CONCLUSION

Civil wars are perplexing and complicated events, but as we have demonstrated here, they can also be viewed and examined as a series of actions and reactions over time. Using the theoretical framework presented in chapter 1, a disaggregated, systematic analysis of multiple conflicts within six countries has been presented. Doing so has demonstrated the value of looking beyond the state and focusing inward at the dynamic set of interactions occurring and the relationships evolving that collectively form something as destructive as a civil war. Group and government capacity is indeed dynamic in nature, as are the tactical decisions employed by conflict actors.

Reflection on the case studies in light of the theoretical arguments reveals findings that are both interesting and important. This chapter provides a summary of what has been learned and some examples of key arguments that were taken from the case studies. It is organized consistently with the theoretical framework that has been applied to each chapter and focuses on key findings in each area. The first section examines the relevant aspects of the conflict context. Special attention is paid to the conflict histories and how episodic or enduring violence has impacted the cases. The second section provides a summary of the dynamic factors, including previous tactics, leadership, and group cohesion, that were found to have influence over the patterns of violence in the cases. Finally, the chapter delves into the important aspects of tactical selections made by groups. This includes resorting to terrorism, international intervention, and conflict termination.

CONFLICT CONTEXT

The context of each of the conflicts studied influenced the actions taken by both groups and government. Terrain, timing, and the nature of the group rebelling were found to be largely as would have been predicted by the theory. A comparison of the impact of static factors on tactical choice across the cases is presented in Table C.1. Of the nineteen conflicts analyzed, five can be considered episodic in nature. These occurred in the Congo, the JVP in Sri Lanka, South Moluccas of Indonesia, and the ELN and MIR of Peru. Two of these were short lived but repeated, including the multiple political rivalries in the Congo and the JVP in Sri Lanka. In the short 1965 cases of Peru it seems evident that the ELN and MIR simply lacked the capacity each needed to keep fighting. Despite the terrain advantage, and the sympathy of the Peruvian population in the high Sierras, neither group could overcome its numerical disadvantage. Further, the terrain actually became a detriment as the small bands of rebels lacked the ability to coordinate their attacks. As a result, they were easily defeated. In fact, in hindsight, launching such an attack at the time truly seemed premature, something Abimael Guzman had predicted. Although the ideology of the ELN and MIR would tend to move them in the direction of employing guerrilla tactics, which was indeed the course of action they took, their numbers would have suggested an approach more along the lines of strategic bombing or the targeting of specific governmental assets. Had they done this and stayed on the streets of Lima, their campaigns may have been more successful and the conflict more enduring. Perhaps their campaign was simply premature, as Guzman had suggested. The grievances that led to the 1965 conflicts in Peru were never addressed. In response, there was a more sustained, enduring set of conflicts that emerged later in the 1980s, one of which did choose this tactical path.

Table C.1 Comparison of Static Factors and Tactical Choices across the Cases

Country	Group	Static factors and tactical choice
Sierra Leone	RUF AFRC Kamajors	One of the most important static factors in Sierra Leone was geography. The presence of diamonds and shared border with Liberia had a profound impact on the tactical decisions made by both groups and governments. These conflicts were characterized at all times by violence against civilians carried out by the RUF and afrc. During their period of junta rule, this transitioned to state-perpetrated violence against civilians.
Republic of the Congo	Cobras Ninjas Cocoyes Ninjas	Elite-led power struggle masked as identity politics (nature of group) led to appeals for international assistance (tactic).
Sri Lanka	JVP LTTE TELO EPRLF	Colonial history was an important static factor in Sri Lanka, where the British favoritism shown to the Tamils resulted in significant backlash from the Sinhala when the country gained independence. Sri Lanka’s geography was part of the basis of its confl ict, in that the north and east of the country had high percentages of Tamils, focusing the fighting there. Another important static factor was the ethnic link between Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils, which influenced Indian intervention. Because of the identity-based nature of the confl ict, terrorism emerged as a tactical option.
Myanmar	Arakan Kachin Karen Mon Shan	All ethnic rebels benefited heavily from their presence in the frontier regions distant from government forces, making guerrilla warfare particularly effective. Each of their insurrections were also informed by the legacy and promises of the Panglong Agreement signed at the time of independence. As a result, rebels continued to try and elicit the same promises through repeated attempts at negotiation over time.
	Communists	The Communist insurrection emerged at the time of independence as major political players fought to determine the direction the new country would take at independence. Having just fought in World War II, all groups were heavily armed, allowing for conventional warfare. The ideological nature of the insurrection led to successful appeals for international assistance from neighboring China.
Indonesia	DI Permestas PRRI South Moluccas OPM FRETILIN GAM	Two static factors were profoundly important in all conflicts in Indonesia. The first was the country’s colonial history and independence, after which Muslim-based groups thought the country would be governed by Sharia law, and many of the country’s regions thought they would receive independence. The second factor was the country’s geography. In this huge archipelago, the government’s ability to control outlying regions has sometimes been limited and impacted its capacity, particularly if it was fighting in two regions at once. In addition, the presence of valuable natural resources in some regions led to competition between the government and local actors. Where many of the conflicts began with the use of guerrilla warfare as a tactic, identity-based divisions in the confl ict regions and the government’s control of natural resource infrastructure oft en resulted in a shift to terrorism. Appeals for international assistance occurred at times when governmental violence peaked or group capacities versus the government were lacking.
Peru	ELN MIR	Peru’s mountainous terrain could have benefited these groups, but the lack of communication in the face of small numbers hurt their cause. Guerrilla warfare was the tactical choice in an eff ort to benefit from the terrain and hide within local peasant populations.
	MRTA	MRTA’S anti-Western ideological stance and its urban location heavily influenced its tactical decisions. While terrorist tactics were utilized, the group was careful to avoid civilian casualties that would hurt its cause.
	Sendero Luminoso	Sendero’s location in the remote mountainous region of Peru helped sustain its cause, making guerrilla warfare a good tactical choice. Its extreme ideological indoctrination resulted in the targeting of “unfriendly” civilian populations, however.

The JVP in Sri Lanka and the Republic of South Moluccas in Indonesia experienced an episodic conflict for similar reasons. In 1971 the JVP sought to overthrow the Sri Lankan government in an attempt to assure the prioritization of Sinhala nationalism over the Tamil cause. This brought about brutal government repression that terminated the conflict decisively. The independence movement for the Republic of South Moluccas began with a revolt over the failure of the Indonesian government to follow through on the promise that regions of the country would be allowed to vote for their independence. Again in this case, however, in spite of strong support and a significant number of trained rebel troops, a massive and coordinated government response brought the rebellion to a quick end.

Despite having the designation here as an episodic conflict, the JVP actually reemerged in the late 1980s over similar nationalist issues. In 1989 the JVP resurged to fight against Indian peacekeeping forces and the government that allowed them entry. Again, its campaign was short lived as the group found it could achieve its goals by working through its political party. As a result, the armed aspect of the conflict was terminated. There was a similar set of circumstances in the Republic of the Congo. Each rebel faction fighting for control of the government was elite led in nature with clear political goals. These objectives, however, were publicly presented as being derived from identity-based grievances. As a result, there were tactical decisions that involved terrorizing the civilian populations in Brazzaville as militias aligned with elite actors carved out their spheres of influence. These campaigns of terror were brought to an end in the first period of violence by a negotiated outcome. Opposition leader Kolelas and President Lissouba were able to come to terms as Kolelas was provided a position in the Lissouba government. Preelection violence renewed the conflict in the late 1990s, however, this time with the Lissouba government pitted against former president Sassou N’Guesso. It is possible that these elites could have again brokered their way to an agreement had it not been for the Angolan intervention, which decidedly tipped the power scales in Sassou’s direction. A military victory for his Cobra rebels was guaranteed. Kolelas and Lissouba found themselves in exile as a result. Had Lissouba’s pleas for international assistance been more successful and the regional alliances been more in his favor, the conflict may have been prolonged. That said, the tactical decision to ethnically cleanse Brazzaville alienated the Congolese population. Perhaps it is unlikely these leaders would have been able to generate the amount of support necessary to sustain guerrilla or conventional warfare as a result.

The remaining conflicts that were examined endured even in the face of sometimes significant power asymmetries. Their ability to do so seems to have been due to tactical decisions made by the actors, which is a function of group capacity versus the government. The longest of the conflicts occurred in Myanmar. The Arakan, Communists, Kachin, Karen, and Mon all emerged immediately post-independence. While the Communists fought to control the type of government the newly independent Burma would become, the other groups advocated for the right to self-determination. These groups were joined by the Shan in 1958 when they were unable to gain independence. Both the Communists and the Karen were able to employ conventional warfare tactics early in their campaigns as they benefited from their experience and the available weaponry their participation in World War II provided. These groups, and others, saw their capacities increase vis-à-vis the government when the Burmese army experienced a significant amount of desertion as individuals tied to one of these groups joined their ethnic or ideological kin. The Communists were clearly emboldened by their strength in the late 1940s and as a result were unwilling to negotiate an end to the conflict when such an offer was made by President U Nu. The strength of these groups waned over time, forcing them to employ other tactics, particularly guerrilla warfare.

The nature of conflicts seemed to vary across episodic and enduring cases. The MIR and ELN of Peru were ideological in nature, as was the JVP in Sri Lanka. All three were unable to endure or to achieve their goals. The Republic of South Moluccas in Indonesia suffered a similar fate, although that conflict was identity based. The elite-led conflict in the Republic of the Congo seemed to have different dynamics. The dyads that occurred in that case emerged almost entirely due to elite aspirations, which could more easily be negotiated. The intervention by Angola, of course, changed that possibility and brought about a military victory by Sassou instead. Among the more enduring conflicts there are both identity-based and ideologically based motivations.

DYNAMIC FACTORS

Intrastate conflicts are indeed dynamic. Among the more enduring conflicts examined here, different trajectories emerged. Some conflicts ebb and flow, involving varying intensities, while others seem to maintain a fairly consistent level of violence. What accounts for these differences can be discovered, as has been demonstrated, by disaggregating the conflict and examining the tactical decisions made by the actors involved. A comparison of the key dynamic factors and their impact on tactical selection in the cases examined can be found in Table C.2.

Previous Actions

Nonstate actors mobilized by a set of grievances make decisions and take actions in their efforts to have them redressed. Their government responds. These tactical decisions are a function of the conflict environment and its context, as well as the changing nature of the relationships between conflict actors. Of course, it should be clear that the actions and reactions that make up a conflict trajectory are not simply between the nonstate actor and its government. Instead, there is a complex set of interactions across conflicts within the state, as well as interactions involving outside actors. This web of interactions determines the patterns and types of violence in a conflict, the tactics conflict actors employ in order to achieve their goals, and ultimately whether the conflict will terminate or endure.

These dynamics were illustrated in the presentation of the cases. The relative capacity of actors and the nature of the conflict influenced their tactical choices, which influenced future phases of the conflict and the subsequent actions of each of the actors. In Sierra Leone, repeated successes by the rebels led the government to seek to increase its capacity by calling in external actors, including the private security firms. Those participants then influenced the RUF and became a factor that pushed the RUF to peace talks at one point and were part of the content of the mediation itself. Once those external actors were removed, the RUF responded to that change in the dynamic and capacity of the government by attacking more fiercely.

TABLE C.2 Comparison of Key Dynamic Factors and Tactical Choices across the Cases

Country	Group	Key dynamic factors and tactical choice
Sierra Leone	RUF AFRC Kamajors	Relative capacity including the number of actors and their ability to secure financing, was vitally important in these conflicts. The government in this case took the unique step of seeking to build its capacity by hiring private military contractors. The governments capacity was also supplemented by answered calls for intervention by the UN, ECOWAS, and African countries that contributed forces to the fight against the RUF. Group capacity was augmented by Charles Taylor’s support through most of the conflict. It was also increased when the RUF and AFRC joined forces to govern. In contrast, it was decreased by the blood diamonds campaign, which significantly impacted its funding stream. The RUF and AFRC engaged in violence against civilians to increase their capacity by forcing people into their ranks, increasing their ability to fund themselves with diamonds, and instilling fear among citizens. Where other groups might court popular support, the RUF chose to use fear to deter public opposition.
Republic of the Congo	Cobras Ninjas Cocoyes Ninjas	Tactical decisions to employ ethnic cleansing kept these elite-led militias relatively small in number. Further, the political nature of the disputes allowed for successful negotiations at times when elites were offered positions in the government. Ultimately, however, decisive intervention by Angola bolstered rebel Sassou N’Guesso over the Lissouba government, resulting in victory and subsequent negotiations to bring the remaining rebels into the fold, with the exception of the Pool region splinter.
Sri Lanka	JVP	The JVP group goal shifted from secession to representation and policy change at specific times, largely based on its relative losses to government or extremist Tamil groups.
	LTTE	The LTTE s capacity was increased by tapping into the Tamil diaspora. At one point, its strength was diminished by the Indian government’s intervention in the conflict; however, those forces left the country after suffering significant losses. The LTTE s capacity was sometimes decreased by having to fight both government and other Tamil groups. The groups decision to employ a chemical agent in one case was influenced by its perception of an imminent shift in its relative capacity. This action resulted in a decrease of the groups capacity in terms of popular support, as it resulted in the injury of Tamil civilians. Prabhakaran’s charismatic leadership largely increased its capacity. However, his actions reduced capacity at times: when he had a falling out with other Tamil leaders that resulted in group splintering, and when they turned public opinion against him. All of these factors led to the LTTE s shifting tactics between conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism tactics. The group’s perception of its relative capacity was a determining factor of this decision.
	TELO	TELO and EPRLF lacked the capacity to compete with the LTTE or government forces, which led to the use of terrorism as a tactic.
	EPRLF
Myanmar	Arakan Kachin Karen Mon Shan Communists	Ethnic and Communist insurgencies benefited heavily from intergroup collaboration and outside assistance. Resources were bolstered as a result. The shift by both China and Thailand to work with the SLORC rather than against it, coupled with the government s increasingly brutal tactics against civilians, led to a series of negotiated ceasefires that did not address underlying grievances. These frequently tenuous agreements also led to intergroup fighting, which has only diminished the capacity of the remaining rebellions. Some splinter factions have also chosen economic enterprise (i.e., illicit drug trade) over autonomy or secessionist goals.
Indonesia	DI	DI was a nationwide group that occasionally built its capacity by joining forces with regional secessionist groups. It lost public support, however, at times when citizens became upset over the groups attacks on noncombatants. The political party Masyumi increased the groups capacity by backing it. Terrorism was frequently employed by the group, due to its identification of non-Muslims as legitimate targets for violence.
	Permestas	Little detail was found about the capacity of the Permestas, aside from during the periods that it joined forces with the DI under the auspices of the PRRI.
	PRRI	The PRRI combined the DI, Permestas, and other groups to fight the government and, at one point, to create an alternate rebel government consisting of both regionalist separatists and supporters of Islam. Key leaders also had personal attributes that undermined unity. The PRRI s abilities were increased when it was supported by the DI. However, U.S. government support and the Indonesian governments fighting on multiple fronts at the time built the groups relative capacity to a point that it could achieve victory. This divide in the goals of the groups members reduced its ability to build a coordinated action. Eventually, the increase in the DI S popularity pulled support from the PRRI, further undermining its capacity. As with the DI, the identification of non-Muslim citizens as legitimate targets for violence resulted in the frequent use of terrorism as a tactic, particularly when the groups capacity decreased.
	South Moluccas	The rebellion was carried out by roughly 1,000 ex-Dutch military forces who engaged mainly in guerrilla warfare tactics. Citizens in the region largely supported the movement, which built its capacity, minimizing the impetus to engage in terrorism. However, the government engaged in a concerted and escalatory campaign against the rebels that not even international negotiation could counter. In the end, there were more than 15,000 government forces mobilized to the island, which eventually overcame the rebels.
	OPM	The group was not a well-organized or trained force, largely due to the diversity in the region, which complicated efforts to create a united front. The government s actions against the OPM were specifically designed to reduce its capacity by undermining public support (by using indiscriminate violence against them), diminishing its ability to fundraise and recruit, and reducing the number of rebels. Over time, the groups goals shifted from independence to special autonomy and a greater share of locally generated wealth, as its capacity versus the government diminished. The group engaged in guerrilla warfare and frequently appealed for international assistance.
	FRETILIN	FRETILIN suffered from significant lack of capacity early in its fight, which was exacerbated by the U.S. and Australian support for the government, which could not be overcome by the Portuguese support for Timor. Its capacity was limited by the fact that the people of East Timor could not agree on the desirability of independence, FRETILINS capacity was so limited that it needed to disengage from fighting to fundraise and build support. The government’s capacity was also diminished by the fact that it was fighting multiple groups in different parts of the country at the same time. Eventually, the level of violence the government inflicted was such that international sentiment turned against it. Given this, neither side had the capacity necessary to achieve military victory, resulting in peace talks and East Timorese independence in 2002. FRETILIN employed terrorism against those Timorese citizens who opposed terrorism. It appealed for international assistance when the government became particularly brutal.
	GAM	After the loss of East Timor, the government’s resolve (an important part of capacity) to not lose Aceh was hardened, as was international pressure to maintain the territorial integrity of the country. Again, however, the government’s brutal repression of the rebellion led to increased support for GAM (which employed largely guerrilla warfare as a tactic) among the people of Aceh and the international community. The reaction led to both a new generation of rebels for the cause and an increase in the amount of territory controlled by GAM. However, the group’s main leadership lived in exile, which resulted in disagreements in strategy between the leaders abroad and those on the battlefield and an eventual splintering of the group. The only time either side was willing to negotiate (calls for international assistance) was when it was clear it could not win, but even then it did not engage in good faith. The 2004 Asian tsunami had a profound impact on the group’s capacity, leading to its capitulation to government.
Peru	ELN MIR	Both of these insurrections were episodic in nature, lacking significant dynamic aspects.
	MRTA Sendero Luminoso	Sendero’s targeting of civilians meant collaboration with MRTA, which would have increased its capacity vis-à-vis the government, was unlikely. As both groups were labeled terrorist organizations, negotiations never occurred. Further, the centralized leadership style of Sendero and its isolated nature did not encourage outside appeals for assistance.

In the case of Sri Lanka, relatively peaceful student protests either failed to get a reaction from the government or, quite to the contrary, were met with violent repression. In response, the dissatisfied Tamil groups formed the LTTE. It began building its capacity in India, purchasing weapons and training in Tamil Nadu. As the LTTE’S capacity increased, Sri Lanka struggled to gain the advantage, escalating the conflict and gaining Indian support in suppressing the rebels. Both the Tamil and Sinhala extremists responded by turning their aggression against the Indian peacekeeping forces.

In Indonesia, the case of Aceh is a good example. The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) formed in 1976 when Acehnese citizens became frustrated with government repression and revocation of autonomy from the region in 1950. When the civil conflict began in 1990 government reaction was repressive, which resulted in the cessation of hostilities. After the 1997 Asian economic crisis and Suharto’s removal from power, however, GAM perceived weakness in the government and responded with increased hostilities. By 2001, there was a stalemate in the conflict, which brought both parties into mediation. One of the major provisions in that agreement was the return of special autonomy status to Aceh. When GAM continued fighting because some members felt nothing short of independence would be acceptable, the government’s response was to increase its capacity in the region and establish a special military base. This round of fighting was sustained until the 2004 Asian tsunami, which completely devastated GAM’S capacity.

No one decision or action, then, should be seen as determining a conflict’s trajectory. It is, instead, the reciprocal actions taken by the participants over time and their dynamic interaction that have a determinant effect on decision making from the point of initiating armed struggle to termination. Understanding intrastate conflicts and increasing the ability to bring them to an end, then, requires a deeper understanding of the factors that influenced each decision.

Leadership and Cohesion

Cohesion also appears to be a determinant of conflict trajectory. Governments that are facing multiple, simultaneous conflicts are compelled to divide their resources. This likely detracts from their ability to achieve victory, as it diminishes the capacity that can be devoted to any one dispute. This was the case in Myanmar, Peru, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. In Myanmar, when rebels worked together, they increased their capacity relative to the government and were more effective. However, the junta adopted a strategy of turning any group it defeated against the others and managed to weaken the rebels. As a result, rebel factions began to fold, choosing to accept ceasefire terms without political concessions. In Peru, MRTA and Sendero Luminoso did not work together and potentially missed taking advantage of the fact that one of those groups was dominant in the high Sierras while the other was doing quite well in the coastal cities. As a result, they were not able to maintain their resistance as effectively following the anti-insurgency policies of Fujimori. Of course, it is difficult to know if either group would have been able to maintain its capacity with the capture of their respective leaders. Sendero Luminoso, in particular, was incredibly centralized. As a result, the capacity of that group was in a significant way tied to Guzman and his ability to indoctrinate members and supporters. The government of Indonesia benefited from the lack of cohesion among the many groups that supported change to an Islamic government in the country. Had the Darul Islam Movement been better able to coordinate action among its troops or its sympathizers in the various regions of the country, it may have fared better against the government, which would have had to divide its forces across many different fronts. A similar situation existed in Sri Lanka. Had the LTTE approach been to mobilize and coordinate the actions of the many Tamil factions in the country, it would have increased its capacity versus the government. Instead, the group either defeated other Tamil entities or compelled them to come into line before the LTTE leadership, minimizing their collective impact.

Centralized leadership and charismatic leaders appear to be both positive and negative factors in group capacity. Strong leaders with dedicated followings increase group capacity by creating cohesion and decrease the chance of splintering. Such leaders can also improve the group’s ability to recruit and raise funds. If the personalization of leadership power becomes too extreme, however, it may become problematic when those leaders are eliminated, as has been demonstrated. Group splintering occurred in Myanmar when the leader of Burmese independence, Aung San, was assassinated. His charismatic leadership may have been able to avoid the disintegration of Burma and work to create a unified government. With his death, this fragile set of ethnic alliances crumbled, and the enduring conflicts that were examined in this book began. Similarly, while the charismatic leadership of Prabhakaran in Sri Lanka served to consolidate support behind the LTTE, his death may have doomed the group to failure. Given the massive, coordinated attacks of the government in 2009, however, it may have been that the group’s capacity was diminished to a point that even Prabhakaran could not have continued the effort.

Furthermore, conflicts that are defined in large part by their leadership may make working together more difficult. It is unlikely that Polay of MRTA and Guzman of Sendero Luminoso could have ever found common ground to work collectively against the Peruvian government. Similarly, had Prabhakaran not created a schism when he alienated Karuna and his eastern Tamils, the group’s extra capacity may have allowed it to fare better against government forces.

Relative Capacity

Economic issues appeared crucial to several of the conflict trajectories. Clearly, unequal access to resources has been known to motivate groups to rebel in the first place (see the work of Gurr 1993, 1971). This was certainly the case in Indonesia, Peru, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka. In the cases of Indonesia and Sierra Leone, a significant motivation for their respective rebellions was the desire to control natural resource wealth. Indonesian regions that were resource rich sought to either secede or gain beneficial policies in order to assure that more of the funds generated by local wealth benefited their citizens. In Sierra Leone, the two sides were motivated by greed and sought to control the country’s diamond wealth for profit.

The importance of economic issues does not stop there, however. The mismanagement of the national economy in Peru can partly be blamed for the resurgence in leftist activity in the early 1980s, but it also contributed to conflict escalation in the late 1980s. In addition to the arrest of the Sendero and MRTA leadership, the de-escalation of the conflict in both situations coincided with an economic recovery. It would seem that Kaufmann (1996) was correct in his assessment that it is difficult to mobilize the economically satisfied. In Indonesia, the 1997 Asian economic crisis led to the country’s poor financial performance and subsequent ouster of Suharto, which caused escalation in the violence in West Papua, East Timor, and Aceh.

Sendero Luminoso may also have been able to endure despite the lack of external support because of its ability to capture resources within the state. By providing protection to the coca producers in the Huallaga Valley, Sendero generated the revenue it needed to sustain its campaign. The rebel-drug connection occurred in other cases as well. Several of the groups in Myanmar provided security for drug routes in the Golden Triangle. The nature of group goals changed in some of these cases, which made it easier for the government to come to terms with them. Once a rebel group goal shifts from representation or secession to protecting their economic livelihood, the government may be more willing and able to negotiate for conflict termination. The military junta in Myanmar offered such groups the right to maintain control over the drug trade routes if they agreed to stop their armed struggle against the government and join it instead, which subsequently pitted them against other groups.

In contrast, in Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka drugs played roles in the conflict that contributed to the strife. In the Sri Lankan case the LTTE engaged in the drug trade in its effort to fund the cause. It is likely that the LTTE would have lost some power versus the government if this revenue stream were not available to it, which essentially means that the drug trade may have extended the duration of the conflict. An even more detrimental impact from drugs was present in the case of Sierra Leone, where the RUF used drugs to control and stimulate violence among its young rebels.

Government policies for land redistribution or transmigration have an unsettling effect, both before and during conflicts. Indonesia transmigration policies that moved Javanese citizens into outlying regions influenced unrest in West Papua, East Timor, and Aceh in Indonesia. During a conflict, such efforts can be undertaken with the goal of changing the nature of the battlefield. In Sri Lanka, the government instituted policies to provide incentives to Sinhala citizens to migrate into areas traditionally dominated by the Tamils. The government’s goal was to dilute the concentration of Tamils in these areas, both to reduce their impact on elections and to undermine Tamil claims that the territories were their traditional homelands that continued to be dominated by Tamil citizens. Similar efforts to change a disputed territory’s demographics have occurred in the Philippines (most notably in Mindanao) and in Kosovo, two cases not examined here. Doing so changed the nature of resolution efforts by undermining, or attempting to undermine, previously defendable secessionist or right-to-self-determination claims.

A review of all six countries and their intrastate conflicts illustrates a major benefit a government typically has over groups in terms of capacity. Groups require a window of opportunity during which time there is hope they can achieve at least a portion of their goals through the use of armed conflict. This is more likely to occur during a time when such rivals perceive some weakness or vulnerability in the government. However, the cases demonstrate that states have a greater reserve of potential capacity than do groups. In the case of Sierra Leone, for instance, the government started the conflict with its forces in a shambles. They had been disempowered by Stevens, leaving the government with a military of only about two thousand troops who were untrained, poorly armed, and underfed. It is not surprising that the RUF thought it could achieve victory. While governments may start out with such weaknesses, they have the ability to increase their capacity by moving troops from one area to another to concentrate forces (Indonesia, Peru), conscripting additional military personnel (Congo, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Indonesia), reallocating budgets to focus on defeating the rebels (Sri Lanka), hiring private contractors to augment their capacity (Sierra Leone, Congo), appealing to international actors for funds and arms (Congo, Myanmar, Indonesia, Sierra Leone), and controlling media access and the flow of information to keep news of the group’s plight secret (Myanmar, Sri Lanka). In addition, in the post–9/11 world, governments have gained a powerful tool against rebels. As was seen in Sri Lanka and the Aceh region in Indonesia, governments that can successfully identify their competitors as terrorists within the international community can potentially interfere with the group’s ability to raise and move funds, acquire arms, and recruit and secure international support. In this sense, Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups have replaced the Communist “menace” of the Cold War era.

TACTICAL OPTIONS

The comparative framework applied to the cases examined in this book illustrates that civil war actors evaluate and reevaluate their tactical decisions throughout the conflict. Their decisions are based on static factors, dynamic factors relating to their relative capacity, and actors’ goals. How those actors view their position in the dispute relative to their opponent(s) will determine if they choose to employ traditional or guerrilla warfare, terrorist tactics, appeal for outside assistance or intervention, or engage in negotiations. What follows is a discussion of tactical decisions made by the conflict actors examined in this book and what helped to inform those decisions.

Terrorism

The cases also provide insight into the factors that appear to influence whether groups or governments will terrorize their populations with indiscriminate approaches to killing. It has been argued that terrorism is a tactic employed by the weak (Bueno de Mesquita 2008) and, therefore, would seem to be influenced heavily by group capacity. The conflict histories examined in this book, however, demonstrate that the decision to employ terrorist tactics is more complex. Indiscriminate killing of civilians was identified in every case: Sierra Leone (RUF against civilians); the Congo (through ethnic cleansing in Brazzaville); Sri Lanka (reciprocal LTTE/Tamil/Sinhala); Myanmar (by the government against those populations unwilling to accept the government’s ceasefire terms); Indonesia (groups against complicit civilians or Javanese); and Peru (involving Sendero and the Peruvian government).

The use of indiscriminate violence in Sierra Leone was relatively unusual. In this case, while the government largely avoided violence against civilians, the nonstate actor (RUF) engaged in terrorism throughout the conflict. The only time that the government attacked civilians was during the brief time when the RUF joined in a junta to rule the country. The government did, however, engage in violence against members of the RUF. This is likely attributable to the fact that the key goal of the RUF was to control the diamonds rather than some sort of ideological or identity-based aspiration. Anyone who was perceived to pose a threat to the RUF’S control of diamonds could be targeted. Meanwhile, citizens and the government sought to protect themselves from the violence that was being wrought, while at the same time attempting to find some way to provide for themselves.

In the Congo, the targeting of civilians can be viewed as a tool by political rivals who employed instrumentalist tactics (see the work of Saideman 1997). The conflicts in the Congo never did seem to be about identity-based representation but rather about the leadership and their position in government. By fanning the flames of identity-based politics, Lissouba, Kolelas, and Sassou were able to rally their militias to the point of ethnic cleansing.

Sri Lanka’s experience also included significant terrorism. In part, this was due to the LTTE’S (Prabhakaran’s) indiscriminate use of violence against the Sinhala population, international tourists, and Tamils who aligned themselves with other Tamil groups. Anyone who could be deemed as being complicit with the Sri Lankan government’s occupation of the island was a potential target. The government targeted civilians as well. At key points in time, it intentionally put civilians in harm’s way rather than protecting them, especially if they were Tamils. During the 2009 conquest of the LTTE, the government killed Tamils without regard to their affiliation.

Myanmar rebels, for the most part, as well as Peruvian MRTA, the ELN, and the MIR, embraced the populations they sought to save and did not target civilians. MRTA, however, was identified internationally as a terrorist group because of the tactics it employed. Yet, MRTA was careful not to indiscriminately target civilians in these attacks and risk alienating its support base.

Violence was directed against civilians in many of Indonesia’s conflicts and was carried out by both the government and associated groups. The government’s population redistribution practices (transmigrasi) resulted in Javanese civilians being targeted in the regions to which they were sent. They were different from the local populations in almost every way and were seen as being representatives of the government’s domination. The conflict in West Papua was a particularly violent case, where citizens turned against one another based on different opinions about whether the region should be independent.

In Peru, the “us versus them” mentality that was indoctrinated through ideological training led by Guzman made the targeting of uncooperative civilians possible. For its part, the Peruvian government also targeted civilians thought to be sympathizing with rebels. Both viewed members of the indigenous population as easily expendable if they did not cooperate. A similar situation ensued in Myanmar when the SLORC decidedly targeted civilian populations as it sought to punish rebel factions that would not accept their terms.

Intervention

The role of external actors was quite evident in the most enduring conflicts that were studied. China’s decision to support the Communist Party of Burma, as well as any ethnic groups that were willing to accept the CPB’S primary role in any alliance, altered the trajectory of those conflicts. The Communists and their allies were able to take over a large swath of land and hold that territory for some time. When that assistance was revoked, the groups were severely weakened, particularly because China not only withdrew aid but also began working more directly with the Myanmar government. External intervention in Sierra Leone was crucial to the enduring nature of its conflict as well. In that case, Charles Taylor of Liberia supported the RUF from the early phases of the conflict through its termination. His intervention was initially in response to his anger at Sierra Leone’s support of ECOWAS activities to terminate the civil conflict in Liberia. Later in the war, Taylor continued support in order to maintain the income stream associated with the Sierra Leone diamonds that were being smuggled through his state. At the same time as Taylor was a force for continuing the conflict, ECOWAS and individual African states were intervening in an effort to bring the brutal war to an end. In addition, a major factor in the termination of the war in Sierra Leone was an economic intervention. When the United Nations banned the trade in uncut diamonds from Sierra Leone until they could be certified as not conflict diamonds, it posed a significant threat to the RUF’S funding as well as Taylor’s profits.

External intervention in the case of Sri Lanka was varied and complex. Early in the conflict India provided support for the LTTE in the form of weapons and training in Tamil Nadu. As the fighting wore on, however, India became concerned that the support that was being provided to the LTTE would create unrest in Tamil Nadu. India then engaged in a peace agreement with the Sri Lankan government and sent in peacekeeping troops to aid with the fight against the LTTE. After those Indian troops were compelled to withdraw in the face of extensive opposition in Sri Lanka, the interventions in the conflict were relatively limited. The LTTE continued to be able to acquire arms and funds internationally throughout the conflict. In part this took the form of coerced payments from the Tamil diaspora community abroad. This was seriously curtailed by new counterterrorism laws after 9/11, which limited the group’s ability to move funds and acquire weapons. The group effectively lost its ability to maintain or build capacity.

In Indonesia external intervention took many forms depending on the location and nature of the dispute. With the Republic of South Moluccas, the United Nations Commission for Indonesia put international pressure on the Indonesian government but was unsuccessful in creating a mediated end to the conflict. In the case of West Papua, both Papua New Guinea and Australia were active in using diplomatic intervention to try to bring about an end to the conflict. In East Timor, U.S. and Australian diplomatic support was initially behind the government as there were fears that the region would become Communist if independent. The United Nations played a strong role in this case and deployed a peacekeeping mission to East Timor for six years. This was necessary because, even when the government and FRETILIN could come to a negotiated agreement, neither side could pacify the domestic population, which was split over the question of independence. Intervention in Aceh was influenced by the case of East Timor in two ways. First, concerns about further erosion of the integrity of the Indonesian state arose, creating international pressure on the rebels to support a negotiated settlement. The second impact was on the government, as international backlash against its brutal repression in East Timor caused diplomatic pressure on it to achieve peace in Aceh.

There was not, however, international intervention in all of the enduring conflicts. Peru’s Sendero Luminoso and MRTA were able to survive without third-party support. Their tactical decisions were important in this regard. MRTA never engaged in guerrilla warfare, choosing instead to remain (mostly) in Lima and in the coastal cities and targeting foreign and government assets. Its approach was one that was aimed at gaining support among Peruvians and, therefore, was careful to avoid civilian casualties. Sendero, on the other hand, had the numbers and the ideology to use guerrilla warfare effectively. It was also operating in mountainous terrain among a population of sympathizers that had experienced severe inequality and deprivation at the hands of multiple Peruvian regimes. It also employed force or coercion in order to gain support. This may have ultimately undercut sympathies, both domestically and internationally, and their potential base, but its campaign endured for over a decade.

As demonstrated previously, most of the enduring conflicts in Indonesia were terminated under pressures from the international system. These were brought to bear on both government and groups. The government’s goal to become more integrated into the international system facilitated these terminations as Indonesia attempted to show that it could resolve internal conflict and avoid human rights violations. In the case of Aceh, however, it is unclear if the negotiated settlement would have held if not for the 2004 Asian tsunami. Another complex case in Indonesia is the continued dissatisfaction with the secular nature of the regime. This cause was championed by the DI Movement from 1952 to 1961, at which time the violence stopped, but the desire for an Islamic state continued for many. This has manifested itself in the formation of Jemaah Islamiyah, a terrorist organization that operates in Indonesia as an umbrella for various Islamist groups. In some cases, while the conflict may have terminated, the sentiment lives. The conflict in Sierra Leone was terminated through a combination of increased government capacity and international pressures on the RUF. The government was relatively constrained in its use of force, particularly against civilians. In order to achieve termination, international actors had to convince the RUF to give up the fight. Finally, in Sri Lanka the government seems to have achieved a decisive victory over the LTTE in 2009, which is discussed further below.

Termination

One of the goals of this book was to gain a better understanding of the types of factors that effectively bring about conflict termination. A comparison of the conflict outcomes for the cases examined in the book is presented on Table C.3. The shorter, episodic conflicts seem to be clearly impacted by relative group and government capacities, as one actor was able to achieve victory somewhat easily. This was true in the case of the Congo, as the military strength of the Mbochi coupled with the Angolan troops triumphed. The cases of lasting conflict, not surprisingly, are more complicated. Group goals do seem to complicate resolution efforts in the long term. Resource goals are clearly easier to negotiate than issues involving representation and certainly secession. This is not that surprising (see, e.g., Rothman 1997). What was more interesting was the changing nature of goals in light of the availability of resources. Groups such as the Shan and Wa armies in Myanmar or the RUF in Sierra Leone, which became more interested in controlling wealth than obtaining political goals, were more amenable negotiating partners. Of course, the civilian population in such situations often bears the brunt of the decisions. This was the case in Peru as well.

The enduring conflicts that appear to have been terminated include several in Myanmar and all of those in Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka. Of course, few of these (with East Timor being a possible exception) addressed the underlying grievances that brought about conflict in the first place. As a result, there is simmering popular discontent that may not reach the minimum battle death threshold to be considered an armed conflict, at least at this time. The conflicts in Myanmar were “ended” essentially through coercion. Groups were given the option to give up their campaign, keep their armies intact, and join forces with the government in exchange for the right to control trade routes through their territory, or they would face an onslaught of destruction in which civilians would be treated the same as combatants. Most groups gave in under such an arrangement. Issues of autonomy or representation were never addressed. It was not surprising, then, that the pro-democracy movement, which emerged in 1989, found common ground with many of the ethnicities that sympathized with or fought alongside the ethnic groups.

TABLE C.3 Comparison of Means of Termination across the Cases

Country	Group	Means of termination
Sierra Leone	RUF	Lome Peace Agreement mediated by ECOWAS, the UN, and others. Required the creation of the UNMOSIL to serve as a peacekeeping force.
	AFRC	Group seized government in 1997 and joined with the RUF. It lost government power in early 1998 and was routed in combat in January 1999.
	Kamajors	Worked against the RUF alongside the government, except for the period when the RUF and AFRC formed a junta to govern, at which time it fought them. Worked with Liberian and ECOMOG forces against them, which brought about negotiations and the end of hostilities.
Republic of the Congo	Cobras Ninjas Cocoyes	Government military victory in the face of Angolan intervention.
	Ninjas	This splinter conflict has been inactive since 2002, following successful negotiations
Sri Lanka	JVP	Pursued political means to have its dispute addressed and continued to hold power in the Sri Lankan government at the time of writing
	LTTE	In 2009 the government abrogated the 2002 ceasefire and escalated conflict with a major offensive against the LTTE in the north. Both sides engaged in extensive violence against civilians. The LTTE called for a ceasefire in February 2009, but the government was close to victory, so it refused. Government forces killed Prabhakaran in May 2009. Given his intense charismatic leadership style (which supported the group’s capacity), this helped assure the government’s victory
	TELO EPRLF	Defeated by LTTE in intergroup violence
Myanmar	Arakan Kachin Karen Mon Shan	All these insurrections have had factions sign ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar government. The lack of substance to the agreements and continued civilian abuse have made these agreements tenuous at best. Some groups, such as the Kachin, Karen, and at least one faction of the Shan, have continued their rebellion.
	Communists	The aging Communist leadership accepted retirement in China at the time the Chinese decided to stop funding their cause and begin to work with the Myanmar government. The Communist insurrection was defeated as a result.
Indonesia	DI Permestas PRRI	The group experienced low supply levels, low morale, and defection of members when the government offered amnesty, decreasing the capacity of the groups and leading many to surrender and to the eventual negotiation of peace with the groups. However, Islamist tendencies continue to exist in the country.
	South Moluccas	Government military victory
	OPM	Government defeat by killing or capturing the group’s leaders, leading to a lack of will to fight among its members
	FRETILIN	When East Timor gained independence, FRETILIN entered the political realm as a party in the new state’s government. At the time of publication, the group still was a major political force in the country.
	GAM	Mediated end to the conflict was facilitated by the 2004 Asian tsunami, which devastated the region and allowed the government to leverage its plight to gain a peace agreement
Peru	ELN MIR	Swift government military victory
	MRTA	MRTA has moved into the political realm and given up armed struggle
	Sendero Luminoso	Sendero appeared defeated in the face of Guzman’s arrest. A splinter faction did emerge, however, and seems to have moved more directly into the drug trade.

It has been well noted that negotiated outcomes are challenging to first achieve, then to maintain, in civil disputes (Licklider 1995; Gurr 1990; Smith 1986). After an in-depth look at the cases in this book, it becomes even more clear as to why that might be the case. External actors often pressure civil war governments and nonstate actors to come to terms. However, unless both entities act in good faith and there is either a certain amount of trust in the process or a guarantor of the peace, these negotiated agreements are unlikely to be fulfilled (see Johnston 2007). In the case of Sri Lanka, for instance, when the government reached a negotiated settlement for the Tamil issue with India in 1985, Prabhakaran reluctantly agreed to a ceasefire as he believed the arrangement would go forward regardless of his objection. His continued devotion to victory through violence demonstrated his lack of commitment to the ceasefire agreement. In Sierra Leone, the Abidjan Accord in 1996 and then the Lomé Agreement in 1999 both failed to bring about lasting peace. It was only when the RUF’S income stream was threatened and the United Nations increased the size of its peacekeeping force that the conflict was terminated.

Conversely, military victories, such as those in Sri Lanka and the Congo, do appear to terminate conflicts. However, again, if underlying issues are not addressed, it is unclear whether even those can stand the test of time. This is certainly the case with Sri Lanka, where the government’s victory in 2009 is too recent to know if there will be a return to violence. Peru’s MRTA appears to have been terminated with the arrest of Polay, although even that group made one last effort to garner support for its cause with the 1996 embassy takeover. The decision to shift toward the political arena seems to have signaled an end to the conflict more definitively. The JVP in Sri Lanka made a similar decision in 1990.

VALUE OF THE COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK

The cases examined have demonstrated how incredibly complex civil conflicts can be. While cases like the South Moluccas were short lived, others persisted. Not surprisingly, cases thought to be episodic in nature tended to reemerge when their underlying issues were not addressed during or after previous bouts of violence. This was the case in Peru, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, among others. While there are differences between the cases examined here, there are also similarities in terms of what drives actors to behave in particular ways. Tactical decisions made by actors are a function of the conflict context, group or government capacity, and group goals. The comparative framework put forth and used to compare the cases presented in this book allows one to flesh out the complexity of civil conflicts and even embrace it. Both static and dynamic factors interact and sometimes result in civil war actors choosing terrorism over more traditional forms of civil warfare, for example. While some factors appear more relevant than others, depending on the dispute examined, all are captured in the framework presented. As a result, a better understanding of the direction that any particular group may take, or the tactics it might employ, can be achieved by applying the comparative framework presented in this volume.

As international norms have shifted, particularly in the post–Cold War era, the international community appears determined to address more effectively the types of disputes examined here. Minimizing the amount of violence against civilians has become a primary goal in dealing with intrastate conflict. The framework utilized here helps illustrate the conditions under which groups make such tactical decisions and identify the factors that move groups toward negotiated outcomes. Without outside intervention, relative group capacity can be influenced in ways that could potentially minimize the level of civilian violence experienced in the midst of war rather than exacerbate it. While previous research on civil wars tended to focus on causes and outcomes, what is suggested here is that in order to understand civil war behavior, a more comprehensive approach has to be taken. The shifting nature of relative group capacity (measured in many different ways), coupled with dynamic group goals, determines the tactical decisions and path that civil war actors will take. The case studies illustrate the relevance of third parties to this process and how tactical decisions can be influenced by their interventions. Application of the framework to conflicts in the system provides an improved understanding of the path of rebellion and the influence various factors may have on the decisions made by the actors involved.