Dangerous Trade: Arms Exports, Human Rights, and International Reputation

When states gathered at the July 2001 United Nations small arms conference, they anticipated neither an easy solution to the problem of regulating the global small arms market nor the widespread backing the initiative would receive. As chapter 3 shows, political and economic obstacles had always defeated multilateral conventional arms controls in the past, and practice is slow to change. Even so, organizers hoped to build on antilandmine momentum and other developments in the 1990s to negotiate a treaty covering legal and illicit small arms sales. Among the major democratic exporters, support at the 2001 conference was expected. The EU had already in 1998 adopted common arms export standards, and the United States had had a hand in promoting the conference. Proponents were therefore caught off-guard both by the largely positive reception to the conference overall and by the prominent U.S. rejection of its goals at its opening.¹ Because the conference was constrained by consensus rules, the result was merely the nonbinding UNPOA, focused solely on national standards to control the illicit small arms market. Follow-on conferences were unable to do more. Despite being considered a failure by many,² however, the UN small arms process catalyzed state support to create international arms export regulations and ultimately led to the ATT. The ATT does what the UNPOA could not and more: it specifies binding humanitarian criteria to regulate the legal arms trade and applies those criteria to major conventional weapons transfers as well as to small arms and light weapons transfers.

This chapter explains why five of the world’s top arms-exporting democracies—Belgium, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States³—have supported new “responsible” arms export initiatives. Unlike states adversely affected by conventional arms proliferation or those with little stake in the global arms market, these states have significant economic incentives not to support new standards. Indeed, conventional wisdom suggests that major arms producers would strongly oppose any measures imposing constraints on their trade to protect economic and industrial interests. For most states, the freedom to trade arms as they choose is perceived as a matter of not only foreign-policy autonomy but also economic necessity and national security. Previous attempts in the 1920s and 1930s, 1970s, and early 1990s all failed as a result of these deep-seated concerns. During and after the Cold War, European suppliers’ focus on export promotion to support industrial interests would seem to make them the prime candidates to oppose new standards. Only the United States, with its larger domestic defense market, would be freer to adopt multilateral controls without suffering sky-rocketing costs or a decline in quality.

Yet to assume that a similar logic applies to current policy developments would be mistaken and misleading. Once-reluctant European states have been among the most eager to demonstrate support for shared “responsible” arms transfer criteria, which the United States vocally resisted until it too changed course in 2009. As I showed in chapter 3, this shift was not preceded by and has not been followed by collective changes in arms export practice, calling into question explanations that rely on the low cost of commitment, material gain, or normative obligation. What changed, I argue here, was not industry interest or influence but rather the social pressures and expectations associated with “responsible” arms export standards in the context of the international institutions negotiating them. Democratic suppliers especially have faced growing pressures to back “responsible” arms transfer policies as arms trade norms have evolved since the end of the Cold War, highlighting new roles for human rights, human security, and humanitarian law. States have responded by supporting these policies as a means to signal their “good international citizenship,” committed to human, social, and economic rights and other collective goods. Such a reputation, leaders believe, will bring social benefits in the form of legitimacy, esteem, and standing in the international community. At least early on in the norm life cycle, states’ policy choices may favor image promotion that acknowledges new norms even as their underlying preferences remain unchanged. Interviews, government documents, and NGO strategies point to the importance of reputation as a social incentive influencing states’ commitment to new arms export policies at the international level, despite material incentives pulling them in the opposite direction.

Scholars commonly trace states’ weapons procurement and export policies back to powerful defense industry preferences for unregulated trade, linked to the military-industrial complex.⁴ From this perspective, governments are in essence held captive by economic, electoral, and security needs to cater to defense industry wishes—even more so when defense companies are state owned. Companies use their close relationship with the state and position of economic power to turn government policy in their favor, seeking to maximize profits and expand export-market shares.⁵ Clearly, concern for defense industry well-being has been a major roadblock to cooperative export restraint in the past. However, in this case, deference to defense industry preferences is not a compelling explanation for state policy: governments have adopted new policies and supported the ATT without industry consent, leaving industry with the choice to get on board or lose its voice on the issue entirely.

This recent turn of events is surprising. The defense industry’s close and supportive relationship with the state as its primary investor, customer, salesman, and licensing authority is to be expected (Stanley and Pearton 1972:85). Governments are intimately involved in the arms trade from the initial financing, research, and design of weapons to the purchasing and export promotion of those weapons. In the process, a complex web of institutions takes root in which government, military, and industry actors reinforce one another’s interests. This relationship is ostensibly sustained by states’ security need to maintain a viable defense industrial base and is a relatively constant feature across social systems, regardless of domestic political structure, type of government, or degree of industry nationalization.⁶ In democracies, it also receives external reinforcement by creating electoral bases in centers of defense production. Politicians support local production lines as an important source of employment and avoid policies that could potentially result in job loss—and therefore vote loss—in their home districts (Keller 1995; Markusen et al. 1991).

The ICBL campaign, although resulting in the landmark Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty and helping to put humanitarian arms control on the agenda, did not break with MIC expectations. Indeed, NGOs worked within the constraints posed by military and industrial interests. Their ability to demonstrate the lack of economic and military utility for APL contributed significantly to the campaign’s success. Military officials acknowledged that they considered APL unreliable and of limited strategic value.⁷ In addition, the global arms trade had been saturated by an overabundance of cheap APL, which were an insignificant portion of the defense industry’s exports (International Committee of the Red Cross 1996; O’Dwyer 2006). Instead, the business of removing landmines—for which the treaty pledges financial support from its signatories—is a far more technology-intensive, expensive, and profitable endeavor for companies (Beier and Crosby 1998; O’Dwyer 2006). It was therefore with the blessing of key military and industrial players that the treaty was able to garner such sweeping governmental support.

The same cannot be said for conventional arms more broadly. Conventional arms are the cornerstone of military strategy and an industrial base important to political, security, and economic interests. Andrew Moravcsik (1993), for example, points to the dominance of domestic industrial preferences in determining governments’ defense procurement and production policies. Similarly, Asif Efrat (2010) cites these entrenched domestic economic and political interests in top arms-exporting states as the reason behind the weak results of the UN small arms process. These interests remain strong and face a potentially rough and uncertain road ahead as many states cope with defense cutbacks and budget-austerity measures. Yet “responsible” arms export policies have gotten support in spite of defense industry preferences, not because of them. Indeed, the cases I describe next point to reluctant industry support only in cases of prior government support.

The MIC has long been an important force in the politics of French arms exports, where pressures to sell abroad have been driven by economic considerations and met with consensus on the right and the left.⁸ France also traditionally has a strong statist system of market governance. In the defense industry, the state is often the client, the banker, the insurance provider, the shareholder, and even at times the owner (Boyer 1996). Edward Kolodziej describes the French MIC as “a government within a government,” with the “formidable resources and influence to elicit the political and economic support for what it wants as the price for its cooperation” (1987:213; see also Freedman and Navias 1997; Labbé 1994). Industry recruitment from the ranks of former military personnel is common, and the educational system early on creates tight networks among bureaucrats, military, and industry officials. Moreover, the lines of communication between government and industry are regular, especially during export promotion and decision making (“French Move” 1998; interview 59108220; Kolodziej 1987).

Exports are an important tool of the French state to bolster an ailing defense industrial base (Freedman and Navias 1997; Graves 2000; Sarkozy 2008). Indeed, even as France has come to support new multilateral export restrictions, it has considered the arms trade essential for weapons procurement, economic power, foreign relations, and national sovereignty.⁹ Between its support for former colonies, its desire to establish itself as a “third pole” during the Cold War, and the economic imperative, politicians and their constituents have fiercely supported the arms trade. Despite the state’s best efforts, however, French defense exports fell by almost half between 1990 and 1995, strengthening the economic calculus to export promotion (Hébert 1998:140). By the end of the decade, the largest land armaments firm—the state-owned Groupement industriel des armaments terrestres (commonly known as GIAT)—still “relied on exports for over 50% of its total turnover” (Graves 2000:90). Even more significantly, by 2005 more than 80 percent of aviation production was being exported (interview 63308220). In a country with persistently high unemployment rates, moreover, France has been one of the slowest to cut its military spending and has resisted privatization trends, which lawmakers have feared will close factories and risk job losses in their constituencies (Graves 2000; Guay 1998; Lewis 2004; Sarkozy 2008).

As a result, France’s support for the ATT is unexpected, especially given the fact that it was made without the consent of the defense industry. As one industry representative commented, although the ATT now seems like a good development to “level the playing field,” that was not industry’s initial reaction (interview 63308220). In the past, the industry was “very hostile to any control that results in a drop in exports” and fought to introduce less restrictive controls (Labbé 1994:213; see also interview 59108220). It believed that additional restraints would force it to follow economically harmful rules or risk the consequences of disobeying them (interview 63308220). Given the government’s firm public commitment to UN processes, however, the defense industry has faced a new choice: support new regulations and have its voice heard in the codification process (“telling the diplomats the reality of the business”) or get left out of the process entirely. It has opted for the former as the “only viable position” because it is better to have a say in rules it will have to follow regardless than to leave rule making to those without the expertise to understand their effect on the industry (interview 63308220).

Although UK defense companies were privatized in the 1980s, their influence and importance have also been common features in British politics.¹⁰ The British defense industry has been a source of employment, technological innovation, national security and defense, and foreign-policy clout.¹¹ Exports have long been seen as a matter of “commercial pragmatism,” crucial to defense industry survival and actively promoted by Labour and Conservative governments alike (Stanley and Pearton 1972:91). The Defence Export Services Organization in the UK Ministry of Defence is in charge of export promotion, supported by the Export Credits Guarantee Department, an interdepartmental committee chaired by the Treasury.¹² Both parties believe that without exports the defense industrial base would be significantly weakened and jobs threatened, especially in the post–Cold War defense downturn.¹³ On average, defense companies currently export about 40 percent of their product (Cook, Foss, and Scott 2004:21; interview 39307200), up from 20 percent in the 1980s (Kapstein 1997:83).

In short, industry “has influence where it matters in Whitehall,” regardless of the party in power (interview 39307200). Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher presided over an “arms export revival,” including the most profitable deals in British history, the Al Yamamah deals, in 1986 and 1988 (Phythian 2000b:20–21). At the time, the press and policy makers lauded the program to export aircraft and training to Saudi Arabia, which enabled the United Kingdom to continue an important production line and support thirty thousand jobs (Spear 1990; Phythian 2000b).¹⁴ Labour was also strong on defense during its return to office. Although elected in 1997 with a commitment to ethical arms transfers and leading multilateral initiatives, it simultaneously promised to maintain the strength of the defense industry (Gummett 2000:269). As a result, some scholars and critics argue that the British government has remained distinctly pro-export and has framed its export reform agenda to allow a permissive interpretation of new criteria (Cooper 2000; Stavrianakis 2008).

Traditionally, industry could be counted on “to mount a vigorous defence of the status quo—or continue to stress the need for further deregulation” of arms transfer controls—and governments in turn did not push for more regulation (Davis 2002:119; Pearson 1983). Nevertheless, the United Kingdom announced its intention to promote a global ATT in September 2004 and expanded the initiative to include major conventional weapons in March 2005. Industry, however, did not become a supporter of the initiative until June 2006, long after the government took on its ATT leadership role (Fidler 2006; interview 33207200). Interviews reveal two reasons for its eventual support: first and foremost, a leveling of the global playing field¹⁵ and, second, the anticipated benefit to the defense industry’s national reputation.¹⁶ Following Labour’s strong commitment to an ATT in its election manifesto, the British defense industry—like the French—decided that it was better to have a say in the process and that multilateral controls are the “only way to do it” (interview 39307200). It began to actively promote the ATT abroad, along with the government and NGOs. However, this did not occur until the government’s own commitment to legalizing responsible arms export standards worldwide was made public and had demonstrated its staying power.

For historical reasons, the German state has maintained a public distance from the arms industry. During World War II, the military and the defense industry were drawn under Nazi control, leading to a distinct postwar distaste for any signs of preferences for policies associated with German militarism. Even as the German defense industry rebuilt in the 1950s and beyond,¹⁷ its relationship with the state has maintained at least some public distance. Small arms producers today, for example, note the government’s more passive approach to their problems, stemming, in their view, from their negative historic image (interview 46307255). The German government therefore may not face the same potential industrial barriers to support new arms restraints as many other top exporters.

Even so, by the 1970s, Germany had reestablished a highly concentrated MIC, albeit less visible to the public eye (Homze 1981; Brzoska 1986). Contact between bureaucrats and industry lobbyists is regular, especially through the defense committee of the Federation of German Industry (Bundesverband Deutscher Industrie) (interview 44307255). Industry often recruits retired military officers “to make use of their inside experience and contacts with former colleagues” (Cowen 1986:234). Governments have also supported exports and state offsets for exports, a role that has grown since the late 1990s, even as “responsible” arms export criteria hit the international agenda.¹⁸ Although there is no official agency to promote German defense goods abroad, military and foreign attachés in German embassies are tasked with such activities and often trained by the Federation of German Industry to be informed about German products (interview 44307255). Exports have grown in importance as defense spending drops and the government wishes to “[keep] the German defence industry German” (Mulholland 2005:23; see also Mulholland 2003 and interview 44307255). As a corporatist state, Germany also maintains a close relationship with labor and seeks to prevent job losses. Ian Davis observes, for example, that “the employment argument” has “enabled the arms companies to elicit some support for a relaxation of the arms export rules among trade union representatives” (2002:161; see also Brzoska 1989; Graves 2000; Pearson 1986).

Because the German domestic arms market is comparatively small, arms exports are used to “extend production runs, spread research and development costs and decrease other per-unit fixed costs” (Graves 2000:78). The export market was initially established through overseas military aid in the 1960s and helped to rebuild the postwar defense industry (Haftendorn 1971). Moreover, it fits with the country’s “deeply rooted” export orientation (Wulf 1996:31). Since the 1970s, Germany has consistently been a top MCW exporter and relied on exports for a majority of its defense products. Experts estimate that about 70 percent of German defense product was exported in 2007 (interview 44307255). As such, both right and left governments have tried to balance the “necessary evil” of arms exports with a culture of arms export restraint (Pearson 1986; see also Brzoska 1989; interview 46307255; Wulf 1996).

Despite Germany’s domestic arms export restraints,¹⁹ its defense industry has refrained from publicly backing similar restraints at the international level. Germany announced support for an ATT in July 2005, but industry has maintained a low profile on the matter. Although it gives its opinions to the government when asked, it consciously avoids looking too aggressive or taking its concerns public (interviews 44307255, 46307255). From some industry representatives’ perspective, legal sales are not the real problem, and government attention is focused on the wrong issue (interview 46307255). Nevertheless, faced with higher domestic restrictions, the defense industry does want to level the export-market playing field (interviews 15107255, 44307255, 46307255). It also says that it cannot afford the long-term loss of reputation that might result from being seen as un-supportive of global export restrictions, even if restrictions might be costly to it in the short-term (interview 46307255). Thus, although the German defense industry has fought for a less restrictive interpretation of domestic laws and policies in the past, it has been neither a block nor a catalyst for German support of multilateral initiatives.

Belgium relies heavily on exports to keeps its defense industry afloat, especially in light of limited domestic demand and the end of the Cold War (Weidacher 2005). Between 1983 and 1993, defense industrial employment fell by half, sales declined by 45 percent, and major companies were forced into bankruptcy or foreign ownership (Hassink 2000:83). Exports continue to form the industry’s backbone. By the end of the 1990s, exports accounted for about 80 percent of total defense sales, more than half of which are small arms (Castryck, Depauw, and Duquet 2007:28). Even before the post–Cold War decline, however, Belgian small arms firm FN Herstal’s “order sheets [read] like an atlas index” as a matter of survival (Stanley and Pearton 1972:70).

Arms sales and their relationship with the state are complicated by Belgium’s delicate system of federalism. Since 2003, regional governments have been in charge of arms transfers licensing in line with rules that are at least as restrictive as those set by federal law and policy.²⁰ Nevertheless, exports have been less transparent and arguably more permissive in Wallonia, where the state–industry connection is much more explicit and potential recipients may be less controversial than in Flanders.²¹ In Flanders, exports outside of Europe and North America, which typically account for more than 75 percent of licenses, are limited (Duquet, Castryck, and Depauw 2007).²² As a result, Geert Castryck, Sara Depauw, and Nils Duquet state, “the decision whether to grant or deny an export or transit licence is generally not a difficult one for the Flemish Government,” and license denials are rare (2007:91). Even so, Flemish licenses in 2006 at the time of the initial ATT vote had dropped considerably from figures for 1999–2004 (Castryck, Depauw, and Duquet 2007; Duquet 2008; Duquet, Castryck, and Depauw 2007; Flemish Peace Institute 2007a).

Wallonia’s defense exporters are much larger, in terms of both value and amount, and feature more traditional military goods, including small arms. In 2006, Wallonia exported €760 million worth of military goods to sixty-four countries. Most of these goods go to North America, the Middle East, and western Europe (Parlement Wallon 2007). FN Herstal, the dominant firm, derives its sales almost completely from outside Belgium (Weidacher 2005). Without a buyer when FN Herstal was sold off by its French parent company in 1997, the Walloon government took on ownership to preserve the industry and employment (interview 31307211). Economic downturn and high unemployment have meant an even closer relationship between the industry and the Walloon state as well as stronger public support for that relationship. As a result, more restrictive export legislation entails higher, more direct costs for Wallonia (Vranckx 2005), which accounts for two-thirds of Belgian defense industry employment (Hassink 2000).

Despite this regional variation in state–industry relations, however, the regional governments are not responsible for Belgian export control law, which is set by the federal government. Moreover, policy decisions in multilateral fora are supposed to reflect federal and regional interests, but in practice the federal government’s foreign-policy choices lead the way (interviews 24107211, 25107211). Although industry is now thought to be in favor of international export restraints for the level-playing-field benefits they might provide, it has not pushed for support in Belgium or elsewhere.²³ With the divorce of policy making and policy implementation, the federal government is freer to support shared export standards. Industry influence appears greater at the regional level—where both Flanders and Wallonia have supported the well-being of their defense companies (Hassink 2000)—and may instead translate into variation in strictness of policy implementation rather than in variation in policy itself, as I explore in chapter 5. Like Germany, then, the Belgian arms industry appears to have been neither a constraint nor a motivation for Belgium to support more restrictive export standards.

The United States, of course, is the original model for the MIC. Its government depends on defense manufacturers to serve “as guardians of ‘national security’ ” (G. Adams 1981:21). Manufacturers, in turn, expect that the Department of Defense will ensure that their costs are reimbursed and their profit margins maintained. The government also actively promotes U.S. defense products abroad through demonstrations and tax subsidies.²⁴ U.S. firms traditionally produced solely for the Pentagon, which often gave preference to American companies (Guay 1998). In the post–Cold War era, rapid restructuring, a larger domestic market, and a wider foreign customer base has meant that the U.S. industry has not suffered the same degree of downturn as its European counterparts.²⁵ As a result, only the U.S. defense industry has a market at home to support itself “without incurring prohibitive costs or a drastic decline of quality” or relying on exports to survive (Moravcsik 1992:40; see also Guay 1998).

Weapons programs receive support from the Department of Defense, all branches of the military, and Congress. Defense companies often hire retired public servants to supplement their political connections and influence. During the 1990s, the defense industry was also given an institutional presence to voice its opinions in the DOS’s Defense Trade Advisory Group. In addition, contract money linked to weapons programs makes specific areas of the country dependent on those companies and contracts for jobs, which can win votes for incumbent politicians.²⁶ Thus, the mutual dependence of the three points of the MIC “iron triangle”—industry, bureaucracy, and congressional appropriations—was born, giving industry a strong voice in government decision making.

The United States was the only country to fully oppose all UN multilateral initiatives before 2009. Even so, this opposition was not the result of industry influence or economic need. The level-playing-field argument has so far not motivated U.S. companies to lobby for an ATT. Despite being faced with “one of the most complex and far-reaching policy apparatuses for reviewing and regulating arms sales” (Nolan 1997:131), U.S. defense companies export at higher rates than their European counterparts and are far less dependent on those exports for survival. U.S. industry has not come out in opposition to the treaty, however, and tends to stay distant from the issue, focusing instead on loosening bilateral controls with close allies.²⁷ As such, the U.S. defense industry cannot be credited with either past U.S. opposition or present U.S. support. Instead, U.S. opposition—driven by a vocal pro-gun lobby and a distaste for binding international agreements—has led industry to focus its attention elsewhere, while support has similarly come without its involvement.

Rather than domestic motivations, I argue that major exporters have strategically chosen to support new arms export controls out of concern for their international reputations—that is, their desire to be seen by other states (and the diplomats representing them) as “good international citizens.” As norms surrounding small and major conventional arms evolved over the course of the 1990s to encompass human rights and human security, so too have the expectations by which states make arms trade policy—even those states that have not internalized new norms.²⁸ These dynamics are strongest in the context of international institutions, which, as social environments, “[create] sensitivity to particular kinds of status markers” (Johnston 2008:151). For the conventional arms community in the post–Cold War era, intense discussions have regularly taken place at the UN and Wassenaar Arrangement as well as in numerous regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the EU.²⁹ These institutions define common policy expectations, publicize states’ policy choices to other states and NGOs, and provide fora for the diplomatic interaction necessary to motivate states’ concern for reputation. The payoff, in turn, can be social and psychological, even if material gains are absent (Johnston 2008).

In this case, reputation serves as a social incentive, with consequences for states’ legitimacy, esteem, and standing in the international community.³⁰ For those states whose identities are strongly tied to their cooperative membership in international institutions, support for “responsible” arms transfer policies stems in large part from a perceived need to maintain (or better) their reputations as “good international citizens.” Democracies especially want to be seen as dedicated to human, social, and economic rights as well as to other collective goods. The analysis here therefore focuses primarily on states’ perceived concern for reputation rather than on their actual reputations as perceived by other international actors. It looks first at the institutional setting in which norms for “responsible” arms transfer policy have evolved since the late 1990s and the agreements that these institutions have produced. Second, it uses in-depth interviews, government documents, and other evidence to assess states’ motives for supporting “responsible” arms export controls in each of the five case studies—France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and the United States. In doing so, it highlights major exporters’ social reputational concerns in international politics as the source of their policy commitments.

International institutions provide a setting in which diplomats interact and develop states’ reputations over time. Johnston maintains that social incentives vary with an institution’s size and decision-making rules. Where groups are large and decisions are made by majoritarian rules that place members’ policies on record, he argues, these incentives will be stronger (2008:31–32). In the case of “responsible” arms transfers, decision-making rules have clearly played an important role: early on, consensus requirements at the EU and UN led to politically rather than legally binding agreements.³¹ Yet Johnston’s argument also suggests that states can hide behind consensus to avoid paying the social costs of dissent. In reality, however, states cannot assume that their opposition will go unnoticed. Especially where NGOs are allowed a place at the table, dissenting states are often publicly “named and shamed.”³² Even in closed-door meetings, the relevant in-group of participant states knows precisely who opposes a popular proposal and can judge accordingly. In each of the institutional settings I outline here—the EU, the UN small arms process, and the UN General Assembly—dissenting states are identified and criticized, regardless of decision rules. States’ concern for reputation, in turn, becomes an important motivation for policy support in each setting.

The politically binding EU Code of Conduct and its eight criteria to guide conventional arms export decision making passed by a unanimous decision of the fifteen members of the European Council of Ministers in June 1998. The code’s legally binding successor agreement, the Common Position on Arms Exports, similarly passed in the council (with twenty-seven member states at the time) under consensus rules in December 2008.³³ In general, the EU Council of Ministers—in which heads of state or their relevant ministers represent member-state interests—prefers unanimity. On sensitive issues such as foreign and security policy, policies are typically negotiated before a vote to facilitate consensus.³⁴ The council also serves as a regularized setting in which leaders meet to discuss and debate issues. From 1970 to 1993, the number of council meetings almost doubled, with foreign policy one of the topics most often discussed (Fligstein and McNichol 1998:70, 71). The council also established the Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports in 1991, intended to compare national practice and discuss potential harmonization. In doing so, it helped to usher in agreement on common criteria, and it has continued to meet regularly to discuss the interpretation and implementation of the Code of Conduct and the follow-on Common Position.

The council is widely seen as a highly secretive institution, whose deliberations and decisions are conducted “far from the public gaze” (Hayes-Renshaw 2002:65). Yet neither its public unanimity nor its lack of transparency could hide French opposition to the legally binding Code of Conduct—an opposition that other members and NGOs openly criticized.³⁵ Prior to 2008, France supported legalizing the code only if the EU lifted its arms embargo to China—itself a very public debate, in which consensus could not be reached.³⁶ However, as I discuss later in the chapter, it reversed its position and led the transformation of the code into the Common Position during its 2008 EU presidency. In doing so, France has conformed to its European peers’ expectations, seeking recognition for the restrictive and responsible nature of its arms transfer policies (interviews 59108220, 60108220). Consensus therefore neither prevented France from weakening the initial EU Code nor protected it from criticism for doing so. And as social reputational pressures have built up in both the EU and UN over time, France has felt compelled to conform.

Research into EU member states’ arms export practices casts doubt on the strength of their policy implementation and the depth of their socialization into new export norms (Erickson 2013b). Most recently, the Arab Spring has shone the spotlight on EU arms exports to dictatorships despite members’ commitments to EU and UN policies (M. Bromley 2012; Dempsey 2012). Nevertheless, when it comes to policy support, the Council of Ministers and the Working Group on Conventional Arms Exports have provided a setting in which “responsible” export controls have become attached to perceptions of the quality of states’ EU membership.³⁷ As Alyson Bailes observes, “There are signs that [the code] has created something like a virtuous circle of pressure for improvements of policy formulation and enforcement, both within the EU and among states preparing themselves for accession” (2004:v). Institutional pressures have thus made EU members early responders to new policy expectations. They have also cleared the path for EU exporters’ support of the UNPOA and the ATT. In fact, the decision to legalize the code in 2008 was a product of members’ concern for their own reputations as well as for the EU’s reputation, which they feared would be undermined by the code’s nonbinding status as they sought to promote a legally binding ATT.³⁸

Like the EU, consensus rules at the UN small arms conferences have been more significant for the content and form of the agreement than for dampening reputational effects. Consensus rules are common in the UN when controversial issues are on the table and are standard practice in the arms control community (interview 5406225; Marín-Bosch 1998; Peterson 2006). Although many supported a legally binding agreement addressing illicit and licit small arms transfers already in 2001, consensus was elusive. The United States, to the surprise of many, announced on the opening day its intention to oppose what it considered a fundamentally flawed document and its negotiation “red lines” (Karp 2002; SAS 2002:219). It was adamantly against entertaining any proposals that were legally binding or that included provisions that could restrict licit transfers or civilian possession. The final UNPOA was therefore only politically binding and dealt only with the illicit small arms trade.³⁹

Consensus meant that the conference had to bend to U.S. wishes. But it did not mean that supportive states would not advertise or criticize U.S. opposition. U.S. allies, other states, and NGOs roundly rebuked the United States in public for blocking otherwise popular efforts. However, U.S. opposition also allowed other “less influential” opponents to maintain a low profile (SAS 2002:220; Wyatt 2002). One expert noted that active U.S. opposition actually managed to make Russia and China, who were less vocal, “look good” despite their own lack of support for more restrictive measures (interview 5406225). In fact, it is difficult to identify with certainty which states joined the U.S. opposition, suggesting that consensus rules might shield smaller opposing states from reputational damage if a larger state’s opposition becomes the magnet of international attention.⁴⁰

This first small arms conference resulted from numerous UN reports and sessions in the 1990s on the problem of SALW proliferation.⁴¹ The idea for a global agreement on small arms took off after the success of the landmine treaty in 1997. Attendance included 169 member states as well as forty-two NGOs invited to address the conference.⁴² Some NGOs, however, argue that one of the downfalls of the conference was the decision to hold it in New York rather than in Geneva (interviews 4206225, 5406225, 9206225), where NGOs had explicitly sought to develop a small arms constituency in the 1990s (interview 7206225). Geneva is the home of the Conference on Disarmament, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, and a plethora of arms control NGOs. Geneva-based diplomats were therefore more likely to be knowledgeable about small arms issues (interview 4206225, 5406225). In contrast, New York–based diplomats had rarely worked on small arms issues and lacked basic expertise (interview 4206225). Thus, although both cities had an established group of regularly interacting diplomats, Geneva’s diplomatic population in 2001 more readily linked small arms policy with “good” international citizenship.

In the final hours of the conference, states agreed to a watered-down UNPOA “strictly in the interest of reaching a compromise” that could enable future global action (UN Department of Disarmament Affairs 2002:80; see also Greene 2002). In the face of “prolonged and difficult negotiations” on an issue barely on the international agenda a few years prior, it was a major accomplishment (UN Department of Disarmament Affairs 2002:89). The 2001 conference recognized and defined the “problem of small arms,” raised small arms awareness, established a humanitarian dimension to the issue, identified like-minded states, and forced states to voice their positions (SAS 2002; Greene 2002; Krause 2002; Wyatt 2002). It also led to the International Tracing Instrument (2005) and to Groups of Governmental Experts on arms brokering (2007–2008) and ammunition (2008). Nevertheless, the 2003 and 2006 review conferences could not garner consensus to legalize the UNPOA or expand it to include humanitarian export criteria. Despite active NGO campaigning and broadening state support, the United States in particular remained a stalwart opponent and stalled the process from going beyond the existing document. Yet the failure of the 2006 conference did not doom global arms export controls. Rather, its failure spurred lead states to take their case to the UN General Assembly, where the supportive majority could rule, not the opposition voices of a few.

Reputational pressures in the General Assembly cannot be isolated from the earlier small arms conferences. States that had agreed to language and initiatives in the context of the conferences found it difficult, if not impossible, to oppose them when it came to the ATT (interview 5406225). By the end of the July 2006 small arms conference—and before the General Assembly vote was even scheduled—Cuba, Iran, and Pakistan had withdrawn their opposition to global arms transfer principles, leaving the United States alone in its resistance (SIPRI 2007:432–33). In fact, leaders used the July conference as a sounding board to decide whether to move forward in another forum (SIPRI 2007:433). The result was a decision to pursue a separate ATT in the First Committee meeting in October 2006 and the General Assembly in December 2006.

Although the UNPOA deals with a wide range of complex issues related to illicit small arms transfers—which some identify as its strength and others as its downfall⁴⁴—the ATT focuses solely on legal arms transfers. This was an area where agreement had evolved over the course of several years and regular diplomatic meetings, moving from “much more resistance” in 2001 (Greene 2002:197) to near-consensus by 2006. These expectations for arms transfer policy carried over to the General Assembly. Nor did states’ reputations—good or bad—get left behind in the transition. Concern for “good international citizenship” connected to arms transfer policy has played out across institutional venues, regardless of their voting rules. With the United States clear that it would not budge, leaders moved to the General Assembly simply because it offered the ability to move forward and subsequently reaffirm the ATT by majoritarian vote.

Other ATT discussions were nevertheless subject to consensus. The 2008 Group of Governmental Experts was unable to reach consensus on specific treaty contents, largely again because of U.S. opposition but with some states also questioning the human security agenda.⁴⁵ Meetings of the Open-Ended Working Group in 2008 and 2009 kept the process in a holding pattern until the United States announced its support in late 2009—on the condition that negotiations proceed by consensus—and thus enabled the process to move ahead. With only Zimbabwe opposed, the UN voted in December 2009 to set ATT negotiations for 2012 with a series of preparatory meetings in 2010–2012. Although the 2012 negotiations “showed that there appeared to be broad acceptance by states of the need to agree to a treaty to regulate the conventional arms trade,” they also laid bare two key contentious issues: the scope of items covered and the inclusion of human rights and human security in arms export criteria (Bromley, Cooper, and Holtom 2012:1041–42). In the end, after some debate about the precise language, human security criteria were included in the final text, but ammunition and transfers to nonstate actors were not included in order to keep the United States on board.⁴⁶ The ATT passed the General Assembly with a vote of 154 to 3 on April 2, 2013, and opened for signature on June 3 with sixty-seven states signing on the first day. It enters into force ninety days after the fiftieth state deposits its ratification instrument on December 24, 2014.⁴⁷

Within these institutions, diplomats have met frequently to interact and develop expectations about arms transfer controls. As one German official stated, “Over the work, you get to know each other” (interview 15107255). These meetings in turn provide fora in which states establish their reputations on “responsible” arms transfers and humanitarian issues more broadly. In a dramatic reversal of past trends, support for such policies has become widespread. An important source of this support across cases, as indicated in the case studies, stems from the reputational concerns of states deeply embedded in and reliant on these international institutions.

I use in-depth interviews with key players in arms export policy making—government, NGO, and defense industry representatives—to illustrate the effect of governments’ reputational concerns on their policy commitments (see appendix B for information about interview data and coding).⁴⁸ First, many participants directly connect states’ policy commitment to their image promotion abroad. Second, participants reveal an acute awareness of how the stringency of their policies stacks up in relation to their peers’ policies, making comparisons about whose are the “best” and “most responsible.” Finally, ministries of foreign affairs typically spearhead state policies, not their economic ministries, which, some participants contend, turns the focus away from states’ economic interests and toward their international reputations. Although the U.S. case demonstrates that some states—especially superpowers—may choose to distance themselves from international institutions,⁴⁹ such cases remain the exception, and even the United States has since reversed its public opposition to multilateral arms export controls in response to reputational concerns.

These references to state identity, image, reputation, and “looking good” help to confirm the social reputation argument and were often given in response to questions asking participants to describe their government’s policies and explain its support for “responsible” arms export initiatives. I was careful never to ask questions that would direct participants to discuss reputation, image, or comparisons with other countries’ policies. If participants or other evidence had instead highlighted prospective material gains (military or economic) from new policies or lead states’ coercive efforts to collect cross-national support, a realist or neoliberal explanation would be more persuasive. As it is, although respondents expressed some concern over economic and foreign-policy costs, they focused instead on social reputational concerns as a strong motivating force behind their support for “responsible” arms transfer policies and related international initiatives.

In general, after the Ottawa Treaty in 1997, governments “didn’t want to be seen as being on the wrong side of history” with new humanitarian arms control initiatives (interviews 7206225, 34207200, 35207200, 58107255).⁵⁰ They believed that support for “responsible” arms transfer policies—such as the landmine ban—would be “good for their international profile,” a point that lead states and NGOs have emphasized in lobbying potential supporters (interviews 37207200, 34207200, 35207200). Although conventional arms present different regulatory challenges than landmines, the Ottawa experience changed international expectations: it altered how states’ define appropriate arms control behavior as well as what social gains they believe can be made from their own support of related humanitarian arms control policies. One NGO representative, for example, observed that humanitarian arms control has become “fashionable.” He stated, “The landmine ban established this high moral ground.… [I]t looks pretty bad if you don’t support it. This has led to the habit of thinking you can look morally good by supporting weapons-related initiatives” (interview 34207200).

As small arms garnered international attention following the landmine treaty, policy support became, according to one government official, “really a beauty contest among diplomats who don’t want to be looked at uneasily by their peers” (interview 58107255). Opposition also meant being seen as “in bed with the [United States],” whose own reputation had suffered because of its policies (interview 34207200). States saw the potential for reputational damage if they opposed new policies, but also for a certain “kudos that come with being seen as in the forefront” (interview 39307200) of humanitarian arms control issues if they were to come out in support of them.⁵¹ In the words of one NGO advocate, “They want to look good; that’s pretty much it” (interview 34207200). Support for the UNPOA, the ATT, and similar international policies could “give an image that they are doing something” (interview 38207200) and taking “some responsibility” for “moral concerns of the impact [of the arms trade] on the developing world” (interviews 40107200, 34207200, 41107200). Thus, although officials may express doubt over the utility and feasibility of new policies in private, it is “almost unthinkable that [states] would say this is a bad thing” (interviews 41107200, 43107200).

The United Kingdom was an early mover on humanitarian arms export policies. Unlike other major exporters, it first embraced new arms transfer policies in response to scandal in domestic politics (see chapter 5) and took on a leadership role to promote those policies at the EU and UN.⁵² In doing so, it has played a significant role in shifting the standard of good policy among major democratic exporters, providing a reference by which they can compare their policies and assess whether they measure up. Early support and leadership from a major exporter once resistant to common export controls made the United Kingdom a critical state in setting off the reputational beauty contest among democratic exporters. As the other case studies make clear, British support, along with the momentum provided by the success of the landmine treaty, created a reputational baseline for “responsible” export controls and set off a norm cascade, making support for new initiatives not only possible but also expected.

The United Kingdom has taken on a leadership role for two key multilateral “responsible” arms export initiatives, both with an eye to its international reputation. First, the Labour government led the creation of the 1998 EU Code of Conduct. In addition to pleasing domestic audiences and diffusing the costs of unilateral export controls, its leadership was intended to express—and confirm—the United Kingdom’s responsible, humanitarian reputation (Blair 1997; Dunne and Wheeler 2001; Robbins 1997). Labour sought to use its “responsible” policies to signal the United Kingdom’s new image not just to constituents at home but also to peers abroad, cementing “good international citizenship” as the foundation of postcolonial British foreign policy.⁵³ Leadership on arms transfer controls, it believed, would “look pretty good if [it could] pull it off” (interview 37207200). Although some note that British policy implementation has been poor (Cooper 2000; Dunne and Wheeler 2001; Mayhew 2005), this poor performance does not seem to have undermined its reputation abroad. Rather, the UK government saw its ability to rally multilateral support for the EU Code and later for the ATT as a reputation-building success (interviews 41107200, 32107200).

Second, since 2004 the British government has spearheaded multilateral transfer controls at the UN in an effort to repair its international reputation, which took a hit following the 2003 Iraq invasion (interviews 4206225, 35207200, 37207200). According to reports, “Britain’s human rights policy had been weakened by the Iraq war, military action in Afghanistan and terrorist attacks against the U.S.” (C. Adams 2004). Interviewees suggest that joining the ranks of ATT leadership was a strategic move on the part of the then foreign secretary Jack Straw at the helm of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, hoping to recapture the United Kingdom’s popular “ethical foreign policy” image of the late 1990s and show that it could “be a force for good on the world scene again.”⁵⁴ It was also a chance for Straw to “leave his mark on the issue” and rescue his own domestic and international standing after Iraq.⁵⁵ Indeed, although Prime Minister Tony Blair had approved Straw’s initial support for a small arms–only ATT, some argue that the same could not be said for Straw’s 2005 announcement that broadened the initiative to include all conventional arms (Straw 2005). The move was unexpected even among other ATT supporters and cemented not only British ATT leadership but also Straw’s legacy as the architect of the expanded scope of the ATT, which would pass by wide margins eight years later.⁵⁶

Yet it seems likely that in the hands of another ministry less invested in international reputation, the United Kingdom would have eschewed its leadership role. The Department of Trade and Industry, the Department for International Development, and the Ministry of Defence are also deeply involved in UK arms trade policy and practice. The Department of Trade Industry works closely with industry and is concerned about the economic costs of transfer controls. The Department for International Development has often been frustrated that policies do not go far enough to address its concerns for sustainable development, and the Ministry of Defence takes a more technical role. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in contrast, has been more concerned about international image and public diplomacy (Martin and Garnett 1997). It has chosen and promoted policies as a way to cultivate UK reputation and the image necessary to attract followers to its initiatives (interviews 32107200, 40107200, 41107200). Less invested in either ethical or economic interests, it has also been able to take the lead inside the government to ensure that policy is unified across ministries when promoting initiatives abroad, despite differences in bureaucratic preferences.

Even so, the government has wanted to make its policies appear more than “just a British idea” (interview 32107200). Although UK support convinced many major exporters (interview 41107200), its colonial history has made its leadership more sensitive for some importing states. It has therefore worked with affected states and NGOs to make the ideas “[pick] up resonance within an organization” to encourage agreement (interview 32107200). British NGOs have also been closely involved with the government’s policy promotion, even as both sides seek to maintain at least the appearance of mutual independence. Indeed, although the government’s support and promotion of “responsible” arms export standards helped new initiatives spread, NGOs claim the ideas behind them. NGOs had sought an international code of conduct since the early 1990s and worked closely with Labour to shape its foreign-policy agenda prior to its 1997 electoral victory (interviews 33207200, 35207200, 37207200).

Whether in spite of or because of its commitment to promoting defense exports alongside ethical arms transfers, the United Kingdom has created a strong international reputation for leadership on arms export controls and set the policy standard for other top democratic exporters. Its success with the EU Code of Conduct encouraged it to take the lead on the ATT, and the Blair government believed its international status was enhanced as a result. UK leadership on the issue has continued under subsequent governments, with support from the Conservative-led coalition government especially showing how changes in expectations since the mid-1990s can alter past political opposition. Most importantly for the purposes of this chapter, UK government leadership—at times in partnership with NGOs⁵⁷ and the defense industry—has helped to set policy expectations, trigger social reputational concerns, and accelerate support worldwide.

Germany’s arms transfer policy and its foreign policy more broadly have been profoundly shaped by World War II. As a rule, postwar Germany sees itself as a strong supporter of multilateral initiatives and wishes to cultivate a reputation for good international citizenship. According to one official, Germany supports new arms transfer policies, “basically because [they] sounded good and that’s what Germany does” (interviews 16107255, 44307255). In general, it is very important for the government to be seen as international, multilateral, and “the best European” (interviews 16107255, 44307255). Germany stands behind UN principles in rhetoric, if not also in action, with multilateralism as “the central reference point [of German foreign policy]” (Grossmann and Hummel 1997:21–22). In fact, because the United Kingdom had declared its strong support, officials believe that “Germany couldn’t not do it” without risking the appearance of being “irresponsible” and uncooperative (interview 45207255, 19407255).

Germany’s public support for common export controls has come despite private skepticism about the merits and feasibility of multilateral “responsible” arms transfer criteria. Many in Germany and elsewhere “did not anticipate the [ATT] initiative to pass through and formalize so quickly at the United Nations.”⁵⁸ Officials have worried that multilateral principles were neither practical nor efficient and risked taking attention away from other initiatives with the potential for more concrete results (interviews 15107255, 19407255, 45207255). This distinction between public support and private skepticism illustrates that even in Germany—where support for multilateral initiatives is assumed to be an intrinsic element of national identity—reputational concerns can be an important policy consideration.

Cognizant of the growing public-relations element of the small arms issue, the Federal Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) has gone from thinking that post-UNPOA initiatives were “nothing serious” to championing an ATT and shared export standards (interview 19407255). Officials want Germany to be recognized as a leader on small arms and related issues. They believe that as a major arms exporter and a larger EU country, Germany has a responsibility to lead, especially on arms control and disarmament (interviews 14107255, 15107255, 16107255). With Canada and other countries already championing small arms control, Germany went “looking for something else” and saw the ATT process as a public-relations opportunity after failing to press hard enough to achieve a binding treaty on ammunition controls (interview 19407255).⁵⁹ In its 2007 EU presidency, Germany kept the issue on the EU agenda. Even so, experts note that although Germany reliably supports policies, it often stops short of overcoming major-power opposition (interview 19407255). As a result, it has not been recognized as a lead state on par with the United Kingdom, presumably because the AA has chosen a backseat in non-European fora.

Germany takes pride in its history of arms control and disarmament (interview 14107255) and sees itself as well qualified to promote “best practice guides for different areas of small arms” (interview 14107255). Officials consistently emphasize the restrictiveness of German policies, especially in comparison to EU requirements and other members.⁶⁰ Annual arms export reports describe German policies in multilateral fora and contain a section titled “German Arms Exports in International Comparison,” in which the government emphasizes its outreach activities and international cooperation, while downplaying the size of its arms exports in comparison to other major exporters. Officials also compare Germany’s leadership efforts in the EU to those of the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and France and note that Germany is one of the most active states on the small arms issue at the UN (interview 15107255). Germany thus expresses a keen awareness of its standing among European leaders and how its policies stack up in comparison.

It is worth noting that, like the United Kingdom, Germany’s strong support of “responsible” arms control would have been less certain had the AA not been the key agency deciding German policy. Ultimately, it is the AA leadership’s decision to push an issue on the foreign-policy agenda (interview 19407255). And, as one official notes, “there is a difference between the principles the AA will follow and what the [Ministry for Economics and Technology (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie)] will follow” with important consequences for German foreign policy (interview 14107255). As the foreign office, the AA is more concerned with international principles and multilateralism and more critical of arms exports, especially as they relate to public diplomacy and support for human rights. AA diplomats represent Germany in the EU and UN and seek to build its reputation for civilian power. In contrast, the Ministry for Economics and Technology is more supportive and tolerant of arms exports and is not the public face of German foreign policy. It is less invested in multilateral fora and seeks instead to defend the status quo of national arms export controls.⁶¹

Given the AA’s existing interest in multilateralism and arms control, NGOs did not see a need to push it to adopt “responsible” arms transfer policy (interview 17207255). Rather, they see themselves as “work[ing] in the same direction” though consultation, research, and regular government–NGO working group meetings (interviews 17207255, 10407255, 45207255). In some respects, these relationships are improvised as initiatives emerge and develop. As one official noted, “Germany has never had a strong opinion on how to [relate to] NGOs” and engages them to some extent as a matter of public diplomacy (interview 58107255). For their part, NGOs focus on ensuring policy implementation, stating that if the government signs on, “we know what’s been promised, and [it also knows] we’ll follow up” on its export decision-making practices (interview 17207255).⁶² By appealing to the policies to which the government has publicly committed, NGOs seek to enhance “responsible” arms transfers in practice as well as on paper, in line with Germany’s own self-image as a cooperative civilian power,⁶³ a compliance dynamic I explore further in chapter 5.

As a civilian power, Germany promotes a foreign policy focused less on hard power than on building norms of global governance (interviews 10407255, 16107255, 44307255). It has a “fairly strong belief in the logic of transparency and in multilateral regimes” (interview 14107255) and “aims to foster working together with other countries and developing rules” (interview 16107255). It wants its arms transfer policies to reflect this point of view (interview 10407255). According to one official, “If there is a code of conduct, we apply it,” regardless of practicality (interview 15107255). Moreover, Germany would not want to be “the one left behind,” accused of not supporting multilateral policies (interview 58107255). Indeed, as Germany seeks to play a peaceful, constructive role in the international community, adopting policies that uphold its public image as conforming with multilateral policy standards is a key factor behind its support for “responsible” arms transfer initiatives.

Like Germany, France seeks recognition as a leader on the EU Code of Conduct, UNPOA, and ATT, but in private it is somewhat skeptical of policy initiatives. Officials note that France places a high priority on promoting multilateral arms export initiatives and is one of the most involved states in promoting small arms control on the international agenda (interviews 59108220, 60108220).⁶⁵ At the same time, they are concerned about the sovereignty and security implications of imposing shared standards on “the last place of freedom,” conventional arms sales, and are unsure of the value of UN processes (interviews 59108220, 60108220). Indeed, France has sympathized with past U.S. opposition, suggesting it, too, might prefer a narrower document focused on regional implementation were it not for its concerns about reputation in EU and international politics (interview 60108220). Indeed, other than the United Kingdom and other major European exporters, France’s main point of comparison on arms trade policy is the United States. France compares itself to the United States as a fellow major power with exceptional global responsibilities, as a major arms exporter with an admired system of national export controls, and as a world leader in human rights promotion (interviews 59108220, 60108220; Tardy 2007).

Shaun Gregory argues that France uses its UN activity to promote “a positive humanitarian image for France and the support of French norms and values in the international system” (2000:169). As support for “responsible” arms export policies has become expected in international politics, France has thus shifted its own policies to align with these expectations. In particular, it has used its newfound, visible policy support to overcome its past reputation for arms export liberalism at home and policy obstructionism abroad. Since 2001, the government has identified two tracks in the UN and wants to be a part of the “good group,” which includes EU small arms leaders, such as the UK and the Netherlands (interview 60108220). This is also a way for France to distinguish itself as more responsible than the (initially) obstructionist United States, although the results of this strategy for France’s reputation have perhaps not been as successful as the government had hoped. Officials argue that French arms export policies have been unfairly criticized as too liberal simply because France is “more responsible” than others in reporting its sales figures, and they take pride in what they see as the restrictive and “responsible” nature of French policies (interviews 59108220, 60108220). Stated one official, “The French image is perhaps not that positive outside, but if you see the work of each person in the process, then it is difficult to see how you could do it better” (interview 59108220). Moreover, officials cite France’s experience in arms control, its large export market, and the complexity of its domestic export mechanisms as attributes that enable it to provide quality leadership on this issue (e.g., interview 59108220).

France’s policy shift also seeks to strengthen the EU’s reputation as a global actor. France promotes multilateralism as a way to enhance and exercise its international influence, linked to its membership and leadership in the EU (Tardy 2007; Wood 1997).⁶⁶ The EU’s inability to legalize the Code of Conduct due to French opposition had hindered the EU’s ability to advocate for a legally binding ATT and be a credible global actor more broadly. Stalling legalization therefore became contrary to French foreign-policy interests beyond the arms trade. In addition, France also believed that not only supporting but leading the legalization of the EU Code after coming out in support of an ATT would signal its membership in the “good group” of states and draw a sharp contrast between its cooperative approach and U.S. hostility.

The decisions to support an ATT and the legalization of the EU Code came from Presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy, leaving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministère des affaires étrangères) and Ministry of Economics and Finance (Ministère de l’économie et des finances) to follow (interview 60108220).⁶⁷ NGOs have also been on the sidelines of French policy making.⁶⁸ The government takes the view that “states lead, not NGOs,” on the issue of “responsible” arms transfer policy (interview 59108220). In fact, French NGOs did not develop the background to become actively involved in arms export policy until the ATT vote in 2006, long after the government had announced its support. Both sides now say they are satisfied with French policies and the government’s receptiveness to NGO input, although NGOs have not been invited to take part in French UN delegations (interviews 59108220, 64208220). Government officials and NGOs say that this hands-off approach to French policy may be in part explained by the fact that France “already [has] a quite restrictive regime” (interviews 59108220, 62208220, 64208220). As I show in chapter 5, NGOs are beginning to turn instead to monitoring policy implementation (interviews 61208220, 64208220). Moreover, France’s concession to legalizing the EU Code was a point of satisfaction for states and NGOs pushing an ATT at the international level. However, to get the government to this point, changes in what would promote its reputation connected to the arms trade in the international community were necessary, with the standard set by the United Kingdom and opportunities for France to showcase its responsible policy positions.

Observers argue that Belgian support of multilateral arms trade standards stems largely from the government’s “looking over its shoulder at others” (interview 26207211). They suggest that the government did not want to “hang [its] neck out on this one” and supported new initiatives mainly because of British leadership and the policy standards set by the United Kingdom (interviews 26207211, 30207211). In fact, some Belgian NGOs—which were otherwise satisfied with the federal government’s leadership on humanitarian arms control—regret that an opportunity was missed to position Belgium as a leader on small arms as it was on the landmine treaty (interviews 29207211, 30207211).

The federal government, which had been an early promoter of linking small arms to sustainable development (Rossel-Cambier 1997) and an APL treaty leader, had been preoccupied by its regionalization of national arms export licensing after 2002 (see chapter 5).⁶⁹ Moreover, in the process of regionalizing policy implementation—but not policy making—some observers have worried that Belgium’s international reputation would suffer (interviews 52207211, 53207211). In their view, divorcing arms trade policy from arms trade practice would threaten the perception of Belgium’s sincerity and its ability to impact other countries’ positions on the issue (interview 52207211). Nevertheless, there is no evidence that this has occurred,⁷⁰ suggesting that states’ arms trade policy implementation—unlike their policies—receives little attention outside their borders.

Despite the regionalization of export licensing, Belgian arms trade policy is still coordinated by the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs in line with European and international expectations.⁷¹ Although the ministry takes input from the regions “on practical measures,” it “will not accept [input from] regions that will hinder pursuing an [ATT] as a Belgian policy goal” (interview 56107211).⁷² Officials view cooperation as a matter of “[supporting] our principles on the multilateral level,” but they also acknowledge that it has been driven by “pressures to support … lead nations” in international fora (interview 56107211). And because economic interests are more closely represented at the regional level (interview 27207211), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is freer to pursue concerns about Belgium’s reputation abroad, alongside its goals to protect human rights and democracy (Houben 2005). This focus also allows Belgium to have influence, as officials see it, because its policy decisions can be seen as part of a more neutral image rather than swayed by global economic or foreign-policy interests (interview 55107211).

Arms control is “considered a central issue in Belgian policy,” and shared standards of “responsible” arms transfers have not been controversial (interviews 56107211, 57207211). According to one NGO representative, “Like all human rights topics … everyone is proud to support [the ATT]” (interview 57207211). The defense industry, too, has learned that Belgium “will do it if the UN wants it” (interview 31307211). Moreover, Belgium takes pride in its “progressive” laws and avoids projecting an “arms salesman” image.⁷³ Officials and NGOs are quick to point out that only Belgium has adopted the EU Code into its national legislation. Belgium sees its arms trade policies as “best of class” and “quite ethical” compared to other states’ policies (interview 57207211). NGOs note that government policy often outpaces their lobbying and that the public has been largely absent from relevant policy discussions (interviews 52207211, 29207211). So they instead focus more on implementation at the regional level, noting that the regional and federal governments “don’t need civil society voices” on policy formation (interviews 26207211, 57207211).⁷⁴

With its successful collaboration on the Ottawa Treaty, Belgium has sought to build on its reputation as a humanitarian leader. Officials state that Belgium seeks to be seen as a “problem solver” in international politics: “We’ve solved quite a number of problems, have objectivity, and define a well-balanced decision, [even] punishing our own industry on mine production” (interview 55107211). To maintain its reputation, Belgium therefore sees a need to support policies consistent with the image it projects to the international community. It has also had to overcome perceptions as a historic center of illicit arms trafficking.⁷⁵ Ultimately, although missing a leadership opportunity on arms exports was a lost chance for Belgium to advance its social reputation, it did not inflict reputational damage. What does cause such damage—at least based on the U.S. experience—is opposition to popular multilateral initiatives, even where national policies might be classified as “responsible.”

Until late 2009, the United States was the only state to vote against the ATT process and the primary voice of opposition on UN small arms initiatives. It is certainly active in regional and international institutions, but its opposition suggests that it may see itself as less beholden to the reputational concerns faced by others by virtue of its perception of its “exceptional” position and power in the international system. This does not mean that U.S. leaders are uniformly unconcerned about U.S. image abroad. The United States has engaged in “public diplomacy” across administrations (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009). Rather, U.S. policy suggests that U.S. leaders may be more flexible in their concern for international reputation, dependent on domestic politics, party ideology, and foreign-policy agendas.⁷⁶ Thus, even as the George W. Bush administration’s opposition to “responsible” export initiatives showed a disregard for reputational concerns, the Obama administration’s October 2009 announcement of support for the ATT process (Clinton 2009) seems an effort to engage in reputation repair and signal renewed multilateralism to the international community.

For many, the strident opposition coming from the United States was puzzling. U.S. arms export policies are considered among the best in the world. Thus, from a practical standpoint, new global standards would not likely require substantive changes in U.S. policies. Sensitive issues such as civilian firearm possession and transfers to nonstate actors were kept explicitly off the table to keep the United States at the table. During the Cold War and after, the United States had even led initiatives to globalize its best practices and establish shared arms transfer controls (U.S. DOS 2001). President Carter initiated talks with the Soviet Union in 1979, and President George H. W. Bush supported the P5 talks in 1991 (see chapter 3). In 1999, the Republican-majority Congress passed legislation requiring the president to start working on an international arms sales code of conduct. The United States also claimed a leadership role in the preparations for the 2001 UN conference and in global small arms control more broadly (SAS 2002; U.S. DOS 2001; U.S. General Accounting Office 2000). According to a 2000 U.S. General Accounting Office report, U.S. leadership had helped to develop international standards to prevent illicit small arms transfers; strengthen small arms export controls; create and strengthen multilateral initiatives on small arms; and provide assistance to other states to destroy excess weapons stocks (5).

Starting in July 2001, however, U.S. policy shifted abruptly. The move damaged its international reputation, quickly earning it an “obstructionist” image (SAS 2002; SIPRI 2007). According to pro-control NGOs, the United States was “seen as the bad guy by a lot of states,” with an “arrogant” attitude, “no interest in abiding by the rules,” and an inability to “play well with others” (interviews 48207002, 51207002).⁷⁷ Even states skeptical about arms trade control sought to distance themselves from what was seen as the extreme U.S. position to spare themselves the hit to their own international reputation.⁷⁸ Yet the U.S. position in this case was not an isolated incidence of U.S. opposition to multilateralism, nor was this the first time the U.S. had derailed multilateral arms export initiatives, including initiatives it nominally supported (see chapter 3). Its opposition should therefore not simply be written off as concern for domestic electoral concerns but can be seen as a larger pattern of skepticism toward binding international instruments in general.

Some observers of the UN small arms meetings argue that U.S. opposition can be traced back to the influence of the National Rifle Association (NRA) on the George W. Bush administration (interview 48207002; Karp 2002). The United States explicitly cited concern for domestic civilian gun possession as justification for its opposition (Greene 2002), and the NRA presence was clear: according to Rachel Stohl, “This influence ranges from the presence of NRA board members on the US delegations at the UN and other multilateral meetings to … NRA positions in policy statements and speeches” (2006:10).⁷⁹ In addition, the NRA has sought to use the issue to rouse its membership base, making it the only significant segment of the U.S. public attentive to—and angry about—UN initiatives (see chapter 5). NRA executive vice president Wayne LaPierre refers to the small arms conferences as a concerted effort by the UN “to strip the Second Amendment from our Constitution” and “take guns away from every law-abiding citizen in the world” (2006:ix, 22).⁸⁰ This argument seems to resonate with some constituents, whose idea of U.S. identity is rooted in a national self-image tied to the western frontiersman, explorer, and farmer (Squires 2000; Uviller and Merkel 2002). The NRA also fears that UN small arms measures might restrict civilian possession outside U.S. borders and so has advocated against gun control in other countries (Bob 2012).⁸¹

Of course, the United States already regulates its foreign sales of small and major conventional arms, with standards that are not vastly different from what ATT supporters proposed. Nevertheless, the NRA set off a small but vocal domestic constituency strongly opposed to multilateral arms trade initiatives and has mobilized sustained opposition to the ATT by U.S. senators.⁸² Because of the Republican Party’s close relationship with the NRA, the Bush administration’s considerations of this constituency’s reactions could have been significant to its political calculus. Certainly, these considerations affected the strategies of pro-control NGOs, which saw the costs of getting involved under the Bush presidency as far outweighing the benefits (interview 48207002). A Democratic administration, they believed, would be less beholden to NRA interests. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the Obama administration will win support from the core NRA constituency under any circumstances, making it perhaps freer to follow other policies at the UN.⁸³ Even so, the U.S. request to delay the final ATT approval to after the July 2012 negotiations seems likely to have been motivated by electoral concerns, with the Obama administration not wanting an American “yes” vote to hurt the chances of more conservative Democrats facing tight races at the polls in November.

However, throughout the ATT process, the UN and ATT leader states have catered to U.S. interests and explicitly kept civilian possession of firearms off the table, thus making it difficult to attribute sustained U.S. opposition to Second Amendment concerns.⁸⁴ Proposed documents have dealt only with the international trade in conventional arms. The Obama administration has publicly supported the ATT, while also reminding UN delegates that the ATT negotiations are “not an attempt to intrude, either in principle or process, into states’ internal activities, laws, or practices concerning the domestic possession, use, or movement of arms” (Mahley 2012). Prior to the final negotiation in March 2013, the American Bar Association (2013) confirmed that the proposed ATT is consistent with the Second Amendment and federal court rulings to date. The final ATT formally acknowledges the “sovereign right of any State to regulate and control conventional arms exclusively within its territory, pursuant to its own legal or constitutional system.”⁸⁵ Despite formally excluding civilian possession from the scope of the treaty, U.S. ratification—requiring two-thirds Senate majority—is highly unlikely in the near future, in large part because of NRA lobbying and electoral influence.

Yet the bigger picture shows U.S. opposition to multilateral transfer controls prior to 2009 as part of a larger pattern of U.S. aversion to multilateralism. Although expressions of U.S. exceptionalism under the Bush administration may have been less nuanced and less attentive to its international reputation, perceptions of exceptionalism are not unique in American politics.⁸⁶ Exceptionalism is embedded both in the U.S. self-image as “an agent … for good in the world and for righting geopolitical wrongs” (Sperling 2007:171) and in how other members of the international community view its “lack of consideration for the majority” (Smouts 2000:48). Certainly, the United States had “downgraded multilateralism as a substantive goal of American foreign policy” after September 11, 2001 (Sperling 2007:182). The Bush administration’s opposition to multilateral initiatives extended beyond small arms to include the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty, the updated Biological Weapons Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Pro-control NGOs in particular have noted this “anti-international agreement attitude” that seeks to avoid obligations enabling non-U.S. rules “to govern US foreign policy” and tie its hands in the war on terror (interview 51207002). Yet it should not be forgotten that it was the Clinton administration that first refused to sign the Ottawa Treaty. Citing exceptional U.S. power and responsibility, it argued a need at times to put aside international norms and rules.

For the arms trade, this aversion to multilateralism has meant—independent of the NRA or partisan preferences—a rejection of external restraints on the ability to use arms transfers as a political tool (R. Stohl 2006). Such rejection, of course, is not new to U.S. policy or practice and has prevented U.S. cooperation in the past (see chapter 3; Erickson forthcoming). Arms trade experts point out that the United States has consistently resisted subjecting its arms exports to human rights criteria in favor of other foreign-policy objectives, regardless of the party in power (Hartung 2001b). Even in U.S. national policy, presidents have preserved the ability to make exceptions for exports “in the national interest.”⁸⁷ U.S. support for the UN small arms processes during their planning phase under Bill Clinton was not a given, despite what some organizers might have believed at the time. In fact, the origins of U.S. opposition to the processes may actually have come under the Clinton administration (interview 50207002), which took a simultaneously supportive and “cautious” approach to the issue (Karp 2002:189).

The Obama administration, too, has emphasized arms transfers as a means to promote U.S. national security and foreign-policy interests (Shapiro 2012). Nevertheless, in late 2009 it publicly announced its (qualified) support for the ATT process. Its concerns about consensus and behind-the-scenes negotiations over acceptable language have suggested ongoing reservations about strong, binding export controls, but ATT support has offered the United States easy reputational gains abroad. Studies report that U.S. reputation had suffered as a result of its unilateralist actions and apparent disregard for international norms and rules during the Bush administration (American Political Science Association 2009; Chicago Council on Global Affairs and WorldPublicOpinion.org 2008). Once in office, the Obama administration made a concerted effort to address this problem by publicly adopting policies and positions on popular international initiatives.⁸⁸ Its public ATT support—whatever its private reservations—is a product of its reputation-building efforts, signaling a break with the past and a new tone of U.S. foreign policy for international audiences.⁸⁹

Reputational concerns have been more consistent across European exporters, which are more deeply embedded in international institutions with peer states to which they constantly compare themselves. In contrast, because of U.S. national origins and confidence in domestic institutions, the U.S. self-image may not consistently rely on its status in international institutions.⁹⁰ Yet disregard for international norms and institutions under the Bush administration in particular has discredited U.S. policies and damaged U.S. reputation that “no amount of ‘public diplomacy’ ” can fix (Walt 2005:231; see also Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009). The consequences may be—like the widespread support of the ATT despite U.S. opposition—a distancing of other states from the U.S. foreign-policy agenda (Walt 2005). Its perception of superior power may be why the United States can value its international reputation less but also why it may need to improve that reputation. In particular, the social benefits attached to a good reputation may help it to cultivate its soft power, assuage the international community’s fears, and promote a stable and rule-bound international order (see Ikenberry 2001; Koh 2003).

Major exporters’ support for “responsible” arms transfer policies has spread dramatically since 1998. Yet military security, economic incentives, and domestic political gain seem largely absent from states’ decision-making calculus. Indeed, for states with large defense industries dependent on exports to survive, signing on to “responsible” arms export controls may be perceived as costly at least to their economic well-being, if not also to their national security. In the next chapter, I show that public opinion also has little interest in governments’ arms export policies. As a result, material preference-based explanations provide little insight into states’ policy choices. Instead, states adopt “responsible” arms transfer policies out of concern for their international reputation, despite their private reservations about the value of new norms, and in response to social pressures from other states and the social benefits reputation can provide. In the context of international institutions, diplomats and leaders observe their peers’ policies, discuss new initiatives, and adopt new expectations for “good” arms transfer policies and for their “good international citizenship” more broadly. By supporting these policies, states hope in turn to build, repair, and maintain their reputations as cooperative, peaceful, and human rights–oriented members of the international community.