave the industry.82
Both public and private regulation can influence the definition of property rights. The influence of public regulation can be found in various ways. For example, CBFM policies define the scope of rights granted to communities; the institutional arrangements for communal property rights (establishing new ones like TCO in Bolivia, or restructuring local communities according to the Java model in Indonesia)83 depend on public regulation. Permits/concessions are crucial for establishing property rights. The limited entry system and ITQ system are also products of public regulation, such as restricting the number of vessels/permits and TAC and allocating them to individuals. Forest certification also has standards regarding property rights. To get certified, clear forest tenure needs to be established and the rights of indigenous people need to be respected. This may act as a barrier for certification in many developing countries where such conditions are not satisfied, such as Bolivia and Indonesia. However, this also suggests that in the certified forests, property rights arrangements may be fine-tuned for the forests to obtain certification. The influence of the MSC on property rights is more indirect given the limited direct relevance of property rights in the standards. Case studies, however, do show that certification has the potential to refine the content of property rights, such as further dividing the quotas for hoki into different stocks in New Zealand.84 Certification also has the potential to consolidate the rights of certified parties and to marginalize their competitors, as shown in the case of South Africa.85
The safeguarding of property rights can be monitored and assured by public and private regulation. As far as communal property rights are concerned, self-governing institutions can also oversee the compliance with property rights.
The good governance indicators provide an indication of the enforcement capacity of public regulators. This capacity is related to the availability of staff, budget, expertise, vulnerability to corruption, the authority provided to a public agency and the relationship between different regulatory bodies. For example, the regulatory fishery agencies in New Zealand have far-reaching authority in enforcement, such as random entry, search and questioning. These far-reaching powers and the cooperation between agencies contribute to strong enforcement capacity.86 Mexico provides an opposite example. The main competent authority CONAPESCA has little enforcement power. The lack of coordination between CONAPESCA and other agencies has even created an enforcement gap for several years.87 Indonesia provides another example showing that conflicts between different departments and levels of government can lead to conflicting enforcement activities.88 In addition, the levels of enforcement may be unequally distributed across a country. For example, in South Africa, generally speaking, many fisheries have been subject to illegal fishing and overexploitation. However, since the enforcement of the economically most valuable fishery in this country, hake has been prioritized, this fishery is better protected than the other fisheries. This means that the unequal allocation of enforcement capacity may lead to a sharp contrast between forests/fisheries.
Certification can provide additional monitoring and assurance to public enforcement capacity. The cases of certified fisheries show that insufficiencies of public enforcement are sometimes identified in the certification process and that the repair of these insufficiencies is a requirement for obtaining certification.89 In America, anecdotal evidence shows that certification has contributed to the improvement of compliance with public regulation regarding riparian buffer-zone protection.90 However, certification does not automatically improve monitoring and oversight. Certifiers may be captured by their customers in order to secure income. The case studies of Sweden and New Zealand have shown that objections to certification seldom have serious consequences.91
Public regulation, self-governing institutions and private regulation rely on different ways of monitoring: self-governing institutions rely on local users who conduct daily management activities and have easiest access to the information regarding the resources and exploitation activities. Public regulators rely on the monitoring of government officials and the certification schemes require the expertise of forest/fishery professionals. The latter actors may have advantages in terms of economies of scale or expertise, but are further away from the daily activities in forests/fisheries and monitoring can therefore be more costly. It is thus crucial to figure out whether these different approaches of monitoring complement or replace/weaken each other. Indonesia provides an example where traditional self-governing institutions have been dismantled by law and self-enforcement is replaced by weak public enforcement.92 In Bolivia, the traditional governing institutions, the villages have not been abolished but an additional level of governing institution has been added on top of the villages, de facto weakening their functioning.93 Certification may also require the replacement of traditional governing institutions by new governing ones such as cooperatives or enterprises.94 There are also examples where public regulators recognize traditional property rights and their governing institutions. Such recognition increases the self-governing capacity of local communities. The lobster and crab fisheries in Mexico and the development of fishing rights in Japan are examples where the recognition by public authorities has strengthened the capacity to exert social control by communities. In North America, the coordination between public and private regulators has helped to reduce enforcement costs. In New Zealand, public regulatory bodies and fishermen’s organizations have collaborated to strengthen monitoring and assurance.
Many different actors are involved in exploiting forests or fish stocks. Coordination between the various parties, both among rights holders or between forest/fishing rights holders and other parties is crucial for the proper functioning of property rights.
The different types of property rights vary in their capacity to coordinate the behaviour of the different actors involved. Under public property rights, the state or other level of government is the rights holder, who also decides the allocation of user rights and acts as coordinator. As far as communal property rights are concerned, self-governing institutions play an important role in coordinating the behaviour of its members. These self-governing institutions decide who has rights to access and to harvest the resources and how. Private actors are rights holders under private property rights. Coordination problems arise especially when multiple parties are allowed to exploit the same resources, as in the fisheries cases. The individual quotas system grants the right to harvest specific species up to a certain volume. This means individual quotas diminish the incentives to move first to catch fish. However, multiple actors may exploit the same stocks in the same or adjacent areas. Moreover, individual parties may not have incentives to coordinate their actions by sharing information or adopting more efficient and environmentally friendly methods.95 In New Zealand, a co-management system has been implemented, encouraging the establishment of quota owners’ organizations. In this system, quotas are still granted to individuals but the organizations play an important role in pooling resources and coordinating the behaviour of individual quota owners.96 In this particular case, a hybrid system has evolved, combining private and communal rights.
Both public and private regulation can influence the coordination of forest and fishery management. Spatial planning is an instrument to demarcate the areas used for forestry and other forest-related activities, such as mining, plantation and agriculture. Marine spatial planning is also promoted to coordinate fishing activities with other activities using marine areas, though its usage in the examined cases is more limited. New Zealand provides an example with little coordination between the commercial, communal and recreational sectors. The fishery planning only concerns coordination among different fishery sectors, but not coordination between fishery sectors and other sectors which have an interest in using marine areas.97 Sometimes, specific governmental institutions are established to promote coordination. Japan provides such an example, where coordination committees have been established at prefectural, cross-prefectural and national levels.98 The case study shows that prefectural coordination committees have worked together with fishermen’s organizations in developing management plans. However, cross-prefectural coordination has rarely occurred in practice.99 Coordination among governmental agencies can also be problematic. Departmentalism and a contested decentralization process have led to conflicting decisions and regulatory gaps among differential sectors or different levels of governments, as shown in the case studies of Indonesia, Bolivia and Mexico.
Certification can also provide a platform for multiple stakeholders to collaborate. The standards of development and governance of the certification schemes usually involve industry, rights holders, social groups and environmental interests. As discussed earlier, the governance structure of forest certification is more inclusive than in fishery certification, resulting in more public involvement in the former.100 In the individual certification process, stakeholders are identified and their opinions are considered in the evaluation.101 However, sometimes public involvement is criticized as insufficient.102 The insufficient involvement of environmental groups has been a cause of concern. As shown in the cases of Sweden and New Zealand, dissatisfaction with certification has led some environmental groups to withdraw their support from certification schemes. This misalignment is problematic since environmental groups are usually an important impetus for the increasing demand for certified products.103
The co-existence of different regulatory schemes may also add complexity to the governance of forests and fisheries and a cause of confusion among regulatees. For example, multiple institutions have been created to manage community forests in Indonesia and Bolivia: traditional self-governing institutions, institutions reorganized or created by the government (e.g. the reformed villages in Indonesia and the TCO in Bolivia) as well as cooperatives/enterprises created to obtain certification. These complexities have added to coordination costs. The example of Sweden also shows that the multiple layers of regulation often lead to confusion among forest owners in deciding their forest management activities. The community-managed fisheries in Mexico (lobster) and Japan provide examples of better coordination. In the lobster fishery in Mexico, the cooperatives are rights holders, which are organized under the federation of FEDECOOP. The FEDECOOP applied for certification. Therefore, the same institutions conduct self-management and operate under public and private regulation. In Japan, the autonomous management bodies, FCAs, originated in the Edo era. These rights holders are acknowledged by law and conduct self-management in practice. Path-dependent institutional arrangements maintain consistency in decision-making and align decision-making with local culture and customs.
The availability of information regarding resources status, forest/fishing activities and their interaction is crucial for resources management. Local users, government institutions and certification assessment can all act as information generators. These different sources of information all have their advantages and disadvantages. Local actors are well informed about local issues, such as the status of the resources, local livelihood demands and behaviours. The indigenous exploitation of forests in Indonesia is such an example. The use of fallow periods, fire and cleared land for agriculture are based on local knowledge and respect ecological limits. However, the replacement of customs by commercial exploitation and agriculture by outsiders, has had devastating effects on the tropical forests.104
Compared to local knowledge, ‘the state has a regional and national vantage point and a repertoire of tools and techniques not normally available to local institutions’.105 However, to obtain information about vast forest or marine areas remains a challenge, especially when the capacity of regulatory agencies is weak, such as in Indonesia, Bolivia, South Africa and Mexico. Even in countries with comparatively strong governmental capacity, information insufficiency is not uncommon. New Zealand is such an example. This country became a marine superpower overnight because of the declaration of the EEZ. Many measures have been adopted to overcome information problems. For example, New Zealand has imposed high reporting requirements on quota holders, vessel holders and fish receivers. Cross-checks ensure the accuracy of information. Some new technologies, such as VMS, are also widely used in Japan, New Zealand and some important fisheries in South Africa to make available real-time information. In Sweden, many informational instruments have been used to guide the behaviour of forest owners.
Certification can also play an important role in information generation and spreading. Certification schemes have rules concerning the documentation of processes related to forest and fishery management. Information is made available during the certification process. Assessment teams gather information from existing documentation and literature produced by clients, scientists, government authorities and other stakeholders. The publication of final reports and of surveillance reports also increases the transparency of information. Assessment reports also identify gaps in knowledge and issue conditions or recommendations accordingly, which provide drivers for information production.106
For resources management it is beneficial to build a robust bridge between those complementary types of knowledge. For example, in North America public and private regulators coordinate in sharing of information and rely on the information provided by each other.107 In South Africa, the government prioritizes its activities in the hake fishery. The adoption of VMS provides real-time information. The fishing industry’s organization SADSTIA also has its own scientific observer programme generating information. In New Zealand and Japan, co-management is promoted to take advantage of the information of both governmental and local users.108
Forest and fishery management requires considerations at different scales. Issues such as the protection of sedentary fish species and the retention of trees can be addressed at a local scale. But issues like biodiversity protection and riparian forest protection require landscape considerations. Regulatory approaches vary in their capacity to address different scales. Certification is conducted at management unit level and is therefore particularly tailored to local situations. Coordination between different units is needed in order to incorporate higher-level considerations. Public regulation can address issues at both local level (such as the management of fisheries in South Africa) or at larger scale (e.g. fishing plans in New Zealand). However, the case study of North America and Sweden shows that even public regulation is often insufficient in incorporating landscape considerations.
Decentralization is often recommended to regulate natural resources. It is believed to enable decision-making close to local users and hence to contribute to resource management. However, the case studies show that when the system is captured and corrupt and lack of coordination among government agencies and different levels of government is aggravated by obscure and conflicting legislation, the decentralization process itself can be a driver of environmental problems. For example, in Indonesia, conflicting legislation concerning decentralization and recentralization reflects a tug of war between different levels of government. Multiple agencies often conduct conflicting spatial planning and issue overlapping permits over the same area. The self-interested motives of bureaucrats behind these conflicting behaviours have not been overcome yet. In Bolivia, conflicting interests among different levels of government and different departments also exist, such as the reluctance of municipalities to support TCOs’ application and the nesting of the land regularization process under the agricultural model. Such conflicts are also reflected in the legislation. One example is the requirement of an FES in titling private land and TCOs are more favourable to agriculture than to forestry use.
An important goal of property rights in addressing common-pool resources problems is to internalize externalities and to limit the incentives of free-riding. Property rights, however, have their own limitations. Establishing property rights over forest and fish resources can help to internalize the economic values of the resources, and hence contribute to solving part of the environmental problems, such as deforestation and the overexploitation of targeted fish species. However, property rights are less useful in internalizing the non-market values of resources. For example, the supporting value of forests for other species, and their functions in soil and water conservation will not be internalized by establishing property rights. Indeed, as the case studies of North America and Sweden have shown, forest degradation may still occur even when clear forest tenure has been established. This has been one of the reasons for creating riparian zone protection by regulation. The fishery chapter also shows the limitations of three types of fishing rights. The limited entry system does not eradicate the incentives to move first in catching fish. Under the individual quotas system, fishermen need to coordinate their activities for resource heterogeneity to be taken into account, which is not always easily achievable. Moreover, property rights holders have not sufficiently considered by-catch and the protection of habitats and ecosystems. Even the TURs leave non-targeted species and ecosystem protection as externalities. As was argued in Chapter 2, property rights are crucial in overcoming common-pool resources problems. However, they do not prevent rights holders from using property rights in ways that can harm third parties. It is for this reason that public and private regulation do not only have to intervene in the establishment and functioning of the property rights, but also in guaranteeing that the use of the property rights will not result in externalities.
In the next chapter conclusions will be drawn about the comparative case studies. This chapter ends by pointing out general trends that can be derived from the case studies. In many of the examined countries, shifts could be observed towards decentralization to local authorities and privatization, whereby increasingly control over natural resources was assigned to private actors or self-governing communities.109
These phenomena also have had an important influence on establishing property rights. Although historically many natural resources were exploited by local communities, as a result of the influence of colonization and decolonization, state ownership and control over natural resources became common in many countries. An example is constituted by the case of Indonesia. Forests used to be managed by communities. During the colonial period the colonial government claimed ownership over resources and controlled land in Java. The later post-colonial Indonesian government retained this state ownership. To some extent similar developments took place in other countries examined in the case studies, such as Bolivia and New Zealand. Indonesia and Bolivia started to recognize private forest tenure in the 1990s. Though purely private property rights over fish resources are difficult to establish, many countries also conferred more control over fish resources on private parties, for example by expanding fishing permits to individuals/companies and by supporting individual quotas systems in New Zealand and South Africa. In addition, the long-ignored communal property rights have also started to regain importance. The rights of local communities, especially indigenous people, over natural resources have started to become recognized in Indonesia, Bolivia and New Zealand, at least on paper.
Also in resources management, decentralization and privatization processes can be observed to varying degrees. The US and Canada are federal countries, where a division of authority over forest regulation exists between central and local (state/provincial) governments. In Sweden decentralization resulted from the new Forestry Act which was implemented in the 1990s. This Act consists of a framework law adopting only general and minimum standards. Under the guidance of the principle ‘freedom with responsibility’, the industry has been provided with discretion to choose the measures to achieve legal goals. The coercive level of command and control instruments has not been high and informational instruments have widely been used to guide the behaviour of the industry/forest owners. In New Zealand, the government has also tried to transfer some fishery regulatory power to the industry, such as quota registry and fishery research. In Japan, fishermen’s organizations have always played an important role in fishery management. In developing countries, decentralization became popular in the 1980s. In some countries, like Mexico, decentralization occurs ‘at a very cautious rate and lacks a cohesive long-term plan’.110 Some developing countries have gone through more comprehensive decentralization, in terms of both finance and administration, such as Bolivia and Indonesia.111
In some developed countries decentralization has improved the management of common-pool resources problems. This success depended on several conditions, such as societal pressure, information and accounting systems, parallel decentralization in administrative functions and finance as well as technical and administrative capacity.112 These conditions, however, are not always satisfied in developing countries. For in Bolivia and Mexico, local government usually has limited capacity (in terms of staff and budget) in forest/fishery regulation. Conflicts exist between different levels of agencies in decision-making.113 Indonesia provides an example of lack of accountability, capture and the absence of legal clarity leading to conflicting decisions among different levels of government. These conflicting decisions lead to unclear and overlapping boundaries between properties.
The delegation process shifts more responsibility for resources management and protection from public authorities to resource users themselves. In other words, rights holders (either private actors or local communities) have more discretion in executing their own property rights. However, to what extent delegation leads to clearer and more secure property rights, and to the promotion of sustainable resources management activities, depends on the incentives, information and capacity of rights holders. For example, in Sweden, delegation has led to the active involvement of private forest owners in forest management and protection activities. However, it has also led to the reduction of the coercive level of command and control instruments, leading to a consistent fairly high level of non-compliance. Decreased budgets of the Swedish Forest Agency have also restricted the use of informational instruments. Although some informational instruments have positively affected forestry management, they have failed to change the underlying values and preferences of forest owners. In New Zealand, the fishing industry holds permanent quotas over specific fish resources. With strong property rights (commercial fishing rights) and the partial delegation of responsibilities by the government, fishermen have formed associations, which have imposed management rules on their members. However, conflicts still exist among commercial, recreational and customary fishing rights holders. Environmental groups and noncommercial fishers have opposed the further devolution of responsibilities out of fear that this would further strengthen the position of the commercial sector and marginalize other sectors.
The decentralization processes have allowed more involvement of private actors in environmental governance, thereby providing opportunities for private regulation to develop. Forest and fishery certifications have spread widely across the world. Although property rights are mainly a domestic law issue, certification schemes (which are often transboundary) can have influence on property rights as well. Forest certification requires clear property rights as a precondition for certification. The MSC influences property rights indirectly. It can empower the certified parties, as shown by the examples of South Africa and the Baja California Rock Lobster fishery. Another side of the same coin is that certification can also be used strategically by clients to marginalize competitors who exploit the same resources by denying them market access. In addition, the content of property rights can also be fine-tuned under the influence of certification. For example, in the New Zealand case the evaluation of certification has promoted the separation of quotas for different hoki stocks. Hence, certification does have an important influence on the way in which property rights are managed at the domestic level as well.
In sum, the case studies show that important shifts took place in many countries towards the delegation and privatization of managing common-pool resources. Delegation and privatization are no guarantee to the successful management of common-pool resources problems. In some cases, mostly developed countries, these shifts have brought the places of decision-making closer to local resource users, thereby increasing local participation and reducing decision-making and enforcement costs and tailoring policies to local circumstances. In other cases, mostly in developing countries, they have (also) led to regulatory capture, legal uncertainty for property rights holders and conflicting decisions among levels of government.
1 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.1.
2 FAO 2010, p. 121. For details see Chao 2012, p. 3, available at: www.forestpeoples.org/sites/fpp/files/publication/2012/05/forest-peoples-numbers-across-world-final_0.pdf.
3 Chao 2012, p. 3.
4 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.1.
5 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.1.
6 Ibid.
7 Schuck et al. 2002, pp. 15–16; Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Definitions: Indicative Definitions Taken from the Report of the ad hoc Technical Expert Group on Forest Biological Diversity’, available at: www.cbd.int/forest/definitions.shtml; United Nations Environment Programme, ‘Forest Definition and Extent’, available at: www.unep.org/vitalforest/Report/VFG-01-Forest-definition-and-extent.pdf.
8 For example, a broadly accepted definition is provided by the FAO, which defines a forest as ‘land spanning more than 0.5 hectares with trees higher than 5 meters and a canopy cover of more than 10 percent, or trees able to reach these thresholds in situ. It does not include land that is predominantly under agricultural or urban land use’. The explanatory note 1 further clarifies: ‘Forest is determined both by the presence of trees and the absence of other predominant land uses. The trees should be able to reach a minimum height of 5 meters’. Page 3, www.fao.org/docrep/017/ap862e/ap862e00.pdf.
9 Notice that often a rather anthropocentric perspective with respect to forests is followed, whereby the value of the forest is mainly considered as a resource for use by humans rather than for its own sake. See Hey 2016, p. 2.
10 www.fao.org/docrep/009/a0653e/a0653e04.htm.
11 This is the main approach to managing public forests in Canada. Permits/concessions have also been established in public forests in Indonesia and Bolivia.
12 For example, in Indonesia, community-based forest management policies provide a different extent of rights to harvest and manage forests for communities in public forests. These types of forests are discussed under the heading ‘Community forests’.
13 For example, Schlager and Ostrom differentiate four types of fishing rights holder: owners, proprietors, claimants and authorized users. Owners enjoy comprehensive bundles of rights, including access and withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation. Proprietors have most bundles except for alienation rights. Claimants have rights of access, withdrawal and management. The rights of authorized users are limited only to access and withdrawal. See Schlager & Ostrom 1999, p. 90.
14 See the discussion in Chapter 4, section 2.2.2. For example, fishing rights for coastal fisheries are treated as property rights under fishery law while the rights of licence holders for offshore fisheries are not. In this book, they are all treated as ‘fishing rights’ for our purpose is to focus on the management of fisheries.
15 Grafton 1996; Squires et al. 1998; McCay et al. 1995; Branch 2009; Gibbs 2009.
16 Such as in South Africa and Mexico. An exception is Japan, where fishery management is highly decentralized. Even for fisheries in offshore areas, which are formally operating under the licensing system, fishermen’s organizations play an important role in coordinating the activities of their members and deciding how fisheries are managed.
17 The government determines who has access to the resources and who is excluded from using them.
18 Such as in South Africa.
19 This means direct decision-making, and does not exclude potential public consultation in public decision-making.
20 New Zealand is such an example.
21 The establishment of a territorial user rights system in abalone fisheries in South Africa is such an example. See Chapter 4, section 4.4.
22 See supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.1.
23 Indrarto et al. 2012, pp. 4–9; Palo & Vanhanen 2012; Gupta, Van der Grijp & Kuik 2012, pp. 122–124.
24 Müller, Pacheco & Montero 2014, p. 10; Müller et al. 2013.
25 Bess & Rallapudi 2007.
26 Gupta, Van der Grijp & Kuik 2012, p. 128.
27 Indrato et al. 2012, p. 21.
28 E.g. Douvere 2008; Douvere & Ehler 2009; Agardy, Notarbartolo di Sciara & Christie 2011.
29 Bess & Rallapudi 2007, p. 723.
30 Ibid., pp. 726–727.
31 See supra Chapter 4, section 4.6.3.3.5. See also Environmental Defence Society 2011, p. 43, available at: www.pepanz.com/assets/Uploads/EEZ-Policy-Document-EDS-4.pdf.
32 See supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.2.
33 The regulation of small private properties and TCOs is modelled on the regulation of large concessions. This creates challenges for local communities who are more used to subsistence use rather than large-scale commercial use. See Chapter 3, section 3.5.4.2.3.
34 In South Africa, some small-scale fishers are classified under the category ‘limited commercial sector’. They are subject to similar regulation to the industrial sector. See Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.
35 Cashore et al. 2007; Overdevest 2010.
36 See Chapter 3, section 3.7.3.3.
37 See Chapter 4, section 4.4.2.3.2.
38 Gulbrandsen 2010, p. 55.
39 Ibid., p. 56.
40 www.msc.org/documents/scheme-documents/msc-scheme-requirements/methodologies/Fisheries_Assessment_Methodology.pdf/view.
41 Gale & Haward 2004, p. 15.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 24.
44 Ibid., pp. 26–29.
45 Chapter 4, section 4.1.
46 Gulbrandsen & Auld 2016, p. 43.
47 Ibid., pp. 43–46.
48 E.g. until 2015, only two out of 31 objection procedures for MSC certification lead to the upholding or denying of certification, ibid., p. 55.
49 Weeber & Wallace 2008.
50 Gulbrandsen 2014.
51 South Africa is such an example.
52 Gulbrandsen 2010, p. 125. E.g. Alaska Department of Fish and Game is the holder of the certificate for the Alaska salmon fisheries.
53 See Foley 2013, p. 301.
54 South Africa, Mexico and New Zealand.
55 For example, forest certification is more widespread in North America and Sweden than in Indonesia and Bolivia. Japan is an exception. Though it ranked high in terms of good governance, the MSC is not active there. An explanation for the absence of the MSC in Japan is provided in Chapter 7, section 4.7.3.3.
56 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.4.2.
57 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.6.2.
58 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.5.5.2.
59 The existence of a good management system is a criterion in both forest and fishery certification. Public regulations are a crucial part of the management system, especially in fishery management. Therefore the evaluation process inevitably also involves the assessment of public regulation.
60 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.5.5.1.2.
61 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.7.4.1.
62 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.7.4.1.
63 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.7.4.2.
64 See the case studies of South Africa, Mexico, Indonesia and Bolivia.
65 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.7.3.2.
66 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.7.4.2; Chapter 4, section 4.6.5.1.
67 Ophuls 1973, p. 228; Demsetz 1967; Johnson 1972.
68 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.6.3.1.
69 Chu 2009; Griffith 2008; Symes & Crean 1995.
70 See the example of Baja California Rock Lobster Fishery in Mexico and the coastal fisheries in Japan.
71 South African fisheries are subject to serious illegal fishing and overexploitation. The hake fishery is an exception with prioritized public enforcement.
72 Young 2001, p. 286.
73 Ibid.
74 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.1.
75 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.5.1.
76 Mexican Constitution Law, Article 27. See also Young 2001, p. 286.
77 Young 2001.
78 Schlager & Ostrom 1999, p. 105.
79 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.4.2.
80 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.3.2.
81 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.6.3.2.1.
82 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.6.3.1.
83 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.1 and section 3.5.3.1.
84 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.6.5.2.
85 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.5.2.
86 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.6.6.2.
87 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.6.2.
88 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.4.2.
89 See the example of South Africa, Mexico and New Zealand.
90 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.6.4.2.
91 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.7.4; Chapter 4, section 4.6.5.1.
92 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.5.3.
93 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.5.5.3.
94 See the examples of Indonesia and Bolivia.
95 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.2.2.2.
96 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.6.3.
97 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.6.6.3.
98 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.7.3.2.
99 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.7.4.3.
100 Supra Chapter 5, section 5.3.2.
101 As seen in the case study of fishery governance.
102 E.g. the hake fishery in South Africa.
103 Gulbrandsen & Auld 2016.
104 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.4.2.
105 Berkes 2009, p. 1694.
106 Cano Chacón 2013.
107 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.6.4.2.
108 Supra Chapter 4, section 4.6.6.4; section 4.7.4.4.
109 For an overview of those developments see Saito 2008, p. 5 and see Webb & Shivakoti 2008; De Vries 2000.
110 OECD 2011a, p. 54.
111 Supra Chapter 3, section 3.4.3.2; section 3.5.3.2.
112 Ibid.
113 The different attitudes of municipalities and central agencies in supporting TCO application are such an example. See Chapter 3, section 3.5.4.2.1.