1. Kuhn, Structure (1970), 163. 2. Popper, Objective Knowledge (1972), 23. 3. La Boëtie, De la servitude volontaire (1987). 4. Greenblatt, The Swerve (2011); Screech (ed.), Montaigne’s Annotated Copy of Lucretius (1998); Popkin, The History of Scepticism (1979). 5. Montaigne, The Complete Essays (1991), 643–4. 6. Montaigne, The Complete Essays (1991), 502–4, 594–5 (an argument repeated by Voltaire in Candide). 7. Montaigne, The Complete Essays (1991), 642–4. 8. Montaigne, The Complete Essays (1991), 555, 567. 9. Montaigne, The Complete Essays (1991), 683. 10. Scholarly views on early modern unbelief have advanced greatly over the course of the last thirty years, but Montaigne continues to be read as a Christian. For my approach to these questions, see, for example, Wootton, ‘Lucien Febvre and the Problem of Unbelief’ (1988); for a more recent discussion of Renaissance humanism see Brown, The Return of Lucretius (2010), preface and Chapter 1. Montaigne’s annotations of his Lucretius demonstrate his close engagement with Lucretius’s critique of all religious beliefs. 11. Montaigne, The Complete Essays (1991), 595. 12. Montaigne, The Complete Essays (1991), 652–3. 13. Nagel, ‘What is It Like to be a Bat?’ (1974). 14. Tunstall & Diderot, Blindness and Enlightenment (2011) – though my reading of this text differs from Tunstall’s, for obvious reasons. 15. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change (1979); Eisenstein, The Printing Revolution (1983); Baron, Lindquist & Shevlin (eds.), Agent of Change (2007). In general I prefer Eisenstein to her critics (e.g. McNally (ed.), The Advent of Printing (1987)): see also above, pp. 60, 197–8 and 302–6. 16. Sharratt, Galileo (1994), 140; Galilei, Le opere (1890), Vol. 6, 232 (Sharratt’s translation). 17. Mazur, Enlightening Symbols (2014); Padoa, La Logique déductive (1912), 21. 18. Tilling, ‘Early Experimental Graphs’ (1975); Maas & Morgan, ‘Timing History’ (2002). 19. Rybczynski, One Good Turn (2000). 20. Ginsburg, ‘On the Early History of the Decimal Point’ (1928). 21. Hacking, The Emergence of Probability (2006), xvi, quoting Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (1950); and xx, referring to Crombie, Styles of Scientific Thinking (1994); Hacking, ‘Language, Truth and Reason’ (1982) (reprinted in Hacking, Historical Ontology (2002)); Hacking, ‘ “Style” for Historians and Philosophers’ (1992) reprinted in Hacking, Historical Ontology (2002); Hacking, ‘Inaugural Lecture’ (2002). Hacking is following in the footsteps of Crombie, Styles of Scientific Thinking (1994), a work that Crombie had described as ‘forthcoming’ as early as 1980 (Crombie, ‘Philosophical Presuppositions’ (1980)). For a critique see Kusch, ‘Hacking’s Historical Epistemology’ (2010). For an approach based on Crombie, see Kwa, Styles of Knowing (2011). 22. The study of the history of intellectual tools or foundational concepts has been called ‘historical epistemology’. The term originates with Gaston Bachelard. See Daston, ‘Historical Epistemology’ (1994). She describes the term as ‘Hackinqesque’, but Ian Hacking prefers Foucault’s term ‘archaeology of knowledge’: Hacking, The Emergence of Probability (2006) and ‘Historical Ontology’ in Hacking, Historical Ontology (2002). Daston has recently offered an alternative: ‘history of emergences’: Daston, ‘The History of Emergences’ (2007). 23. Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reality (1975), 73. 24. Laudan, ‘A Confutation of Convergent Realism’ (1981). Laudan, in my view, overstates his case; but attempts to demolish it piecemeal (such as Psillos, Scientific Realism (1999), 101–45) seem to me to involve too much special pleading to be entirely convincing. 25. Chang, Is Water H2O? (2012), 224–7. 26. Newcastle, Philosophical Letters (1664), 508. 27. Wootton, Bad Medicine (2006). See the comments of Papin in his letter to Leibniz, 10 July 1704 (Papin, Le Vie et les ouvrages de Denis Papin (1894), Vol. 8, 190–94 = Leibniz, Huygens and others, Leibnizens und Huygens’ Briefwechsel mit Papin (1881), 317–21. The placebo: Papin, Le Vie et les ouvrages de Denis Papin (1894), Vol. 8, 206–8 = Leibniz, Huygens and others, Leibnizens und Huygens’ Briefwechsel mit Papin (1881), 328–30. 28. See p. 413. 29. My position corresponds to that of Hacking, ‘Five Parables’ (1984), and in Hacking, Historical Ontology (2002), 43–5. 30. Boyle, Some Considerations (1663), 84 = Boyle, The Works (1999), Vol 3, 257; see, for similar sentiments expressed in secular terms, Kuhn, Structure (1970), 173.
1. Koyré, Newtonian Studies (1965), 65. 2. Shea, Designing Experiments (2003), 116. 3. Febvre, Le Problème de l’incroyance (1942); Febvre, The Problem of Unbelief (1982); and Wootton, Lucien Febvre and the Problem of Unbelief (1988).