The war in Vietnam1 is still one of the most controversial and contested wars in U.S. history. Close to 40 years after the end of the conflict, interest in the war has not abated. With the opening up of the Vietnamese archives in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi to more and more researchers, interest in research into this conflict is likely to increase, as evidenced by recent scholarship and the influx of North Vietnamese perspectives that are challenging many of the narratives that have existed in the West since 1975. Among the narratives being challenged2 are the concept of a counterinsurgency versus a main force war; that General Westmoreland was out of his depth and General Abrams was the correct commander; that the U.S. military had not been trained or equipped to carry out a counterinsurgency campaign; that the U.S. military was not a learning institution; and that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was a hopeless military that could never hope to defeat the People’s Army of North Vietnam (PAVN; or more commonly known at the North Vietnamese Army or NVA) or the Viet Cong (VC).
All of these narratives fail to encompass the reality that, as all wars are, the Vietnam conflict was incredibly complex. The war was not the same in every year of its duration, or in each district or province of South Vietnam, or for all U.S. or ARVN units and formations. One must try to understand the effect of each environment, year, and strategy employed by both sides to try to understand the complexity of this war.
Vietnam was a full-spectrum campaign that encompassed all aspects of war, from political subversion to conventional warfare. Historian Graham Cosmas described it thus:
From the Military Assistance Advisory Group’s Geographically Phased Counterinsurgency Plan of 1961 through General Westmoreland’s two-fisted strategy, General Abrams’ one war, and the Marshall Committee’s area security system, MACV’s basic approach to fighting the war in South Vietnam changed only in nomenclature and detail. It consisted throughout of two basic elements. The first was a series of variations on the spreading of the oil-spot approach to pacification. Working outward from relatively secure bases, the allies tried to drive enemy military units from the villages, uproot the Viet Cong political and administrative structure, emplace a pro-government system, and carry out programs to win the allegiance of the peasants. The second element was to destroy major enemy formations and base areas. Initially intended to assist pacification by forestalling enemy offensives, these operations also acquired the purpose of breaking the other side’s will by inflicting heavy casualties on its forces. MACV emphasis on the two elements—pacification and offensives—shifted over time in response to conditions in South Vietnam, to the actions of the other side and to policy direction from Washington. The actions of the enemy were the most significant variable in determining the intensity of the main force war and MACV’s distribution of resources between big battles, territorial security, and other endeavors.3
This chapter will serve as a general introduction to the war, and as a foundation from which to delve deeper into the complexity of the war and the possible reasons for the final defeat of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam. The reader will need to decide for themselves where the role of counterinsurgency fits into the picture.
With the creation of the independent states of Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam after the Geneva Accords of July 21, 1954, the United States almost immediately shifted their military assistance from the French to the new president of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) or South Vietnam. In doing so, President Eisenhower committed the United States to a new war in Asia.
The aims of the U.S. aid and support commitment were limited: “the establishment and preservation of a noncommunist [state] in South Vietnam.”5 The U.S. organization designated to provide most of the support was the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), under the command of Lieutenant General John O’Daniel. The U.S. government had already sent Brigadier General Edward Lansdale6 into South Vietnam in a more covert role (Saigon Military Mission) to advise President Ngo Dinh Diem and his government. Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who went on to wield considerable power, summed up this era succinctly: “We have a friend who understands us very well but who likes to poke sticks into the spokes of our wheels—France—and another very valued friend who gives us a great deal of monetary assistance but who understands nothing about Vietnam—the United States.”7
President Diem and his government were already struggling to hold on to power in the mid- to late 1950s, beset by political and religious factions. By the end of 1955, many of the noncommunist political and military opponents to Diem had been defeated; but the most difficult adversaries—the communist “stay behind” elements (more commonly known as the Viet Minh) remained. The North Vietnamese state, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, was too preoccupied with purges, land reform (and later, famine), to be able to offer any concrete support to the southern communists. As a result, many cells and stay behind elements were slowly being destroyed by Diem and the support from Lansdale’s planning teams,8 while at the same time the South Vietnamese security forces were slowly being built up.
By the end of 1955, Diem had consolidated considerable power in South Vietnam and had dealt with many of his opponents. His government had lasted for 18 months, longer than many had expected. Throughout the Diem period, however, tensions had been brewing within the U.S. advisory and embassy teams, and U.S. officials in South Vietnam were dividing up into pro-Diem and anti-Diem camps. This division would ultimately lead to the downfall of Diem in 1963, with tacit U.S. support.9
With many political threats neutralized or seriously weakened, Diem turned his attention to the development of the security forces to protect his fledgling state. Lieutenant General Samuel Williams had taken charge of MAAG at the end of 1955 and now had more than 600 advisors in country. General Williams was a close friend of Lansdale and when Lansdale left in 1956, Williams became a close confidant to Diem.10
As Williams took over, it became apparent that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was dealing with significant problems. ARVN11 was supposed to be at close to 150,000 men strong; its units and formations were also struggling with issues of equipment, training, and leadership. The original mission of ARVN was to be capable of opposing a North Vietnamese invasion autonomously for a period of time, until members of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) could provide support as needed. Training, military academies, technical services, quartering, and so on, all had to be built practically from scratch to fulfill this mission, and many ARVN commanders were sent overseas to other military academies and staff colleges to be educated. Williams convinced Diem to organize the various battalions into seven divisions.12
One of the most controversial aspects of this period is a commonly held view that the MAAG made a fundamental flaw in creating a “conventional” army to oppose a future North Vietnamese invasion, as opposed to creating a force to oppose a guerrilla campaign. In doing so, runs this argument, MAAG left the ARVN ill-equipped and unprepared to meet its actual enemy. Even the official U.S. Army history of the advisory effort states that “Diem and his American advisers thus organized and trained the new army for a Korean-style conflict, rather than for the unconventional guerrilla style of warfare that had characterized the earlier Franco-Viet Minh struggle.”13
There are a number of issues with this long-standing assumption. First, any army needs to be trained and educated to deal with the spectrum of conflict, from high-intensity conventional war to antiguerrilla operations, or even aid to the civil power duties. Second, General Williams and his staff did push for training in counterguerrilla operations; he specifically advised Diem that the local Viet Minh cadres needed to be destroyed. Third, two large paramilitary forces were created and trained to deal with insurgency in the countryside. Known as the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps, these two units numbered more than 100,000 troops in the late 1950s. They not only dealt with local guerrillas, but also provided a bulwark against possible ARVN political ambitions. Training and equipment efforts started later than expected and, as with all things in South Vietnam during this period, created political tensions involving MAAG, Diem, and the U.S. Embassy.14 Training and control of this force was the largest of these, one that was not satisfactorily resolved until the early 1960s.
Political struggles notwithstanding, ARVN provided material support to both paramilitary forces when they were attacked. Their actions highlight how both Diem’s government and U.S. advisors were thinking about both internal and external threats to the regime. The issues that arose concerned professionalism in the various forces; they did not indicate that Diem, ARVN, or MAAG were unaware of the full-spectrum operations they were likely to be facing.
Fourth, Williams had been correct in organizing a force that could deal with an external threat and in looking to the Korean War as an example. The Korean Military Assistance Group (KMAG) had been very successful by the cease-fire in 1953. The Korean War had encompassed guerrilla as well as conventional fighting, and the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) had contended with both effectively.15
Some elements of ARVN performed well during this period, and some performed poorly. Many performance issues arose more from the internal politics of the newly born state, the creation of a new army, and political fears of security forces that might pose a threat to a fledgling RVN government and less as a result of how much counterguerrilla training ARVN had received. General Williams, observing the politically charged environment, noted: “officers who are performing their duties efficiently are relieved and transferred to other duties. … The general impression is that the officer has incurred the ill-will of some high official.”16
As noted previously, Diem’s Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign (with its armed element) had been very successful generally, but its brutality in certain situations had also alienated some elements of the population. Membership in the South Vietnamese Communist Party (later National Liberation Front) dropped dramatically as people fled to the north to avoid the RVN’s efforts. Le Duan, the secretary of the Central Committee’s Directorate for South Vietnam, was upset with what he saw as inaction on the part of the North Vietnamese government to support an insurrection in South Vietnam. Le Duan began calling openly for more than political subversion: he called for an armed struggle in South Vietnam. Ho and the Party in the North, however, wished to consolidate their power and to allow for socialism to take hold before embarking on another overt military struggle. Le Duan wrote a pamphlet named On the Revolution in South Vietnam, in which he called for further political agitation and subversion of the Diem regime, as well as creating the groundwork for a future armed struggle. His pamphlet was well received by the North Vietnamese Central Committee in 1956, and Le Duan was recalled to North Vietnam in 1957 to fill an important government position.
The communist strategy in South Vietnam for most of 1957 focused on political subversion, assassination, and armed attacks against government targets, but also avoidance of ARVN engagement if possible. Hundreds of former southern Viet Minh fighters went north for training for the new campaign;17 hearing of this, Diem named the armed teams “Viet Cong” (VC), a derogatory term for Vietnamese communists.18
As the campaign progressed, ARVN was drawn more and more into offensive action against the VC. Many of the South Vietnamese paramilitary forces had difficulties holding their own, especially in the Mekong River Delta and north of Saigon along the Cambodian border,19 but ARVN was quite successful in destroying the VC elements that sought battle in 1958 and 1959. South Vietnamese Communist Party membership, which had dropped dramatically since 1957, continued to do so as a result of the fighting in the countryside, but Diem appeared to be losing ground in some areas of the country as well.
In January 1959, at the 15th Plenum of the Party, the North Vietnamese Central Committee adopted a resolution, pushed heavily by Le Duan, calling for the use of force to overthrow the Diem government.20 By June 1959, elements of the NVA had entered Laos and begun building a network of roads and supply points that would become known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail.21 On July 8, 1959, an American advisory team supporting the 7th ARVN Division was attacked in their quarters at Bien Hao by the VC. Two Americans were killed and one was wounded—the first Americans to be killed in action in Vietnam.22
The VC, with support from the NVA, stepped up their attacks through the end of 1959. ARVN, the South Vietnamese paramilitary forces, and the VC all experienced setbacks.23 The escalating violence and brutality from both sides was highlighted by the fighting in Ben Tre. Many government posts were captured, as were weapons. Government officials were publicaly executed in front of villages to send a message. After 10 days, ARVN was sent in; they managed to pacify the area, but many civilians were caught up in both the fighting and the recriminations that followed. The VC had failed in their attempt to create a “liberated area”; control of local security was passed back to paramilitary forces.24
Communist reports note the difficulties involved in attempting to eradicate the presence of the RVN government in the countryside. Meanwhile, the RVN government enacted new, repressive security laws (Law 10-59) and held military tribunals to try suspects. One communist document recorded: “encountering difficulties, obstacles and losses, under the enemy’s cruel terrorism.”25 Some of the laws and tactics used by ARVN and other security forces appeared to have a negative impact on parts of the population. General Williams felt that security forces were key to achieving stability in the countryside: “I believe the task facing the Government of Vietnam … is primarily one of achieving greater efficiency in the Army, Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Force through centralized direction, coordination and motivation.”26
While ARVN and Diem’s government were able to stem the tide in Ben Tre and other areas, the VC stepped up their attacks from within the country, as well as from new sanctuaries in neighboring Cambodia. The attack on the ARVN 32nd Infantry Regiment during Tet 1960 (January) was the best known of these and became a major embarrassment for Diem’s government. The Tet attack was able to cause much damage to two of the three battalions, though VC troops involved were chased down and partially destroyed during the counterattack. However, the VC were able to seize more than 600 weapons as they withdrew. General Williams described the incident as a “severe blow to the prestige of the [South] Vietnamese Army and [an] indication of the VC ability to stage large-size, well-planned attacks.”27
It was during this upsurge of violence in late 1959 and early 1960 that General Williams lifted an important restriction on the U.S. advisors in MAAG. Up to this point, the advisors served at the corps and divisional levels of ARVN and did not go on combat missions. With support from the U.S. commander in chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry Felt, U.S. advisors were allowed to serve in battalions and regiments as advisors. They were also allowed to go on operational missions, with one stipulation that was hard to monitor and prevent: “[that] they do not become involved in actual combat.”28
By late 1960, it was becoming clear that the North Vietnamese were moving to take charge of the campaign to destroy Diem’s government in the south.29 Perhaps surprisingly, however, Le Duan and others were unhappy about the VC’s recent attacks on ARVN and U.S. advisors. They feared that, with an escalation, the United States would be drawn more and more into the conflict, and that this would create more problems for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, aka North Vietnam). They also feared that both China and the Soviet Union might end aid if they felt the conflict was going to escalate too far. Le Duan and others instructed the South Vietnamese communists to shift their focus for the time being to assassinations and political subversion. With more than 3,500 infiltrators coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1960 alone, North Vietnamese communists began to subvert Diem’s power in the countryside in earnest, using tactics from intimidation to, in some areas, providing an alternative to Diem’s government.30 The policy was straightforward: “the present rule [RVN] is a disguised colonial regime set up by the US imperialists. … [S]uch a regime and administration must be overthrown.”31
In many conflicts, much of the civilian population tends to sit on the fence and wait to see who might win. Only then will they tend to support one side, motivated by their need to survive. As one RAND report noted: “It was very difficult for the villagers to decide their behavior toward both sides. … They listened to the VC and also to the RVN. Both sounded right to them. They didn’t know who their master was. … They had to be good to both sides in order to protect themselves.”32 This dilemma was well understood within U.S. governmental circles. A memo written and heavily discussed by MAAG, the U.S. Embassy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in April 1960, bluntly stated: “the majority of the population in South Vietnam and Laos live in rural areas and have little or no interest in political ideologies. They are neither extreme nationalists nor dedicated Communists but rather apathetic toward each, willing to support whichever side is in momentary local control but only to a degree necessary to avoid inciting the wrath of the other side toward them.”33
The South Vietnamese Communists ended their 1960 campaign with several successes in various parts of the countryside. In many areas, the RVN’s reach was limited to the regional capital, with the security forces based there and hemmed in. There were some areas where the RVN had considerable power and reach, and where the VC had great difficulty in undermining the government’s presence. At the end of 1960, the VC strength throughout South Vietnam was only about 10,000, and DRV officials in Hanoi, having decided that the war would not end quickly, created a new front organization—the National Liberation Front. Its aim was to convince observers overseas and in South Vietnam that the VC was a southern dissident group, that some elements were not communist, and that Hanoi was not running the war in the south.
By the end of 1960, U.S. officials in MAAG and the embassy were coming to different conclusions about the apparent rise in violence and threats to RVN efforts in the countryside. Tensions had arisen between MAAG and the RVN earlier in the year: the U.S. government was willing to support an army of 150,000, and Diem and his chiefs had decided to create a force of 20,000 rangers for antiguerrilla operations. General Williams, along with many of his colleagues in the U.S. military hierarchy, opposed this plan on the grounds that ARVN was still a young army and had more pressing needs for incoming officers, NCOs, and personnel. MAAG was already reporting a major shortfall of officers in key positions and expressed concern that the raising of a new unit would place further strain on ARVN personnel and equipment.
This initiative was influenced by the ongoing debate about whether ARVN was being adequately trained to deal with guerrillas or the VC. While there is some validity to the concerns being raised, they were dwarfed by other, more pressing issues facing ARVN that made contending with the VC difficult under any circumstances.
One of the issues of greater concern to MAAG was the politicization of the ARVN officer corps. Many U.S. advisors had become aware of the politicization of ARVN and the security forces generally, and a common joke at the time was that to be promoted, officers had to rely on the three “Ds”: the first, loyalty to Dang or the political party of Can Loa (Diem’s); the second, Dao or religion (preferably Catholicism, since Diem and many of his loyal advisors were Catholic); and the third, Du, a derogatory word for the region that Diem had come from.34 Another issue, raised repeatedly by CIA personnel in Saigon was that the VC had infiltrated ARVN.
Brigadier Lansdale, assessing the situation in 1960, openly dismissed lessons from the British campaign in Malaya, citing his own experience of fighting the Huks in the Philippines as being more relevant.35 His memorandum highlighted many of the issues that officers in MAAG had already pointed out: overlapping lines of authority, an insufficiently clear-cut chain of command, inadequate training provision for ARVN units, jurisdiction and support for the Civil Guard, and the potential negative impacts of raising the proposed ranger companies.
General Williams was replaced by Lieutenant General Lionel McGarr in August 1960. McGarr agreed with many of the issues that Williams had raised36 and, as Williams had already expressed, he felt that the core mission of ARVN was to be prepared to confront a potential NVA invasion. However, he also felt that ARVN would have to contend with the VC as well, and should be prepared accordingly—a position that made sense to many MAAG personnel. Further, he pushed for command of the Civil Corps to be transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defense.
The U.S. Ambassador at the time, Eldrige Durbrow, welcomed the change in MAAG as he had often been at odds with General Williams. However, Durbrow (along with many of his successors) placed considerable emphasis on the need for President Diem to reform his economic policies and appear to be more “democratic” to a wider demographic base. This was difficult for Diem to achieve. Durbrow also believed that the two greatest threats to the RVN government were the VC and a potential coup. Lieutenant General McGarr agreed with this assessment, but felt that the expansion of the RVNAF was key to staving off the VC and therefore a priority, and that any political or economic reforms were secondary issues.37
McGarr did understand some key aspects of counterinsurgency or pacification efforts. He felt (as many did and still do today, with some validity) that guerrillas were the root issue, and that ARVN should prioritize dealing with them. The political aspects of the insurgency should be dealt with by RVN politicians, civil servants, and civil guard.38 The U.S. government agreed with McGarr and rebuked Durbrow’s liberalization efforts.39
It is important to discuss what was meant by counterinsurgency or pacification during this period, as many officials used the terms interchangeably. Military operations were carried out to clear insurgent armed groups from a given area; host nation police, usually paramilitary police, would come in as army troops withdrew, to impose order in the area and represent the government. In South Vietnam, this mission would have been carried out by the Civil Corps and other paramilitary forces. Government officials would then bring in administrative measures to represent the local government; aid projects might be started, always visible as part of the host nation effort. Security forces would be used to continue to protect the host nation’s government in the given area. This is what had occurred in previous campaigns that have often been cited as similar, notably the Huk campaign in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency. It is important, however, to remember a few keys points to avoid simplistic narratives; primary among these is that the enemy in South Vietnam was better armed and organized than in either of the examples cited. Also, British main forces in the Malayan Emergency operated in smaller units, but were not used in static locations. The many paramilitary forces in the Malayan Emergency, chiefly the paramilitary Malayan Police, did much of the static work and the engagement of coercive measures against the population.40
A number of contentious issues came to a head in Vietnam on November 11, 1960 when the elite ARVN Parachute Group surrounded the Presidential Palace and called for political reforms, a new government, and a better strategy to deal with the VC. Diem and his brother Nhu barricaded themselves in the basement of the palace and appeared to be starting negotiations with the coup elements. At the same time, they were in touch with various loyal ARVN units, formations, and commanders. While the U.S. government appeared to be neutral, Durbrow did tell Diem to negotiate with the rebels; this drew some accusations of meddling from other U.S. personnel.
The coup was poorly planned and dealt with quickly; loyal ARVN troops arrived, the paratroopers surrendered, and the rebel leadership fled to Cambodia. While the coup may have been farcical in execution, it nevertheless confirmed the politicization of ARVN, which concerned many in both MAAG and the U.S. government. Diem learned from this event as well; he decided not to enact any political or economic reforms and, more damaging for the security forces, did not relinquish any of his power as commander in chief. Hence, the key issue of command and control became even more of a problem.41
The formal response from the United States to the coup was the submission of a “Basic Counterinsurgency Plan” from the U.S. Embassy’s Country Team Staff Committee for South Vietnam. Under this plan, ARVN would increase by 20,000 men; the Civil Guard would expand to 68,000 men and be placed under the command of the Ministry of Defense; the chain of command would be rationalized; and coordinated intelligence and counterintelligence programs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and civic action would be established. The RVN was supposed to implement a number of measures to deal with the need for economic and political stability. As a result, South Vietnam went from having 685 U.S. advisors at the end of 1960 to more than 20,000 advisors and U.S. personnel in 1964.42
The newly elected President John Kennedy met with Lansdale in January 1961. Lansdale, just returned from a trip to Vietnam, reported that the RVN was in critical condition and suggested that Ambassador Durbrow should be replaced.43 When the President asked Lansdale about Diem, Lansdale gave his opinion that he was the best person in the RVN, and that the United States needed to be seen to support him.44 Kennedy also assessed the Basic COIN plan with his senior advisors and approved it at the end of January 1961. Additionally, Kennedy created a Vietnam Task Force under Lansdale’s leadership. Lansdale’s advice to U.S. personnel in Vietnam was to work with Diem and not try to force him to do anything; the replacement of Durbrow with Frederick Nolting as ambassador meant that this advice began to be applied in Saigon.45 Mark Moyar described “a new approach for dealing with the South Vietnamese government, one based upon persuasion rather than coercion, that the United States would largely follow for more than two years.”46
The National Liberation Front (NLF) or VC and North Vietnamese had not been idle. The North Vietnamese reestablished the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) to direct operations in South Vietnam.47 Supplies and troops continued to infiltrate down a series of routes through southern Laos and then into northern South Vietnam. Various intelligence estimates from this period reported close to 1,000 men a month.48 NVA regulars entered South Vietnam in April 1961 and attacked various RVN outposts along Route 9.49 The infiltration and escalation were alarming to all in Saigon and Washington DC, especially after attacks in September in the Central Highlands and the loss of the provincial capital of Phuoc Vinh for a few hours. Kennedy asked the Soviets to apply pressure on the North Vietnamese to stop, but they did nothing. The JCS and the new secretary of defense, William McNamara, discussed the deployment of U.S. forces to protect provincial capitals in South Vietnam50 as well as the DMZ, which would allow ARVN to send more troops on mobile operations to hunt down and destroy VC and NVA infiltrators.
President Kennedy asked retired General Maxwell Taylor to visit South Vietnam, assess the situation, and talk to Diem about possible deployment of U.S. troops. Taylor met with Diem and the meetings went well, but his report was nevertheless alarming to many in DC. He asserted that “the record shows that the disintegration of the political situation in South Vietnam since 1959 is primarily due to the government’s inability to protect its citizens and to conduct the war effectively.”51 Despite this statement, Taylor affirmed that the United States needed to continue working with Diem and his government. He also noted that, while some within ARVN disliked Diem, the army would still work for him because he was the best option available. Taylor also reported that many ARVN officers were first class and dedicated to the cause, and agreed with the proposed deployment of U.S. forces to stem the tide from North Vietnam. President Kennedy agreed with most of Taylor’s findings, but did not support sending U.S. ground forces. He chose instead to increase the number of advisors and provision of new equipment and helicopters. Interestingly, another member of Taylor’s team was asked to assess the influence of the NLF’s political message. The findings supported those of previous years: that the vast majority of the rural population were interested in their own affairs and had little interest in national politics.52
There were disagreements within the Taylor team about how best to handle Diem. They could easily be divided between the Lansdale camp and the Nolting camp. For the time being, the Nolting camp appeared to be winning. Nolting informed Diem that, with the Kennedy administration’s continued support, Diem would need to delegate more power, give the United States a say in the decisions of the RVN, and broaden his government. Much debate ensued within the RVN; many Vietnamese considered these requests insulting and that they would make the RVN appear a protectorate to the rest of the world. Over time, the Kennedy administration backed away from several of the Nolting camp’s demands, and military equipment and advisors began to flow into South Vietnam, raising personnel numbers from 600 to more than 2,000. Kennedy also appointed a new lieutenant general, Paul Harkins, as the head of MAAG.53
In Washington DC, debate continued regarding the role of counterinsurgency or pacification. The State Department, Pentagon, and chief advisors to the president (chiefly Roger Hilsman and Walt Rostow) worked in an interagency committee tasked with developing a national-level coordinated counterinsurgency doctrine. The chair of the committee was the deputy director of the CIA, Richard Bissell. The findings of the committee were signed in as policy in 1962 as the National Security Action Memorandum and later known as the Overseas Internal Defense Policy. The policy emphasized the need for a coordinated political, military, psychological, and economic campaign to destroy any communist subversion within a state. The campaign would use both direct and indirect measures to achieve victory: military forces fighting guerrillas and civilian departments dealing with the political, economic, and social roots of the rebellion.54
One major theme of the strategy was the contention that “the United States could control both the course of the war and the conduct of its ally.”55 This reflects an element often misunderstood in such situations: that such aims must be achieved by the host nation with support from the U.S. government. The U.S. Ambassador was supposed to be in charge of most of the advisory effort and to coax the host nation government into focusing on reform. This last point caused considerable tension, as had already been highlighted by previous advisors to Diem, members of MAAG, and the U.S. Embassy in Saigon.
The actual implementation of the plan was also left to the people in country to decide. Major General Victor Krulak, who was the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) for the JCS, was quite critical of the plan and how the RVN would view it. He stated: “to teach is not difficult; to advise is not hard, either; to urge, persuade, and cajole are easy projects to undertake. But military operations are executed by a chain of command, and no other way.”56 There was already a history of friction between MAAG and the U.S. Embassy, and even though President Kennedy had reaffirmed the power of the ambassadors in many of the embassies, he also stated that “United States forces operating in the field … [are] under the command of the U.S. area commander’ and not the Ambassador.”57 Many of these issues would not be resolved until the creation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program in 1967.58
In 1962, after much political wrangling in DC among various U.S. government agencies, it was agreed to expand the size and role of the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam. A new U.S. military command was set up, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), responsible for coordinating all army, navy, and air force efforts in country. It was a hybrid command, as in theory it was subordinate to U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), but Harkins would work closely with the ambassador and the JCS in Washington, DC. Its jurisdiction was limited to U.S. military operations in South Vietnam, while Pacific Command controlled air operations in Vietnam.59
The politics behind MACV’s four-star command power and the relationship with Ambassador Nolting was Machiavellian in the extreme. After much wrangling, it was decided that the new four-star general, Paul Harkins, would work directly with President Diem and his commanders on military matters. He would keep the U.S. Ambassador informed of any political matters and of his contacts within the RVN; any issues would be resolved through the two chains of command back in DC. The success of this plan rested entirely upon the personalities of the people involved, and in practice there was no single, clearly defined authority overseeing the U.S. effort in Vietnam. Even Diem, while happy with the increased U.S. presence and support, was upset about the fact that he now had to work with multiple U.S. teams to focus his efforts.60 The role and command and control of MAAG also remained unresolved; initially, it was still treated as a separate command, but over time General Harkins moved to subsume the MAAG under MACV. It would take some two years—until May 1964—to formally bring most of the functions of MAAG under MACV.61
It was also during the first half of 1962 that the controversial “strategic hamlet” program began. The RVN started to create fortified villages, with both a security force and a political cadre to oppose the VC and their political cadres. The United States helped fund the expansion of both the Civil Guard companies and the Self-Defense Corps that protected the strategic hamlets. Lessons had been learned from a previous failed attempt at fortified villages—the “agroville project” of the late 1950s—strong rural settlements set up by the RVN in 1959, similar to the later “Strategic Hamlets.” The expansion of the new project became a major political battle within RVN, as much of the effort (and, some would argue, the loyalty of the program and the people) came under the remit of Diem’s brother Nhu. The Can Loa Party and Republican Youth fell under Nhu’s command, and their message and loyalty were tied to the people in the strategic hamlets and vice versa.
Overall the United States and British advisors62 were supportive of the strategic hamlet effort but raised questions about the location and number of the hamlets. Both Diem and Nhu focused most of their effort in the Central Highlands, in response to the infiltration of the area, while the Americans and British favored the Mekong Delta. The RVN wanted to create 16,000 strategic hamlets in two years; this rate of construction would likely have impaired not only quality but also ability to defend sites under construction from VC attacks. In fact, the security and reinforcement of the hamlets was sporadic from the program’s first months; neither the Civil Guard nor the ARVN consistently provided reinforcement when word arrived of VC attacks.63
At the end of 1962, more than 3,000 strategic hamlets had been classified as completed, but MACV reported that only 600 had adequate security, equipment, and political cadre infrastructure in place. U.S. and British advisors had initially been resistant to focusing hamlet building in the Central Highlands, but they appeared to be doing well. The ethnically distinct Montagnards (“Yards”) were the dominant group in the highlands. The CIA began to work in the area as well, establishing the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), which were similar to the Self-Defense Corps. The monies for the raising and training for these “Yard” CIDG came initially from the CIA and later from the U.S. Army Special Forces “Green Berets” (USSF) (at which point it became known as Operation Switchback).64 The strategic hamlets had some issues during this period, but the VC and COSVN acknowledged them as a legitimate threat to their ability to control parts of the countryside. As one VC report from the Mekong Delta region stated: “we expended tremendous efforts in the program to destroy strategic hamlets but in fact accomplished very little.”65
At the same time, the North Vietnamese had slowed down some of their efforts. Many observers believe that they did this for two main reasons: one, to forestall an overt U.S. escalation of the war with U.S. troops being deployed; two, because the DRV was gathering strength for a coming war that was likely to be protracted.66 The RVNAF, bolstered by an influx of US advisors, were also inflicting damage on the VC and NVA in the countryside.67
Although there was hope among North Vietnamese observers that internal unrest within ARVN would escalate and possibly spark a coup attempt, RVN leadership appeared to be improving at this period, according to feedback from MACV and other U.S. agencies.68 The NLF four-point manifesto, published in July 1962, called for an end to the U.S. military presence; cessation of RVN’s “terror” campaign; formation of a coalition government representing all political parties, religions, and sects; and an end to the military training of youth, public servants, and students. It also specified that RVN must be neutral and accept aid from all countries, not just the United States.69
Despite reports of difficulty for the NLF and VC operating in the South Vietnamese countryside, other intelligence reported growing VC influence in the countryside and leadership issues in ARVN.70 The stated aims of the NLF, with DRV support, remained consistent; an internal document highlights this: “owing to our preserving struggle, the enemy may get bogged down, unable to win. The more protracted the struggle, the more of a disadvantage they will face. Therefore they may be forced to negotiate and compromise … or the outcome could be similar to the Algerian defeat of the French, whereby the enemy would be obliged to recognize our sovereignty and independence.”71
By the end of 1962, reports indicated generally improved ARVN and other RVNAF performance. U.S. officials and journalists, and even VC observers, had taken note.72 Gen Harkins had worked closely with President Diem to replace numerous ineffectual commanders. However, issues remained concerning the chain of command, particularly the command of ARVN Special Forces, and the very central role that Diem continued to play in the promotions of officers and allocation of resources, mostly motivated by his continuing fear of more coup attempts. U.S. advisors noted the concentration of power that still rested with the two Ngo brothers as well as Nhu’s wife, “Madame Nhu.” This impeded political functions and the RVN’s efforts to achieve a unified strategy to overcome the NLF and the DRV in the countryside.
The RVN’s Joint General Staff created an offensive plan for 1963, in coordination with the Joint Operations Center from MACV and with Diem’s approval. It was a phased program: RVN agencies, ARVN, and other security forces would cooperate in a nationwide offensive against the VC. The offensives were to be divided into three phases, each with multiple layers of small and large unit actions. The security forces were to be reorganized, with planning to occur from the provincial level to the national level. The strategic hamlet program was to be tied in as well. The second phase would involve military operations to take on VC main forces and base areas, to pacify targeted areas for further governmental control and influence. The third phase ran concurrently to the second; as the areas were cleared, the government pacified.73 (In today’s simpler parlance: clear, hold, and build.) However, as any officer or government official who has worked in Afghanistan or Iraq can attest, execution is a lot harder than planning, and taking on the NLF, VC, and PAVN was no exception. 1963 was to prove a watershed year for operations in Vietnam.
By the start of 1963, the RVN’s security forces had grown by more than 100,000 in ARVN, Civil Corps, and Self-Defense units. American advisors in MAAG and MACV remained concerned about Diem’s political influence over promotions and selection, in ARVN in particular. Diem also sporadically pressed his generals to avoid too many casualties. Another area of concern was the actual deployment of ARVN units; U.S. advisors regularly reported finding ARVN units in static positions, while Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps units were actively hunting down and fighting VC. Some advisors openly disdained ARVN as “an armed force that was poorly organized, poorly trained, and poorly led.”74
The Battle of Ap Bac75 on January 2, 1963 reinforced many contemporary negative impressions of ARVN, although it is important not to place too much emphasis on any single engagement. U.S. intelligence had honed in on a VC radio signal station at Tan Thoi in Dinh Tuong province. The hamlet next to Tan Thoi was Bac, where it was estimated that more than 100 VC were stationed, protecting the radio transmitter. The 7th ARVN Division, who were stationed in the province, was ordered to clear it out.
Subsequent engagement established that the VC had considerably more personnel in the area than originally estimated—some 400 troops, including elements of the 261st and 514th battalions. Several U.S. observers declared that the VC troops they engaged on January 2 were some of the best they had encountered. The strength and firing positions of the VC’s defensive layout were first class, and subsequent speculation has ensued as to whether the VC were keen to draw ARVN into a set piece battle on their terms to win a major propaganda victory. ARVN’s plan, supported by U.S. advice, was simple: more than 1,000 would move to take the VC positions from different angles. Some would be flown into battle by helicopters, while others would be driven in the new U.S. armored personnel carriers, M113s. The idea was to flush the VC out to the east, where artillery and aircraft would pummel them as they withdrew.
The first attacks, by the Civil Guard, went in at 0635. This and subsequent attacks were stopped in their tracks. The ARVN battalion that was supposed to attack to the north was delayed by fog. The VC were able to deal with the Civil Guard in the south first, and then turn their attention to the north as the ARVN battalion finally arrived on station.76
U.S. advisors flew over the battlefield to assess locations for another attack and chose the western side of the hamlet as a good landing zone for helicopters. The first helicopters were thoroughly shot up as they came in, and supporting helicopter gunships were also damaged as they came in to help. The landing zone was a killing ground as ARVN troops attempted to reach the tree line. As one U.S. advisor recalled: “if you didn’t have something to shield you until you got to the tree line, then you’d be cannon fodder. … Charlie had dug in real well. They had done a wonderful job.”77
With tensions mounting during the battle between U.S. advisors and ARVN commanders, mechanized forces were called in next to help support the downed choppers and wounded ARVN in the field. Artillery and aircraft were finding it difficult to contend with the VC’s camouflaged positions. By 1330, the M113s had made it to the open rice paddies to evacuate the wounded and dead ARVN, and by 1400 they were able to turn their attention to VC positions in the tree line. The VC were lying in wait; they caused considerable damage to the approaching M113s, which were forced to withdraw and regroup into larger formations. The battle continued, the VC holding their positions against a barrage of artillery, aircraft, and M113 attacks. An ARVN airborne battalion was airdropped into the battle as well, sustaining heavy casualties when the VC turned their attention to their attack. The VC commander, Colonel Hai Hoang, recognized near nightfall that his forces were all but surrounded, low on ammunition, and had suffered numerous casualties. His reconnaissance had noted an opening to the east, through which he withdrew his troops.
The final casualty count for the Battle of Ap Bac for the ARVN was 80 soldiers killed and more than 100 wounded. U.S. advisors suffered three killed and six wounded. It is estimated that more than 100 VC were killed and an unknown number wounded (as the VC withdrew with their wounded). It was a tactical defeat for ARVN, but the VC had suffered as well.
One of the main reasons why Ap Bac became so well known, and was considered such an important defeat, was because of one of the U.S. advisors, Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann. Vann sought out U.S. journalists in Saigon to tell them the “truth about the battle,” which he characterized as “a miserable damn performance … just like it always is.” There has been, and continues to be, much debate about the role and performance of Lieutenant Colonel Vann, both on the day of the battle and in subsequent years, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is important to note that he is only one person, and that his observations, because they were shared with journalists in Saigon, assumed a perhaps disproportionate importance, and consequently came to color the image of ARVN and the war effort as a whole.78 It also triggered ongoing debates in both Saigon and DC about the state of the war and the performance of both the RVN and ARVN. The NLF were able to use the battle to great propaganda effect as they moved through villages, boasting of their success in destroying the latest U.S. weapon systems, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and helicopters.79
One recurring issue that emerged clearly from the battle analysis was that ARVN leadership was slow in reacting and did not prosecute attacks consistently enough against the well-entrenched enemy.80 Another lesson learned on the day was that the VC would stand and fight to a certain point, even against overwhelming firepower, and then withdraw after inflicting heavy casualties. U.S. commanders would learn about this tactic firsthand when they began confronting VC main forces and PAVN in 1965.
While Ap Bac created intensive debates in both Saigon and DC, questions also began to arise concerning the rule of Diem and his family. A damning U.S. intelligence report was filed in February 1963, which declared: “Although there is no doubt that President Diem and his family are dedicated to Vietnamese independence, they are also deeply committed to maintaining themselves in power. … They have driven into opposition or into exile many whose talents are sorely needed.”81 In his defense, Diem had begun to organize the RVN and the security forces into a cohesive force to contend with opposition in the countryside, establishing three corps-level tactical zones (later four) to carry out a combined pacification plan.82 The four zones were I [northern South Vietnam], II [central highlands], III [in and around Saigon], and IV [Mekong Delta] Corps. This organization extended to the provincial and district levels, and on paper, it looked like a solid strategy to deal with the conditions of 1963. In practice, however, implementation was more complicated.83 As is the case with many aspects of the Vietnam War, however, there is also evidence to the contrary: one North Vietnamese report described “protracted and large-scale operations launched unremittingly against any given region [that] were numerous and fiercer than in the previous year.” Another report noted that, “with a network of outposts and strong points and a web of roads, airfields, and strategic hamlets, the enemy was able to establish fairly tight control.”84 However, communist infiltration continued at a high rate, usually between 1,000 and 1,500 a month. The U.S. mission was also being questioned; some observers felt that there were still three different efforts (MACV, military; CIA, paramilitary; and the U.S. Operations Mission, foreign aid) operating in parallel, in spite of the stated aims of the National Campaign Plan. It was clear that the MACV mission, due to its size and resources, had become the dominant partner; however, the three missions generally worked well together and rarely contradicted one another in public.
This harmonious cooperation was ruptured by the Buddhist uprisings in spring and summer of 1963.85 The Buddhist sect, which had believed for many years that Diem and the RVN were too repressive in their measures, and openly favored Catholics over Buddhists within the RVN and in the local communities, launched public protests in May in the key historical city of Hue. The police responded and nine protestors were killed, sparking additional protests across the major cities of South Vietnam. The Buddhists were well organized and communicated effectively to the wider world86 their accusations that Diem and his government had repressed their demands for reform. Diem viewed these protests and the Buddhist movement as a direct political threat to his power, but under pressure from the U.S. Embassy he was forced to make some concessions to the Buddhist demands. At the same time, his brother Nhu formed a counterpropaganda network and police intimidation program.
Tensions continued throughout the summer of 1963. The protesters and the government were on a collision course, as protests continued, punctuated by numerous self-immolations by Buddhist clergy. Senior commanders within ARVN, including some Buddhists, met with Diem on August 18 to insist that the protests had carried on for too long. They felt that the VC had infiltrated the movement, and the recent success in the countryside was slipping away as a result. They urged Diem to authorize the forced evacuation of the pagodas and imposition of martial law.87 On August 21, RVN Special Forces, police, and Republican Guards, acting on Nhu’s orders, carried out a series of raids and arrests across the country in an attempt to stamp out the protest movement. Thousands were arrested and 30 pagodas were seized. VC and NLF propaganda was seized at some of the locations, supporting the claims by some within ARVN that the VC had been infiltrating the protest movement. Some outside observers felt that the mass round up was completely justified; one Canadian observer considered it “justified in light of the warlike preparations in the pagodas and the clear intent of the Buddhist leadership to go on with political agitation until the government was overthrown.”88
Whatever advantage may have been gained in the short term, this crackdown increased the outcry of opposition to Diem and his government’s actions overall. At this point, several senior and mid-level RVN officials resigned from office. Various ARVN commanders also tried to distance themselves from the activities of the 21st and to place blame in other quarters. Tensions in the U.S. Embassy increased to the point of creating schisms between those who supported Diem’s and the RVN’s efforts, and those who considered them too repressive. Some key officials felt that all the good pacification work completed since the start of the year was slipping away because Diem was unable to brook any opposition to his power and/or negotiate an agreement with the Buddhists. Many junior and mid-level officials, both military and civilian, discussed their opinions and concerns with the U.S. journalist community in Saigon. President Kennedy sent out a number of fact-finding teams to assess the situation; many of their reports reflected the differences of the situation, rather than offering any particular solutions to the problems.89
The Buddhist protests were to have a lasting impact on the RVN. By August, Major General Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don, and other senior commanders in the ARVN Joint General Staff were planning a coup against Diem and his family. Their immediate goal was the ouster of Diem’s brother Nhu from any more interference in security operations, but initially they were willing to keep Diem if he was willing to reform. Other ARVN officers, including three of four corps commanders, supported the conspirators, and they began to feel out others in ARVN and in the RVN as well. They also approached members of the U.S. mission, knowing that U.S. backing would be important and that U.S. opposition would constitute a death knell to their efforts. There was a major personnel change in the U.S. Embassy at the same time, as Ambassador Nolting resigned for family reasons and was replaced by former Republican senator from Massachusetts, Henry Cabot Lodge. The general’s overture was given to Ambassador Lodge upon his arrival not long after the pagoda raids in August.90
The U.S. mission in Saigon, trying to assess what should be done, created a draft cable with no input from many of the agencies in DC. The draft cable clearly indicated a shift in policy regarding Diem’s government: it called explicitly for the removal of Nhu and others within the RVN government whom the U.S. mission had deemed unfit. The new ambassador was to issue a statement absolving the RVNAF from complicity in the pagoda raids and to place all blame on Nhu (overlooking the August 18 meeting between ARVN commanders and Diem). U.S. aid and support would continue only with the ending of anti-Buddhist activities, release of prisoners, and, most shocking of all, plans to “examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring about Diem’s replacement if this should become necessary.”91
The cable went out without approval from Kennedy or senior officials. Debates erupted in DC regarding its merits, and outrage was expressed by some who felt that the cable contravened the agreed course of action in Vietnam. Diem had a number of important supporters in DC, notably General Maxwell Taylor of the JCS, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Vice President Lyndon Johnson, and former Ambassador Nolting.92 Despite the uproar, however, no one countermanded the cable that was now sitting with Ambassador Lodge in Saigon, and consequently further action was taken based upon its directives.
General Harkins worked closely with Ambassador Lodge to set up meetings with some of the conspirators. Both men agreed that Nhu had to be replaced and that the pagoda raids should be condemned. Harkins also favored supporting the “rebels” in their attempt to seize power if ARVN and other RVNAF supported Diem and came to his aid. Harkins was scheduled to meet with General Minh on August 31, but this meeting was called off by the “rebels” who felt that they still did not have enough support within ARVN to move against Diem. Debates in DC continued while Minh and his conspirators hesitated.
By the end of September, following a series of high-level fact-finding missions, including General Taylor and Secretary of Defense McNamara, the Kennedy administration began formulating an official policy regarding the conspirators.93 The McNamara and Taylor report emphasized the need to cut off aid to force President Diem to reform major aspects of the way he did business. If Diem refused to carry out the reforms within a set time period, the United States should consider supporting a coup. President Kennedy further reinforced this by making public statements that the war was going well for the RVN and that the U.S. presence may decrease, given the RVN’s successes in the countryside. At the same time, he declared that political reconciliation needed to occur in South Vietnam and that the suppression of the Buddhists was counterproductive to final victory over the Viet Cong.94 Privately, Lodge was told to suspend most nonmilitary aid to the RVN, and the CIA chief, who was close to Nhu, was recalled from Saigon.
In early October, the ARVN conspirators approached the U.S. mission, stating that they now had enough internal support for a coup. They wanted to know if the U.S. government would oppose their moves and also whether they would continue both military and nonmilitary aid to a new regime. The U.S. government told Lodge to communicate with the conspirators, and that U.S. aid would flow, as long as the new regime brought in reforms, prosecuted the war effort, and improved relations within the opposition in the RVN.95 Kennedy specifically instructed Lodge to avoid giving overt aid to a coup, but to identify and build contacts with the possible future leadership.96
These developments increased tensions within the U.S. mission in Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge was told to limit overt support for any future coup. MACV applied pressure on Diem to put the Special Forces under the command of Joint General Staff and further away from the influence of the Nhu and his own loyal supporters. While Lodge and Harkins were in agreement regarding a potential coup and most of the assurances that the conspirators sought, there was one fundamental disagreement between them: Harkins felt that Nhu needed to be replaced, but wanted to keep Diem as head of state.97 He believed that Diem had issues, but that he was a strong leader who would carry out reforms after the coup. He also considered Diem a solid civilian leader and felt that many of the ARVN generals lacked the required leadership skills. He cautioned that the United States should “not to try to change horses too quickly … [but] continue to take persuasive actions that will make the horses change their course and methods of action.”98 Lodge, however, felt that Diem had to go as well.
Another issue that started to cause problems between MACV and the embassy was that Harkins felt that Lodge treated him like a subordinate and not as an equal. This highlighted one of the ongoing issues with U.S. planning in Vietnam: functioning often relied on personalities, and if people did not work well together, communication and effectiveness deteriorated. In the end, the two men stopped speaking with one another; Lodge met with the conspirators without including Harkins. Harkins claimed that he thought that the coup discussions had ended by the end of October when he told senior ARVN generals that it was not a good time to commit a coup following recent ARVN successes in the countryside. Lodge took command in all communications between the U.S. government and the conspirators and shut out most of MACV staff from ARVN planning. President Kennedy and others in the administration became frustrated with the lack of information from Harkins; when they realized that he was being shut out of discussions, Kennedy demanded that he be included in future meetings with Lodge and the conspirators. President Kennedy made it clear to the U.S. mission at the end of October: “if the three men [Lodge, Harkins and CIA Station chief] could not agree on what to say, they should refer the matter to Washington for resolution.”99
The generals moved against Diem and his brother on November 1, 1963, deploying units to seize key areas of Saigon. U.S. advisors had been told to get off the streets and not to offer support if fighting broke out. However, only the Presidential Guard brigade put up any defense of Diem, and by the afternoon MACV had assessed that the vast majority of the divisional and corps level commanders supported the coup. By the early hours of November 2, the Presidential Guard had surrendered after some heavy fighting. The rebel assault on the palace was led by Colonel Nguyen Van Thieu, of whom we will hear more later.
Diem and his brother attempted to flee, but were captured and killed. Major General Minh asserted that “Diem could not be allowed to live, because he was too respected among simple, gullible people in the countryside. … [W]e had to kill Nhu because he was so widely feared—and he had created organizations there were arms of his personal power.”100 This, of course, was what COSVN, NLF, and DRV had hoped for—a coup—and now they had it.
Following Diem’s capture, his cabinet was dissolved and the National Assembly suspended the 1956 constitution. A mixed civilian-military government was formed; General Minh headed the Military Revolutionary Council and Diem’s vice president, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, was the new premier. On November 8, President Kennedy and the U.S. government recognized the new government. A series of changes occurred within ARVN as people were replaced, promoted, or demoted. Harkins had met with General Don, who was the minister of defense. He made it clear to them that he still expected specific reforms to occur, especially within the RVNAF. He emphasized the need for better training of the paramilitary forces, improved training for ARVN, resolving chain of command issues, and clearer division of military authority between the province chiefs and the divisional commanders.
Tensions remained within the U.S. mission as Harkins and Lodge still disagreed about the final outcomes of the coup. As one author bluntly stated: “initial American optimism notwithstanding, the elimination of Diem did nothing to remedy the fundamental political, social, and institutional deficiencies of South Vietnam. Instead, the fall of the government simply swept away most of what administrative machinery the nation had. At the same time, the Kennedy administration by associating itself publicly with the anti-Diem forces, left the U.S. government deeply implicated in both the murders of Diem and Nhu and the failings of subsequent regimes.”101 If the coup had created issues, the assassination of President Kennedy later in November created many more.
U.S. officials may have felt that the last days of Diem were bad, but the situation worsened steadily following the coup. Robert Komer, the future head of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), recalled that “the political control structure extending from Saigon down into the hamlets disappeared following the November coup.”102 General Minh and his government were toppled in a second, bloodless coup in January 1964, and the U.S. mission gave its support to the new leader, Major General Nguyen Khanh.103 The new U.S. president, Lyndon Johnson, adopted a two-track approach to issues in South Vietnam. The first was not a departure from previous planning: it focused on reviving the pacification program. However, this proved quite difficult to implement with the RVNAF carrying out a series of coups and countercoups. The second track was the planning for joint U.S. and RVNAF attacks on North Vietnam, in an attempt to stop the DRV’s support of the VC. Johnson’s first major policy directive, NSAM 288, called for an increase of 50,000 men for ARVN; expansion of the paramilitary forces (the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps were renamed as the Regional and Popular Forces and overall as the Territorial Forces104); and more powerful equipment. He also discussed “graduated overt military pressures” against the DRV.105
The overall plan for MACV and the RVN during 1964–65 did not change much from previous plans. It emphasized search-and-destroy missions against VC main forces, chiefly carried out by ARVN; clearing operations to take out VC and Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) in a given area, carried out by ARVN and RF; and securing operations to develop the role of the RVN in a given area, carried out chiefly by the PF and National Police. Some people referred to this as the “oil spot” method.106 This plan, formally named the “Chien Thang” pacification campaign,107 was to be centered on the eight key provinces around Saigon.
President Johnson decided to replace General Harkins. He announced this in April 1964, appointing Lieutenant General William Westmoreland to replace him. Westmoreland’s orders were to report by August 1, although he would serve as Harkins’ deputy through the interim period. Debate is still ongoing 50 years later regarding Westmoreland’s understanding of pacification.108 Most evidence indicates that he did understand the importance of a holistic approach to the war; when he was serving as the MACV deputy in February 1964, he worked with the Deputy Chief of Mission, David Nes to establish an ad hoc pacification committee in an attempt to coordinate the somewhat fragmented operations of the U.S. mission. Ambassador Lodge disbanded the committee in April, considering it a threat to his power. Westmoreland supported the MACV Chief of Staff, Brigadier Stillwell, who proposed that the commander of MACV (COMUSMACV) would be the executive agent for all U.S. pacification efforts. Ambassador Lodge did not make a decision; he stood down and General Maxwell Taylor was appointed U.S. Ambassador in his place.
Ambassador Taylor did not agree with the proposal to make COMUSMACV his executive agent. Instead, he created a Mission Council comprising all of the relevant U.S. agencies, plus MACV. It was to meet once a week to discuss intelligence, planning, and implementation. It was an attempt to bring some order out of chaos, but did not ultimately provide a solution, since not all agencies met every week.109 Additionally, the U.S. mission was fundamentally hampered by the RVN pacification strategy, which was also in disarray. The U.S. advisory mission remained at consistent levels throughout these transitions, and by the end of 1964 there were more than 20,000 U.S. troops in country as advisors and support troops.110
DRV and COSVN planners were not idle during this period. They saw what they had hoped for coming to pass—the collapse of Diem and the subsequent breakdown of a coherent strategy in South Vietnam as the RVNAF vied for power. Before they could take advantage of events, they needed to work out an effective strategy, which took time. In December 1963, the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee of the DRV, after much debate, presented a secret directive to accelerate the “main force” build-up of the VC, in an effort to destroy the RVNAF on the battlefield.111 As a member of PAVN recalled: “A COSVN conference to study a resolution from the Center dragged out for twenty-one days arguing about our strategic formula, especially regarding the building up of our forces.”112 While debate on this issue went on in the North, the “main force camp,” under the leadership of Le Duan, undertook practical action. The DRV increasingly took control of NLF and VC efforts in the South. While guerrilla attacks were still considered useful, the push for the creation of regimental- and division-sized units for the VC accelerated. The DRV also moved to replace senior southern commanders with more commanders from the North. General Nguyen Chi Thanh was appointed as the COSVN commander in early 1964; he set out to make sure that the NLF and VC were subjugated to the strategy of COSVN and that the main force strategy moved forward.113 At the same time, regular PAVN forces began to move into the South to support the main force campaign. The men shifting south at this time were predominantly northern, as many southerners had already returned to VC units. Thus, at the same time that many within MACV and the RVN were focusing on fighting an antiguerrilla campaign, the DRV and COSVN were escalating the war.114 The DRV strategy was named GO-GU and it was an encompassing plan to wipe the RVN off the map before the United States became too heavily involved.115
Fighting in the countryside increased in intensity throughout 1964, as did numbers of attacks and VC personnel. The numbers for July indicated that the VC had carried out 12 battalion level attacks, and that RVNAF units were suffering from poor leadership and logistical support. One of the most dramatic attacks took place on July 6, when the VC attacked one of the CIDG camps at Nam Dong in Thua Thien province at battalion strength. After heavy close hand-to-hand fighting, the VC were held at bay and eventually driven back with air support and after serious fighting. The USSF team attached to the CIDG lost a few killed and wounded; their courage in this engagement was rewarded with the first Congressional Medal of Honor for the Vietnam War.116
Throughout the summer of 1964, the VC were on the ascent and the Johnson administration grew increasingly frustrated. MACV had been successful, working with the RVNAF, in dispersing the security forces as part of the larger Chien Thang pacification plan. However, the VC used this to their advantage. It was estimated that 70 percent of the ARVN battalions in I and II Corps were operating in small and detached outposts, in line with the pacification campaign, and in an attempt to provide security for a series of villages.117 A COSVN campaign late in 1964 in the strategically important Binh Dinh province capitalized on this arrangement. It deployed two main force battalions to destroy the ARVN outposts; the VC took each outpost one by one, and ARVN had great difficulty in trying to mass in opposition. Westmoreland drew an important lesson from this engagement, one which shaped his thinking for the coming years: “ignore the big units and you [court] disaster.”118
MACV was also struggling with problems of desertions across the RVNAF. In 1963, there were 9,666 deserters from ARVN, 8,235 from the Civil Guard or Regional Forces (RF) and 18,000 from the Self-Defense Corps or Popular Forces (PF). In 1964, these numbers skyrocketed: 21,000 in ARVN alone, 15,000 in the RF, and 36,000 in the PF.119 It would grow worse in 1965.
Another major concern during this period was the political instability in Saigon, with various RVNAF and civilian groups vying for power and multiple coups (six within 18 months). This increased pressure on units who were not only trying to keep the VC and PAVN at bay, but also had to monitor events in Saigon, constantly looking over their shoulders to check on the latest developments and assess what it meant for men and commanders. An unsuccessful RVN pacification operation at Hop Tac in September 1964 was attributed to the political instability in Saigon.120 Westmoreland recognized early on that unless political stability was restored, the country would fall to the VC. A MACV study emphasized that the “lack of stability in the GVN [Government of Vietnam] and RVNAF” was a major issue, one which required resolution. One solution proposed was to create a joint U.S./RVNAF military command structure; this was rejected, however, as the RVN was unwilling to be seen as controlled by MACV.121
Escalation took on a new dimension in August 1964 when the U.S. Navy (USN) destroyer Maddox was attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin.122 President Johnson sought congressional approval to retaliate, and the first air strikes from USN carriers began on August 4. After attacking a few PAVN gunboats and installations, the USN lost two aircraft. Johnson approached Congress once again for a wider resolution, seeking the authority to “take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.”123 Congress’ response was the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The U.S. House of Representatives voted 416-0 in favor of authorizing the use of military force in Southeast Asia. During Senate deliberations, only two senators spoke against the resolution, resulting in a vote of 98-2 in favor.124
The situation in Saigon remained tumultuous, with General Khanh attempting to hold on to power and much of the city in turmoil. In late October, a civilian team, the High National Council, took power, headed by Phan Khac Suu and Tran Van Huong. MACV and the U.S. Embassy tried to forestall various groups’ attempts to seize power and to focus the RVN and RVNAF on the war against the VC in the countryside.
As planning for U.S. air attacks into Southeast Asia progressed, some MACV planners recognized the threat to U.S. airbases in the RVN. In August 1964, Westmoreland initially asked for U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army (USA) ground troops to protect the airfields. At first, the JCS in DC considered this unnecessary, although a Marine amphibious brigade was placed on alert. The 9th Marine Brigade spent the remainder of 1964 sailing in the South China Sea, prepared to land in the RVN to counter coups or protect airbases if required. Several antiaircraft units were also earmarked for deployment to the RVN; however, no U.S. ground troops entered the RVN during the remainder of 1964.
The VC attacked several high-value targets as the year drew to a close. Westmoreland initially hesitated about responding to the escalation; he felt that the internal dynamics of the RVN needed to work themselves out first. By the end of 1964, however, Westmoreland and Taylor were in agreement that an immediate bombing campaign of the DRV was needed to respond to escalating VC attacks in the RVN. Operation Rolling Thunder, the U.S. airpower response, began on March 2, 1965. The war had escalated for both sides, and the collision course was set.125
Two PAVN divisions infiltrated into the Central Highlands in early 1965 and, combined with local VC units, created numerous problems for I and II Corps’ efforts to carry out the Chien Thang pacification program in the top and middle parts of the RVN. COSVN was carrying out a main force campaign, with support from guerrilla forces, and they were pushing hard to destroy the RVN before any potential U.S. intervention could be launched. COSVN had already caused considerable damage in Binh Dinh and could claim control of four districts. RVNAF casualty rates multiplied threefold during the first months of 1965, compared to the previous year.126 Le Duan was frank in his assessment: “the liberation war of South Vietnam has progressed by leaps and bounds. … [A]fter the battle of Ap Bac the enemy knew it would be difficult to defeat us. After the Binh Gia campaign127 the enemy realized that he was in the process of being defeated.”128
The VC and PAVN attacked U.S. airfields and bases with increasing ferocity. The JCS, MACV, and CINCPAC began planning for an infusion of U.S. ground troops to protect the airbases. In February, there were many discussions about whether to deploy the 9th Marine Brigade; in early March, Ambassador Taylor and Westmoreland met with the RVNAF leadership to discuss the deployment of the Marines. The RVNAF did not oppose the plan, and on March 7, JCS ordered the landing of the 9th Marine Brigade at Da Nang to protect the U.S. airfield. The Marines were specifically ordered not to “engage in combat operations against enemy forces except for its own protection or the protection of installations”:129 an attempt by both the JCS and MACV to keep U.S. ground forces out of the RVNAF’s ground war.
Le Duan recognized that the impending U.S. intervention would interfere with his GO-GU plan. The Eleventh Plenum in March in the DRV decided to keep pushing the main force campaign, even in the face of anticipated U.S. escalation. Le Duan and Thanh were clear that their strategy was not changing: “increase [our] military forces, and match the enemy’s growing numbers.”130
In early March, President Johnson sent the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold Johnson, to assess the situation and discuss potential U.S. ground troop deployments. General Westmoreland bluntly advised General Johnson that the Vietnam situation had “deteriorated rapidly and extensively in the past several months and that major remedial actions must be quickly undertaken.”131 General Johnson, reporting to the president in mid-March, laid out three options: (1) refine the present mission of advice and support; (2) dispatch U.S. combat troops to the RVN to take charge of key areas and allow the RVNAF to refocus its efforts elsewhere; and (3) deploy four divisions to cut across the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the north and cut off the infiltration network. The JCS also offered their report, calling for the deployment of a few divisions and more Marines into I and II Corps in a ground combat role to take on PAVN and the VC. Westmoreland proposed the deployment of one USA division in a combat role in the Central Highlands.132
Ambassador Taylor was opposed to a large increase of U.S. ground forces; he felt that this would allow the RVNAF to sit back and let the United States do the fighting and would smell of imperialism as well.133 President Johnson made his decision in early April; he avoided a large increase of ground combat troops, but sent a large logistical element to support the effort, broadened the air and naval campaign, and deployed a few more Marine battalions to protect installations. Within a month, the Marines had begun local search-and-destroy missions and the president had changed his mind as more and more intelligence came in indicating an influx of PAVN units into the RVN and planning for major offensives. At a series of meetings in Hawaii in mid-April to discuss the situation, McNamara made the case to the president for more ground troops: two U.S. Army brigades and a Marine regiment. Johnson accepted McNamara’s proposals and the 173rd Airborne Brigade, 1st Brigade, 101th Airborne Division, and 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division were ordered to proceed to South Vietnam to arrive and build up between May and July. As with the Marines, the U.S. Army troops were to have a limited mission: they were to protect installations and carry out defensive measures and, as a last resort, act as a reaction force. As the Marines in I Corps had done, U.S. Army troops would acclimatize to the area and build defensive works, and over time push out and seek enemy units in the area.134 Le Duan sent Thanh supporting letters to continue “fighting hard.”135
In the meantime, political developments in Saigon were coming to a head. The civilian leadership was forced out on June 14 by General Nguyen Van Thieu, who became the Chief of Staff of the ruling committee of generals, and Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky, who became the prime minister. Westmoreland expostulated, “with governments coming and going as if Saigon was a revolving door … I could see little possibility of the South Vietnamese themselves overcoming the military crisis.”136 Westmoreland was also candid with McNamara in his assessment of the state of war in the RVN and the role of the U.S. ground forces: “the fabric of GVN civil functions and services has been rendered so ineffective and listless by successive coups and changes, and the military arm is in such a need of revitalization, that we can come to no other conclusion” [than to send U.S. ground forces in to “stem the tide”].137 The war was going badly for RVNAF in II and III Corps as more and more VC and PAVN main forces attacked government positions. In June, ARVN was slowly being destroyed at Dong Xoai, causing intense debates as to whether U.S. troops could be sent to relieve ARVN troops. Eventually, U.S. airpower was authorized to intervene and helped to shift the battle in favor of ARVN. By the end of June, Westmoreland was given clear guidance on the use of U.S. ground forces; he was advised that he could commit U.S. forces “independently of or in conjunction with the South Vietnamese in any situation in which the use of such troops is requested by an appropriate GVN commander and when, [in Westmoreland’s] judgment, their use is necessary to strengthen the relative position of GVN forces.”138 The die was cast.
As June 1965 ended, the situation was looking bleak for the RVN. Reports stated that the VC and PAVN had isolated 12 of the 45 provincial capitals and 44 of the 200 district capitals. President Johnson sent Secretary McNamara on a fact-finding mission to meet with Westmoreland. McNamara also met with the senior leadership of the RVNAF, who were now asking outright for more U.S. divisions to stem the flow of recent communist successes. Agreeing would bring the total number of U.S. troops in country to 200,000 soldiers. McNamara asked Prime Minister Ky explicitly whether, if this number was achieved, it would cause issues for his government; Ky said no. Westmoreland presented a two-phase plan: the first phase would involve 175,000 troops (44 battalions) to stem the tide. Phase two, planned for early 1966, would bring in an additional 95,000 troops (24 more battalions) to take offensive action and turn the tide.139
McNamara approved Westmoreland’s plan. On his return to Washington, he met with President Johnson and the cabinet to brief them on the situation and Westmoreland’s proposal. He described the situation as “a hard VC push … to dismember the nation and to maul the army.”140 On July 27, President Johnson gave the green light for the first phase, involving some 180,000 troops. General Wheeler from the JCS assured Westmoreland that phase two would be implemented in time for 1966.141 Other countries, including Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, also committed troops at this point.142 Johnson went on television on July 28 to advise the U.S. population that he was deploying the 1st Cavalry Division and raising the number of U.S. troops in country to 125,000.143 The stage was set for a U.S.-dominated campaign.
The overall aim of the escalation and infusion of United States and allied ground troops was “to pacify the Republic of Vietnam by destroying the VC … while at the same time reestablishing the government apparatus, strengthening GVN military forces, rebuilding the administrative machinery, and reinstituting the services of the Government.”144 Westmoreland intended to use a strategy similar to that employed in the past, except now with U.S. ground forces in the mix.145 First phase: halt the enemy. Second phase: resume the offensive (destroy the VC main and guerrilla forces and pacify selected high-value areas). Third phase: win the war (restore the role of the RVN’s government to the country). Once again, in the simplest terms, this translated to clear, hold, and build.146 Westmoreland knew that this would take time and tried to be careful about assigning specific forces to each mission at first. MACV made it clear that all operations would be carried out in coordination with the RVNAF; a directive issued in September 1965 mandated “the participation of Vietnamese forces in operations … so that the war does not appear to be a U.S. action against the Vietnamese people.”147 One key issue raised in late 1965 was how much of a role U.S. ground troops should play in the pacification campaign. As the main force threat appeared to dissipate in the months of September and October, MACV and the Marines in I Corps were supportive of U.S. ground troops participating and supporting the RVNAF in pacification duties.
A discussion of the deployment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade provides a useful perspective of the war from the tactical level during this period. The 173rd was based in Okinawa as one of the U.S. Army’s rapid reaction or fire brigade force for the Asia/Pacific region. In January 1965, brigade HQ began to carry out contingency planning for a deployment to the RVN. In February it was placed on alert, earmarked to protect the important airfield at Bien Hoa. Over the course of a week in May, the 173rd moved all its assets to Bien Hao and the airfield and port of Vung Tau by air from Okinawa. Heavy equipment was moved by sea freight and arrived by the end of May. The 173rd stood at 2,816 officers, NCOs, and men. Within days of arrival, they had dug defensive positions, linking across the Bien Hao airfield and established supporting artillery. At first, the troops were given rules of engagement (RoE) that only allowed for them to fire if shot at. They were not to enter or fire into any hamlet. The first “offensive counterinsurgency operations” were launched as platoon-sized patrols around the airfield in mid-May. Due to the brigade’s lack of previous airmobile training, the 173rd carried out a series of airmobile patrols in and around the airfield to accustom the men to using helicopters. Over this period, the RoE also began to change, allowing more flexibility with firepower.
The first major air assault for the 173rd was with the units at Vung Tau on May 26 and 27; the three companies were airlifted 15 kilometers to the northeast of the base. Over the course of two days, there were a series of skirmishes with the VC. The 173rd had eight casualties, and they estimated having killed or wounded seven VC. In early June, the brigade received support in the form of the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment148 (RAR) and the 161st Battery, Royal New Zealand Artillery; both units would serve in the brigade for a year. By the end of June, all the units had been collected at Bien Hao.
With all the units consolidated at the airfield, Westmoreland needed to use them more and more to support ARVN operations, especially to the northeast in War Zone D. Throughout the month of July, the brigade, minus 1st RAR, were airlifted into War Zone D to fight alongside ARVN. At first, the Australian government put a restriction on the use of 1st RAR to be part of the various search-and-destroy missions and asked Westmoreland to use the battalion in defense of the Bien Hao airfield. The constantly shifting battlefield and the threat to ARVN forced the use of the 173rd (minus the Aussies) to move into II Corps and the Central Highlands to support ARVN operations against PAVN during August and into early September. The brigade was then moved back to Bien Hao to support the deployment of the U.S. Army 1st Infantry Division to the area. The brigade carried out numerous patrols and search-and-destroy missions, but the VC and PAVN did not stand and fight.149 PAVN was gathering strength in the Central Highlands as the 1st Cavalry Division assembled. The major battle between PAVN and the 1st Cavalry Division in the Ia Drang valley, in November 1965, indicated that main force engagements were on the increase once again.150
The USMC’s experiences in I Corps in 1965 also highlight the complexities involved in skirmishing with guerrillas, dealing with VC political cadres, and engaging with main force elements. Lieutenant General Lewis Walt, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) commander, answered to General Westmoreland151 and served as the senior advisor to the ARVN I Corps commander.152 Westmoreland issued explicit orders153 to III MAF that were consistent with orders given to U.S. Army units and formations; Marines were to carry out the following tasks: “(1) Defend and secure the base Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAORs); (2) conduct search-and-destroy missions against both local VC and more distant enemy locations; (3) conduct clearing operations in contiguous TAORs; and (4) execute contingency plans of COMUSMACV anywhere so directed.”154
General Walt took these orders and developed what was called the “balanced approach.” He recognized the complexity of the battlefield before him but tried to create a plan that could tackle the threat.155 He created three operational formulas: “(1) Battalion, or larger, operations would be directed toward destroying main force concentrations once positively identified … [;] (2) aggressive counterguerilla patrols within, and in proximity to, the population centers; and (3) employing USMC forces as a general shield behind which training of local security forces and other pacification programs could take place.”156 By April, the Marines were actively engaged in patrols outside the perimeters of the various airfields and enclaves established at Chu Lai, Da Nang, and Phu Bai. By June 1965, there were more than 17,000 Marines in I Corps, as elements of the 3rd Marine Division established themselves.157 Two things occurred in I Corps during this period that highlighted the difficulty and the attempts at coming to terms with the war: Operation Starlite and the Combined Action Program.
Operation Starlite was a significant engagement with the 1st VC Regiment (main force), which took place 12 miles south of the Chu Lai enclave in early August. III MAF planners called for a two-battalion attack, one by sea and another by helicopter, to destroy the VC Regiment on August 18, with artillery, air, and naval gunfire support. The plan was to hook and outflank and force the VC to pull back to the sea, where they would be destroyed overall in a decisive battle. As a succession of amphibious landings and helicopter flights went in, the VC positions were taken by surprise. Some started to fight back aggressively for their positions, and after two days of fighting, the VC Regiment attempted to break out. General Walt kept the pressure up for five days, aiming to clear the area.158 As General Walt stated, “this was not to be an antiguerrilla war, pacification, revolutionary warfare. … [T]his was a clash of conventional armed forces against conventional armed forces.”159
The Combined Action Program (CAP) was an innovative measure intended to fulfill the need to provide security around the enclaves. The simple idea was to take a Marine squad and attach it to a Popular Force (PF) platoon. (The ARVN 1st Division was also acting in support of the plan.) The two units, Marine and PF, would live and fight alongside one another to secure the local area, cooperating on training and intelligence gathering.
The first joint CAP operations began on August 3, 1965. The 3/4th Marines were the first to develop the concept, and the III MAF selected veterans to run the Marine side of the effort.160 The CAP system had great promise; Walt declared that “we [had] found the key to our main problem—how to fight the war. The struggle was in the rice paddies, in among the people, not passing through, but living among them, night and day.”161 There were issues, however, with the program, both in terms of the numbers of Marines potentially required162 and the intentions of the VC and PAVN main forces—particularly their interest in drawing the Marines out into the hinterland. Even Walt later recalled: “time after time we identified and closed with the Main Force Viet Cong, each time a little farther back into the mountains or farther north towards the DMZ.”163
At an important meeting in late November 1965, the RVNAF Joint General Staff highlighted to Secretary McNamara and MACV the issues they were encountering with keeping elite forces or the “general reserve” (parachute troops and marines) in the field following the recent heavy fighting. The J3 of the RVNAF Joint General Staff, General Nguyen Duc Thang, among others, specifically requested the creation of more airborne and marine units, as well as U.S. reinforcements for I, II, and III Corps. According to Thang, it was also agreed that, due to the recent ARVN attrition, United States and allied ground troops would have the primary mission of search and destroy, while RVNAF took over protection of strategic bases and the pacification mission. Westmoreland did not agree with this plan and laid out an alternative in which 69 of the potential 169 ARVN battalions (many were still being raised) would be earmarked to defend government centers and critical areas; 22 would be used to expand the power of the RVN government; and 71 would be used for offensive operations and as reaction forces to support the pacification effort when needed.164
By the end of the year, Thang was appointed the minister for revolutionary development, gaining control of most of the RVN pacification efforts. In January 1966, he organized much of the political effort into the Revolutionary Development Cadres. These cadres, recruited from local areas, trained in anticommunist ideology and formed into teams of around 50 members. The plan was to assign them to hamlets in their local area to support local government, development projects, and farmers, and carry out medical treatment. These teams were put into place after RVNAF or U.S. forces had cleared an area.
The biggest issue that these teams faced was their own security. The VC, fully understanding the threat that they represented, concentrated attacks on them over the coming years. It is also important to note that the RVN pacification effort, after being dormant in 1965, revived in a different guise and with a unified structure in 1966 following the appointment of Thang.165 The U.S. advisory efforts to pacification were still not combined.166
The DRV formalized the takeover of the campaign in the RVN when General Pham Hung joined General Thanh, serving as his deputy in COSVN. The two men continued Le Duan’s strategy to “intensify the military struggle” to deal with the influx of U.S. troops. Mass mobilization began in the DRV to fill the ranks in PAVN and to support the VC. The DRV’s party campaign called for “readiness to join the army, to partake in battle, and go wherever the fatherland deems necessary.”167 However, as the U.S. forces came in and started to engage the main forces, casualties mounted quite dramatically for both PAVN and the VC. Some within the DRV, including General Giap, called for a return to a guerrilla-style campaign. Others in the party, classified as moderates or Northerners first, wished to negotiate an end to the war so that they could focus on building the socialist revolution in the north and deal with the south later. These divisions caused serious debates between party factions over the next few years, but in the meantime, Le Duan and his main force strategy remained the dominant plan. They were supported by General Thanh, who expected the United States to seek negotiations due to the attrition that was being meted out on the battlefield.168
The conflict in Vietnam cannot be classified easily. It was a main force war, a guerrilla war, a civil war, and a war of pacification. Each year of the war was different from the one before, and an awareness of context is key. The enemy could be VC or PAVN or both, or guerrilla VC forces also, and VC political cadres could also play a part. It truly depended upon the year and the location, and there was no one model or system that could work in every situation.169
By the end of 1965, the VC and PAVN main force threat was proving challenging for both II and III Corps. Westmoreland asked for an early deployment of 25th Division from Hawaii; two brigades went to III Corps and one brigade went to the Central Highlands. A conference was held in Honolulu in January 1966, where U.S. and RVN civilian and military leadership met to discuss plans for 1966 and Phase II of the U.S. troop increases. The issue of calling up U.S. reserves was raised once again, but Johnson, still opposed to the idea, avoided the issue. Instead, regular units of the U.S. Army and USMC were again stripped of officers, NCOs, and soldiers to help fill the gaps in the units and formations already in Vietnam.
The campaign objectives for 1966 were laid out by the leadership and given to Westmoreland: “Defend[ing] key military and civilian areas, opening roads and railroads, clearing and securing four national priority pacification zones, and bringing 60 percent of South Vietnam people within secure territory by the end of 1966. … [Intensifying] their offensive against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units, bases, and lines of communications within South Vietnam … inflicting casualties on their forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field.”170 Their strategy involved both attrition and pacification, although by this point, it appeared that the immediate fear of a collapse in Saigon had been alleviated by the influx of U.S. ground troops.
Debates regarding pacification and U.S. support reignited after the initial threat to Saigon had receded. As part of the U.S./RVN conference, President Johnson met with RVN leadership; both teams emphasized the need to promote pacification efforts to provide breathing space for the RVN. The United States agreed to give more support to the Chieu Hoi program, which allowed former VC members to return to their hamlets and serve the RVN.171 The United States also provided more advisors and monies for the RF/PF or Territorial Forces; these were increasingly hampered by issues of recruitment and retention, as VC and PAVN main forces attacked more and more hamlets in an effort to destroy any vestiges of the RVN.
Increased U.S. support came with increased U.S. pressure to return the RVN to civilian control. During the spring and early summer of 1966, political protests broke out once again against Thieu and Ky.172 The popular I Corps commander, Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi, had been replaced by Saigon, since Thieu and Ky saw him as a threat. ARVN troops had to be deployed to I Corps to deal with the resulting unrest among the troops. The RVN recognized the need for civilian elections and called for them to take place in the summer of 1967.173
The Johnson administration recognized that U.S. support for pacification in South Vietnam was too disjointed, compared to the RVN. Westmoreland concurred, writing that “the South Vietnamese were ahead of us in organization for pacification.”174 U.S. military senior command at the Pentagon and White House were also aware of this issue; Chief of Staff Army General Johnson had sponsored a study named Program for the Pacification and Long-term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN). Released in March 1966, it called for a major reorganization of a U.S. civil-military program to achieve victory.175 After much wrangling in DC among various agencies and personalities, in late March President Johnson appointed the civilian Robert Komer as his “special presidential assistant for supervising pacification support from the White House.”176
Komer’s authority allowed him to draw upon the resources of the various agencies in DC for the nonmilitary programs that supported pacification in the RVN, and he also had a say regarding the military resources that supported civil programs. The U.S. Embassy was to support Komer when requested and, critically, Komer had direct access to President Johnson.177 By October 1966, Komer, McNamara, and President Johnson had come to the conclusion that MACV should take charge of all pacification efforts, but recognized that it would take time to achieve due to “stove pipes” in the U.S. government. They correctly foresaw political battles as each of the agencies involved, including U.S. Ambassador Lodge, fought against the plans.178 In early November, President Johnson ordered Lodge to create the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) to unify all the U.S. pacification plans (except the CIA) under one embassy official with a staff to better coordinate the effort. The deputy ambassador, William Porter, was put in charge. President Johnson made it clear to Lodge that the OCO was on trial for 120 days, “at the end of which we would take stock of progress and reconsider whether to assign all responsibility for [pacification] to COMUSMACV.”179
Although an improvement on previous U.S. attempts, OCO did not start well. It took time to fill key positions and was forced to rely upon both MACV and the RVNAF for assets to move and support pacification efforts. Within the 90 days, Komer and others had already decided that, in spite of apparent improvements in coordination, OCO still lacked the assets to achieve much and it was imperative to move management of pacification efforts under MACV.180
Contrary to some claims, Westmoreland was supportive of the idea of the OCO—a program designed to unify all ongoing pacification efforts, military and civilian. He understood the need for integration and cooperation. He offered MACV staff and a one-star general, Brigadier Paul Smith, former commander of the 173rd Brigade, to support Porter. He already had more than 1,000 MACV district-level advisors in the field, and he offered their support as well. Westmoreland also created the Revolutionary Development Support Directorate, which coordinated liaison and inspectorate functions with Thang’s Revolutionary Development Ministry. He was interested in having OCO and pacification fall under his command but did not express this publicly, not wishing to contribute to the interagency fights already occurring.181
While the United States attempted to reorganize the pacification program, the war in the countryside continued to gather strength. One characteristic example was the fighting in III Corps surrounding Saigon. The United States had deployed most of the 1st and 25th Infantry divisions into III Corps, as well as supporting allied forces, alongside some 40,000 RVNAF. VC and PAVN troops in the area numbered some 60,000 men. A large proportion of ARVN and allied troops focused primarily on search-and-destroy missions, while creating bases ringing the city of Saigon. Other units carried out pacification duties, as well as supporting the efforts of agencies from the U.S. Embassy and the RVN government. Even in this one area, the need to understand context is key: due to the enemy’s dispositions, the 1st Infantry Division chiefly engaged against VC and PAVN main forces, who were focused in their region, while 25th Infantry Division,182 at least initially, had a different sort of war.183
Major General Frederick Weyand,184 CG 25th Division, understood that his area of operations would need to encompass both main force engagements and support of pacification efforts with the RVN. He commented that “no single element of the enemy’s organization … if attacked alone would cause the collapse of his force structure or the reduction of his will to resist.”185 Weyand also knew that his division was likely in for a rough time; the ARVN 25th Division was one of the worst-performing units, the National Police were despised, and many of the hamlets in their area were either openly or partially controlled by the VC. Weyand carried out a few brigade-sized search-and-destroy missions in an attempt to destroy the 165A VC Regiment, but these proved frustrating and ineffectual when the VC repeatedly refused battle and pulled back.
One of 25th Division’s more successful operations was Maili in April in Hau Nghia province. This was a combined effort with ARVN and RVN officials, encompassing clearing and pacification efforts. The United States and RVNAF worked closely and integrated their ambushes and patrolling activities. Maili was considered partially successful, as the RVN was able to backfill the clearances with a form of government presence and the RVNAF provided “stay behind” forces to hold. This style of operations continued through the summer and autumn of 1966, with multiple combined clearance operations in various hamlets. As noted previously, the units and formations carried out various MEDCAPS and country fair activities in the areas. Many officers in the U.S. Army 25th Division were highly critical of U.S. pacification support from the embassy, which at this point was disjointed and inconsistent.186
Clearance operations looked good on paper, but many on the ground questioned their long-term impact. RVN government services were still not strong enough, and the RVNAF’s effectiveness after U.S. troops pulled back was dubious.187 One report commented that “the Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre are still not accomplishing their intended mission, particularly the destruction of the communist infrastructure.”188 By the end of 1966, the U.S. Army 25th Division appeared to be achieving success in pacification, yet the war was still escalating. Analysis of operations in 1966 indicates that only 25 percent were pacification; Weyand still needed to contend with VC and PAVN main forces as they arrived in his division’s AO, contrary to his expectations in April 1966.189
The war in I Corps escalated as well.190 As the III MAF and Lieutenant General Walt created and developed the enclaves, CAP was expanded to more and more hamlets. The command structures for CAP developed over time, and it appeared to be making a partial difference in the “village war.”191 However, it must be noted that at no time were more than 2.8 percent of all the Marines in III MAF assigned to CAP. Walt and his command were trying to find the correct balance for the war in each AO. They understood that, even in specific AOs, there were different levels of war and that the focus was constantly shifting from main force elements to pacification and back again. Walt did not differentiate too much between the two, as he wanted his commanders and marines to be capable of fighting the spectrum of conflict. At the start of 1966, Walt did feel that the war was entering a new phase: “we began increasingly to encounter regular soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army, coming out of the western mountains. …[T]hey were sturdy, well-fed men with good weapons and equipment, uniformed, disciplined, and organized into companies, battalions, and regiments.”192
MACV and other intelligence feared a massive PAVN invasion of the northern provinces,193 especially during the I Corps ARVN revolt. Some of the best ARVN units were based in the northern area as a deterrent to PAVN, but until the revolt was dealt with, attention was necessarily focused internally. Walt sent out teams to assess the situation in the northern province of Quang Tri. A series of intelligence reports and claims about PAVN movement into the north came back, confirmed in July when captured PAVN soldiers from the elite 324b Division freely confirmed PAVN invasion plans. Walt and his staff decided to move elements of the 3rd Marine Division to the north while the 1st Marine Division, which had been coming into I Corps, would try to backfill some of 3rd Marine Division’s areas of responsibility.
Planning went ahead in conjunction with the 1st ARVN Division to clear out any of the PAVN in Quang Tri province. This plan was accepted by MACV and JGS, and ARVN and Walt were told they would have all the support they needed to destroy PAVN in the area. The operation, named Hastings, got underway in mid-July.194
Over the second half of July and into early August, 8,000 USMC and 3,000 ARVN troops sought out and attempted to destroy the 324b PAVN Division. General Walt was impressed with PAVN’s fighting ability: “we found them well equipped, well trained, aggressive to a point of fanaticism. They attacked in mass formations and died in their hundreds.”195 With massive airpower support, the Marines and ARVN were able to inflict close to 1,000 kills and an unknown number of wounded, while losing just under 200 Marines and ARVN. Following on from this battle, the 3rd Marine Division would be closely tied to the DMZ area to forestall any PAVN invasion into Quang Tri City and Hue to the south. Unfortunately for III MAF, this strategy achieved long-term gains for PAVN. The first was that “at year-end [1966] virtually all progress in rural pacification had ceased.”196 Even Lieutenant General Walt realized, looking back in 1970: “They could—and did—force us to commit large numbers of our men to the north, weakening security and giving some relief to the hard-pressed guerrilla forces in other areas. They could—and did—vastly increase the bloodletting, accepting the heavy price upon their own people to impose casualties upon us and add to the war-weariness of the American people.”197
As 1966 ended, Robert Komer wrote a report on the effectiveness of ARVN and pacification in 1966, and possible plans to improve effectiveness in 1967. It was very much in line with the Combined Campaign Plan for 1967,198 written by MACV and JGS. He makes a number of recommendations that appear to contradict later assumptions about Komer’s beliefs on the role of U.S. forces in fighting main forces. He states forthrightly:
[O]ur hopes for significant pacification progress in 1967 rest chiefly on shifting approximately 120 battalions of ARVN into the effort … [C]lear and hold is the essential prerequisite to civil side progress in the countryside … [S]traighten out ARVN’s leadership problems. This is probably most important of all … US advisors just can’t make up for gross deficiencies in their counterparts. We ought to press Thieu, Ky and Vien to clean their own stables since they are obviously sensitive to our specific suggestions, yet know the shortcomings of ARVN even better than we do … In 1966 the main attention of MACV naturally (and correctly) was focused on the US build up and employment of US forces in search and destroy operations against enemy main units … [T]he pace of pacification will be determined largely by the success of the military clear and hold effort. Only MACV can make RVNAF do this job better … because continuous local security is the prerequisite for all that follows, top priority in 1967 must be to improving ARVN effectiveness as quickly as feasible. The most likely alternative—and it is a grim one—is that the Americans will otherwise end up having to do this job too.199
The main force battles of 1966 had also begun to have an impact in the DRV. A public feud erupted between Le Duan and General Giap regarding the casualty rates and the main force strategy versus a protracted guerrilla campaign. Giap openly stated that PAVN was being bled white in suicidal missions in the RVN. COSVN commander Thanh defended his offensive strategy, claiming that a defensive strategy would hurt morale. He felt that PAVN and VC main forces needed to engage in set piece battles with the RVNAF and United States, executing a strategy of attrition. By the end of 1966, both Thanh and Le Duan had to accept a rise in casualties as an unwelcome but necessary aspect of a protracted guerrilla warfare campaign.200 Westmoreland acknowledged that the enemy was “hurt … but he was far from defeated.”201
As 1967 dawned, both sides were assessing possible changes to their overall strategies. MACV and the RVN remained committed to a combined pacification and attrition or main force engagement strategy. Some MACV veterans, including Major General DePuy, who served as the MACV J3 and later CG of 1st Infantry Division, highlighted one of the major difficulties in seeking out main forces: “we hit more dry holes than I thought we were going to hit. They [VC and PAVN main forces] were more elusive. They controlled the battle better. They were the ones who usually decided whether or not there would be a fight.”202 U.S. divisions arrived in country throughout 1967: the 9th, 101st, and later the Americal (made up of various independent brigades), among others, arrived to support the 1st, 4th, and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions (some 437,000 troops in total). Contrary to accepted mythology, U.S. units were subject to RoE in battle and, with a few notable exceptions,203 operated within them. Often the greatest difficulty was coordinating with allies such as the Republic of Korea or the RVNAF on applying RoE.
U.S. formations also did learn and adapt to the environment in Vietnam. The biggest issue that they faced throughout their involvement was summarized succinctly by Westmoreland at the end of 1966:
the enemy has embarked on a war of attrition involving protracted guerrilla warfare supported by large formations of conventional troops operating from base areas and sanctuaries. … [H]is purpose is to create a state of mind in our troop units and at home that is characterized by insecurity and futility. … [H]e believes that his will and resolve are greater than ours. He expects that he will be the victor in a war of attrition in which our interest will eventually wane.204
The U.S. pacification effort received a major boost in 1967. In March, President Johnson appointed Ellsworth Bunker as the new U.S. Ambassador to the RVN, as Lodge wished to retire. Johnson also appointed Lieutenant General Creighton Abrams, vice chief of the army, as one of Westmoreland’s deputies, chiefly to reinvigorate the advisory mission with RVNAF. During a meeting on Guam with RVN leadership, President Johnson announced that all U.S. pacification efforts would now fall under the command of MACV, which would advise the RVN pacification efforts. The old OCO and the MACV Revolutionary Development Support Directorate were to merge into the new Office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS). Johnson appointed Komer to head CORDS as a deputy MACV commander, holding the rank of ambassador. Komer flew back to Vietnam with Westmoreland to work out the details of the new arrangement. In early May, the organization was formally announced as NSAM 362 with the approval of Ambassador Bunker.
Even with the president’s support, U.S. mission leaders struggled to improve alignment of effort and resolve personality clashes. Komer’s remit included supervising the formulation and execution of “all plans and programs, military and civilian, which support[ed] the government’s Revolutionary Development program and related programs.”205 CORDS was intended to serve in an advisory capacity within the RVN’s pacification program, with CORDS advisors serving alongside their RVN counterparts. This meant a fundamental shift for the RVN Territorial Forces, as Westmoreland shifted them from his J3 (Operations) cell and CORDS established a new Territorial Forces Evaluation System (TFES) to assess the various RF/PF. CORDS also took over advisory responsibility for the National Police, new life development, refugees, Chieu Hoi, RD Cadre, civic action and civil affairs, as well as parts of several USAID programs.
The organizational structure for CORDS followed the MACV HQ system: a civilian served as deputy to the senior U.S. military advisor from the three-star corps down to the district level. The CORDS official had the right to supervise and execute military and civilian plans, including RVN pacification efforts. As with the TFES, CORDS created a Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to assess the level of RVN control.206 The eight core programs prioritized for the remainder of 1967 and into 1968 were: (1) improve 1968 pacification planning; (2) press land reform; (3) revamp police forces; (4) accelerate Chieu Hoi; (5) mount an attack on the VC [political] infrastructure; (6) expand and improve ARVN support for pacification; (7) expand and supplement RD team effort; and (8) increase capability to handle refugees.207
It took some time to get CORDS up, running, and fully staffed, and the 1968 Tet offensives would prove a baptism of fire. But it benefited from the beginning from the fact that “the two men [Komer and Westmoreland] developed a working relationship of mutual trust and confidence. Westmoreland permitted Komer wide latitude within the pacification sphere, and Komer deferred to Westmoreland on military operational matters.”208
Pacification seemed to be properly under way at last, but the war in the countryside continued to escalate as the two sides committed increasing numbers of troops to the fight. Some Vietnam commentators have claimed that the United States started to do the bulk of the fighting as early as 1965, but casualty rates tell a different story. In 1965, 1,369 U.S. troops were killed in action, compared with 11,000 RVNAF troops. In 1966, 5,000 U.S. troops were killed, compared with 12,000 RVNAF troops. In 1967, the United States lost 9,377 troops and the RVNAF more than 12,000—the first year the numbers are in any way comparable. In 1968, nearly 15,000 U.S. troops were killed, compared with almost 30,000 RVNAF troops.209
The United States continued to act in an advisory capacity to the RVNAF, even throughout the huge infusion of U.S. ground forces. Senior command in Washington wanted to assign some of the best from the U.S. Army to tactical advisory roles; Westmoreland, however, was adamant that he needed the best officers available for U.S. Army tactical units, not for advisory work.210 This caused friction with his deputy, General Abrams, who was in charge of the advisory mission, but General Johnson made it clear to Abrams that the U.S. Army took priority.
There were excellent advisors serving in MACV, but it was necessary for senior command to clarify the status of advisory positions to the promotions boards and the like to get high-quality personnel.211 Over time, there were also attempts to make the advisory positions more attractive with offers of command time, training, extra pay, and so on.212 None of this, unfortunately, contributed to improved battlefield or pacification performance for the RVNAF. Casualties in 1967 were the highest recorded yet, at least partially due to some of the largest search-and-destroy missions of the war, chiefly against the main forces in “Iron Triangle” and “War Zone C,” to the north and northeast of Saigon, respectively.
Operation Cedar Falls was the first of these; it began in January 1967 and involved nearly six brigades. It was a classic “hammer and anvil” operation. The United States and ARVN tried to move civilians out of the way by evacuating hamlets and villages, which only served to alert VC and PAVN units in the region. The operation, which kicked off on January 8, also included RVN units to help with the “hold” phase of the plan. All units began clearance operations via helicopter, river craft, APC, tank, and on foot. VC units engaged the Americans as they came; it appeared to the MACV J2 MACV that some of the main forces had already slipped away from the battlefield.
U.S. forces spent most of January clearing areas, taking bases, and seizing weapons and caches. At the end of January, MACV and ARVN claimed to have cleared the area and destroyed most of the military installations and HQs for COSVN Military Region 4. More than 700 VC, plus some PAVN, were killed; another 500 joined Chieu Hoi and 200 became prisoners. There had been only one significant engagement, in which the United States lost 72 killed and 300 wounded, and ARVN 11 killed and 8 wounded.213
Following on from Cedar Falls, Westmoreland ordered a two-division level search-and-destroy mission to clear out War Zone C, which was home to COSVN and the 9th VC Main Force division. The 1st and 25th Division were tasked with clearing the area, an operation that took two months. They planned to launch on February 22, airlifting three brigades to create a blocking position along the Cambodian border and parachuting one of the nine battalions into the blocking zone. Two other brigades would move overland and squeeze the enemy between themselves and the blocking forces to the north.
On February 22, a massive air attack went in against the various blocking position areas, and then the nine battalions started to load up into helicopters and C-130 transports. By the end of the first day, having encountered little resistance, all troops earmarked for the blocking position were in place, including the paratroopers. The two overland brigades moved north on the 23rd. The advance went slowly, due more to terrain than to the enemy. Two ARVN Marine battalions were flown in to support the clearance operations.
After a few days, it was clear that COSVN and main force units, refusing battle, had slipped away. U.S./ARVN troops carried out a series of unsuccessful searches for caches and HQs. However, COSVN had regrouped and, beginning on February 28, launched a series of attacks against the U.S./ARVN lines of communications in War Zone C. In the first attack, a company from the 3rd Brigade, 1st Division was almost wiped out by a main force battalion. The United States responded by redeploying their forces: some went back to their permanent bases, others scoured the area for returning VC and PAVN units. A series of sharp local battles erupted across the secured area, and U.S./ARVN units created a chain of firebases in an attempt to draw the VC and PAVN into battle. There was heavy fighting at several of the firebases, notably GOLD and FSB 14.
After two months, the VC and PAVN had lost nearly 3,000 dead and suffered much damage to the 9th Division, which by May had withdrawn to Cambodia to refit. COSVN had been forced to move much of its supplies and training camps to other locations, some inside Cambodia. The United States had lost 282 men killed.214 Civic action had followed up the various operations, but many in the countryside still chose neutrality over taking sides. U.S. commanders continued to be frustrated by the fact that the VC and PAVN were still free to decide when battle commenced and when it ended. The deputy commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division, Bernard Rogers, commented, “With respect to the enemy contacted during the two operations, we found most of them dedicated, well-disciplined, persistent, tenacious, and courageous, often displaying more ‘guts’ than sense. It was sheer physical impossibility to keep him from slipping away whenever he wished if he were in terrain with which he was familiar—generally the case. … [T]hus the option to fight was usually his.”215
The war in northern I Corps also escalated in 1967. General Walt had shifted much of the 3rd Marine Division into Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, aiming to forestall an invasion. The rising threat in these provinces compelled the whole of I Corps, III MAF, and MACV to focus on reinforcing the area with more troops, which meant removing U.S. troops from ongoing pacification duties. Task Force Oregon was renamed the Americal or 23rd Division and was moved into southern I Corps to allow the 1st Marine Division to move north to Da Nang to further support the 3rd Marine Division. The 1st Cavalry Division was also shifted from II Corps to support the Marines, anticipating the possibility that PAVN was massing for a decisive battle with I Corps.
By the end of 1967, close to 42 percent of the U.S. maneuver battalions were fighting in I Corps.216 In an attempt to forestall expected PAVN attacks, a major barrier force was created for northern I Corps. One Marine and one ARVN regiment were earmarked to create firebases, minefields, and major outposts (chiefly in the area of Route 9, which ran east to west) to act as a barrier against any attempted PAVN invasion. Bases such as Khe Sanh (a former USSF and CIDG camp) were reinforced and expanded, and 50 percent of all B-52 strikes were concentrated in I Corps territory.217
As 1967 came to an end, some U.S. observers were feeling optimistic. RVN elections had been held, and Thieu and Ky had been elected. Some people expressed concern that the elections had been rigged, but many civilians in the RVN who had voted felt that the system was less corrupt than when Diem was running elections. Casualty numbers were rising, but intelligence indicated that the VC and PAVN were also suffering.218 Pacification was still not as effective as many had hoped, but the establishment of CORDS made it seem possible that things would settle down and that progress would follow. Two areas of concern remained, over which MACV and the U.S. Embassy had no control: public opinion in the United States and the DRV’s plans to break the stalemate.
It was apparent to the U.S. population at the end of 1967 that the Vietnam conflict was unlikely to end any time soon. The rising casualty rates and the ongoing draft to fill active units further alienated segments of the population.219 President Johnson also had to contend with McNamara, who by the end of 1967 had begun to question the war effort. McNamara called upon the president to initiate negotiations, start pulling out U.S. troops, and allow the RVN to carry the weight of the campaign. It was clear that McNamara had to leave his position as secretary of defense, but he could neither be fired nor resign for fear of the message this would send to the U.S. population. He eventually resolved the quandary by taking a job with the World Bank. Many of the antiwar Democratic candidates, including Robert Kennedy, had hoped they would publicly state their reservations about the war, but they did not.220
General Westmoreland was also worried about the issues that were bubbling to the surface in the United States. He stated publicly that he intended to be able to shift most of the responsibility for the war to the RVN in two years’ time and to begin withdrawing forces. Privately, both he and President Johnson hoped not to increase numbers for the ground campaign, but refused to acknowledge that in public, for fear that the DRV would interpret it as weakness. Therefore, the MACV and JGS Combined Campaign Plan for 1968 was not significantly different from the 1967 version. The DRV, however, decided to go in a different direction.
In autumn 1967, Generals Thanh, Le Duan, and Giap convened a series of meetings to plan strategy for 1968. They were seeking a decisive victory, via the “General Offensive-General Uprising” of 1968. Thousands of PAVN had infiltrated into the RVN, and the VC were amassing weapons and cadres to carry out attacks in urban areas. Lists were being drawn up of key RVN officials who were to be killed.221 The two sides were on a collision course for the Tet offensives of 1968.
In many ways, 1968 was the turning point in the Vietnam conflict.222 The United States and RVNAF, after initial setbacks, inflicted heavy damage on the VC and PAVN throughout the country. The RVN survived; the popular uprising anticipated by the DRV never materialized. However, beginning with the Tet offensives, 1968 added up to a strategic defeat for the United States, and hence for the RVN, and dramatically diminished U.S. will and enthusiasm to continue to prosecute the conflict.
U.S./ARVN intelligence had indicated the possibility of COSVN attacks in 1968, but senior U.S. military commanders could not agree on how large the effort was likely to be and where it might fall. In December 1967, Westmoreland sent a message to General Wheeler, predicting that COSVN was preparing to launch a series of significant attacks across the RVN, seeking a notable victory: “I believe that the enemy has already made a crucial decision to make a maximum effort.”223
Expanded engagement in I Corps by January 1968 included a concerted siege on the USMC firebase at Khe Sanh.224 Senior leadership decided that it was critical to hold out, anticipating that a major COSVN offensive was most likely to launch in the I Corps region, in which Khe Sanh’s position would be of crucial importance. They dedicated massive air support to ensure that Khe Sanh remained secured.225
Some MACV personnel were skeptical about this course of action, suspecting that other plans were afoot. Earlier in January, signal intelligence had picked up communications, and major caches of weapons had been found near Saigon and other large urban areas.226 Lieutenant General Weyand, now II Field Force commander (corps level), met with Westmoreland. He asked to pull many of the U.S. forces in III Corps, who were preparing to carry out a major offensive along the Cambodian border, back toward the major population areas, including Saigon, in response to intelligence indicating that a major attack was about to commence. Westmoreland agreed, and by the end of January, 27 U.S. battalions were within 30 kilometers of Saigon. The RVNAF also redirected some of their forces, placing units along known infiltration routes and approaches to Saigon.227 Other intelligence coming in to I and II corps, from captured PAVN officers and documents, supported the supposition that something larger was in the works.228
The U.S. mission’s plans created some tensions with the RVN government regarding the upcoming Tet cease-fire, an annual observance. Westmoreland and his staff, anticipating an attack, asked the JGS to cancel all leave over this period. This request provoked much wrangling, and Washington had to get involved. Eventually U.S. and RVN leadership agreed on a 36-hour cease-fire, except in I Corps and IV Corps (southern Vietnam), where the increase of attacks indicated that a major attack was likely to commence shortly. On January 24, Westmoreland told General Wheeler that attacks countrywide were now more likely, but that the main event would still be Khe Sanh.229
The first Tet offensive began on January 30, 1968, when, it is estimated, close to 84,000 VC/PAVN forces attacked 36 provincial capitals, 64230 district centers, and five of the six major South Vietnamese cities, including Saigon and the important city of Hue. The VC/PAVN occupied some of the capitals, parts of Saigon, and all of Hue for most of a month. During that time, the VC/PAVN lost about 50,000 killed, wounded, and captured, while the United States lost nearly 2,100 and the RVNAF lost just over 4,000. It is estimated that tens of thousands of Vietnamese civilians died in the first month, and hundreds of thousands more were homeless.231
Some of the attacks were very public affairs, particularly the VC/PAVN sapper attack on the U.S. Embassy compound in Saigon. They never succeeded in getting inside or destroying the embassy—there was some heavy fighting, but the sappers were all killed before they could do any lasting damage—but just having mounted a sustained attack was a major public-affairs coup for the VC/PAVN, and images from the fighting sent shockwaves through the U.S. public.
By the 31st, Westmoreland was able to report that the embassy could return to normal functioning.232 By this point, reports from MACV and the field indicated that the offensive could be contained, that the VC/PAVN were playing against their strengths, and that they were now exposed to direct battlefield engagement with the United States and ARVN. They were also hampered by the failure of the anticipated popular uprising in RVN to materialize. Even COSVN had recognized a few days into the offensive that all was not going according to plan.233 One report admitted that “we failed to seize a number of primary objectives. … [I]n the political field we failed to motivate the people to stage uprisings and break the enemy’s oppressive control.”234 However, while this may have been objectively true and obvious to troops on the ground in Vietnam, observers and the general public were seeing a different picture. Many in the United States believed that the VC/PAVN were winning, and that U.S. efforts since 1965 were coming to a crashing end.235
As the United States, allied forces, and RVNAF started the counteroffensives that would slowly destroy the VC/PAVN main forces willing to stand and fight, Komer and Westmoreland remained focused on ensuring that pacification efforts would continue alongside to try to seize back the initiative. Komer worked closely with the RVN to ensure that provincial Revolutionary Development plans were being accelerated after the setbacks of late January and February; MACV and Washington DC, after recovering from the shocks of the first two days, awaited the anticipated invasion of I Corps territory.236
MACV and III MAF estimated that there were five PAVN divisions in and around northern I Corps and anticipated their attacks in all parts of I Corps. In the event, VC/PAVN forces attacked many of the urban centers, provincial capitals, and district centers in I Corps. They were stopped from entering Da Nang, but an estimated 3,000 VC and PAVN regulars managed to get into and gain control of the old imperial capital of Hue, most importantly the old citadel. Pacification efforts in I Corps dropped off dramatically, owing to the resulting refugee crisis and the widespread destruction of hamlets, villages, and towns. Even the USMC CAPs were stretched, as they were detached and used to defend or take part in some of the counteroffensives.237 The fighting in Hue over 25 days is a microcosm of war in Vietnam in 1968.
The PAVN 4th and 6th Regiments (later reinforced by the 5th) were ordered to march from western Thua Thien to take the city of Hue. The two regiments arrived outside the city on the evening of January 30; the 1st ARVN Division was stationed in and around the city. PAVN surprised the defenders, and by daybreak on the 31st, the 6th Regiment controlled more than 60 percent of the citadel and had raised the red and yellow VC flag over it—an act that would have resounding political and military consequences. The 4th Regiment, meanwhile, concentrated their efforts south of the citadel, in the “modern city.”
Within hours of receiving word of the attack on Hue, the USMC was shifting reinforcements to support the 1st ARVN Division and to try to control parts of the city. Task Force X-Ray (three battalions plus supporting units and subunits) from Phu-Bai moved north toward Hue. However, before they could come to ARVN’s aid, they had to clear out the various VC/PAVN units that had launched attacks in their AO.238 In Hue itself, PAVN was executing close to 3,000 RVN officials and “loyal” RVN supporters.239
The 1/1st Marines were the first to reach southern Hue to support ARVN on January 31, smashing through VC/PAVN road blocks to the south. Intelligence had been universally inadequate; some initial reports indicated only three VC/PAVN companies in the city, but the heavy fighting in which lead elements of TF X-Ray were shortly involved showed that these reports were clearly incorrect. By February 1, it was decided that the Marines would focus on taking back the city south of the Perfume River, while the 1st ARVN concentrated on destroying the PAVN on the north side, in and around the citadel. ARVN attacks were bogged down against PAVN’s effective defense, requiring an influx of U.S. Army reinforcements.
The 1st Cavalry Division, having already been redeployed from II Corps to support III MAF, next moved its third brigade to the west of Hue as the U.S. forces gathered themselves in preparation for the counteroffensive scheduled to start on February 3–4 to clear PAVN out of the city. It is interesting to note that, at this stage, the RoE for fire support in the city was quite restrictive in recognition of Hue’s historical importance. This restrictive RoE was lifted later in the battle, as the RVN government decided it was more important to clear the city and the citadel as soon as possible to diminish the impact of a “PAVN occupied city.”240
The fighting for the city and the citadel continued until March 2, with extensive heavy fighting and considerable destruction of the city. RoE tried to limit the damage to civilians and their homes, but urban fighting is by its very nature quite destructive, as it was in this case with U.S./ARVN troops trying to clear out an enemy who was willing to fight to the death, house by house and sometimes room by room. TF X-Ray lost 140 killed and more than 1,000 wounded; ARVN lost 300 killed and nearly 1,700 wounded; the USA lost 100 killed and almost 500 wounded. It is estimated that between 2,500 and 5,000 PAVN were killed and an unknown number wounded.241 The fighting in Hue also created over 100,000 refugees.
The fighting during the Tet offensive and in Hue was visible to the U.S. general public on a daily basis via television news broadcasts.242 They tended to view the offensives as defeats for the United States and the RVN, even though COSVN recognized it was losing many more veterans on the battlefield. Westmoreland’s request for more troops during the offensives did not help support the narrative that the United States/ARVN was successfully pushing back the PAVN/VC forces. His request for a further 200,000 troops was leaked to the press in March and caused a political storm. The “peace” candidate Eugene McCarthy had come close to winning the New Hampshire Democratic primary for president, and Robert Kennedy had entered the race for the Democratic ticket. President Johnson announced to the American public on March 31 that he would not seek reelection in the 1968 presidential race.
Westmoreland’s request for 200,000 more troops was not granted; instead he received just under 20,000 reinforcements, bringing the total U.S. presence close to 550,000 troops. Many within MACV recognized that they were losing the political message campaign in the United States. General Abrams summed it up at the end of March: “while the enemy failed in RVN, he won in the US. This is manifested by the loss in political support.” Komer echoed these sentiments: “despite our efforts, official Washington has totally misread the real situation here. Washington has focused on our own losses, not on the enemy’s. It has been swayed far more by the press than by our own reporting. … As a result, all too many see cutting our losses as the only way out of a painful impasse.”243
Toward the end of March, it was announced that in May General Westmoreland would give up his command of MACV and take over as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. In early April, General Abrams was selected as Westmoreland’s successor.244 Before the transition took place, COSVN launched their second offensive. MACV was aware of their plans, and many of the attacks were broken up before they reached their targets. After a month of fighting, the VC/PAVN units attempted to escape to their border sanctuaries, and it is estimated that close to 30,000 VC/PAVN were killed and wounded in the month of May. Abrams took over in June, as MACV and the JGS consolidated their planning for future offensives and pushed back many of the remaining VC/PAVN. The final COSVN offensive of 1968 occurred in August; as with their previous attempt, the Americans and the RVNAF were ready and forestalled many of their attacks. A North Vietnamese official history confirms that “because the enemy’s situation and our situation had changed we had to fight continually and to concentrate on the cities. In the rural areas we were vulnerable and were strongly counterattacked by the enemy, so our forces were depleted. … [W]hen the enemy launched a fierce counteroffensive our weaknesses and deficiencies caused the situation to undergo complicated changes.”245
Pacification efforts were seriously hindered during the first offensive; more than 500 of the RF/PF and 5,000 outposts were overrun or abandoned. In response to the fighting in the cities, other RF/PF forces were rushed into various cities and provincial capitals. Nearly 6,000 RF/PF soldiers were killed, missing, or had deserted through the fighting, while ARVN was brought in March to deal with the missing Territorial Forces in the countryside. Many CORDS and RD programs were thrown into disarray, but the first offensive had also caused many VCI to expose themselves. As the VC/PAVN were slowly overpowered, many VCI, having been “outed,” had to leave as well. By the end of March, many in MACV and CORDS felt overall the situation was improving. However, the new U.S. secretary of defense, Clark Clifford, and his staff were very pessimistic about whether the pacification programs could rebound and, in fact, about the war as a whole. An internal Pentagon report declared that “the enemy’s current offensive appears to have killed the program [CORDS] once and for all.”246 This proved to be an overly pessimistic assessment: pacification had survived, but at a cost.247
The impact of the three offensives of 1968 cannot be understated. While all three were manifestly military defeats for the DRV, they nevertheless used them to strategic and propaganda advantage. General Walt concurred: “there is no question that the Tet offensive, coming after three years of American involvement and years of grinding, patient effort at pacification, was a master stroke of propaganda, despite the debacle in military terms.”248
The final years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam were complex and frustrated. As was true all through the conflict, each year was distinct, and context was a key factor. The final years of active U.S. involvement were successful in many ways, but this did not change the United States’ ultimate decision to withdraw from the conflict and abandon the RVN to the whims of the DRV. Robert Komer, writing in 1986, recalled the contradictions of this war:
[T]he Tet offensive … did force the GVN and ARVN at long last to take some measures as [to] manpower mobilization and some purging of poor commanders and officials. After Tet 1968, VN performance improved significantly. … [T]he enemy’s cumulative losses during his Tet and follow-on offensives of 1968 were a major factor forcing him to revert to a protracted war strategy in 1969-1971. Not until mid-1972, almost four years later, had Hanoi rebuilt its forces sufficiently to launch another multi-offensive of any size. By this time it had to be conducted mostly by NVA [PAVN]forces. … [I]t had become an NVA war. Another contributory factor was that the pacification program proved far less severely hurt than Washington had prematurely concluded. Instead it entered a period of rapid expansion in late 1968 which continued for the next two years. As a result, the GVN position four years later, by mid-1972, was far stronger than at Tet 1968, despite US withdrawal of almost 500,000 troops.249
How did all this come about?
One of the largest debates during the war concerned a perceived change in strategy under General Abrams. Many authors consider General Abrams to have been a better commander than Westmoreland, since he was able to coordinate the strategy to deal with both main forces and pacification; they250 believe that Westmoreland failed in Vietnam and that, if Abrams had been put in charge earlier, the outcome would have been different.
This thesis does not hold up well to close scrutiny. As stated in the introduction, the war had entered a different phase by the time that Abrams took command. The enemy also, as the saying goes, “had a vote” in the way the war evolved in the post-1968 period. Finally, with the election of Richard Nixon as president in late 1968, the U.S. involvement changed dramatically. Some historians also claim that only Abrams understood the necessity for the U.S. military to operate as small units and to support pacification, moving on from the large-formation sweeps that characterized the conflict from 1965 to 1967. This thesis does not hold up, either; when looking at the statistics, it is apparent that many of the units operating between 1965 and 1968 were carrying out more small-unit actions and fewer large search-and-destroy missions.251 In the post-1968 period, many U.S. units were able to operate in small formations, since many of the VC/PAVN forces had been so reduced by losses in the 1968 offensives.252 Komer described, “the heavy VC/NVA losses in their 1968 offensives, which compelled Hanoi to revert in 1969–71 to a strategy of protracted war. Particularly important, these losses were incurred mostly by the southern Viet Cong who were always the chief opponents of pacification.”253
Large search-and-destroy missions continued under Abrams; some of these became notorious, such as the Battle of Hamburger Hill. However, as Westmoreland had before him, Abrams recognized the need to keep the enemy off balance with large sweeps and set-piece battles. Abrams openly emphasized the need to kill as many of the enemy as possible to force him further back into his sanctuaries254 and, like Westmoreland, grasped the complexity of the conflict: “all elements of allied forces were to be involved in a campaign to destroy the VC infrastructure, guerrillas, local forces, main forces and remaining NVA in country.”255 The way the United States and RVNAF fought in the final years was not a dramatic change, but the way PAVN fought from 1972 until the end was.
With the military defeat of the VC/PAVN in 1968, pacification became the object of a new focused effort. The environment had changed dramatically in Vietnam following the VC’s 1968 losses, which had revitalized the RVN.
One of the first attempts to recover from the initial offensives in 1968 was the establishment of the joint Central Recovery Committee. It was headed by Ky, Thang served as the Chief of Staff, and Komer served as the American representative on the committee. It coordinated all the government departments, MACV, and U.S. Embassy agencies to support recovery of the country in the aftermath of the offensives, especially in the damaged urban centers.
Another key undertaking was to start rebuilding CORDS in the countryside. The two later COSVN offensives in 1968 not only disrupted the recovery efforts in some areas, but also highlighted positive results, as fewer RF/PF outposts were lost or abandoned. By September 1968, the RF/PF had expanded from 300,000 to 385,000; the RD Cadre had expanded from 35,000 to 50,000; and the National Police, 60,000 to 80,000, with funding from the United States and RVN doubling since 1966. More U.S. advisors were also placed with the growing number of Territorial Forces.256
In November 1968, the United States and RVN launched the Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), the end result of much pressure on the RVN to shift focus back to the countryside from the cities. By this time, Komer had been replaced by his deputy, William Colby, who had been working in Vietnam for many years. APC was launched as a focused campaign, with two major outcomes hoped for by Abrams, Komer, and Colby: “they wanted the South Vietnamese to take the initiative and expand [their] control of the rural population … [and they] hoped the campaign would help convince critics in the United States that the war was winnable and pacification succeeding.”257 The APC’s chief drive was to remove 1,000 hamlets from VC control and bring in the power of the RVN, through security (Territorial Forces) and governance. President Thieu supported the effort and created a new Central Pacification and Development Council to provide a unified direction.
By the end of January 1969, the APC operation was coming to a close. The RVN and MACV could claim success, as the VC opposition had been quite light and the new local security force, People’s Self-Defense Force (PSDF),258 successfully raised in each of the hamlets.259 U.S. forces and ARVN were used to destroy any VC or PAVN who remained in the area to threaten the newly cleared hamlets.260 The end result of APC for General Abrams was, “if we are successful in bashing down the VC and the government can raise its head up, the villages and the hamlets can maintain their RF/PF units and keep a few policemen around and people are not being assassinated all the time, then the government will mean something. … [P]acification is the gut issue for the Vietnamese. That is why I think we cannot let the momentum down.”261
The RVN kept up the momentum. With assessments for 1968 operations still coming in, COSVN launched the Tet offensive of 1969. This time around, it was a resounding defeat for COSVN. Reports estimated that between late February and late March, the VC/PAVN lost 5,000 men per week as casualties, and another 1,000 men as defectors. For APC, the most encouraging news was that the Tet offensive of 1969 had a minimal effect on pacification.262 The 1969 campaign would be the last major VC/PAVN offensive until 1972, when the dynamics in Vietnam had fundamentally shifted as a result of the Nixon administration’s strategy.
As the APC was being assessed, the new Nixon administration was busy preparing its own Vietnam policy. A series of high-level visitors arrived in Vietnam to meet with MACV and senior RVN officials and gather information. One core question from many of the visitors concerned the state of the RVNAF and its ability to carry the war with fewer Americans. As the national security advisor and later secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, stated:
We recognized from the beginning the uncertainty that the South Vietnamese could be sufficiently strengthened to stand on their own with the time span that domestic opposition to American involvement would allow. Therefore a negotiated settlement has always been preferable. Rather than run the risk of South Vietnam crumbling around our remaining forces, a peace settlement would end the war with an act of policy and leave the future of South Vietnam to the historical process. We could heal the wounds in the country as our men left peace behind on the battlefield and a healthy interval for South Vietnam’s fate to unfold.263
This plan, known as the Vietnamization phase of the war, was formalized in National Security Study Memorandum 36, a timetable to withdraw U.S. armed forces from Vietnam. The new U.S. policy became public in June, when Nixon met with Thieu at Midway Island. During this meeting, Nixon announced that 25,000 U.S. troops would be sent home by the end of August, with no precondition from the DRV on pulling any of their troops out. While MACV and the JCS were initially upset with the Nixon administration’s plans, they soon recognized that this was going to happen and began to prepare to redeploy U.S. forces from Vietnam.264
General Abrams was now left with a strategy that pushed for pacification in the countryside, battlefield improvement of the RVNAF to safeguard Saigon, and a withdrawal plan for more than 500,000 U.S. forces. As the historian Richard A. Hunt stated, “Abrams was placed in a bind: He wanted to use pacification to help win the war; the White House wanted to use pacification to help America withdraw.”265
COSVN’s Resolutions 9 and 14 now focused the core of their efforts against the Territorial Forces and RVN attempts to reimpose their grip on the villages and hamlets. Larger VC main forces were broken up to operate as small units to attack the RVN and CORDS in the countryside. COSVN reported in late 1969, “the Autumn campaign has not met planned results. … [T]he enemy … has nevertheless fulfilled his most pressing requirements, particularly those of his rural pacification program.”266 The PAVN main forces pulled back to sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos to lick their wounds and rebuild for the future, as the United States began its withdrawal.267 As the United States withdrew, more and more battles erupted between RVNAF and VC/PAVN forces, especially in IV Corps or the Mekong Delta. The RVNAF appeared to be holding their own in these engagements;268 it was the RF/PF who would suffer most of the casualties in the remaining years of the conflict.269
For the RVN to continue to succeed in the countryside and protect what it had gained since Tet 1968, it needed to be able to develop both administrative capabilities and security forces. The core concern affecting the Nixon administration’s plan for the future was whether the RVNAF had the ability to defend the state. Nixon and his team had inherited the Johnson administration’s Accelerated Phase II Improvement and Modernization Plan, but this only envisioned making the RVNAF capable of dealing with a VC guerrilla threat, supported by a large U.S. residual force still in country to fight the PAVN. The new secretary of defense, Melvin Laird, made it clear to Abrams and Wheeler that keeping such a major U.S. residual force in the country in the long term was out of the question.271
President Thieu, hearing these rumors, arrived for meetings with Nixon in Midway proposing a massive expansion of the RVNAF, with heavy artillery and armor units to oppose PAVN and the VC. General Abrams disagreed with the need for heavy artillery and armor, believing that U.S. airpower and supporting heavy fire platforms would suffice. He was correct that, as long as these capabilities remained in place, they could support an RVNAF that was quite lightly equipped. The question, of course, was how long they would be available to support. In July, General Wheeler emphasized to Secretary Laird that “the resulting structure is not designed to provide the South Vietnamese armed forces the capability to deal with both the full enemy guerrilla force in country and cope with the North Vietnamese forces. … RVNAF alone cannot in the near future maintain the integrity of South Vietnam.”272 The debates continued for another year, as Laird pushed the RVNAF to focus on the threat they were already facing, and not a major conventional threat that was only a possibility. Tensions remained high between the JCS/MACV on one side and Nixon’s administration on the other.
The U.S. advisory mission for the RVNAF started to take a central role once again as U.S. ground forces began to pull out. After nearly 15 years of advising, most of the advisors were hoping to work themselves out of a job. The Combat Assistance Team was established in 1969; under this model, the number of advisors at the tactical level was reduced to an absolute minimum and their mission changed formally from “advising” to “combat support coordination.” The size and role of each team was left up to the regional commanders, based upon the performance of the RVNAF in the area.
Even with effort focused on “working out of a job,” the numbers of advisors actually increased from 1968 to 1970. In 1970, there were just under 3,000 advisors serving with ARVN, from the corps to the battalion level, with another 8,000 advisors in CORDS and 2,300 alone in support of the Territorial Forces. The quality of the advisors still varied, and many of the issues that had been reported consistently since 1965 remained unresolved. General Abrams was one of the most vocal critics about the quality of the advisors.273
The RVNAF, as part of its preparations for the future, also set out to create a much stronger military training structure. After years of frustration in this area, this initiative was being commended by observers in MACV and DC by 1971. More high-quality U.S. advisors were being assigned to the various RVNAF training establishments, and the JGS began to send highly qualified officers and NCOs to the training establishments as well. In addition, the training programs were rationalized. The RVNAF was a force of nine divisions, plus one airborne and one marine division. There were over 120 “line” battalions, plus 9 marine, 9 airborne, and 20 Ranger battalions. There were now 17 cavalry (armored) squadrons (battalions), 43 medium artillery, and 15 heavy artillery battalions. The Territorials (RF/PF) fielded over 500,000 and the PSDF numbered close to 3 million. There were also close to 100,000 armed National Police. The CIDG was formally transferred from the 5th U.S. Special Forces Group to the RVN and was renamed the Ranger Border Defense Battalions. There were close to 37 of these.274
As the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces continued and MACV worked to prepare the RVNAF for success in the future, planners established a more formalized system of combined operations between RVNAF and the remaining U.S. ground forces.275 While combined operations had occurred in the past, it had never been fully operationalized and, with the divisions of roles in both forces, some units had never operated with one another. Abrams set out to change this but, as with the war overall, combined operations arrangements were context and situation dependent. The USMC and U.S. Army in I Corps had worked closely with the highly regarded ARVN 1st Division and with the weaker 2nd Division. By the end of 1969, the remaining USMC and U.S. Army units were carrying out area security with Territorial Forces as well as ARVN, and carrying the war to the PAVN sanctuaries in the western parts of I Corps. Similar combined operations arrangements already existed in II Corps as well; their efforts increased in 1969 and 1970, as U.S. Army units and formations worked closely with ARVN and Territorial Forces.
As the United States withdrew and placed ARVN in the forefront in some locations in Kontum Province, the South Vietnamese sometimes struggled to hold the line.276 Operations such as Washington Green, where the 173rd ABN Brigade had been integrated closely with the Territorial Forces in Binh Dinh, had been considered successes, but the withdrawal of U.S. forces showed some cracks in the previously strong defense.277
The combined or partnered operations in III and IV Corps were more problematic. In both corps, the RVNAF were consistently rated some of the lowest in the country. Lieutenant General Julian Ewell, II Field Force commander, and the III Corps commander, General Do Cao Tri, announced the Dong Tien (Progress Together) program in June 1969, to “buddy up U.S. and ARVN units to conduct combined operations [that would] … maximize their effectiveness of both forces [and] achieve in 2, 3, or 4 months a quantum leap in ARVN and RF/PF performance.”278 General Ewell was explicit with his U.S. commanders: “in planning and conducting combined operations, ARVN units are to remain under the operational control of their own commanders. Combined ARVN and U.S. planning should be conducted. … [I]t is essential that ARVN commanders at all echelons continue to exercise operational control of their own units during these operations. … [The] whole purpose … is to have the ARVN units take over their own independent operations as rapidly as possible.”279 The remaining U.S. units and formations partnered alongside the ARVN and Territorial Forces in their AOs to carry out area security and search-and-destroy missions.
The largest combined ARVN/U.S. effort during this period was the 1970 invasion of Cambodia from II, III, and IV Corps zones. Although space does not permit a detailed discussion of the invasion itself here,280 the important points to note are that ARVN (48,000) and U.S. (32,000) ground forces carried out a series of attacks into the major PAVN and VC sanctuaries just across the border in Cambodia over the months of April, May, and June. Some of the attacks were short raids, others consisted of occupation of Cambodian territory to support the new U.S.-backed General Lon Nol in his war against PAVN and the Khmer Rouge.
The invasion was largely a success; the amount of supplies captured and the disruption caused to PAVN set the possibility of any main force invasion of South Vietnam back by a few years. All but one PAVN base was destroyed, and PAVN casualty estimates were more than 11,000 PAVN/VC killed, compared with 976 allied troops killed and 4,500 wounded.281 There were key “Vietnamization” successes as well, with numerous reports praising ARVN performance during the incursions. They were commended for their ability to plan and conduct operations with minimal support from U.S. forces, as well as operating a considerable distance from their own supply bases. Morale also appeared to be on the increase as U.S. and ARVN forces were finally allowed to strike at PAVN sanctuaries. A U.S. journalist reported that “even long time critics concede that ARVN has been operating efficiently and effectively.”282
Another positive sign was that pacification efforts in South Vietnam continued during the invasion and were able to carry on with minimal ARVN or U.S. main force support. However, battlefield success notwithstanding, the political victory once again belonged to the DRV. Protests against the invasion erupted on university campuses across the United States, culminating in the killings at Kent State University in Ohio in May, and pressure mounted on Nixon to speed up the withdrawal and seek “Peace with Honor.” Nixon complied, announcing on June 30: “with American ground operations in Cambodia ended, we shall move forward with our plan to end the war in Vietnam and to secure the just peace on which all Americans are united.”283
As 1970 drew to an end, there were promising signs that Vietnamization and pacification were working. ARVN was fighting better than it had in the past, although many U.S. commanders still felt that there were fundamental issues remaining and that the RVNAF was “still not ready to stand on their own.”284 The two key issues that had plagued the RVNAF since the mid-1950s—lack of leadership and politicization of the officer corps—had still not been resolved. When General Westmoreland visited South Vietnam in 1970, he reiterated the “need to clean house in the senior ranks of the Vietnamese Army. … [There were] many young colonels capable of assuming general officer responsibilities and eager to do so.”285 By the end of 1970, the U.S. 9th, 1st, 25th, and 4th Infantry divisions had left Vietnam, along with two brigades—close to 200,000 troops altogether.286
The next major test for Vietnamization was the Lam Son 719 raid into Laos in February and March 1971.287 ARVN attacked into two major PAVN base areas, opposite the northern section of I Corps, near Khe Sanh. American forces were only allowed to provide air cover and helicopter support, and American tactical and formation-level advisors were not allowed to cross into Laos, remembering the fallout from the 1970 Cambodian invasion. Some units of ARVN fought very hard and determined battles, while others displayed cowardice in front of the enemy. Overall, PAVN was able to reorganize and inflict damage on ARVN, which withdrew to Khe Sanh in late March after a series of heavy battles.
ARVN senior command had encountered considerable difficulties in organizing both the defense and later the withdrawal of forces from the combat areas. Abrams concluded, “Saigon cannot sustain large-scale cross-border operations … without external support.”288 ARVN did succeed in penetrating into the two sanctuaries and causing considerable damage, but the U.S. press coverage portrayed it as yet another defeat, further demoralizing an already war-weary U.S. population that chiefly wanted the war to end.
Even as Lam Son caused issues in the United States, pacification efforts in South Vietnam continued unabated, and many observers claimed progress. The attrition of main forces in the cross-border attacks was having a positive impact on both fighting and pacification efforts inside South Vietnam. One British observer, Sir Robert Thompson, commented on an extreme case of attrition in the countryside: “a famous Viet Cong company (316) in Long An province … which in the middle 1960s had been 200–300 strong and a very efficient unit. I was told that it was now down to three men, all of whom were North Vietnamese.”289 A RAND report also highlighted that “attrition is pushing pacification, not vice versa.”290 This point was reinforced by Abrams, Ambassador Bunker, and Colby, but pessimism about long-term success remained: “the South Vietnamese government, for all its improvement, still lacked a solid popular political base; poor leadership and corruption persisted in both the civil administration and the armed forces.”291
As 1972 dawned, many CORDS and intelligence reports claimed that much of the RVN’s population was now under their control. While the RVN administration was still encountering difficulties in spreading its message and reach, security in the countryside appeared to have achieved unprecedented levels of stability. HES reports classified close to 97 percent of the population as secure or relatively secure,292 and numerous journalists and advisors were reporting that they could travel to certain districts without military escort. U.S. ground forces were at 158,000, while the RVNAF had grown to over a million troops and the PSDF numbered nearly 3 million. Many of the larger U.S. bases were being handed over to the RVNAF. There were still issues within the RVN, and Ambassador Bunker predicted in early 1972 that the DRV would “mount a major military offensive … to prove his public claims that Vietnamization and pacification are failures.”293
The U.S. advisory mission was also being drawn down; in the spring of 1972, there were just 5,000 advisors in country, and the number of CORDS advisors had dropped to 2,600. MACV reorganized both its advisory and operational mission, transforming into a combined advisory group. Advisors became liaisons and coordination teams for U.S. combat assets still in the country,294 a role that proved critical in the Easter Offensive of 1972.
The planning for the PAVN Easter Offensive295 had begun in 1971, motivated by RVN pacification efforts. Le Duan, emboldened by the Lam Son attacks, by reports of U.S. forces withdrawing and a U.S. public whose appetite for war was at an all-time low, thought that the United States might not intervene on behalf of the RVN in the event of an offensive. Leadership in Hanoi wanted to launch an offensive in 1972, to “win a decisive victory … and force the U.S. imperialists to end the war by negotiating from a position of defeat.”296 A major debate erupted about when the offensive should be launched; some DRV officials felt that they should wait until 1973, when there would likely be no U.S. troops in country. Le Duan disagreed and called for the attack in 1972, citing the recent troop reductions that Nixon had announced, which would have left minimal infantry troops behind.297 The timing was set for the dry season of 1972, around March, and 10 of 13 PAVN divisions were moved into military regions 1, 2, and 3, supplied and reinforced for the coming offensive.298
MACV and DC were aware that an offensive was in preparation, but they did not know when it might fall. Nixon continued the troop withdrawals, but reinforced air and naval assets in the area, including more B-52s to Guam.299 The DRV launched the offensive on March 30300 in a four-pronged attack, chiefly centering on I Corps and the taking of Quang Tri and Hue; III Corps and the taking of An Loc; and the final attack in II Corps, against Kontum.301
After a series of close-run battles, chiefly in I Corps, including Quang Tri,302 the attack toward Hue, and fighting in Kontum and An Loc, the RVNAF began to regain lost ground with the support of U.S. airpower and other combat enablers. U.S. advisors on the ground helped as combat enablers and helped to boost morale; they “stiffened the morale of the ARVN commanders in time of desperate peril.”303 PAVN also failed to deliver a decisive defeat, or even a focused attack on one front, opting instead for multiple attacks across four fronts. After nearly six months of fighting, Quang Tri was retaken in early September by the RVNAF, and the offensive finally died down. It is estimated that PAVN and RVNAF each lost about 100,000 killed and wounded during this six-month period. Putting aside the collapses of the new 3rd and 22nd ARVN infantry divisions in the opening stages of the offensive, the RVNAF was widely commended for its fighting ability. The Vietnam historian and observer, Douglas Pike, declared that “ARVN troops and even local forces stood and fought as never before.”304
Despite these accolades, leadership remained an unresolved problem. General Abrams became quite bitter and fatalistic about the performances of various senior ARVN commanders, noting gloomily that “we’ve done what we can.”305 The Nixon administration, clearly looking for the exit, proclaimed that Vietnamization was working and that handing the war over completely to ARVN forces would be fine. Secretary Laird called for a massive reduction in the remaining numbers of advisors, to 2,500 in total,306 and the administration played down the role of U.S. advisors and airpower in the defeat of the offensive in an attempt to demonstrate that the RVNAF was ready to take control without U.S. advisory support.
PAVN had been dealt a significant blow by the offensive, but two key issues remained: the RVNAF had not been able to force PAVN completely out of all the areas of the country they had occupied; and pacification efforts had been partially derailed by rerouting forces to forestall PAVN. There had been a drop in the HES in areas where PAVN marched through, which was not surprising. The Territorial Forces fought very well in some areas and encountered difficulties in others. However, unlike in 1968, the vast majority of Territorial Forces were able to defend their positions. It must also be noted that the main aim of the PAVN invasion was not destruction of the pacification effort, but the destruction of ARVN. What the offensive did bring about was another massive refugee problem and destabilization in areas of the country where PAVN was able to reestablish control and create logistic bases for the future.307
While all this was ongoing, the last stages of the U.S. involvement were also rolling out. In June, Abrams was replaced by General Weyand as COMUSMACV, while Abrams took over as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from Westmoreland. Weyand was told that the final withdrawals would begin and that by early November, there would be just over 13,000 U.S. personnel in South Vietnam in total.308
During the summer of 1972, secret peace talks between the United States and the DRV began again in Paris.309 By October, the United States had dropped its demand that all PAVN forces must withdraw from RVN territory, and the DRV had dropped its demand that Thieu must be removed and a coalition government formed. The DRV needed the United States to stop its bombing and blockade operations, which were impeding the DRV’s ability to reinforce the south and undertake any economic development. The final agreement called for the removal of all U.S. troops from South Vietnam, the return of all U.S. and RVN POWs, replacement of equipment, respect of the territory and neutrality of Laos and Cambodia by both sides, and establishment of a National Reconciliation and Concord to help organize future elections in the RVN. The practical reality of this agreement was that PAVN was not forced to withdraw its 150,000 troops still occupying territory in South Vietnam. Neither Thieu nor the VC was happy with these terms, and both felt that they had been left out of the negotiations. After a series of political wranglings in November and December, Nixon launched the “Christmas Bombings,” B-52 strikes against the DRV from December 18 to 29 to compel the DRV to sign the cease-fire—which they did on January 23, 1973.310 It went into effect on January 28, and over the next 60 days, all remaining U.S. forces, advisors, and MAVC staff withdrew, as well as all allied armies still in country. MACV stood down on March 29, and from that point, the United States was not allowed to provide any more advice to the RVN.311
As the United States prepared to leave the RVN, PAVN and COSVN prepared for the final campaign.312 It is estimated that close to 100,000 PAVN entered the occupied areas of the RVN throughout 1973, with the old U.S. base at Khe Sanh serving as a major transit point and defended area. Nixon had pledged support in the form of airpower, but even had the DRV violated the cease-fire, the administration did not follow through on this promise. The emerging Watergate scandal took most of the press and public attention away from Vietnam, and in July 1973 Congress voted to stop all funds for any U.S. military activity in the two Vietnams, Cambodia, or Laos.313
Fighting erupted in various places across South Vietnam throughout 1974, as the RVNAF tried to hold areas that they controlled and PAVN attempted to seize more territory, especially in I Corps. RVNAF units were being bled white in some locations, while PAVN was reinforced with men and material. U.S. supplies and aid to the RVNAF were reduced dramatically every quarter by the U.S. Congress from the end of 1973 on. One example of this was the supply of artillery to II Corps: in 1973, ARVN artillery batteries were firing close to 100 rounds a day. By mid-1974, they were restricted to fire four rounds. The lack of funds and equipment had a major impact on morale and corruption within the RVNAF; some commanders took to selling diesel and other goods, and desertion levels soared to new heights. A senior U.S. officer recalled that “in 1974 the fight went out of [RVNAF]; they sensed that the RVN was doomed.”314
In 1975, PAVN launched the final offensives against the RVN,315 knowing that the United States, mired in the post-Watergate political crisis, would do nothing to stop them. The RVNAF’s performance was inconsistent; in some places, it put up a stiff defense and in others, it simply disintegrated. It is difficult to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RVNAF’s final days, depleted as they were in terms of men and material.316 As one observer noted, “unit for unit and man for man, the combat forces of South Vietnam repeatedly proved themselves superior to their adversaries. Missing … were the inspired civilian and military leadership at the highest levels and the unflagging American moral and material support.”317 By April 30, 1975, the RVN collapsed, and it was all over.
The conflict in Vietnam was singularly complex, encompassing the full spectrum of conflict, and it is difficult to lay blame for the defeat on one specific strategy or commander, as many pundits have tried to do since 1975. There were many reasons for the defeat in South Vietnam, and the principal one that many pundits fail to consider is the enemy’s perspective. The DRV, COSVN, PAVN, and VC were dedicated to a total victory, whatever the cost. The opening of the archives in Vietnam has provided important new information shedding light on their side of the story, and a simple truth, if there is one in this complex campaign, is that the RVN, even supported by the United States, could not match the drive and dedication of the DRV and COSVN to achieve their goals.
In his concluding remarks on Vietnam, Robert Komer highlights both the complexity of this war, and the cruel realities:
the final irony is that the war ended as we Americans had thought it would begin—with a series of conventional NVA attacks employing artillery, tanks and even air power. It was the collapse of the regular ARVN forces, weakened by the withdrawal of the US shield and congressional cutbacks in US military aid, which brought the 20 year conflict to its ignominious end. By this time the indigenous Viet Cong insurgency had largely petered out. Pacification had not failed; indeed it had become a qualified success at long last. But it too was swept away in the final debacle.318
APC: Accelerated Pacification Program
APCs: Armored Personnel Carriers
ARVN: Army of the Republic of Vietnam
CAP: Combined Action Program [or Platoon]
CG: Commanding General
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG: Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCPAC: Commander in Chief Pacific Command
COMUSMACV: Commander US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CORDS: Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
COSVN: Central Office for South Vietnam
DRV: Democratic Republic of Vietnam [North Vietnam]
HES: Hamlet Evaluation System
JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff
JGS: Joint General Staff
KMAG: Korean Military Advisory Group
MAAG: Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAB: Marine Amphibious Brigade
MACV: Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF: Marine Amphibious Force
NVA: North Vietnamese Army
OCO: Office of Civil Operations
PAC: Pacific Command
PAVN: People’s Army of [North] Vietnam
PF: Popular Forces
PROVN: Pacification and Long-term Development of South Vietnam
PSDF: People’s Self-Defense Forces
RD: Revolutionary Development
RF: Regional Forces
RoE: Rules of Engagement
ROKA: Republic of Korean Army
RVN: Republic of Vietnam [South Vietnam]
RVNAF: Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
SACSA: Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities
SEATO: South East Asia Treaty Organization
TAOR: Tactical Area of Responsibility
USA: United States Army
USMC: United States Marine Corps
USN: United States Navy
USSF: US Special Forces
VC: Viet Cong
1. Thousands of monographs and articles have been written on this period of Vietnam’s history, and it would be impossible to list them all. For those interested in pursuing the subject in more depth, there are a number of excellent sources for further study. The single best source for primary material now available online is the Texas Tech University Vietnam Archive. The Center for Military History (CMH) Web site also has many excellent resources, including PDFs of all the official histories written to date (2014). The CMH Web site also has the MACV histories and advisory volumes listed below as PDFs, as well as copies of the Indo-China monographs that were written by senior ARVN commanders. The USMC History and Museum Division has compiled a number of official histories as well, available on their Web site as PDFs. In terms of key texts providing more in-depth analysis and debate, see the Further Reading section under “United States—Vietnam.”
2. See Dale Andrade, “Westmoreland was Right,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (2010), for a very good introduction to the polarized debates of recent years.
3. Graham Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2007), 410.
4. This chapter will cover the 1954–75 period only. One of the best recent books on the 1945–54 period is Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012).
5. Jeffrey Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years the US Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1987), 7.
6. A recent excellent study of Lansdale’s role in the Philippines can be found in PDF form online: Major Andy Lembke’s Art of War thesis, http://usacac.army.mil/Cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/ArtOfWar_AmericaAndThePhilippines.pdf
7. Quoted in Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 41.
8. See Rufus Philips, Why Vietnam Matters (Annapolis, VA: Naval Institute Press, 2008) for an in-depth insider’s point of view of this critical period.
9. Moyar, 56–59.
10. Ibid., 68–69.
11. The overarching term to use for combined ARVN, air force, navy, and paramilitary forces, when applicable, is the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces or RVNAF.
12. See Ronald Spector’s Advice and Support: The Early Years (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1983) for an in-depth discussion of the MAAG effort during this difficult period.
13. Clarke, 7.
14. See Spector, 320–25 for more detail.
15. See the work of Lien-Hang Nguyen, Hanoi’s War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), for much more detailed discussion of the North Vietnamese strategy in dealing with Diem’s regime and security forces.
16. Quoted in Spector, 301.
17. These southerners would provide the cadre of the future National Liberation Front’s “main force” elements: the 324th, 325th, and 350th Divisions.
18. Spector, 312–14. See full chapter for more details.
19. See Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), for an in-depth study of the role of the NLF in a specific district and the impact of the war in the countryside. See also the early work of Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966).
20. Melvyn Lefler and Odd Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume II: Crisis and Détente (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); see in particular Fredrik Logevall’s chapter in Lefler and Westad, “The Indo-China Wars and the Cold War, 1945–1975,” 292.
21. Moyar, 83–84.
22. Spector, 329.
23. See Spector, 329–31 and Moyar, 85–89.
24. Moyar, 88–89. See quote on page 88 that specifically states that the power of Diem’s government and security forces was too much for the VC to oppose.
25. Spector, 335. It is ironic that the communists were complaining about terrorism, since this was one of their main tactics in trying to separate any support for RVN from the rural population.
26. Quoted in Spector, 335.
27. Quoted in Moyar, 89.
28. See Spector, 332.
29. See Nguyen’s Hanoi’s War, chiefly the chapter “The Path to Revolutionary War,” for much more detail regarding the position of Le Duan and attempts within the DRV to take control of the campaign in the south.
30. Moyar, 89–95.
31. Ten-point manifesto, December 1960, quoted in Pike’s Viet Cong, 359.
32. RAND Vietnam Interviews, ser. AG, no. 543, also quoted in Moyar, 437.
33. Memo, Commander-in-Chief Pacific to JCS, April 27, 1960, “Counterinsurgency Operations in South Vietnam and Laos,” quoted in Spector, 361.
34. Spector, 344–7.
35. There is some validity to this assertion: the U.S. effort in the Philippines was a purely advisory role. The enemy, the Huks, came from across the Philippine population, whereas in Malaya the vast majority of the insurgents were ethnic Chinese and hence easily able to identify and focus on. The British also acted in an advisory capacity in some of the provinces in Malaya, but overall it was quite a different campaign.
36. He did not object to the formation of the rangers, but felt they needed better training.
37. Spector, 368–9.
38. Clarke, 14.
39. Moyar, 123.
40. See the many writings of Karl Hack for much of the recent work on the Malayan Emergency. The author of this chapter also lays out the roles of the British Army during the Emergency in a book chapter, “Lost and Found in the Jungle” included in Hew Strachan’s, Big Wars and Small Wars (London: Routledge, 2005).
41. Spector, 369–71.
42. Spector, 371.
43. Kennedy followed Lansdale’s advice and replaced Durbrow.
44. Moyar, 122–4.
45. Nolting would disagree with Diem on many occasions, but kept his opposition or disagreements private. See Moyar, 130.
46. Moyar, 130.
47. Clark, 14.
48. Moyar, 134.
49. Ibid., 129.
50. They had discussed the possible use of U.S. troops in Laos to support the noncommunist government fight against the Pathet Lao.
51. Quoted in Moyar, 136.
52. Moyar, 136–43.
53. Ibid., 142–5.
54. Michael Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965–1972 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1997), 19–22.
55. Quoted in Hennessey, 22.
56. Ibid.,, 23.
57. Graham Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005), 22.
58. See below for more description of this organization.
59. Clarke, 14. See Chapter 2 of MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967, for a very detailed analysis of the formation and the various politics regarding the chains of command and jurisdictions.
60. See Cosmas, 25–27.
61. Ibid., 41–44.
62. Sir Robert Thompson, a senior official from the Malayan Emergency, headed the British Advisory Mission to South Vietnam.
63. Moyar, 156–59.
64. See Francis J. Kelly, Vietnam Studies: The Special Forces in Vietnam (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1973), for an in-depth discussion of the creation of the CIDG, transfer to the USSF, and their efforts in creating more troops. The complete transfer took until July 1963 to complete. See Graham Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–7 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2005), 78–79.
65. Quoted in Moyar, 184.
66. However, the NLF and the VC were still increasing their numbers during this period.
67. In 1962 alone, the number jumped from 2,600 to 11,500.
68. Moyar, 145–55.
69. Pike, Viet Cong, 350–1.
70. See Cosmas’s reference to a DIA report from 1962 on page 72 highlighting that the VC openly controlled 10 percent of the countryside and had influence in another 60 percent; also Moyar, 165–66.
71. Quoted in Pike’s Viet Cong, 359.
72. See Moyar’s descriptions, 169–81.
73. Cosmas, 83.
74. Quoted in Cosmas, 86.
75. See David Toczek, The Battle of Ap Bac (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2001) for an in-depth analysis of the battle.
76. Moyar, 188–9.
77. Ibid., 189.
78. For a wider discussion of these debates, see Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 194–205 (plus footnotes), Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (London: Pimlico: 1998), and David Toczek, The Battle of Ap Bac (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 2001). I will leave it to readers to delve deeper and decide where the truth may lie.
79. See the description of the VC marching through the countryside after the battle in Pike’s Viet Cong, 131.
80. Although it is interesting to note U.S, Lieutenant General Dave Palmer’s later comment on this period: “[the ARVN’s] cautious tactics were, in spite of the very sincere exhortations of the U.S. advisors, precisely the same that any American commander would have used after the U.S. troops were committed in 1965. Moreover, the American’s fate for accepting human losses in lieu of calling for firepower to do the job would have been the same as that of a South Vietnamese commander—removal from command.” Quote in Moyar, 192.
81. Quoted in Cosmas, 88.
82. ARVN corps commanders were in charge of both internal security and combat operations against any VC main forces.
83. Clarke, 13. The strategic hamlet program was moving forward, but there were many reports where the deficiencies were highlighted, especially in terms of the administration and the political parties involved.
84. Quoted in Moyar, 208–209.
85. See Moyar, Cosmas, and Philips for more detail.
86. Buddhist priests carried out public acts of self-immolation for the world’s media to record. Images of priests burning themselves became iconic images of the war overall.
87. There is still quite a bit of debate regarding this issue. See Cosmas and others for more detail.
88. Quoted in Moyar, 233.
89. Cosmas, 91–93.
90. Ibid., 95–96.
91. Cosmas, 96–97.
92. Moyar, 244. An interesting point was raised by General Taylor when he stated: “we need a strong man running this country. We need a dictator in time of war and we have got one. I seem to recall that in our civil war we also had a dictatorial government.” Moyar, 245.
93. Kennedy had sent the fact-finding mission because he felt he was not getting an honest assessment from Ambassador Lodge. Moyar, 253.
94. Kennedy was interviewed on air with Walter Kronkite and spoke openly about some of the issues he had with Diem’s government.
95. Cosmas, 97–101.
96. Moyar, 255–6.
97. There were others who had similar views within the Kennedy administration.
98. Quoted in Cosmas, 101.
99. Cosmas, 103.
100. Quoted in Moyar, 273. See Moyar’s analysis on page 270–3 for a more detailed description of the final hours of Diem and his brother, Nhu.
101. Cosmas, 106.
102. Robert Komer, Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 139.
103. See Cosmas and Clarke for more detail regarding this period.
104. For an exhaustive history of the forces, see Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, Territorial Forces (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1981).
105. Cosmas, 119–20. See also H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 115–6 for more details on the planning that occurred with the JCS.
106. Clarke, 94–95.
107. Cosmas, 139.
108. This chapter does not allow enough space to allow for a full discussion of Westmoreland and his big unit strategy. Please see the works of Lewis Sorley and Dale Andrade for more information on the debates that are still ongoing.
109. Cosmas, 140–1.
110. Clarke, 13.
111. Cosmas, 120–1.
112. Quoted in Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, 73.
113. See Nguyen, 71–75 for more detail.
114. Cosmas, 122.
115. Nguyen, 73–75.
116. Captain Roger Donlon.
117. Cosmas, 192.
118. Quoted in Moyar, 335.
119. Clarke, 43.
120. See Cosmas, 143–4 for more details on the planning and execution of Hop Tac.
121. See Clarke 85–93 for more detail regarding this difficult debate.
122. See Chapter 6 of McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty for a very detailed review of the lead-up and decision-making process to this event. This chapter does not allow for an in-depth discussion of this key event, but there are many other sources that do so.
123. Quoted in Moyar, 313.
124. Many U.S. citizens also favored military action against the DRV. Moyar, 315–6.
125. Cosmas, 159 and 169–73. See also McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty, Chapters 11–12 for more details.
126. Moyar, 356–7.
127. See Cosmas, 194 for more detail regarding the Binh Gia.
128. Quoted in Nguyen, 74.
129. Quoted in Cosmas, 179.
130. Quoted in Nguyen, 75.
131. Quoted in Cosmas, 202.
132. John Carland, Stemming the Tide: May 1965–October 1966 (Washington DC: Center for Military History, 2000), 16–18.
133. Moyar, 368.
134. Carland, 19–21.
135. Nguyen, 76.
136. Quoted in Cosmas, 230. Ironically, this last coup was successful, and both Thieu and Ky would be the representatives of the RVN until just before the end in 1975.
137. Quoted in Moyar, 407.
138. Quoted in Cosmas, 240.
139. See Moyar, 409–11 and Cosmas, 241–4 for more details.
140. Moyar, 411.
141. One of the most controversial debates occurred at this time, regarding the need to call up the reserves to support the effort. President Johnson refused to do so, fearing a congressional and public debate regarding the war. See Cosmas, 244–5 and Moyar, 414–5 for more specifics.
142. The Philippines and Thailand also provided troops.
143. As he had been during the debates regarding the call-up of reserves, the President was not entirely truthful with the U.S. public—a decision that would create problems in the future when people began to question the escalation. See questions from the press to Johnson on July 28, Moyar, 415.
144. MACV Directive 525-4, quoted in Clarke, 106.
145. U.S. forces had been trained in pacification duties and had extensive supporting doctrine for their mission. See Andrew Birtle, US Army and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942–1976 (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 2007), for a much more nuanced discussion of the preparation, training, and doctrine in pacification for all USA units. See also Michael Hennessey, Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965–1972 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1997), for more detail on the USMC thinking about pacification training and doctrine.
146. RF/PF forces would be given the primary responsibility for securing areas so that both ARVN and U.S. forces could be used in clearing operations. ARVN would support the Territorial forces when needed and the U.S. forces would be used in quick reaction forces to support when needed. Clarke, 107.
147. Quoted in Clarke, 107.
148. There is debate about whether the Australians fit in well with the 173rd, since they had a different military culture. While some of the arguments advanced are valid, it is not as black and white as some commentators have made it out to be. See Ian McNeil, To Long Tan (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1993) and Bob Breen, First to Fight (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988) for more details.
149. Carland, 28–32.
150. Cosmas, 250–1; also see Carland, 113–47 for an in-depth discussion of the Ia Drang valley campaign.
151. The command structure in I Corps and Vietnam in general was quite complicated. See Cosmas for a full discussion of how this developed.
152. See Lewis Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General’s Report on Vietnam (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970) for an interesting personal account of the war.
153. Westmoreland recalled in his memoirs: “I had no wish to deal so abruptly with General Walt that I might precipitate an inter-service imbroglio.” See William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1976), 166.
154. Quoted in Michael Hennessy, Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965–1972 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishing, 1997).
155. Many U.S. Marines had some experience in the small wars of the 1920s and 1930s, while others had experienced the conventional battles of the south and central Pacific as well as Korea. See Hennessy for more details of some of the relevant debates.
156. Quoted in Hennessy, 78.
157. 1st Marine Division arrived in 1966.
158. See John Shulimson, US Marines in Vietnam: The Landing and the Build-up (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 1978), 69–83, for specific details of the operation.
159. Walt, 69–70.
160. See Shulimson, 133–8 for more details on the start of the program.
161. Walt, 112.
162. Even Westmoreland was complimentary of the program: “the Marines achieved some noteworthy results, particularly with one of the more ingenious innovations developed in South Vietnam, the Combined Action Platoon… . [A]lthough I disseminated information on the platoons and their success to other commands, which were free to adopt the idea as local conditions might dictate, I simply had not enough numbers to put a squad of Americans in every village and hamlet.” A Soldier Reports, 166.
163. Walt, 77.
164. Clarke, 123–4.
165. For an in-depth study, see Brig. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History), 1977.
166. Richard Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 36–37.
167. Nguyen, 76 and see 73–76 as well.
168. Nguyen, 73–76.
169. My latest research project involves examining the battlefield performance of U.S. and ARVN forces across three provinces and over the course of the war in order to consider some of these issues in depth.
170. Quoted in Cosmas, 257–8.
171. The RVN also restructured the program at this time; as noted previously, the RVN pacification programs were put under the command of General Thang.
172. Hunt, 37–44.
173. See Clarke’s Chapter 7, “Revolt in I Corps” for an in-depth discussion of this issue.
174. Westmoreland, 211.
175. Lieutenant General Creighton Abrams was one of the officers who wrote the report.
176. Hunt, 73. See also Komer’s book, Bureaucracy at War, for more details regarding his thinking.
177. Hunt, 73.
178. This issue had already been debated, in 1963 and 1964, when Westmoreland had offered to manage the effort.
179. Quoted in Cosmas, 358. See also Hunt, 82–85 and Thomas Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981), for more details.
180. Hunt, 85.
181. Cosmas, 399–400.
182. See Eric Bergerud, The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), for a detailed analysis of 25th Division’s campaign in Vietnam.
183. See Carland’s Chapter 14 for more details on the complexity of the war for the 1st Infantry Division.
184. He would go on to be II Field Force Commander (Corps level), COMUSMACV and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.
185. Quoted in Carland, 337.
186. Bergerud, 155.
187. Westmoreland felt that the division had done well, but understood that Deputy Ambassador Porter was wary of the apparent success. See Westmoreland, 208.
188. Quoted in Bergerud, 160.
189. See Carland’s Chapter 15 for more details on the 25th Division’s efforts in 1966.
190. While the Marines were trying to carry out the war in I Corps, they also had to contend with the “I Corps Revolt” in the spring and summer.
191. See the various USMC official histories for more details regarding CAP. One of the best personal accounts was written by Bing West, The Village.
192. Walt, 138.
193. It was estimated that more than 2,000 PAVN were infiltrating per month into I Corps.
194. See Jack Shulimson, US Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War (Washington, DC: USMC History and Museums Division, 1982), Chapter 10, for a very detailed account.
195. Quoted in Shulimson, Expanding War, 176.
196. Hennessey, 98.
197. Walt, 139.
198. “RVNAF will have the primary mission of supporting Revolutionary Development activities, with priority in and around the National Priority Areas and other areas of critical significance… .The primary mission of the US and FWMAF [Allied forces] will be to destroy the VC/NVA main forces, base areas, and resources and/or drive the enemy into the sparsely populated and food scarce areas … Although RVNAF is assigned the primary responsibility of supporting Revolutionary Development and US/FWMAF are assigned the primary mission of destroying the main VC/NVA forces and bases, there will be no clear cut division of responsibility. RVNAF General Reserve… .will conduct unilateral and participate in coordinated and combined search and destroy operations. US/FWMAF will continue to provide direct support and implicit aid to Revolutionary Development activities.” Cosmas, 401.
199. Komer secret report, “Improving ARVN Effectiveness,” December 22, 1966, Personal papers.
200. Nguyen, 79–80 and Dale Andrade, “Westmoreland Was Right,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (2010), 161–3.
201. Quoted in Cosmas, 406.
202. Ibid.
203. The massacre at My Lai being a well-known issue.
204. Quoted in Cosmas, 410.
205. Hunt, 89–90.
206. Both HES and TEFS were subjected to ongoing scrutiny and debate throughout the remainder of the war.
207. Westmoreland, 215–6; Komer, 118–21; Clarke, 211–2; and Hunt, 90–100 for more detail. Over the course of CORDS, countless pamphlets and guides were published on all aspects of pacification. The author has many of these and they are worth the read, if you can track them down at the National Archives and other archives.
208. Cosmas, 362.
209. See Table 14 in Clarke, 274. From 1969 until 1974, the RVNAF lost 2 to 20 times as many as the United States.
210. There were exceptions to this. Many U.S. advisors who served with the ARVN General Reserve and alongside the ARVN Special Forces, LLDB, and the Ranger units had served multiple tours and been decorated, and were promoted upon return to U.S. units and formations.
211. This was an ongoing issue for the U.S. Army in Iraq and Afghanistan.
212. Clarke, 236–8.
213. See George MacGarrigle, Taking the Offensive (Washington DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1998), Chapter 6, for more details.
214. See MacGarrigle, Chapters 7 and 8, for more details, as well as Bergerud.
215. 1st Infantry Division, After Action Report, Operation Junction City, personal papers.
216. Cosmas, 423.
217. See MacGarrigle, Chapter 16; Hennessy, 119–24; and Gary Telfer, US Marines in Vietnam: Fighting the North Vietnamese (Washington, DC: USMC History and Museum Division, 1984), for more detail.
218. Research into archival material also indicates serious debates in North Vietnam at this time about strategy, prompted by increases in casualties. Many in the DRV felt that a point of stalemate had been reached. See Ngyuen, Hanoi’s War, for more details of the debates.
219. See Cosmas, 441–5 for an interesting analysis of how MACV attempted to deal with the public relations campaign.
220. Cosmas, 462.
221. Nguyen, 80 and Cosmas, 461–69.
222. The stated aims of the DRV and COSVN at the end of 1967 for the Tet offensives (“to secure a decisive victory in a relatively short time”) were never met. Victory was not achieved until 1975 after much more loss for the DRV and COSVN. See Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnam: The Anti-US resistance War for National Salvation, 1954–1975: Military Events (Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House), 100.
223. Quoted in Cosmas, MACV The Joint Command in the Years of Withdrawal, 1968–1973 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2007), 35–36.
224. Westmoreland reiterated that Khe Sanh was going to be a focal point for PAVN in his memoirs; see 314–5.
225. See Cosmas, Withdrawal, 39–40 and, for an extensive analysis, Jack Shulmison, US Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968 (Washington, DC: USMC Historical and Museums Division, 1997), Chapter 4.
226. Westmoreland confirmed that captured documents indicated preparations for a major offensive across South Vietnam. See Westmoreland, 313–4.
227. Cosmas, 50.
228. See Westmoreland, 316–8 for more detail on the bits of intelligence that were coming into MACV about a possible major VC/PAVN offensive.
229. Cosmas, 52. The siege of Khe Sanh would last for 71 days; Hennessy, 132.
230. Hennessy claims 72 of the 245 district centers; 133.
231. Cosmas, Withdrawal, 59.
232. See Westmorelannd’s account on 323–6.
233. See the intelligence reports and files that are listed in Cosmas, 64–65.
234. Quoted in Westmoreland, 332.
235. There are too many accounts and newspaper reports reflecting this perception to list here; this thesis is not a new one and is generally acknowledged as an important factor in events and decisions during this period.
236. Cosmas, 69–70.
237. Hennessey, 132–3.
238. See Shulimson, Defining Year 1968, for greater detail of the confusion and the attempts to move forward to support the 1st ARVN Division, 169–71.
239. Hunt, 136.
240. Shulimson, 177–82.
241. For a full account of the fighting in Hue see Shulimson, 183–224.
242. There were more than 600 journalists in South Vietnam at this time. See Peter Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington, 2 vols (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977) for extensive analysis of the impact of the media.
243. Quoted in Cosmas, Withdrawal, 88.
244. Westmoreland recommended Abrams to the president as the best choice; 323.
245. Quoted in Cosmas, Withdrawal, 116.
246. Quoted in Komer, Bureaucracy, 146.
247. Hunt, 136–43.
248. Walt, 170.
249. Quoted in Komer, 147.
250. Lewis Sorley has been the historian who has been most closely associated with this thesis.
251. See Dale Andrade. “Westmoreland Was Right: Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Vietnam War,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 2 (June 2008), 145–81; as well as Hunt’s Chapter 14, “One war or business as usual,” for more detail on this key debate.
252. What was consistent during both time periods was that the VC/PAVN were able to decide when battle commenced and ended.
253. Komer, 151.
254. See Andrade, Westmoreland, 164–6.
255. Ibid., 166.
256. Hunt, 144–54.
257. Hunt, 193.
258. By 1970, there were over 2 million.
259. Cosmas, Withdrawal, 119–21. See Hunt’s Chapter 12, “The Impact of the APC” for a more extensive discussion and debate.
260. See Hunt’s Chapter 11, “Abrams in Command: Military Support of the APC” for a more detailed discussion of the multiple support operations carried out by both United States and ARVN.
261. Quoted in Hunt, 193.
262. See Hunt, 218 for a detailed analysis of losses in Tet 1969 versus Tet 1968, especially in terms of outposts abandoned or lost: 477 in 1968 and only 8 in 1969. The battlefield had changed.
263. Quoted in James Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 13.
264. See Hunt, Chapter 13, “New Directions”; Willbanks, 5–20; and Cosmas, 141–55 for more detail on this very contentious issue and planning.
265. Hunt, 213.
266. Quoted in Willbanks, 58.
267. Hunt, 218–9.
268. See William Colby, Lost Victories (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), for a detailed assessment of the RVN ability to stem the VC in the countryside.
269. Hunt, 253.
270. See Willbanks, 40–42 for an important discussion of the derogatory meaning of this term for many within the RVN and RVNAF. As noted above, the RVNAF had borne the brunt of the casualties of the war since 1954.
271. See Cosmas, Withdrawal, quote from Laird to President Nixon, March 13, 1969, for the specific tone and outlook.
272. Quoted in Cosmas, Withdrawal, 157.
273. Clarke, 368–73. See the full chapter for more details on the various debates, as well as Willbanks, 32–40.
274. Clarke, 379–81.
275. The issue of unified allied command in the field remained a major issue up until the last days of U.S. ground forces.
276. Clarke, 391–401 and see Cosmas, 254–70 for more detail.
277. See the analysis by Hunt, 224–6.
278. Quoted in Clarke, 409.
279. Quoted in Clarke, 410. See also the analysis by Willbanks, 54–56.
280. See Cosmas, Withdrawal, 279–310 for a much more detailed discussion of the invasion and the planning behind it.
281. Cosmas, Withdrawal, 302.
282. Quoted in Willbanks, 84.
283. Ibid., 86.
284. Quoted in Clarke, 422.
285. Quoted in Willbanks, 89.
286. Willbanks, see Tables 5 and 6.
287. See Willbanks, 94–121; Clarke, 472–6; and Cosmas, 311–39 for much more analysis and discussion. Willbanks also has a new book on the operation expected to be published in 2015.
288. Quoted in Willbanks, 112.
289. Robert Thompson, Peace Is Not at Hand (London: Chatto & Windus, 1974), 85.
290. Quoted in Cosmas, 270.
291. Cosmas, 269.
292. Willbanks, 122 and other reports.
293. Quoted in Hunt, 255.
294. Willbanks, 123–4.
295. As with the previous offensives, a full analysis of this important engagement is beyond the scope of this chapter. Please see Dale Andrade, America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001).
296. Quoted in Cosmas, Withdrawal, 348.
297. Only the 196th Infantry Brigade remained in country. Hunt, 255.
298. See Willbanks, 123–5 and Cosmas, Withdrawal, 348–9.
299. See Cosmas, Withdrawal, 349–56 for a wider discussion of the U.S. preparation for the air campaign.
300. For more analysis, see Andrade, but also Willbanks, 126–62; Cosmas, 356–79; and Clarke, 481–90.
301. Willbanks, 127.
302. Quang Tri fell to the NVA in April.
303. Quoted in Willbanks, 159.
304. Ibid., 151.
305. Quoted in Clarke, 487.
306. Ibid., 488–9.
307. Hunt, 255–7. Colby declared that pacification “essentially did the job it was supposed to—deprive the enemy of any population base. The last six months of attack have in my view been a recognition by Hanoi that they had lost the people’s war and found it necessary to go into a soldier’s war.” Quoted in Hunt, 257.
308. Cosmas, Withdrawal, 371–9.
309. The background to and complexity of these talks does not permit discussion in any great detail here.
310. See Cosmas, Withdrawal, 381–4; Clarke, 490–6; and Willbanks, 163–86 for more details on the negotiations and the debates.
311. See Cosmas, Withdrawal, 384–400 for more details on the specifics of the drawdown of all U.S. and MACV personnel.
312. For a very detailed discussion of the final months in South Vietnam, see George Veith, Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973–1975 (New York: Encounter Books, 2012).
313. Cosmas, Withdrawal, 401–4.
314. Quoted in Willbanks, 207. See also 204–6 for more details on the shortages and supply issues.
315. See Willbanks, Chapters 9 and 10, for a more detailed description of the end of the RVN.
316. The defense of Xuan Loc by the 18th ARVN Division was one of the most outstanding performances of any ARVN unit. Interestingly, throughout most of its history, it had been one of the worst performing divisions in the RVNAF order of battle.
317. Quoted in Cosmas, 405–7.
318. Komer, 154.