[Chart B 2.]
FROM the earliest days when the Russians began to face the prospects of a struggle with Japan, it had been recognised that the development of Dalny as a commercial harbour rendered it, in the hands of the enemy, an ideal base for offensive operations in Kwangtung. It was indeed an accepted fact that its capture by the Japanese would seal the fate of Port Arthur, unless by some formidable and uncertain military effort it could be relieved from Manchuria. It was this consideration, it will be remembered, which had been mainly responsible for hazarding the main concentration so far south as Liau-yang. Now before it was complete the Russians had to face the fact that a forward movement was imperative.
As in Korea, so now on the Liau-tung side the Japanese had struck for a territorial object. For the second time they had gained the initiative and by the inherent power of the form of war they had adopted, they could force the Russians to conform with a weak and premature offensive at a point where they least wanted and were least prepared to strike. The effect of the Japanese opening had already been making itself felt in an interference with General Kuropatkin’s war plan. That plan, based on the assumption that Port Arthur could hold out for a considerable time, was to maintain an expectant attitude about Liau-yang, or further north if necessary, until he had accumulated such a force as would give him the power to make an irresistible offensive return. However correct that attitude so long as Dalny was intact, it was one which the Russians were unable to maintain, when they saw the place in the hands of their enemy.
As early as May 19th, that is after Port Arthur had been isolated and the weakness of the Nanshan position against a combined force was being realised, the Viceroy had placed two alternatives before the General, each involving a departure from his expectant attitude. He might contain the Japanese Second Army and throw the bulk of his force upon General Kuroki or he could contain him and drive General Oku into the sea. Directly Nanshan fell, General Kuropatkin intimated that he had chosen the latter. But in fact he did not accept the alternative in full. The difficulty was that he did not feel free to advance in force. For not only was the Japanese connecting army in position at Takushan, but General Kuroki had pushed his right far enough forward to threaten the Russian communications to the northward. General Kuropatkin therefore confined himself to ordering General Shtakelberg to prepare to advance, not it would seem to the relief of Port Arthur, but in order to make a diversion in its favour. “The mission of your Excellency’s corps,” he wrote, “is to draw upon itself, by an offensive movement towards Port Arthur, the greatest possible force of the enemy, and so to weaken his operations in the Kwangtung Peninsula . . . . No decisive action is to be undertaken against superior forces . . . . The final object of your southern movement is the capture of Kinchau and in the sequel an offensive in the direction of Port Arthur.”1 His decision appears to have been approved at St. Petersburg. For the moment indeed more was impossible. So threatening was the pressure of the other two armies from the Yalu and Takushan, to say nothing of the fleet demonstrations in the Liau-tung Gulf, that 35,000 men were all that could be spared for the movement; but it meant in effect that the Russians were now for the first time assuming the offensive.
In Port Arthur the danger of the new situation was equally realised. After the loss of Nanshan, it was fully expected that the Japanese would immediately push forward and attempt to carry the place by assault. On May 27th therefore a Naval Council was called to consider what the squadron could do to assist in meeting the danger. It was decided by the majority of the officers present that active operations were impossible, as too many of the damaged ships were still unfit for sea. The only course, therefore, was to assist in the defence of the fortress till the last moment and then endeavour to break away and escape. In communicating the decision to the Viceroy Admiral Vitgeft explained that he had lent the garrison no less than thirty 6-inch guns and a hundred of lesser calibre which it might be fatal to withdraw from the land front at so critical a moment.
Foreign as such a decision is to our views there was something to be said for it in the peculiar circumstances. Our own traditional view, which forbids devoting a fleet to the defence of its base, rests, it must be remembered, in a confident hope that we have at least a fair chance, if not of a victory, yet certainly of dealing a blow that will seriously cripple the enemy and contribute substantially to the ultimate issue. In the Russian case, as in the similar cases of Louisburg and Sevastopol, there was no ground for such confidence. The Japanese by their first blow in February had established a moral ascendancy which Admiral Makarov was only beginning to remove when his untimely death plunged the squadron back into spiritless ineffectiveness. Demoralised, untrained and ill-commanded as they were, to all ranks it seemed that to sally out into a wilderness of mines against a superior enemy was but to play into the enemy’s hands. Their real chance of selling themselves dearly had passed, when they neglected to press home the success of their open-sea mining. As the campaign stood the recovery of their naval position seemed in their shattered self-confidence to rest on the Baltic Fleet and the possibilities of that fleet turned upon the preservation of a base in the Yellow Sea and scarcely less strongly on finding a potent squadron there when it arrived. It is true that the squadron by a resolute counter-attack might have inflicted serious damage upon the Japanese, but that course would have deprived the garrison of the help of the naval guns and personnel and without them it was believed Port Arthur could not resist an assault. If this was true the Russians would still have been unable to command the Yellow Sea for lack of a base; and from the nature of the war it was on the command of that sea that everything turned. The conditions were such that without it they could never hope to develop sufficient military force in the theatre of operation to expel the Japanese from the territory they had won. They were dominated in fact by the just conviction that without command of the Yellow Sea, however far the war might be prolonged, it could never be brought to a successful issue; and the end of strategy is victory and not the destruction more or less complete of any section of the enemy’s forces.
So at least they argued. Being unable in their depression to realise how precarious was the Japanese position, they did not see how seriously even a mere demonstration of activity in the squadron would have embarrassed their enemy, and impeded his operations ashore. They could not see that the real defence of the fortress lay upon the sea, because there lay the weakness of the attack. Without really hazarding their battle strength they might well have kept Admiral Togo in such a state of concentrated vigilance as would not only have prevented his giving direct assistance to the army, but would have made it almost impossible for him to secure the regular flow of supplies and reinforcement on which the energy of the attack depended. It was, in short, a case in which to British eyes nothing could excuse the reduction of a fleet in being to the status of a fleet in suspended animation.
The Viceroy, then in the throes of his contention with General Kuropatkin, had no better course to suggest. On June 1st came a vague reply that although it was of course the duty of the squadron to assist in the defence of Port Arthur, it ought also to put to sea and fight a decisive action. As in the circumstances to seek a decision in the open was in their opinion to find certain defeat, this order did not carry conviction with Admiral Vitgeft and his Staff, and for some days their decision to devote the squadron to the passive defence of the fortress was undisturbed.
In the Japanese fleet there was no such hesitation. Its function, as the situation stood, was perfectly clear, and that was to complete the isolation of the fortress. On May 26th, the day Nanshan was won, a commercial blockade of Kwang-tung was declared. Hitherto its communications had remained open for everything except contraband of war, and even for that the watch had been very loose. The Japanese Consul at Chifu became aware that in spite of the removal of the Port Arthur cable, the Russians were keeping up regular communication with head-quarters by means of junks. Such craft had nothing to fear from mines, and creeping under the shore could pass freely in and out by night undetected. He therefore urged his Government that stricter measures should be taken, and as a result on the 24th Admiral Togo received instructions to declare the blockade.
The area proclaimed was the whole of the peninsula up to the line occupied by the Japanese army—that is from Pi-tsu-wo round to Port Adams, the inlet leading up to Pu-lan-tien. On the east coast the work involved no material alteration of the existing dispositions. On the south, however, the Miau Islands presented a difficulty which had to be dealt with specially. Junks working from the Shantung coast were using them as a base, whence at night they could easily steal across to the bays in the south-west of the peninsula. To check such proceedings an auxiliary cruiser was stationed from time to time at Toki-tau in the midst of the group. On the west side—that is in the Gulf of Liau-tung, which up to this time had been practically unwatched, more extensive arrangements were necessary, but the consequent disturbance of the major operations was small, since they could be made to work in with the assistance which, as we shall see, the Army now called for on that side.
As for the method in which the blockade was to be conducted, the most noteworthy rules laid down for commanding officers were that all contraband, including “food” intended for the enemy, might be thrown overboard unless it could be used. The junks were to be disposed of as circumstances might dictate, an instruction which obviously assumed the right of sinking neutrals uncondemned. In all other cases vessels were merely to be turned back whether inward or outward bound.
It was for the naval blockade that Admiral Togo was most concerned, indeed, now more than ever, and his increased anxiety is alone enough to condemn the resolution which the Russians had taken. “Our strategy,” he wrote in his General Orders of May 30th, “is beginning to be more restricted. As the enemy now cooped up in Port Arthur will probably make desperate efforts to obstruct us, every section of the fleet must be strictly on the alert and be absolutely ready to start at a short notice in order to follow and destroy the enemy should he break out and go southward.” At the same time he telegraphed to the Imperial Staff a request for a thousand more mines to blockade Port Arthur and Vladivostok and to bar the approach of the Baltic Squadron. Here we have still the desire to confine the enemy to harbour and to seek the destruction of his fleet by military rather than by naval means. Foreign as such a policy is to our own ideas, it must be judged by the exceptional circumstances of the case. Admiral Togo’s decision was the inevitable outcome of the oppressive situation in which he was placed—playing as he had to do with the whole strength of the Japanese navy against an almost equal enemy with strong and untouched reserves. In a sense therefore he had to treat his active force as the real reserve, and to this end he had already taken the first step. On the previous night (May 29–30) for the first time the auxiliary mine-layers under a heavy fire had laid a minefield close in to the entrance.
As for the rest of the fleet work, the most arduous part of it lay in the dangerous duty of clearing Talien-hwan of mines as quickly as possible, in order to establish there a permanent base for the military operations against the Russian squadron. This work and such support as the Army should still require was committed to Admiral Kataoka, and with his Chief’s consent he at once sent one of his Staff with a Gunnery Lieutenant to confer with the General. Till the bay was clear the required pressure could not be developed from the position which the Japanese had won; and it was evident the sweeping operations would take a considerable time. For the present the Army must be supplied from the unsatisfactory base at Yentoa Bay, and there Admiral Hosoya was stationed. By the 30th he had the last of the troops ashore and before him lay the work of landing the supply and ammunition columns which were beginning to arrive and without which General Oku was tied to the coast.
He had now some 75,000 men, which was the full force at that time assigned for him. As to how he was intended to use them we have no precise statements—whether, that is, his primary object was Port Arthur or the Russian Army in Manchuria, but the latter seems to be indicated by his original instructions. “The Second Army,” they ran, “in conjunction with the fleet is to form a base of operations in the south of Liau-tung. It should establish itself in the line Ta-sha-ho—Port Adams (Pu-lan-tien) facing north; and on the line Kin-chau—Dalny facing south, there providing itself with a base from which it can advance against the enemy in concert with the First Army.” General Oku’s attitude, however, was still one of defence to the northward, where he was holding the northern line which his instructions enjoined with but one division and a force of cavalry. Another division had just landed at Yentoa Bay. His actual front was to the southward where after leaving one division in reserve at Kinchau he had pushed on with the bulk of his force to a line that reached from the southernmost angle of Society Bay to Ta-tzu-shan in Hsiao-ping-tau Bay immediately east of Ping-tu-tau. It is possible that the shadow of the naval situation may have clouded the clearness of the original intention, but if there was any doubt at this time as to the direction in which the main effort was to be made it was quickly decided by General Shtakelberg’s forward movement.
On May 30th it was revealed to the Japanese by the appearance of his cavalry at Telissu, which is situated on the railway over 50 miles south of Kaiping and scarcely half that distance from General Oku’s weakly held left rear at Pu-lan-tien. While it was obvious that he must now change front to the north, the sanguine anticipation of a speedy success against Port Arthur was not abandoned. To meet the situation it was decided to divide the Army into two separate commands, a measure which may have been contemptated from the first. Three divisions were given to General Oku, and these, with another that was now ordered out to reinforce him were to form the Second Army to face northwards. The other two were made the nucleus of a Third Army and General Baron Nogi, who as a Brigadier had captured Port Arthur so brilliantly in the Chinese war, was sent from Tokyo to command it and carry on operations against the fortress. It was with this force the Navy would naturally be most nearly concerned. Admiral Togo was quite prepared to give at once such assistance as he could and the day after the enemy’s cavalry were reported at Telissu he issued an order for the Naval Brigade to stand-by to land and be billeted on the Taa-ku-san Peninsula and Dalny West Entry Point where they would be under Admiral Kataoka’s orders.2
Finding, however, there was no call for the Brigade there and the men were appealing pathetically for active employment he turned to General Oku. The position of that officer was far from happy. The original intention was that he should meet the Russian advance with a vigorous counter-stroke, but his train was still in process of disembarkation and he could not move. His cavalry screen, after a sharp lesson from the Cossacks, was falling back reporting large forces on his front which seemed to threaten his right, and to place his supply depôt at Pi-tsu-wo in jeopardy. Expecting to be attacked on June 5th without fail, he had concentrated two of his divisions on his left at Pu-lan-tien and there was only one to hold the whole course of the Ta-sha River to the sea. In these circumstances he felt compelled to abandon Pi-tsu-wo, and in June 4th he called for naval assistance to remove his supplies. The Commander-in-Chief replied the same day by ordering Admiral Hosoya to send the Saiyen which landed a party and proceeded to aid in evacuating the threatened depôt. Not content with this Admiral Togo the same day transferred the whole Naval Brigade to Yentoa Bay, informing General Oku it was at his disposal and that he had only to let Admiral Hosoya know when he wished it to land. Later instructions to Admiral Hosoya went so far as to direct him to land the Brigade even without a request from the General if the reports he received seemed to show it was necessary.3 This does not mean, of course, that he intended to lose hold of it altogether. His idea was, in accordance with the traditional principle of our own Service, to relieve the Army of the embarrassment of guarding its sea base.4 There was no thought of letting the Brigade pass out of naval control. Still it was a handsome offer made to the extreme limits of his authority in the best spirit of generous co-operation.
General Oku did not at once accept the assistance. As things stood, he replied, it was not required, but that if the need arose he would give timely notice. The fact was the expected attack had not developed. The critical day came and passed with no sign of the enemy’s approach, and their forward movement began to assume the appearance of a mere demonstration. Next day, therefore, the evacuation of Pi-tsu-wo was stopped and the Saiyeri’s landing party was recalled.
The unaccountable delay of the Russians was due to precautions which the Japanese themselves had taken by means of what was now called the “Fourth Army” operating from Takushan. When the news of the Russian advance came in, its second group of transports was arriving and on June 2nd General Kawamura received the following order: “The Xth Division will hold itself in readiness to move on Kaiping as soon as the order is given. Supplies and transport will be made ready at once and pushed as far forward as possible.” The line he was to take was through Hsiu-yen on his left front, and to facilitate the movement a force was detached by General Kuroki to act as his advance guard. This force, which was to cover the forward accumulation of supplies, became at once an open threat to the Russian Southern Force which was concentrating about Kaiping. In these circumstances General Kuropatkin did not feel he could as yet permit General Shtakelberg to complete his concentration for the movement against General Oku. To add to his trouble the threatening movement of the Fourth Army was emphasised from the sea. On the declaration of blockade Rear-Admiral Togo had been told off to enforce it in the Gulf of Liau-tung. Now simultaneously with the order to General Kawamura he was directed to make another demonstration against Kaiping and at the same time to survey the coast with a view to establishing in that neighbourhood an advanced supply base for General Oku.
The operation was to begin next day, but again there was a dense fog and it was not till June 7th that Rear-Admiral Togo was able to start. By that time General Kuropatkin had seen his way to give General Shtakelberg the definite orders already quoted.5 His object was still to draw as much force as possible away from Kwang-tung. He was, therefore, to attempt by a rapid and energetic offensive movement to crush the Japanese advanced detachments, but he was to avoid being entangled in a decisive action with a superior force; and he was to regard as his object the recapture of the Nanshan position as a preparatory step to the relief of Port Arthur, an enterprise which, as we shall see, was to be in the nature of an elaborate combined operation by land and sea.
Meanwhile General Kawamura was pressing on, and on June 8th he captured Hsiu-yen, as Rear-Admiral Togo appeared on the Kaiping coast. Early on the 7th he had entered the Gulf in the Akashi with his three other third-class cruisers, two gunboats and a torpedo-boat division. The torpedo-boats were detached to Kin-chau Bay to enforce the blockade. In all 80 junks were examined and in one of them, which was captured at noon in Fucho Bay, were found two Russian officers with despatches. They with their papers were at once sent on board the Akashi, and important information is said to have been thereby obtained concerning the working of the railway. It may well have related to the training of General Shtakelberg’s troops to Telissu which was then going on. At all events the Rear-Admiral proceeded at once to Tower Hill where, after detaching one cruiser as before to the mouth of Liau River, he began to bombard the railway and any troops he could see. One train from Kaiping was caught and driven back and all traffic was stopped. All day he fired deliberately at the bridges, but the range was too great and no material damage was done.
While the cruisers were thus employed one of the gunboats carried out a survey of the coast to find a suitable spot for a supply base working as high up as Kae-chu Point (immediately west of Kaiping) from which they drove the Russian observation post. At the same time the cruiser which had been sent to the Liau River returned to report all quiet.
The object of her mission was that since the beginning of the war the Russian gunboat Sivuch had been wintering there in company with H.M.S. Espiegle and an American gunboat. The two neutrals had left when the ice broke up, but the Sivuch remained. At first the Russians, recognising the neutrality of the Treaty port, had disarmed her, but as the fear of a Japanese landing there dominated their war plan they had reoccupied the place and restored her armament. It was necessary therefore to keep an eye on her.6
His cruiser’s report received, Rear-Admiral Togo in the evening withdrew his whole division and anchored in Fucho Bay, that is, opposite General Shtakelberg’s right flank. Next morning he returned to Tower Hill and repeated his performance against the railway. While the coast to northward was bombarded and the Liau River again examined, a portion of the coast just south of Tower Hill which had been selected for the proposed supply base was deliberately surveyed. The work had results beyond its immediate object. The Russian Staff had information that another division was just leaving Japan. It was really destined for Yentoa Bay to reinforce General Oku, but in view of the presence of Rear-Admiral Togo’s division and the active surveying that it was doing, the possibility of the new force landing near Kaiping could not be ignored. General Kuropatkin thus saw himself again threatened on both flanks, and felt he must still withhold from General Shtakelberg the permission to concentrate, without which his order could not be carried out. The Russian offensive movement was therefore arrested and General Oku determined to meet it with a counter-stroke. His supply columns were rapidly getting ashore, his reinforcing division was on the point of arriving, and he was free to move. As a preliminary step he wished to concentrate towards Pu-lan-tien, a movement which would necessarily expose his base. The solution of the difficulty was the Naval Brigade, and on the 7th he asked for its services. His request was that it should hold the landing place and the line he wished it to occupy was the lower course of the Ta-sha-ho, that is from the Pi-tsu-wo road to the sea. To this Admiral Togo at once consented. By 1.30 p.m. next day, the 8th, the whole contingent was ashore, and after a conference with the Divisional Staff it was attached to the Brigade which was on the extreme right, and was placed in communication with the Cavalry Brigade, which was covering the right and Pi-tsu-wo on the further side of the river.7
As for the rest of the fleet, it was mainly engaged in covering the sweeping operations in Talien-hwan, which were now in full swing, and in protecting the swept areas. Mining at the entrance to Port Arthur was also actively carried on, and from time to time assistance was given to General Nogi in his reconnaissances on his left front. Over and above this minor work remained the arduous work of the naval blockade. The strain of which had been increased by a warning received from Tokyo that the Port Arthur squadron was on the point of breaking out and would probably attempt to get into the German port of Kyau-chau.
Such anxiety was not without foundation. A great naval movement, as has been said, was on foot to combine with General Shtakelberg’s advance. Both the Port Arthur and the Vladivostok squadrons were to take part, but the difficulties in the way of arranging concerted action were as great as they were peculiar. The whole Pacific Station had been placed under the command of Admiral Skruidlov, when he was appointed to succeed Admiral Makarov. On his way out he had visited Vladivostok, and before he could continue his journey to Port Arthur the place was isolated and he was cut off from the main division of his force. The Pacific Fleet, of which he was Commander-in-Chief, had been reorganised in two main squadrons. The First Squadron comprised all the units then on the spot, that is the Port Arthur and Vladivostok divisions, while the Second Squadron was made up of the reinforcement which was being brought forward in the Baltic under Rear-Admiral Rozhestvenski. Vice-Admiral Bezobrasov had come out to command the First Squadron, but as he too could get no further than Vladivostok, the Port Arthur division had been left temporarily in the irresolute hands of Admiral Vitgeft, who made no secret of his unfitness for such a command.
It was a position from which there was little to be hoped. Indeed it was almost ludicrous. On May 15th the Bogatuir had run on a rock outside Vladivostok, and there she still lay in spite of every effort to get her off. Thus while the main force was quite inadequately commanded, the three chief flag-officers were a thousand miles away with only three armoured cruisers between them, and since the rigorous enforcement of the Japanese blockade their power of communication with Port Arthur was quite precarious. Thus the Russian arrangements for the command of their fleet, which were scientifically designed to give it unity and cohesion, had completely broken down—a fact which should be kept sympathetically in mind in judging their naval operations. The collapse was not their fault. It was due to the tragedy of Admiral Makarov’s loss and the promptitude of the Japanese Army in isolating Port Arthur when they did. In so doing they had rendered a service to the Navy which more than repaid the assistance which it had been able to render the sister service.
How seriously this condition was to affect the war, the Japanese as yet were unaware, but it was now when it became obvious that if Port Arthur was to be saved it must be by a great combined operation, that the breakdown was forcibly brought home to Russian officers in incessant contentions, irresolutions and shrinking from responsibility. The decision which had been come to after the Naval Council of May 27th was, of course, highly unsatisfactory to General Stessel’s Staff. Although they were unwilling to return the naval guns and other material which had been lent them, they could not rest content with the wholly passive attitude the fleet had decided to assume. They could not believe that operations of some kind to disturb the Japanese operations and to support their own were impossible. Accordingly, after the receipt of the Viceroy’s despatch advising active measures, General Kondratenko, who was the real life and soul of the garrison, endeavoured in friendly conference to come to a more satisfactory understanding with the Admiral. The upshot was that a council of flag and general officers assembled on board the flagship on June 2nd. The main questions at issue were, firstly, whether or not the fleet should put to sea at an early opportunity; and, secondly, if it did put to sea, should it assist in the operations for the defence and relief of the fortress, or should it make for Vladivostok, with a view to massing the whole fleet in order to fight a decisive action and make a bid for the general command of the sea.8
The Admiral began by pointing out that the fleet was unfit to fight. No less than 100 guns and 20 searchlights were now ashore, besides 600 skilled ratings, and they had been unable to have any gunnery practice. But apart from the unfitness of the fleet, an attempt to reach Vladivostok would be very risky owing to coaling difficulties and minefields in the Japanese waters. Further, he and his naval colleagues were of opinion that the departure of the fleet would expose the fortress to capture from the sea.
General Stessel agreed that the co-operation of the fleet was essential to the defence. But in his opinion its co-operative action should be directed in the first place against the enemy’s communications so as to prevent the landing of further reinforcements, and in the second to supporting the advance of General Kuropatkin’s relieving force. General Kondratenko endorsed this view and, with the general commanding the Artillery, emphasised the need of active operations of this character, insisting further that the base from which they should be conducted was Port Arthur and not Vladivostok. The commandant of the fortress, General Smirnov, took a wider view, and urged that no co-operation could be effective till the command of the sea had been won. Only by joining the Vladivostok Division could this be achieved, and now after the recent Japanese losses was the moment to make the attempt. Eventually no decision was reached, and the conference broke up with a request from General Stessel for the opinion of the members in writing.
Things stood thus till the 4th, when the General sent to the Admiral a memorandum which had been drafted by General Kondratenko. It purported to be the final opinion of the soldiers. It followed the line those two officers had taken in favour of active operations based from Port Arthur, and General Smirnov’s view was eliminated. It was accompanied by a despatch just received from General Kuropatkin, in which apparently he explained what he was doing to relieve them. Thereupon Admiral Vitgeft summoned a naval council to consider the military memorandum, and it met next day, the 5th.
As the flag and senior officers read the soldiers’ opinion it came to this: that unless the fleet went out at once to disturb the Japanese operations Port Arthur must fall very shortly, and the fleet with it; for the Japanese would certainly press forward from Dalny at once, and it would be impossible to stop them at any of the intervening positions. But at the same time it was highly important to retain the ships’ guns which were then in position at weak points of the land defences. After a long discussion the naval officers agreed upon a memorandum in reply. It began by setting forth once more the unreadiness of the fleet and the lack of training, and stated that for this reason as well as on account of the Japanese minefields and blockship obstructions a sortie was attended with almost insuperable difficulty. Apart from the fact that Admiral Vitgeft regarded himself—and he plainly said so—as unfit to conduct the operations required, the squadron in a fighting sense was not in being, nor had they more than half-a-dozen destroyers fit for service. As to the pressing need of a sortie, they formally traversed the soldiers’ view that a rapid advance of the enemy was possible, but subject to this protest they agreed to accept it. Their decision, therefore, was that a sortie should be made as soon as the repairs of the injured ships were finished and the squadron was fitted for sea with stores, men, and such guns as could best be spared from the land defences. The earliest date would be the middle of June.9
Preparations for sea began in earnest, and next day, June 6th, Admiral Vitgeft sent a telegram to the Viceroy to seek authority for a course of action which had been decided on against his own judgment. In this telegram he pointed out that all ships except the Pobyeda were ready, but many units were still short of their guns, and the roadstead was not clear of mines. But General Stessel had represented that the fortress was in a “critical state,” and that its condition required that they should put to sea. Were they to do so? The message appears to have disturbed General Stessel, and a correspondence took place between him and the Admiral in consequence. The General had asked him to say definitely when he meant to weigh. The Admiral replied he intended to do so if necessary even without waiting till the channel was cleared of mines, but he repeated that his decision was solely due to the General’s statement that the fortress was in a “critical state.” He begged to know if prospects were better, as he wanted as much time as possible for sweeping. The General evidently took this as an attempt to throw upon his shoulders the responsibility for anything that might happen to the squadron, and he promptly took steps to repudiate it. He protested he had never said the fortress was in a “critical state,” only that the situation was “extremely difficult.” For the moment, he added, they had stopped the enemy’s advance, but for how long they could not tell, since, for lack of naval reconnaissance, they were ignorant of what reinforcements he was receiving.10
This was on the 9th. Next day General Stessel formally demanded co-operation in support of his troops in the advanced positions; but little or nothing could be done, so absorbed were the small craft in trying to clear the roadstead of mines, which the Japanese seemed to replace as fast as they were removed. On the 13th came another demand for assistance, and to this the Admiral replied that a sortie was quite impossible till the gullet was cleared.
At this point the correspondence was stopped by two telegrams from the Viceroy which had been sent off on the 11th, the day before the combined attempt to relieve Port Arthur really began. They were the response to Admiral Vitgeft’s request for authority to do what his military colleague desired. Not only was the sortie authorised, but the Admiral was told he was to consider his instructions were definite, and he must bear the responsibility of departing from them. At the same time he must take all possible precautions to ensure a safe exit, and was to remember in measuring the risks that the Japanese squadron was greatly weakened by their recent losses, and that a naval victory would decide the campaign. On the other hand the General was warned that there must be a measure to his persecution of the Admiral. His own duty was to hold the fortress to the last, but the Admiral was in command of the squadron and reponsible for its safety, and the General must not consider that it was to be sacrificed for the sake of the fortress. From this point then it was definitely settled that a sortie should be made at the earliest opportunity, but that it was for the Admiral to decide when the hour had come. Active preparations were accordingly resumed, and a commencement was made in returning guns to the ships.
It will be observed that in the instructions which Admiral Vitgeft had received up to this time nothing definite was said about breaking through to Vladivostok. On June 1st the Viceroy had sent off a telegram on the subject, but it had not yet come to hand. “I am taking all measures,” it ran, for the speedy raising of the investment of Port Arthur, but . . it is necessary for the fleet, while protecting the fortress, to prepare to proceed to sea for a decisive action with the enemy, to defeat him, and to continue its course to Vladivostok.” This message, however, did not reach Port Arthur till the 16th, and two days earlier came another modifying it. It was dated June 5th, and was in these words—“If on the departure of the squadron the enemy’s fleet is defeated, and Port Arthur still holds out, the duty of the squadron, instead of proceeding to Vladivostok, is to co-operate in raising the siege of the fortress, and supporting the operations of our troops being sent to relieve Port Arthur.”11
The impression left on the Admiral’s mind of what was expected of him must have been far from clear. He was to go out and fight, but only on the supposition that he would meet an inferior force. If successful he was to carry on to Vladivostok, but not if Port Arthur was still holding out. The general idea indicated was the employment of his squadron to dispute the command of the Yellow Sea as part of the great combination for saving Port Arthur, and that he was to regard Port Arthur as his base so long as it was available.
1 Cordonnier. The Japanese in Manchuria, Vol. I., page 230 (citing Lectures at the Nikolai Staff College).
2 Japanese Confidential History, p. 287. Combined Fleet, Order No. 505, May 30th.
3 Japanese Confidential History, p. 339, June 4.
4 This principle was formulated as early as 1757 by General Lord Ligonier for the guidance of the army officers commanding the Rochefort Expedition.
5 Ante, p. 265.
6 She was a Swedish-built vessel of 1,134 tons. Her armament was one 9-inch, one 6-inch, and six 9-pdrs., etc.
7 Japanese Confidential History, p. 340.
8 Russian Military History, Volume VIII., Part i., pages 330, et seq.
9 Report of Rear Admiral Vitgeft, Russian Military History, Vol. VIII., Part ii., Appendix No. 19.
10 Report of Rear Admiral Vitgeft. Russian Military History, Vol. VIII., Part ii., Appendix No. 19, pp. 333 et seq.
11 Russian Military History, Vol. VIII., Part ii., Appendix 19a and 19c.