The economy in the late 1970s looked much as it had for most of the decade; external and domestic problems were taking their toll. The inflation rate remained high for the year after the Liberal victory of 1974, until public concern about the inflation problem reached a peak in October of that year, when fully 84 percent of the public told the Gallup Organization that inflation was the most important problem facing Canada.1 When this situation continued on into 1975, the Trudeau government decided it needed to take some action as its popularity began to drop (see Figure 8.1).
Despite his previous disdain for a wage and price control program during the 1974 election, Trudeau decided that such a policy was the only option. At first, the policy was to be a “voluntary” program of wage and price restraint, and Finance Minister John Turner toured the country to persuade business and labour to temper their actions and demands. When this did not produce results, and shortly after Turner’s resignation (more fully described when he is profiled in Chapter 9), Trudeau announced a program of wage and price controls, complete with an Anti-Inflation Board and Secretariat to oversee compliance. This decision angered the Conservative opposition. During the election campaign of 1974, Trudeau and the Liberals had ridiculed the Conservative proposal on wage and price controls on the grounds that it was impractical (see Chapter 7).
The anti-inflation program also met a chorus of criticism from both labour and industry. For workers and their unions, the program was basically a system for limiting wage settlements, since that was the only part of the program that was relatively simple to implement. For business, any attempt to control prices was seen as interference in the marketplace by a government which was already suspect because of Trudeau’s past history of leftist writings and occasional musings that the capitalist system wasn’t working well anymore.2 The result over the next year was a modest drop in the inflation rate, but the main factor in accomplishing this was a restrictive monetary policy imposed by the Bank of Canada, which in turn brought about a rise in unemployment as businesses scaled back their operations.
By 1978, when the controls program ended, the unemployment problem was of equal public concern with inflation. The term “stagflation” was widely used to describe a condition where inflation and unemployment were both high, growth was low, and government debt was increasing. Turner’s successor as finance minister, Donald Macdonald, lasted only two years in the job before he, too, decamped to Bay Street. His replacement, Jean Chrétien, had little experience with finance, and Trudeau himself seemed to be running economic policy. His sudden announcement in 1978 that two billion dollars would be cut from expenditures caught Chrétien by surprise. Some years later, Chrétien would express the view that this action “almost destroyed my career in the process.”3
Federal Vote Intention, 1974–1980
The Gallup Report, selected dates
The economic quagmire faced by Canada during the decade of the 1970s played a major part in the erosion of public confidence in the Liberal government. A major new challenge arose with the surprise election of a Parti Québécois government in Quebec in November 1976. As the focus of national politics shifted to questions of national unity, the federal government’s bilingualism program, never popular in the West, appeared costly and ineffective in the wake of the PQ victory. As soon as they achieved power in Quebec, the Parti Québécois government introduced Bill 1 (later Bill 101), which required that French be designated the official language of the province and therefore also the language of education of children in most circumstances, as well as the predominant language in commerce. In addition, demands by air traffic controllers in Quebec that they use French in communication with aircraft threatened a national air strike just before the opening of the Olympic Games in Montreal. Resignations of prominent cabinet ministers Jean Marchand and James Richardson followed the language disputes, and tarnished Trudeau’s reputation as the person who could bring the linguistic solitudes together. Trudeau put his efforts into a series of constitutional initiatives, including (re)patriation of the Constitution from Britain with a charter of rights and reforms to the Senate, but opposition from provincial governments caused the Liberals to temporarily abandon these initiatives.4 The government seemed to be reeling from crisis to crisis, although its standing in the polls actually improved following the PQ victory in Quebec.
Party Leadership Conventions, 1975–1976
After the 1974 election, there was a growing sense within the Conservative camp that the party needed a new leader. When Robert Stanfield announced that he was stepping down after three unsuccessful election campaigns, the Conservative leadership appeared to be a prize worth having. Trudeau’s personal popularity had waned, particularly in Quebec. It was no accident that two Conservative leadership candidates emerged from that province, with strong arguments that they were the ones to lead the party to a Quebec breakthrough, and hence to national power. Both of these men had appeal, but both had significant handicaps in their quest for the leadership.
Claude Wagner had been a prominent cabinet member in the former Liberal government in Quebec, and subsequently a provincial court judge. He had a high profile, but an aloof manner, and in addition engendered the suspicion that his conversion to the Conservatives might have been opportunistic (see Chapter 7). Brian Mulroney, a longtime backroom political operator for the Conservatives, had been instrumental in recruiting Wagner, and had a province-wide reputation as a labour conciliator. However, Mulroney had never sought public office of any kind, and seemed to be seeking the top job without serving any meaningful apprenticeship. (Mulroney will be more fully profiled in Chapter 9.)
Other leadership candidates were plentiful. No fewer than nine of the party’s prominent MPs threw their hats into the ring. The main reason for this interest was the perception that the two leading candidates, Wagner and Mulroney, would have difficulty winning over many of the delegates who arrived at the convention supporting other candidates — therefore, the candidate who could emerge after the first ballots as a “third force” would have a good chance to win. The candidates came from all regions of the country, demonstrating that the Progressive Conservative Party was a viable national organization that had a chance to appeal across many of the divisions of Canadian society.
Library and Archives Canada. Duncan Cameron, photographer.
Joe Clark at 1976 Progressive Conservative convention, Ottawa.
The eventual winner of the leadership, Joe Clark, was not initially the leading contender to emerge as the “third force.” For one thing, at 37 years of age, he was the youngest of all those seeking the leadership; he had been elected for the first time in the election of 1972. For another, he had no substantial career in any other profession than politics, having worked on a variety of campaigns throughout his student days and beyond. Clark had long been involved with the Conservative Party as a student while attending the University of Alberta between 1957 and 1961, and subsequently became president of the national PC student federation.5 He was from the small town of High River, Alberta, not a part of the country where the Conservatives needed to augment their support through the choice of a leader. Finally, Clark was virtually unknown outside the party, a fact that caused him to be nicknamed “Joe Who?” by the press, once he was chosen as leader on the fourth ballot.
The key to the Clark victory was the series of ballots necessitated by the large number of candidates, and the desire of many of the delegates to find a candidate who would be moderate and electable, much the same dynamic that permeated the 1967 convention that had chosen Robert Stanfield. One candidate, Flora Macdonald, was able to transfer virtually all of her delegate support to Clark once it became clear that he had a better chance to advance to subsequent ballots. In Macdonald’s case, the initial support pledged to her was greater than the number of votes she received. The fact that Flora was a woman, that she did not have a university or other professional education, and that delegates felt she could not win an election were all factors that affected her vote totals. In addition, she had worked for the ousting of John Diefenbaker during the 1960s (after Diefenbaker fired her as party secretary), a factor which meant that some in the party were determined not to see her as leader.6 In addition to Macdonald, who was on the left of the party, Sinclair Stevens, aligned with the party’s right wing, also supported Clark, thereby broadening his middle-of-the-road appeal.7 On the final ballot, the Mulroney support split in Clark’s favour, giving him the leadership ahead of Wagner by a mere 65 votes.8
Despite the bruising battles at the convention, things started well for Clark. For twelve months after the leadership convention, the Conservatives enjoyed a consistent lead in the Gallup poll (see Figure 8.1). In addition, in October 1976, 36 percent of Canadians believed Clark would be a better prime minister than Trudeau, who was favoured by only 28 percent.9 This was the first time that Trudeau had trailed an opponent on a preferred leader scale since he became prime minister in 1968. However, the honeymoon that Clark enjoyed with the voters would not last long. In his first two years as leader, Clark had great difficulty generating a positive image among the public at large. When asked in election surveys at the time of the 1979 election, many Canadians could not think of much to say about Clark one way or the other, and those that could emphasized his youth, his enthusiasm, or his determination. As often happens with leader images, however, the flipside of such descriptions emerged as negative images for Clark. “Youth was transformed into immaturity and inexperience, and determination into a penchant for making hasty, ill-considered decisions and sticking to them.”10 In a sense, even after he became prime minister, Canadians in general never felt they learned very much about Joe Clark, or warmed to him. Conservative fortunes took a nosedive in 1977, exemplified by the party’s failure to win any of the six by-elections that were held in May of that year. Rumblings began to be heard within the Tory ranks that perhaps Clark should be replaced.
David Lewis had been defeated in the 1974 election, and given his age and the paucity of safe NDP seats that might provide a by-election opportunity, he decided to retire. Lewis had been the first Ontario-based leader of a party that originated in the West as the CCF, and had heretofore been led by westerners. The party in 1975 was at a low point; after its success in the 1972 election and its prominent role in supporting the Liberal minority government and exacting some policy concessions from it. However, the party’s vote in 1974 had dropped sharply, and it lost nearly half its seats (see Chapter 7). What many in the party felt it needed was a leader from a new generation of socialists, not associated with those who wrote the Regina Manifesto but rather someone who could take advantage of the potential votes for the party in urban Canada, particularly Ontario and British Columbia. Someone was also needed who could mobilize support from the Canadian Labour Congress and its affiliated unions, which had been so important in the founding of the new party in 1962, but which had been muted on the campaign trail since that time.11
Unlike the Conservative leadership race, where the two leading candidates were relative newcomers to federal politics, the front-runner from the beginning in the NDP contest was Ed Broadbent. Abandoning a career as a university professor, he had been first elected to Parliament in 1968, and had been leader of the NDP caucus during the 1972–74 period.12 Despite this experience, he was only 39 when he sought and won the leadership in 1975.13 The parliamentary spectacle from 1976 to 1979 of two much younger opposition leaders attacking the aging Trudeau was a distinct change in scenario from the days when he faced older men across the House of Commons aisle.
When, at the end of March, the 1979 election was called for May 22, it was referred to as “long-awaited,” and as having “ended more than 18 months of speculation.”14 In 1977, the Liberals were riding a crest of popularity produced in equal parts by support for Trudeau, and growing disenchantment with the new Conservative leader. Trudeau’s high ratings, however, had more to do with sympathy for him as a result of the actions of his wife Margaret and their subsequent separation, and a belief that he was needed as a bulwark against the separatist government of Quebec.15
There had been a general expectation that an election would be called in 1978. As that time came, Trudeau, perhaps for a combination of personal and political reasons, hesitated and delayed. The inflation and unemployment numbers were both edging upward, and GDP growth was down (see Figure 7.1). Some political moves, such as the luring of western Conservative stalwart Jack Horner to cross the floor of the House of Commons to take up a Liberal cabinet post, had detrimental effects on party morale. This, and a series of scandals, raised the level of public cynicism about a government that had been accused by the auditor general in 1976 of “having lost, or [been] close to losing, effective control of the public purse.”16 Several cabinet ministers resigned after having been implicated in scandals. All of these events culminated in a sudden dip in the polls for the Liberals, and the decision was made to put off the election.
Fifteen by-elections were called instead, in October 1978. Canadian voters voiced their disenchantment with the Trudeau government when the Liberals suffered the worst by-election defeats that any government had endured since Confederation.17 The biggest loss was in Toronto, where the Liberals lost all four ridings they had held, despite having two star candidates — Doris Anderson, the former editor of Chatelaine, and John Evans, the former president of the University of Toronto. In the aftermath of the by-election defeats, others who had been approached as potential Liberal candidates began to back away.
Delaying an election until the legal time limit is running out puts a government on the defensive and limits its strategic options. Despite this, Trudeau bravely stated his issues in order of priority. One after the other, these were the three issue areas identified in this book as key to the maintenance of a dynasty in Canadian federal politics: “The challenge to national unity; new economic policies to guarantee employment and prosperity; new social policies to improve the quality of life.”18 There were other topics, like restraint of spending, security of energy supply and redistribution of resource revenues, but Trudeau clearly understood that he would succeed or fail on his ability to persuade the country that he remained the best leader to deal with the economy, Confederation issues, and the social welfare of Canadians. He also knew that he was extremely vulnerable on the first two. In 1978, economic indicators showed inflation and unemployment both over 8 percent. The federal budget deficit had also risen sharply — from $676 million in 1974 to $11.8 billion by 1978. Economic problems appeared to be spiralling out of control. And on the national unity front, the Parti Québécois under René Lévesque enjoyed substantial popularity and was preparing for a referendum which could break up the country.
The Liberals fought the 1979 election with a highly centralized operation centred in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Principal Secretary Jim Coutts and campaign co-chairs Keith Davey and Marc Lalonde determined the strategy, which gave the impression of isolating the leader from the rest of the party.19 Running under the slogan “A Leader Must Be a Leader,” Trudeau ridiculed Tory leader Clark constantly as someone with ideas that were either wrong or downright silly. In a speech in Hamilton, Trudeau picked on a discussion paper Clark had used during his leadership campaign that suggested that those who courted ill health through smoking or poor diets might pay higher health insurance premiums:
How is he going to [police] it? Is he going to send his Fat Squad or his Smoke Squad around to your house to check your ashtrays and see 12 butts and say “Oh, your OHIP premiums are going up five bucks a month”? Or is he going to send some inspector to your door and if he finds you watching television or drinking beer or eating some of those greasy chips, up another $10 a month?20
With these comments, Trudeau was demonstrating the same contempt for his opponents that had been in evidence in 1974, when he ridiculed the PC wage and price control proposal by pointing to his audience and saying, “Zap! You’re frozen.” The fact that he had later picked up and implemented the same policy he had denigrated during the campaign seemed lost on him.
This was a far different Trudeau than the one who got elected having “Conversations with Canadians” in 1968. The Liberal leader combined these withering and sarcastic attacks on his opponents with some efforts to delineate the elements of his own issue agenda. Having identified national unity as the top issue, Trudeau criticized anyone who maintained it wasn’t — who cared, he said, whether unemployment was reduced by a point if the country went up in smoke.21 The problem for this position was that approximately twice as many people identified economic problems as the most important issue in the campaign than pointed to those involving Confederation (see Table 8.2). Nevertheless, Trudeau pledged to repatriate the Constitution, without agreement with the provinces if necessary, and to put the question to a referendum if he had to. The “Magnificent Obsession”22 with a unified and independent Canada was on full display in his campaign rhetoric. And, as it turned out, people in Quebec were listening.
The economy was another matter, particularly in English Canada. We noted in the previous chapter the overwhelming public concern with inflation in 1974. Table 8.2 shows that inflation continued to be the number one economic problem identified by the public in 1979, an understandable situation since the inflation rate had crept back up (see Figure 7.1). The difference from the 1974 campaign was that few people were talking about the specific solution of wage and price controls, after these had been tried with limited success in the intervening period. Rather, the Liberal solution was an austerity program, propounded by a Trudeau who was now a convert to neo-conservative economics, and who had made unilateral declarations of spending cuts in 1978. This position was designed to show that the government was prepared to get serious about its potential contribution to inflation, but a program of cutbacks and public service payroll reductions left no room for innovation in new spending programs to try to prime the economy or to stimulate regional economic growth. Local constituency candidates were left with little room to manoeuvre when the campaign discussion focused on benefits close to home.
Neither did they have much to promise when it came to alleviating unemployment, another serious economic problem. The unemployment rate had also moved up — from just above 5 percent in 1974 to more than 8 percent in 1978. Given the growth of the deficit, new spending programs to create jobs were out of the question for the Liberals. Their strategy was to downplay the importance of economic issues and emphasize, as they had in 1974, that there was a limited amount that any national government could do to affect these worldwide economic trends. More important was national unity, which could be promoted by constitutional repatriation. To supplement this position, the Liberals made a foray into the third important issue area, that of social welfare. Changes to the Canada Pension Plan were suggested, so that housewives would be eligible to contribute to it and receive benefits. In addition, private pensions would be made more “portable” by reducing the number of years required to work before transferring to another job was allowed with pension benefits accompanying the worker.23 Costs, however, were carefully not attached to these proposals.
The Conservative campaign strategy was precisely the opposite of the Liberals. They had no interest in debating the national unity question, particularly given their residual weakness in Quebec, and social policy proposals were not going to win the Conservatives many votes. Rather, campaign director Lowell Murray and pollster Allan Gregg determined on a “Let’s Get Canada Moving Again” appeal. This put the focus directly on the economy, where the public would be constantly reminded of the inadequacies of the Liberals’ performance over more than a decade. In an effort to create their own attractive alternative policies, but wary of their 1974 experience, the Conservatives settled on a proposal to cut taxes, headlined by a promise to allow the interest paid on mortgages to be deducted on income tax returns.24 “Mortgage deductibility” ended up being hotly debated during the campaign, but was cited by relatively few people as a specific reason for voting in the election. Nevertheless, it did demonstrate that the Conservatives had some different ideas of how to stimulate the economy that were in contrast to the Liberal austerity program.
Most Important Issues in the 1979 and 1980 Elections
Party Seen as Closest on Most Important Issues, 1979
The Conservative strategy of “damage avoidance” carried over to the televised leaders’ debate held during the campaign. This was only the second such debate held in Canada — the 1968 debate (see Chapter 6) having been followed by two elections where one party or the other decided that it was not in its interest to hold one. The same reasoning was initially present in 1979, as well, as the Liberals were anxious for an encounter that would allow Trudeau to demonstrate his intellectual mastery over his opponents. The Conservatives eventually decided that the appearance of “ducking” the debate would be worse than what might happen during it, and agreed to participate. The debate format was one where journalists posed questions, and the three leaders took turns debating in pairs. The questions, however, differed in the three pairings, making it difficult for viewers to directly compare the leaders’ ability to deal with all the issues.25
The debates attracted a large television audience, and appeared to create a generally favourable impression on viewers. Joe Clark, however, received more negative than positive mentions in a post-debate questionnaire, with a number of people considering him “weak” in comparison to the other leaders.26 However, the “negatives” associated with Clark’s debate performance were not so serious as to deter people from voting Conservative if they were otherwise inclined to do so.
For Ed Broadbent, the leadership debates were a heaven-sent opportunity to place the NDP on an equal footing with the other two parties, and to establish his image with the public. An experienced speaker, thoughtful and measured, Broadbent made the most of his opportunity, particularly in the lead-off pairing with Clark. Positioning the NDP as a viable opposition to the Liberals was particularly important to Broadbent because the party was fearful that voters might feel it necessary to vote Conservative in order to defeat the Liberals. The positive impression made by Broadbent in the debates, together with the decision of the party to centre its campaign on a series of television appearances by its leader, was bolstered by the party’s advertising, which made overt comparisons between Broadbent and the other leaders.27 But Broadbent spent much time during the campaign trying to avoid the question of which party the NDP would support in the event of a minority outcome.28 A series of policy proposals to deal with inflation (curbs on price increases), unemployment (a national industrial strategy), energy security (expanding Petro Canada), and tax reform (raising corporate taxes) tended to be overlooked in the battle between the two major parties.
Party and Leader Thermometer Scale Ratings, 1979–1980
1979, 1980 Canadian National Election Studies. N (1979) = 2135. N (1980) = 1384.
The variety of issues cited by respondents to the 1979 National Election Study (see Table 8.2) indicates that all parties could claim some success in setting the agenda during the campaign. This differential pattern of success is reinforced by Table 8.3, where it can be seen that those citing issues related to the state of Confederation and national unity were much more likely to see the Liberals as closest to them. Similarly, the Liberals were successful in attracting voters concerned with social welfare issues. The Conservatives scored well with voters citing the party’s mortgage deductibility proposal as the top election issue, and also with those who felt the main issue in the election was simply the need for a change of government. Economic issues were more dispersed in their appeal, but for the most part favoured the opposition. Pluralities citing general economic problems favoured the Conservatives, and those concerned specifically with unemployment were more likely to choose the NDP.29 The issue effects in 1979 did not work decisively in any one direction.
Despite this, the switching patterns between 1974 and 1979 heavily favoured the Conservatives, and to a more limited extent the NDP (see Figure 8.3). In looking at the total electorate, over five times as many people switched to the PCs from a 1974 Liberal vote as did the reverse, and three times as many 1974 Liberals went in the NDP direction. It is likely that if these trends had been reinforced by the behaviour of newly eligible voters and previous non-voters, the Conservatives might well have won a majority of the seats. However, as these data indicate, there was only a small preference for the Conservatives in the group that did not vote in 1974, and a substantial preference for the Liberals in that group of newly eligible (mostly young) voters who cast their first vote in 1979. This group was particularly numerous because of the long five-year time period which had passed since the previous election.
The weakness of the Conservatives in attracting this group did not begin with the 1979 election, and did not end there either. Throughout the Trudeau years, the Liberals maintained a consistent advantage among younger voters, with new and younger cohorts comprising an increasing share of the total electorate.30 The magnetism of Trudeau himself, combined with the stability of the Liberal dynasty that began with Pearson and continued with Trudeau, contributed to the inclination of newly entering cohorts of the voters to choose the Liberals and to continue to vote for them.
The limited nature of the Conservative victory in 1979 was reinforced by the regional patterns of the voting (see Table 8.4). The Conservatives did very well in Ontario (57 of 95 seats), in Alberta (all 21 seats), and in British Columbia (20 of 29 seats). They also did reasonably well in the other western provinces, and in the East. However, the Liberals swept Quebec (67 of 75 seats), leaving six for the declining Créditiste Party, and only two for the Conservatives. The fact that the Liberals piled up 62 percent of the vote in Quebec contributed to an overall result whereby the Liberals actually received four more percentage points of the national vote than the victorious Conservatives. The NDP benefited from many voters who did not feel comfortable supporting either of the two major parties, and/or were attracted to their new leader, who consistently ran well ahead of his party in popular appeal (see Figure 8.2). They won a total of 26 seats — a net gain of 10 over 1974 (see Table 8.4).
Electoral Turnover, 1974–1979 and 1979–1980
1979, 1980 Canadian National Election Studies. N (1979) = 2396. N (1980) = 1429.
With only 36 percent of the vote and two seats in Quebec, the Conservatives could not have hoped to form a majority government. Their mandate was limited by the regional patterns of the voting, by the splits in public opinion on their policy positions, and by the choices of newly entering voters to support other parties. Nevertheless, the party felt that its best strategy was to act as if it had received majority support. Visions of the way in which John Diefenbaker had parlayed a minority in 1957 into a massive majority in 1958 (see Chapter 4) danced in their minds. Thrown suddenly into opposition in 1957, the Liberals were unprepared and performed poorly — the natural result of a dynasty. Expectations were widespread in 1979 that Pierre Trudeau would not adjust to the role of Opposition leader, and that the Liberals would be unable to cope with the new situation in which they found themselves.
Mindful of potential public skepticism of their ability to govern, Clark and his colleagues did not meet Parliament immediately, but spent four months following the election preparing their approach. Appointing a cabinet proved to be a challenge, given the paucity of Conservative members from Quebec. Clark addressed this problem by appointing several unelected senators to his cabinet, and by appointing a defeated Conservative candidate, Robert de Cotret, to the Senate and naming him Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce. The strategy was to get through this initial period of transition, govern effectively for two years, and then seek a majority.
Unfortunately for them, this preparatory period was not successful in establishing an image of competence. Rather, the new government was forced to backtrack on some of its election promises, such as moving the Canadian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Already the subject of sarcastic commentary that the proposal was simply designed to lure Jewish votes, the initial post-election decision to carry through with it drew fire, not only from Arab governments in the Middle East, but also from domestic Canadian companies like Bell Canada, which felt that their economic contracts with these Arab governments could be jeopardized.31
Another problem area involved the government-owned oil company Petro Canada. Always a sore point in Western Canada, Petro Canada had been established by the Liberals as a condition of NDP support during the minority period in 1973. It was designed to provide a measure of domestic energy security in the face of rising oil prices. During the 1979 campaign, the Conservatives had promised to “privatize” it, both on the grounds of ideological opposition to state industry and on pragmatic grounds that it was not needed. In the latter months of 1979, however, the revolution in Iran led to a $10 a barrel jump in the price of oil, a situation which made it much less clear that getting rid of Petro Canada was good public policy. The Alberta government, representing an oil-producing province, was still keen on privatization, but Ontario, representing consumers, was not.
With Conservatives in power in both of these provinces, the spectacle of quarrelling among Tory provincial and federal politicians was not helpful to the party’s image. Hesitantly, the Clark government decided that it wanted things both ways, and announced that it would privatize part of Petro Canada and keep another part in state hands. Finally, the government signalled that the tax-relief promises made during the campaign were going to be forthcoming much more slowly than originally indicated. In particular, the much-heralded mortgage deductibility provision was announced as having much lower limits than expected, and other tax breaks were to be postponed. The government’s explanation was that they needed to get the country’s financial house in order in order to fulfil their policy proposals, but the sudden drop in popularity of the Conservatives (see Figure 8.2) indicated that much of the public regarded these actions as further indications of ineptitude.
Despite these early signs of Conservative vulnerability, Pierre Trudeau decided in November of 1979 to resign as Liberal leader. Beset by his marital difficulties, and discouraged by his political prospects, Trudeau felt he did not have the energy to continue.32 He also realized that the Liberal defeat was in part a personal rejection of his leadership. Supporters of two former finance ministers, Donald Macdonald and John Turner, were positioning their men to compete for the leadership (until Turner abruptly announced that he would not run). These two candidates with strong economic backgrounds aimed to improve the party’s credibility in dealing with the country’s finances — a policy area where the Liberals in general and Trudeau in particular were especially vulnerable. Support for the Liberals remained in the national unity issue area; the Conservatives’ poor showing in Quebec reinforced the party’s image as anathema to Quebecers. Quebec was also a major “consumer” province in terms of energy, where policies designed to please the West would not be well received. The social policy area was also one where the Liberals retained much of their traditional strength. It would be on issues relating to the economy that the Conservative government had their best hope to demonstrate their competence and expand their electoral support.
In order to seize the initiative on economic matters, and to stake a claim to solving problems with energy supply, the Conservatives delivered a budget in December. It was comprised of a series of fiscal changes and a combination of tax increases and tax credits, but the one proposal which caught everyone’s attention dealt with energy taxation. Citing the need for “short term pain for long term gain,” Finance Minister John Crosbie proposed to introduce an excise tax of 18 cents per gallon on fuel for transportation. Its impact was dramatic, because an energy price increase of this magnitude was totally unexpected, and because it seemed to hit energy consumers of all income levels (though a tax credit for low-income earners was also proposed).
Opinion was divided on the merits of the budget, with some applauding the conservation efforts that were expected to follow such a price increase, and others decrying the lack of specificity about what the increased tax revenue would be spent on (some suggesting that it would go to offset the mortgage interest deductibility proposal). It certainly caused many observers to contrast the gasoline tax increases with the 1979 Tory campaign promises of tax reduction. But the most important impact of the Crosbie budget was to galvanize the opposition parties into action. Unanimously, they decided to vote against it, and this they did in short order, bringing the Conservative government down after only 259 days in office.
Opinions differ as to whether the Conservatives deliberately entertained, or even courted, defeat because they thought that Liberal “arrogance” in voting them out of office would backfire, or whether the defeat was the result of parliamentary miscalculation. In either case, there is no doubt they felt that right was on their side.33 In his memoirs, Crosbie explains why the PCs were confident that the government would not fall:
I shared the cabinet’s conviction that, if the Opposition parties were so foolhardy as to bring down our new administration in Parliament, the Canadian people would punish them at the polls.34
Strategically, the Conservatives were emboldened because the Liberals were officially leaderless, and seemingly in no position to fight an election. If Pierre Trudeau was dragooned into leading them one last time, the Conservatives felt that the country would confirm its repudiation of his leadership. If they tried to quickly choose a new leader, that person would not have time to mount an effective campaign. Indeed, apparently a number of Liberals felt the same way, and were themselves uneasy about seizing the opportunity to defeat the Conservatives over the budget.35 In the end, the governing Conservatives fell by a vote of 139 to 133.36 The election date was set for 18 February 1980. In his memoirs, Crosbie noted: “To our later regret, we paid little attention to the November Gallup poll, which was published on December 3, just eight days before Budget Day. It showed a steep drop in Conservative popularity from 36 percent in summer/fall to 28 percent in November, 19 points behind the Liberals.”37
Pierre Trudeau, while he voted against the budget with the other Liberals, was genuinely ambivalent about his future role as leader.38 Despite the fact that he was asked to return by the party caucus, and by the Liberal national executive, he took some time to decide. Once again, personal factors were foremost; he had bought a new house in Montreal, and planned his retirement. Press Secretary Patrick Gossage remembers that “he was distracted in a way I had never seen him before.”39 The factor which seems to have weighed most heavily in his decision to return was the upcoming referendum in Quebec on sovereignty association for the province; he felt he could better participate in the defeat of that initiative from the position of prime minister. The unfinished constitutional agenda also attracted him. A renewed Trudeau government would be able to make another attempt to repatriate the Constitution and implement his long-cherished Charter of Rights. A “national unity” agenda would be the primary purpose of a new Trudeau government.
Results of the 1979 and 1980 Federal Elections, by Province
The 1980 election was fought over a different set of issues than that of 1979. The first glaring difference was that while national unity was the lead item in the previous Liberal platform, the subject would be barely mentioned this time. In large part, this was a result of the Clark government’s defeat over its budget, and in particular the gasoline tax proposal. Unprepared for an election, the Conservatives were forced to rely on the same set of issue priorities they had campaigned on nine months earlier, minus those which had been abandoned, such as moving the embassy in Israel and immediate tax cuts. They were also forced to add those policies which had been crystallized by the budget. The Conservative campaign got off to a slow start. In the first week, Clark took some heat for being unable to estimate the price of Conservative campaign promises, complaining that he did not have a “magic accountant.” According to some observers, this was his worst moment of the campaign.40 There was no question that his government had made some mistakes and that a number of them were caused by the inexperience of his cabinet. Campaigning on the slogan “Real Change Deserves a Fair Chance,” Clark argued that his government had had only a short time to work on its agenda, that it had made some mistakes but had signalled its intention to fulfil many of its previous promises, and that it deserved an opportunity to govern for a reasonable period of time before being judged.41 For many people, however, that judgment had already been made.
Despite the fact that opinion was divided about the wisdom of the specific large rise in energy taxation provided by the budget, this proposal proved to be an albatross for the Conservatives in a number of ways. In the first place, it was not clear how this large tax increase would improve the overall supply of energy, since the extra revenue would accrue to the government and not to private energy suppliers. The Conservative government was not proposing, for example, to channel extra tax revenues to Petro Canada, the state-owned oil company, for exploration and development — rather, they were committed to dismantling that Crown corporation or selling it to private interests.
The tax increase might encourage energy conservation, but what exactly was the government going to use the extra money for? There were implications it might be used to pay down the national debt, but such a move, fiscally responsible though it might be, was not the substance of dramatic election oratory. More damaging for the Conservatives were the hints that it might be used to extend the tax credits for mortgage interest. There was an announcement early in the campaign that if the government was re-elected they would double the amount originally announced for the limits of such deductions.42 The mortgage deductibility plan, however, continued to be controversial, since it would benefit primarily middle-class homeowners rather than the less well-off sections of society. The fact that the large “tax grab” was not specifically targeted to some generally approved spending target handicapped the Conservatives when they argued that it was necessary, and perpetuated the feeling that the government did not really know what it was doing.
The Liberal strategy was to run a low-key campaign, counting on public anger with the Conservatives to defeat them, and endeavouring not to do or say anything which might dissipate the lead they had in the polls. This involved “hiding” their two key electoral assets, proven leadership in the person of Pierre Trudeau and the public belief that the Liberals were the party most likely to be able to organize a defence of federalism against the upcoming Quebec referendum. The last thing the Liberals felt they needed on the hustings was a freewheeling Trudeau, promoting his plans for constitutional repatriation with a Charter of Rights and delivering biting criticisms of Quebec nationalism. After all, many “soft nationalist” voters in that province also supported the federal Liberals. Furthermore, there was always a chance that the “arrogant Trudeau” would emerge, perhaps in the process creating some sympathy for Joe Clark and the Tories. As Clarkson puts it, the 1980 strategy was “Hiding the Charisma: Low-Bridging the Saviour.”43 For those who loved Trudeau, he was still there; for those who hated him, at least he was out of sight. Unlike 1979, no leader debates took place in 1980.
The Liberals announced a five-point election program, but these were quite different from the key points of the 1979 campaign. Gone altogether was the need to respond to the challenge to national unity. Liberal strategists felt there was little benefit in reasserting Trudeau’s established advantage in dealing with this issue. The Liberal platform drastically toned down the previous economic policies to guarantee employment and the new social policies to improve the quality of life. Replacing these in the economic issue area were the commitment to be vigilant in managing federal finances, to support industry in creating more jobs, and to strengthen regional economies. Although these were generalities, they placed the emphasis firmly on elements of the material standard of living of Canadians, rather than the finer points of the Constitution. Furthermore, they implied the importance of government action, something which subtly differentiated the party from the free enterprise rhetoric of the Tories.
Given the uncertain pricing situation of imported oil, and the emphasis of the Conservative budget, the Liberals stated a priority for “achieving energy security at a fair price for all Canadians.” In concrete terms, the party proposed to counter the price differential between domestic and more expensive foreign prices for imported oil by creating an overall “blended price,” which would charge everyone a similar amount for their fuel.44 There were several implications here. The government was going to maintain a major role in setting and regulating oil prices. Given that a referendum in Quebec was expected sometime in 1980, an oil and gas policy that would assure Quebecers a guaranteed supply of oil and gas could be used as an argument to support the federal cause. A separate Quebec would receive no such guarantees. Trudeau committed to a “made-in-Canada blended price, energy security, an expanded Petro Canada and stepped-up Canadianization” of the energy sector.45 Eastern Canadian consumers were not to be subjected to the full brunt of rising oil prices from imported oil, while westerners maintained the benefits of cheaper domestic production. Western producers were not going to be allowed the option of raising their prices to meet the world price and reap the profits. And finally, taxpayers would be spared the whopping 18-cent-per-gallon tax on gasoline contained in the Conservatives’ ill-fated budget.
To firm up their appeal on the third issue, that of social welfare, the Liberals put aside their austerity pledge to announce that they would raise that part of the Canada Pension Plan based on need, known as the Guaranteed Income Supplement, by $35 a month for each household that qualified.46 The money to finance this, it was implied, would come from corporate taxes rather than individuals. Very shortly after this announcement, the NDP unveiled their own social program, which promised to raise the full old-age pension (not just the portion for low-income earners) by $40 a month. The party announced plans for additional “shelter grants” for those elderly persons in need.47 Placed immediately on the defensive over the pension rise proposals, Clark reacted the next day by saying he would not enter into “any election bidding” on pensions, and would resist the suggestion he “up the ante” to $45. The headline for Clark was “Can’t Promise Pension Rise, PM Says.”48 It was hardly the news beleaguered Tory candidates wanted to hear when planning their speeches for local rallies.
Once again, the NDP sensed enhanced opportunities. They had done well in 1979 in a situation where the public was displeased with the government and hesitant about the main challenger. Now the situation appeared very similar, with the apparent fortunes of the other parties simply reversed. All the public opinion polls indicated that the electorate was looking for an alternative to the current government, and was less than enthusiastic about bringing back the previous one. Ed Broadbent appeared to be increasing his personal popularity, and was once again the centrepiece of the NDP campaign. Although handicapped by the lack of a leaders’ debate, since the Liberals were determined to avoid one, the party’s economic and social policy agenda resonated well with its natural constituencies in the West and in urban Ontario. However, many Canadians had deeply felt suspicions regarding the NDP’s ability to manage the economy, while Broadbent and his colleagues had little to say about how they would deal with a sovereign Quebec.
Library and Archives Canada. Robert Cooper, photographer.
Pierre Trudeau with Queen Elizabeth II, signing the Constitution, Ottawa, 1982.
Turnover in Partisanship and Vote, 1974, 1979, and 1980 Elections
Canadian National Election Study Panel. Percentages are of total sample. Number of cases for this analysis is 791. Excludes non-voters in all three elections.
Rows and columns do not total, and do not total to 100 percent, because not all categories are mutually exclusive. For example, someone who switched in one pair of elections and did not vote in the third is counted in both relevant cells.
Table adapted from Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon H. Pammett, Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections (Toronto: Gage, 1991), 58.
All political parties were cognizant of the volatility of the Canadian electorate, which could produce quite different results over relatively short spans of elections. A Trudeau landslide in 1968 had been followed by near defeat in 1972 and restoration of the Liberal majority in 1974. Now, less than a year following their defeat, the Liberals appeared poised to return to power. The extent and nature of this volatility was revealed by the Canadian Election Studies, which were designed in this period to incorporate a “panel” whereby the same respondents were interviewed in the three elections (1974, 1979, and 1980), thus allowing us to draw a picture of the amount of stability and change in behaviour of the same people on these three voting opportunities. Table 8.5 looks at the voting behaviour in three elections of those who had various degrees of feeling for the parties. It shows several different kinds of change.49 Only 41 percent of this group of eligible voters voted in the three elections for the same party, and also maintained an “identification” with that party — that is, felt closer to it than any other party. The rest changed in a variety of ways. Some maintained an identification with the same party but cast at least one of their votes for some other party, indicating that “their” party had disappointed them in some way. A somewhat larger group, 16 percent, changed both their vote and the party they felt closest to at least once during that period. In addition, the table shows two other forms of electoral change. Some people, both those who were consistent in their votes and those who were not, moved to or from a feeling of partisan closeness to any political party. And finally, a substantial number of people moved in and out of the active electorate, choosing not to cast a vote at all.
The 1980 election restored the Trudeau dynasty. The Conservative defeat was decisive, as the party lost seats in every part of the country (see Table 8.4). Despite its difficulties in making its case, however, the primary reasons for the defeat had little to do with the election issues. For those citing various specific issues as important to them, and counting those who stayed with the same party they had supported last time, there were no major patterns favouring one party over the other. Rather, the Conservatives’ problems stemmed from two other sources. The first was the lower turnout of voters (69 percent in 1980 versus 75 percent in 1979), a factor which worked strongly against the PCs. Almost as large a proportion of the electorate moved from a 1979 Conservative vote to non-voting in 1980 as switched to the Liberals. In contrast, the Liberals and the NDP were both able to hold on to a higher proportion of their previous voters (see Figure 8.3).
The second factor was leadership. Despite the “low bridging” of Trudeau, he was far and away the most popular leader in 1980, and was a major factor allowing the party to hold on to such a high proportion of its previous support.50 Figure 8.2 shows that the average rating of Clark on a scale of 0–100 declined to 44 in 1980 from an already low mark of 50 — the lowest score for a major party leader since National Election Studies began. By this time, the Canadian public was well aware of Pierre Trudeau’s faults and failings. He was arrogant and disdainful of others; he was autocratic and consolidated power within his own office; he was highly erratic as a public speaker; he had a bad record on the economy and didn’t actually seem very concerned with it; he had an obsession with the Constitution that was not shared by most of the country. But even at its lowest ebb, in 1980, Trudeau’s average rating on the 100 point scale only declined to 55, on the warm side of the neutral mark. He was respected for his intellect, loved for his charisma, and the subject of pride when compared internationally to other leaders. He was firmly in power again, and the Liberal dynasty, shaky as it had proven to be under Trudeau’s leadership, was again restored. The brief and relatively uneventful Clark interlude was over.
1. Data on the economic problems of the 1970s, and the public reaction to them, may be found in Jon H. Pammett, “Inflation, Unemployment and Integration,” in Jon H. Pammett and Brian W. Tomlin, eds., The Integration Question: Political Economy and Public Policy in Canada and North America (Toronto: Addison-Wesley, 1984), 95–111.
2. Trudeau consulted with John Kenneth Galbraith about the implementation of wage and price controls. See Christina McCall and Stephen Clarkson, Trudeau and Our Times, Volume 2: The Heroic Delusion (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1994), 125.
3. Jean Chrétien, Straight From the Heart (Toronto: Key Porter, 1985), 117.
4. John Meisel, “The Larger Context: The Period Preceding the 1979 Election.” In Howard Penniman, ed., Canada At the Polls, 1979 and 1980 (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 27.
5. David L. Humphreys, Joe Clark: a Portrait (Toronto: Totem, 1978).
6. Alvin Armstrong, Flora Macdonald (Toronto: Dent, 1976), 202–03.
7. Michael Nolan, Joe Clark: The Emerging Leader (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1978), 19.
8. Robert Krause and Lawrence LeDuc, “Voting Behaviour and Electoral Strategies in the 1976 Progressive-Conservative Leadership Convention,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 12 (1979), 97–136.
9. Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO), Gallup Report, October 16, 1976.
10. Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon H. Pammett, Absent Mandate: The Politics of Discontent in Canada (Toronto: Gage, 1984), 113.
11. Walter D. Young, “The New Democratic Party in the 1979 Federal General Election,” in Howard R. Penniman, ed., Canada at the Polls, 1979 and 1980: A Study of the General Elections (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 191–92.
12. A good biographical sketch of Broadbent is to be found in Alan Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism: Essays on the CCF-NDP (Toronto: Oxford, 1992), Chapter 7.
13. Broadbent was elected on the fourth ballot, although he led on each. Other candidates were John Harney (a university professor from Toronto and former MP), Lorne Nystrom (an MP from Saskatchewan), and Rosemary Brown (a member of the British Columbia legislature).
14. Jeffrey Simpson, “PM Calls the Election: It’s May 22nd,” Globe and Mail, March 27, 1979: 1.
15. Stephen Clarkson and Christina McCall, Trudeau and Our Times: Volume 1, The Magnificent Obsession (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), 139–43.
16. John Saywell, Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 27.
17. Gossage, Patrick, Close to Charisma: My Years Between the Press and Pierre Elliot Trudeau (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1986), 149.
18. Pierre Trudeau, text of election announcement, as reported in the Globe and Mail, March 27, 1979: 9.
19. Stephen Clarkson, The Big Red Machine: How the Liberal Party Dominates Canadian Politics (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2005), 64–66.
20. Jeffrey Simpson, “PM’s Attack on Clark Is Turned Up to Full Blast,” Globe and Mail, April 23, 1979: 1.
21. Ibid.
22. See note 15.
23. Jeffrey Simpson, “Housewives Should Be Eligible for Pension Plan, Trudeau Says,” Globe and Mail, April 28, 1979: 1.
24. John Courtney, “Campaign Strategy and Electoral Victory: The Progressive Conservatives and the 1979 Election,” in Howard R. Penniman, ed., Canada at the Polls, 1979 and 1980: A Study of the General Elections (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1981), 148.
25. Lawrence LeDuc and Richard Price, “Great Debates: The Televised Leadership Debates of 1979,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 18 (March 1983), 135–54.
26. Ibid., 146.
27. Whitehorn, op. cit., 94.
28. Jeffrey Simpson, “Broadbent’s Campaign Staged to Fit Television Screen,” Globe and Mail, May 14, 1979: 8–9.
29. A more detailed analysis of the voting patterns for 1979 may be found in Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon H. Pammett, “Voting Behaviour and the Outcome of the 1979 Election: The Impact of Leaders and Issues,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 15 (1982), 517–52.
30. Ibid., 545.
31. William Irvine, “Epilogue,” in Penniman, op. cit., 341–42.
32. McCall and Clarkson, op. cit., 145–46.
33. Jeffrey Simpson, Discipline of Power: The Conservative Interlude and the Liberal Restoration (Toronto: Personal Library, 1980), 18.
34. John Crosbie and Geofffrey Stevens, No Holds Barred, 165.
35. Simpson, Discipline of Power, 32.
36. Two Créditises attended the vote but abstained, one Liberal was absent, and three Conservatives were absent for the vote.
37. Crosbie, 176–77.
38. Clarkson and McCall, op. cit., Chapter 8.
39. Patrick Gossage, Close to the Charisma (Halifax, Goodread, 1986), 189.
40. Stevens, Geoffrey, “Leadership Still Issue As Campaign Closes,” Globe and Mail, May 19, 1980: A1.
41. Mary Trueman, “Students Rough on Clark Over Broken Promises,” Globe and Mail, January 11, 1980: 1–2.
42. “Mortgage Tax Credit Value Would Double if PCs Return,” Globe and Mail, January 16, 1980: 1.
43. Clarkson, The Big Red Machine, 87.
44. Mary Trueman, “Liberals Promise Two Prices for Oil,” Globe and Mail, January 26, 1980: 1.
45. McCall and Clarkson, op. cit., 154.
46. Mary Trueman, “Would Boost Monthly Pension Aid by $35 a Household, Trudeau Says,” Globe and Mail, January 16, 1980: 1.
47. James Rusk, “NDP Promises $40 Pension Increase,” Globe and Mail, January 24, 1.
48. Robert Sheppard, “Can’t Promise Pension Rise, PM Says,” Globe and Mail, January 25, 1.
49. For a more extensive analysis of the voting patterns in the 1980 election, see Harold D. Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon H. Pammett, Absent Mandate: Interpreting Change in Canadian Elections (Toronto: Gage, 1991), 140–43.
50. See the table of leader effects in Absent Mandate, second edition, 137.
Clarke, Harold D., Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc, and Jon H. Pammett. Absent Mandate: The Politics of Discontent in Canada (Toronto: Gage, 1984).
Clarkson, Stephen, and Christina McCall. Trudeau and Our Times, Volume 1: The Magnificent Obsession (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990).
Davey, Keith. The Rainmaker: A Passion for Politics (Toronto: Stoddart, 1986).
Humphreys, David L. Joe Clark: A Portrait (Ottawa: Deneau and Greenberg, 1978).
McCall-Newman, Christina. Grits: An Intimate Portrait of the Liberal Party (Toronto: Macmillan, 1982).
Morton, Desmond. The New Democrats 1961–1986: The Politics of Change (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986).
Penniman, Howard, ed. Canada at the Polls 1979 and 1980: A Study of the General Election (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981).
Simpson, Jeffrey. Discipline of Power: The Conservative Interlude and the Liberal Restoration (Toronto: Personal Library Publishers, 1980).
Troyer, Warner. 200 Days: Joe Clark in Power (Toronto: Personal Library Publishers, 1980).