Macbeth, and King Richard the Third

• Types of explicit federal hazard mitigation programs as well as federal programs that indirectly impact hazard mitigation

• Master the terminology and understand the perspective of federal hazard policies

• Evaluate the effectiveness of federal mitigation programs for reducing vulnerability

Providing relief to people who have suffered the hardship and heartache of a catastrophic disaster is generally considered a worthwhile endeavor, even a moral obligation. This chapter summarizes how the federal government influences hazards management both through appropriations and directly through federal land holdings. The chapter then discusses how the federal government’s involvement in emergency management has evolved over time. We then outline several federal programs that pertain directly to hazards management, as well as some other federal activities that are not focused on mitigation per se, but which nevertheless have some bearing on hazards management. The chapter also explores federal climate change adaptation and resilience efforts that help individuals, communities, and businesses prepare for and mitigate climate-related risks. The chapter also examines ways in which federal government programs offer incentives for development in hazard areas, with the unintended result of increasing vulnerability in certain regions of the country. The chapter concludes by exploring the issue of federal disaster assistance as a “moral hazard” as well as some propositions for changing our current approach to hazards management at the federal level.

The bulk of the federal government’s domestic activities are accomplished through intergovernmental programs, particularly through appropriations of funding decided on by Congress and administered by federal agencies to state and local governments. The federal government is also involved in hazards management as an owner of significant land holdings. Direct federal intervention in land use regulation takes place only in very limited circumstances. We discuss the federal role in hazards management through the use of appropriations and land ownership in this section.

Involvement of the national government in the affairs of states and local governments frequently occurs through appropriations of various kinds, many of which are directed toward public health and safety and homeland security programs. Federal agencies distribute billions of dollars each year in the form of grants, contracts, loans, and other types of aid. Some funds are given directly to local governments; other federal funds are administered by the state and then funneled to local communities. Federal grants and other aid packages are often used to secure the cooperation of state and local governments through the imposition of rules and criteria that apply to the use of the funds. The “strings” that are attached to appropriations from Washington, DC are a roundabout but effective way that the federal government has leverage over activities that would otherwise be entirely within the domain of state and local governments.

Most federal grants and other forms of aid are distributed on a cost-share basis, with the federal government providing the bulk of funds and state and local governments providing matching funds. For major development projects, such as those carried out by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, the current cost-share formula is typically 65% federal, 35% local. Some critics believe that this system allows state and local governments to shirk their share of the responsibility for the long-term, cumulative impacts that such infrastructure projects may have in the community, including the increased development and growth in hazard locations that may result. Cost-shares that include a greater local contribution may provide a larger sense of local ownership in a project and thereby a greater level of accountability on the part of local communities.¹ However, with severely limited local government budgets in many communities, the cost-share model is often necessary to fund large infrastructure projects or capital improvements that reduce risk to hazards.

About 650 million acres, or 28%, of the 2.27 billion acres of land in the United States is owned by the federal government.^* States with the largest percentage of federal land ownership are located primarily in the west. In Nevada, for example, 84.5% of land is owned by the federal government; in Alaska 69.1%; and in Oregon, 53.5% is in federal possession.^*

The Department of the Interior controls the majority of acreage owned by the federal government (68%) and has invested the most in land acquisition. The Department of Agriculture controls 28%; 24 agencies control the remaining 4%. Of the land the federal government owns and leases within the United States, 30% is used for forest and wildlife, 22% is used for grazing, 16% is dedicated to parks and historic sites, 2% is used for military purposes, whereas the remaining uses combined represent 32% of total acreage controlled by the federal government.

FROM SMOKEY BEAR TO WOODSY OWL

The primary mission of the U.S. Forest Service is to manage the nation’s 154 national forests and 20 national grasslands, which encompass 193 million acres. Part of this mission involves managing wildland fires, a process that has evolved over the last 100 years from a strategy of total suppression—putting out fires as quickly as possible—to an approach that recognizes the role of natural fire in the health of many ecosystems. The iconic symbols Smokey Bear, first introduced in 1944 as the national symbol for the prevention of wildfires, and Woodsy Owl, the national symbol for the promotion of conservation practices since the 1970s, illustrate the changing focus of land management at the U.S. Forest Service over the decades (Figure 6.2a and b).

FIGURE 6.2 The symbols of (a) Smokey Bear and (b) Woodsy Owl demonstrate the evolution of management practices on U.S. forests and grasslands.

In 1977, President Carter signed Executive Order (EO) 11,988, “Floodplain Management,” which required all federal agencies to take action to reduce the risk of flood loss, minimize the impact of floods on human safety, health and welfare, and to restore and preserve the natural and beneficial values of floodplains whenever agencies construct buildings and infrastructure with federal funds or carry out federal programs.

On January 30, 2015, President Obama signed EO 13,690 (amending EO 11,988), and established a “Federal Flood Risk Management Standard.” Under the EO, all roads, buildings and other pieces of infrastructure paid for with federal money must be built in areas with less risk of flooding, based on the premise that climate change will make floods more common and much more destructive.

“These impacts are anticipated to increase over time due to the effects of climate change and other threats. Losses caused by flooding affect the environment, our economic prosperity, and public health and safety, each of which affects our national security,” states the Order. “The Federal Government must take action, informed by the best-available and actionable science, to improve the Nation’s preparedness and resilience against flooding.”

Moving forward, the new standard mandates that all federal agencies and departments must “use data and methods informed by best-available, actionable climate science,” and build two feet either above the 100-year flood elevation or to the 500-year flood elevation. All critical buildings, such as hospitals and evacuation centers, must be built at least three feet above the 100-year flood elevation.³

The role of the federal government in emergency management has evolved over the years from distant observer to immediate responder, principal financier of disaster costs, and, more recently, champion of hazard mitigation.⁴ As a way of introducing the federal role in hazard mitigation and preparedness, this section discusses some of the notable changes in the federal approach to emergency management that have occurred from the 1800s to the present. This brief history might help explain some of the policies and programs that are in place today, and provides a background for some of the impediments to and opportunities for hazard mitigation and climate change adaptation facing emergency managers working in the field.

Under the United States Constitution, the function of protecting public health and safety rests primarily with the states. The role of the federal government is to step in and provide aid when state and local governments are overwhelmed or otherwise unable to provide the services that the citizenry needs. Over the years, however, this principle, while not eroding entirely, has come to mean that the federal government steps in on a regular basis, with more being expected of federal agencies and programs than ever before.

Between 1800 and 1950, there was a slow trickle of federal involvement in emergency management functions, but there was no national policy for responding to natural or human-caused disasters.⁵ Catastrophes ravaged portions of the nation periodically, including notable disasters such as the following:

Deaths from such disasters numbered in the hundreds, sometimes in the thousands. Costs in present-day figures ran into the billions of dollars. Response to these disasters was ad hoc, organized by local groups and funded primarily by charities and some local and state monies. Any mitigation that took place was carried out by individual property owners or local governments in a piecemeal fashion;⁴ there was no concerted effort to push risk reduction at any level.

6.3.1.1 The 1930s: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Becomes Active in Flood Control

The Flood Control Act of 1934 gave the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers increased authority to design and build flood control projects. This Act reflected a philosophy that humans could control nature and eliminate the risk of floods, setting the tone for the basic approach to mitigating the impacts of most natural hazards throughout the next several decades. The Corps’ programs were very successful, in the sense that hundreds of dams, levees, floodwalls, diversions, and other structural flood control projects were built across the country. Although the Corps’ programs promoted economic development and population growth along the nation’s rivers and coastlines, history has proven that this attempt at emergency management was sometimes shortsighted and costly.

The 1950s was a quiet time for large-scale natural hazards, although three significant hurricanes did occur: Hurricane Hazel, a Category 4, inflicted significant damage in Virginia and North Carolina in 1954; Hurricane Diane hit several mid-Atlantic and northeastern states in 1955; and Hurricane Audrey, the most damaging of the three storms, struck Louisiana and North Texas in 1957.

The newly passed Disaster Assistance Act of 1950 picked up the tab for some of the costs of these disasters, introducing Americans to the concept of federal disaster assistance, but the amounts compared to later distributions of aid were paltry at best.⁴ The focus of the nation at this time was not on hazards posed by nature but on the potential for nuclear war and nuclear fallout. The era of the Cold War beginning in the 1950s meant that disaster management focused less on land use regulations to keep hazardous areas free of development and more on the threat of foreign invasion. The construction of bomb shelters in private homes and public buildings was widespread, which coincidentally provided protection from tornadoes and some other natural hazards, but only as a by-product of the more pressing need to combat the perceived threat of nuclear attack.

In 1961, the Office of Emergency Preparedness was created to deal with natural disasters. As the 1960s progressed, the United States was struck by a series of major natural hazards: the Ash Wednesday Storm, a nor’easter that caused significant damage along the Atlantic Coast; the Prince William Sound earthquake, which set off a tsunami along the Pacific Coast; and Hurricanes Betsy and Camille, which killed and injured hundreds of people and caused millions of dollars in damage along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.

The lack of insurance against such large-scale disasters prompted the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, creating the NFIP that offered federally backed flood insurance for homeowners in flood hazard areas. The NFIP was unique in its day, as it called upon local governments to undertake community-based mitigation activities to lessen flood risk. We discuss the NFIP in detail later in this chapter.

The federal Disaster Relief Acts of 1969 and 1970 further emphasized the role of the federal government as the primary source of disaster funding. By this time, more than 100 federal agencies bore some responsibility for risk and disasters. These agencies were scattered among the civil and defense departments—each operating on its own turf and with its own agenda—but none of these agencies focused primarily on mitigation as a viable way of reducing hazard risk.

In 1979, President Jimmy Carter created the FEMA. Many of the responsibilities of other agencies were soon transferred to this agency. Integrating the diverse programs, operations, policies, and people into a cohesive operation was a mammoth task, fraught with political, philosophical, and logistical problems. At this point, mitigation was still not promoted or funded in any major way within FEMA itself. There were relatively few natural disasters during this period, so the disjointed nature of the agency, while inefficient and cumbersome, was not noticeable to any large degree.⁵

Abundant federal disaster assistance was made available through the passage of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act in 1988. During the 1980s and 1990s, federal expenditures for disaster relief expanded by leaps and bounds. More disasters, larger dollar losses, and an inconsistent method of defining what qualifies as a “disaster” contributed to spending in the millions, and even billions, each year.

The purpose of the Stafford Act was (and still is) to support state and local governments and their citizens when disasters overwhelm their capability to respond. A wide range of disaster assistance is available from FEMA under the Stafford Act. Such assistance generally falls into two categories. (1) Individual and Family Assistance (IA) grants provide funds to help meet the serious needs and necessary expenses of disaster victims that are not met through other means such as insurance, loans, or charities. Eligible costs include housing, personal property, medical and dental expenses, funerals, and transportation. (2) The Public Assistance Program (PA) provides aid to help communities rebuild damaged facilities after a disaster. Grants cover eligible costs associated with the repair or replacement of facilities owned by state or local governments and some nonprofit organizations. Funds are used to restore water and wastewater services, establish emergency public transportation, remove debris, and other activities to return the community to pre-disaster conditions. While mitigation can be a component of rebuilding public facilities using PA funds, restoration rather than mitigation is the primary goal of the Public Assistance Program.

The Stafford Act also created the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP). The purpose of the HMGP is to reduce the loss of life and property due to natural hazards by providing money for mitigation as part of the disaster assistance package that state and local governments receive following a disaster declaration. Mitigation projects utilizing HMGP funds are meant to be implemented during the window of opportunity that opens when communities are rebuilding after a disaster.

In addition to FEMA, other federal agencies also began to disburse greater disaster aid and loan packages during the 1980s and 1990s. The Small Business Administration, for example, issues low-interest loans to help community businesses reestablish their operations following a hazard event. The Department of Housing and Urban Development administers disaster-related community development block grants (CDBG) to local governments impacted by disasters as well as other programs such as the Public Housing Modernization Reserve for Disasters and Emergencies, the HOME Investment Partnership Program, and the Section 108 Loan Guarantee Program. The Farm Service Agency of the U.S. Department of Agriculture provides numerous types of assistance to farmers following natural disasters, including loans, grants, technical assistance, and catastrophic risk crop insurance.

By the late 1980s FEMA was up and running and the Stafford Act provided a process to disburse disaster assistance to impacted communities fairly quickly. However, a series of major disasters between 1989 and 1993 highlighted some of the deficiencies of FEMA’s capability to deal with catastrophic disasters. In 1989, Hurricane Hugo pummeled North and South Carolina and the U.S. Virgin Islands. It was the worst hurricane in a decade, with over $15 billion in damages and 85 deaths. FEMA was perceived as slow to respond. Soon after Hugo, the Loma Prieta Earthquake rocked California, with record damages but fewer deaths. In 1991, raging wildfires in Oakland, California, burned homes and businesses. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck with very costly consequences, devastating Florida and Louisiana. Hurricane Iniki soon followed, creating havoc in Hawaii.

In the eyes of many, FEMA and the entire emergency management system failed. The public wanted, and by now expected, the government to be there to help in its time of need. This sentiment was highlighted by the famous “where are the cavalry?” plea to the federal government at a press conference by Dade County emergency management coordinator Kathleen Hale days after Hurricane Andrew. FEMA seemed incapable of carrying out the essential government function of disaster assistance.⁵ The extent of the damages incurred during these disasters emphasized the need for reducing the risk of future disasters—in other words, mitigation seemed an obvious choice.

President Bill Clinton nominated James Lee Witt to be Director of FEMA, who initiated sweeping reforms inside and outside of the agency, including the creation of the Mitigation Directorate within FEMA. FEMA now placed emphasis on mitigation as a primary means of reducing vulnerability to future natural hazards. The need for a strong relationship between FEMA and state and local emergency managers was recognized as well, allowing for better coordination and communication before, during, and immediately following a hazard event.

Witt’s reforms were soon tested during the Midwest Floods of 1993. Devastating flooding occurred in an area covering 525 counties in nine states, and much of it was caused by the failure of dams and levees that had been built by the Army Corps of Engineers years earlier. It was now evident that reliance on engineered structures was a potentially dangerous approach to flood control, and the opportunity to change the focus of disaster recovery was realized. FEMA initiated a bold new approach to mitigation following the Midwest Floods, financing the largest buyout and relocation program that had ever been implemented. For the first time, large-scale removal of people and property from the floodplain was accepted as a long-lasting and cost-efficient method for avoiding future disasters. The Midwest buyouts were unique for a number of reasons, not the least of which was the massive scale of the projects. Entire neighborhoods and even entire towns were acquired with public funds and moved—buildings, facilities, people, pets and all—and rebuilt on higher ground. You can read more about acquisition and relocation as a long-term mitigation strategy in Chapter 12.

When President Clinton elevated the Directorship of FEMA to cabinet level status, the value and importance of emergency management and the federal role in that management were recognized. In 1995, FEMA published the first National Mitigation Strategy, which declared mitigation to be the “cornerstone” of emergency management, with two primary goals: increasing public awareness of hazards and reducing loss of life and injuries.

PATTONSBURG BECOMES MORE SUSTAINABLE WITH FEDERAL MITIGATION FUNDING

Before the Great Flood of 1993, Pattonsburg was a classic Midwest farm community of 400, occupying a couple dozen square blocks in the middle of Missouri’s countryside. But Pattonsburg was also an unsustainable community. Located at the confluence of Big Creek and the Grant River (a tributary of the Missouri River), the village had been flooded 33 times. The Great Flood swept through Pattonsburg on July 6, 1993, exactly 84 years after the community’s first major flood disaster on July 6, 1909. In a well-rehearsed ritual, the villagers cleaned up their homes and shops, and moved back into the floodplain. Then the Great Flood came back a second time. On July 23, the Grant River sent another sickening surge of muck and debris back through the community. This latest flood was the last straw, bringing home the realization that Pattonsburg could not continue to survive in conflict with the river. In the fall of 1993, more than 90% of the residents voted in favor of relocating their town and rebuilding it on higher ground. In the spring of 1994, Pattonsburg got news that it would receive $12 million in federal disaster assistance. The new town was designed and built three miles away—outside of the floodplain—and incorporated additional sustainable methods into the rebuilding process, including codes for energy efficiency, solar access, and building orientation, plus guidelines for waste minimization and sustainable economic development.

In the years following the Great Midwest Floods, FEMA steadfastly increased its emphasis on hazard mitigation—breaking the cycle of destruction and rebuilding that had been the norm. FEMA encouraged disaster-resistant communities, whereby the community would promote sustainable economic development, protect and enhance its natural resources, and ensure a better quality of life for its citizens. Project Impact, a program initiated by FEMA in 1997 that encouraged involvement of all sectors of the community in emergency management and mitigation activities, was an attempt to foster public–private partnerships for community-wide mitigation planning. Project Impact communities were designated in all 50 states, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico.

While several worthwhile mitigation projects were undertaken with Project Impact funding, it has been criticized by some observers as having taken on a distinctly political quality with emphasis on launching a corporate-style marketing campaign complete with logos on baseball caps and tote bags. Other analysts noted that Project Impact lacked the inclusion of all the relevant stakeholders that should have been involved for a community-based mitigation plan.⁶ Despite these criticisms, Project Impact proved to be successful in some communities by increasing awareness of mitigation, especially in the private sector among select businesses and industries. In any event, Project Impact funding was subsequently cut, and the initiative was replaced with passage of the Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA) of 2000.

On October 30, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 to amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988. This legislation is aimed primarily at controlling and streamlining the administration of federal disaster relief and mitigation programs, and places emphasis on pre-disaster mitigation planning to reduce the nation’s disaster losses. In fact, the DMA requires state and local mitigation plans as a prerequisite for certain disaster assistance, in effect, making states and local governments work for their mitigation dollars. We discuss the DMA in more detail later in this chapter.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush decided 22 previously disparate domestic agencies needed to be coordinated into one department to protect the nation against threats of all kinds. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created to serve this role. FEMA is now housed in DHS, where the agency carries out its long-standing role of disaster assistance and mitigation programming.

In the years following the creation of DHS, the primary focus of emergency management shifted to terrorism and security threats and away from natural hazards. State and local emergency management agencies received grants and loans to beef up security and antiterrorism capabilities, in some cases at the expense of natural hazard mitigation programs. However, the recurrence of major domestic and international disasters, including the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 26, 2004, the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005, and the hyperactive hurricane seasons of 2004–2005, were harsh reminders to politicians and the public that natural hazards remain very real threats to communities throughout the nation and the world.

The devastation of communities along the Gulf Coast following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 once again portrayed FEMA in an unfavorable light. A lack of coordination, a failure in communication, and a dearth of strong leadership created a string of mistakes and misdirection, culminating in catastrophe on a scale never before seen in this country. Granted, the hurricane itself was a major natural hazard, with winds, waves and storm surge reaching near-record heights as the storm made landfall along the Gulf Coast. However, it was a lack of timely response and poor pre-disaster planning and preparedness that led to the wretched conditions that occurred in the aftermath of the storm.

Along with the hardship and heartache endured by thousands of Katrina victims, another casualty of the disaster was the reputation of federal, state, and local government emergency management agencies and their employees. Much of the disaster was steeped in partisan political bickering, which, while providing a field day for the media, stymied many of the genuine efforts of people dedicated to righting past wrongs and moving forward with recovery and reconstruction plans.

One outcome of Hurricane Katrina was passage of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, or PKEMRA. The Act was aimed at correcting shortfalls highlighted by the response to Hurricane Katrina by reorganizing some components of FEMA and reshaping the agency’s relationship to the Department of Homeland Security. In particular, the Act created new leadership positions within FEMA, assigned additional responsibilities to the agency,⁵ and gave the director of FEMA a direct line of access to the president during periods of disaster.⁷

Recognizing that preparedness is a shared responsibility, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness was signed on March 30, 2011. At its core, PPD-8 requires the involvement of the whole community—not just the government—in a systematic effort to keep the nation safe from harm and resilient when struck by hazards, such as natural disasters, acts of terrorism and pandemics. This policy directive is articulated through the National Preparedness Goal: “A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”^*

A series of frameworks and plans related to reaching the goal has been developed, each of which corresponds to one of the five preparedness mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. Each Framework includes core capabilities, or distinct critical elements needed to achieve the goal. For example, the National Mitigation Framework comprises seven core capabilities, including the following:

SELF-CHECK

• Explain the effect of the Flood Control Act of 1934 on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

• Discuss the reason for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.

• What is the National Preparedness Goal and how is it implemented?

The Frameworks follow a whole community approach to preparedness, which recognizes that everyone can contribute to and benefit from national preparedness efforts. This includes individuals and families (including those with disabilities and others with access and functional needs), businesses, community and faith-based groups, nonprofit organizations and all levels of government.

In the previous commentary about the evolution of federal involvement in emergency management, we briefly mentioned several programs that focus primarily on hazard mitigation. In this section we will discuss this type of program in more detail, including the following:

We refer to these as explicit emergency management programs, because these programs are directly focused on emergency management and disaster mitigation. The majority of these programs are carried out by FEMA, with the exception of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA).

We begin this discussion of federal mitigation and preparedness functions with a brief review of FEMA. We noted earlier in this chapter that FEMA was created in the late 1970s to act as the lead agency for many aspects of disaster management, and that mitigation as a recognized discipline became a major focus of the agency in the 1990s. We also mentioned that FEMA is now housed within the larger Department of Homeland Security, where it is one of many different component agencies responsible for protecting America from hazards of all kinds. Although FEMA has experienced trouble with management and been criticized during past disasters, it is still considered the preeminent force for supporting the creation of resilient communities.

FEMA’s official mission is “to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.”^* This involves fostering readiness for disasters at every level of the emergency management system. The Mitigation Division spearheads FEMA’s efforts to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect our nation’s institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of preparedness and preventive techniques. The Mitigation Division administers the nationwide risk-reduction programs and Congressionally authorized efforts that are discussed in this section.

Objective observers may quibble about whether insurance alone fully qualifies as a mitigation tool, because it primarily transfers the financial risk of disasters from the property owner to the insurance company, as opposed to directly reducing risk. However, in the case of the NFIP, the availability of flood insurance is often viewed as a mitigation technique, because the insurance does not become available merely through payment of premiums, but through community-wide efforts to reduce the risk of flooding.

Congress established the NFIP in 1968 through the National Flood Insurance Act to help control the growing cost of federal disaster relief. The NFIP began as a voluntary program for local communities who wished to provide the opportunity for residents to purchase federally backed flood insurance. In exchange, local governments were required to enact an ordinance to regulate development in their floodplains. The legislation was bolstered a few years later through the Flood Insurance Act of 1972, which required the purchase of flood insurance for all federally backed mortgages (Veterans Administration loans, for instance), as well as for all mortgages issued by lending institutions that are federally regulated or federally insured, which covers the majority of lenders in the United States.

The NFIP is intended to be a self-supporting program that requires no taxpayer funds to pay claims or operating expenses for the average historical loss year. Expenses are to be covered through premiums collected for flood insurance policies. The program has borrowing authority from the U.S. Treasury for times when losses are heavy. These loans are to be paid back with interest.

The NFIP is the largest single-line writer of property insurance in the United States. In 2013, the NFIP had approximately 5.6 million policies in force.^* Program administrators estimate that mitigation efforts carried out under NFIP regulatory standards reduce America’s flood losses by $1.7 billion each year.^† In an average year, NFIP policyholders receive approximately $1.24 billion for flood insurance claims and related expenses. However, this value varies year to year, as evidenced by the $17.75 billion paid out following Hurricane Katrina.^‡

Upon enrollment in the NFIP, local communities are required to adopt floodplain ordinances that meet criteria established by FEMA. The ordinances must include construction standards for all development in the floodplain areas of the community. These construction standards apply to both new development and to reconstruction of homes and other buildings that suffer “substantial damage” during a flooding event, meaning the cost of repair or reconstruction after an event is more than 50% of the structure’s value. NFIP criteria require communities to issue permits for development in designated floodplains, all new structures located in the 100-year flood zone must be elevated above expected flood heights, drainage ways and culverts must be properly sized and maintained, and all local water supply and sewage systems must be protected to minimize infiltration of floodwaters.

In order to enforce local floodplain ordinances, communities must have accurate information about the location of floodplains in the jurisdiction. As part of the NFIP, FEMA develops FIRMs for each participating community. FIRMs are paper or digital maps that represent the full range of flood risk in the community. Each FIRM indicates certain areas using special designations that help the community prepare their development regulations and ascertain where these regulations will apply. See Chapter 3 for a description of FIRMs.

There is much riding on a community’s FIRMs. Development permits, ordinance provisions, and structural requirements such as elevation are determined by the location of property as shown on the local FIRMs. The maps also determine the various insurance rates for covered properties. No map is perfect, and floodplains change due to a number of factors. From time to time, FEMA, communities, or individuals may find it necessary for a FIRM to be updated, corrected, or changed. Conditions that may warrant a change in a local FIRM include the following:

• The occurrence of significant construction within the already identified floodplains on the FIRM.

• Significant development in upstream communities after the FIRM was published.

• The occurrence of flooding for which inundation patterns indicate that the FIRM boundaries are no longer accurate.

• The completion of a major flood control project within the community or upstream of the community.

In 1997, FEMA developed the Map Modernization Program to update and digitize the entire U.S. floodplain map inventory. The completed multiyear effort to update and digitize the flood map inventory costs roughly $1 billion, but is projected to prevent $45 billion in flood losses over the next 50 years. Unfortunately, that time frame means that many communities will still be using out-of-date flood maps when determining standards for future development in their floodplains. In many of these communities, changes in development, topography, and inundation patterns have occurred so rapidly that new construction of homes and businesses may be unwittingly allowed in areas of flood risk, even in communities that faithfully enforce their floodplain regulations.

STATE EFFORTS TO SPEED UP MAP MODERNIZATION

Some states have proceeded with their own flood map modernization programs. For example, the state of North Carolina has undertaken a massive flood mapping project. The decision to proceed was made following Hurricane Floyd in 1999, when flood hazard data and map limitations were dramatically revealed. At that time, approximately 75% of North Carolina FIRMs were at least 5 years old, and approximately 55% of North Carolina’s FIRMs were at least 10 years old. The flooding that occurred during and after Hurricane Floyd far exceeded the flood boundaries portrayed on the FIRMs. Many structures were flooded in locations that did not appear as flood hazard areas on the maps in existence at the time. Although FEMA had begun the process of updating FIRMs nationwide, the federal mapping budget was finite; on average, North Carolina would have received one updated flood study per county per year. In a state with 100 counties, the federal process was deemed inadequate to protect communities from future flood events, hence initiation of the state-level fast-track to map modernization.

The NFIP has been criticized over the years because of flaws in its design and application. Foremost among these criticisms is the observation that the NFIP is not actuarially sound, meaning the program does not collect enough income from premiums to build reserves that can meet long-term future expected flood losses. This has occurred in part because Congress authorized subsidized insurance rates for some properties. Historically, FEMA was relatively successful in keeping the NFIP on a sound financial footing. In fact, the program was self-supporting from 1986 until 2005. However, following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma in 2005, FEMA paid more than $19 billion in claims, far exceeding the $2.2 billion in annual premiums and its $1.5 billion borrowing authority from the U.S. Treasury. As a result, Congress passed legislation to increase the NFIP borrowing authority first to $3.5 billion, then to $18.5 billion, and finally to $20.775 billion in 2006, to allow the agency to continue to pay claims.

Prior to Hurricane Sandy striking several states along the Atlantic coast in 2012, the NFIP was approximately $17 billion in debt. The additional flood insurance claims due to Sandy are estimated to be between $12 and $15 billion, far exceeding the $4 billion in remaining borrowing authority. In January 2013, Congress passed legislation and the President signed into law a bill to increase the borrowing authority to $30.425 billion to protect the financial integrity of the NFIP and ensure that the program had the resources to cover its existing commitments.^* These figures indicate that the NFIP has heavily subsidized properties in high-risk areas in recent years, and the rising cost of disasters has made it difficult for the program to be self-supporting, as it was originally conceived.

Even the most ardent supporters of the NFIP admit that the program has historically not been run like a private insurance company—that is, with loss reduction as a primary goal. This problem is most evident with regard to the repetitive losses that occur on a regular basis, creating a significant drain on NFIP resources. Repetitive loss properties (RLPs) and severe repetitive loss properties—those with multiple claims for flooding—represent a small proportion of the properties that are insured by the NFIP, but in an average loss year they account for a much larger chunk of the NFIP flood claim dollars.

Most RLPs are older, less safe homes that were grandfathered into the NFIP when it first began and therefore were built before NFIP construction standards were created and prior to issuance of Flood Insurance Rate Maps. In other words, many RLPs, known as Pre-FIRM structures, were built before local flood hazard risks were fully known, and thus were not constructed to resist water damage. Most RLPs are residential structures, not vacation or investment properties, and many have been repaired multiple times. The sheer number and cumulative amount of these losses created the repetitive loss payout problem.

Through its repetitive loss provisions, the NFIP has had the unintended effect of helping people stay in areas which were repeatedly flooded when it might be in the property owners’ and the communities’ best long-term interests to mitigate the flood vulnerability of these properties or to move elsewhere. Furthermore, a small minority of policyholders of RLP structures have been able to take advantage of and abuse the NFIP by making claim after claim on the same flood-prone properties, collecting more than the property was even worth in some instances.

In recognition of the problems of repeated NFIP payouts with every flooding event, FEMA implemented a strategy to target severe RLPs for mitigation. The Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 established a pilot program requiring owners of RLPs to elevate, relocate or demolish houses, with the NFIP bearing some of those costs. Funds from the Flood Mitigation Assistance program (discussed below) can also be used to help with these activities.

Additionally, to address concerns about the long-term viability of the NFIP and the program’s ability to mitigate the impacts of flooding on communities, Congress passed the “Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012.” The Biggert-Waters Act reauthorized the NFIP for 5 years and required significant changes to the program. One of the most impactful of these changes was a restructuring of premium rates to make the NFIP more actuarially sound so that premiums more accurately reflect the current risk of floods to properties. The Act also required the phasing out of subsidies for second homes, business properties, and severe repetitive loss properties. The Act also required FEMA to create a repayment schedule to eliminate the debt within 10 years.^* These changes to the NFIP, particularly the requirement to charge premiums that align with the level of risk for a structure, have been touted as a critical step toward effective mitigation since the change removes existing incentives to develop in hazardous areas.

However, due to concerns about onerous insurance rate increases caused by the Biggert-Waters Act, Congress again took up the issue, passing the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, repealing and modifying certain provisions of the Biggert-Waters Act. The primary change was to lower the rate increases on some policies and create a surcharge on other policyholders—such as owners of second-homes.^† While the intention of the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act is to strive toward structuring the NFIP to be actuarially sound, it remains to be seen whether the limits on rate increases and reinstatement of certain subsidies will continue to incentivize unsafe development through the NFIP.

The Community Rating System (CRS) is administered by FEMA as part of the NFIP. The CRS provides flood insurance premium discounts for residents in NFIP communities that undertake floodplain mitigation activities above and beyond the minimum NFIP requirements. By rewarding sound floodplain management with insurance savings for residents, the CRS program works toward the goals of reduced flood losses, accurate insurance ratings, and increased awareness of floods and flood insurance. As of March, 2014, there were 1296 CRS communities spread throughout the United States, reducing insurance premiums for nearly 3.8 million policy-holders. Over 67% of the NFIP’s policy base is located in these communities.^‡ Communities receiving premium discounts through the CRS cover the full range of population—from small hamlets to large metropolitan areas, as well as a broad mixture of flood risks, including both coastal and riverine.

The reduction in insurance premiums is in the form of a CRS classification. There are 10 classes in the system, each providing an additional 5% premium rate reduction for properties in the community’s mapped floodplain. A community’s class is based on the number of credit points it receives for its floodplain management activities. Class 1 requires the most credit points and gives the greatest premium reduction. Class 10 receives no premium reduction. A community that does not apply for the CRS or does not obtain the minimum number of credit points is a Class 10 community.

ROSEVILLE, CA GETS A TEN

Following damaging floods in Roseville, California in 1995, the community strengthened and broadened its floodplain management program and became the first community to receive the highest CRS rating. Because of their great Class 1 rating, residents within the 100-year floodplain can receive a 45% discount on their flood insurance premiums, while those outside the floodplain can receive a 10% discount. Not only did residents of Roseville receive the benefits of reduced flood insurance premiums, the town became energized to continue the successful mitigation activities that earned them the top CRS rating, and residents actively maintain the projects that continue to make their community safer.

The CRS schedule identifies 18 creditable activities, organized under four categories, or “series.” The schedule assigns credit points based upon the extent to which an activity advances the goals of the CRS. The following list explains the four series of the CRS schedule:

1. Public information activities: This series credits programs that advise residents about the local flood hazard, flood insurance, and ways to reduce flood damage. These activities also provide data needed by insurance agents for accurate flood insurance rating. Activities in the Public Information Series include elevation certificates, map information, outreach projects, hazard disclosure, flood protection information, and flood protection assistance.

2. Mapping and regulatory activities: This series credits programs that provide increased protection to new development, including additional flood data, open space preservation, higher regulatory standards, flood data maintenance, and stormwater management.

3. Flood protection activities: This series credits programs that reduce the flood risk to existing development, including floodplain management plans, acquisition and relocation, flood protection (retrofitting), and drainage system maintenance.

4. Flood preparedness activities: This series credits flood warning programs, levee safety, and dam safety.

The most possible credit points are awarded for acquisition and relocation projects to remove structures from the floodplain.

In 2011, the NFIP completed a comprehensive review of the CRS program. Based on the findings of this review, changes are underway to drive new achievements in the following six core areas:

The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 and is intended to facilitate cooperation between state and local authorities, prompting them to work together. The DMA encourages and rewards local and state pre-disaster planning and promotes sustainability as a strategy for disaster resistance. The enhanced planning network is meant to enable local and state governments to better articulate accurate needs for mitigation, resulting in faster allocation of funding and more effective risk reduction projects.

Significant changes brought about through enactment of the DMA include the requirement that local governments create and adopt a mitigation plan in order to receive certain disaster assistance funds, including post-disaster project grants (bricks and mortar grants) under the HMGP and the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program (discussed below) as well as assistance for rebuilding public infrastructure following a major disaster, with some exceptions.

The rules that accompany the DMA lay out a rigorous planning process that states, local governments, and Native American Tribes must follow. FEMA is in charge of reviewing all the state and local plans that are submitted to it for approval, and certain criteria must be met before a plan will meet FEMA’s guidelines. The plan must identify all the hazards that threaten a community and must also include a thorough risk analysis for each of those hazards. The plan must contain mitigation goals and objectives and lay out strategies and actions that will reduce the community’s vulnerability to the hazards identified. The plan also must discuss the mechanism to implement the mitigation actions and a process to maintain, evaluate and update the plan over time. These are not easy tasks to accomplish, and an effective mitigation plan requires many staff hours and community networking to meet FEMA standards. However, the benefits of developing and implementing a sound and well thought-out mitigation plan are innumerable, and communities that make the effort are rewarded by far more than their eligibility to receive future federal mitigation money. See Chapters 7 and 8 for a discussion of the DMA as it pertains to state and local hazard mitigation planning and the consequences of not preparing a mitigation plan.

FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) grant programs provide funding for eligible mitigation activities that reduce disaster losses and protect life and property from future disaster damages. Programs included in the 2013 HMA Unified Guidance include the HMGP, Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM), and Flood Mitigation Assistance Program (FMA).^* The guidance consolidates the common requirements for all HMA programs and explains the unique elements of the programs in individual sections. Additionally, it provides information for Federal, State, Indian Tribal, and local officials on how to apply for HMA funding for a proposed mitigation activity.

The HMGP is the largest source of federal funding for state and local mitigation activities. HMGP funds are only available to communities after a disaster declaration has been made by the President, and the amount of mitigation funding is based on a percentage of the total disaster assistance package that is given, as calculated by damage loss estimates. As a result, the larger the disaster, the more mitigation funds are made available.

In recognition of the importance of planning, states that have an approved State Mitigation Plan in effect at the time of the declaration of a major disaster may receive additional HMGP funding. States, with local input, are responsible for identifying and selecting hazard mitigation projects.

Projects funded by the HMGP must be cost-effective; environmentally sound; conform to applicable environmental regulations; and substantially reduce the risk of future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering resulting from a major disaster. Types of projects for which HMGP funds can be used include, but are not limited to the following:

The PDM Program provides technical and financial assistance to state and local governments to assist in the implementation of pre-disaster hazard mitigation measures. PDM projects must be cost effective and designed to reduce injuries, loss of life, and damage and destruction of property, including damage to critical services and facilities.

Perhaps most notable about the PDM Program is the fact that it provides mitigation funding that is not dependent on a disaster declaration. Instead, funding through the PDM Program is provided in the form of a competitive grant system. PDM can provide funding for hazard mitigation activities (including planning) that complement a comprehensive mitigation program before a disaster strikes. PDM Program-funded multihazard mitigation projects must primarily focus on natural hazards, but may also address hazards caused by nonnatural forces. In recent years, the funding available for PDM grants has been reduced. The fiscal year 2014 budget for the PDM Program made $63 million available for mitigation grant projects for the entire country.^*

• Acquisition or relocation of hazard-prone property for conversion to open space in perpetuity

• Structural and nonstructural retrofitting of existing buildings and facilities, such as elevation, floodproofing, storm shutters, and hurricane clips

• Minor structural hazard control or protection projects, such as vegetation management, stormwater management (e.g., culverts, floodgates, retention basins) or shoreline/landslide stabilization

• Localized flood control projects to protect critical facilities, such as ring levees and floodwall systems

The FMA Program expands FEMA’s mitigation assistance to states, communities, and individuals by providing grants for cost-effective measures to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk of flood damage to the built environment and real property. The priority goal of the FMA is to reduce repetitive losses to the NFIP.

Unlike the HMGP, which is available only after a presidentially declared disaster, FMA funding is available to eligible communities every year. To be eligible for FMA grants, a community must be a participant in the NFIP and have jurisdiction over special flood hazard areas.

The FMA Program provides three types of grants: planning, project, and technical assistance. Planning grants allow states and communities to determine flood risks and identify actions to reduce these risks. Creation and approval of a flood mitigation plan is a prerequisite to receiving FMA project grants. The regulations do not mandate that FMA plans be limited to flood hazards, although funds will only be provided for the flood portion of a mitigation plan.

Once a community has a flood mitigation plan approved by FEMA, it is eligible for flood mitigation project grants from the FMA. Types of projects that are eligible for funding through the FMA include elevation, acquisition, and relocation projects; minor structural projects (flood retention ponds, floodproofing sewers, culvert modification, etc.); and beach nourishment activities.

The goal of the National Hurricane Program is to significantly reduce the loss of life and property, economic disruption, and disaster assistance costs resulting from hurricanes. The program addresses population protection and evacuation, structural mitigation in hurricane-prone areas, and public education and awareness campaigns. The program has also funded hazard identification research as well as post-storm analyses to evaluate the effectiveness of mitigation measures and response activities. While the Hurricane Program’s focus on hurricane mitigation and preparedness is well defined, the program is underfunded, with FEMA receiving a paltry $5.9 million annually to combat hurricane risks along both the Atlantic and Gulf coasts.

The National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) involves four agencies at the federal level: FEMA, the USGS, the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The fundamental goal of the NEHRP is to reduce the impacts of earthquakes and subsequent loss of lives, property damage, and economic loss. To this end, the NEHRP provides financial and technical assistance to all levels of government and to the private sector to implement earthquake hazard mitigation measures. The NEHRP has fostered the development and implementation of seismic design and construction standards and techniques, promotion of loss estimation studies, and education and information dissemination of risk-reduction activities. Since the advent of the program, building codes in many states where seismic risk exists have been changed to include seismic resistance standards for new construction.

Administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the CDBG program provides communities with resources to address a wide range of community development needs. CDBG funding can serve as a significant source of disaster recovery support for cities, counties, and states that have experienced a presidentially declared disaster. If the funds are applied in ways that prioritize safe and sustainable redevelopment, CDGB activities can also be an important mitigation tool.

In 2014, President Obama announced the National Disaster Resilience Competition, setting aside nearly $1 billion in funding available for communities that have experienced disasters in recent years to help them rebuild and increase resilience to future disasters. The funds, allocated through the CDBG program, encourage communities to enhance resilience by redeveloping in ways that incorporate hazard mitigation and by adopting policy changes to better plan for the impact of extreme weather and climate change.

Congress passed the CBRA in 1982 in an attempt to reduce costs to the federal government as a result of development in the extremely fragile environment of coastal barrier islands. Besides bearing the brunt of impacts from storms and severe erosion, most coastal barriers are made of unconsolidated sediments such as sand and gravel. This geological composition alone makes them highly unstable areas on which to build (see Figure 6.3). CBRA prohibits spending federal money for growth-inducing infrastructure such as roads, bridges, wastewater systems, potable water supplies, and protective works including seawalls and groins in areas that are within the Coastal Barrier Resources System (CBRS). The CBRS consists of 585 “units” of land that were undeveloped at the time the legislation was passed and were mapped according to criteria developed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. CRBA further stipulates that new development is ineligible for federal flood insurance in these areas.

SELF-CHECK

• Explain the mission of FEMA.

• Discuss how the NFIP works to mitigate flood hazards and the modifications resulting from the Biggert-Waters Act.

• Identify the types of mitigation projects eligible under the Pre-Disaster Mitigation program.

In this section, we will discuss a few federal programs that focus on protecting the quality and resources of the natural environment, including the Clean Water Act (CWA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA). We refer to these as “indirect” hazards management programs, because they do not focus on reducing hazard vulnerability per se, but can result in risk reduction as a by-product of their main objective. We will also consider some other federal activities that may make these and the explicit hazard management programs less effective, including capital improvement programs and taxation policies that foster development in hazardous areas later in the chapter.

The primary purpose of the federal CWA, formally known as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, is to improve water quality in the United States by reducing pollutants discharged into bodies of water. The CWA consists of several pollution control programs primarily administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, including point source (pollution that is discharged from a specific definable source, such as a pipe), local stormwater management, and nonpoint source (pollutants that do not discharge from a specific source, such as agricultural runoff). In so far as water quality and flood mitigation are interconnected objectives, these CWA programs can help mitigate the impacts of flooding in local communities. In addition, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act contains provisions that help protect the nation’s wetlands, which are sensitive environmental areas that can contribute to flood mitigation and storm surge damage reduction.

Section 404 of the CWA requires a permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers to discharge “dredge and fill materials” into the “waters of the United States.”^* Through a complicated series of regulations and guidelines, the term waters of the United States covers many types of wetlands. The term discharge of dredge and fill can cover many kinds of development, because it is very difficult to build in a wetland without creating dry areas suitable for construction. As a consequence, in the process of protecting water quality, Section 404 limits development activity in wetlands, including coastal and many freshwater wetlands. The Corps will issue a permit only if it finds that there are no practicable alternative sites for the proposed activity. In addition to a permit, Section 404 requires that the impacts of the dredge and fill activity be offset through restoration projects or the creation of new wetlands elsewhere, a practice known as compensatory wetland mitigation.

The protection of the nation’s wetlands is very significant for flood mitigation because, in their natural state, wetlands can absorb floodwaters, acting much like a sponge, and provide storage for floodwaters, releasing the excess water slowly during dry periods. Coastal and estuarine wetlands also serve as natural barriers against storm surge, by dissipating the incoming energy generated by coastal storms.

404 Flaws: Without the protections afforded by Section 404, a substantial portion of the nation’s wetlands would undoubtedly have been lost to development. However, there are some inherent limitations to the program as a conservation tool. First, 404 permitting applies only to discharge of dredge and fill materials. There is no prohibition against other methods of damaging or destroying wetlands, and many acres of wetlands across the country have disappeared without any discharge taking place. Secondly, the Corps must issue a dredge and fill permit if the permitee demonstrates there is no practicable alternative site for the project. And finally, the definition of what qualifies as a wetland can be problematic. For instance, isolated wetlands (wetlands that are not adjacent to a navigable waterway) are not under the Corps of Engineers’ permitting authority, leaving many wetland areas unprotected because they do not have a visible connection with another larger body of water.

WETLANDS DESTRUCTION LEFT NEW ORLEANS VULNERABLE

Wetlands along the southern coastlines of the United States serve as natural speed bumps to approaching hurricanes by starving them of warm ocean water and creating physical barriers to surging flood waters. However, in the last 100 years, the construction of levees and canals has starved floodplains of sediment and accompanying nutrients, turning thousands of square miles of wetland habitat into open water. These practices, combined with additional human and natural forces—including conversion of wetlands to agriculture and urban development, oil and gas pipeline canals, land subsidence, and hurricane storm surge—have served to weaken the natural protection provided by wetlands in centuries past. With a changing climate, sea level rise will likely cause further damage to wetlands, either by drowning these sensitive areas with ocean water and disrupting the delicate balance of fresh and salt water, or through erosion.

Among the various forces that have played a role in the degradation of wetlands are activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers itself, at times with devastating consequences. Louisiana’s coastal wetlands provide an illustration. The state lost more than 70% of its substantial coastal wetlands between 1956 and 2000 and continues to lose more coastal wetland acreage each year,⁸ leaving the region exposed to flooding and the full force of hurricane storm surge (Figure 6.4).

FIGURE 6.4 Extensive wetland loss in the northern Gulf Coast of the United States has been a critical concern of environmental agencies, natural resource managers, emergency managers, coastal communities, and many others. The image shows projected coastal land loss in Louisiana between 1932 and 2050. (Louisiana’s Comprehensive Master Plan for a Sustainable Coast, Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority, 2012.)

New Orleans’ exposure to increased flood risk started half a century ago 45 years ago when the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed a 76-mile canal, the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO), from the Gulf to the city. The artificial shipping channel brought saltwater into the wetlands, raising their salinity and killing off the lush, freshwater cypress swamps—including the 30,000-acre Central Wetlands, which is only 15 minutes from the city’s French Quarter. Had they been in their more pristine, pre-MRGO state, the Central Wetlands and other swamps may well have softened the 2005 storm surge from Hurricane Katrina that left adjoining communities like the Lower Ninth Ward under water for weeks. Since Hurricane Katrina, the Army Corps has dammed up the MRGO, and is instituting a plan to restore natural features of the ecosystem, including the all-important diversion of fresh water back into the wetlands to resurrect their vital vegetation.^*

* http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2012217_2012252_2014247,00.html.

When passing the Coastal Zone Management Act in 1972, Congress declared that the coastal zone of the United States is of tremendous importance to the entire nation, not just to the individual coastal states, and that the existing management programs (largely state programs) were not adequately managing the coast. The Act establishes a national policy “to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation’s coastal zone for this and succeeding generations.”^* The CZMA is administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce, through the NOAA Office for Coastal Management, and applies to the 35 states that border the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Gulf Coast, and the Great Lakes.

To participate in the Coastal Zone Management Program, states must respond to all the requirements of the Act, but are free to determine the substantive content of their own coastal programs. This flexible approach was established in recognition of the variability in the nature of the coast from state to state. For example, Maine, which is characterized by rocky beaches with numerous coves and bays, has a very different type of coastline than Georgia, which consists of sandy beaches and a string of barrier islands. Both of these coasts are different from coastlines bordering the Great Lakes. In addition, this flexible approach recognizes the many social, economic, and political differences that exist from state to state.

Although participation is voluntary, the CZMA provides two strong incentives for states to formulate coastal programs. The first involves grants; grants under Section 305 assist states in preparing their Coastal Zone Management Programs, while Section 306 provides funding to administer approved programs. Grant allocations are based on the extent and nature of the state’s shoreline and population. The second incentive to encourage states to participate in the Coastal Zone Management Program is the “consistency doctrine,” found in Section 307 of the CZMA.^†

Under the consistency doctrine, actions of any federal agency in a state’s coastal zone must be consistent with that state’s coastal management policies, giving the state a degree of control over activities of the federal government. The consistency provision covers activities and projects carried out directly by a federal agency (for instance, highway construction by the U.S. Department of Transportation), as well as activities and projects for which a federal permit or other form of approval is required (such as 404 permits issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). Examples of other federal action that must be consistent with state coastal management programs include navigational and flood control projects, wastewater treatment facility funding, military activities, and federal fisheries management.

In 1990 Congress amended the Coastal Zone Management Act and added several additional activities for which states may use CZMA grant funds. These activities include measures to prevent or significantly reduce threats to life and property destruction by eliminating development and redevelopment in high-hazard areas, managing development in other hazard areas, and anticipating and managing the effects of potential sea level rise and Great Lakes level rise. With this amendment, Congress made explicit the need to mitigate the impacts of natural hazards as a part of state coastal management programs.

Some states have established policies and strategies under their coastal management programs that are effective in mitigating the impacts of natural hazards. These activities include the following:

• Shoreline management and retreat (e.g., creating setback rules, regulating shoreline development, and shoreline stabilization)

• Regulating shore-hardening structures (e.g., prohibiting or restricting seawalls, revetments, groins, and other shore-hardening structures)

• Managing post-hazard reconstruction (e.g., regulating the repair and reconstruction of buildings damaged by a coastal hazard)

• Managing unbuildable lots (e.g., regulating construction on lots that should not be developed because of their proximity to hazard areas)

• Promulgating building codes and construction standards (e. g., regulating construction through rules, inspections, and enforcement)

• Implementing land acquisition programs (purchasing private lots in hazardous areas)

• Promoting local land use planning (encouraging or requiring local governments to include hazard mitigation in their land use plans)

• Developing special area management plans (creating plans that deal with coastal hazards in designated areas of the coastal zone)

The primary purpose of the NEPA is to require federal agencies to take environmental issues into consideration when making significant decisions. The Act requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed explanation of the environmental impact of agency decisions and to inform other agencies and the public of that impact through various types of disclosure documents, including the following:

• Environmental assessments (EA), which are prepared to assist the agency in deciding whether or not a more detailed study is required.

• Environmental impact studies (EIS), which are prepared when it is decided that an action is likely to cause a significant impact on the environment.

• Findings of no significant impact (FONSI), which are prepared if an EIS is not required.

NEPA is solely a policy act, which requires disclosure of information regarding potential environmental impacts. NEPA lacks the regulatory muscle of other federal environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. Because NEPA does not prevent an agency from implementing its decisions, regardless of the action’s impact, some have characterized NEPA as a “toothless ogre.” However, as a consciousness-raising device, NEPA does have the potential to require greater collaboration and transparency for activities that take place in environmentally sensitive areas, including the coastal zone, floodplains, and wetlands.⁹ At a minimum, the requirements under NEPA can slow down the progress of activities that could harm the environment, allowing citizens and affected local communities to respond.¹⁰

On December 18, 2014 the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) issued revised draft guidance for federal agencies to consider greenhouse gas emissions and the effects of climate change when they conduct reviews required by the NEPA. At this stage, it remains to be seen whether the guidance is specific and clear enough to help provide reasonable bounds around the level of analysis required for climate change in NEPA reviews.

SELF-CHECK

• Explain the importance of wetlands for flood mitigation.

• Discuss the purpose of the CZMA.

• Describe the limitations of NEPA.

As the impacts of climate change become better understood and more widely accepted, many federal agencies are developing new programs or modifying existing programs to reduce risks posed by climate change. As identified by the IPCC, the phrase climate change adaptation refers to the process of adjusting to our climate and its effects in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial opportunities.^* Many climate change adaptation programs work to reduce risks posed by natural hazards, ultimately achieving hazard mitigation and preparedness goals as well.

Myriad grant programs within federal agencies have also been expanded to include studies, plans, and projects that focus on climate change adaptation. For example, the National Coastal Wetlands Conservation Grant Program administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service provides financial assistance for acquisition, restoration, management, or enhancement of coastal wetlands, projects which may further climate change adaptation goals as well as hazard mitigation.^†

Other federal agencies with active climate change programs include the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), which carries out initiatives to help cities and states become “climate ready” in the face of possible disease outbreak and public health threats due to climate change. The Department of Interior (DOI) has developed an integrated strategy across the Department’s agencies and bureaus to respond to the impacts of climate change on Indian tribes and on the public land, water, ocean, fish and wildlife and cultural heritage resources that the DOI manages. In 2014, the DOT issued an updated Climate Adaptation Plan that lays out the potential impacts of climate change on the nation’s transportation infrastructure. The plan specifies concrete steps; the department will take to fully integrate considerations of climate change and variability in DOT policies, programs, and operations to deal with issues such as rising sea level and changes in regional temperature that may affect our vast road and rail network.

In addition to the activities mentioned above, the following section highlights just a few of the many climate change adaption initiatives being implemented at the federal level.

The federal government plays an extremely important role in coordinating scientific research and assessment to better understand the impact of climate change on the nation and the world. Established by Presidential Initiative in 1989, the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) is a research program to help assess, predict, and respond to human-induced and natural processes of global change. A key outcome of this program is the National Climate Assessment, which summarizes the impacts of climate change on the United States. The Assessment has historically been updated only every few years; however, the USGCRP intends to implement a “sustained assessment,” which will ultimately facilitate continuous participation of scientists and stakeholders to update information in the National Climate Assessment as it becomes available.

Through an Executive Order in 2009, President Obama convened the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force to develop a report with recommendations for how the Federal Government can strengthen policies and programs to better prepare the Nation to adapt to the impacts of climate change. The Task Force represents more than 20 federal agencies, each of which is tasked with developing and annually updating a climate adaptation strategy.

On June 25, 2013, the White house released the President’s Climate Action Plan to reduce carbon pollution, move the American economy toward clean energy sources, and begin to address the effects of climate change. The Plan acknowledges that, even if we take steps to reduce carbon pollution, we must also prepare for the inevitable impacts of climate change, such as increased flooding, prolonged periods of drought, and dangerous storm surge on top of higher sea levels.

The President’s Climate Action Plan included the launch of the Climate Data Initiative, which provides access to federal climate-relevant data to stimulate innovation and private-sector entrepreneurship in support of climate change preparedness. The website (data.climate.gov) provides federal, state and local data, tools, and resources to conduct research, build applications and design other value-added tools using government information.

Additionally, the President’s Climate Action Plan committed the federal government to developing a Toolkit for Climate Resilience that centralizes access to data-driven resilience tools, services, and best practices. Released in November 2014, the Climate Resilience Toolkit (toolkit.climate.gov) provides scientific tools, information, and expertise to help people manage their climate-related risks and opportunities, and improve their resilience to extreme events. While the Climate Data Initiative provides more raw data, the Climate Resilience Toolkit is designed to serve interested citizens, communities, businesses, resource managers, planners, and policy leaders at all level of government.

The DoD has recognized climate change as an urgent threat to national security, and has made climate change an integral part of Pentagon planning. In October 2014, the Secretary of Defense released the Pentagon’s Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap, a 16-page document that lays out the effects of extreme weather events and rising temperatures on military training, operations, acquisitions, and infrastructure. The Roadmap also details how the department will adapt to and mitigate climate change threats.

In the Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary stated that the military could be called upon more often to support civil authorities, and provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the face of more frequent and more intense natural disasters. Our coastal installations are vulnerable to rising sea levels and increased flooding, while droughts, wildfires, and more extreme temperatures could threaten many of the department’s training activities. Supply chains could be impacted, and DoD will need to ensure that critical equipment works under more extreme weather conditions. The Review points out that weather has always affected military operations, and as the climate changes, the way operations are executed may be altered or constrained.

The mission of the EPA is to protect human health and the environment. A major component of that mission is to address climate change, which the agency does through a variety of programs designed to help decision makers better understand and address risks posed by a changing climate. EPA’s regional adaptation programs provide information, tools, training and technical support for climate-change preparedness and resilience throughout the country, and make available the latest scientific data about climate change, its causes and its impacts. Additionally, the EPA plays a major role in the regulation of wetlands under its authority to administer the Clean Water Act.

WHAT ARE THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE WHERE I LIVE? THE EPA WANTS YOU TO KNOW

The EPA’s website provides an interactive map that shows climate change impacts and adaptation by region, as well as by sector (agriculture, energy, human health, etc.). By clicking on the map, users can find out specific types of impacts and examples of ways to adapt, as well as links to resources for more information. For example, by clicking on the Northwest region of the map, the reader finds out that climate change will likely result in reduced snowpack and lower summer streamflows, worsening the existing competition for water, and that sea level rise is projected to increase coastal erosion and land loss. To find out what the Northwest is doing to adapt to these climate change impacts, the user can click on the adaptation section of the website to read examples of strategies and actions, such as Portland, Oregon’s facility expansion to deal with future water supply and demand scenarios, and about the city of Olympia, Washington’s new maps that illustrate potential high tides, storm events, and sea level rise. Visit http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ to find the impacts of climate change in your region.

NOAA’s roots date back to 1807, when the Nation’s first scientific agency, the Survey of the Coast, was established. Today, NOAA maintains a presence in every state, with the goal of building a “climate-smart nation” that is resilient to climate and weather extremes, and long-term changes. NOAA’s objectives include the following:

• Identify and manage risks to marine ecosystems and the services they provide

NOAA meets these objectives by providing data and information on climate through a variety of programs and services, including the following:

• The Office for Coastal Management was established in 2014 when NOAA combined two offices: the Coastal Services Center and the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management. A top priority for the Office is to unify efforts to make communities more resilient. The Office provides NOAA data and tools along with opportunities to work collaboratively within communities on issues that run the gamut from protecting endangered species to erosion to generating better building codes for storm-resistant buildings.

• Digital Coast is used to address timely coastal issues, including land use, coastal conservation, hazards, and climate change among others. The website includes tools, training, case studies, and information that help users incorporate climate data into coastal management decisions. For example, the Digital Coast’s Sea Level Rise Viewer provides models illustrating potential marsh migration, and how tidal flooding will become more frequent with sea level rise.

• NOAA National Weather Service (NWS) Climate Services: The NWS Climate Prediction Center (CPC) has primary operational responsibility for short climate timescales (e.g., weeks, months, and seasons). In support of the NWS preparedness and response mission, the CPC also has capabilities to provide climate information for the intermediate timescales (e.g., seasons, years, and decades) at which preparedness and adaptation meet or overlap. This includes activities to link seasonal and decadal modeling and prediction (e.g., frequency and intensity of droughts and floods) and efforts to develop prediction techniques for regional climate information across timescales.

In June 2013, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced the launch of seven Regional Hubs for Risk Adaptation and Mitigation to Climate Change. The Regional Climate Hubs deliver science-based, region-specific information and technologies to farmers, ranchers, and forest landowners to support climate resilience. These hubs work with universities and other partners to provide actionable information, as well as providing grants and technical support to agricultural water uses for more water-efficient practices in the face of drought and long-term climate change. The Hubs are also designed to partner with agricultural extension organizations to further disseminate information and best practices that enhance resilience to a changing climate.

The Regional Climate Hubs help translate climate change projections into potential impacts on the agricultural and forestry sector. In addition to helping farmers and foresters better anticipate climate impacts, the Hubs provide information and tools to better manage risk, mitigate hazards, and ultimate become more climate resilient. For example, the Hubs draw on and downscale information published by programs such as the U.S. Drought Monitor to make climate data useful and actionable.

The previous sections of this chapter sketched out the evolution of various federal mitigation approaches that have been in effect over the years, and discussed in more detail how some of these programs may reduce vulnerability to natural hazards. However, at the same time that these programs are being carried out to make development safer, there are dozens of other federal programs and policies that actively encourage development, even in some of the most hazardous areas of our country. These incentives are primarily in the form of federally funded infrastructure programs, and policies of the federal tax code. These counterproductive forces to national mitigation efforts have been characterized as “driving with the brakes on.”⁴

The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) is administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a branch of the United States Treasury Department. The basic function of the IRC is to raise revenue needed to operate the federal government. As a matter of tax policy, the Code includes provisions that allow taxpayers to make deductions, take credits, and otherwise lessen their tax burden. For example, after a major disaster declaration, homeowners may claim a casualty loss deduction for uninsured losses of real and personal property. Eligible businesses are allowed to write off many of the uninsured expenses associated with restoring property to pre-disaster condition. In essence, these deductions serve to subsidize risky property decisions.⁶

Additional tax subsidies apply to investment properties, including property that is held for resale or rental income, characteristics of much ocean and lakefront real estate today. Some of the tax benefits for investment properties found in the IRC include the following:

• Mortgage interest and property taxes on second homes may be treated as deductions from taxable income.

• Expenses incurred in operating a second home as a rental property may be treated as business expenses (advertising, maintenance, management, etc.).

• Damage to a property caused by a natural hazard may be treated as a casualty loss deduction.

The cumulative effect of these various tax breaks has been described as “perhaps the most insidious federal stimulus to develop along hazardous coasts.”⁴ The Internal Revenue Code removes much of the investment risk in hazard areas by softening the financial burden of property damage and offsetting the economic pain of unwise land use decisions.

Capital improvement programs undertaken by federal agencies, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, provide significant stimulation for growth in hazard areas. Altogether, the federal government carries out approximately 40 different programs that foster development nationwide, including many programs that apply to high hazard areas such as the coastal zone.⁶ Growth and rebuilding has been stimulated through several community development programs, and federal subsidies for water and sewer have eased the cost of development substantially in many hazard areas. One of the most aggressive growth stimulators is the federal Department of Transportation, which constructs highways, causeways, and bridges that connect barrier islands and other previously inaccessible areas with the mainland, greatly easing transportation to hazardous islands. Many of these transportation projects are necessary to support existing communities, but they also often serve to encourage new development.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PROVIDES EASY ACCESS TO DAUPHIN ISLAND

Dauphin Island is located just off the coast of Alabama in the Gulf of Mexico. Access to the island was only by ferry for many years, so the island remained relatively undeveloped, until the U.S. Department of Transportation constructed a bridge linking the island to the mainland. Since that time, development on Dauphin Island has continued to grow, and with increased development came increased vulnerability to the impacts of hurricanes and other coastal storms. The bridge to Dauphin Island has been repeatedly damaged, and repeatedly rebuilt, at considerable federal expense.

We learned earlier in this chapter that the Flood Control Act of 1934 authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to design, and build flood control structures, such as levees, dams, and seawalls, as well as navigation projects, such as inlet dredging, and erosion control projects such as beach re-nourishment. While many of the Corp’s projects are relatively small, local protection projects (small dikes and seawalls), other Corps projects involve massive engineered structures, such as major dams and levee systems. Today, most Corps-constructed flood protection projects are owned and operated by sponsoring cities, towns and agricultural districts, but the Corps continues to maintain and operate nearly 400 dams and reservoirs for flood control.

While these projects have provided flood and erosion protection for countless communities for many years, they have also been blamed in part for the development boom that has taken place in floodplains and along the coastline in the past few decades. In fact, projects conducted by the Corps may actually exacerbate vulnerability by making the hazard areas seem less vulnerable than they actually are, thus encouraging development in areas prone to flooding and severe erosion.

Despite these criticisms, it is important to realize that the Corps—like many other federal agencies—has little, if any, programmatic authority when deploying funds appropriated by Congress for flood control projects. The Corps has no independent authority to set construction priorities and limited ability to consider the broader effects of the projects that Congress assigns, many of which were earmarked in appropriations bills prior to the moratorium placed on earmarking.¹ In other words, federal agencies such as the Corps, Department of Transportation, Department of Energy, and other builders of infrastructure are not growth management agencies; land use decisions largely remain under the purview of state and local policy makers. See Chapters 7 and 8 for a discussion of land use decision making and capital improvement planning at state and local levels.

SELF-CHECK

• Name two ways that the federal government offers incentives to development.

• Describe how tax benefits on investment properties can lead to increased hazard vulnerability.

• Explain how federal infrastructure programs aid development of hazard areas.

It is clear from our discussion in this chapter that some federal programs promote development in hazardous areas. The intent of these programs is to bring about public benefits such as a robust economy, growing communities, a healthy tax base, and the profitable use of private property. However, the unintended consequences of these infrastructure programs and tax breaks may be increased vulnerability to natural hazards. Furthermore, a similar argument can be made that payment of federal financial aid also plays a role in stimulating development in hazard areas.

The federal system of disaster assistance allows property owners and communities to recoup their losses whenever a presidential disaster is declared. FEMA disburses public assistance funds to help communities reestablish facilities and services, and provides individual and family assistance grants to help residents get back on their feet. Numerous other agencies, such as the Farm Service Agency, the Small Business Administration, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development also provide grants and loan packages to those affected by disasters to help them recover and rebuild, often in the same location. However, disaster assistance programs have been criticized for enabling unsafe and unsustainable development by supplanting the motive of “self-sufficiency.”

DISPUTES OVER PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS IN VERMONT

As Tropical Storm Irene moved up the coast of the Northeastern United States in August 2011, more than 7 inches of rain were dumped over many areas of Vermont, causing torrents of rainwater to cascade down hills and funnel through valleys at high velocity. The storm was particularly destructive to the state’s infrastructure, damaging 146 state road segments and a staggering 2260 locally maintained road segments. Hundreds of bridges were damaged or destroyed, and a significant number of culverts that allow water to pass underneath roads and bridges were damaged, destroyed, or blown out.¹¹

With the expectation that federal reimbursement would help cover the enormous cost of rebuilding, state agencies and localities in Vermont began the long road to recovery. Recognizing that many of the pipe culverts that were washed out were no longer adequate in size and design, Vermonters began replacing them with larger, open bottom “box” culverts that would have more capacity to handle increased floodwaters from current and future storms. However, a disagreement between FEMA and the state soon erupted over whether the cost of upgraded culverts could be reimbursed by the Public Assistance program, which typically provides funding to rebuild or repair an asset “as it existed immediately prior to the disaster,” rather than providing funding to rebuild an asset to be more resilient to future impacts. After a prolonged dispute with several appeals from state agencies, FEMA ultimately agreed to reimburse the cost of many upgraded culverts that would help to mitigate future disasters and cope with increased flooding due to climate change.¹²

While federal assistance is technically available only as a supplement to state, local, and private resources, it has been characterized by some scholars as having become an “entitlement,” at least in the eyes of the recipients. Americans want and expect the federal government to pay the expenses associated with a natural disaster. Politicians want and expect to be able to provide assistance to their constituents. Yet the ready and willing provision of disaster assistance from the federal government negates common sense when development decisions are made. This dilemma has been described as a moral hazard, as expressed by Professor Rutherford Platt in his book Disasters and Democracy:

…to what extent does the likelihood of generous federal assistance serve to diminish the natural caution that individuals, communities, and businesses might otherwise exercise in adjusting to natural hazards in their investment and location decisions? At what point does compassion lead to “co-dependency” whereby potential disaster victims and their federal protectors become locked in a repetitive cycle of loss, compensation, reconstruction and new losses?⁴

According to the moral hazard paradox, the increasing amount of disaster funds and the ease with which many communities become eligible to receive assistance have lessened the incentive to take responsibility for hazard avoidance. Compensation for losses that may occur makes spending money on mitigation seem pointless.¹³ Federal insurance claim payouts make investment in flood-prone areas worthwhile, and beach nourishment programs make building on the coast a sure profit-maker. The risk of building in a hazardous area has been reduced so significantly by federal programs that, in effect, the federal government is subsidizing the risk itself. The individual property owner shares in the risk only as one of millions of other taxpayers, spreading the cost to those who do not live in hazard areas equally with those who do.

For the past two decades, much of the post-disaster federal largess distributed to communities affected by natural hazards has included money for mitigation, not just for rebuilding in the same place in the same way. In theory, and more often than not in practice as well, mitigation funds—parceled out to the states as a percentage of the total disaster dollars that flow from the federal government following disaster declaration—do indeed make communities less vulnerable to future natural hazards. One of the finest examples of mitigation success can be found in communities that have chosen to engage in massive buyout projects, where residents are given the chance to sell their homes and businesses and relocate to drier, safer, higher ground, and start again. But hazard mitigation itself involves the same dilemma as disaster assistance: what should the federal role be? In other words, how much should communities and individuals be expected to do for themselves as a condition of federal assistance?¹⁴ We discuss this issue and other components of the moral hazard conundrum in the exploration of possible solutions in the next section.

We have explored the argument that the federal government subsidizes the risks associated with development in hazard areas. The provision of affordable flood insurance, construction of shoreline protection and flood control works, tax deductions for hazard-damaged property losses, as well as payments of disaster assistance—all of these federal activities allow or even encourage people to build in known hazard areas. Although the American public has come to view these payments as their right, we should consider some alternative (but difficult) choices for eliminating or reducing federal subsidies.

One solution to the problem of subsidizing risk may be to reduce disaster payments, using a phased approach over time, with ample warning to state and local governments that they will soon be responsible for a larger share of relief following the next big disaster. Some commentators have proposed a type of deductible system, whereby state and local governments would have to pay on their own up to a certain amount before federal money is distributed. This method should encourage state and local governments to take a more proactive and aggressive approach to regulating land uses in high hazard areas, such as the coastline, along known fault zones, and in wildfire areas.

Critics of the current approach to hazards management believe that new development in hazardous areas should bear more of the burden of mitigation measures. This might encourage private developers and builders as well as homebuyers to avoid places prone to flooding, wildfire, erosion, or earthquake. Additionally, local and state governments could assess hazard districts with higher tax rates or impact fees, while reducing taxes and fees for properties built in safer locations. A program to assist moderate and low-income residents find housing in safer areas could serve to balance the inequities of higher taxes and fees.

Even if disaster assistance programs were reduced as has been suggested, there would still be a substantial role for the federal government to play, especially in support of particularly expensive mitigation strategies such as large-scale acquisition and relocation of property in areas subject to repeated losses. By providing a significant portion of the initial outlay to purchase flood-prone, high-erosion, or seismic risk areas, the federal government can help local and state governments realize a long-term benefit, while also permanently eliminating the federal government’s chances of having to pay for assistance for that area in the future. As for what the state and local governments should do in return, the hazard mitigation plans that are required by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 are a start to sharing the responsibility, along with incorporating mitigation into a wide range of other policy and planning efforts at the state and local level.

EUROPEAN UNION FLOOD DIRECTIVE REQUIRES COORDINATED ACTION

Between 1998 and 2009, major flooding in Europe displaced nearly half a million people, caused 1126 deaths, and resulted in more than $65 billion in insured economic losses. In an effort to manage flood risks, the European Union created the Floods Directive in 2007, requiring all EU Member States to assess flood vulnerability along all rivers and coastlines, to map the flood extent and assets at risk, and to take coordinated measures to reduce the flood risk. The Floods Directive is novel in its approach to require that countries work collaboratively to understand how flood risks are changing and ensure that actions by one country do not increase flood risks in neighboring countries. Lessons may be applied to federal policy in the United States to create policy that encourages or requires coordinated risk assessment and mitigation actions for hazards that transcend community or state boundaries.

SELF-CHECK

• Define moral hazard.

• Explain how mitigation programs may provide a false sense of security to hazard-prone communities.

• Give examples of potential changes to federal disaster policies.

The federal government steps in to provide relief after every major disaster that happens in our country. In what ways do these disaster funds reduce the risk of future disasters, and when might they in fact contribute to the risk of future disasters? This chapter discussed how the federal government’s involvement in emergency management has grown over the years. The Federal Emergency Management Agency and other federal programs play a direct role in the country’s hazard management activities. Other programs such as the Clean Water Act and Coastal Zone Management Act play a more indirect role. The federal government has increasingly supported mitigation through investments in climate change adaptation and resilience efforts such as research, technical assistance, and grants to communities. Still other federal programs actually work to encourage potentially counterproductive patterns of development in hazard areas. This complex influence of federal policy and spending, along with questions about the long-term impact of our approach to disaster relief, has spurred exploration of possible changes in the federal approach to disaster management.

1. Over the past several decades, federal involvement in emergency management has

2. FEMA was created by President Carter to act as a lead agency for many aspects of emergency management. True or False?

4. FEMA took a Mitigation Directorate during the Clinton Administration. True or False?

5. Which federal agency was created after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001?

6. The National Flood Insurance Program is supported by federal taxes. True or False?

7. National flood insurance is available to anyone who can afford the high premiums. True or False?

8. A Flood Insurance Rate Map should be changed after a flood proves that the FIRM boundaries are no longer accurate. True or False?

c. Communities that have undertaken extraordinary floodplain mitigation measures

10. The Coastal Barrier Resources Act grants federal funds to aid the development of coastal areas. True or False?

11. The goal of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act is to protect wetlands from development. True or False?

c. Require federal agencies to consider environmental issues in the decision-making process

13. The Internal Revenue Code includes provisions that increase a tax-payer’s tax burden based on real estate investments in coastal areas. True or False?

14. The belief that federal disaster relief is an entitlement rather than assistance is growing in the United States. True or False?

1. Federal involvement in emergency management functions has increased in recent decades. Name five federal programs that directly relate to hazard mitigation or emergency management functions.

2. During the time of the Cold War, natural disasters were not a primary concern for U.S. citizens. Identify the act that introduced Americans to the concept of federal disaster assistance.

4. Flood insurance is a major concern for many U.S. residents. Describe the purpose and major provisions of the NFIP.

5. Those who make their living off the land can be particularly affected by natural disasters. In what way does the Farm Service Agency engage in disaster relief?

6. Hurricane Katrina opened a new chapter in the federal government’s role in emergency management. Describe some of the reactions to FEMA’s response to recent disasters.

8. Repeated losses cause a significant drain on the National Flood Insurance Program. Define repetitive loss properties.

9. The Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program provides mitigation funding that is not dependent on a disaster. Give three examples of qualified mitigation projects under PDM.

10. Explain what an “indirect mitigation program” is, and name three such programs at the federal level.

11. Explain how the Coastal Zone Management Act provides a level of flexibility.

13. Explain ways in which the federal government encourages development in hazardous areas.

14. Describe how the risk of building in hazardous areas is transferred from an individual homeowner to taxpayers in general?

15. What would be the benefit of raising National Flood Insurance premiums to reflect the true risks of living in flood-prone areas?

1. Your small horse riding and stable business was hit hard by a tornado. You lost three of your 15 horses, and one-third of your buildings were damaged beyond repair. In addition, two of your three employees have had to quit and relocate as a result of losing their homes in the storm. As the owner of this small business, which federal programs could you expect to get assistance from?

2. Nearly 20,000 communities participate in the National Flood Insurance Program. Your community, which hasn’t had a major flood in more than three decades, is considering entering the program. Draft a proposal to your city council that describes the benefits of the program; be certain to include what, if any, steps your community will need to take to enter the program.

3. A developer has proposed to build a retail mall in a long-neglected area of your town. Most people in town support the move because it would bring business and interest to the area. A portion of the proposed site is believed to be wetlands, however. As the president of the local conservation group, how would you use the Clean Water Act to oppose the proposal? Alternatively, as the developer of the proposal, what would you do to satisfy requirements of the Clean Water Act and still get the job done?

4. Some critics have pointed to a major flaw in the CBRA that manifests itself in the context of recovery from a natural hazards disaster. Based on the provisions in CBRA regarding the exemptions discussed in this chapter, does the Act open the door to expanded development of barrier islands using federal funds, despite the clear intent of Congress when it passed the legislation? Consider the following hypothetical scenario to help you formulate your answer:

Suppose an 18-inch water line runs through a CBRA unit. The pipe connects development on one end of the unit to a water supply on the other end of the unit. Now suppose the pipe is damaged in a coastal storm. Does CBRA allow federal funds to be used to pay for the cost of replacing the 18-inch pipe? Can other funds, such as private financing or state and local government funds, be used to expand the pipe from 18 to 24 inches? What about the potential for more intense development that is made possible by the increased water capacity in the 24-inch pipe?

5. Assume you live in a hurricane-prone area of the United States. Many say that the federal government is subsidizing the privilege of living in a coastal community, and other taxpayers are unfairly being asked to support the subsidy with their taxes. How do you respond?

Imagine you have just been appointed “Mitigation Czar” by the President of the United States. What would you do to enhance the role of the federal government in reducing the country’s vulnerability to natural hazards?

Although your 100-year-old home is in a Maryland floodplain, it has only been flooded twice since the early 1900s. Unfortunately, that’s no guarantee it won’t happen again. Using the National Flood Insurance Program’s website at www.floodsmart.gov, estimate how much your flood insurance premium would be for both you home and its contents (note: you’re in zone A). Then, using the site, come up with things you can do—in addition to buying insurance—to minimize potential loss.

It’s clear from what has happened to other communities in the United States that it is not enough to recover from a natural disaster or event—a community must take steps to prevent future damage before a disaster strikes. The National Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program provides mitigation funding to communities that have not been declared disaster sites. Outline what mitigation programs your community might be eligible for under the PDM. Use the following website as a resource: http://www.fema.gov/pre-disaster-mitigation-grant-program.

1. Singer, P. A. 2006. Hurricane season: Port in a storm, National Journal, 38(21):1422–1426; Czerwinski, testimony.

2. Gorte, R. W., C. H. Vincent, L. A. Hanson, and M. R. Rosenblum. 2012. Federal land ownership: Overview and data. Congressional Research Service. 7-5700. February 8.

3. Obama, B. January 30, 2015. Executive Order 13690—Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input. The White House.

4. Platt, R. H. 1999. Disasters and Democracy: The Politics of Extreme Natural Events. Washington, DC: Island Press.

5. Haddow, G. D., J. A. Bullock, and D. P. Coppola. 2010. Introduction to Emergency Management, Fourth Edition. Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.

6. The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment. 2002. Human Links to Coastal Disasters. Washington, DC: The Heinz Center.

7. Sylves, R. T. 2008. Disaster Policy and Politics: Emergency Management and Homeland Security. Washington, DC: CQ Press.

8. Flourney, A. C. and A. Fischman, 2013. Wetlands regulation in an era of climate change: Can section 404 meet the challenge? George Washington Journal of Energy & Environmental Law, Summer, at 67. Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/368.

9. Beatley, T. et al. 2000. An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management. Washington, DC: Island Press.

10. Kalo, J. J. 1990. Coastal and Ocean Law. Houston, Texas: The John Marshall Publishing Co.

12. Clancy, J. B. and Jessica Grannis. 2013. Lessons Learned from Irene: Climate Change, Federal Disaster Relief, and Barriers to Adaptive Reconstruction. Washington, DC: Georgetown Climate Center.

13. Godschalk, D. et al. 1999. Natural Hazard Mitigation: Recasting Disaster Policy and Planning. Washington, DC: Island Press.

14. Burby, R., ed. 1998. Cooperating with Nature: Confronting Natural Hazards with Land-Use Planning for Sustainable Communities. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press.

Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000	Amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988; streamlines the administration of federal disaster relief and mitigation programs and places emphasis on pre-disaster mitigation planning to reduce the Nation’s disaster losses.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program	Funding program administered by FEMA. The purpose of the HMGP is to reduce the loss of life and property caused by natural hazards by providing funding for mitigation to state and local governments following a disaster declaration.
Moral hazard	Term used to describe how federal disaster relief may encourage citizens and communities to build in areas vulnerable to impacts of natural hazards.
National Flood Insurance Program	Voluntary participatory program for local communities who wish to provide the opportunity for residents to purchase federally backed flood insurance. In exchange, local governments enact ordinances to regulate development in floodplains.
Ordinance	A piece of legislation enacted by a local government with the power of enforcement.
Repetitive loss properties	Property with two or more National Flood Insurance Program claims over $1000 each within a 10-year period
Wetland mitigation	Compensatory mitigation refers to the restoration, establishment, enhancement, or preservation of wetlands to offset unavoidable adverse impacts of activities permitted under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act.