Notes

CHAPTER ONE: CONTRADICTIONS

1. Helen-Louise Hunter, “The Society and Its Values,” in Robert L. Worden, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2009), pp. 76–77.

2. Goohoon Kwon, “A Unified Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper 188 (September 21, 2009), p. 10.

3. The eight other states are Burma, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, having both political rights and civil liberties scores as low as is possible (7). See “Worst of the Worst 2011: The World’s Most Repressive Societies,” Freedom House (2011), http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/101.pdf (accessed June 3, 2011).

4. Shuang Long Hui (Twin Dragons), directed by Ringo Lam and Hark Tsui (Hong Kong: Golden Harvest and Media Asia Distribution, 1992).

5. According to the Unification Ministry, as of April 17, 2011, the total number of North Korean defectors residing in South Korea is 21,165. See “Number of N. Korean Defectors in S. Korea Tops 21,000,” Yonhap News, May 14, 2011, http://english .yonhapnews.co.kr/ (accessed June 4, 2011).

6. Survey of 297 North Korean Defectors (Seoul National University: Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, July 24, 2008).

7. Michael Breen, Kim Jong-Il: North Korea’s Dear Leader (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), p. 5.

8. Gone with the Wind, directed by Victor Fleming (USA: Warner Bros., 1940).

9. Team America: World Police, directed by Trey Parker (USA: Paramount Pictures, 2004).

10. The Economist (June 17–23, 2000).

11. Chico Harlan, “North Korean Ruler and Heir Attend Parade,” Washington Post, October 11, 2010.

12. Andrew Higgins, “Who Will Succeed Kim Jong-il?” Washington Post, July 16, 2009.

CHAPTER TWO: THE BEST DAYS

1. “Chapter 25: The Korean War, 1950–1953,” in American Military History (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, U.S. Army, 2001), p. 570.

2. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea: Through the Looking Glass (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 48.

3. Energy consumption is measured as primary energy use (before transformation to other end-use fuels) in kilograms of oil equivalent, per capita. “World Development Indicators,” Worldbank.org (2011), http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed January 31, 2011).

4. See Joseph S. Chung, “The Economy,” in Andrea Matles Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1994).

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Jon Halliday, “The North Korean Enigma,” New Left Review, no. 127 (May–June 1981), p. 39.

9. Harrison E. Salisbury, To Peking and Beyond—A Report on the New Asia (New York: Pedigree, 1973), p. 175.

10. Tim Kane, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2003,” Heritage.org (October 27, 2004), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deploy ment-1950–2003 (accessed February 24, 2011).

11. Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles (Carlyle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), p. 21.

12. Homer T. Hodge, “North Korea’s Military Strategy,” Parameters (Spring 2003), pp. 68–81.

13. Scobell and Sanford, North Korea’s Military Threat, p. 34.

14. See Chung “The Economy,” in Savada, North Korea.

15. Ibid.

16. Nikita S. Khrushchev, “The Secret Speech—On the Cult of Personality, 1956,” Ford ham.edu (1956), http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1956khrushchev-secret1 .html (accessed February 2, 2011).

17. Philip Short, Mao: A Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001), pp. 503–4.

18. Thomas P. Bernstein and Andrew J. Nathan, “The Soviet Union, China, and Korea,” in Gerald L. Curtis and Sung-joo Han, eds., The U.S.–South Korea Alliance: Evolving Patterns and Security Relations (Lexington, Mass.: LexingtonBooks, 1983), p. 99.

19. Ibid., p. 99.

20. Victor Cha, “Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security, vol. 34, no. 3 (Winter 2010).

21. “President Nixon’s Speech on ‘Vietnamization,’ ” Vassar.edu (November 3, 1969), http://vietnam.vassar.edu/overview/doc14.html (accessed June 17, 2011).

22. Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 269.

23. Jimmy Carter quoted in Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 145.

24. Syngman Rhee was ousted by widespread demonstrations in 1960. His successor, Yoon Bo-seon (1960–1962), was overthrown in a military coup by Park Chung-hee in 1961. Park remained in power until 1979, when he was assassinated by his director of intelligence. Park’s successor, Choi Kyu-ha (1979–1980), was overthrown in a military coup in December 1979.

25. Han S. Park, North Korea: The Politics of Unconventional Wisdom (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne-Reiner, 2002).

26. B. R. Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters (New York: Melville House, 2010).

27. Sin Sang-ok and Ch’oe Ŭn-hŭi, Sugi: Nere Kim Jong il Ipnida (Diary: I Am Kim Jong-il) (Seoul: Haenglim Publisher, 1994), p. 19.

28. C. Kenneth Quinones and Joseph Tragert, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding North Korea (New York: Alpha Books, 2003).

29. Hy-Sang Lee, North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 2001), p. 27.

30. Ibid., p. 103.

31. Ermanno Furlanis, “I Made Pizza for Kim Jong-il,” Asia Times, August 4, 2001, http://www.atimes.com/koreas/CH04Dg01.html (accessed May 18, 2010).

32. Kim Il-sung, “The Results of the Agrarian Reforms and Future Tasks,” report to the sixth enlarged executive committee meeting of the North Korean Organizing Committee of the Communist Party of Korea, April 10, 1946, Selected Works, vol. 1 (1971), p. 37.

33. Donald Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 10.

34. At this time, Kim’s confidence was also manifest in his wholesale rejection of the Cultural Revolution in China. When Kim secretly met CPSU general secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Vladivostok in December 1966, he described the Cultural Revolution as “massive idiocy” and declared that the DPRK would follow a self-reliant and independent path from China. Similarly, North Koreans talked disparagingly to the Cubans about Mao’s senility. GDR archives cited in Bernd Schaefer, “North Korean ‘Adventurism’ and China’s Long Shadow, 1966–1972,” Woodrow Wilson Center Cold War Archives Project, Working Paper 44 (October 2004), http://www .wilsoncen ter.org/topics/pubs/swp44.pdf (accessed December 19, 2010), pp. 9–13.

35. Bui Tin, “Fight for the Long Haul: The War as Seen by a Soldier in the People’s Army of Vietnam,” in Andrew Wiest, ed., Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2006), p. 64.

36. “Embassy of the GDR in the PRC. October 22, 1971. The Position of the DPRK on the Forthcoming Nixon Visit in the PRC,” cited in Schaefer, “North Korean ‘Adventurism,’ ” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/swp44.pdf (accessed December 19, 2010), pp. 34–35.

37. “Excerpts from Speech Delivered at a Banquet Given at the Great Hall of the People in Peking by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council of the People’s Republic of China in Honor of the Party and Government Delegation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Songun politicsstudygroup.org (April 18, 1975), http://www.songunpoliticsstudygroup .org/kimilsungspeechapril181975.html (accessed December 19, 2010).

38. “Report on the Official Friendship Visit to the DPRK by the Party and State Delegation of the GDR, led by Com. Erich Honecker, December 8, 1977, SAPMO-BA, DY 30, J IV 2/2A/2123,” in North Korea in the Cold War Collection, Woodrow Wilson Center Cold War International History Project, http://www.wilsoncenter .org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=F26BC540- 0F93-4A9A-FC10ADDBD95F582B&sort=Collection&item=North%20Korea%20in%20the%20Cold%20War (accessed December 29, 2010).

39. Stenographic record of conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il-sung, May 30, 1984, SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 2460, in North Korea in the Cold War Col- lection, Woodrow Wilson Center Cold War International History Project, http:// www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document &identifier=011D0BD8-C4D3-4C59-CCF31FC248028B81&sort=Collection&item =North%20Korea%20in%20the%20Cold%20War (accessed December 29, 2010).

40. Taik-young Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 106–7.

41. “World Development Indicators,” Worldbank.org.

42. RAND Corporation study cited in Hamm, Arming the Two Koreas, p. 56.

43. Ibid., p. 131.

44. “The Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System,” BOK.or.kr (2011), http://ecos.bok .or.kr/ (accessed March 2011).

45. Joseph S. Bermudez, The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), pp. 38–39.

46. 2010 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 2010), p. 24.

47. Bruce E. Bechtol, Defiant Failed State: The North Korean Threat to International Security (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2010), p. 24.

48. Stu Russell, “The Digit Affair,” USSPueblo.org (2010), http://www.uss pueblo.org/Prisoners/The_Digit_Affair.html (accessed February 23, 2011).

49. Michael Breen, Kim Jong-il: North Korea’s Dear Leader (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), p. 28.

50. John Glionna, “The Face of South Korea’s Boogeyman,” Los Angeles Times, July 18, 2010.

51. David E. Pearson, The World-Wide Military Command and Control System: Evolution and Effectiveness (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 2000), pp. 84–91.

52. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 59.

53. “DMZ—DPRK Tunnels,” Globalsecurity.org (2011), http://www.globalsecu rity.org/military/world/dprk/kpa-tunnels.htm (accessed January 31, 2011).

54. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 142.

55. Video of the assassination attempt is available at “Burma, Myanmar: South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan Assassination Attempt,” Ash inmettacara.org (July 3, 2009), http://www.ashinmettacara.org/2009/07/burma-myanmarsouth-korean-president.html (accessed January 5, 2011).

56. As University of Georgia professor and acclaimed juche expert Park Han-shik states, “The notion that nuclear weaponry is the only ‘guarantor’ for national security and a reliable means of deterrence against military provocation from hostile governments is a direct product of sŏn’gun politics.” Han S. Park, “Military-First (Sŏn’gun) Politics: Implications for External Policies,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2010), p. 103.

57. Han S. Park, “Military-First (Sŏn’gun) Politics,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy, p. 91.

58. Rüdiger Frank, “Socialist Neoconservatism and North Korean Foreign Policy,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy, pp. 15–16.

59. Ibid., p. 10.

60. “Joint New Year Editorial Issued,” KCNA (January 1, 2009 [Juche 98]), http://www .kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed January 18, 2011).

61. The typically verbose title of the 2011 editorial is “Bring About a Decisive Turn in the Improvement of the People’s Standard of Living and the Building of a Great, Prosperous and Powerful Country by Accelerating the Development of Light Industry Once Again This Year.” See “Joint New Year Editorial,” KCNA (January 1, 2011 [Juche 99]), http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed January 18, 2011).

62. “Joint New Year Editorial of Leading Newspapers in DPRK,” KCNA (January 1, 2008 [Juche 97]), http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed January 18, 2011).

63. KCNA (January 1, 2009).

CHAPTER THREE: ALL IN THE FAMILY

1. Kenji Fujimoto, “I Was Kim Jong Il’s Cook,” reprinted in The Atlantic (January/February 2004), http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2004/01/fuji moto.htm (accessed June 19, 2011).

2. Sydney A. Seiler, Kim Il-sŏng 1941–1948: The Creation of a Legend, the Building of a Regime (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1994), pp. 55–56.

3. Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 5; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 12; Sung Chul Yang, Korea and the Two Regimes: Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1981), p. 32.

4. Andrei Lankov, From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea 1945–1960 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p. 59.

5. Seiler, Kim Il-sŏng 1941–1948, pp. 31–38.

6. “Report Describes Soviet Abuses in N. Korea,” Dong-A Ilbo, March 10, 2010, http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=050000&biid=2010031031168 (accessed October 14, 2010).

7. “Stalin’s Meeting with Kim Il Sung,” March 5, 1949, Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, fond 059a, opis 5a, delo 3, papka 11, listy 10–20. Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson Center.

8. Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 127.

9. Ibid., p. 69.

10. Hahn Jae Duk, quoted in Yang, Korea and the Two Regimes, p. 82.

11. Kim Il Sung: The Great Man of the Century, Volume II (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1994), p. 93.

12. B. R. Myers, “North Korea’s Race Problem: What I Learned in Eight Years Reading Propaganda from Inside the Hermit Kingdom,” Foreign Policy Magazine (March/April 2010), pp. 100–101.

13. Andrei Lankov, “Why the United States Will Have to Accept a Nuclear North Korea,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 21, no. 3 (September 2009), pp. 253–54.

14. Kyung-Ae Park, “People’s Exit, Regime Stability and North Korean Diplomacy,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 49–52.

15. Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2010), p. 35; Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 9.

16. James Bond: Die Another Day, directed by Lee Tamahori (USA: MGM Studios, 2002).

17. Seiler, Kim Il-sŏng 1941–1948, pp. 196–97.

18. Michael Breen, Kim Jong-Il: North Korea’s Dear Leader (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), pp. 64–65.

19. Breen, Kim Jong-Il, p. 6; Becker, Rogue Regime, p. 127.

20. Mark Ziegler, “While the Rest of the World Watches Kim Jong Il, Fearful of North Korea’s Nuclear Threat, the Dictator Often Can’t Take His Eyes Off . . . the NBA,” San Diego Union-Tribune, October 29, 2006, http://legacy .signonsandiego.com/news/world/20061029-9999-1n29kim.html (accessed October 7, 2010).

21. Fujimoto, “I Was Kim Jong Il’s Cook.”

22. Becker, Rogue Regime, pp. 43–44.

23. Ermanno Furlanis, “I Made Pizza for Kim Jong-il. Part 2: Hot Ovens at the Seaside,” Asia Times, August 11, 2001, http://www.atimes.com/koreas/CH11Dg02.html (accessed October 15, 2010). For complete story, see also part 1 (http://www .atimes.com/koreas/CH04Dg01.html) and part 3 (http://www.atimes.com/koreas/CH17Dg03.html).

24. Jasper Becker, “A Gulag with Nukes,” Opendemocracy.net (July 18, 2005), http://www .opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/north_korea_2686.jsp (accessed October 18, 2010).

25. Joongang Ilbo, October 4, 1991.

26. Yuriko Koike, “A Ruthless Sister Becomes North Korea’s Next Ruler,” Daily Star (September 16, 2010), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=119330#axzz0zwdV6uYa (accessed October 9, 2010); and Michael Madsen, “Biographical Sketch of Kim Kyong-hui” (2010), http://nkleadershipwatch.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/kim-kyong-hui-basic (accessed October 9, 2010).

27. “Kim Ok at Dear Leader’s Sickbed,” Korea Times, September 13, 2008, http://www .koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/05/113_31010.html (accessed October 9, 2010).

28. Yang Jung A, “Kim Jong Il’s Wife Kim Ok Pursues Kim Jong Woon as Successor” (June 2, 2008), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02300&num =3672 (accessed October 9, 2010).

29. Sin Sang-ok and Ch’oe Ŭn-hŭi, Sugi: Nere kim jong il ipnida (Diary: I Am Kim Jong-il) (Seoul: Haenglim Publisher, 1994), p. 19. Also see Helen-Louise Hunter, Kim Il-song’s North Korea (New York: Praeger, 1999).

30. “KPA Warning on U.S.–S. Korea War Manuevers,” KCNA (August 15, 2010), http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed November 9, 2010).

31. “Japanese Reactionaries’ Visits to ‘Yasukuni Shrine’ Blasted,” KCNA (August 25, 2008), http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed November 9, 2010).

32. “KCNA Blasts S. Korea’s Anti-DPRK ‘Human Rights’ Racket,” KCNA (December 5, 2009), http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed November 9, 2010).

33. “North Korea Bans Bolton from Talks,” Washingtontimes.com (August 4, 2003), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/aug/4/20030804-121425-6611r/ (accessed November 9, 2010).

34. “U.S. VP’s Vituperation Against DPRK’s Headquarters Rebuked,” KCNA (June 3, 2005), http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed November 9, 2010).

35. “KCNA Blasts Rumsfeld’s Vituperation,” KCNA (November 25, 2003), http://www .kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed November 9, 2010).

36. U.S. State Department, “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000—Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism” (April 30, 2001), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/2441 .htm (accessed November 10, 2010).

37. Mark E. Manyin, “North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL30613 (June 29, 2010), pp. 20–25; Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Defiant Failed State: The North Korean Threat to International Security (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2010), pp. 63–66.

38. The nuclear tests took place in 1991, according to North Korean defector Hwang Chang-yŏp. See Bradley Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader: North Korea and the Kim Dynasty (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), p. 436.

39. Paul French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula—A Modern History, 2nd ed. (New York: Zed Books, 2007), p. 59.

40. Martin, Under the Loving Care, pp. 282–86, 317.

41. French, North Korea, p. 59; Martin, Under the Loving Care, p. 244; Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 346.

42. Martin, Under the Loving Care, p. 507; Richard Worth, Kim Jong Il (New York: Chelsea House, 2008), p. 84.

43. Han S. Park, “Military-First (Sŏn’gun) Politics: Implications for External Policies,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2010), p. 103.

44. “The Crumbling State of Healthcare in North Korea,” Amnesty.org (July 2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA24/001/2010/en (accessed November 15, 2010).

45. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 1.

46. Becker, Rogue Regime, p. 145.

47. Martin, Under the Loving Care, p. 642.

48. Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), p. 467.

49. “Interview: Charles Kartman,” PBS.org (February 20, 2003), http://www .pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/kartman.html (accessed December 11, 2010).

50. There remain questions over whether Kim Jong-il’s second son, Kim Jong-chol, attended the International School of Berne while Kim Jong-un attended Liebefeld. Stories that are associated with Kim Jong-un at the International School may be mistakenly referring to his older brother, Jong-chol.

51. Personal interview, January 4, 2010, Washington, D.C.

52. Andrew Higgins, “Who Will Succeed Kim Jong Il?” Washington Post, July 16, 2009.

53. Cited in ibid.

54. “N. Propaganda Describes Kim Jong-eun as ‘Genius,’ ” Chosun Ilbo, October 20, 2010.

55. “Data and Statistics,” International Monetary Fund (2010), http://www.imf.org/ex ternal/data.htm (accessed December 8, 2010).

56. “Freedom of the Press 2010,” Freedom House (2010), http://www.freedom house.org/template.cfm?page=16 (accessed December 8, 2010); “The 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International (2010), http://www.transparency.org/policy _research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009 (accessed December 8, 2010).

57. Victor D. Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002), pp. 79–92.

58. “North Korea Reverts to Hard-line State Control,” Chosun Ilbo, January 3, 2011.

CHAPTER FOUR: FIVE BAD DECISIONS

1. North Korean GNI per capita for 2009 is estimated at $960 while South Korea’s latest GNI per capita figure is $20,759 (for 2010). “Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System,” BOK.or.kr (2011), http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIn dex_en.isp (accessed April 15, 2011).

2. John Wu, “The Mineral Industry of North Korea,” 2005 Minerals Yearbook: North Korea (U.S. Geological Survey, June 2007), p. 151.

3. Goohoon Kwon, “A Unified Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper 188 (September 21, 2009), p. 10.

4. “Soviet Economic Assistance to Its Sino-Soviet Bloc Countries,” CIA Declassified Document (June 13, 1955), http://www.foia.cia.gov/ (accessed April 7, 2011).

5. Samuel S. Kim, “Sino–North Korean Relations in the Post–Cold War World,” in Yong Hwan Kihl and Hong Nak Kim, eds., North Korea: The Politics of Regime Survival (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2006), p. 195.

6. Eui Gak Hwang, The Korean Economies: A Comparison of North and South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 204.

7. Ibid.

8. Kim Il-sung, “On Accelerating the Construction of the Taedonggang Power Station,” May 8, 1974, Chojakchip (Works), vol. 29, 1987, pp. 192–93 cited, in Hy-Sang Lee, North Korea, p. 110.

9. Kim Il-sung, “On the Immediate Tasks of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” speech at the First Session of the Third Supreme People’s Assembly, October 23, 1962, Selected Works, vol. 3 (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1971), p. 392.

10. Andrew Scobell and John M. Sanford, North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), pp. 21–23.

11. Hy-Sang Lee, North Korea, p. 3.

12. Robert Marquand, “North Korea Offers to Pay Off Czech Debt,” Christian Science Monitor (August 11, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Eu rope/2010/0811/North-Korea-offers-to-pay-off-Czech-debt-with-Korean-ginseng (accessed February 8, 2011).

13. See Victor Cha, Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), chapter 4.

14. “Vinalon, the North’s Proud Invention,” FAS, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/industry38.htm (accessed April 15, 2011).

15. One ri is equal to 500 meters or 1,640 feet. “Treasure House of Literature and Arts Enriched,” KCNA (December 9, 2010), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201012/news09/20101209-08ee.html (accessed April 14, 2011); “Kim Jong Il Enjoys ‘October Concert,’ ” KCNA (November 1, 2010), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201011/news01/20101101-17ee.html (accessed April 14, 2011); “Art Performance Goes on in Hamhung,” KCNA (March 13, 2010), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201003/news13/20100313-03ee.html (accessed April 14, 2011).

16. Eva Hagberg, “The Worst Building in the History of Mankind,” Esquire (January 28, 2008), http://www.esquire.com/the-side/DESIGN/hotel-of-doom-012808 (accessed February 13, 2011).

17. Donald Kirk, “Orascom Gets into Pyramid Business,” Asia Times, December 23, 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/JL23Dg01.html (accessed February 13, 2011).

18. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 28.

19. Nicholas Eberstadt, The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2007), pp. 75–76.

20. Ibid., p. 106.

21. Joseph S. Chung, “The Economy,” in Andrea Matles Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1994).

22. Philip H. Park, Self-Reliance or Self-Destruction: Success and Failure of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Development Strategy of Self-Reliance “Juche” (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 114.

23. Jaewoo Choo, “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on China: Political Ratification,” Asian Survey, vol. 48, no. 2 (March/April 2008), p. 359.

24. Ibid., pp. 347–48.

25. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “North Korea’s External Economic Relations,” PIIE Working Paper Series, WP 07-7 (August 2007), p. 28.

26. “World Food Programme Food Aid Information System,” World Food Programme (2011), http://www.wfp.org/fais/ (accessed April 4, 2011).

27. Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, pp. 30–31.

28. Food made up 50 percent of total South Korean outlays to the DPRK and more than 50 percent of all U.S. assistance. It constituted almost all of Japanese assistance until Tokyo ceased all food shipments in 2002 over revelations about North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens.

29. “North Korea Probes Corruption in Investment Agencies,” RFA.org (January 30, 2008), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/nkorea_corruption-20080130.html (accessed April 11, 2011).

30. Andrei Lankov, quoted in “Investing in the Fatherland: Corruption in North Korea,” RFAUnplugged.org (January 30, 2008), http://www.rfaun plugged.org/ (accessed April 11, 2011).

31. Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), p. 67.

32. U.N. report quoted in Smith, Hungry for Peace, p. 67.

33. The North Korean economy was approximately US$23.2 billion in 1990 and contracted to $12.6 billion by 1998.

34. The Staff of U.S. Representative Ed Royce (R-CA), “Gangster Regime: How North Korea Counterfeits U.S. Currency,” House.gov (March 14, 2007), http://www.royce .house.gov/uploadedfiles/report.3.12.07.FINAL.Ganster Regime.pdf (accessed March 14, 2011).

35. David E. Kaplan, “The Wiseguy Regime,” USNews.com (February 7, 1999), http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/990215/archive_000266.htm (accessed March 14, 2011).

36. “Narco Korea,” TIMEasia (June 2, 2003), http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers /501030609/index.html (accessed March 14, 2011).

37. Bill Powell and Adam Zagorin, “The Tony Soprano of North Korea,” Time.com (July 12, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1642898,00.html (accessed March 14, 2011).

38. See Paul Rexon Kan, et al., “Criminal Sovereignty: Understanding North Korea’s Illicit International Activities,” Strategic Studies Institute Letort Paper (April 12, 2010), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=975 (accessed March 14, 2011).

39. Sheena Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks,” International Security, vol. 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007), pp. 85–86; Andrew J. Coe, “North Korea’s New Cash Crop,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 75.

40. Balbina Y. Hwang, “Curtailing North Korea’s Illicit Activities,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, no. 1679 (August 25, 2003), p. 3.

41. Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation,” p. 92; Hwang, “Curtailing North Korea’s Illicit Activities,” p. 2; Raphael F. Perl, “Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL32167 (January 25, 2007), p. 15; Liana Sun Wyler and Dick K. Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL33885 (August 25, 2008), p. 3.

42. Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation,” pp. 89–90; Hwang, “Curtailing North Korea’s Illicit Activities,” p. 3; Kan, et al., “Criminal Sovereignty,” p. 5.

43. Hwang, “Curtailing North Korea’s Illicit Activities,” p. 3.

44. Kan, et al., “Criminal Sovereignty,” p. 24.

45. Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation,” p. 89; Hwang, “Curtailing North Korea’s Illicit Activities,” p. 3.

46. Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation,” p. 90.

47. Kim Young-il, “North Korean Narcotics Trafficking: A View from the Inside,” North Korea Review, vol. 1, no. 1 (February 29, 2004), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=26320 (accessed March 17, 2011).

48. On the Burmese, see Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation,” p. 98; on the Taiwanese delegations, see Kan, et al., “Criminal Sovereignty,” p. 12; on the Chinese and Taiwanese counterfeiters, see Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation,” p. 91.

49. See Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation,” p. 95; Kan, et al., “Criminal Sovereignty,” p. 11.

50. It is important to note that the Australian government acquitted all of the North Korean crew members due to insufficient evidence. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “North Korea’s External Economic Relations,” Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper Series, WP 07-7 (August 2007), pp. 6–7; Perl, “Drug Trafficking and North Korea,” pp. 6–7n23, p. 13; Wyler and Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” pp. 4–5.

51. Wyler and Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” p. 4.

52. Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 162.

53. Methamphetamines are produced in lab-like environments, using all chemical components. Perl, “Drug Trafficking and North Korea,” p. 11.

54. Hwang, “Curtailing North Korea’s Illicit Activities,” p. 3; Perl, “Drug Trafficking and North Korea,” p. 9.

55. Wyler and Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” p. 6.

56. Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, p. 8; Perl, “Drug Trafficking and North Korea,” pp. 9–10; Benjamin K. Sovacool, “North Korea and Illegal Narcotics: Smoke but no Fire?” Asia Policy (January 2009), p. 108.

57. Defector testimony quoted in Kan, et al., “Criminal Sovereignty,” p. 8.

58. 2007 World Drug Report, UNODC.org (2007), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf (accessed March 17, 2011), pp. 128, 138, 157.

59. 2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, vol. 1, State.gov (March 2011), http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2010/index.htm (accessed March 17, 2011), p. 432.

60. Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation,” p. 92; Dick K. Nanto, “North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL33324 (12 June 2009), p. 1.

61. Hwang, “Curtailing North Korea’s Illicit Activities,” p. 4.

62. Ibid.; Kan, et al., “Criminal Sovereignty,” p. 13.

63. Bertil Lintner, “North Korea’s Burden of Crime and Terror,” Asia Times Online (April 20, 2007), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/ID20Dg02.html (accessed March 17, 2011).

64. Kan, et al., “Criminal Sovereignty,” p. 18.

65. Wyler and Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” p. 1.

66. U.S. government official quoted in Royce, “Gangster Regime,” p. 10.

67. Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation,” p. 91.

68. Ibid., p. 92; Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, p. 10; Wyler and Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” p. 12.

69. Kan, et al., “Criminal Sovereignty,” p. 16.

70. Wyler and Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” pp. 12–13, 16.

71. Kan, et al., “Criminal Sovereignty,” pp. 15–16.

72. Chestnut, “Illicit Activity and Proliferation,” p. 91; Wyler and Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” p. 6.

73. Wyler and Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” p. 14.

74. Perl, “Drug Trafficking and North Korea,” p. 5.

75. Wyler and Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” p. 13.

76. The ten others are: Burma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Iran, Mauritania, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. See the Trafficking in Persons Report, 10th ed., State.gov (June 2010), http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza tion/142979.pdf (accessed March 21, 2011).

77. Perl, “Drug Trafficking and North Korea,” pp. 15–16; Wyler and Nanto, “North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities,” p. 17.

78. Peter M. Beck and Nicholas Reader, “Facilitating Reform in North Korea: The Role of Regional Actors and NGOs,” Asian Perspective, vol. 29, no. 3 (2005), pp. 36–37.

79. Michael Rank, “North Korea: Beyond the Capital Lies a Different World,” Guardian (September 26, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/26/north-korea-rason-beyond-capital (accessed April 13, 2011).

80. Toru Makinoda, “N. Korea Plans Free Trade Zone on Island,” Daily Yomiuri (January 23, 2009).

81. “Editorial Comment,” Rodong Sinmun (November 21, 2001).

82. Marcus Noland, “West-Bound Train Leaving the Station: Pyongyang on the Reform Track,” IIE.com (October 14–15, 2002), http://www.iie.com/publications/pa pers/noland1002.htm (accessed February 25, 2004).

83. “NK Embarks on Initial Phase of Market Economy,” Korea Update, vol. 14, no. 10 (September 30, 2003).

84. Jonathan Watts, “How North Korea Is Embracing Capitalism by Any Other Name,” Guardian (December 3, 2003), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/03/north korea (accessed February 20, 2011).

85. Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 27. Kim Dae-jung quote is from Becker, Rogue Regime, p. 196. Peter Maas, “The Last Emperor,” New York Times Magazine (October 19, 2003); Don Gregg, “Kim Jong-il: The Truth Behind the Caricature,” Newsweek (February 3, 2003).

86. Oh Seung-yul, “Changes in the North Korean Economy: New Policies and Limitations,” in Korea’s Economy 2003 (Washington, D.C.: Korea Economic Institute, 2003), pp. 74–76; Transition Newsletter World Bank at www.world bank.org/transition newsletter/janfebmar03/pgs1-6htm (accessed February 25, 2004). For more extreme estimates, as high as 50,000 won to US$1, see Jamie Miyazaki, “Adam Smith Comes to North Korea,” Asia Times, October 22, 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/EJ22Dg01.html (accessed February 25, 2004).

87. Nicholas Eberstadt, “North Korea’s Survival Game,” unpublished paper, presented at the AEI–Chosun Ilbo meeting, February 12–13, 2004, Washington, D.C.

88. Philip P. Pan, “China Treads Carefully Around North Korea,” Washington Post, January 10, 2003, p. A14.

89. “China to Provide Grant-in-Aid to DPRK,” KCNA (October 31, 2003), http://www .kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200310/news10/31.htm (accessed April 4, 2011).

90. Michael Chambers, “Managing a Truculent Ally: China and North Korea, 2003,” unpublished manuscript, Fairbank Institute, Harvard University, February 23, 2004; “China’s Top Legislator Meets DPRK Premier,” Beijing Xinhua, October 30, 2003; “China to Provide Grant-in-Aid to DPRK,” Pyongyang KCNA, October 30, 2003; International Herald Tribune, January 12, 2004.

91. World Food Programme (2011).

92. Mark Manyin, “Food Crisis and North Korea’s Aid Diplomacy: Seeking the Path of Least Resistance,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 78–83.

93. Choo, “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence,” p. 347.

94. Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, “China–North Korea Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 7-5700 (December 28, 2010), p. 15.

95. Manyin, “Food Crisis and North Korea’s Aid Diplomacy,” in Park, ed., New Challenges, p. 86.

96. World Food Programme (2011).

97. Haggard and Noland, “North Korea’s External Economic Relations,” p. 37.

98. Off-the-record comments by international relief worker, August 7, 2010, Los Angeles, California.

99. Manyin, “Food Crisis and North Korea’s Aid Diplomacy,” in Park, ed., New Challenges, pp. 75–76.

100. The minimum wage for workers in the complex is supposed to be $68.71 per month, with an average of $20–$30 of overtime pay. But after the North Korean authorities deduct “social insurance” (15 percent) and “socio-cultural fees” (30 percent), most workers are left with about $45.

101. For a detailed description of the complex, see Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, “The Kaesong North–South Korean Industrial Complex,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL34093 (March 17, 2011).

102. Nanto and Manyin, “China–North Korea Relations,” p. 7.

103. Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL32493 (January 22, 2010), p. 32.

104. See, “Rates,” Mt. Kumgang Tour Reservation Guide, http://www.mtkum gang.com/eng/reservation/price/price_list.jsp (accessed March 31, 2011).

105. Haggard and Noland, “North Korea’s External Economic Relations,” pp. 40–41.

106. See Nanto and Manyin, “The Kaesong North–South Korean Industrial Complex,” summary; and “Closing Kaesong would hit North Korea hard,” Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 2009, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/05/18/2009051800226 .html (accessed April 12, 2011).

107. Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, “North Korea,” p. 47.

108. “The World Factbook—Korea, North,” CIA.gov (2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed April 13, 2011).

109. Norimitsu Onishi, “South Brings Capitalism, Well Isolated, to North Korea,” New York Times, July 18, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/18/world/asia/18korea.html (accessed April 13, 2011).

110. Barbara Demick, “A One-Hour Commute to Another World,” L.A. Times, February 28, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/28/world/fg-commute28/2 (accessed April 13, 2011).

111. “N. Korea Mountain Tours Popular in South Korea,” UPI (September 30, 2005), http://www.spacewar.com/reports/NKorea_Mountain_Tour_Popu lar_In_SKorea .html (accessed April 4, 2011).

112. “N. Korea Covered by Slogans,” UPI (October 3, 2005), http://www.spacewar.com/reports/NKorea_Covered_By_Slogans.html (accessed April 4, 2011).

113. Haggard and Noland, “North Korea’s External Economic Relations,” p. 11.

114. “Choco Pies Rule Black Market in North Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, January 12, 2010; and John Feffer, “Choco Pies vs. Cold Noodles,” Huffington Post (March 3, 2010) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/choco-pies-vs-cold-noodle_b_482697 .html (accessed February 22, 2011).

115. Rüdiger Frank, “Socialist Neoconservatism and North Korean Foreign Policy,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave, 2010), p. 18.

116. Sharon LeFraniere, “Views Show How North Korean Policy Spread Misery,” New York Times, June 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/asia/10 koreans.html?pagewanted=all (accessed February 21, 2011).

117. Marcus Noland, “North Korea’s Failed Currency Reform,” BBC Online (February 5, 2010) http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/print.cfm?researchid=1487&doc=pub (accessed February 21, 2011).

118. Park Hyeong Jung, “How to Move North Korea,” unpublished paper, KINU, March 10, 2011, p. 1.

119. “N. Korea ‘Importing Animal Feed for Human Consumption,’ ” Chosun Ilbo, February 10, 2011, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/02/10/2011 021000980.html (accessed March 30, 2011).

120. The 2008 figures are from the “World Bank World Development Indicators,” Worldbank.org (2011), http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog (accessed April 15, 2011).

121. “North Korea Halves Pyongyang in Size in Apparent Economic Bid: Source,” Yonhap News, February 14, 2011, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr (accessed March 30, 2011).

122. “N. Korean Protesters Demand Food and Electricity,” Chosun Ilbo, February 23, 2011, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/02/23/2011022300383 .html (accessed March 29, 2011).

123. Park Hyeong Jung, “North Korea’s Foreign and Domestic Policy and Its Relations with China,” unpublished paper, KINU (June 15, 2010).

CHAPTER FIVE: THE WORST PLACE ON EARTH

1. Andrei Lankov, “Something Special About Kaesong Tour,” DailyNK (February 19, 2009), http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00300&num=3276 (accessed February 18, 2011).

2. Ermanno Furlanis, “I Made Pizza for Kim Jong-il,” Asia Times Online (August 4, 2001), http://www.atimes.com/koreas/CH04Dg01.html (accessed May 18, 2010).

3. Again, there is less to the medical system than meets the eye. North Korea has a ministry of public health, and, by most international metrics, it appears to be within the norm. According to statistics, there is one family doctor per 120 to 140 families and about 800 hospitals total in the country, employing over 300,000 medical professionals. These all constitute metrics of a functioning health system in the North, but the truth is much more grim. See Dr. Margaret Chan, “Transcript of Press Briefing at WHO Headquarters, Geneva,” WHO.int (April 30, 2010), http://www.who .int/media centre/news/releases/2010/20100430_chan_press_transcript.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011). See also, “WHO Country Cooperation Strategy, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” WHO.int (August 2009), http://www.who.int/countryfocus/cooperation_strategy/ccs_prk_en.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011).

4. “President Meets with North Korean Defectors and Family Members of Japanese Abducted by North Korea,” April 28, 2006. Available at http://georgewbush- whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060428-1.html (accessed January 13, 2011).

5. This information is taken from Peter Baker and Glenn Kessler, “Bush Meets Dissidents in Campaign for Rights,” Washington Post, June 15, 2005.

6. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown, 2010), p. 422.

7. “The Invisible Exodus: North Koreans in the People’s Republic of China,” Human Rights Watch, vol. 14, no. 8 (November 2002), pp. 24–25.

8. Sharon LeFraniere, “Views Show How North Korea Policy Spread Misery,” New York Times, June 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/asia/10koreans .html?pagewanted=all (accessed February 21, 2011).

9. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Repression and Punishment in North Korea: Survey Evidence of Prison Camp Experiences,” East-West Center Working Papers, no. 20 (October 2009), p. 7.

10. David Hawk, “Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps,” U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (2003), p. 35.

11. “Starved for Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea),” Amnesty International (January 2004), p. 35.

12. Hawk, “Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps,” p. 24.

13. Ibid., p. 55.

14. Ibid., p. 37.

15. Ibid., p. 45.

16. Children of the Secret State, directed by Carla Garapedian (London: Hardcash Productions, 2000).

17. Human Rights Watch, “The Invisible Exodus,” pp. 24–25.

18. Amnesty International, “Starved for Rights,” p. 29.

19. Human Rights Watch, “The Invisible Exodus,” pp. 23–24.

20. Hawk, “Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps,” p. 67.

21. Ibid., p. 61.

22. Ibid., p. 62.

23. Text of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Chapter 1, Article 33.1.

24. DPRK Population Center, Analysis of 1993 Population Census Data, DPR of Korea (Pyongyang: Population Center, 1996), as cited in Courtland Robinson, “North Korea: Migration Patterns and Prospects,” unpublished working paper for the CSIS-USC Korea Project (August 21, 2010), http://csis.org/files/publication/101215_North_Korea_Migration_Patterns.pdf (accessed January 12, 2011).

25. Rhoda Margesson, Emma Chanlett-Avery, and Andorra Bruno, North Korean Refugees in China and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, RL 34189, September 26, 2007, p. 4; http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34189.pdf (accessed January 3, 2011).

26. Courtland Robinson, “Famine in Slow Motion: A Case Study of Internal Displacement in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 2 (2000).

27. Some refugees use their resettlement funds given by the ROK government to bring additional family members out of the North. This practice is known as “chain refugees.” Kyung-Ae Park, “People’s Exit, Regime Stability, and North Korean Diplomacy,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 46.

28. A new facility was created in 2006, specifically for children. Located outside of Seoul, it caters to refugees 13–24 years old. Many of these children do not have parents. Justin McCurry, “North Korean Refugees Adapt to Life, School, and Prejudice in South Korea,” Christian Science Monitor (August 4, 2010).

29. “Humanitarian Assistance: Status of North Korean Refugee Resettlement and Asylum in the United States,” United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters (June 2010), http://www.gao .gov/new.items/d10691.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011).

30. “China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?” International Crisis Group—Asia Report, no. 112 (February 2006), p. 9.

31. John Pomfret, “North Koreans Export Girls for Marriage,” Washington Post, February 12, 1999.

32. Human Rights Watch, “The Invisible Exodus.”

33. For this entire story, see ibid., pp. 13–14.

34. Park, “People’s Exit,” p. 59.

35. Courtland Robinson, “North Korea: Migration Patterns and Prospects,” unpublished working paper for the CSIS-USC Korea Project (August 21, 2010), http://csis .org/files/publication/101215_North_Korea_Migration_Patterns.pdf (accessed January 12, 2011).

36. Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 94.

37. Hawk, “Exposing North Korea’s Prison Camps,” p. 63.

38. Peter Baker, “White House Puts Face on North Korean Human Rights Abuses,” Washington Post, April 16, 2006.

39. Yoshi Yamamoto, Taken!: North Korea’s Criminal Abduction of Citizens of Other Countries (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2011).

40. For excellent yet heartbreaking footage of these children from inside North Korea, see Children of the Secret State.

41. Briefing by representatives of USNGOs, a consortium of American NGOs operating in North Korea, March 2, 2011, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

42. Park, “People’s Exit,” p. 50.

43. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 73–76.

44. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations (December 10, 1948), http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (accessed January 3, 2010).

45. “The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” United Nations (December 16, 1966), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm (accessed January 3, 2010).

46. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea,” U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (2005), p. 9.

47. Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1999), p. 61.

48. For a complete list of the famines of the twentieth century, see Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, p. 7.

49. Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, p. 61.

50. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), p. 16.

51. Documents containing the text of an unusually candid speech by Kim Jong-il at Kim Il-sung University were subsequently smuggled out of the country. See Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, revised ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 395.

52. Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, p. 47.

53. Haggard and Noland, “Hunger and Human Rights,” p. 16.

54. Ibid.

55. Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, p. 27.

56. The other 30 to 40 percent live and work on the cooperative farms that fuel the PDS, and so they are allocated an annual stock of food directly from the farm.

57. Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, p. 55.

58. Ibid., p. 54.

59. “A Matter of Survival: The North Korean Government’s Control of Food and the Risk of Hunger,” Human Rights Watch, vol. 18, no. 3 (May 2006), p. 10.

60. Human Rights Watch, “The Invisible Exodus,” p. 8.

61. Hazel Smith, Hungry for Peace: International Security, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Change in North Korea (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), p. 87; Paul French, North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula (New York: Zed Books, 2007), p. 129.

62. Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, p. 56.

63. Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, p. 46.

64. Amnesty International, “Starved for Rights,” pp. 8–9.

65. Smith, Hungry for Peace, p. 67.

66. Ibid., p. 70.

67. Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, p. 25.

68. World Food Programme, “Full Report of the Evaluation of DPRK EMOPs 5959.00 and 5959.01—‘Emergency Assistance to Vulnerable Groups’—20 March-10 April 2000” (September 2000), p. 6.

69. Haggard and Noland, “Hunger and Human Rights,” p. 15.

70. Human Rights Watch, “The Invisible Exodus,” p. 10.

71. Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, pp. 72–73.

72. Amnesty International, “Starved for Rights,” p. 25.

73. World Food Programme, “Full Report of the Evaluation of DPRK EMOPs,” (2000), p. 18.

74. Human Rights Watch, “The Invisible Exodus,” p. 11.

75. Ibid., p. 27.

76. Smith, Hungry for Peace, p. 71; Eberstadt, The End of North Korea, p. 46.

77. Smith, Hungry for Peace, p. 92.

78. Amnesty International, “The Crumbling State of Healthcare in North Korea,” (2010), ASA 24/001/2010, p. 22, www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA24/001/2010 (accessed January 16, 2012).

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid., p. 23.

81. Ibid., pp. 11–12.

82. Ibid., pp. 5–6.

83. Ibid., p. 12.

84. Ibid., p. 12.

85. Smith, Hungry for Peace, p. 84.

86. Becker, Rogue Regime, p. 29.

87. French, North Korea, p. 130.

88. Children of the Secret State.

89. Amnesty International, “Starved for Rights,” p. 23.

90. Ibid.

91. Becker, Rogue Regime, p. 37.

92. Children of the Secret State.

93. “Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment—Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (October 30, 2003), p. 19.

94. “Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment—Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (November 22, 2004), p. 22.

95. “Tracking Progress on Child and Maternal Nutrition: A Survival and Development Priority,” UNICEF (November 2009), pp. 11, 104.

96. Haggard and Noland, “Hunger and Human Rights,” p. 14.

97. Amnesty International, “Starved for Rights,” p. 26.

98. All food aid statistics from “Food Aid Information System,” World Food Programme (2011), http://www.wfp.org/fais/ (accessed January 7, 2011).

99. Haggard and Noland, Famine in North Korea, pp. 93–95.

100. Haggard and Noland, “Hunger and Human Rights,” pp. 12, 96–97.

101. Mark E. Manyin and Mary-Beth Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R40095 (March 2010), p. 2.

102. Ibid., pp. 15–18.

103. Ibid., pp. 20–22.

104. “World Food Programme International Food Information System,” World Food Programme (2011), http://www.wfp.org/fais/ (accessed February 14, 2011).

105. Mark E. Manyin, “Food Crisis and North Korea’s Aid Diplomacy: Seeking the Path of Least Resistance,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 80.

106. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), p. 340.

107. “Humanitarian Assistance: Status of North Korean Refugee Resettlement and Asylum in the United States,” United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters (June 2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10691.pdf (accessed February 14, 2011).

108. “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” http://www.state .gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm (accessed January 31, 2011).

109. Woodward, Bush at War, p. 340.

110. Park, “People’s Exit,” p. 56.

111. “Half of North Korean Defectors’ Households Income Less than One Million Won a Month: Poll,” Yonhap News, February 16, 2011.

CHAPTER SIX: THE LOGIC OF DETERRENCE

1. Michael E. O’Hanlon and Mike M. Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea (Blacklick, Ohio: McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing, 2003), p. 59.

2. “Chapter 8: The Korean War, 1950–1953,” in Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2003 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 2005), p. 246. Available online at: http://www.history.army.mil/books/AMH-V2/AMH%20V2/chapter8.htm (accessed May 14, 2011). For the Koreans, it is: ROK soldiers—187,000 dead and 30,000 missing; ROK civilians—500,000 to 1 million dead; DPRK soldiers and civilians—1.5 million dead.

3. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: IISS, 2011), pp. 205–6.

4. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., Defiant Failed State: The North Korean Threat to International Security (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2010), p. 21.

5. In 1954, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) consisted of 225,590 personnel. Today (2011) that number has fallen to 28,500. See, Tim Kane, “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950–2003,” Heritage Foundation (October 27, 2004), http://www.heritage.org/re search/reports/2004/10/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003 (accessed April 21, 2011).

6. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, pp. 249–54.

7. Dennis C. Blair, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (February 2, 2010), http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_tes timony.pdf (accessed April 21, 2011), pp. 13–14.

8. Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York: New Press, 2004), p. 53.

9. O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, p. 174.

10. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, revised and updated ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 312, 325; Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 128–30, 217–18.

11. Cited in Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 288.

12. Personal interview, USFK officer, Washington, D.C., March 14, 2011.

13. Narushige Michishita, “The Future of North Korean Strategy,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 21, no. 1 (2009), p. 107; Koo Sub Kim, “Substance of North Korea’s Military Threats and the Security Environment in Northeast Asia,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, vol. 21, no. 3 (2009), p. 243.

14. Joseph Bermudez Jr., North Korean Special Forces (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Publishing Company, 1988), p. 62; Bechtol, Defiant Failed State, pp. 22–23.

15. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, p. 64.

16. Ibid., p. 62.

17. O’Hanlon and Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, p. 62.

18. “Kim Jong-Il Using Body Doubles in Appearances, Even Photos,” Worldtri bune.com (October 4, 2006), http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/ (accessed April 27, 2011).

19. C. Kenneth Quinones and Joseph Traggart, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding North Korea (New York: Alpha Books, 2003), p. 278.

20. Personal conversation with Hwang Jhang-yŏp, March 31, 2010, Washington, D.C.

21. Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 144–45.

22. Robert M. Gates, “Media Roundtable with Secretary Gates from Beijing, China,” Defense.gov (January 11, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/tran scripts/transcript .aspx?transcriptid=4751 (accessed April 18, 2011).

23. Cumings, North Korea, p. 89.

24. A heat shield for the Nodong missile is in operation, but this would not work on a longer-range ballistic missile. David Wright, “North Korea’s Missile Program” UCSUSA.org (2009), http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/north-koreas-missile-program.pdf (accessed April 25, 2011), pp. 6–7.

25. Daniel A. Pinkston, North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Program (Carlyle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), pp. 14–15.

26. Ibid., p. 15.

27. Becker, Rogue Regime, p. 160.

28. Nodong missiles have a range of up to 13,000 kilometers (8,080 mi) with a payload of 700–1,000 kilogram (1,543–2,204 lb). Wright, “North Korea’s Missile Program,” p. 4.

29. D. Wright and T. Postol, “A Post-Launch Examination of the Unha-2,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 29, 2009), http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/post-launch-examination-of-the-unha-2 (accessed May 14, 2011).

30. “Kim Jong Il Observes Launch of Satellite Kwangmyongsong-2,” KCNA (April 5, 2009), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200904/news05/20090405-12ee.html (accessed May 14, 2011).

31. “NORAD and USNORTHCOM Monitor North Korean Launch,” North American Aerospace Defense Command (April 5, 2009), http://www .norad.mil/News/ 2009/040509.html (accessed May 14, 2011).

32. Sharon A. Squassoni, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL31900 (November 28, 2006), pp. 1–17; Gaurav Kampani, “Second-Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea,” The Non-proliferation Review (Fall/Winter 2002), pp. 107–16.

33. Bechtol, Defiant Failed State, pp. 49–69.

34. Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), pp. 134–35.

35. Becker, Rogue Regime, p. 149; Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., “North Korea and Support to Terrorism,” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 3 (2010), pp. 45–54; Mark E. Manyin, “North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL30613 (June 29, 2010), pp. 22–25.

36. U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000—Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism” (April 30, 2001), http://www.state.gov/g/ct/rls/crt/2000/2441 .htm (accessed November 10, 2010).

37. Jeff Stein, “Wikileaks Documents: N. Korea Sold Missiles to Al-Qaeda, Taliban,” Washington Post, July 26, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2010/07/wiki_n_korea_sold_rockets_to_a.html (accessed January 16, 2012).

38. The other four are Angola, Egypt, Somalia, and Syria. See “Non-Member States,” OPCW (2011), http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/non-member-states/ (accessed May 3, 2011).

39. “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs,” International Crisis Group Asia Report, no. 167 (June 18, 2009), p. 7.

40. Bechtol, Defiant Failed State, p. 53.

41. Ibid., p. 149.

42. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,” Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 2 (March 1979), pp. 263–92.

43. “Servicepersons and Pyongyangites Hail Successful Nuclear Test,” KCNA (October 20, 2006), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200610/news10/21 .htm#1 (accessed May 2, 2011).

44. “DPRK Regards S. Korea’s Full Participation in PSI as Declaration of War against DPRK,” KCNA (May 27, 2009), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200905/news27/ 20090527-17ee.html (accessed May 2, 2011).

45. “Meeting Marked Anniversary of Assumption of Supreme Commander,” KCNA (December 23, 2009), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200912/news23/20091223-14ee.html (accessed May 2, 2011).

46. “DPRK Will Develop Friendly Relations with UN Member,” KCNA (October 2, 2010), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201010/news02/20101002-04ee.html (accessed May 2, 2011).

47. Rüdiger Frank, “Socialist Neoconservatism and North Korean Foreign Policy,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 34–35.

48. Cited in Chico Harlan, “North Korean Ruler and Heir Attend Parade” Washington Post, October 11, 2010.

49. “Meeting Marks Anniversary of KPA Supreme Commander,” KCNA (December 23, 2010), http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2010/201012/news23/20101223 -13ee.html (accessed May 2, 2011).

50. “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces U.S. Military Attack on Libya,” KCNA (March 22, 2011), http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed April 18, 2011).

51. Lee Myung-bak, “Address to the Nation by President Lee Myung-bak on the Shelling of Yeonpyeongdo,” Yonhap News, November 24, 2010, english.yonhapnews .co.kr/northkorea/2010/11/29/32/0401000000AEN20101129006400315F.html (accessed January 16, 2012) .

52. Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made a special trip to the ROK in the aftermath of the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling (December 7, 2010). Ostensibly, this visit was for the purpose of showing alliance solidarity, since rarely does the top military official in the U.S. government make a trip solely to Korea and Japan. But Mullen’s trip was also out of concern that the new ROK rules of engagement were too overzealous.

53. Victor D. Cha, “Testimony of Dr. Victor D. Cha Before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs,” House.gov (March 10, 2011), http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/cha031011.pdf (accessed April 18, 2011).

54. Personal interviews, ROK official and U.S. official, December 21, 2010, and December 30, 2010, Washington, D.C.

55. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, pp. 312, 325; Carter and Perry, Preventive Defense, pp. 128–30, 217–18.

56. Ibid.

CHAPTER SEVEN: COMPLETE, VERIFIABLE, AND IRREVERSIBLE DISMANTLEMENT (CVID)

1. Uzi Mahnaimi, “Israelis ‘Blew Apart Syrian Nuclear Cache,’ ” Sunday Times, September 16, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/arti cle2461421.ece (accessed October 1, 2007).

2. The information in the section above is based on briefings by U.S. intelligence officials as cited in the video “Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor at Al-Kibar,” available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1864/why-now. Also see Der Spiegel’s exposé: Erich Follath and Holger Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Reactor,” Der Spiegel (February 11, 2009), http://www.spie gel.de/international/world/0,1518,658663,00.html (accessed April 18, 2011); and Seymour Hersh, “A Strike in the Dark—Why Did Israel Bomb Syria?” New Yorker (February 11, 2008), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/02/11/080211fa_fact_hersh/?printable=true (accessed April 18, 2011); and Laura Rozen, “Operation Orchard,” Mother Jones (April 28, 2008), http://motherjones .com/mojo/2008/04/operation-orchard (accessed April 18, 2011).

3. Mary-Beth Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R40095 (January 20, 2011), p. 1.

4. “North Korea: Nuclear Weapons Program,” FAS (2006), http://www.fas .org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html (accessed April 18, 2011); Larry A. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL33590 (January 5, 2010); Mark E. Manyin and Mary-Beth Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R40095 (March 12, 2010); Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, revised and updated ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 249–80; Michael J. Mazaar, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), pp. 15–34; Charles L. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 165–89.

5. Leslie Gelb, “The Next Renegade State,” New York Times, April 10, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/10/opinion/foreign-affairs-the-next-renegade-state .html (accessed February 27, 2011).

6. Mary-Beth Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL34256 (January 20, 2011), p. 5.

7. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korea Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 331–32.

8. The other member countries/entities were: Australia, Argentina, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Indonesia, New Zealand, Poland, and Uzbekistan.

9. Zachary S. Davis, “Leading or Following?: The Role of KEDO and the Agreed Framework in Korea Policy,” Nautilus Institute (June 2000) http://www.nautilus .org/publications/books/dprkbb/agreedFramework/ (accessed April 20, 2011), p. 62.

10. Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, “Adjusting to the New Asia,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2003), pp. 119–31; Kent Calder, “The New Face of Northeast Asia,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2001), pp. 106–22.

11. Glenn Kessler, “North Korea May Have Sent Libya Nuclear Material, U.S. Tells Allies,” Washington Post, February 2, 2005; David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea,” New York Times, February 2, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/02/politics/02nukes.html (accessed April 18, 2011).

12. Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” p. 5.

13. U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks” (September 19, 2005), http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm (accessed April 18, 2011).

14. Christopher R. Hill, “North Korea—U.S. Statement,” National Defense University (September 19, 2005), http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/north korea/state/53499 .pdf (accessed April 18, 2011).

15. “Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Six-Party Talks,” KCNA (September 21, 2005), http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed April 18, 2011).

16. A pedantic issue I flag here is that almost all analyses have referred to BDA as a U.S. “financial sanction” that froze North Korean money. As my narrative shows, this is an incorrect characterization. The United States never froze any North Korean accounts. It issued a financial advisory to U.S. institutions to beware of business with BDA because of money-laundering concerns. The Macau monetary authorities then seized the North Korean accounts, and other banks around the world started to hold DPRK accounts suspect.

17. J. Michael McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” Senate.gov (February 5, 2008), http://intelligence.senate.gov/080205/mcconnell .pdf (accessed April 18, 2011).

18. ODNI News Release No. 19-06 at http://www.dni.gov/announcements/20061016_ release.pdf; and Mark Mazzetti, “Preliminary Samples Hint at North Korean Nuclear Test,” New York Times, October 14, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/14/world/asia/14nuke.html (accessed October 27, 2006).

19. Siegfried Hecker, “Report on North Korean Nuclear Program,” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University (November 15, 2006); Thom Shanker and David Sanger, “North Korean Fuel Identified as Plutonium,” New York Times, October 17, 2006, at http://www .nytimes.com/2006/10/17/world /asia/17diplo.html (accessed October 27, 2006).

20. The process of returning the money took much longer than anticipated and was hotly contested within the U.S. government as Treasury and State Department officials nearly came to blows in the St. Regis hotel in Beijing over the decision. The BDA funds were considered so tainted by the financial community that the only institution that could return the money to North Korea without fear of losing its reputation was the U.S. Federal Reserve.

21. Nikitin, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” p. 5.

22. “Five Years Later in North Korea,” New York Times, July 17, 2007.

23. “President Barack Obama’s Inaugural Address,” Whitehouse.gov (January 21, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/ (accessed March 29, 2011).

24. “DPRK Foreign Ministry Vehemently Refutes UNSC’s ‘Presidential Statement,’ ” KCNA, April 14, 2009.

25. Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on North Korea’s Declared Nuclear Test on May 25, 2009, http://www/dni/gov/press_releases /20090615_release.pdf (accessed January 16, 2012).

26. “UNSC Urged to Retract Anti-DPRK Steps,” KCNA (April 29, 2009), http://www .kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200904/news29/20090429-14ee.html (accessed April 18, 2011).

27. Niksch, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” p. 17.

28. “Five Years Later on North Korea,” New York Times, July 17, 2007.

29. Leon Sigal, “N. Korea: Fibs v. Facts,” Baltimore Sun, August 5, 2003.

30. “The North Korea Deal,” New York Times, June 27, 2008.

31. “Korean Paralysis,” New York Times, March 4, 2003; “The North Korean Challenge,” New York Times, February 11, 2005; “Going Nowhere on North Korea,” New York Times, July 16, 2005; “The U.N. Sideshow on North Korea,” New York Times, July 16, 2006; “Testing North Korea,” New York Times, November 5, 2006; “The Lesson of North Korea,” New York Times, February 14, 2007; “Five Years Later in North Korea,” New York Times, July 17, 2007; “Now He’s Ready to Deal,” New York Times, April 19, 2008; “The North Korea Deal,” New York Times, June 27, 2008.

32. “Next Steps with North Korea,” New York Times, August 5, 2009.

33. Leon Sigal, “A Bombshell That’s Actually an Olive Branch,” Los Angeles Times, October 18, 2002; and “N. Korea: Fibs v. Facts,” Baltimore Sun, August 5, 2003.

34. Georgy Toloraya, “Yadernyi poker v. Koree [Nuclear Poker in Korea],” Center for the Study of Contemporary Korea, Far Eastern Institute, Moscow, December 9, 2004, http://world.lib.ru/k/kim_o_i/a9628.shtml, cited in Leszek Buszynski, “Russia and North Korea,” Asian Survey, vol. 49, no. 5 (September/October 2009), pp. 809–30.

35. “Now He’s Ready to Deal,” New York Times, April 19, 2008.

36. Selig Harrison, Testimony Before the House Committee of Foreign Affairs (June 17, 2009), http://ciponline.org/asia/Jun17-Korea-Testimony.html (accessed January 16, 2012).

37. “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific (March 19, 1996), http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bureaus/eap/960319LordKorea.html (accessed July 18, 2010); Joel Wit, “United States and North Korea,” Policy Brief No. 74, Brookings Institution, 2001; and U.S. Department of State, “Background Notes: North Korea,” Bureau of Public Affairs, June 1996.

38. Erik Eckholm, “Where Most See Ramparts, North Korea Imagines a Wall,” New York Times, December 8, 1999.

39. “Korean War Accounting,” DTIC (2011), http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/korea/ (accessed April 19, 2011).

40. Mark E. Manyin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL31785 (May 26, 2005), pp. 28–29.

41. Robert L. Goldich, “POWs and MIAs: Status and Accounting Issues,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, IB92101 (April 14, 2003), p. 15.

42. Details based on discussions with Arnold Kanter, July 13, 2009, Washington, D.C. Also see Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, pp. 265–67; Wit, et al., Going Critical, pp. 11–13; Mazaar, North Korea and the Bomb, pp. 70–71; Chae-jin Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), pp. 135–36; Rinn-Sup Shinn, “The United States and the Two Koreas: An Uncertain Triangle,” in Young Jeh Kim, ed., The New Pacific Community in the 1990s (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 91.

43. Winston Lord, “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula,” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, April 1, 1996, pp. 165–70; and Kelly Smith Tunney, “U.S. Reportedly Gives North Korea Deadline for Opening Nuclear Facilities,” Associated Press, January 23, 1992.

44. For example, see Snyder, “North Korea’s Nuclear Program,” pp. 59–61; and Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, pp. 266–67.

45. Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter, “The Time for Temporizing Is Over,” Washington Post, June 15, 1994.

46. Marion V. Creekmore Jr., A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker, and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), p. 176.

47. “U.S.-DPRK Joint Communique,” Nautilus Institute (October 12, 2000), http://www.nautilus.org/publications/books/dprkbb/agreements/ (accessed April 18, 2011).

48. Madeleine K. Albright, “Press Conference, Koryo Hotel” (October 24, 2000), usinfo.org/wf-archive/2000/001024/epf204.htm (accessed January 16, 2012).

49. Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), pp. 53–55.

50. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), p. 424.

51. Pritchard, Failed Diplomacy.

52. Bush, Decision Points, p. 423.

53. Quote by Derek Mitchell in “Bush Letter to Kim Jong-il Shows Policy Change,” USA Today (December 6, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-12-06-bush-letter_N.htm (accessed March 18, 2011).

54. “Transcript: Fourth Democratic Debate,” New York Times, July 24, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/24/us/politics/24transcript.html?pagewanted=all (accessed April 20, 2011).

55. “Transcript: First Presidential Debate,” CBS News (September 26, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/06/politics/2008debates/main4504409.shtml (accessed April 20, 2011).

56. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of Electronic Information and Publications, “U.S.-Asia Relations: Indispensable to Our Future,” Secretary Clinton’s remarks (February 13, 2009), http://www.state .gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/117333.htm; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs: Office of Electronic Information and Publications, “Putting the Elements of Smart Power into Practice,” Secretary Clinton’s remarks (February 19, 2009), http://www.state .gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/119 411.htm.

57. Adam Gabbatt, “Obama Sends Letter to Kim Jong-il,” Guardian (December 16, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/16/obama-letter-kim-jong-il (accessed March 17, 2011); “Obama Wrote Personal Letter to Kim Jong-il,” CBS News (December 16, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/16/politics/washingtonpost/main5986078.shtml (accessed March 17, 2011).

58. Ian Rinehart, “The Value of Strategic Patience,” unpublished paper, Georgetown University, March 3, 2011.

59. U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks” (September 19, 2005), http://www.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm (accessed June 20, 2011).

60. Senate, Foreign Relations Committee hearing, “North Korea: Back at the Brink?” June 11, 2009.

61. An earlier version of this argument appeared in the “What Do They Really Want: Obama’s North Korea Conundrum,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 4 (2009), pp. 119–38.

62. For seismic activity, see U.S. Geological Survey, ov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Quakes /us2009hbaf.php#summary. For assessments of the October 2006 and May 2009 tests, see M. B. Kalinowski, O. Ross, “Data Analysis and Interpretation of the North Korean Nuclear Test Explosion of 9 October 2006.” INESAP Information Bulletin, no. 27, pp. 39–43 (http://www.ine sap.org/bulletin27/art12.htm); Martin Kalinowski, “Second Nuclear Test Conducted by North Korea on 25 May 2009 Fact Sheet,” Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace Research (ZNF), University of Hamburg (www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/177/Kalin owski.pdf).

63. For examples of the “up the ante” argument, see John Glionna, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test May Be for Kim’s Legacy,” Los Angeles Times, May 26, 2009.

64. It is worth noting that while the North Koreans learn from their tests, the United States learns a great deal more about the state of their programs and their level of development. See Richard Halloran, “How U.S. Exploited N. Korea Missile Tests,” Honolulu Advertiser, July 12, 2009.

65. “Agreed Framework Between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” October 21, 1994, http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework .pdf.

66. See statement by Evans Revere before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (June 11, 2009), http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/Rever eTestimony09 0611p.pdf.

67. “U.S.-DPRK Joint Communique,” October 12, 2000, Washington, D.C., available at http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/2000/dprk-001012a.htm.

68. Victor Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2002).

CHAPTER EIGHT: NEIGHBORS

1. Xiaobing Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2007), p. 105.

2. S. B. Thomas, “The Chinese Communists’ Economic and Cultural Agreement with North Korea,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1954), p. 63.

3. Thomas P. Bernstein and Andrew J. Nathan, “The Soviet Union, China, and Korea,” in Gerald L. Curtis and Sung-joo Han, eds., The U.S.–South Korea Alliance: Evolving Patterns and Security Relations (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 99.

4. Bernstein and Nathan, “The Soviet Union,” p. 99.

5. Joseph S. Chung, “The Economy,” in Andrea Matles Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1994).

6. Chen Jian, “Limits of the ‘Lips and Teeth’ Alliance: An Historical Review of Chinese–North Korean Relations,” Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program Special Report, no. 115 (September 2003), p. 6.

7. Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 192.

8. Chin O. Chung, Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow: North Korea’s Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1958–1975 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1978), p. 129.

9. Bernd Schaefer, “North Korean ‘Adventurism’ and China’s Long Shadow, 1966–1972,” Woodrow Wilson Center Cold War Archives Project, Working Paper 44 (October 2004), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/swp44.pdf (accessed December 19, 2010), pp. 9–13.

10. Suh, Kim Il Sung, pp. 192–93.

11. Jasper Becker, Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 150.

12. Victor Cha, Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia (New York: Columbia, 2009), pp. 94–95.

13. The 2000 bid was ultimately unsuccessful for China. While the ROK may have been able to forget about Tiananmen, the IOC could not, and eventually awarded the 2000 games to Sydney, Australia.

14. Joint Communiqué cited in Chae-jin Lee, “South Korean Foreign Relations Face the Globalization Challenge,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea’s Globalization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 174.

15. Nicholas D. Kristof, “Chinese and South Koreans Formally Establish Relations,” New York Times, August 24, 1992.

16. “Growing Ties Herald Fresh Era for Asia,” South China Morning Post, September 29, 1992.

17. Victor D. Cha, “South Korea: Anchored or Adrift?” in Richard J. Ellings, Aaron L. Friedberg, and Michael Willis, eds., Strategic Asia 2003–04: Fragility and Crisis (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004); David C. Kang, “Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations,” International Security, vol. 27, no. 3 (Winter 2003/2004), pp. 178–79; G. John Ikenberry, “American Hegemony and East Asian Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 58, no. 3 (September 2004), p. 362; Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, “Adjusting to the New Asia,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2003), pp. 119–31; Patrick M. Morgan, “The U.S.-ROK Alliance: An American View,” International Journal of Korean Studies, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2007), pp. 17–18.

18. Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2009), p. 11.

19. Mark E. Manyin, “Food Crisis and North Korea’s Aid Diplomacy: Seeking the Path of Least Resistance,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges of North Korean Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 76.

20. Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The Inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), pp. 292–93.

21. Ibid., p. 295.

22. Ibid., p. 296.

23. The Article 41 designation meant mandatory implementation of the sanctions, but not with U.N. authorization to use force.

24. Chinoy, Meltdown, p. 302.

25. Ibid., p. 303.

26. Marcus Noland, “The (Non)-Impact of U.N. Sanctions on North Korea,” Asia Policy, vol. 7 (January 2009), pp. 61–88.

27. “N. Korean Submarine ‘Left Base Before the Cheonan Sunk,’ ” Chosun Ilbo, March 31, 2010, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/03/31/2010033101024 .html (accessed May 24, 2011); “N. Korean Top Leadership ‘Closely Involved in Cheonan Sinking,’ ” Chosun Ilbo, May 27, 2010, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/05/27/2010052701465.html (accessed May 24, 2011).

28. Personal conversation, Blue House official, May 14, 2010. This account of the meeting was told to me by a Blue House official who was present at the meeting.

29. Unpublished survey by the ASAN Institute for Policy Studies, November 27, 2010.

30. Drew Thompson, Silent Partners: Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea, U.S. Korea Institute at SAIS, February 2011; and John S. Park, “North Korea Inc.: Gaining Insights into North Korean Regime Stability from Recent Commercial Activities,” United States Institute of Peace Working Paper, April 22, 2009.

31. John C. Wu, “The Mineral Industry of North Korea,” 2005 Minerals Yearbook, North Korea, U.S. Geological Survey (June 2007), p. 151.

32. Goohoon Kwon, “A Unified Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper 188, September 21, 2009, p. 10.

33. Thompson, Silent Partners, p. 53.

34. Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, “China-Korea Relations: China Embraces South and North, but Differently,” Comparative Connections, vol. 11, no. 4 (January 2010).

35. Desiree Polyak, “Molybdenum,” 2008 Minerals Yearbook, U.S. Geological Survey (January 2010), pp. 106–7.

36. Thompson, Silent Partners, p. 58

37. Ibid., pp. 50–51.

38. Leo Lewis and Tim Reid, “Kim Jong-Il’s Son ‘Made Secret Visit to China,’ ” Times, June 17, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6508436 .ece (accessed May 21, 2011); Justin McCurry and Jonathan Watts, “North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il ‘Visiting China with His Son,’ ” Guardian, August 26, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/26/north-korean-leader-china (accessed May 21, 2011).

39. Park Hyeong-jung, “North Korea’s Foreign and Domestic Policy and Its Relations with China,” KINU, June 15, 2010 (unpublished paper).

40. Thompson, Silent Partners, pp. 33–34

41. Manyin, “Food Crisis,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges, p. 81.

42. Thompson, Silent Partners, p. 28.

43. David C. Kang, “ ‘China Rising’ and Its Implications for North Korea’s China Policy,” in Kyung-Ae Park, ed., New Challenges, p. 121.

44. Up until the time of writing (June 2011), Bosworth’s sole trip to Moscow was December 14, 2009.

45. Seung-Ho Joo, “Russia and the Korean Peace Process,” in Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, eds., The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), pp. 142–44.

46. Jacob Neufeld and George M. Watson Jr., eds., Coalition Air Warfare in the Korean War, 1950–1953 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force Historical Foundation, 2005), p. 61; Zhang Xiaoming, Red Wings Over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), pp. 138–39.

47. Joseph P. Ferguson, “Russia’s Role on the Korean Peninsula and Great Power Relations in Northeast Asia,” NBR Analysis, vol. 4, no. 1 (June 2003), p. 35.

48. Byung-joon Ahn, “South Korean–Soviet Relations: Contemporary Issues and Prospects,” Asian Survey, vol. 31, no. 9 (September 1991), p. 816; Coit D. Blacker, “The USSR and Asia in 1989: Recasting Relationships,” Asian Survey, vol. 30, no. 1 (January 1990), p. 2.

49. Roy Kim, “Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 3 (July 1988).

50. Gary Lee, “Gorbachev Announces Reduction of 6,000 in Afghanistan Force,” Washington Post, July 29, 1986.

51. Kim, “Gorbachev and the Korean Peninsula.”

52. Gorbachev’s February 1988 announcement that all troops would be withdrawn from Afghanistan within a year took care of that obstacle, and a visit by Foreign Minister Qian to Moscow in December 1988 settled the Cambodia problem, leaving just the Sino-Soviet border “obstacle” to be surmounted. See John Garver, “The ‘New Type’ of Sino-Soviet Relations,” Asian Survey, vol. 29, no. 12 (December 1989), pp. 1136–52.

53. Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “South Korea’s Nordpolitik and the Efficacy of Asymmetric Positive Sanctions,” Korea Observer, vol. 37, no. 4 (2006), pp. 605–42.

54. Viktor Levin, “Shevardnadze Arrives in DPRK, Talks ‘Unlikely to Be Simple,’ ” Moscow Home Service, September 2, 1990.

55. Asahi Shimbun, January 1, 1991, cited in Wada Haruki, “The North Korean Nuclear Problem, Japan, and the Peace of Northeast Asia,” Japan Focus (March 10, 2006), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Haruki-Wada/2376 (accessed May 23, 2011).

56. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, revised and updated ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2003), p. 213.

57. Lee Young-Hoon, “An Analysis of the Effect of North Korea’s International Trade and Inter-Korean Trade on Its Economic Growth,” Bank of Korea Economic Papers, vol. 8, no. 1 (2005), pp. 175–211; UNSTAT; KOTRA.

58. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 28.

59. Nicholas Eberstadt, The North Korean Economy: Between Crisis and Catastrophe (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2007), pp. 75–76.

60. Joseph S. Chung, “The Economy,” in Andrea Matles Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1994).

61. Stephen Handelman, “Gorbachev Wins More Leverage in Asia,” Toronto Star, June 8, 1990.

62. Joseph E. Yang and Eleanor Randolph, “Gorbachev, Roh to Seek Full Ties; Moscow-Seoul Accord Could Realign Asia,” Washington Post, June 5, 1990.

63. “Gorbachev Report on Far East Trip,” BBC Summary of World Politics, April 29, 1991.

64. Seung-Ho Joo, “Russia and the Korean Peace Process,” in Kwak and Joo, eds., The Korean Peace Process and the Four Powers, p. 147.

65. “The Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System,” Bank of Korea (2011), http://ecos .bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp (accessed May 23, 2011).

66. Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on a Korean Airliner (KAL 007),” Rescue007 .org (September 5, 1983), http://www.rescue007.org/speech.htm (accessed May 29, 2011).

67. In fact, in a diplomatic gaffe, it turned out the boxes that Yeltsin handed over were missing the crucial flight data recorder (FDR) tape that stored all of the necessary information. This tape would be handed over to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in January of 1993.

68. Jung Sung-ki, “Seoul, Moscow Discuss Swapping Arms for Debts,” Korea Times, September 12, 2007.

69. Woo Pyung-kyun, “NK-Russia Ties Under Medvedev’s Government,” Vantage Point, vol. 31, no. 8 (August 2008), pp. 20–23.

70. “DPRK-Russia Joint Declaration Released,” KCNA (July 20, 2000), http://www .kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm (accessed May 23, 2011).

71. Yoshinori Takeda, “Putin’s Foreign Policy Towards North Korea,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, vol. 6, no. 2 (2006), pp. 192.

72. “Chronology of U.S.-DPRK Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy: December 1985–June 2003,” Armscontrol.org (June 2003), http://www.armscontrol .org/pdf/dprkchron .pdf (accessed May 23, 2011), p. 4.

73. Seung-Ho Joo, “Moscow-Pyongyang Relations Under Kim Jong-il: High Hopes and Sober Reality,” Pacific Focus, vol. 24, no. 1 (April 2009), p. 118.

74. One of Putin’s priorities was to organize a major debt resettlement campaign for Russia. The ministry of finance reached a debt restructuring agreement with the ROK in 2003 ($660 million in interest written off by Seoul, $300 million paid in armaments, and $1.4 billion restructured and extended to 2025). In 2005 it reached agreement with China on Soviet-era debts, and in 2006 it paid off $3.59 billion to Japan. See Alexandre Mansourov, “Russia’s Advances and Setbacks in Northeast Asia Under President Putin (1999–2007),” in Hans J. Geissmann, ed., Security Handbook 2008: Emerging Powers in East Asia: China, Russia and India: Local Conflicts and Regional Security Building in Asia’s Northeast (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2008), p. 117.

75. Michael J. Mazaar, “Kim Jong-il: Strategy and Psychology,” Korea Economic Institute Academic Paper Series, On Korea, no. 1 (2006), p. 8.

76. “Kim Jong Il: Bow When You Don’t Say That Name,” Christian Science Monitor, March 14, 2003, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0314/p11s01-cogn.html (accessed May 26, 2011).

77. Tadashi Ito, “PRC Source Cited on Putin Rejecting Kim Chŏng-il Request to Host Talks in Russia,” Sankei Shimbun, September 9, 2003.

78. Andrew E. Kramer, “Dmitry A. Medvedev: Young Technocrat of the Post-Communist Era,” New York Times, December 11, 2007, http://www.ny times.com/2007/12/11/world/europe/11medvedev.html (accessed May 27, 2011).

79. Yong-Chool Ha and Beon-Shik Shin, Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), p. 10. Available online at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub747.pdf (accessed May 26, 2011).

80. Georgy Toloraya, “The Six-Party Talks: A Russian Perspective,” Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no. 4 (2008), pp. 45–69.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid., p. 47.

83. “No Plans for N. Korea to Give Up Six-Nation Talks—Deputy Russian FM,” RIA Novosti (October 15, 2006), http://en.rian.ru/world/20061015/54822806.html (accessed May 23, 2011).

84. U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, Beijing, September 19, 2005,” http://www.state.gov/p/eap/re gional/c15455 .htm (accessed May 23, 2011), Clause 1, Paragraph 3.

85. Mark Manyin, “Japan–North Korea Relations: Selected Issues,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL 32161(November 26, 2003).

86. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2011 (London: IISS, 2011), p. 250.

87. “Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention,” International Crisis Group (ICG) Asia Report, no. 100 (June 27, 2005), p. 2.

88. “Chaeoe Tongp’o Hyŏnhwang” [Current Status of Overseas Compatriots], MOFAT.go.kr (2011), http://www.mofat.go.kr/consul/overseascitizen/com patriotcondition /index.jsp (accessed June 2, 2011).

89. “Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention,” p. 3.

90. Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, p. 221.

91. Marcus Noland, Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000), p. 105.

92. There were about 6,500 Japanese spouses of Korean nationals who had been placed in Japan during the occupation period as part of labor conscription policies during the Pacific War. At the end of the war, many of these Koreans in Japan chose to return to their homeland, bringing their Japanese brides with them.

93. To National Security Adviser Steve Hadley’s credit, a number of these ideas did come to fruition, including not only Graceland but later trips by President Bush for summits in historic ancient cities of Kyŏng-ju, Korea, and Kyoto, Japan.

94. Kidnapped!: The Japan–North Korea Abduction Cases, directed by Melissa Kyung-ju Lee (Australia: The Australian Film Commission, 2005).

95. Yoshi Yamamoto, Taken!: North Korea’s Criminal Abduction of Citizens of Other Countries (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2011), p. 66.

96. “Woman May Be No. 17 on Abductee List,” Japan Times, November 11, 2006.

97. Unmesh Kher, “Accounted for at Last,” Time (October 3, 2002), http://www.time .com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,354086,00.html (accessed June 2, 2011).

98. Kidnapped!, directed by Melissa Kyung-ju Lee.

99. “Terrorism by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” NPA.go.jp (2005), http://www.npa.go.jp/keibi/kokutero1/english/0401.html (accessed June 2, 2011).

100. “Chapter 6: Just Cry When You Feel Like It,” in The Families (Washington, D.C.: Reach, 2005), pp. 11–12.

101. “Terrorism by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”

102. “Chapter 8: A Letter from Ms. Soga,” in The Families, p. 6.

103. “Chapter 4: She Is Our Strong Ally,” in The Families, p. 8.

104. “Chapter 5: A Fight to Protect Children,” in The Families, p. 13.

105. Kidnapped!, directed by Melissa Kyung-ju Lee.

106. See “Abductions of Japanese Citizens by North Korea,” MOFA.go.jp (2011), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/abduction/pdfs/abduc tions_en.pdf (accessed June 2, 2011).

107. From about March 2003 until its decision in December 2003, Britain had been in secret talks with Muammar Qaddafi’s regime to give up Libya’s WMD programs to the United States.

108. “G8 Foreign Minister’s Meeting, Summary of the G8 Presidency,” G8 Information Centre (May 23, 2003), http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/foreign/fm230503.htm (accessed May 23, 2011).

109. In 2008, Bush took North Korea off the terrorism list in the course of DPRK nuclear dismantlement, even though the abductions issue had not been resolved, on the legal grounds that there was no evidence of recent DPRK terrorist-related activities or support for terrorist organizations.

CHAPTER NINE: APPROACHING UNIFICATION

1. Hong Soon-young, “Thawing Korea’s Cold War: The Path to Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 3 (May/June 1999), p. 10.

2. For a well-informed critical treatment of the Sunshine Policy, see Donald Kirk, Korea Betrayed: Kim Dae Jung and Sunshine (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

3. Figure is from government sources quoted in “South Korea Paid Astronomical Sums to North Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, December 3, 2010.

4. Don Kirk, “South Korean Leader Says Move Was Meant to Aid ‘Sunshine’ Policy: Payment to North Puts Seoul on the Defensive,” New York Times, January 31, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/31/news/31iht-a1_43 .html (accessed May 29, 2011); Kirk, Korea Betrayed, pp. 157–58.

5. “N. Korea to Extort New Demands for Kaesong Complex,” Chosun Ilbo, June 12, 2009.

6. Jay Lefkowitz, “Freedom for All Koreans,” Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2006.

7. “North Korea: Workers’ Rights at the Kaesong Industrial Complex,” Human Rights Watch Background Briefing Paper, no. 1 (October 2006).

8. Shin Hye-son, “Mt. Kumgang Tour Gains Popularity Among Honeymooners, Group Tourists,” Korea Herald, December 1, 1998.

9. Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, “North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL32493 (January 22, 2010), p. 32.

10. See Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin, “The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL34093 (March 11, 2011), summary; Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, “North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis,” p. 47.

11. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, “North Korea’s External Economic Relations,” PIIE Working Paper Series, WP 07-7 (August 2007), pp. 40–41.

12. Bill Powell, “A Korean Killing with Terrible Timing,” Time (July 13, 2008), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1822310,00.html (accessed June 1, 2011).

13. Roh Moo-hyun quoted in Kang In-duk, “Toward Peace and Prosperity: The New Government’s North Korea Policy,” East Asian Review, vol. 15, no. 1 (Spring 2003), p. 3.

14. “South-North Joint Declaration, June 15, 2000,” USIP (June 15, 2000), http://www .usip.org/publications/peace-agreements-north-korea-south-korea (accessed May 29, 2011).

15. “2 Korean Leaders Enjoy Soaring Popularity After Summit,” Korea Times, June 19, 2000.

16. For examples, see Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth, “Adjusting to the New Asia,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2003), pp. 119–31; Kent Calder, “The New Face of Northeast Asia,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2001), pp. 106–22.

17. Germany data from Holger Wolf, “Korean Unification: Lessons from Germany,” in Marcus Noland, ed., Economic Integration of the Korean Peninsula, Special Report 10 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998), pp. 168–69; Korean data from “Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System,” BOK.or.kr (2011), http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp (accessed May 30, 2011).

18. South Korea went from an “A1” rating down to a “Ba1” rating for its long-term sovereign credit rating. See Suduk Kim, “Currency Crisis in Korea—When and Why It Happened,” Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, vol. 7, p. 13.

19. Deok Ryung Yoon, “The Economic Impacts of a North Korean Collapse,” IIRI Working Paper Series, no. 7 (October 2010).

20. Kim Dae Jung, “Nobel Lecture,” Nobelprize.org (December 10, 2000), http://nobel prize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2000/dae-jung-lecture .html (accessed May 31, 2011).

21. Samuel S. Kim, “North Korea in 1999: Bringing the Grand Chollima March Back In,” Asian Survey, vol. 40, no. 1 (January/February 2000), pp. 151–63; Samuel S. Kim, “North Korean Informal Politics,” in Lowell Dittmer, et al., eds., Informal Politics in East Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 237–68.

22. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, revised and updated ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 15–16, 23–24.

23. Ibid., p. 25.

24. On tethering adversaries in international relations, see Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 21–24.

25. Entire document can be seen at “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between South and North Korea,” UCLA (February 19, 1992), http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/docu ments/korea-agreement .htm#CHAPTER%203 (accessed May 30, 2011).

26. Entire document can be seen at “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” FAS (February 19, 1992), http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/1992 /920219-D4129.htm (accessed May 30, 2011).

27. The per capita GDP for the West was $20,887, while for the East it was $7,300. See Wolf, “Korean Unification: Lessons from Germany,” pp. 168–69.

28. Becky A. Gates, “The Economy,” in Stephen R. Burant, ed., East Germany: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1987). Can be viewed online at: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/gxtoc.html (accessed May 31, 2011).

29. Susan Larson, “Foreign Policy” in “Government and Politics,” in Burant, East Germany.

30. Wolf, “Korean Unification: Lessons from Germany,” p. 170.

31. Population statistics from “World Development Indicators,” World Bank (2011), http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed May 30, 2011); GDP statistics from BOK.or.kr (2011).

32. For comprehensive lists of a number of the studies on costs of unification see Marcus Noland, Sherman Robinson, Li-Gang Liu, “The Costs and Benefits of Korean Unification: Alternate Scenarios,” Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 8 (August 1998), p. 802; and Yoon, “The Economic Impacts of a North Korean Collapse,” pp. 13–15.

33. Charles Wolf Jr. and Kamil Akramov, North Korean Paradoxes: Circumstances, Costs, and Consequences of Unification (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2005).

34. “Korean Unification to Cost Over $3 Trillion,” Korea Herald, September 14, 2010.

35. Hong, “Thawing Korea’s Cold War,” p. 10.

36. “N. Korean Envoys Visit South to Pay Respect for Former President,” Chosun Ilbo, August 22, 2009.

37. James Atlas, “What Is Fukuyama Saying? And to Whom Is He Saying It?” New York Times Magazine (October 22, 1989); Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest (Summer 1989).

38. This section is adapted from an earlier version published in Orbis: Victor D. Cha, “The End of History: ‘Neojuche Revivalism’ and Korean Unification,” Orbis, vol. 55, no. 2 (Spring 2011), pp. 290–97.

39. I do not deny that there are economic risks that affect the discount, including a highly leveraged country both in terms of household and corporate debt. Korea also has active labor unions that strike six times more, on average, than in Japan. But the North Korea threat is undeniably a significant factor.

40. “Seoul Stocks End 0.34 Percent Lower on Geopolitical Fears,” Yonhap News, March 29, 2010, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr (accessed May 31, 2011).

41. “Stocks, Currency Cut Losses After N. Korean Attack,” Yonhap News, November 24, 2010, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr (accessed May 31, 2011).

42. Nicholas Eberstadt, “Hastening Korean Unification,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 82–83.

43. Ibid., p. 83.

44. “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” Whitehouse.gov (June 16, 2009), http://www.whitehouse .gov/ (accessed May 31, 2011).

45. Victor Cha and David Kang, Approaching Korean Unification: What We Learn from Other Cases (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2011); Report available online at: http://csis .org/files/publication/101217_Cha_ApproachingUnifi cation_WEB.pdf (accessed June 6, 2011).

46. Yoon, “The Economic Impacts of a North Korean Collapse,” pp. 13–14.

47. North Korea’s territory is 120,538 square kilometers (46,539 sq mi) while that of the South is 99,720 square kilometers (38,502 sq mi).

48. The length of North Korea’s roadways totals 25,554 kilometers (15,870 mi), whereas South Korea’s total sits at 103,029 kilometers (64,020 mi). The CIA World Factbook, CIA (2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed June 6, 2011).

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.

51. South Korea is estimated to have 19.289 million landlines plus 47.944 million cell phones. North Korea is believed to have 1.18 million landlines plus an additional 450,000 cell phones. CIA (2011); “Mobile Phone Use Growing in North Korea,” Chosun Ilbo. April 9, 2011, http://english.cho sun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/04/09/2011040900314.html (accessed June 7, 2011).

52. In 2010, South Korea’s oil and gas pipeline length was 3,003 kilometers (1,865 mi). North Korea’s total was just 154 kilometers (95 mi). CIA (2011).

53. Economist Intelligence Unit Special Report, no. M212 (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, April 1992), p. 102.

54. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2011 (London: IISS, 2011), p. 249.

55. ROK military figure from ibid., p. 251.

56. Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Reunification (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 112, 122.

57. Kang-suk Rhee, “Korea’s Unification: The Applicability of the German Experience,” Asian Survey, vol. 33, no. 4 (April 1993), p. 371.

58. “Defector Among Us: What Does She Look Like?” Joongang Ilbo, October 19, 2011, http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2927327 (accessed June 6, 2011).

59. Hwang-ju Lee, “Inadequate Training, Unrealistic Expectations,” DailyNK, August 21, 2010, http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00400&num=6713 (accessed June 6, 2011).

60. “Defector Among Us,” Joongang Ilbo, October 19, 2011.

CHAPTER TEN: THE END IS NEAR

1. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956–1961 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962).

2. I am grateful to Nick Anderson for his research support on this section.

3. Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no. 1 (March 1959), pp. 69–105; Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, “How Development Leads to Democracy: What We Know About Modernization,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 88, no. 2 (March/April 2009), pp. 33–41.

4. Eric Goldstein, “A Middle-Class Revolution,” Foreign Policy (January 18, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/18/a_middle_class_revolution?page =full (accessed May 10, 2011); David Brooks, “The Forty Percent Nation,” New York Times, February 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes .com/2011/02/06/opinion/06brooks .html (accessed May 10, 2011).

5. GDP per capita figures and life expectancy from “World Bank Open Data,” World Bank (2011), http://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed May 10, 2011); Human Development ratings from “UN Human Development Reports,” UNDP (2011), http://hdr .undp.org/en/ (accessed May 10, 2011).

6. Francis Fukuyama, “Is China Next?” Wall Street Journal, March 12, 2011, http://online.wsj.com (accessed May 10, 2011).

7. Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 53–56.

8. “World Economic Outlook Database,” IMF (2011), http://www.imf.org/ex ternal/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed May 10, 2011).

9. Real GDP per capita is a measure of the average income per individual in society adjusted for inflation.

10. All Real GDP per capita figures from IMF.org (2011).

11. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 2 (April 2002), pp. 51–65.

12. “Freedom in the World 2011,” Freedom House (2011), http://www.freedomhouse .org/template.cfm?page=594 (accessed May 10, 2011).

13. Ellen Knickmeyer, “The Arab World’s Youth Army,” Foreign Policy (January 27, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/27/the_arab_world_s_youth_army (accessed May 10, 2011).

14. Bobby Ghosh, “Rap, Rage, and Revolution: Inside the Arab Youth Quake,” Time (February 17, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2049808,00 .html (accessed May 10, 2011).

15. Median age shows the distribution of age in a population. It essentially divides a population into two equal halves; half being older than the given age and half being younger. And so, in the case of Yemen, half of its population is eighteen or younger, the other half being eighteen and older.

16. All demographic and employment figures from The World Factbook, CIA (2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed May 10, 2011).

17. Cell phone and Internet penetration data from The World Factbook (2011).

18. All literacy data from “World Bank Open Data,” World Bank (2011).

19. Hugh Miles, “The Al Jazeera Effect,” Foreign Policy (February 8, 2011), http://www .foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/08/the_al_jazeera_effect (accessed June 8, 2011).

20. “ICT Indicators,” Arab Information and Communications Technology Organization (2008), http://www.aicto.org/index.php?id=432&L=0 (accessed June 8, 2011).

21. “Televisions Per Capita by Country,” Nationmaster.com (2011), http://www .nation master.com/graph/med_tel_percap-media-televisions-per-capita (accessed June 8, 2011).

22. Paul R. Pillar, “How Does a Ruler Stay in Power?” National Interest (April 7, 2011), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/autocracy/how-does-ruler-stay-power-5133 (accessed May 10, 2011).

23. All EIU data from “Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in Retreat,” EIU (2011), http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_ 2010_web.pdf (accessed May 10, 2011).

24. “World Bank World Governance Indicators,” World Bank (2011), http://info.world bank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed May 10, 2011).

25. “World Bank Open Data,” World Bank (2011).

26. UNDP, “U.N. Human Development.”

27. The next-closest military service terms are in Vietnam (24–48 months), Chad (36 months), Egypt (12–36 months), and Venezuela (30 months). See The World Factbook (2011); International Insititute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2011 (London: IISS, 2011).

28. The Military Balance, p. 249.

29. “Televisions per Capita,” Nationmaster.com.

30. “Orascom Signs Mobile Phone Deal with North Korea,” New York Times, November 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/technology/15iht-orascom .4.18698081.html (accessed June 7, 2011).

31. Bill Powell, “The Capitalist Who Loves North Korea,” Fortune (September 15, 2009), http://money.cnn.com (accessed June 7, 2011).

32. “Freedom in the World 2011,” Freedomhouse.org.

33. “Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2010,” EIU.com.

34. “World Governance Indicators,” World Bank (2011); “Freedom of the Press 2011,” Freedom House (2011), http://freedomhouse.org/template .cfm?page=668 (accessed June 7, 2011).

35. Yossi Shain, “Mexican-American Diaspora’s Impact on Mexico,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 114, no. 4 (Winter 1999–2000), pp. 661–91.

36. Survey of 297 NK defectors (Seoul: Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Seoul National University, July 24, 2008).

37. Inside North Korea, directed by Peter Yost (USA: National Geographic Television, 2007).

38. Andrew Salmon, “North Koreans Escape Freedom but Still Hold Kim Jong Il Dear,” The Times, May 29, 2009.

39. “Number of N. Korean Defectors in S. Korea Tops 21,000,” Yonhap News, May 14, 2011, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/ (accessed June 4, 2011); “Settlement Support for Dislocated North Koreans,” Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification (2011), http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/eng/default .jsp?pgname=AFFhumanitarian_settlement (accessed June 7, 2011).

40. Park Hyeong Jung, “How Can We Move North Korea?” unpublished paper for the Fourth Korea Institute for National Unification–U.S. Institute of Peace Washington Workshop, March 10, 2011; and “NK Tightens IT Gadget Control to Block Outside Info,” Korea Herald, April 1, 2011.

41. “Kim Jong-il ‘Has Nightmares of Being Stoned by His People,’ ” Chosun Ilbo, March 28, 2011, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/03/28/2011032801124 .html (accessed June 7, 2011).

42. Nina Hachigian, “The Internet and Power in One-Party East Asian States,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3 (2002), pp. 41–58; Ko Kyungmin, Heejin Lee, and Seungkwon Jang, “The Internet Dilemma and Control Policy,” Korean Journal of Defense Analyses, vol. 21, no. 3 (2009), pp. 279–95; and “North Korea Takes to Twitter and YouTube,” New York Times, August 16, 2010.

43. Andrei Lankov, “Pyongyang Strikes Back: North Korean Policies of 2002–08 and Attempts to Reverse ‘De-Stalinization from Below,’ ” Asia Policy, no. 8 (July 2009), pp. 61–62.

44. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, “Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea,” International Security, vol. 35, no. 1 (Summer 2010), pp. 44–74.

45. Ibid., pp. 60–64.