Chapter 17

1920-39. The provision of commissioned Observers for the Fleet Air Arm.

Having followed the resurgence of the air force observer as far as the reappearance of the flying ‘O’ in 1938, it is timely to retrace our steps to consider what had been happening at sea. While the RAF had decided that it could safely dispense with professional back-seaters once peace had broken out, the RN had taken a very different view. Against the backdrop of a prolonged inter-Service power struggle for control of maritime aviation, which was not finally resolved until 1937, the Admiralty had begun to sponsor its own commissioned air observers from as early as 1921.

There had been some RN/RAF negotiations before this, however, and by the summer of 1920 the Air Council had identified the following three broad roles for air observers in maritime operations:1

a. Gunnery spotting.

b. Extended fleet reconnaissance.

c. Coastal patrol and anti-submarine work.

The Air Force accepted that the first of these duties demanded considerable familiarity with the dispositions and tactics employed by naval forces and that mutual understanding and close co-operation between the observer in the air and the gunnery officer on board ship would be essential to the success of the mission. For that reason the Air Council believed that the air observer for spotting duties should be a naval officer. Naval observers, it was suggested, should merely attend RAF schools to receive appropriate training before rejoining their ships, rather than being formally attached to the RAF as had already been agreed was to be the case with RN pilots. It was also recognised that ‘the nature of the work necessitates the provision of a separate W/T operator’, thus establishing the pattern of three-seat shipboard aircraft, as compared to the two-seaters which sufficed elsewhere. In the interests of easing intercomunication via the use of familiar procedures, it was also considered preferable that wireless operators should be naval ratings for whom the RAF would provide an appropriate machine gun course.

For reconnaissance work, however, a two-man crew was envisaged and it was anticipated that obtaining the desired information might well involve aerial combat, á la Bristol Fighter crews operating over the Western Front in 1918. That being the case, the observer, ‘besides being an expert air navigator, must be as much a fighting airman as the pilot.’ Since the performance of the crew as a fighting team was considered to be the crucial factor, it followed that little tactical advantage would be gained from any specifically naval expertise so the Air Council advocated the use of all-RAF crews for reconnaissance work.

The third style of operations, regardless of whether it involved the use of seaplanes or landplanes, would be an essentially shore-based activity. On that basis, the Air Council assumed that ‘their Lordships will no doubt agree that this precludes the employment of Naval officers as observers.’

A little surprisingly perhaps, the Admiralty agreed to all of these proposals. It is also worth pointing out, of course, that, while the Air Council had been cheerfully offering to provide observers for maritime duties, it was no longer training any. Indeed, in discussing the shore-based case, it was specifically recognised that two pilots would be provided, both of whom were to be ‘specially trained for observation duties.’

By contrast, when the Admiralty began to call for volunteers it stressed the importance that it attached to the provision of dedicated observers since it ‘considered that the development in the future of gunnery depends to a large extent on the efficiency of observation from the air.’² It is even possible that, in order to compensate for the RAF’s lack of interest in observers, the RN may already have been providing suitably qualified substitutes (possibly ex-RNAS back-seaters who had elected not to transfer permanently to the RAF?) for at least a year.³

Once formal training got under way, the Naval Observers Course proved to be very comprehensive. It involved two months of preliminary instruction at the Naval Schools of Gunnery and Signals, followed by a five-month Fleet Spotter Course conducted at the RAF Seaplane Training School at Lee-on-Solent.⁴ The next six months were spent on probation, some of it at sea, and during this period additional tactical training was provided by attendance at a further course run by the RAF Training Base at Leuchars. Formal confirmation as an observer required satisfactory completion of the entire thirteen-month sequence.⁵

As previously agreed, to begin with, the duties of RN observers were confined to spotting, ie the direction of naval gunfire, reconnaissance being the responsibility of RAF personnel. Initially most of the RAF men will presumably have been ex-WW I observers, possibly supplemented by a few pilots, but it soon became necessary to start finding replacements. To meet this requirement, three RAF Fleet Observers Courses were run at Lee-on-Solent during 1922-23, producing a total of eighteen additional RAF officers qualified for naval observation duties, all but one of them actually being pilots.

In 1923 the Balfour Committee was set up with the aim of resolving the persistent differences between the RN and the RAF and deciding how maritime aviation should be run. The outcome, the so-called Trenchard-Keyes Agreement of July 1924, was that the RAF was to retain full control of its flying boats and shore-establishments while being obliged to concede a substantial measure of its previous authority over the shipborne aircraft of what had become known, since April 1924, as the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) of the Royal Air Force.6

The first post-war naval three-seater, the Westland Walrus, was an adaptation of the DH 9A; this one, N9534 of No 3 Sqn, was photographed during a visit to Cranwell in 1922. (RAF Museum P20155).

One of the concessions won by the Admiralty while negotiating this deal was that ‘not less than 30%’ of the officers employed in seagoing air units were to be provided by the RN. As implemented, however, this was interpreted as no more than 30% were to be provided by the RAF, which is not quite the same thing. Since back-seaters had been specifically excluded from the quota system, the result was that the RN had taken upon itself an obligation to provide at least 70% of the pilots required – an obligation that it would sometimes find difficult to meet. Furthermore, it had been agreed that, in future, all observation duties for the Fleet (spotting/gunnery control and reconnaissance) would be carried out exclusively by naval personnel.⁷

This made good sense because, as the Balfour Committee had pointed out, it was unrealistic to believe that these roles could be permanently ‘sharply divided’, especially under operational conditions when they were bound to overlap. The Air Ministry did not contest this issue, perhaps because the Air Force was rapidly running out of observers. Unless the RAF was prepared to misemploy further pilots, therefore, the exclusive use of naval observers would very soon have had to become policy in any case.⁸

In the meantime, to reflect the importance that the Admiralty attached to the functions of Observer Officers, it had been decided that they should have specialist status similar to that afforded to Gunnery, Navigation, Torpedo and Signals Officers.⁹ Accordingly, an ‘O’ annotation was introduced and this began to appear in the Navy List from January 1924 onwards. This annotation was not accom-panied by the reinstatement of any distinguishing emblem to be worn on the uniform. A badge for naval observers was not reintroduced until as late as 1942 (see pages 166 & 257), although regulations promulgated by the Air Ministry and Admiralty had provided badges for naval pilots since 1925.¹⁰

The small ‘silver anchor and cable of silver embroidery surrounded by a laurel wreath of gold embroidery’ badge introduced in 1925 to be worn on the left sleeve of RAF officers (almost exclusively pilots) serving with the FAA.

Although it was no longer actually providing the back-seaters for naval aeroplanes, for much of the inter-war period the RAF continued to exercise some influence over seagoing observers, as it continued to train them at its School of Naval Co-operation at Lee-on-Solent (with landplanes operating from Gosport until 1934 when an aerodrome was built at Lee).¹¹ The length and content of the course, which was specified by the Admiralty, not the Air Ministry, was periodically adjusted to cater for changing requirements and to meet fluctuating demands. In 1928, for instance, the school advertised just one course. It was of twenty-one weeks’ duration and had places for ten men, only eight of whom were to be drawn from the RN, the two spare places presumably being available to officers of the RM and perhaps Commonwealth navies.

Naval three-seaters of the 1920s tended to be designed for comfort rather than speed, as suggested by the corpulent fuselage of this Blackburn Mk II, S1048 of HMS Furious’ No 449 Flt. (P H T Green)

1923-39. The provision of Air Gunners for the Fleet Air Arm.

While the RAF made considerable use of W/T during the 1920s, wireless was probably of even greater significance to the RN. So much greater, in fact, that for spotting and reconnaissance duties, the FAA had, as previously noted, standardised on a three-man crew, one of whom was to be a dedicated wireless operator (or, to use naval terminology, a telegraphist) who would also be expected to double as an aerial gunner. The first dedicated maritime three-seater aircraft, the Westland Walrus, entered service with the RAF’s No 3 Sqn at Leuchars in 1922 but, being a somewhat makeshift, interim adaptation of the wartime DH 9A, apart from some trials work with HMS Argus, these aeroplanes spent almost all of their time ashore. By 1923, however, the much more capable Fairey IIID and the purpose-built Avro Bison and Blackburn Blackburn were becoming available and all of these types could, and did, operate from aircraft carriers.

The Admiralty first appealed for volunteers from ‘the W/T branch for duty as W/T Operators and as Assistants to Naval Gunnery Observer Officers carried in aeroplanes working with the Fleet’ as early as 1921.12 An initial batch was trained at Gosport the following year but it was late 1923 before the Navy called for further volunteers.¹³ Thereafter, seaborne aviation’s having gained a substantial measure of autonomy from the RAF, the RN sought to obtain additional non-commissioned back-seaters on a regular basis.

Already qualified as telegraphists, they were introduced to airborne radio equipment and procedures at the School of Naval Co-operation at Gosport and to aerial gunnery techniques at the Air Armament School at Eastchurch (both courtesy of the RAF), a third phase, at Portsmouth, being added later to deal with other aspects of air/sea activities.¹⁴ On completion of their training, these men were rated as telegraphist air gunners (TAG) and, as such, they received an additional two shillings per day for as long as they were assigned to flying duties (one shilling while they had been under instruction). From 1925 TAGs were identified by embroidered aeroplane badges worn on the right arm, large ones for ratings, small ones for chief petty officers, the latter also wearing small pairs of aeroplanes on the collars of their uniforms.

In the late 1920s earlier naval observation aircraft began to be supplanted by Fairey IIIFs. What had previously been regarded as quite separate activities, reconnaissance and the ranging of naval artillery, were now merged, most of the FAA’s multi-seat units becoming fleet spotter reconnaissance flights. From 1933 these flights began to be grouped into squadrons as the FAA, along with the rest of the RAF, began to expand. Shortly after this, the Navy allocated a third role to its multi-seat units making them torpedo spotter reconaissance squadrons. These developments increased the demand for dual-qualified TAGs, making it necessary to widen the scope for internal recruiting. At the same time an effort was made to improve efficiency by demanding higher standards in training. From mid-1935, therefore, the selection pool was broadened to include ratings of the Seaman and Signals Branches in addition to those already being drawn from the Telegraphist Branch.

This picture of the crew of a Fairey IIID (possibly of No 441 Flt circa 1929) provides a graphic impression of the way in which the inter-war FAA was manned. From the left: an RAF airman (a fitter, to judge from the state of his overalls), a lieutenant RN (almost certainly an observer); an RAF flight lieutenant pilot; a second RAF airman (a slightly less oil-stained rigger?); and a RN seaman (probably the TAG), whose cap tally reads HMS Argus. (Air Britain)

The core skills required of these men, essentially the ability to handle a Lewis gun and to send and receive Morse at twenty words per minute, were no different from what had been demanded before. On the other hand, since they were no longer being drawn exclusively from the Telegraphist Branch, it was considered inappropriate to continue to call them TAGs. Regardless of their original qualifications, therefore, while they were employed on flying duties the new breed of back-seaters were to be rated simply as air gunners.15 Existing TAGs were to be given the options of ceasing flying altogether, becoming air gunners under the new terms, remaining as TAGs for the remainder of their current flying stint or undergoing additional training to qualify them for an entirely new aircrew category (see below). The new air gunner wore much the same badge as his TAG predecessor with the additional embellishment of a star above the aeroplane.

Following the Admiralty’s assumption of responsibility for the administration of the FAA in 1938, the regulations were re-stated.¹⁶ Training was now a two-stage sequence involving fourteen weeks at the RN Signals School in Portsmouth (95% at eighteen words per minute initial pass rate in Morse) followed by fifteen weeks with the School of Naval Co-operation, by now at Ford.¹⁷ No specific amount of flying was specified but practical experience, including drogue work and air-to-air firing exercises was provided from the fourth week at Ford onwards.

1935-39. The provision of Observers Mates.

As previously noted (see page 143), the RAF had decided to reintroduce non-commissioned observers in 1934. A year later, at the same time as it was revising its arrangements for the provision of air gunners, the RN followed suit by introducing observers mates.¹⁸ It was their Lordships’ intention that the new category should be recruited from experienced gunners but, since the latter had only just been introduced, this would not be possible until 1938 at the earliest. In the meantime, therefore, they had to make do by drawing on existing TAGs.

The first batch of prospective observers mates began training in April 1935, although this rate was not formally introduced until July and the dates and details of the courses involved were not promulgated until as late as September.19 The training sequence was to consist of a month at the RN Signals School in Portsmouth followed by three weeks of academic training in naval gunnery control at Whale Island (HMS Excellent). Having received a firm grounding in naval procedures, the observers mates then joined their commissioned colleagues at the RAF School of Naval Cooperation where they were to stay for a further twenty-two weeks. Topics addressed in the classroom at Lee-on-Solent included:

Air Navigation	65 hours
Reconnaissance	25 hours
Spotting	25 hours
Armament (bombs and the Lewis gun)	25 hours
Photography	10 hours
Meteorology	20 hours

Whether they are being flown by air force or naval pilots, operating aeroplanes at sea has always been an exciting business, as Fg Off E U G Solbé discovered when he missed the wire landing on HMS Courageous on 30 January 1937 in this No 820 Sqn Shark, K8466.

Streaming and recovering target drogues was the responsibility of observers mates and air gunners, and TAGs before them. This is an Avro Bison attached to No 445 Flt aboard HMS Courageous in 1929. (P H T Green)

Provision was also made during the course to ensure that all students were fully up to date with the latest technical developments in W/T and R/T equipment. Observers mates were also responsible for handling the towed sleeve targets used for naval anti-aircraft gunnery practice and the course provided the necessary instruction on streaming, recovery and marking. In addition to academic and practical ground-based work, all observers mates were supposed to spend 120 hours in the air while they were at Lee, with 100 hours being specified as the minimum acceptable for qualification.

Those who completed the training sequence successfully emerged as acting observers mates and remained as such for two years when, so long as they were considered to have accumulated sufficient experience and expertise, they dropped the ‘acting’ prefix on the strength of a recommendation by their CO. Acting observers mates wore the TAG’s aeroplane badge with a crown above, a star being added below once he was confirmed. Additional pay was drawn at 3/6d per day while acting, rising to four shillings on confirmation, plus 6d per day ‘buzzer allowance’ for seaman class ratings. In 1938 both rates of pay were increased by a shilling a day, although this now included the ‘buzzer allowance’ which ceased to be payable after 23 February.

1936. The attitudes of the RAF and RN towards non-pilot aircrew – compare and contrast.

As outlined above, the non-commissioned naval observer of 1936 was being provided with what amounted to the same training as his commissioned colleague. This comprised a total of thirty-two weeks of formal instruction, covering all of the duties that he might be called upon to undertake, and included a substantial amount of airborne experience. This contrasts sharply with the limited scope of the mere eight weeks being offered to his RAF counterpart at North Coates. At that stage the RAF course covered only bombing and gunnery and provided very little flying time. It was acknowledged that RAF observers also needed to know most of the other things that naval observers were being taught but, in the Air Ministry’s opinion, instruction in these topics could be safely delegated to squadrons.

The flight deck of HMS Courageous with a range of Flycatchers and Fairey IIIFs, the clutch of RN and RAF officers at left, and the scatter of matelots and ‘erks’ among the aeroplanes illustrate the ‘hybrid dark/light blue society of the inter-war FAA.’ (J M Bruce/G S Leslie collection)

This fundamental difference in approach still reflected the attitudes of WW I. In 1917 the RNAS had recognised that a well-trained observer would be an efficient observer and that an efficient observer was as valuable as a competent pilot. The RFC had never really accepted that this was true. In the 1920s the RN had insisted that it continue to be provided with comprehensively trained, specialist, commissioned observers; the RAF had done without. Ten years later, the Air Council finally began to accept that pilots could not cope alone. Perhaps because some influential senior officers had hazy memories of the ‘successful’ way in which the squadron-based training of observers had been conducted in 1916-17, however, the Service chose to reintroduce a very similar system for their successors, who were, after all, ‘only’ corporals, and part-timers at that. Regardless of the example set by the Navy, there was no question of the Air Force introducing back-seat officers.

The scale of the ‘mainstream’ RAF’s operation in 1936 was much larger than that of its FAA, of course, but size was not the root of the problem. The RAF had yet to be persuaded that observers were sufficiently worthwhile to warrant a substantial investment of both time and treasure. The RN knew that they were and, because they treated them as respected professionals, the FAA could actually do many things rather better than the rest of the RAF.

1936. The capabilities of the RAF and the FAA – compare and contrast.

Denied the soft option of following railway lines, carrier-borne aviators frequently flew out of sight both of land and of their (moving) operating bases and this had obliged them to take navigation very seriously. Following a practice which had been pioneered by the RNAS, the Navy’s peacetime observer officers also paid considerable attention to bomb-aiming, as a result of which this was another field in which the FAA could teach the rest of the RAF a few tricks.

Having attended No 22 Naval Observers Course in 1932-33, Lt (later Capt) G A Rotherham flew from HMSs Glorious and Furious in Fairey IIIFs of No 822 Sqn until 1936. As one who lived in the hybrid dark/light blue society of the inter-war FAA, Rotherham was well-qualified to comment on the contemporary practices of the RAF. While shore-based at Catfoss for a spell of armament training in May 1935, he noted that:20

‘… the RAF were not using any method to find the actual wind – they simply relied upon the Met Man’s word as gospel. During the same visit we complained to a visiting Air Marshal about our bomb sight which, in our view was a lamentable device whose compass might start revolving if vibrated. With a little juggling I was able to make it do just that for his benefit. The Air Marshal told us that this was the first complaint he had ever heard on the subject. Perhaps this was because in the RAF the device was operated by ‘Other Ranks’ whose opinions were not given much consideration.’

And that:

‘I was surprised at the attitude of some of the pilots on the light bomber squadron that was there with us. I overheard one pilot, who was complaining about his bomb-aimer, suggest that the good bomb-aimers should be shared around so that the pilots would have an equal chance to get good marks. There seemed to be no recognition that bombing was a crew event that required careful co-ordination between pilot and aimer.’

From these observations it is quite clear that, by comparison with its FAA, at least some of the RAF of the mid-1930s was, in many respects, distinctly unprofessional. It is also clear that Rotherham believed that this could be directly attributed to the RAF’s total reliance on pilots and its consequent lack of regard for its back-seaters. Note, incidentally, that Rotherham does not suggest that the RAF did not know how to find the local wind; he observes only that it was not bothering to do it – which more or less says it all.

Lest the reader should suspect otherwise, it should be made clear that Rotherham appears to have felt no overt animosity towards his RAF colleagues. Indeed, while conceding that there was some discord between ‘the top brass’, he notes that ‘at the lower levels we got on very well together.’ His comments are merely offered as those of a professional aviator, observing the practices of a sister organisation. Although, after a passage in which he explains the arcane system whereby all FAA pilots were assigned dual RN and RAF ranks (often involving convoluted degrees of relative seniority), a disapproving tone might be read into the following: ‘We Observers, of course, carried Naval rank only since the RAF had no equivalent trade.21 In the RAF Pilots were God; Observers were nothing.’²²

1935-39. The status of non-commissioned naval aircrew is recognised.

Reflecting contemporary RAF practice, throughout much of the inter-war period all non-commissioned FAA aviators were, in effect, misemployed groundcrew. There was a significant difference, however, in that the Navy recognised, much sooner than did the Air Force, that being an aviator could not sensibly be treated as a part-time occupation. When air gunners and observers mates were introduced in 1935, therefore, the regulations made it quite clear that they would be ‘borne for air duties and will be additional to the complement authorised for Seamen, Signal and Telegraphist duties in each ship.’²³ Nevertheless, when they were not directly involved in their primary tasks, these men could be employed in their original capacities.

A flying rating was well-advised to maintain his core skills, as his career advancement was still within the structure of his original branch. As a result, their promotion prospects tended to suffer by comparison with those of their colleagues who had remained in the mainstream rather than ‘wasting their time’ volunteering to fly. Once it had gained full control of its air arm, however, much as the RAF was being obliged to do, the RN decided to acknowledge its aircrew by creating a Flying Branch. This branch, into which all rating pilots, air gunners and observers mates were to be remustered, was to have its own career ladder.²⁴

As part of this innovation, rates of pay were rationalised. Typically, a newly qualified petty officer observer (or pilot) was now paid 7/6d per day plus 4/6d non-substantive specialist pay. Air gunners drew the same basic rates of pay but their specialist pay was on a lower scale and factored for their assessed level of skill, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Class air gunners being paid 2/6d, 2/9d and 3/-d, respectively.

The new branch was introduced, along with its associated arrangements, with effect from 1 June 1939. One of these arrangements was that observers mates were to be restyled as rating observers. By either name, however, there had never been very many of them, only about forty having qualified before training became a wholly naval responsibility.²⁵

1938-39. The status of commissioned naval observers is recognised.

Although the Balfour Committee had concluded in 1923 that overall responsibility for shipborne naval aviation should lie with the Air Ministry, the Admiralty had continued to harbour reservations over this and the debate had rumbled on into the 1930s. An initial undertaking to review the ratio of RAF to RN personnel within the FAA in 1936 escalated to become an inquiry that re-examined the whole question of the control of maritime air power. Conducted by the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, his eventual report recommended that shore-based aircraft should remain with the RAF’s Coastal Command but that seaborne aviation – the FAA – should be transferred to the RN.²⁶ The Cabinet endorsed the so-called ‘Inskip Award’ on 29 July 1937.²⁷ Parliament was informed of this decision the following day²⁸ and it was promulgated throughout the Navy less than a fortnight later.²⁹

It would take almost two years to put this decision into effect. The provision of aircrew officers was one obvious problem, the solution being the creation of a dedicated Air Branch.30 This catered for observers, as well as pilots, and, as in the RNAS of WW I, the RN of the late-1930s still had a great deal more respect for its non-pilot aircrew than did the RAF, as was to be made very clear in 1938. By August of that year the Admiralty’s plans were sufficiently firm for it to be able to publish an Order promulgating the arrangements for ‘command and responsibilities of officers in air units’. It began by stating that:³¹

‘As soon as a sufficient measure of control of the Fleet Air Arm has been transferred from the Air Ministry to the Admiralty, observers, as well as pilots, will be appointed, instead of attached, to units. Officer Pilots and Observers will then rank equally for command of units …’

HMS Glorious in the 1930s. On her way back from Norway on 8 June 1940 she was intercepted and sunk by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. (P H T Green)

It went on to say that the responsibilities of an observer in an aircraft included the conduct of navigation, control of signalling, submitting reports of observations made and spotting for naval guns. The senior observer on a unit was to be responsible to the CO for all specialist staff work; the training of observers, observers mates and air gunners; the communications and meteorological organisations; and the maintenance of all necessary equipment, including navigational instruments, wireless and bomb sights. This was at a time when RAF observers were still mere part-time corporals who had only just been, grudgingly, given responsibility for navigation – but only in war – not in peace! (see page 172).

Having made its policy very clear, however, it would seem that an early bias in favour of pilots soon began to make itself apparent and the Admiralty was at pains to reverse this trend. It was surmised that one reason for the difference in attitude was that, ever since 1925, naval pilots had worn an appropriate badge whereas observers had not, which might possibly have been interpreted as indicating that they were ‘less qualified’. It was initially proposed that the playing field should be levelled by abolishing the pilots badge.³² That might have been a little awkward, however, as HM King George VI had only recently approved the design of a new badge for pilots to replace the one inherited from the RAF (see Note 10). That option was foreclosed upon in April 1939 when the new pilots badge was actually introduced.³³

The obvious counter-proposal was to introduce a corresponding badge for observers. That idea was given a fair wind but the argument was drawn to a close in June, when it was decided that such a badge would not be introduced. There were two arguments underpinning this decision. First, it was alleged that the old (RNAS) observer’s badge had never been popular so it was thought unlikely that the current generation of observers would be particularly keen to wear one either. More convincingly, it was maintained that those observers who were drawn from the Executive Branch would wish to ‘preserve their identity’ as such, fearing that their long term career prospects might be compromised if they sported a specialist badge, as that might be interpreted as indicating a transfer of allegiance to the very junior Air Branch. Since the majority of observers (possibly all) were still of the Executive Branch in 1939, they got their way.³⁴

Thus it was that, at the beginning of WW II, the observers of the newly reconstituted FAA were held in much higher regard, and had far more status, than did their RAF equivalents, none of whom were even commissioned at the time, but without a distinguishing badge. With hindsight it is clear that the decision to proceed without a badge had been somewhat short-sighted and a badge was eventually authorised, but not until 1942 (see page 257).

________________________

¹      AIR6/21. The Air Council aired its views on the nature and provision of observers for maritime work, at a Meeting, its 99th, held on 5 August 1920. The quotes that appear in the next four paragraphs are taken from a draft letter to the Admiralty on the same file.

²      Admiralty Fleet Order (AFO) 289 of 2 February 1921 invited officers to volunteer to be trained as observers. At the time, the first course was expected to begin on or about 15 May, although some sources indicate that it might actually have begun as early as 11 April.

³      AFO 1234 of 21 April 1920 had introduced rates of specialist pay for naval officers already serving as air observers and made provision for those under training. A fully accredited observer was paid six shillings per day while on duty, or four if he was not W/T-qualified; a trainee was to receive three shillings for each day that he actually flew. The promulgation of a pay scale for trainees, long before the establishment of a formal training system, suggests that the Admiralty was already resigned to having to provide its own replacements.

⁴      The Seaplane Training School was renamed the School of Naval Cooperation on 19 April 1923; see AMWO 217 of that date.

⁵      AFO 2552 of 28 September 1923.

⁶      AIR8/67. The recommendations of the Balfour Committee were published as Cmd 1938 of 1923.

⁷      AFO 1059 of 25 April 1924 provided for all FAA observers to be naval personnel. This ruling was publicised within the RAF by AMWO 551 of 25 July 1924.

⁸      In practice, although the third RAF Fleet Observers Course was the last, eight more RAF officers (five of them pilots) were trained as observers between 1923 and 1925 via attendance at Naval Observers Courses. It seems likely that these additional men will have been required as gap-fillers during the transitional phase while responsibility was being transferred to the RN.

⁹      AFO 3502 of 28 October 1921.

¹⁰    AMWO 567 of 10 September 1925 stated that all RAF officers serving with units of the FAA were to wear, on the lower left sleeve, ‘a small silver anchor and cable of silver embroidery surrounded by a laurel wreath of gold embroidery’. This emblem was still current during WW II, as is shown by AMO A.852/1940 of 21 November which reminded those concerned that the badge was supposed to be removed when an RAF officer’s attachment to the FAA ceased.

AFO 2793 of 2 October 1925 announced that a similar device was to be worn by RN and RM officers attached to the RAF for service with the FAA, except that the laurel wreath was to be embroidered in silver (rather than gold), the whole being superimposed on a set of gold embroidered albatross’ wings. This had introduced, what amounted to, a naval pilots badge, very similar to that worn today, but differing in two significant respects. First, it lacked a crown and, secondly, it was to be worn only while the individual was actually serving with the RAF, ie the FAA.

Note that each of these regulations formally acknowledged the badge authorised by the ‘other’ Service but that neither had referred specifically to pilots. It was implicit that the rules applied almost exclusively to pilots, however, because (apart from a dwindling handful of observers – see Note 29 to Chapter 15) all of the RAF officers involved would have been pilots and only pilots of the RN and RM were actually attached to the FAA, then an RAF organisation. While RN observers may have been employed full time on flying duties, they retained their exclusively naval affiliations and were thus excluded from the provisions relating to badges.

¹¹    The School of Naval Co-operation eventually moved to Ford on 29 December 1937. Control was formally transferred to the Admiralty on 24 May 1939 when the RAF unit became the FAA’s No 1 Observers School, which functioned as Nos 750, 751 and 752 Sqns. On the same date a No 2 Observers School was established at Lee-on-Solent where it operated as Nos 753 and 754 Sqns.

It is perhaps not widely appreciated that the RAF was also responsible for the training of all naval pilots, this task having been assigned to No 1 FTS at Netheravon as early as 1919. In 1928 this responsibility was transferred to the RAF Training Base at Leuchars which eventually became No 1 FTS when this designation was restored to use in 1935. Three years later No 1 FTS moved back to Netheravon where it continued to train exclusively naval pilots until it disbanded in 1942, although, beginning in 1938, several other RAF units were additionally assigned to this inter-Service enterprise, eg Nos 6, 10, 20 and 23 ERFTSs and No 7 FTS.

¹²    AFO 3303 of 7 October 1921.

¹³    AFO 2555 of 28 September 1923.

¹⁴    From 1927 onwards the Eastchurch course was probably completed before that at Gosport, with the Portsmouth element being added to the beginning of the sequence from 1931 onwards. In 1934 the Gosport phase moved to Lee-on-Solent and in 1936 responsibility for the gunnery element was transferred to the RAF’s new Air Observers School at North Coates (a few courses having passed through a temporary facility at Leuchars in the interim).

¹⁵    AFO 1739 of 18 July 1935.

¹⁶    AFO 1220 dated 26 May 1938.

¹⁷    Control of the School of Naval Co-operation passed to the Admiralty on 24 May 1939 and, following a further reorganisation of naval aircrew training, aerial gunnery was catered for by No 1 Air Gunners School (Nos 755 and 757 Sqns) at Worthy Down and No 2 Air Gunners School (No 758 née 759 Sqn) at Eastleigh for the remaining months of peace.

¹⁸    AFO 1739 of 18 July 1935.

¹⁹    AFOs 2191 and 2192 of 12 September 1935.

²⁰    G A Rotherham. “It’s Really Quite Safe” (1986), p76.

²¹    The reason why observers were excluded from the dual ranking arrangement was only partly due to the fact that the RAF did not recognise their trade. The main reason was that it was unnecessary, because RN observers were not actually attached to the FAA (of the RAF). Because naval pilots were so attached, there was some potential for conflict between the terms of the Air Force Act and the Naval Discipline Act; this problem was solved by granting RN/RM pilots temporary RAF commissions for the duration of their attachments. These arrangements had been introduced as early as 25 July 1924 by AFO 1982. When, some fifteen years later, the Admiralty assumed full responsibility for all aspects of aviation at sea, the dual commissioning procedure became superfluous and AFO 1288 of 18 May 1939 announced that all RAF commissions currently held by RN/RM pilots would be cancelled.

²²    G A Rotherham, op cit, p64.

²³    AFO 1739 of 18 July 1935.

²⁴    AFO 1221 of 11 May 1939.

²⁵    The schools involved in the training of observers mates are as at Note 11.

²⁶    AIR19/23. CP-199(37) dated 21 July 1937, ‘The Navy And It’s Relation To The Fleet Air Arm And Shore-Based Aircraft’ aka The Inskip Report.

²⁷    Ibid. Minutes of a Cabinet Meeting held on 29 July 1937.

²⁸    ZHC2/835, Hansard for 30 July 1937.

²⁹    AFO 1694 of 12 August 1937.

³⁰    Under Admiralty administration, some officers for flying duties (pilots and observers) would continue to be drawn from the Executive Branch, that is to say career officer who would specialise in aviation but not to the total exclusion of their broader interests as ‘sailors’, and the Royal Marines. The majority, however, would hold short service (seven-year) commissions as professional aviators in the Air Branch which had been created specifically for that purpose. These arrangements were promulgated by AFO 381 of 24 February 1938, the first intake of prospective (A) Branch officers being scheduled for April. Unlike those of the Executive Branch, (A) Branch officers were not permitted to command HM Ships.

AFO 635 of 24 March 1938 announced that Air Branch officers were to be distinguishing by a small (less than one inch tall) silver ‘A’, surrounded by a gold embroidered wreath, to be worn on the left sleeve above the distinction lace. This lasted for only a year, however, as it was superseded in 1939 by AFO 908 which introduced a half-inch gold embroidered ‘A’ to be worn within the curl of the distinction lace, along with a new pilots badge (see Note 32).

³¹    CAFO 1914 of 11 August 1938.

³²    ADM1/10491. Minute dated 25 January 1939 on Naval Law file NL 81/38.

³³    AFO 908 of 6 April 1939 introduced the badge that is still used today. To be worn on the left sleeve á la early RNAS practice, it comprised ‘wings of gold embroidery having in the centre a silver anchor and cable surrounded by a gold embroidered wreath and surmounted by a crown.’ AFO 1476a of 1 June 1939 announced that a similar design, but of woven fabric, was being introduced for rating pilots.

³⁴    ADM1/10491. Minute dated 9 June 1939 on Naval Law file NL 81/38 with which the 5th Sea Lord concurred on 20 June, with other members of the Board of Admiralty following suit.