CHAPTER XXII.

THE BATTLE OF THE YELLOW SEA.

[Chart M 3. Diagrams A and B.]

Section I.—Movements before Contact.

THE first intimation of the coming movement was the appearance of the Novik outside the gullet accompanied, as usual, by the sweepers and their gunboat escort. She was observed about 6.30, apparently by the new signal station ashore, for the first news came from the Fuso, Admiral Hosoya’s flagship at Dalny, by a wireless message which was taken in by the various Japanese squadrons at 6.35.¹ Admiral Togo with his four battleships and his despatch-vessel Yaeyama was at his station just north of Round Island, while Admiral Kataoka with the Nisshin-Kasuga sub-division was, as usual, steaming in towards Cap Island to prevent any fresh attempt to annoy the left of the Japanese army. Admiral Dewa with the Yakumo and his three protected cruisers was 15 miles south of Liau-ti-shan in the position assigned to him for covering the detachment operating with the Second Army at Newchwang. His second armoured cruiser, the Asama, was at the Elliot Islands coaling. Admiral Yamada of the Fifth Division² was just coming in from his night station at Terminal Head and nearing Ping-tu-tau, where he was to be on guard against attempts to annoy the army, but only two ships of his division were with him. The Chinyen was coaling at Odin Cove and the fourth ship was under repair at the base. Rear-Admiral Togo with the Akashi, Suma, and Akitsushima of the Sixth Division was at his watching station, two miles west of Encounter Rock. His fourth cruiser Idzumi had left to coal at the base.

For some time there was nothing to show that anything more important was in the wind than the usual sweeping operations, or possibly a threat to General Nogi’s left; and no one stirred. But as the Russian battleships began to follow the Novik and were seen to be assembling under Io-tu-san on the west side of the roadstead, things began to look more serious. From time to time their movements were reported by the inshore flotilla that was watching the port and by the look-out station through the Fuso at Dalny. Apparently they could also be seen dimly through the morning mist by Admiral Yamada, for at 8.15 the Hashidate gave warning to the Mikasa. A little later there was a movement which seemed to indicate that they were coming east as though to attack the Army’s left. Admiral Kataoka had just reached Cap Island, and, as it was his special function to support the Fifth Division in preventing such an operation, he ran in under the Ping-tu-tau signal station to join Admiral Yamada and to get a message through to Dalny calling out the whole of the flotilla. For the present nothing further was done. The indications were too indefinite for a concentration of the various divisions to be called for.

By the last general order issued on July 23rd Admiral Togo had directed that if the whole of the enemy’s fleet came out and attempted to get away southward, all divisions were to assemble south-east of Encounter Rock. But the conditions stated had not yet arisen and there were other possibilities to provide for. If the Russians really meant putting to sea there were, besides an escape to the southward, two courses which they might adopt. They might move eastwards against General Nogi’s left, as Admiral Kataoka apprehended, or against Dalny, or even against the Elliot Islands; or they might move westward into the Gulf of Pe-chi-li either to attack the Saiyen detachment, or to escape into Chinese ports. To mass at once at Encounter Rock would therefore be premature.

By 8.50, however, so many of the enemy’s ships were out that Admiral Togo decided to close in nearer to them, and he proceeded to steam due west at 10 knots. Still it was the Army that was uppermost in his mind. For shortly after 9.0 he sent this wireless order to Admiral Hosoya: “The Fifth Division must watch the enemy near Ping-tu-tau. The gunboats of your division at Ping-tu-tau must proceed closer and prevent the enemy and their sweeping flotilla from advancing east of Lao-lui-chui.”

By 9.30 the whole Russian squadron with the exception of the Bayan could be seen stopped in the roadstead, and some of the battleships were reported to have anchored. Admiral Togo received this information from the Fuso by 9.38. But still he made no change except to call up the Asama from the Elliot Islands and to confirm Admiral Kataoka’s order for the Dalny flotillas to leave at once for their attacking stations.

Shortly afterwards the situation became clearer. On reaching the roadstead most of the Russian ships had actually anchored, for mines had been seen and must be cleared before the squadron could proceed. But by the time the Mikasa took in the last signal from the Fuso the work was done, and at 9.55 Admiral Vitgeft, having cleared for action, made this general signal: “The fleet is informed that His Majesty has ordered us to proceed to Vladivostok.” With that a fresh start was made and not without a fair prospect of getting through. As the Russians weighed they could see the four ships of Admirals Kataoka and Yamada watching them to the eastward, and since it was intended to get away to the westward along the Liau-ti-shan shore this was a hopeful sign. Accordingly, preceded by the sweepers, they began to move off very slowly, heading first south-east and then south to clear their own minefields.

The movement was at once seen from Ping-tu-tau, and Admiral Yamada, giving the Mikasa the warning cypher for an escape to the southward, at once started south with his two cruisers to keep touch. Admiral Kataoka remained off Ping-tu-tau long enough to pass the word through the signal station that all torpedo craft must proceed to the stations assigned to them in the event of an escape to the southward. Then at 14 knots he went off south-east to join the battle division, which was still advancing due west from Round Island and not for the battle rendezvous.

It was with the deliberate intention of confusing the Japanese that the Russians adopted the course they did. Their heading first south-east and then south was, as we have seen, merely to avoid their own minefields protecting the entrance. Once past them, they turned with their sweepers before them parallel to the Liau-ti-shan shore. Instead of making directly out to sea, as they had attempted to do on June 23rd, it had been decided to pass out through their own mined area, “which surrounded the Cape on which the lighthouse stands,” that is the west Liau-ti-shan Cape.3

The danger of the inshore course, and the necessity it entailed of sweeping in advance of the squadron, made progress very slow and prolonged the uncertainty of the Japanese. The state of the atmosphere further obscured the situation. Though it was clear to seaward the mist still hung along the shore, and it was some time before it was definitely ascertained in what direction the Russians were moving. Contradictory reports were coming in, which Admiral Dewa at his isolated and exposed station off Liau-ti-shan found particularly confusing. At 9.55 he took in the Hashidate’s warning to the Mikasa that the enemy were coming south. A few minutes later the senior officer’s boat of the 3rd destroyer division, which had patrol section “D” south-west of Liau-ti-shan, came up to inform him the enemy were all out and collecting east of Lutin Rock, and this was confirmed directly afterwards by the senior officer of 16th torpedo-boat division that had been watching close inshore. Being now certain the enemy were coming out, Admiral Dewa started off eastward at 10 knots for the battle rendezvous. While on this course he was joined by the 3rd destroyer division, which informed him that at 10.0 it had left the Russian squadron 3 miles south-east of Liau-ti-shan. Ordering it to take station on his starboard side he still held on. But at 11.0 another torpedo-boat of the 16th division came up and signalled that the enemy had come south of Liau-ti-shan and were now heading south-west, that is, for the Pe-chi-li Gulf. Thereupon at 11. 13 he turned 16 points and hurried back to the westward. The enemy could not be seen, but as he proceeded his impression as to their destination was so far confirmed that he altered course more to the north, increased a couple of knots, and at 11.53 informed the Mikasa that the Russians were heading for the Gulf of Pe-chi-li.

An hour earlier Admiral Togo had received a similar warning. On his westerly course he had reached a point about 10 miles due north of the battle rendezvous and had stopped. There at 10.50 he took in a message from the Hashidate to say that at half-past ten the Russians had turned to the south-west, round Liau-ti-shan East Cape, as though they intended to go into the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. Still he did not move nor did Admiral Yamada, who had started south with the Fifth Division, alter his course. For another quarter of an hour he held on as he was, and then at 11.7 altered to south by west, so as to come out, he says, “west of Encounter Rock, keeping clear of Position X.” The expression is curious, for to come out west of Encounter Rock it was unnecessary to alter to the westward. Coming south from Ping-tu-tau he would have cleared it by six miles, but as will appear directly there was reason for giving it a wide berth. As for Position X it must have long been marked as a danger area. Its position was 8 miles S.S.E. of Liau-ti-shan on the “Central patrol line,” that is, the line which ran south by east from Tiger’s Tail and it was in this neighbourhood that lay the old Russian minefield in which the Hatsuse and Yashima had been lost.

It seems clear that up to this time Admiral Togo did not believe that the Russians were on their true course. For about 11.0 he began to steam south for the rendezvous and called up the Nisshin and Kasuga to join him. By 11.30 the two armoured cruisers had taken station in rear of the line, and Admiral Kataoka was able to report to his chief what he had seen of the movements and order of the enemy. His report ended at 11.45 this signal: “The enemy are heading for the Gulf of Pe-chi-li.” It was only a few minutes later that Admiral Dewa sent an identical message. Upon this or similar information Admiral Togo now decided to act, and he made to his despatch-vessel Yaeyama the following signal: “My squadron is about to proceed into the Gulf of Pe-chi-li. You must lead the destroyer and torpedo-boat flotillas, which will be coming from the direction of Dalny, and bring them to me. They appear to be steaming west near Ping-tu-tau.”4 The Yaeyama at once went off at high speed upon her mission. As for Rear-Admiral Togo with the Sixth Division he was already moving westward 3 miles west of Encounter Rock. At 11.45 he says he finally understood the enemy was “coming south.” Thereupon he ordered steam for full speed, and in order to make quite certain of the Russian movements proceeded due west at 10 knots.5

Up till nearly noon, therefore, when Admiral Togo was just reaching his battle rendezvous, he saw all his calculations upset and his whole scheme of operations frustrated. Before him was the prospect of a stern chase, and with a start of some 25 miles the coveted squadron might well slip through his fingers. But in fact it was not so; for scarcely was his signal made when the Russians turned on their true course for Shantung Promontory.

About 11.25 Admiral Vitgeft had reached along the Liau-ti-shan shore, as far as the lighthouse on the West Cape, and being now in open water and clear of the mined area he dismissed his sweepers with their escort of gunboats and half his flotilla, keeping only eight destroyers with his flag. As they turned back for Port Arthur, he seems to have altered to south and to have kept that course till 12.0, when just as the Yaeyama was starting to carry the orders for the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, he turned S. 50 E., the direct course for Shantung Promontory, which would bring him past Encounter Rock at a distance of about 7 miles to the south-west of it.

The last movement to the southward had been observed by Admiral Yamada about 11.30 as the Russians emerged from the mist, and it was then that, having got clear of Position X, he had made his movement to the south-west in order to keep touch. About a quarter of an hour later, however, finding the enemy had turned more to the eastward and were closing on him, he changed to east and adjusted speed to preserve contact. At the same time it would seem that Admiral Togo heard of the Russian change of course, for instead of heading for the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, he held on for the original rendezvous and reached it at 12.9. Similarly at noon Admiral Dewa discovered what had happened. In pursuance of the last impression he had continued to steam westward till Liau-ti-shan bore N. W. 18 miles, and then, as the enemy cleared the shore mists, he could see their line for the first time. All doubt was now at an end, but his position was full of anxiety. He was apparently completely isolated. “All our divisions,” he says, “were separated from me. Not one was near and there was nothing but the Third Division to oppose them.” His only course was to try to lead them up to the battle division and with this object he once more turned 16 points and headed back eastward, on a course approximately parallel to the enemy, keeping them out of range abaft his port beam. “Neither getting too close,” he says, “nor too far, we waited for the moment to come.”

His anxiety was not prolonged. By 12.20 he could see the Sixth Division to the north-east, that is on his port bow.6 Rear-Admiral Togo was then steaming west, but five minutes later, finding he was closing to six miles from the enemy, he turned E.S.E. At the same time (12.25) the battle division was sighted by Admiral Dewa coming in from east by north. After reaching the rendezvous alone it had been steaming W.S.W. gradually increasing to 14 knots, with the intention of cutting across the course of the enemy, “who were then,” says the Confidential History, “coming south.” This, of course, was not the fact. They were heading E.S.E., and if “coming south” means anything, it must mean they seemed bent on attacking.⁷ It was open then to Admiral Togo to accept action by holding on and crossing their bows; but this he did not do. About half-past twelve the two fleets, as their courses converged, had sight of one another through the mist at a distance which the Japanese estimated to be 10 miles. The Russian formation could not be made out, probably because at this time, according to Semenov, the Tzesarevich having trouble in her engine-room had sheered out of the line and was confusing the squadron.

It was now the tactics proper of the action began. Admiral Togo’s first move was to turn four points together to port—that is, away from the enemy. This he did at 12.40, very soon after sighting them, but the object of the movement is nowhere stated. Its effect was that he stood away S.S.W. in port quarter line for 10 minutes, and then when he was nearly ahead of the Russians, he turned into line ahead again on his previous course, crossing their bows at a distance of about nine miles. By this time the Russian order was restored and they could now be clearly seen coming on boldly in single line ahead, with the flagship leading, as though to attack. They were then, according to Admiral Togo’s report, about 10 miles W.S.W. of Encounter Rock,8 and convinced by the enemy’s keeping their course that they meant fighting he hoisted his battle flag. But, in fact, Admiral Vitgeft was not keeping his course. Seeing that as the Japanese were standing it would be impossible for him to get away to sea on his true course between Admiral Togo’s division and Admiral Dewa’s, he had already begun to edge to port—that is, more directly to the eastward—with the idea of getting away round his enemy’s rear. Apparently Admiral Togo did not notice the movement, so gradually was it begun. Had he done so it is to be assumed he would have made an effort to stop it by pressing the Russian van. What he actually did at 12.55—that is, so soon as his battle flag was hoisted—was to signal for eight points together to port and to stand directly away S.S.E. in line abreast as though to facilitate the tactics on which Admiral Vitgeft was bent.

What then was the meaning of these manœuvres? The official Japanese explanation is that his object was “to lure them out to sea.” This phrase recurs in all the various reports with the regularity of a mot d’ordre. But was it the whole truth? They were already some 20 miles from Port Arthur. A few miles more or less could make little difference. Moreover, although as the distance from the base increased the chance of decisive action increased, yet at the same time the chances of the enemy’s escape southward increased in the same ratio, and to prevent such an escape was the avowed object of the action. The official explanation, therefore, leaves room for doubt, and the more so as there is another which goes to show that it was not the whole truth.

At 12.50, just before Admiral Togo made his 8 point turn to seaward, Admiral Dewa tells us he was within range but did not open fire. “This,” he says, “was because the enemy’s fleet had not yet got through the dangerous area of the minefield near Encounter Rock, and it was not considered a suitable time to come to action.” Was this also Admiral Togo’s idea and is the existence of this obstacle the true explanation of his refusal to close at this time? Of the minefield itself we have no other direct mention from the Japanese, and the indirect corroboration is very slight. There is little indeed beyond the fact that on August 1st, the day Admiral Togo took the battle division to the base to coal, the 14th torpedo division left Dalny in the morning and remained all day stopped to the west of Encounter Rock.9 Nothing is said of what they were doing there. Their regular station was off Dalny West Entry Point, and it is conceivable they were taken off it to escort minelayers. In any case, in the face of Admiral Dewa’s statement it cannot well be doubted there was a minefield in the neighbourhood, and we have already seen to what extent Admiral Yamada’s movements tend to confirm it.

Nor does his testimony stand alone. We have from the Russian side various independent statements that between the time at which Admiral Dewa says they were in the danger zone and the time the action began a number of floating mines were seen, and that the fleet had to manœuvre to avoid them. It is possible the officers who believed they saw them were mistaken—the belief was not universal—but the Russians were by this time very familiar with the appearance of floating mines, and quite a number of officers were convinced that they existed. The belief was that they had been dropped from certain destroyers which had been manœuvring ahead of them. The official Japanese explanation is that these destroyers had been throwing overboard empty coal baskets. It may have been so, but there are difficulties in accepting this theory. The destroyers in question were, according to the Japanese, the 5th destroyer division on its way to join Admiral Dewa, but the track it took is not easy to reconcile with the position in which the Russians believed they saw the mines. The “coal-basket” theory, in fact, has the flavour of an endeavour ex post facto to explain away the Russian reports after they came to hand, and it certainly does not get rid of Admiral Dewa’s definite statement that a minefield did exist in the neighbourhood of the area in which the Russians believed that mines were seen.¹⁰

In default then of an explicit and credible denial from the Japanese, we are forced to assume the existence of a minefield somewhere near the spot where Admiral Togo’s second-in-command believed it to be. The assumption is strengthened by the fact that the position is near the direct course from Port Arthur to Shantung Promontory—the line the Russians were expected to take. The reason the device failed is also indicated. It was simply that—as had so often happened before—some of the mines had broken adrift and come to the surface revealing the existence of the danger to the enemy’s squadron in time for them to avoid it.

If these conclusions are right Admiral Togo’s tactics become more explicable. Probably his plan was not to attack the enemy till they had suffered the shock of a minefield. His first turn to seaward then may have been to entice them deeper into the danger area. By the time he made the second it would seem they had passed it without mishap. The stratagem had failed, and, seeing before him an action against the Russian Squadron in undiminished strength, it was obvious he must endeavour to fight it clear of his own mines.¹¹

There is the further consideration that the failure of the minefield may have determined him to fight at extreme range. Not only was his battle squadron inferior to that of the enemy, but it had to be husbanded. On the other hand, he believed his long range fire would prove superior, and that his flotilla was greatly superior. Prudence then dictated a long range action in the hope of creating such an opportunity for his torpedo craft as his tactical memorandum contemplated. Nor must it be forgotten that in order to facilitate the seizure of such opportunities he had designed a certain battle formation for the whole fleet, and now, owing to the long uncertainty as the Russian destination, he found himself in contact with the enemy with his various divisions unable to take up their assigned stations. The Third Division, whose proper position was on his starboard quarter, was before his starboard beam steaming nearly parallel to the enemy, and consequently crossing his course, about five miles away. The Sixth Division, which should have been in his wake, was some five miles to the north-eastward, trying, it is true, to get into position by steaming to the southward, but with every prospect of being cut off from him by the advancing enemy. Time, therefore, was wanted, nor was there any imperative reason why it should not be taken. Strategically, indeed, there was abundant reason for not risking a complete decision till the Straits of Korea were reached and Admiral Kamimura’s squadron would be brought into line.

Section II.—The First Action.

Whatever its cause Admiral Togo’s movement to seaward did not last more than 10 minutes. It was seen to be producing no effect. The Russians still held on their easterly course clearly bent, not on attacking, but on getting away round the Japanese fleet to the eastward. To parry the move Admiral Togo at 1.6 signalled for 8 points together to port and turned back into line ahead again E.N.E. to cut across their course. If, therefore, his idea was to entice them out to sea, he gave it up with remarkable suddenness in favour of a movement calculated to force them back towards the land.

He was now in reverse order with Admiral Kataoka leading in the Nisshin. She had already been trying one or two sighting shots from her after barbette, and a few minutes after the squadron had turned into line-ahead again all the ships took it up, firing deliberately at 13,000 metres (14,200 yards)¹¹ and concentrating mainly on the Tzesarevich. Both she and the Retvizan, her next astern, replied, their shot falling very close, though no hit came.

At the same time Admiral Vitgeft, to parry the new threat to his van, continued to edge off to port till the two fleets were nearly on parallel courses again. It still looked as though he meant to get away to the eastward, and at 1.17 Admiral Togo signalled to the Nisshin to lead two more points to port to head him off. By 1.25 the Japanese were steady on this new course, and it became obvious to Admiral Vitgeft that by no means could he get through by keeping on as he was. Giving up all idea of passing ahead of his enemy, he therefore turned suddenly about 12 points to starboard in succession, and headed south as though to pass round their rear.

To this move Admiral Togo did not respond at once. It was the almost invariable practice of the Japanese to hold on steadily when their enemy was making a turn under fire, and to use no helm till the turn was complete. In this manner they could count on getting the most out of the favourable target. The result, however, on this occasion, was disappointing. The range was from 12,000 to 14,000 yards—too great for effective work, and not a single hit was made. Indeed, the Japanese seemed to be outranged. By half-past one the two fleets had passed one another on nearly opposite courses, and Admiral Togo saw his chance as the enemy headed south of stopping them by crossing ahead. Accordingly at 1.33 he signalled for 16 points together to starboard and for an increase to 14 knots. It was now his turn to suffer, and as he came round the Russians concentrated upon him. As he put his helm over a shell broke up his wireless gear, and then in three minutes more another struck the after shelter deck, made a large hole in the foot of the main mast, killed four men and wounded seven others and a lieutenant.

The Russians thus drew first blood, and as yet the Japanese had not secured a single hit. Still their last move had parried the Russian attempt to get away to the southward. Seeing it was useless to proceed, Admiral Vitgeft turned again some 12 points in succession to port and began to steam back on a course opposite to that the Japanese were now on. As before, Admiral Togo held steady to develop his highest intensity of fire upon the enemy’s turn. The effect was rapidly to reduce the range and before the turn was complete the Tzesarevich and the Retvizan were seen to be badly hit. Both were on fire. Dense volumes of black smoke arose from the Flagship, and steam rushed from the funnels. These were the first successful shots of the Japanese, and their elation was increased by an appearance of confusion in the Russian fleet.12 As the turn developed its formation seemed to become clubbed, ships were masking each other’s fire, and to add to the Japanese advantage the range was now less than 8,000 metres (8,800 yards), low enough for 6-inch guns to tell. In short, it was a situation to be pressed for all it was worth to the Japanese. Such at least would seem to have been Admiral Togo’s view, for when the Russian turn was complete he did not conform with a corresponding turn, but merely altered two points to starboard and began a circling movement in order to envelope the still disordered mass of the enemy. At ranges of about 7,000 metres (7,700 yards) he poured in salvoes, and with such effect, that it is said the enemy were almost hidden by the exploding shells. But whether or not the very intensity of the Japanese fire made accurate laying impossible there was no effective result. It quickly, indeed, became apparent that the Japanese had overestimated the confusion of the Russians. There had, in fact, been only an appearance of disorder, and so far from being stopped by the volume of fire they were soon seen to be drawing away steadily to the north-eastward in unbroken formation, and returning the fire with undiminished spirit.

What, then, should Admiral Togo have done? In order to carry out the principles of his Tactical Memorandum by “pressing the van” and maintaining a position between the Russians and their destination he should have turned back at once while there was yet time for another pass ahead of them. But this for some reason he did not do. As the Russian line came round and steadied on its new course, the cruisers in its rear became dangerously exposed, and the chance of dealing them a rapid blow, which would compel Admiral Vitgeft to cover them, was perhaps too tempting to lose. In any case, what Admiral Togo did was merely to alter further to starboard and continue his enveloping movement about north-west. with the intention, so says his official dispatch, of cutting them off. But too much time had been lost and the movement came to nothing but a weak enfilading attack on the enemy’s rear.

As a main attack no form can be less promising of decisive result. It was, in fact, work which Admiral Dewa should have been doing by way of a minor diversionary attack, and the reason he failed to perform this function is of permanent interest. The problem of using cruiser squadrons as battle units, and indeed the whole question of combining semi-independent squadrons in the fight, was then in its infancy, and the main difficulty involved in Admiral Togo’s system declared itself at once. It was the difficulty of mutual interference.

The original Tactical Memorandum provided that when the battle division tried to use its superior speed to press the enemy’s van, the main cruiser division, whose position was in the rear of the battle division, was to break off and make a strong attack on the enemy’s rear. When Admiral Togo made his first attempt to cross ahead of the Russian line Admiral Dewa, although he had not been able to get into his proper position had made an effort to do this by turning back north-westward. But when Admiral Vitgeft parried the Japanese movement by turning to the southward his intended attack was no longer possible. The Russians were coming down straight for him. It was also obvious that the Japanese battle division must conform and come down on a parallel course. Accordingly, Admiral Dewa says that he realised that if he continued as he was he would interfere with his chief’s movement. He was also, it seems, influenced by the necessity of getting his division out of the fire-zone. The leading Russian battleships had begun to fire on him. Shells were falling very close, and his idea seems to have been to draw out of range and then steam round ahead of his own battle division, so as to get upon its disengaged side and take up his proper position in its rear. Accordingly, at 1.32, he turned eight points in succession to port, away from the enemy, and ten minutes later he signalled for another eight points to port together and for his flotilla to keep clear of the fire-zone and act as convenient.13 He was now, therefore, in line abreast heading south-eastward so as to pass clear of the battle division as it came southward in conforming to the last Russian movement.14

By the time, however, he had been three minutes on this course, the Russians had commenced their turn back to the north-eastward. It thus became possible for him to carry out the movement he had just abandoned, and he himself says: “1.53 I steamed north at 18 knots, passed to west of the battle division and pressed the enemy’s rear ship.” The detailed reports and track charts, however, do not confirm this statement. They all agree that at the time stated and before he proceeded north he turned eight points into line ahead and proceeded south-westward. To Admiral Togo this movement, so soon as it was realized, must have appeared peculiarly inopportune. Apparently, instead of hastening to press the rear, Admiral Dewa was steaming out of the fire-zone, and at 1.57 the Commander-in-Chief sent him a wireless message to remind him of his assigned function. It was an order to “attack the enemy’s cruiser division,” and to execute it he turned to the northward.¹⁵

Admiral Togo had despatched the message just before he turned to attack the cruisers himself. He was no doubt anxious for Admiral Dewa to take over the attack which he himself could not possibly press home. He must have seen that unless he was immediately successful he would have to desist; and he was not successful. “Immediately,” says Commander Semenov, who was in the Diana, the last ship in the Russian line, “our cruisers went full speed ahead and spread fanshape to port. In this way they got out of their unpleasant situation and were at the same time enabled to bring their whole broadside to bear.” So promptly was the movement made that they came off lightly. Though they were covered with splinters no serious hit was made. The Askold lost her fore funnel and the Pallada a cutter, but only two men were wounded. It was impossible for Admiral Togo to press the attack further, and he had to leave them to the Third Division. Already, indeed, he had gone too far. The enemy’s battle division streaming away to the eastward was turning a little to starboard, evidently bent on escaping. The Tzesarevich was almost out of sight. So after four minutes he had to give it up and at 2.9 he circled again to starboard “to try,” as he says, “to cut across the enemy’s bows.” But he adds, “We were a little late, and being unable to succeed in this design, were forced to take a course parallel to that of the enemy.”

The plain truth is he had been outmanœuvred, partly from the failure of his plan for checking the enemy by a cruiser attack on the rear and partly from having underestimated their steaming powers. He had no longer a controlling lead. His ill-advised enveloping movement had only resulted in a weak attack on the enemy’s rear and had suffered them to get away on their true course for Vladivostok. Gradually edging to starboard they were now going about south-east by east direct for Shantung, and the Mikasa was only just abeam of the rear ship. They had, in fact, slipped by him, and so great was the range that his rear ships had to cease fire. How was he to retrieve his mistake? He had still a knot in hand, but this he was unwilling to use. He contented himself, therefore, with altering course to east-southeast—that is, to a course inclined slightly to that of the enemy—and kept down to his normal battle speed of 14 knots.

Nevertheless, he began to overhaul the enemy owing to a movement which Admiral Vitgeft now found it necessary to make in order to shelter his cruisers. At 2.30, while they were still under fire of the Japanese rear ships, he signalled to them to take station out of range on his disengaged side. In order to facilitate the movement he turned his battle division some four points together to starboard, turning back into line when he had made room for the cruisers. The effect was to bring down the range of his rear ship to between 10,000 (10,900 yards) and 11,000 (12,000 yards) metres, and at 2.45 all the Japanese battleships reopened. For the most part they concentrated on the two rear ships, and as the range continued to decrease the fire was not without effect. Still the Russians replied with spirit and accuracy, and probably inflicted quite as much damage as they received. At 2.50 the Asahi, the second Japanese ship, was badly hit; at 3.0 the Mikasa received a shell on the water line, and in five minutes more another below the quarter-deck. Shells continued to fall thickly about the two leading ships, and in the Russian line no sign of serious damage could be seen, except that the Poltava, the rear-most ship, was falling astern.

On these lines there was small hope of bringing the action to the successful conclusion which the Japanese had so confidently expected. It had lasted nearly two hours and their position was in no way better than when they began. Indeed it was rather worse, for so far from making any real gain on the chase, they had actually fallen behind, for owing to the slight convergence of courses the Poltava was now before the Mikasa’s beam. True as she had begun to fall astern of station she was now only 8,500 metres (9,300 yards) away, but the fact had to be faced that they had lost the position which it was their main object to retain, between the Russian fleet and its destination.

So serious was the situation that at this juncture, so we are told on very high authority, Admiral Togo was minded to use his reserve of speed to close and bring matters to an issue. Not that he was in favour of a very close action, if we judge by his original Tactical Memorandum. In that which he issued on January 10th, before the war began, he says, “Although we cannot always maintain the proper battle range, we will attempt to choose one not less than 3,000 metres” (3,300 yards). But the range hitherto had never fallen below double his minimum. It had averaged nearly three times that figure and at the longer ranges he had found no advantage over the enemy. Yet his Chief of the Staff, Captain Shimamura, dissuaded him. He pointed out how much more advantageous it would be to open out to a still greater distance till they had ranged ahead of the Russian line, and to close when the relative bearings were more conformable to their dominant tactical idea of “pressing the van.”16

There were obvious reasons for accepting this advice. Owing to the bad position into which Admiral Togo had fallen the objections to pressing the enemy at the moment were weighty and clear. If he continued to chase obliquely with the enemy before his port beam it would permit them to develop a damaging concentration on his van, and the more he gained the worse it would become. He could, of course, have secured a concentration for himself by attacking their rear, but apart from the inherent inefficiency of such a method there were strategical objections which had declared themselves in his last attempt. It was more than doubtful if any attainable amount of success against the rear ships would secure the object for which the battle was being fought. The last two units in the line were those of least value in the Russian battle squadron and this alone indicated that Admiral Vitgeft was ready to cut their loss and carry on to escape. The case then was clearly no exception to the rule that an attack on the rear is an essentially untrustworthy method of forcing an enemy from his purpose. It was only by pressing the van that the Japanese could make certain of gaining their end, and the Russian fire was already demonstrating the danger of forcing such an attack directly. Accordingly at 3.0 with shells still falling thickly about the leading ships Admiral Togo began to lead away to the south-east. Twice again the Mikasa was hit—once on her after funnel and once below the quarter-deck; but by 3.20 the range had become so great that he ceased fire.

So the first stage of the action came to an end. Clearly if it was to be renewed with the advantage his assumed inferiority demanded he must do as Captain Shimamura advised and use his speed to get ahead again. Till then he must keep out of range. It is possible that he had hoped to improve his position by tempting the enemy to conform to his last change of course. But this they had not done. Admiral Vitgeft, so far as is known, kept on as he was. Accordingly, at half past three Admiral Togo signalled for the last knot, and 20 minutes later he inclined inwards again about parallel with the enemy.

The situation was far from promising. A wholly indecisive action had degenerated into a chase, and it was a chase that might well last till nearly nightfall unless something could be done to check the Russian speed. For this he could only look to his cruiser squadrons whose positions were as follows:—

Rear-Admiral Togo having been fired on by the Russian Squadron after 2.0, as he came down from the northward, had inclined away out of range, and picking up the 3rd destroyer division had crossed ahead of the battleships. As they came on he led round to starboard a very wide circle and so at 3.13 took his assigned station astern, with his attached flotilla of two divisions of destroyers and four of torpedo-boats, but instead of being 5 miles astern he was nearly 8.

The Fifth or Reserve Division under Admiral Yamada was out of sight. About 2.30 he was 5 miles north of Encounter Rock. There he had been found by the Chinyen from Odin Cove, and taking her into his line he held away south-eastwards on the far side of and parallel to the Russians. In about an hour, to the eastward of the Rock, he picked up the Idzumi of the Sixth Division hurrying down from the Elliott Islands, and brought her along, but he was still some 10 miles away on Admiral Togo’s port quarter.

Admiral Dewa in making his sweep to the northward in pursuance of his order to attack had almost disappeared. For some time he had only been visible by his smoke. But about a quarter to three he came into sight again and was seen to be heading for the enemy’s cruisers with all the advantage of his 18 knots. To avoid him the Askold and her consorts were then drawing forward under cover of the battle squadron, and Admiral Togo saw here apparently a chance of checking the enemy’s progress. At all events, at 2.55 he told the Asahi to telegraph to the Yakumo the following order:—“The enemy’s cruisers are running off ahead. Chase and attack them.” The message was not taken in till 3.12. By that time Admiral Dewa had come out on the far side of the Russians and was heading eastward with their rear ships firing on him, but as the range was 13,000 metres (14,200 yards) the shots fell short. On receipt of the Asahi’s wireless message he turned four points together to starboard in order to close, and at 3.20 turned into line ahead again to continue the chase. But it was just at this time Admiral Togo ceased firing and the Russian battleships quickly turned their attention to the Yakumo. The shells now began to fall close and thick, and at 3.40 one burst on her middle deck, killing 12 men and wounding 11. The distance from the Russian rear ship was still over 8 miles, so that the Yakumo’s 8-inch guns were outranged. As for the Russian cruisers, his assigned objective, they were far ahead and quite out of his reach. It was therefore clear to Admiral Dewa that if he persisted it would only mean his own destruction by the enemy’s battle division; and realising that it was impossible to carry out his chief’s order he broke off to the northward and drew out of range.

So the last hope of checking the Russian speed was gone and the Japanese had to settle down to their chase in the waning afternoon with small prospect of gaining their end before night. “They had got ahead of us,” wrote Admiral Kataoka, “and had altered course to the south-east . . . . and had apparently achieved their object of escape.”17

Section III.—The Second Action.

So soon as Admiral Dewa realised the impossibility of carrying out his chief’s last order he fell back upon the Tactical Memorandum and determined to regain his place in the formation it enjoined. He could now see his other armoured cruiser, the Asama, coming in from the Elliot Islands, and leaving her to follow him, he at 4.0 o’clock led away to starboard to rejoin the Commander-in-Chief across the wake of the Russians.¹⁸

The movement must have been approved by Admiral Togo. At least, he made no signal to check it, and at the moment it was probably not unwelcome. When the Yakumo was leading her division into action he could see the Russian destroyers were racing ahead of their cruisers. Fearing an attack he had just called his own destroyers to close on him and had made them the following signal:—“The enemy’s destroyers are going ahead. Look out. They may come back on the opposite course to us.” In a quarter of an hour more the danger looked so threatening that he called up the destroyers of the Sixth Division to join those on his disengaged side.¹⁹

But almost at once the position improved. The Poltava was dropping back astern of the Sevastopol. One set of her engines had broken down. She could only use the other and was checking the pace of the whole squadron. From the Mikasa the Russians could just be seen, almost hull down, on the horizon, but the Japanese were obviously gaining, and at 4.30 Admiral Togo altered back two points to port to his original courses E.S.E. As the Russians shortly before this appear to have altered to starboard to head for Shantung the two fleets began to converge.20 By 5.0 the range was estimated at under 10,000 metres (10,900 yards), but still neither side opened fire. They continued to close, and it was plain a renewal of the action was imminent.

It was now but two hours to sunset, and the position which Captain Shimamura had persuaded his chief to try for had not been attained. In spite of the lagging of the enemy’s rear ships they were still going 14 knots, or about a couple of knots above Admiral Togo’s estimate, and he was barely abreast of the Russian line. Clearly, if another action was to be fought before dark, it was useless to carry on as he was. Something must be done at once. It was now, therefore, that Admiral Togo abandoned the idea of getting ahead, and determined to act on his own view. The lagging of the Poltava, which was falling further and further astern, gave at least an opening. Accordingly, he ordered the men back to quarters. The range was now down to about 8,000 metres (8,800 yards) and at 5.35 the Poltava opened fire. The Mikasa replied, and one by one the rest took it up, concentrating on the isolated rear ship, while the Russian cruisers, which after the first action had drawn within semaphore range of their battle division, opened out again.

The results of the Japanese concentration were far from good. The Poltava maintained her fire with spirit and carried on uninjured, while the Mikasa, not having reached ahead as the Admiral had intended, found herself the point of concentration of the whole Russian Squadron. In self-defence she had to shift her fire to the Tsesarevich. For a while she was unsupported, and was almost immediately hit under the fore-bridge below the water line, but fortunately the shot failed to penetrate her 7-inch armour.²¹ Five minutes later (5.45) her next astern, the Shikishima, who had just opened fire, had a burst in one of her fore barbette guns which entirely disabled it, and in another 10 minutes the hydraulic gear of one of her after 12-inch broke down and could not be repaired for a quarter of an hour. Thus for the time her heavy gun power was reduced by a half, and she could give but little help to the flagship.

By this time the Russians had turned away a little to the eastward,22 and the Mikasa, finding the range of the Tsesarevich had increased, ceased fire. Then, in a further effort to close. Admiral Togo altered to east-by-south and re-opened on the Retvizan, the second ship in the Russian line. But since the Japanese were still on the starboard quarter of the enemy such turns towards them only emphasised the tactical weakness of Admiral Togo’s position, and exposed him to a more telling concentration. Nor could he get adequate support from the ships in his wake. All except the Fuji were occupied with the Russian rear, and consequently the Mikasa began to suffer. Just before 6.0 she was hit again—this time very severely. A heavy shell struck the starboard gun in her after turret just as it was being fired, causing it to burst. The muzzle, as far as the thrust collar, was flung into the sea. Almost simultaneously another shell appears to have struck the turret and completely disabled it. The whole of both gun crews fell down senseless with the fumes. Prince Fushimi, who was the turret-commander, together with the captain of the damaged gun and 15 petty officers and men were wounded, and the turret itself swung round to starboard away from the enemy and there jammed immovably. The wreckage fouled the other gun so that it could not be run in or out or elevated. Repairs were impossible, and the captain later on ordered all the ammunition to be carried forward to supply the fore turret.

Meanwhile Admiral Dewa had come up, and at 5.45 after disposing his three unarmoured cruisers out of danger on his starboard quarter he brought the Yakumo into the wake of the Nisshin and joined in the concentration on the Poltava. To her the three armoured cruisers confined their attention while the battleships gradually shifted their turret fire forward but still apparently kept their 6-inch on the isolated ship.

The action was now very furious at ranges that varied from 9,000 to 8,000 metres (9,800 to 8,800 yards), but the effect on either side was small and the Russians held on regardless of the Poltava’s plight. “The cannonade was fierce,” says Admiral Kataoka, “but we could not get near enough to achieve much result.”

The Russians began to hope they might still get away. “Our gunlayers,” says Commander Semenov, “were not shooting worse than the Japanese. It even appeared to me as if in the long run our fire was the more steady and was corrected better. I thought of the possibility of the battle being renewed on the morrow. If it continued like this we should have the advantage inasmuch as we were saving ammunition.” Other Russians, however, took the opposite view, and seem to have been astonished at the superiority of the Japanese gunnery,23 a view which was emphasised about 6 o’clock by both the Peresvyet’s topmasts being shot away in the sight of both fleets. Russian officers state that their range-finders were useless for the ranges at which the action was being fought, but the Japanese were equally dissatisfied with the working of their fire-control. It was indeed the hurry of their fire that brought them their next misfortune. About 6.10 the Asahi had bursts, similar to that of the Shikishima, in both guns of her after turret. What had happened was not understood at the time, but the experts finally put the trouble down to the effect of overheated guns quickening the combustion of the charge. A few more rounds were fired from the damaged guns and then the turret was silent for the rest of the action.²⁴

At this critical time then the Japanese 12-inch armament was reduced by almost a third. Out of the 16 guns in the battleship turrets not less than five were out of action. Still, owing to the tactical defects of Admiral Togo’s position he was unable to alter course so as to close more quickly and bring his 6-inch into effective action. He was still too far astern, but at the same time he was steadily gaining, and by 6.30 he managed to get the range of the third Russian ship down to a little over 7,000 metres (7,700 yards). “Then,” says his flag captain, “thinking there would be no chance of a close action I opened fire with my 12-pounders at maximum elevation, concentrating on the third ship,” while the fore turret was kept on the Tzesarevich. But the Mikasa still received very little support. The Asahi for some reason continued on the Poltava at over 9,000 metres (9,800 yards), and since the accident was using her 6-inch guns. The Fuji was on the third and fourth ships; while the Shikishima, also with her 6-inch in action, was on one of the rear ships.

The consequence was that the Mikasa had to bear the hostile concentration almost unaided and she continued to suffer seriously. Since 6 o’clock she had been hit eight times, losing a 12-pounder, two officers killed, and six men wounded. At half past six came another severe blow. A 6-inch shell burst on the semaphore, killing a lieutenant and a chief yeoman of signals, and wounding the captain, two lieutenant-commanders, two junior officers and 14 men. It was followed immediately by two 12-inch, one of which burst on the middle deck, while the other penetrated it and burst on the lower one, tearing a large hole on the starboard side two feet above water and severely wounding 11 men.

Where the shots came from is not known, but apparently except for the Mikasa’s fore turret, neither the Tsesarevich nor the Retvizan, her second astern, was being fired at. But now the Asahi turned her forward 12-inch on the Russian flagship and the luck changed. In a few minutes came the decisive shot of the action. For some time the Japanese fire control had been improving and the Russians were beginning to lose station. Far in the rear the Poltava was completely isolated. Her fire was dying away, no smoke was coming from her funnels and she seemed almost disabled. The three armoured cruisers were still upon her; the Yakumo had even sheered out of the line to close on her starboard quarter, and Admiral Dewa was calling up his three other cruisers to help finish her off. Still the disarrangement of the enemy’s line was the only marked result of the storm of fire the Japanese were pouring in from their secondary armament. The Russians as a whole were keeping their speed well, nor was there any marked diminution of their fire. About 6.40 however, the Tzesarevich was seen suddenly to swerve to port with a heavy list. For a moment it looked as if she were about to sink, but she carried on turning continually till she made a complete circle, and charged through her own line ahead of the Sevastopol.

Admiral Vitgeft was dead. A 12-inch shell had struck the foot of the mainmast, and in bursting had killed him and one of his Staff, as they stood near the conning tower, as well as 15 men. To make matters worse, it severely wounded the Chief of the Staff and the Flag Captain, both being rendered senseless. Then another struck under the roof of the conning tower, broke into two parts, and the base portion breaking up inside, killed or stunned every officer and man stationed there.25 At the same time, for some undetermined reason, the helm was forced hard a-starboard, where it remained fixed. It was this that caused her to break through her own line, and being quite out of control she had to stop.

The result was complete confusion. The meaning of the flagship’s turn was not at first understood by the rest of the ships. The Retvizan, her second astern, began to follow her round, till it was seen the injured ship was not under control. Then her captain came promptly to a decision of his own. As the Russian advance was arrested the Japanese had forged ahead, and Admiral Togo was leading round to port and concentrating upon the Sevastopol and Peresvyet as they passed in front of the flagship a converging fire of his whole line. To save her as these two ships drew clear the Retvizan turned to starboard and boldly pushed forward about E.S.E. to draw the punishment on herself. So much is certain, but what the other ships did is difficult to determine. In the smoke and excitement observers confused the identity of ships, and the accounts differ materially. The Poltava made little use of the opportunity to recover her lost ground, but after holding on a few minutes turned away like the rest. One of the other three ships, probably the Pobyeda, moved out of the mass to support the Retvizan26 In any case the tactical result of the movement is clear. It saved the Tzesarevich, and drew the whole fire of the Japanese line.

We have already seen how, so soon as Admiral Togo realised what had happened and saw the enemy’s line in confusion, he had begun to circle to port to envelop the mass. But as the two Russian ships drew out to close on him, he concentrated on them one after the other. Still, they came on in so threatening a style that he felt compelled to give up his circling movement for the time and sheer off a bit to starboard. The range was getting down to his minimum, and there was danger from torpedo and, if not, of ramming. In the rear of his line the diminished range was telling in favour of the Russians, and it was at this time the Nisshin received her most serious punishment. At 7.0 a shell burst on the after bridge, killing her Engineer Commander, two other officers, and eight petty officers and men. So violent was the explosion that bridge and chart-house were destroyed, all the charts disappeared, and of nine of the killed not a fragment was ever seen again.

What the two Russian ships suffered we do not know for certain. According to the Retvizan the damage was slight, and it was certainly not enough to put either of them out of action. The Retvizan indeed continued to come on so boldly that it was thought she meant to ram; and this seems actually to have been her captain’s intention. According to the best Russian account, he had got within 17 cables. According to another it was 15 cables, and he could have rammed in five minutes.27 Though up to this time it is said she had received very few hits, and had still one turret and two 6-inch in action, she was found to be settling from a leak, and he decided to try. The moment looked favourable, for the Mikasa was not firing, and appeared to be silenced. According to the Mikasa’s account, she had actually ceased fire. The whole line was now concentrated on the Retvizan, so that she was completely hidden in smoke and spray. Accurate laying was impossible, and the Mikasa’s captain says he ceased fire till he could see something to lay on. It would almost look as though the volume of the Japanese secondary fire, so far from doing decisive damage, afforded the enemy’s ship protection by making effective use of the primary armament impossible. But at last a 12-inch shell got home. It was seen to strike her amidships. As it burst she was enveloped in black smoke, and when it cleared she was seen turning away to port, though still without sign of vital injury. The fact was that just as the captain of the Retivzan had decided to ram a fragment of shell struck him, causing such unbearable pain that he was no longer able to carry on, and he gave the word to follow the squadron.²⁸

Now if ever was Admiral Togo’s time to press things home to an issue. The Tzesarevich after being stopped for 20 minutes was just getting under way. The bulk of the squadron was moving off north-west and the two protecting ships were making away to rejoin. Directly the Retvizan turned Admiral Togo altered course to port to resume his circling movement, but only about a point, as though unwilling to bring the range down below his minimum. Shortly afterwards he altered another point and so continued gradually circling more and more to port till at 7.30 he was steaming about north-north-west. As all this time the enemy was making away about north-west the range began to increase. Thus instead of pressing to the utmost the advantage he had gained he was content to continue the action under conditions which constantly decreased the chance of a decisive victory.

Though the bold move of the two Russian battleships had afforded the Tzesarevich a respite to recover herself, it had failed to restore the line of battle. The reason was that no one quite knew who was in command. As soon as possible after the flagship’s disaster she had signalled, “Admiral transfers the command.” Prince Uktomski in the Peresvyet was second in command and as soon as he saw the signal he made “Follow me,” intending apparently to re-form the line to cover the flagship. But as both his top-masts had been shot away the signal had to be made from the bridge rails and it was not properly seen. His movement consequently was not understood, and it only increased the confusion.

By this time the Retvizan had come back and was taking the lead as second ship, heading about north-west, and the Tzesarevich, steering as best she could with her engines, was following her. The rest of the ships conformed, but in no sort of order. “They were,” say the Japanese, “a mere rabble, one ship overtaking another,” and all firing wildly with their after guns.

As for the Russian cruisers their precise movements cannot be determined. When last heard of they were somewhat ahead of the battle line on its disengaged side, while the destroyers were beyond and ahead of the cruisers. When the battle division was thrown into confusion Admiral Reitzenstein appears to have begun to lead his cruisers back, but the Japanese enveloping movement must soon have brought them into a position that was dangerously exposed. In any case, when the Retvizan gave up her attempt to ram, and the Japanese resumed the circling movement, Admiral Reitzenstein turned and began to lead his division to the westward to get it on the disengaged side of his own battle squadron.29

In the Japanese fleet the movement of the enemy’s cruisers was variously interpreted. To Rear-Admiral Togo it appeared to threaten an attack on himself. He had fallen some 14 or 15 miles astern of the battle division, having been held back since 4.0 by a break-down of the Suma’s engines. It was not till 6.0 that she had completed her repairs and even then it was found she could do no more than 11 knots. As by this time the Idzumi, who had parted company from the Fifth Division at 4.40, was coming up to join him, he determined to leave the Suma behind and telegraphed at 6.25 to Admiral Yamada for permission for her to join the Fifth Division, and with his other three ships at high speed held on to take part in the action of which till now he had been only a spectator. He gives a graphic picture of the scene as he approached. The enemy’s confusion at this time he describes as “beyond words.” With Admiral Yamada to the northward and the Third Division following the First Division round they were nearly surrounded by a ring of fire, and the flotillas were “circling about them like bees” threatening to rush in and attack at any opportunity. “It was,” he says, “a most magnificent spectacle.” Though still far away from the battle division he was fast closing on the Russian cruisers and the Suma, who was now well on her way to the northward, was so close that it looked as if the retiring enemy were going to cross ahead and cut her off from the Fifth Division. She consequently turned back and, as we shall see, Rear-Admiral Togo had to devote himself to her protection, and continue a spectator of the main action.

To the Asama the affair had a different aspect. She had been pushing on at high speed to fall in astern of the battle line; but at 6.24, she says, she saw the 4th destroyer division rush up to cross her bows, as though to attack the isolated Poltava. Twenty minutes later she saw the Tsesarevich’s sudden turn to port. Then she was aware that Admiral Togo was also turning to port, and, realising that it was now impossible to join him, she appears to have thought that the best course open to her was to endeavour to support the destroyers which had crossed her to attack the Poltava. In any case, shortly before 7.0 she turned north-east and made away to engage the isolated ship. This course she held for about 15 minutes, when the Japanese destroyers turned away sharply to port and abandoned their attempt. Apparently they had seen the Russian cruisers coming back, and in a minute or two the Asama also saw them “come back and take up a position nearly north of their battleships.”30 Thereupon she altered to north by east and tried a shot with her 8-inch. The range was 9,000 metres (9,800 yards) and it fell short. The Russian cruisers were then seen to begin circling round ahead of the battleships as though to attack her, and the Poltava opened fire, which she returned. The range, however, was still too great, but by 7.25 it was down to 7,500 metres, (8,200 yards) and she was hotly engaged both with the cruisers and the battleship.³¹

In this unequal contest she was not unsupported. To the eastward, on the other side of the field, Admiral Dewa had given his attention to the cruisers as soon as they turned, and to the northward on the Asama’s port bow Admiral Yamada was coming up from the westward as fast as his slow ships would permit. He had reached within 11,000 metres (12,000 yards) of the enemy and, taking advantage of the slight swell to get the necessary elevation, he began to fire with his 12.5 guns. The effect of his appearance was to head off the Russian cruisers to the southward, while their battleships also altered more to port on a course which was at first opposite to his own. The range, therefore, rapidly decreased and he became hotly engaged with the battleships. By this time, however, he had reached right ahead of the Asama, and about 7.30 she turned 16 points to port to keep clear. For some minutes she endeavoured to engage the cruisers on her port side, till suddenly she was aware that the Russian battleships, as Admiral Yamada apparently headed them off, were coming straight for her. The next moment the Poltava and Peresvyet, both of whom were supposed to be silenced, opened on her and she found herself in a very critical position. “The shells were all round us,” says her Captain, “so that we were at death’s door.” But by turning away to the westward and using her utmost speed, she got off without injury, under cover of the growing darkness and the fire of the Fifth Division.

Admiral Yamada had soon closed to 6,000 metres (6,600 yards) and was very hotly engaged with every nature of gun, both with the battleships and some of the cruisers. He claimed several hits, one of which we know was on the Diana, but beyond the Chinyen being hulled twice, he himself suffered no damage. Indeed his well-timed action lasted but a few minutes. At 7.45 he found himself, like Admiral Dewa in the morning, compelled to desist by the movements which, as will be seen directly, the first division was making, and he turned back to port. For a time he too continued to engage on his port side, but on his new course the range rapidly increased and about 8.0 the darkness caused him to cease fire.

By this time the Askold was running off far to the southward, followed by the Novik and some of the destroyers, while the Pallada and Diana had turned back to join the battleships. What had happened was this. So soon as Admiral Reitzenstein had come back and taken a position on the north or disengaged side of the battleships the confusion of their movements told him the fleet was without a commander. No flag but his own was to be seen, and, believing he must be the senior officer present, he endeavoured to take the lead in the Askold. Putting on full speed he left his other cruisers and placed himself ahead of the Retvizan, which was now the leading battleship. Then signalling “Keep in my wake,” he turned to port as though once more to lead the fleet past the Japanese rear and on its true course again, thus making “the circling movement,” which was observed from the Asama. “Seeing that the enemy,” he says in his report, “was endeavouring to surround our squadron, which at this moment was retreating and pouring in a withering fire upon the enemy’s battleships with its stern guns, I decided to break through the weakest spot in the enemy’s line without loss of time.” The weakest spot in the circle which the various Japanese divisions were forming was, of course, where the Sixth Division was coming up after the Third. For this point then he made. But as Prince Uktomski was actually in command no one paid any attention except his own cruisers.32 They attempted to follow his lead, believing that as the battleships made no move the signal was addressed to themselves. But not having the Askold’s speed they would not attempt to follow her round the front of the battleships. The Diana and Pallada, therefore, adopted the hazardous measure of forcing their way through the confusion of the rear. It was done successfully, but with so much delay that by the time they emerged the Askold was far to the southward and going at very high speed. To overtake her was obviously impossible, and in despair they turned sharp to .starboard to follow the battleships.

By this time Admiral Yamada was making off to the north-westward, and to the Russians he seemed to be clearing out of their way. They believed they had beaten him off, but in fact, as we have seen, he was merely continuing the movement which he says he made to avoid interfering with the Commander-in-Chief.

Admiral Togo’s movements at this time—when nothing but a close pressed attack seemed wanting to complete the business of the enemy—were such as to persuade the Russians that he too had had enough. So far from closing to make most of the last of the light he had continued to permit the range constantly to increase, and they believed he had suffered too severely to venture near them. But the cause was undoubtedly the fear of a torpedo attack.

When we last saw him his enveloping movement had brought his head about N.N.W. This was at 7.30. Holding that course for about 10 minutes he suddenly found some of the enemy’s destroyers on his port bow, and although the mass of the enemy were turning westward as though to avoid Admiral Yamada, he could not in face of the new danger continue his circling movement to close them. In ten minutes, however (7.40), the destroyers were seen to be dashing off after their battleships. Thereupon Admiral Togo signalled for two points together to port in order to diminish the range, and at the same time apparently he ordered his own destroyers to attack those of the enemy. Still the situation was dangerous, and in 4 minutes the Admiral turned into line ahead again N.N.W., “because,” says the Captain of the Mikasa, “we were getting too close to the destroyers.” It was necessary to clear them away before he could close further and he now signalled to Admiral Dewa “Attack destroyers.” Admiral Dewa thereupon called his unarmoured cruisers to fall into line and turned to the westward to do what was wanted. In five minutes more, however, it could be seen that the Novik was leading off the destroyers after the Askold. The danger had passed and Admiral Togo in one last effort to close before darkness at last turned four points together to port. This brought his course nearly west and almost straight for the Fifth Division, but, as we have seen, Admiral Yamada had promptly turned away to avoid interfering, and was now clearing off to the north-westward. At the same time Admiral Dewa realised that, although there was no need for him to carry on with his last order, there was other pressing work for him to do. He saw the Askold leading off to the southward and to him it appeared that she was making for the spot where the Yaeyama had collected the flotillas for the night attack and he went away at full speed to save them.33

But it was already too late to do any good. The sun had been down some time, and the range had increased so much that there was little hope of accurate laying in the failing light. In ten minutes, therefore, the Admiral decided to abandon the battle, and at 7.55 he turned into line ahead again and ordered a signal for all flotillas to attack. For him there was no more to do. Still for 20 minutes longer he held on as he was N.W., nor was it till about 8.15 that turning back in a wide circle he made away to leave the field clear for the destroyers. Admiral Yamada having taken in the signal to the flotilla also realised that the action was at an end and went off to the northward for his assigned duty of protecting the Dalny area. So the main action ended. “Most unfortunately,” Admiral Togo wrote in his report, “the sun set completely before the battle was over, preventing us from distinguishing friend from foe and from destroying the enemy as we could have done in the daylight. We abandoned the battle to the flotilla and followed the courses laid down in the programme.”

The delays of the morning had told their tale. The failure of the minefield, which had led to so much time being lost in commencing an attack, and the subsequent miscalculations of the first action could not be entirely recovered. Still for the moment at least he had headed off the bulk of the enemy; his overwhelming flotilla remained fresh against a crippled and demoralised fleet, and in the dark it was assumed to be a far more effective weapon than a battle squadron. Above all, ammunition must be husbanded for the morrow. That the possibility of another action next day was in his mind is clear from the order to follow the courses laid down in the programme. What the programme was is not quite clear. The only one we have is that which he drew up on July 1st in view of the enemy’s breaking away. Under this the duty of the Fifth or Reserve Division, as has been said, was to stand by the base. For the other three divisions two alternative dispositions were provided. If the enemy got away unseen they were to steer for certain stations lying on a line that ran 60 miles westward from Ross Island (south-west of the original Hakko Base). Outermost was to lie the Third Division. Then at an interval of 20 miles came the Sixth Division with the Nisshin, Kasuga, and Yaeyama, and inmost the four battleships. The other alternative was expressed thus:—“If the enemy, although lost sight of, are thought to be still north of Shantung Promontory, all ships will assemble at Position 769 (25 miles east of the promontory) and the Third and Sixth Divisions will stretch a line of search north-west, at right angles to the line between P. and H.”34 Now when at about 8.15 Admiral Togo broke off the action and turned back 16 points to leave the field clear for the flotilla he had reached a point 37 miles due north of Shantung Promontory. He, therefore, knew the enemy were still to the north of it, and by the programme it was a case for the Shantung position. Yet he made, he says, not for that position, but for a point in lat. 350 30′ and long. 124° 11′, that is, a position 90 miles almost due west of Hakko and nearly 30 miles north of the Ross Island line.

An explanation is to be found in the last episode of the battle. Though the bulk of the fleet had apparently been headed off north of Shantung two cruisers were escaping to the southward, and there was no knowing how many other ships might follow their example in the dark. One of the escaping ships was, as we have seen, the Askold. The other was the Novik, with five of the destroyers in company. Admiral Dewa, it will be remembered, fearing their objective was the Yaeyama and the massed flotilla, was now coming south at full speed to the rescue. By 8.0, when Admirals Togo and Yamada were about to leave the field, both the Askold and Novik, at ranges of about five miles, had begun firing at the isolated Suma, who was crossing their track to get back to the Sixth Division. Admiral Dewa, at a somewhat longer range, then opened on them to try to draw their fire.35 Rear-Admiral Togo, who on his easterly course had crossed ahead of the Russian cruisers, now saw something more drastic must be done to save his consort, and he boldly turned round and tried to run in between the Suma and her pursuers. The Suma by zigzagging had prevented the Russians getting the range, and was eventually able to fall in astern of her Admiral uninjured. He was now hotly engaged with both the Russian cruisers. They had swerved to starboard a bit when they saw his move, but were now turning to port again and threatening to cross his T. To parry the move he turned at 8.20 sharply to port, and presenting his broadside engaged on a parallel course about S.S.E.

Since Admiral Reitzenstein first started his movement the Askold had been hit again and again. She had lost one officer and 12 men killed and about 50 wounded, two of her four funnels were gone, her upper works were wrecked, her after barbette destroyed, and she had two large holes on the waterline. Yet at the cost of a heavy consumption of coal she kept her speed, and rapidly ran away from her adversaries. The Novik, also severely damaged, came on behind her very fast, and passed so close to Rear-Admiral Togo’s cruisers that about 8.50 they were forced to turn away to the eastward for fear of torpedoes. A quarter of an hour earlier (8.25) Admiral Dewa also gave up. The Yaeyama and the flotilla were safe, and in the last of the twilight he could see the Russian destroyers coming on after the Novik. His position was, therefore, too perilous, and he turned and ran to the eastward. Rear-Admiral Togo, however, did not abandon the pursuit. The enemy were just in sight, but were obviously gaining, and by 9.15 they had entirely disappeared. Still the Rear-Admiral would not own himself beaten, and after sending away the Suma to get her engines overhauled at the base, he held on in chase through the night, hoping for better luck in the morning.

So ended the first fleet action of the war—without any definite decision. On neither side were the losses heavy. The Japanese returned 11 officers and 59 ratings killed and 14 officers and 142 ratings wounded. The Russian return was 8 officers and 66 ratings killed and 35 officers and 359 ratings wounded. The Mikasa suffered the most heavily by far with a total loss in officers and men of 125 killed and wounded. The Asahi had only two wounded, and the Fuji was without damage or loss of any kind. Next to the flagship comes the Nisshin, with a total loss of 32. Amongst the Russians the losses were more evenly distributed, the Peresvyet coming highest with a total of 90. The Retvizan lost only 49, and the Tzesarevich 63.36

To such losses the expenditure of ammunition appears out of all proportion, especially seeing how large it was from the secondary armament. From the primary armament of the Japanese (12 5 to 8-inch) nearly 1,200 rounds were fired, and from the secondary (6-inch to 12 pounders) over 6,000.³⁷ Yet not a single ship had been taken, not a single ship had been even rendered incapable of proceeding under her own steam, and, as always happens in such cases, a feeling of dissatisfaction arose in the Japanese fleet. This was particularly strong amongst the rear ships, which had not felt the severity of the Russian fire. To them it seemed that the Admiral had shown excessive caution in his conduct of the action. It was complained that he should have pressed in to decisive range, but at what point of the engagement is not clear. There was, however, a definite idea that he might at least have cut off the two rear ships, presumably about 4 o’clock, when they had fallen astern. Half an hour it was urged would have sufficed to destroy them, and that would have left time enough to pursue and beat the remaining four—even if Admiral Vitgeft had left them to their fate.

British opinion with its rich experience will probably see in such views the vicious sentiment which spoiled so many of our own actions—the tendency to rank trophies above the strategical object of a battle. Had Admiral Togo acted on the lines suggested the strategical object would at least have been gravely risked. Without the two rear ships the Russians could do over 14 knots and the Japanese had only one knot more. A renewal of contact could not have been ensured before dark, and not only would the four most powerful Russian ships have had a good chance of getting through to Vladivostok, but they might have dealt Admiral Kamimura a serious blow on the way. Such risks were not for the Japanese—the general situation forbade them to be taken. There can be little doubt that in resisting the temptation and keeping the strategical end resolutely in view Admiral Togo and his advisers showed the highest warlike character. Whether or not he would have been well advised to have pressed the enemy more closely when the strategical end was secured is another matter. But in passing judgment it is well to remember that the Admiral had to decide the matter in a ship that had lost half her heavy guns, and for a squadron reduced in offensive power by a third, and that he had to decide it in the full consciousness that on the just estimation of the risk hung the issue of the war. It was not only a naval question, but one in which was involved the whole of the operations ashore. Had he felt behind him the adequate reserves which made the “fleet in sight” maxim for us an almost immutable law, his decision would be hard to defend, but for him no such reserves existed.

Nor was this all that permanently cramped his hand. Quite as disturbing was the moral factor of public opinion at home. Dominating his every action there was the spirit of an impressionable and over-sanguine people that was not to be trusted if any substantial part of the enemy’s fleet was permitted to escape into the Sea of Japan. Throughout the war it had been a cause of deflection and since the last Vladivostok raid it had become a consideration of the most serious kind. To make sure that nothing should occur to intensify it was an object of the greatest moment and to this object the Admiral had to devote himself. The situation was still very uncertain. Though headed off the enemy were apparently quite equal to renewing the action; their courses during the night could not be foreseen, and no one could tell what the morrow would bring.

Section IV.—The Flotilla Attack.

When Admiral Togo made the signal for the flotilla to attack there were in company with the fleet five divisions of destroyers, numbering 18 units, and eight of torpedo-boats, numbering 29; or close on 50 all told. To oppose them the Russians had no more than four destroyers, the other four having gone off with the Novik. The greater part of the Japanese flotilla was to the southward of the field of battle. Of the first three destroyer divisions which should have been with the battle squadron only the 3rd was in its place. The 1st was some distance astern with the 14th torpedo-boat division, which also formed part of the battle squadron flotilla. The 2nd, still further astern, had been trying to get up in response to the Commander-in-Chief’s signal made before the action began, but at sunset finding it was not gaining, and that the enemy were going off to the north-west, it had cut the corner and was following them on their port side. The 5th division was to starboard of the 2nd and some miles to the eastward of the main body of the torpedo-boats, while the 4th, which it will be remembered had taken a line of its own under the protection of the Asama, was now acting independently to the westward.

For daylight attacks, as we have seen, all flotilla divisions were grouped with the fleet divisions and there was a further provision for their acting in pairs, but for the night no special organisation had been enjoined and each division acted independently. All, however, or nearly all, turned at once to the north-westward with the general idea of getting ahead of the enemy while the light lasted and of then turning back to make their attacks on the reverse course. The 4th destroyer division, owing to the line it had taken, when driven off by the Russian cruisers, had secured a position 5 miles ahead shortly after 8.0. It turned to attack at 8.20, but there was still too much light, and twice it was repelled by gun-fire it could not face. Shortly before 9.0 it tried again, but by that hour it was quite dark and for some time it was unable to find the enemy.

The conditions of the night were not too unfavourable for attack. There was, it is true, sufficient swell to affect the speed of the flotilla but otherwise its chances were good. There was no moon, but the sky was not overcast; the stars showed faintly through fleecy clouds and it was consequently, we are told, “not very dark.” There was light enough for trained eyes to make out a big ship dimly at a mile and a half and a destroyer at about 1,000 metres (1,100 yards).38 It was, therefore, not too difficult for the Japanese flotilla to pick up the enemy nor too easy for the Russians to detect their approach.

For the Japanese the chances of getting contact in the dark were increased by the fact that, owing to differences in speed and constant manœuvring to avoid being hit, the Russian Squadron soon began to straggle and cover a wide area, while one ship took a line of her own from the first. This was the Diana. The squadron was making straight for Port Arthur, and as soon as her captain realised that this meant a return to the forbidden base he decided to obey the order of the Tsar and endeavour to reach Vladivostok. But it was no easy matter. To the eastward the Japanese battle squadron could still be made out, to the north-east were the cruisers of the Fifth Division, and to the southward a number of other cruisers, while to the south-east—the course she wished to take—was the flotilla coming on in a cloud. Nevertheless, with remarkable boldness, her captain decided to select this point for his attempt to break through. It was argued that such a move would come as a complete surprise, and if the Diana did not fire or use her search lights the Japanese would have difficulty in deciding her identity in time to get in a shot. Accordingly, about 9.0, she turned back, and the Grozovoi, one of the four remaining destroyers, followed her lead. Almost immediately she seems to have been attacked by the 14th torpedo-boat division. Only two boats got in their shots, and although each discharged two torpedoes all of them missed.39 At 9.15 she was met by a single boat of the 20th division, which had already got scattered. There were three shots, but the Diana zigzagged, and none took effect. About the same time she was sighted by a stray boat of 6th division. Two torpedoes were fired—one, it is stated, as close as 300 metres, but again both were avoided, and the Diana carried on. According to her own account similar attacks continued till 10.15, and in this she is confirmed by the Grozovoi, which was in company. It is, however, impossible to trace these later attacks in the Japanese reports. One of her officers says that he saw “19 shapes” which were taken to be destroyers, but by using helm with judgment she eluded 13. Only 6 saw her, she says. No more than 8 torpedoes were fired at her. By the Japanese reports it also appears that 8 were fired, but all of them in the half-hour between 8.45 and 9.15. After that, although she may have been sighted once or twice, no Japanese boat records attacking her.⁴⁰

Meanwhile the 4th destroyer division, which had been foiled in the opening attempt, had picked up the enemy again, and was attacking hotly under a heavy fire. There were now only three boats in company, as one of them had been left behind with a damaged bilge pump. The first boat says she lost her chance with the leading ship, which was the Retvizan, and fired a long range torpedo at the second at a range 200 or 300 metres, being all the time under fire. Then she turned, and firing her after tube at the same ship to starboard made off to the south-west. The second took the leading ship with both tubes at 1,000 metres, and then lost her leader from having to avoid a collision with her next astern. This boat claims to have advanced to within 600 metres through a heavy fire. From that distance she discharged a short range torpedo from her fore tube, but was immediately hit by a 12-pounder shell, which disabled one of her boilers, and for a time she could do no more. After making good her damage, however, she proceeded alone north-west, met and fought a Russian destroyer, and carried on in pursuit.

After this attack of the 4th division the Russians seem to have been left alone for a time to continue their retreat undisturbed. In spite of their firing, which must have revealed their position, no other boats were able to get contact for some 20 minutes. This was apparently due to the Russians having increased speed and altered to starboard. These elusive movements seem to have been made independently, with the result that the squadron, which had not succeeded in resuming any definite formation, became further broken up. The Tzesarevich, unable to keep up, found herself quite alone. To the officers in charge, their inability to follow the Admiral gave an excellent excuse for not carrying on with his move. The retreat was widely resented in the fleet, and after a short consultation they decided to proceed no further towards Port Arthur, as the ship was in no condition “to encounter the enemy’s main body.” Better, it was thought, to endeavour to reach Vladivostok in accordance with the Tzar’s order, and apparently about 9.30 she too turned and proceeded slowly south.41

The new course brought her at once in contact with the rearmost groups of the enemy’s flotilla. Almost immediately she encountered one of the scattered 20th torpedo-boat division, which at 9.50 gave her both tubes at 400 metres, without effect. She did not fire, but must have altered course to evade the attack, for at 10.0 she was found heading N.N.W. by another boat of the same division. This time she opened fire, and turning again south put on full speed, and so once more came off scot free. Similar attacks followed, and were avoided by similar tactics. She reported that she had nine torpedoes fired at her, all of which missed. But the tactics she adopted, involving as they did constant turns away from her true course and spells of full speed, had told their tale. Owing to the damage to her funnels the coal consumption was found to be so enormous that by midnight all thought of being able to reach Vladivostok had to be abandoned. Her only chance seemed to be to make the best of her way to the neutral port of Kyau-chau, and thither her course was laid.

As for the bulk of the squadron, it was still holding on in the general direction of Port Arthur, but with constant deviations to avoid the swarms of torpedo craft that were hunting it. Thus harried it seems to have gradually broken into three groups. Ahead was the Retvizan with apparently one of the three destroyers that had remained with the squadron; not far away came the Poltava and Pallada; and last a group of the battleships Pobyeda, Peresvyet and Sevastopol. With them was one destroyer; the third, Vuinoslivi, was away to the westward. Such at least is the impression we get from the various flotilla reports. Attacks on such groups either by destroyers or torpedo boats are noted about every quarter of an hour from 9.30 to 12.30. The boats were as a rule seen and fired upon, though no searchlights were used, and the destroyer Asigiri, of the 4th division, which had been hit in the first attack, was entirely disabled by a 6-inch shell, apparently from the Pallada.42 This, she says, occurred about 30 miles S.E. of Round Island, and after 10.0 o’clock. About 11.0 the 5th destroyer division encountered a battleship and a destroyer 19 miles S.S.W. of the Island, and shortly before 12.0 turning S.E. they attacked two other ships. From midnight to 12.30 the 10th torpedo-boat division was attacking two battleships “of the Tzesarevich and Retvizan class,” which they first sighted 3 miles S.E. of Encounter Rock (probably Poltava and Retvizan). At 12.30 an isolated destroyer of the 4th division sighted a ship like the Retvizan with two other battleships. She fired one tube at the first, but could not get in the other, for “the enemy so repeatedly changed course that she could not get near them.”

After this there was a long period of quiescence. No attacks are reported by the Japanese for nearly two hours, except for an isolated torpedo-boat of the 21st division discharging under fire one tube against a battleship like the Pobyeda. All the boats which had been in action were during this time getting up their spare torpedoes and were making for Port Arthur waters to get ahead for a second attack, but they were scattered in all directions. There had indeed been no concerted action of any kind. Each division, and too often each individual boat, had taken its own line. There had been in consequence a good deal of interference; one boat of the 2nd torpedo division was actually torpedoed. There were two Russian destroyers near at the time, and the shot, we are told, “was thought to have been fired” by one of them, but it may equally well have come from another boat of her own division which was attacking independently at the same moment.43 The fact that no further attacks took place at this time seems to have been due to most of the boats being too far to the westward, owing partly to the continual tactical turns which the Russians made to the eastward, and partly to the Japanese heading direct for Port Arthur to secure an intercepting position. So much at least we gather from the Russian destroyer, the Vuinoslivi, which, as we have seen, was to the west of the squadron, and says she saw many groups of torpedo craft in that direction making to the northward.⁴⁴

If this was really their course they must have crossed the Russian line of retreat ahead and seen nothing. This would account for the fact that of all the boats that were preparing for a second attack only very few got contact with the enemy a second time. Some of these which had made for Encounter Rock did get their chance. As the Russians approached that point the attacks broke out again, but they were very partial, and were made by quite a small proportion of the whole flotilla. Between 3.20 and 4.20 one isolated ship, a group of two and another group composed of three, were attacked in the neighbourhood of the Rock by three or four destroyers and as many torpedo-boats belonging to six different divisions. The last shot was fired by a destroyer of the 5th division. At 4.15 she sighted the Pobyeda, Peresvyet, and Sevastopol about 13 miles S.E. of the Rock, and regardless of their fire ran in and discharged a torpedo at the last-named ship. Other boats must have been in the neighbourhood, but no further attack was made. The Kugero, senior boat of the same division, was certainly there with her spare torpedoes ready, but at 4.30, so her report says, “As it was nearly dawn she proceeded to Cap Island,” where she picked up her three consorts and went off to her blockade station. Most of the other divisions did the same, and probably for the same reason. Yet there was still plenty of time for a final attempt. For quite three hours more the last group of Russian ships at any rate was exposed. By 6.0 the Retvizan was safe inside the Gut, and the Poltava and Pallada had anchored under the batteries, but an hour later the Pobyeda, Peresvyet, and Sevastopol were seen coming in from the southward.45 By the Tactical Memorandum the flotilla had been told to seize every occasion for attacking in the daylight, and particularly at the end of an action, when the enemy’s secondary armament would be likely to have suffered. But after the hard night’s work it was perhaps too much to expect of human nerves and endurance.

Yet there was reason enough for one last effort. Not a single ship had been touched. The Russians, moreover, traversed successfully their own minefields, and the retreat was effected without loss of any kind. It was certainly a remarkable performance. The impression, produced by the Japanese accounts, is that the Russians were saved by the clever handling of their ships. There seems to have been no lack of boldness in the Japanese attacks. Again and again they claim to have advanced under fire to sufficiently close ranges, and the fact that they were so often seen and fired on goes to show the claim is just. For the Russians used no searchlights either of purpose or because they were all destroyed. Their guns and small arms they employed freely, but it would seem that this did little to help the Japanese in locating them, for a few turns were always enough to throw the assailants out. Yet every Japanese division was engaged. No less than 74 torpedoes were expended, 32 by the 17 destroyers and 42 by the 29 torpedo-boats that took part in the action, and not a single one got home.46

If the failure of the prolonged attack is to be attributed to any one cause beyond the defensive tactics of the enemy, it is to lack of combination that it must be set down. The Japanese practice of acting independently was as well marked as ever. Even where a division came across a group of the enemy, it would break up, each boat attacking a different ship. Not once was there an attempt to push home in a bewildering mass, nor was there any case of two divisions combining to attack from opposite sides as the Tactical Instructions had provided. Every Commanding Officer seemed to play for his own hand, and when the day broke every hand was empty.

On the other hand, no boat had been lost. One destroyer and one torpedo-boat were seriously damaged, but that was all. The latter, in tow of a sister boat, was found at dawn by Admiral Yamada near Round Island as he was making his way back to his station. He stopped to give assistance, and as the light made he too could see the three Russian battleships still south of Encounter Rock. He promptly turned W.S.W. to chase them, giving the alarm with his wireless as he went. But all in vain. Only the Fuso answered. Alone he could do nothing, and powerless to interfere he had to watch them enter the harbour in safety.⁴⁷

This second failure of a torpedo attack upon a fleet in the open has led in some quarters to the disparagement of the flotilla as a factor in battle. But such a conclusion must not be accepted too hastily. It is safer to regard the abortive result as, in the first place, a confirmation of the lesson that all recorded torpedo attacks have taught—namely, that peace results at target practice can never be hoped for under war conditions. Peace results lead to our expecting from the flotilla more than it can possibly give by its unaided efforts. The blinding effect of searchlights and shot splashes, and the inevitable excitement of noise, speed, and darkness, make accurate shooting very hard to obtain; while the normal difficulties of ascertaining the range at night are magnified in the case of a fleet in motion, owing to the practical impossibility of fixing the enemy’s course and speed, and particularly when he adopts the simple expedient of constantly changing both.

It is in this last consideration that the real lesson lies, and it is one that points to the continued value of the torpedo. As the range and accuracy of the weapon itself are continually increasing, and higher direct effects may be looked for with higher training and improved tactics, defensive evolutions by the squadron attacked will remain more necessary than ever. Unless suitable evolutions are made the attack, as practice advances, is more and more likely to succeed. But these necessary evolutions will tend as much as ever to produce, with the excitement of the moment, confusion and dispersal in the squadron and to expose it to a crushing attack from the enemy’s ships. The lesson then is the same as that of the first attack on the Port Arthur anchorage. To reap the fruits of flotilla action it must be followed up as promptly as possible by ship attack. The events of the war clearly indicate that as a preparation for ship attack flotilla action is invaluable, and so far as that experience goes it leaves us in little doubt as where to look for the true and highest function of the torpedo. The risk of a squadron following a flotilla in close support must always be considerable, but we may have to regard it as one of those risks which must be run if decisive work is to be achieved. It is a risk closely analogous to that which armies have to take as a normal condition if success in prolonging artillery preparation until the infantry attack is actually culminating. Indeed it is in this analogy with an ordinary condition of land warfare that we may perhaps seek the clearest light on the use of the squadron and flotilla in combination.

Brilliant and devoted as was the spirit in which the Japanese handled their flotillas, it is clear that they never rose to this higher grasp of its true functions, and until we see the torpedo used with boldness and sagacity in just co-ordination with the other arm it would be more than unwise to condemn it as ineffective.

1 Japanese time is given in the text throughout. It was 55 minutes ahead of Port Arthur time as used in the Russian accounts. The courses are magnetic as given in the Japanese reports. The Russians give true courses, but their method is not used except where expressly mentioned. The variation was 4 degrees west.

² For convenience Admiral Yamada’s command is spoken of as the Fifth Division, but it was actually that division less the Nisshin and Kasuga, which were in the battle line under Admiral Kataoka. The organisation of the battle squadron and attached cruiser divisions at this time was as follows:—

       BATTLE SQUADRON: Admiral Togo.

           Mikasa (flag), Asahi, Fuji, Shikishima (Rear-Admiral Nashiba), Kasuga, Nisshin (Vice-Admiral Kataoka), Yaeyama.

       THIRD DIVISION: Vice-Admiral Dewa.

           Yakumo (flag), Asama; Kasagi, Chitose, Takasago.

       FIFTH DIVISION: Rear-Admiral Yamada.

           Hashidate (flag), Matsushima, Itsukushima; Chinyen.

       SIXTH DIVISION: Rear-Admiral Togo.

           Akashi (flag), Suma, Akitsushima, Chiyoda, Idzumi.

³ Semenov Rasplata 209. According to Plan 4, C.I.D. History I., a minefield had been laid on August 5th about 5 or 6 miles south of the Cape. There were the old ones 2 miles from the shore.

⁴ Reports of Admirals Dewa, Kataoka, and Togo. There is some doubt whether it was on the signals of Admirals Dewa and Kataoka that Admiral Togo acted. His signal to Yaeyama is given at 11.42, Kataoka’s at 11.45, and Dewa’s at 11.53.

⁵ It is uncertain whether the expression “coming south” is always to be taken literally. The Chinese characters used to express the idea stand for “south” and “to come down.” The opposite character “north” appears in the dictionaries with the secondary meaning “to be defeated,” owing presumably to the fact that in early Chinese times all enemies came from the north; hence “to run away defeated” was “to run north.” Similarly, “coming south” in some contexts seems equivalent to “making an advance or offensive movement.”

⁶ The Akashi, Rear-Admiral Togo’s flag, recorded the position at 12.20 as 38° 33′ N., 121° 30′ E.

⁷ See note ante p. 375.

⁸ They were in fact W. by S. 13 miles according to bearings taken from Admiral Dewa’s flagship.

⁹ Japanese Confidential History, I., p. 521.

¹⁰ The principal evidence for the existence of these mines from the Russian side is as follows:—

In the Official Naval Journal Morskoi Sbornik of January 1908 four charts of the battle were published. They are stated to have been prepared by the Commision which was appointed to inquire into the fleet actions of the war. In these charts two minefields are shown, one close to the spot Admiral Dewa indicates, and the other a little to the eastward of it. The track of the Russian Squadron touches the southern limit of each minefield.

       Two minefields are also mentioned in an account published in the Novoe Vremya for August 19th, 1904. “At this time,” it says—that is when the action was commencing—“floating mines were noticed ahead of us and our squadron had to manœuvre to avoid them, which checked our speed and was prejudicial to accurate firing.” Then, again, just before the Japanese second turn to seawards together, it says, “our squadron came across a second row of mines, which obstacle was successfully negotiated.” (Attaché Rep. 1, Appendix V.)

       There is also the testimony of Commander Semenov, who says that at some time between the time of sighting and the time of opening fire the Novik stopped for 10 minutes flying the signal “Attention—floating mines” till all the squadron had passed her. Rasplata (English translation), p. 211.

       In the Ruskaya Starina, November 1907, is an account of the battle stated to be compiled from information furnished by senior officers who were present. It also mentions these minefields, but the author states that his informants did not entirely agree as to their existence. The Captain of the Retvizan went so far as to say, “I saw no mines. I affirm they were imaginary and in fact did not exist.”

       For the Russian belief that this was the cause of Admiral Togo’s movement, see Ruskaya Starina, November 1907.

¹¹ The Japanese give the ranges in metres. The equivalent in yards is here given to the nearest round number.

¹² Report of the Captain of the Kasuga.

¹³ The flotilla which he had with him was that assigned to him by the Tactical Memorandum, viz.:—Fourth and Fifth Destroyer Divisions and the 15th and 16th Torpedo Boat Divisions. The Third Destroyer Division, which had been with him from the first belonged to the Battle Division and had been detached to join it, when he first turned to attempt to attack the rear. Of the rest of the Battle Division Flotilla the First Destroyer Division and the 14th Torpedo Boat Division were already with the flag, and the Second Destroyer Division had been cut off to northward of the enemy.

¹⁴ See Reports of Captains of Chitose, Kasagi and Takasago. Admiral Dewa in his own report says the shells which reached him were aimed at the battle division as though they were “overs,” but from the relative positions of the opposed fleets as given in the track charls not only is this impossible but the first turn south-east would have tended to increase the danger had it existed.

¹⁵ It was made apparently through the Asahi, the Admiral’s next astern (as his own wireless was carried away) at 1.57.

¹⁶ Captain Pakenham’s Report, 12th February, 1905.

¹⁷ Japanese Confidential History, Volume VI., Appendix.

¹⁸ The Asama had received the Commander-in-Chief’s call at 9.45. In an hour she had finished coaling and steamed south-west to join the Third Division. At 2.50 she took in Admiral Dewa’s wireless order to meet him, 10 miles south of Encounter Rock. By 3.40, however, she learnt from a passing steamer that the fleets were engaged and firing being heard on the port bow she altered course south towards it. It was Admiral Dewa endeavouring to engage the enemy’s rear that she heard and at 4.0 she sighted him hull down S. by W. going southeastward. At 4.50 enemy were seen four points on her port bow, and a few minutes later she made out the Japanese battle squadron on the horizon. By 5.0 the Sixth Division hove in sight S. W. By 5.20 she had crossed the track of the Russians and altered to S.E. by E. to join her Admiral.. (Captain of Asam’s Report and Attaché Reports, II. p. 5.)

¹⁹ Reports of Admiral Togo and Captain of Mikasa.

²⁰ Such appears to have been the general effect, but for this period of the day we have no trustworthy information as to the Russian course.

²¹ Captain of Mikasa’s Report and Return of Damage. Japanese Confidential History, Volume VI. Appendix.

²² At 5.45, Admiral Yamada’s Report. Ibid.

²³ Attaché Reports, II., p. 77.

²⁴ Attaché Reports, II., page 2. Captain Nomoto’s Report, Japanese Confidential History, VI., Appendix. At 6.30 she is said to have used her after turret. Ibid. Chapter XIV. Section i., Subsection 2.

²⁵ Attaché Reports, II., p 187.

²⁶ The Japanese were in doubt as to whether she was the Pobyeda or the Peresvyet. The Report of the Captain of the Mikasa differs here from the Mikasa’s account in the Japanese Confidential History. The two accounts do not even agree as to which ship was being fired at. The Asahi thought it was the Pobyeda, and this is probably correct, for Prince Uktomski does not mention making the movement with the Peresvyet and the Morskoi Sbornik (Dec. 1904) says, “The Retvizan and Pobyeda rushed for the enemy while the others re-formed on the Peresvyet.”

²⁷ Ruskaya Starina, November 1907 and April 1908.

²⁸ The accounts in the Ruskaya Starina, November 1907 and April 1908, are said to be compiled from depositions of Commanding Officers. The latter contains a statement by the Captain of the Sevastopol that he too intended to ram, but at the critical moment a lucky shot disabled one set of engines, and as he could then only get eight knots, he had to give it up. His position at the time is uncertain, but when the flagship charged into the line ahead of him he seems to have swerved to starboard to avoid her.

²⁹ Admiral Yamada says he saw him “turn to port to come back” at 7.13. Commander Semenov enters the turn west at 6.20, i.e., 7.15.

³⁰ Attaché Reports, 11, 7.

³¹ The Asama’s report says she opened on the Poltava at 7.2 (range 9,800 metres) and altered to the Askold at 7.17 (range 8,600). Captain Hutchinson says she began on the Poltava after 7.30, when she saw the Russian cruisers circling and altered to the cruisers at 7.35 at 7,500 yards. These times fit the other accounts better than do the Asama’s, and they have therefore been followed.

³² Commander Semenov says the cruisers closed on the disengaged or starboard side of the battleships at 7.0 (that is 7.55), and that the Askold had then the signal flying for “Single line ahead.” Then when she got ahead of the Retvizan she made “Follow me.”

³³ Admiral Dewa’s Report. He implies that although he took in the signal to attack the destroyers he had already decided to go to the relief of the Yaeyama.

³⁴ Combined Fleet Confidential Order, No. 756, Part iii, Japanese Confidential History, I. p. 415. “P.” was four miles south of Encounter Rock and “H.” 22 miles north-east of Shantung Promontory.

³⁵ Admiral Reitzenstein says that about this time four of the enemy’s battleships approached him and fired four torpedoes. These ships can only have been the Third Division. Admiral Dewa, however, says nothing of having fired torpedoes.

³⁶ The Russian figures are taken from the table in C.I.D. History, Volume 1, Appendix S., which was compiled from various sources. According to the Russian Medical History their losses were higher, amounting to 92 killed and 468 wounded.

³⁷ Japanese Confidential History, Volume VI., Appendix, Report No. 1.

³⁸ Semenov, page 230.

³⁹ It is possible, however, that it was her sister-ship, the Pallada which the 14th division attacked, but probably it was the Diana, as these shots are required to make up the eight which she says were fired at her.

⁴⁰ The attacks are identified by the fact that the Japanese boats specify “a ship of the Diana class running south attended by a destroyer.”

⁴¹ Attaché Reports, II., 171.

⁴² She says she was a four-funnelled one-masted ship, and as there was none of this type in the Russian Squadron she hesitated to attack. The Pallada had three funnels and a high conning tower close to the fore mast, which, if the foremast were cut down, would give the appearance of four funnels. She carried eight 6-inch guns.

⁴³ The three boats of this division had lost each other. No. 38 attacked a two-funnelled two-masted ship at 11.45. She then turned and followed and at 12.20 was torpedoed. No. 45 at 12.20 discharged two torpedoes at a two-funnelled ship, turned and went off to Ping-tu-tau. No. 37 was driven off by destroyers, and, missing her chance afterwards, stood by No. 38.

⁴⁴ Morskoi Sbornik, June 1908.

⁴⁵ Attaché Reports, II., 20. The times given are probably Russian. By Japanese time it would be 55 minutes later.

⁴⁶ One destroyer, the Akebono, is nowhere mentioned as having found any of the enemy.

⁴⁷ After the Russians had come out in the morning Admiral Hosoya, by the Commander-in-Chief’s order had caused ten special timed mines to be laid near the entrance of the boom, but the Russian ships passed in without fouling them.—Report of the Seventh Division.