[Charts H and Map D.]
UP to the last moment the Russians had failed to penetrate the Japanese war plan. The only firm data in their possession were that three armies existed, and that one of them, after what seemed an inexplicable delay, was concentrating on the Yalu. The other two had either embarked or were embarking, but what their destination was no man could tell even approximately. Intelligence there was in abundance. From every spy authorised and unauthorised, as well as from every Military Attaché at neutral Courts, both friendly and unfriendly, it poured in upon the Russian Staff until they had categorical information that the two unlocated armies were to land in every conceivable place from Vladivostok to the Chinese frontier in the Pe-chi-li Gulf.1
In these circumstances they very properly decided that no information worth having was obtainable, and that their initial stage of defence must be settled on general principles. In short they frankly faced the fact, that in wars so essentially amphibious in character as the one in hand, it was impossible to determine the enemy’s lines of operation until they were declared, and consequently that the only sound strategy was to concentrate upon those which threatened the most serious danger.
An appreciation framed on this basis had been sent to the Tsar on February 15th, that is after the first line of the enemy’s operations had been declared by the landing at Chemulpho. The Viceroy’s idea then was, that as the Port Arthur squadron had been paralysed, the Japanese object would be to use their control of the Yellow Sea to press a rapid advance into Manchuria with a view of striking the railway at Kirin and possibly at Kharbin. From the first both places had been regarded as within their reach, if the fleet proved unable to prevent a landing in the north of Korea. They were now in a position to land where they liked, and in the Viceroy’s opinion they would have their first two armies concentrated by the end of March.
So much was taken as fairly certain. The doubt was the line the third army would take and on this point his Staff saw five possibilities.2 Firstly, it might be used against Port Arthur as in 1894, and in that case it could be landed anywhere between Talien-hwan and Ta-ku-shan. To attempt a disposal to resist such a landing was held to be out of the question. It would entail too wide a dispersal of force. The fleet alone could have prevented it, and the fleet was for the time powerless. The only sound strategy, therefore, was to accept the landing as beyond their power of prevention. There must be no thought of spreading the Kwang-tung army in order to resist the enemy at every likely landing place. It must be massed in some central area where it could bar him from his objective wherever he might land. The area chosen was Port Arthur itself, with an advanced position prepared at Nanshan, on the neck of the Kwang-tung Peninsula. It was a position which would also cover Dalny, but against an amphibious force it had inherent defects which, as we shall see, became glaring when an attack was imminent.
Still it was a scheme which for the time the Russians could view with equanimity. However low their confidence in the fleet had fallen they had no doubt of being able to deal with the enemy on land upon at least equal terms. From this point of view, the landing of a Japanese army near Pi-tsu-wo was not without its advantage to themselves. They even hoped to see their enemy take this line, since it would involve him in a long and difficult siege, and would hold a large section of his forces away from the Russian concentration point at Liau-yang.3
So much for the hypothesis that the third Japanese army would be used for a direct stroke oversea at Port Arthur. The second hypothesis was the possibility that it would land somewhere west of the Yalu in order to turn the Feng-whang-cheng position which covered the zone of concentration against a force advancing from the Yalu.
Thirdly, it might disembark east of the Yalu and join the other two armies for an advance in force into Manchuria.
Fourthly, there was the possibility of its operating directly against Vladivostok with a subsequent advance on Kirin or Kharbin, but this was regarded as highly improbable.
Lastly there remained the formidable hypothesis of a landing in the Liau-tung Gulf at Newchwang and a combination with the Chinese army which was assembling at the Great Wall. This line though the most effective was held to be the most dangerous owing to the difficulties of an unsuitable coast and the liability of the invading force being overwhelmed by a massed movement from Liau-yang while the two Korean armies were contained by a small holding force.
On this scheme of probabilities the Russian forces were distributed. In the Vladivostok district was kept a Corps sufficient to prevent a coup-de-main at the fortress or a quick advance on the railway at Kirin. The Kwang-tung district, as we have seen, was similarly treated, that is to say, the army allotted it was given no higher function than to prevent the Japanese attaining their end in that quarter except by prolonged operations. To carry the idea to its logical conclusion the Port Arthur squadron was to operate on the same basis of defence and delay. Since it was recognised as being as incapable as the army of preventing a landing in Liau-tung its energies were to be devoted to the defence of the Kwang-tung Peninsula and particularly to the mining of all possible landing places from Deep Bay right away round to Eight Ships Bay, and eventually to Kinchau Bay on the opposite side of the Nanshan position. As for the coast beyond Deep Bay as far as Ta-ku-san, where no attempt was to be made to prevent a landing, it was simply patrolled by Cossacks. Eastward again as far as the Yalu similar patrols were on the watch for an attempt to turn the Feng-whang-cheng position, while the “Eastern Force,” detailed for covering the main concentration at Liau-yang, pushed its cavalry across the Yalu as far as the Gensan—Ping-yang line.
In spite of the flood of contradictory information that continued to pour in upon the Staff this treatment held its ground. Still it was not without disturbance owing to the unaccountable slowness of the Japanese deployment. In spite of their success at sea two months went by without any attempt to isolate Port Arthur or any appearance of a concentration on the Yalu. All the Russians could tell was that two of the three armies were being held back and that the fleet was being devoted to heroic efforts to seal up the Port Arthur squadron. What could it mean? A wide impression grew up that possibly the Japanese war plan had been entirely misunderstood. To many it began to look as though they intended merely to seize Port Arthur and Vladivostok and then without crossing the Yalu or even perhaps the Gensan-Ping-yang line to offer terms of peace which the Powers would force Russia to accept. Nor are there wanting indications that the Japanese actually encouraged this view and that Admiral Kamimura’s diversion into the Sea of Japan was connected with it.4
The Russian Headquarter Staff were in fact so far led away that on April 19th at the Viceroy’s suggestion the Tsar commenced the formation of a strong reserve at Harbin. But against this measure General Kuropatkin urgently protested. The only sign of modification in his attitude appears in the Southern theatre. There the persistent efforts of the Japanese to seal Port Arthur indicated an intention to masque it so as to permit an expedition to pass into the Gulf of Liau-tung and land either at Newchwang or at Kaiping where the railway ran close to the sea, or possibly even west of the Liau river where it would be in touch with the Chinese Army. The General, however, told the Tsar frankly that the point where the Second and Third Armies would land was still absolutely unknown. Precautions had been taken to prevent a blow at Dalny or Talien-hwan as well as at Newchwang or Kaiping—the places most to be feared; but if they landed anywhere between the Yalu and Pi-tsu-wo or west of the Liau River no resistance would be met with, or only such as the patrolling Cossacks can offer. The only other trace of modification is that as the Japanese advanced beyond the Gensan—Ping-yang line the Russian “Eastern Force” was thrust forward to the Yalu and placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Zasulich. But his orders from General Kuropatkin were, if the Japanese pushed across the river in force, to fall back upon the Feng-whang-cheng position gradually and confine himself to rearguard actions.5
Although then up to the end of April the Russian Staff had not penetrated the Japanese idea of deployment on three distinct lines they cannot be said to have been taken by surprise, but were as fully prepared to meet it as they could hope to be with the military force then at their command and their fleet so severely crippled as it was. It may even be said that of all the possibilities they had taken into account the landing on the east coast of Liau-tung was the one they regarded as most favourable to their eventual success. It was at least the one which would give them most time for their concentration and the best prospect of a speedy and drastic return to the offensive.
Even when it was known that the First Army was concentrated on the Yalu the information did little to modify General Kuropatkin’s view. Between him and the Viceroy it is true there was a strong conflict of opinion, but for the present purpose we are only concerned with the instructions that were actually issued. In communicating the news to General Stessel, who was in command of the Port Arthur army, General Kuropatkin warned him to expect a landing both in the Gulf of Korea and the Gulf of Liau-tung, that is, on both sides of his command, and that extensive operations would follow either against Port Arthur or against the main army that was concentrating about Liau-yang. In the former alternative the Japanese would probably attempt a disembarkation in the Kwang-tung peninsula somewhere in the rear of Nanshan in order to seize that position. In that case General Stessel’s corps would be cut in two and the main army would at once advance to the relief of the fortress.6 On such an appreciation it was obviously necessary to keep a sufficient garrison concentrated in Kwang-tung, and military opposition to a landing between Deep Bay and Ta-ku-shan was still impossible. Out of two divisions which formed the Port Arthur garrison only one regiment could be spared for Nanshan and one for Dalny. It was a situation typical of amphibious war and exhibits clearly its peculiar strength. Do what the Russians would, the advantage of strategical surprise must lie with the Japanese owing to the impossibility of forecasting with any certainty the lines of operation of an enemy attacking oversea.
The degree to which the Japanese realised the plan of the Russian defence is uncertain. But it will be seen that their appreciation of what was probable coincided very closely with General Kuropatkin’s suggestions. Whether or not they expected their landing to meet with resistance ashore, they knew that the only serious opposition must come from the sea, and consequently the operations were to begin with an attempt to eliminate all possibility of naval interference.
The sailing of the main fleet with the blockships was timed for five o’clock in the evening of May 1st, three days before the actual landing was to be made. Everything was ready and it only remained to know how General Kuroki had fared upon the Yalu. The news came in good time and it told how in the first trial of strength ashore the Japanese Army had fully proved its capacity to meet its enemy whether in tactics or hard fighting. The general idea had been to hold the Russians to their position which extended from before Wiju down to Antung and to turn their left or inland flank by crossing the river some seven miles higher up.7 The success of such a movement depended chiefly upon concealment, and in order to assist in blinding the enemy General Kuroki did his best to fix their attention on their right. In this he was assisted by the fact that a quantity of bridging material which had been brought into the Yalu by sea, was unable to pass the Russian batteries up to Wiju and was therefore lying in the lower reaches with the flotilla. On the 25th, however, he was able to construct a false bridge just below Wiju with material that was there and as soon as his preparations were ready for the real attack he called upon the flotilla to move up and make a demonstration against the Russian right as though to cover a crossing on that side.
This flank General Zasulich had protected by gun positions at Anshi-shan and Roroja (Nyo-nyo-jo), a few miles below Antung, and accordingly in response to General Kuroki’s request the flotilla undertook to deal with them. The diversionary operation began on the 29th by the flotilla moving up the river to above Yong-am-po where the gunboats were within range of the enemy’s position. The torpedo-boats went still higher and the armed steamboats pushed right up to Antung firing as they went on the enemy’s guns and any troops they could see. The demonstration was repeated on the 30th and a disturbing fire was kept up all night. On the morning of May 1st all units advanced as high as they could get and engaged everything they could reach from Antung downwards.
The effect of this work was to confirm General Zasulich’s opinion that the enemy intended to deliver the main attack on his right by the false bridge. Dominated with this idea, he kept his strength massed at Antung and behind it, till the last moment. Consequently General Kuroki found his task on the Russian left comparatively easy and was able with a loss of little over a thousand men all told not only to drive the Russians headlong from their position but to surround and capture their whole rearguard. By 2.0 o’clock the Russians had lost more than double the number of the Japanese; of the 24 guns engaged 21 had been captured; and the remains of the army were in full retreat for Feng-whang-cheng.
Although General Kuropatkin had not been entirely deceived and had warned General Zasulich that he must be prepared for a serious attack on his left and centre, the mistake had much to excuse it.8 It was due to what perhaps may be regarded as a normal condition of combined operations. That is to say, where an enemy has been working his strategical offensive in intimate co-operation with a naval force the moral effect upon the defending general will be such as to incline him to expect a plan of attack which will enable his enemy to continue the naval co-operation tactically, if such co-operation be possible. Without lifting this normal tendency to the level of a definite factor in war it may probably always be reckoned with by the attacking side as a condition which may facilitate surprise. In this case at any rate the disturbing influence of the sea appears to have been the decisive factor in producing a victory so cheaply. At Tokyo the share of the Navy was fully recognised and the Emperor in sending his usual congratulatory message addressed it to both General Kuroki and Admiral Hosoya.
The rapidity of the success had further consequences. It was on this victory, as we have seen, that the movement of the Second Army depended. Three hours before the time fixed by Admiral Togo for his great operation to begin the victory had been won and to the hour he was able to sail from Haiju with the blockships. At 5.0 o’clock the same afternoon he weighed with his whole force in a state of high exhilaration and confidence.
The orders which the Admiral had issued the day before explained to the fleet, as usual, the general situation. “The Port Arthur enemy,” they say, “seem to be still maintaining their previous attitude. Their destroyers are occasionally reported to be moving in the neighbourhood. Our First Army is expected to cross the Yalu to-day or to-morrow. The Vladivostok enemy appeared a few days ago at Gensan. Their present whereabouts is unknown. The Second Squadron is now engaged in taking action against them. In obedience to superior orders the Combined Fleet will act in conjunction with the Second Army, which will land on May 4th at Yentoa Bay and will begin the combined strategical operations.”
It will be observed that the “Combined Fleet” now meant the First and Third Squadrons. The First Squadron, which was to form the covering force, included Admiral Togo’s own battle division and Admiral Dewa’s reinforced Third Division, which now comprised the two armoured cruisers Yakumo and Asama besides his own four second-class cruisers. The Third Squadron, whose duty was escort and support, now consisted of Admiral Kataoka’s own division, reinforced by the armoured cruiser Nisshin, Rear-Admiral Togo’s and so much of Admiral Hosoya’s as was not employed on the Korean Coast.9 This squadron, it will be remembered, was to remain in touch with the Army transports till May 3rd while the First Squadron escorted the blockships, with two gunboats, three divisions of destroyers, and four of torpedo-boats which were to support the attack.10
The line of advance was to be direct, but if by 7.0 p.m. on the 2nd the weather proved unfavourable the course was to be altered for the Elliot Islands, and in that case the flotilla would proceed to Thornton Haven, while the First Squadron and the blockships would anchor next morning on the east side of Wuma-tau, an outlying island of the Elliot Group 15 miles to the N.N.W. From this point the operation would be resumed at midday (on the 3rd) if the weather permitted. The usual elaborate orders were issued for the movements of the flotilla, which was to have for its support the two gunboats that had been protecting the Chinampho anchorage, that base being now abandoned. It had the further duty of maintaining a close night blockade of the port should the blocking fail, and it would be relieved by the First Squadron in the day-time.
With these orders the expedition sailed in perfect weather. On the way, however, it began to blow and things looked so threatening that Admiral Togo suggested a postponement. But Commander Hayashi, the officer in charge of the block-ships, elected to proceed, although one of them had already broken down and had to be sent into Thornton Haven. By 7.0 p.m. on May 2nd, when they reached the final rendezvous south-east of Round Island, both wind and sea had gone down a little and it was decided to carry on.
In high hopes the blockships parted company, but about 10 p.m. it suddenly began to blow again from the south. An ugly sea was getting up and heavy clouds obscured the moon. Such evil fortune would have tried the most experienced hands. But the hands were all raw and very quickly the concession which had been made to high ethical sentiment began to declare its cost. The order of the blockship subdivisions became confused, they lost touch with each other and with the supporting flotilla, the weather was growing worse and worse and in half-an-hour Commander Hayashi reluctantly determined he must give up the attempt. Slowing down to let his second astern come up he passed the order to her and then turned to port to speak one of the gunboats and get her to make the signal. The result was complete confusion. Scattered as they were, only two or three ships followed their leader. The rest had lost all touch and went blindly on. The flotilla did the same and each division took its appointed station for rescue in spite of a sea that made it almost impossible for them to do anything but keep afloat, and played havoc with the engines of the labouring blockships.
Elaborate directions had been given as to how the operation was to be performed. They were to go in in four groups. In the first group were four ships, in the second and third three, and all these were to go in successively in line ahead. The last group, consisting of two ships only, would advance in line abreast to lay mines at the last moment. But all this careful preparation was thrown away. Leaderless and of unequal speeds, they lost all formation and wandered to and fro trying to find out whether to go on or turn back, and in constant danger of running one another down. What happened it is impossible to say with any certainty. All we know is that they went in singly or in groups of two or three together at long intervals which permitted the Russian guardships and batteries to concentrate on each in detail as it came into the beams.
The scheme of defence which Admiral Makarov had designed against such an attempt was now perfect. Officers and men were used to the work, seamen gunners had been trained to work the shore batteries, and the accuracy and volume of fire was terrific. More than this there lay right in the path of the blockships the eastern field of E.C. mines and beyond it a boom and net defence. Both the previous attempts had been child’s play to this one. As each ship appeared she became the centre of a storm of fire that combined with the glare of the search-lights and the heavy seas made accurate navigation impossible. Yet with extraordinary resolution nearly all staggered on through it. The leading ship cleared all obstacles and, torn to pieces, reached the western edge of the entrance. Anchoring deliberately she blew herself up, but she was too far out, and there an hour later she was joined by another.
Two others seem to have passed the mine-field unscathed and then to have crashed through the boom and sunk themselves in a position in which they only served to strengthen the barrier of sunken vessels which the Russians themselves had made. Two or three others got foul of the mine field and went down where they were quite useless.
As for the two mining ships, in the confusion they dared not carry out their orders for fear there might be ships behind them. The mines were all rendered harmless and thrown overboard, and then they in their turn went in to sacrifice themselves as uselessly as the rest. Of the eleven vessels that formed the blocking squadron when the attempt was made no less than eight went in in spite of everything, and yet bewildered as they were with the seas that swept over them and the storm of fire, with the obstacles and the activity of the search lights not one of them found the fairway. Splendid as was the failure, it was complete.
The heroism of the attempt was only equalled by the work of rescue. That a man could be saved seemed almost impossible, and yet the flotilla stood in regardless of the fire that was now their portion, and coolly searched for their devoted comrades in spite of the dangerous sea that was running. The work was long and anxious. Not only had the casualties in the block-ships been very severe, but most of their boats had been either destroyed by shell-fire or swept away by the heavy seas. Out of four vessels only was any rescue made, and from the rest not a man was saved, except a few who were thrown ashore in the last stage of exhaustion and made prisoners. Few even of the boats that would swim were able to survive the fire that was concentrated on them, and when all was over it was found that of the 158 men who formed the crews of the eight ships, only 67 were rescued by their own boats, and of these 4 were dead and 20 wounded. The enemy recovered 17, and the remaining 74 were never heard of again.
Such was the tale which Admiral Togo began to gather when at 9.0 next morning he drew in near the port according to his programme. He, himself, perhaps, had scarcely expected to find the attempt had been made. Twelve hours before, when the weather suddenly became so bad, he had recognised it was at any rate unfit for the transports to move, and he had sent back a cruiser to stop them. The morning was too misty to see what had happened, but he met outside Commander Hayashi who, when he found the bulk of the ships had not followed his lead back, had tried to go in again and was only prevented by his steering gear breaking down. From him the Admiral learned how the unfortunate attempt had been made, and that was all. Gradually, however, the rescue boats began to come in with the remnant of the survivors. They were in no way disheartened, nor had they any idea of how ill-placed were the sunken ships. So sanguine, indeed, was their report, and so far was it confirmed by the fact that not a single Russian ship had appeared outside, that the Admiral came to the conclusion that in spite of every difficulty the operation had succeeded. Till as late in the afternoon as was safe, he remained off the port to support a renewed search for survivors, and as no enemy came out his impression of success became almost certainty.
In comparative freedom from anxiety, therefore, he could proceed with the arrangements for landing the Second Army; and that night, in case, as we must assume, his order for the transports to stop had not reached them, he took up his position for covering its passage. Admiral Dewa’s division was ordered to Position T, four miles W.S.W. of Chang-zu-do, the main island of the Blonde group, while he himself proceeded to a point 7 miles E.S.E. of Hai-yung-tau (Position S). For the present no attempt was made to establish a destroyer blockade of Port Arthur. The Admiral appears to have considered that the securest method of protecting the expedition was on the principle of “close cover” of the objective zone. It was during the approach to that zone that it would be most dangerously exposed and that an attack was most probable. The whole of the flotillas were at any rate sent to East Bay in Kwanglo-tau, the southernmost island of the Elliot Group, where they would be in a position to screen the arrival of the transports.11
In the morning of the 4th, however, there was no sign of them. It was clear the Admiral’s order to stop them had been duly received, and as the weather was fast improving he telegraphed to Admiral Hosoya to carry on and proceeding himself direct to Kwanglo-tau anchored in East Bay. Thither also he recalled Admiral Dewa from the Blonde Islands, and thus concentrated his whole covering force as the expedition was starting from the Ping-yang Inlet.
1 Russian Military History, Vol. II., Part i., chap. 4.
2 Russian Military History, Vol. II., Part i., chap. 4.
3 Ibid. This consideration goes far to justify the apparent supineness of the Russians in dealing with the landing at Pi-tsu-wo, for it was precisely, as events proved, “the long and difficult siege” which prevented the Japanese from making the progress on which they counted in Manchuria, and forced them to snatch a peace when they did.
4 See, for example, a report of the Russian Attaché in London, dated April 18th, that is at the time Admiral Kamimura’s diversion was ordered, in which he says the Japanese financial agent, in sounding the London bankers about a loan, had told them this was the Japanese plan. Russian Military History, Volume I., Note 318, page 632.
5 It would seem, however, that his ideas of what was expected of his force were confused by Admiral Alexeiev urging him to offer a strenuous resistance (see C.I.D., I., page 112.)
8 See C.I.D. I., pages 117–8.
9 Third Squadron.—1. Fifth Division: Itsukushima (Flag), Chinyen, Matsushima, Hashidate, Nisshin, Miyako (despatch). 2. Sixth Division, Rear-Admiral Togo: Akashi (Flag), Suma, Akitsushima, Chiyoda (despatch). 3. Seventh Division, Rear-Admiral Hosoya: Fuso (Flag), Heiyen, Saiyen, Atago, Banjo, Tsukushi, Akagi; Chokai (with the block-ships); Oshima, (cable-ship escort); Kaimon (guard-ship, at Ping-yang).
10 For the whole order, see Appendix G., p. 510.
11 East Bay was also the established water and coaling base for the flotilla at this time, and this may account for the order, but all divisions were ordered there to coal and water on the 6th.