5
State-level politics, coalitions, and rapid system change in India
Virginia Van Dyke
The Indian political party system has changed dramatically in the last two decades. These changes have included the rise of Hindu nationalism and the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata party as a true national party and a rival to the Congress party in electoral strength and ideology; the increase in strength of state-based parties; the ethnification1 of politics in north India, that is, the emergence of caste-based parties; and the arrival on center stage of coalition governments at the national, state, and local levels. In 1994 Brass wrote of the “universal presence of the Congress” in all states,“even where Congress has been reduced to seemingly permanent minority status.”2 More recently, Yadav referred to a “post-Congress polity,”3 and a number of states have no significant presence of Congress at all. While the BJP was for some time expected to be unable to move outside of north and northwest India, where its implicit slogan of “Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan” could resonate, it won the assembly elections in Karnataka, one of the southern states, in 2008.
On 22 July, 2008 a trust vote was held by the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) to establish its majority after the left parties withdrew support to protest the India–United States agreement on sharing nuclear technology. The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) joined the move to bring the government down, while some state-based parties attempted to establish a “third front” apart from the two main alliances. The maneuverings that went on as Congress attempted to secure the requisite numbers threw into relief some of the fundamental changes and tendencies of the Indian political party system. First, in terms of the coalition at the Center, the regional parties continue to tend towards forming a third front that cannot be written off, even though the members of that front are transient.That is, it is not so clear that India is moving towards a permanent two-front system at the Center, despite the fact that it has been the pattern since 1998. Second, regional parties are crucial at the Center, but participate there largely to extract benefits and support at the state level where their interests essentially lie.
There are numerous examples of this phenomenon of state-based politicians utilizing their participation in coalitions at the Center to accomplish goals at the state level. Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party had, in 2007, accomplished the surprising feat of coming to power in Uttar Pradesh in a one-party majority government in spite of all indications suggesting coalition governments would be the political configuration in that state in the foreseeable future. Mayawati was a leader of the proposed third front at the Center and projected as the prime ministerial candidate. Apparently as a result, her primary opponent and bête noire in the state, Mulayam Singh Yadav, then reversed his long-term previous policy, deciding to side with Congress. Suddenly, “disproportionate assets” charges were filed by the Central Bureau of Intelligence (CBI) against Mayawati, charges that she maintains were politically motivated and engineered by the Congress-led central government. The leader of another party, Ajit Singh, who controls a few MPs in UP, was wooed by all three sides, opting finally to back Mayawati who could offer berths in her cabinet and who would be most useful in electoral understandings that would benefit him in the next general as well as state-level assembly elections.
State-level parties
Many states have a unique configuration of parties; some states have parties which are specific to only that state. Chhibber and Petrocik have shown that even Congress is in some sense a different party in each region as its support base varies by caste, class, religion, or language,4 while Yadav and Heath have demonstrated that Congress has different supporters depending on the nature of the opposition, that is, Congress is the party of the well-off in opposition to the Left and the party of the lower socioeconomic groups in opposition to the BJP (see Table 5.1).5
In constructing a typology of state party systems, one would need to move fast as the situation is in a state of extreme flux. Formerly one-party dominated states have over time become two-party systems and in some cases multiparty systems thereafter.Those fragmented multiparty systems with a history of coalition formation may become stabilized as two-party systems, as seems to be occurring in UP. States where the BJP was allied with a regional party have become states where the BJP is making inroads in the place of the regional party.
In contrast to what is seen at the Center, the state-level systems do seem to be tending towards a two-party system (or two coalitions) as would be suggested by “Duverger’s law.”6 Coalitions are emerging as old party structures break down: for example as Congress declines, fragments of the Janata Party become regional parties and the BJP establishes itself. Over time then, the tendency is towards two-party systems once again, that is, in some states the coalition period looks like a transition period, much like the short-lived coalitions that emerged after Congress lost control of a number of states for the first time in 1967.
The desire to expand and the need for regional party allies for national level coalitions, has led the BJP to seek a presence in every state, as, of course, does Congress. Congress has been less successful in forging alliances with regional parties, as regional parties first emerged in opposition to Congress; this is changing under the new compulsions of politics. The importance of coalition building was clearly illustrated in the 2004 general election when one of the crucial factors responsible for shifting the election result from the expected BJP-led NDA victory to one for the Congress-led coalition was the move of the DMK (with 16 seats) from the former to the latter. An ongoing, important change in state politics involves the emergence of the BJP as at least an alliance partner in every state but one. In spite of continued efforts, it has not been able “to open its account,” by winning a seat in Kerala, as will be discussed further later.
Two-party systems comprised of the BJP in opposition to Congress include:
Chhattisgarh
Delhi
Gujarat
Himachal Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Rajasthan
Uttarakhand
In Maharashtra, the BJP has been in an alliance with a regional party, the Shiv Sena, while Congress may ally with its own breakaway faction, the Nationalist Congress Party, as it did in the last assembly elections. (Even in two-party systems, it is very common to have small parties—often breakaway f actions—and independents contesting.)
Another type of two-party system is characterized by Congress in opposition to a left front. In Kerala, this takes the form of two opposing coalitions. In West Bengal, where the Left front has been in power since 1977, there is a third party, the All-India Trinamul Congress (AITC), led by the mercurial Mamata Banerjee, which has taken support from the BJP or from Congress at different times. In the last assembly elections, the BJP was in alliance with the All-India Trinamool Congress, but was not able to win a seat.
States which have multiparty systems include Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Jharkhand. In a fourth type of system, Congress is in opposition to a regional party. In many cases the BJP will strike up an alliance with a regional party; sometimes it is able to parley such alliances into a foothold in the state.That is, or has been, the case in Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Goa, Haryana, Karnataka, Orissa, and Punjab. In Goa, for example, the BJP and the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) together contested the assembly elections in 1994, with the BJP gaining four seats and the MGP gaining 12. In 1999 Rubinoff suggested that the BJP had “displaced the MGP as the preferred party of the state’s Hindu voters.”7 By the 2007 elections the BJP and Congress were splitting the votes and the regional parties were relegated to one or two seats each.
This strategy is not always completely successful. In 2000 the BJP had an alliance with the Indian National Lok Dal in Haryana.The INLD did very well in the elections, and its partner, the BJP, did very poorly.8 During the 2009 state-level elections in Andhra Pradesh and Orissa, a state party in each that had been allied with the BJP abruptly decided to contest the elections alone to the detriment of the latter. The state party in Orissa, the Biju Janata Dal, then came to power on its own. Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party in UP is also an important exception to the BJP’s strategy as Mayawati has utilized coalitions with the BJP to enable it to come to power on its own while the BJP’s strength in Uttar Pradesh has been severely attenuated.
A fifth type of party system exists in Tamil Nadu, where two opposing regional parties drawing on Dravidian nationalism, the DMK and the AIADMK, trade power, and each also trades alliances at the national level between the BJP and Congress. The AIADMK had supported the BJP in its first attempt to establish a coalition government at the Center in 1998, and was responsible for bringing that government down by withdrawing support. In spite of the BJP’s giving the AIADMK a prominent role, including the position of Lok Sabha speaker, the leader of that party was dissatisfied with the BJP’s refusal to dismiss the state government in Tamil Nadu controlled by her primary rival.
Coalition politics
Different configurations of party systems have given rise to very different types of coalitions; fragmented multiparty systems involving less institutionalized parties (opportunistic and rapidly changing),9 on the one hand, more stable relationships among parties, on the other hand. Kerala is the sole example of a system of two “fronts,” which alternate in power, but each expect to last the full five-year term once in power. Coalitions differ in India from those in many other political systems in that they are characterized by factionalism and frequent party splitting. They tend not to be defined by ideology, except in the cases of religious nationalist and left parties. In fact, McMillan argues, drawing on Luebbert, parties may prefer to maintain their uniqueness by not allying with parties that are too similar. For this reason it would be rare to find in India the ideologically linked minimum winning
coalition proposed by theorists as the most likely result of post-electoral coalition negotiations in multiparty systems.10 Further, because of factionalism and the strong likelihood of party splits, governments with excess parties are common, also challenging the ideal of the minimum winning coalition (see Table 5.2).
As Sridharan notes, India’s first-past-the-post electoral system, also known as a single member district plurality (SMP) system, creates a situation whereby a small swing in the percentage of votes can produce a large swing in seats, thereby encouraging brinksmanship behavior among politicians.11 Parties tend to gamble that their opponents might be deci-mated in the next election; they do not assume that they will be negotiating with the same party leaders in a few years, as would be the case in a more stable proportional representation system. Further, the intentions of the coalition partners are often not to establish a stable cabinet that can facilitate “good governance.” Coalitions are formed with very short-term goals in mind, positioning themselves to be ready for the next election and to be in power long enough to reap some patronage benefits from that as well. Often, not many resources are expended in creating or running a coalition that is expected to be short-lived.12 Further, politicians are aware that if they are never in power only the most ideologically dedicated supporters will continue to vote for them; they need to establish themselves as leaders of parties that may actually run the government.As Luebbert argues, party “leaders are motivated above all by their desire to remain party leaders.”13 One cannot remain a party leader long as the head of a party that is never in the government, particularly given the patronage nature of the system.
State politics cannot be considered in isolation from the government at the Center. Through the actions of the state governor, appointed by the party in power at the Center, and through the ability of the central government to utilize the imposition of “Presidents Rule” to dismiss state governments, state-level governments led by a party that is not the party at the Center sometimes have a limited lifespan. So, parties ally with Congress or the BJP at the national level to derive benefits, but also to ensure the longevity of their governments. However, power in India’s federal system is shifting in the direction of the states for several reasons, including the dislike of state parties for a policy that may lead to their dismissal for partisan purposes (see Rudolph and Rudolph, this volume).
The rise of the BJP and its impact on state politics
1947–1967
Both at the national level and in many states a one-party dominant system characterized this time period. This term was developed by Rajni Kothari to describe a political system in which, although there were opposition parties along with free, competitive elections, the same party won every election. Part of the success of Congress at this time can be attributed to the fragmented opposition. Parties such as Swatantra, a party of large landowners advocating a more capitalist economic system, and the Praja Socialist Party had limited support in terms of constituency and geographical spread. Another advantage of Congress was its ability to absorb the opposition. The Shiromani Akali Dal, for example, actually merged with Congress on two separate occasions. Congress, through its domination of the national government could also control the states. In 1959, when a Communist-led government was elected in Kerala, the Congress-controlled central government was complicit in organizing massive protests, and then dismissing the state government, based on argument that public sentiment had changed, as evidenced, allegedly, by the protests.
Aiding in the development of regional identities and regional parties was the government policy of redrawing state boundaries along linguistic lines, known as the linguistic reorganization of states. This policy enabled parties that drew on a specific regional identity tied to language to have its likely constituency defined in one electoral arena. To use the Akali Dal as an example again, it was never able to win an election until the boundaries of Punjab were redrawn to give Sikhs a majority of the population in the reorganized unit.
1967–1977
In 1967, following the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964 and the beginning of a long succession struggle which included a split in the party, Congress lost power in eight states. Coalition governments emerged in many states. These tended to be unstable and few lasted long, but it portended a future when Congress would not be the dominant party. In 1967 in Tamil Nadu, a non-Congress government emerged and two regional parties, the DMK and its offshoot, the AIADMK, have alternated in power ever since. Two-party systems emerged in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh the same year. In 1977 a Communist government came to power in West Bengal and has held power from that date.
Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, gaining popularity for backing Bangladesh in the Pakistan civil war, solidified her leadership of the party in the elections of 1971. She restructured and centralized the party organization; she began personally to make decisions regarding state-level politics, undermining institutional support for state Congress leaders. Although originally admired for her populist and pro-poor measures, a series of economic and political challenges led to her declaring the “emergency,” involving a suspension of civil liberties that gave her the opportunity to jail many of her political opponents. However, while in jail, opposition leaders were then able to network with each other. After elections were called in 1977, a conglomeration of opposition parties came together to form the Janata Party, which won a decisive victory, allowing the first non-Congress government to take power at the center, as well as in a number of states.
1977–1989
The Janata Party fell apart due to infighting arising out of competing ambitions. The next elections brought Congress back to power as the “party that works.” However, Indira Gandhi faced militant anti-state movements in both Punjab and Assam. The latter was a protest by Assamese-speaking Hindus against a lack of government control over an influx of Bengali speakers, largely Muslims, from Bangladesh. The former was a movement led by Sikhs for greater economic, political, and social autonomy for their state, which grew into a demand for outright secession about the same time as Indira Gandhi sent the Indian army into the Sikh central religious site to rout the militants. Indira Gandhi was assassinated in retaliation for this course of action, and her son, Rajiv Gandhi, assumed the position of prime minister in 1984. Concerns about Rajiv Gandhi’s alleged corruption and elitism brought another “third front” government to power in 1989, the Janata Dal led by V. P. Singh, supported from the outside by the BJP.
1989–2008
The beginning of the BJP’s electoral success dates to 1989. Although its predecessor party, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, was a presence in Uttar Pradesh, it was never able to gather significant strength elsewhere. The Jan Sangh had been part of the Janata Party that provided an opposition to Congress at the Center and in many states in the 1970s. It established its new identity as the BJP in 1980. In the general election of 1984, in the midst of the sympathy wave after Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the BJP won a mere two seats. In 1989 it won 86; in 1991, 120; and, by 1996, it had become the largest party (although far from a majority) and was asked to form the government. This it was unable to do because of its “majestic isolation,” shunned as a coalition partner by most parties at that time because of its Hindutva ideology. However, in 1998, they were at last able to form a government at the center. It also won state-level elections for the first time: in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh in 1990; in UP in 1991; Delhi in 1993; and Maharashtra and Gujarat in 1995. There are a number of explanations as to why this party was able to make these phenomenal gains.
BJP politicians and ideologues refer to the BJP as “the party with a difference,” by which they mean they are guided by an ideology and a vision; they are not simply seeking the gaddi or a powerful position. They are, in fact, a party with a difference in that they are part of a larger structure. The BJP grew out of a pre-existing organization called the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), which was founded in 1925 in a context of Hindu– Muslim riots.The intention of the organization was to train young men, ideologically and physically, to defend Hinduism against the perceived Muslim threat, as well as to construct a nation grounded in a specifically Hindu culture.A women’s wing was added, somewhat reluctantly, later. The RSS has spawned a number of organizations, which are collectively referred to as the Sangh Parivar [Sangh family]. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and its offshoot, the Bajrang Dal, are active in advancing what they view as Hindu causes, from creating agitations around “disputed sites” such as the mosque in Ayodhya, or a Sufi shrine in Karnataka, to protesting so-called forced conversions and organizing attacks on Christian Churches in Gujarat, Orissa, and even Kerala.
All these organizations are closely intertwined; many members of the VHP and the BJP were trained by the RSS and hold joint membership. A particularly esteemed position within the RSS structure is that of a pracharak; an individual who is supposed to be a dedicated celibate lifetime worker.The head of the VHP is an RSS pracharak, as is former BJP Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
Jaffrelot argues that over time the BJP has moved back and forth between agitation as a method of creating support and a focus on building up its grassroots organization.14 In the late 1980s, the BJP committed itself to agita-tional methods, joining a VHP campaign to build a Hindu temple to Lord Ram on what was said to be the site of his birth, then occupied by a sixteenth-century mosque.The grand processions and ceremonies that accompanied this demand, along with favorable media coverage in much of the vernacular press, and the fortuitous timing of a television series on the life of Ram, created what was referred to as the Ram Lahar, or “Ram Wave.” This emotional response to an upsurge of Hindu nationalist sentiment challenged the ideals of secularism associated with Nehru and the Congress.
The BJP utilized a number of other strategies to build its support, such as incorporating and promoting—even creating— Hindu religious figures to represent its message articulated through vitriolic speeches, some distributed on cassette tapes. Despite its rhetoric of a Hindu society undivided by castes, like other parties, it created a support base comprised of specific caste groups. For example, in UP, it gained the support of the Lodhi Rajputs along with its usual base of high caste voters, by promoting individuals from this caste into high positions in the party including that of chief minister. Again in common with other parties, it incorporated local notables who have the support of voters in their local area no matter to which party they belong.15 Hansen argues that one of the primary reasons for its success in gaining the votes of the upper castes was that, in an era of Congress decline and aggressive caste-based mobilization by the backward castes and the scheduled castes, this party articulated an ideology of order and nationalistic pride in India that attracted them, particularly police officers and military personnel.16
Post-Ram Wave, other tactics have been used. Although, the BJP has played down Hindutva issues in the interests of coalition formation, communal tension and violence have continued to work to the BJP’s advant-age.17 Horrific anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat were followed by a resounding BJP victory in the subsequent elections in that state in 2007. But, the BJP has been particularly adept at coalition building, adopting this strategy when it was still disdained by Congress. Coalition formation with smaller parties at the state level, in conjunction with accommodating the state-based party at the Center, has been a useful policy. As a national, well-organized party, with ideologically motivated extra-parliamentary activists, the BJP can erode the support base of smaller regional parties, who see their primary opponent as the Congress.18
Karnataka: The BJP’s “southern beachhead”19
Karnataka is an example of a state which moved from a one-party-dominant system to a competitive two-party system to a multiparty system after the entry of the BJP into this state’s politics. After a series of unstable coalitions, a BJP-led one-party government took power in 2008. Its success in Karnataka demonstrates the BJP’s ability to parlay short-lived alliances or coalitions into an expanded presence.
Karnataka is a southern state, former bastion of the Congress party, which evolved into a two-party system in 1983 when Ramakrishna Hegde of the Janata Party became chief minister with the support of the BJP. The Janata Party split, but the three faction leaders—H. D. Deve Gowda, Ramakrishna Hegde, and S.R. Bommai—were reunited in the 1990s and the party won the assembly elections in 1994, along with the general elections in 1996. It built its strength by combining the support of the two major castes, the Vokkaligas and the Lingayats, along with “other backwards, scheduled castes, and Muslims.”20 In 1998, the Janata Dal split again, and Hegde, who was a Brahman, but whose support base was among the Lingayat community, fashioned an alliance with the BJP with his newly formed Lok Shakti party.According to Gould, the BJP, whose state-level leader was a Lingayat, successfully combined “standard Hindutva appeal[s]” and appeals around farmers’ issues to split the “Lingayat–Vokkaliga axis,” the basis for the Janata Dal’s success. In so doing, the BJP was able to make inroads into the state.21
Before the assembly elections in 2004, the Lok Shakti had become the Janata Dal (United) while Deve Gowda’s faction had become the Janata Dal (Secular), perceived as promoting Vokkaligas and also dynastic rule.22 In the state elections in 2004 the BJP won the largest number of seats and two former adversaries, the Congress and the JD(S), formed a coalition government, although there were some talks between the BJP and the JD(S), as well. The Congress party nominally controlled the post of chief minister, but Congress Chief Minister M. Dharam Singh was very solicitous of taking the advice and recommendations of Deve Gowda, head of the JD(S), who was seen as inordinately powerful.After the panchayat (local-level) elections, however, Congress moved toward setting up joint councils with a dissident from the JD(S), the former Deputy Chief Minister Siddaramaiah, who had chief ministerial aspirations, and who had also made joint appearances with Congress leaders at backward caste forums. This was perceived by the JD (S) as an attempt to split the party and absorb MLAs, as Congress had done during the previous Congress-led administration. Deve Gowda’s son, Kumaraswamy, abruptly resigned from the government, in spite of Deve Gowda’s assurances to Congress that he would rein in his son, took the majority of MLAs with him, and formed a coalition government with the BJP. This was a shocking move considering the party’s secular stance. It appears to have been done in order to secure the post of chief minister for Kumaraswamy; what is still not clear is whether the outspokenly secular Deve Gowda’s protests were sincere or whether the split in the family was but a drama for the press and public.23
The BJP and the JD (S) agreed that each party would have a turn at the chief minister’s post for 20 months; an arrangement identical to that which had not worked out for the BJP with Mayawati previously, an ominous sign for them. When Kumaraswamy was supposed to turn over the position to the BJP, complaints against the BJP were concocted and the deadline came and went. Much to the JD (S)’s surprise, however, the BJP, rather than continuing to support the alliance, withdrew its support to the government, and President’s Rule was imposed. Second-tier party leaders then went back to Congress, attempting to negotiate a new tie-up with the party that they had snapped ties with so abruptly.When those talks failed, the government was formed once again with the BJP and the JD (S), but the BJP chief minister resigned his position after a week when the JD (S) would not commit to supporting him in a confidence motion while raising new conditions which were not part of the original arrangement. Deve Gowda certainly did not want to be the person who facilitated the establishment of a BJP government in Karnataka. However, the unpopular move of ending the government led to the exodus of a number of party leaders, mainly to Congress, but also to the BSP and the BJP. The BJP capitalized on being the “injured party”; in the 2008 elections, the BJP came to power largely on its own, with the assistance of a few independents. In spite of painstaking organizational work in the state by the Sangh Parivar, and an emotive issue as well, that of the “disputed” Sufi shrine of Bababudangiri, it was playing the factional politics game that enabled the BJP to achieve its “beachhead.”24
Coalition in Punjab
Punjab is a Sikh majority state, in which the party configuration includes a party that draws its support specifically from Sikhs. The Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) was founded in 1920 as the action group to lead a nonviolent agitation to reclaim the historic Sikh gurdwaras (places of worship and gathering) from private hands into which they had devolved. This organization then became a political party which has led a number of campaigns to secure specific rights for the Sikh community. Since leadership of the community passed into the hands of a dominant cultivating caste, the Jats, the latter have largely supported this party, while some urban and scheduled caste Sikhs have tended to support Congress.
In 1997, the normal electoral system was reestablished after more than a decade of a militant movement which disrupted elections and marginalized the mainstream parties in Punjab. No assembly elections were held between 1985 and 1992; the 1992 elections were held in the face of a militant-declared boycott, and few crossed that line, either out of sympathy or fear. Since 1997 the Akali Dal has been in coalition with the BJP, when the Akali Dal is in power in the state, or a BJP-led coalition is in power at the Center. This coalition works politically and socially on a number of different levels. At the national level, the BJP adds members of parliament from the Akali Dal to its own strength. At the state level, it establishes intercommunal harmony (as the BJP is supported by Hindus and the SAD by Sikhs) which helps to assure continued normal relations after an extended period of communal tension and violence.25
From a political aspect, the support base of each party is completely separate. As the two parties are not trying to entice each other’s supporters, they reinforce rather than undermine each other. Ideologically, they are both religious nationalist parties. More than this, the BJP alliance supports the Akali Dal against factional splits that could undermine an Akali Dal-led government. Promoting factional splits was a way that Congress had been able to undermine Akali Dal governments in the past—and in fact is a strategy that Congress had used against regional parties elsewhere—and this alliance is a protection, particularly when the BJP is in power at the Center. So the Akali Dal has included the BJP in its government, even when they have had a clear majority on their own. Unlike in other states, where the BJP has eroded the support of a regional party with which it is allied, the Akali Dal is an institutionalized political party whose voters would be highly unlikely to vote for the BJP, except in the case of seat adjustments (and maybe not even then).
The Counterexample of Kerala
Kerala is a counterexample in a number of different ways: it has stable coalition governments made up of two fronts; it is one of only two major states where the communist parties have a strong presence; and it is the only major state where the BJP has virtually no presence. The BJP has done its best to penetrate the party system in Kerala: there is a network of RSS shakhas, particularly in the capital; other Sangh Parivar organizations are present; agitations over “Hindu issues” have taken place; and members of the RSS sometimes clash physically with Communist Party members. In spite of all this, the BJP has not had the ability to penetrate the two fronts that dominate Kerala politics, and there is little scope to contest outside these fronts, each of which receives more than 40 percent of the vote, with little margin between them.26 Further, Chiriyankandath argues, the type of mobilization that leads to actual communal violence has had the effect of undermining the BJP’s position rather than reinforcing it.27
Coalitions are more stable in Kerala than in many other states in India for a number of reasons. The two fronts are to some extent based on ideology, particularly the Left front, in contrast to other states in India. An early emergence of coalitions has led to the expectation of continued coalitions, rather than political parties indulging in brinksmanship behavior in an effort to establish one-party rule. Therefore, the coalitions themselves are more institutionalized, with coordination among parties. The party system itself is also institutionalized; parties in many cases have had long-term support in castes or communities in constituencies located in particular geographical regions.
Uttar Pradesh and “ethnic parties”
Religious nationalism and caste-based politics have been alternative forms of political mobilization since the BJP used the Ram Temple to build support at the same time that V. P. Singh introduced new job reservations in central government departments and seats in educational institutions for backward castes. This is referred to in India as Mandal (the name of the commission that recommended caste-based affirmative action for backward castes) versus Mandir (Hindu temple). Cleavage-based politics is a type of identity politics where parties compete to shape voters’ perception of the primary group to which they belong. For example, the Kurmis, a “backward caste” in UP, some of whom have adopted the name, Patel, have been courted at election time by several parties:
1 the BJP, appealing to the idea of an “organic” Hindu whole
2 the Samajwadi Party attempting to put together a coalition of backward castes and Muslims, but perceived as dominated by Yadavs
3 Apna Dal (translates as “our own party”) a caste-based party based on Kurmis/Patels
4 the BSP trying to form a coalition of the Bahujan Samaj (the majority of low castes), but perceived as promoting mostly Chamars.
Caste has, of course, always been important in Indian politics, which has had reserved constituencies for scheduled castes from its inception; in fact, some reservations stem from the colonial period. In the 1970s Congress utilized the KHAM strategy in Gujarat, which was an attempt to put together a coalition of castes: Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis, and Muslims. In UP, Charan Singh challenged Congress by putting together a coalition of backward agrarian-based castes. What has evolved since then, and represents a change, is what Kanchan Chandra has referred to as the “ethnification” of politics or the tailored appeal to a specific caste by an “ethnic party” that explicitly excludes other castes.28 While Charan Singh, although himself a Jat, appealed to OBCs in general, his son, Ajit Singh, appeals specifically to Jats. While the KHAM strategy referred to “Harijans” as a category to be included, the scheduled caste leader from Uttar Pradesh, Mayawati, originally appealed only to Harijans while vehemently criticizing upper castes, and, in fact, her appeal was most specifically to her own caste, the Chamars. Meanwhile, Mulayam Singh Yadav’s party has been so perceived as responding specifically to the Yadav caste—despite the fact that he also had broad support from Muslims—that a new term emerged, the “Yadavization” of politics in UP.
Caste-based parties are emerging because of the heightened competition for government benefits as more groups become politically mobilized and come to include a strata of educated, ambitious individuals. While scheduled caste/low caste voters once voted for their higher caste patrons, and landless laborers voted as the landowners directed them to vote, castes have begun to vote for their own parties. That is, rather than patronage links being vertical, linkages are now horizontal. As India is a “patronage democracy,” status recognition, and material goods have both come from the state, not from achievement in the private sector, although this is changing rapidly.Those who can do so, opt for careers in government service, those who cannot, gain “material and psychic benefits” from their “proximity” to the state.29 Political parties gain the support of groups by incorporating their members in important positions. Further, Chandra argues that caste provides a shorthand way for voters to identity who is “one of them” and, therefore, likely to dispense government benefits in their direction; therefore, the tendency is to vote for parties that incorporate one’s own caste,30 if, in fact, the party is large enough to have an actual chance at office.31
The BSP, led by Mayawati, until its transformation in 2007 to a broad-based party, was the quintessential example of a caste-based party, and the state of UP an example of the impact caste-based parties have had.This state has moved from a one-party dominant system, to a basically two-party system to a multiparty system in which Congress is by far the most junior member. As Yadav and Heath argue, wherever cleavage-based politics emerge, Congress changes from a “catch-all party” to “a catch-none party.”32 The BJP was able to draw away the high-caste voters, along with certain specific backward castes who supported the BJP in their competition with other backward castes; Mulayam Singh’s Samajwadi Party was supported largely by Yadavs and Muslims; and the BSP initially drew its support from scheduled castes and some Muslims.
The BSP was founded by Kanchi Ram, a Dalit government employee who initially started the Backward and Minority Communities Employment Federation (BAMCEF), an organization of scheduled caste government workers who felt they were not getting due respect.33 Mayawati, once second in command, but known for her autocratic leadership style, emerged as the chief minister-designate. After Kanchi Ram’s death in 2004, Mayawati utilized a strategy that was focused unapologetically on gaining political power for Dalits, a name used by Kanshi Ram and Mayawati to broaden the party’s appeal beyond its solid base among the Chamars, to all the scheduled castes. Mayawati allied first with the Samajwadi Party, then abruptly left that alliance in an acrimonious fashion when the SP seemed to be gaining strength because of its participation in the coalition.This led to the infamous guest house incident in which Mulayam Singh supporters surrounded the guest house where she was staying, leading her to believe they planned to kill her. Her response to this was to contact the BJP, a high caste-based party with which she never would have been expected to ally. She ultimately formed coalitions with the BJP on three occasions: June to October 1995; March to September 1997; and March to October 2002.The BJP supported her in the belief that she could and would transfer Dalit votes to them in upcoming elections. In each case, she unceremoniously pulled out of the alliance when it suited her purpose to do so, for reasons that often left analysts guessing as to her motives. She also forced the BJP to support her Dalit-friendly policies, to the dismay of the BJP’s high-caste supporters. Although the BJP was counting on gaining the support of scheduled caste voters, it really never reaped such benefits.While allying with a high caste-based party like the BJP could have dampened her supporters’ enthusiasm, her clear upper hand in these relationships actually enthused those who supported her.
The BSP has successfully appropriated and utilized symbols of empowerment to an extent unmatched by other parties, transforming the political geography of the state. Ambedkar statues dot the countryside, the BSP headquarters in Lucknow sits next to a large mausoleum containing very large statues of scheduled caste leaders, including Mayawati and Kanchi Ram, and some scheduled caste villages, or scheduled caste areas in villages contain “pucca” (brick) houses built with funds from the government. Mayawati has also constructed a very large park in the center of town, Ambedkar Park, containing statues of Dalit heroes.When the previous Mayawati-led government ended its tenure and a Mulayam Singh-led government took its place, work stopped on the Ambedkar Park and started instead on Ram Manohar Lohia Park, dedicated to Mulayam Singh’s mentor.
In the most recent assembly elections in UP, in 2007, Mayawati expanded both her appeal and her distribution of tickets, granting official party support to candidates from higher castes, which suggests that the party has actually moved away from being an ethnic party. It was able to form the government on its own for the first time, ending, at least in the short term, a long period of coalition government.
Conclusion
The focus here on the ability of parties to form governments raises the question of what role ideology and policy play in state-level politics. Coalition theorists disagree on the degree to which policy or power drives the decision-making process among politicians forming coalitions. In India, ideology, or the desire to put into place particular policies, is less important than gaining control over the government for several reasons: policy issues are not the stuff of political campaigns; politicians’ goals are often tied up with patronage distribution; and there is a consensus among the parties on some of the larger issues. For example, with the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms in the early 1990s, states have a larger discretionary role in attempting to attract foreign investment, and even in independently taking out loans from the World Bank for various projects. Many parties approve of these policies although this is more contentious in the states controlled by the Left.
Further, the less policy is discussed, the easier it is to keep a party together; in fact, once a state government is in power, it typically avoids being in session to the extent legally permissible. Much of what passes for policymaking has more to do with patronage distribution, such as the decision by a state government to add a particular caste to the list of castes that qualify for affirmative action benefits, or contesting over water distribution among states, which primarily affects farmers.
There are specific powers that are granted to the states by the constitution; among these are education and law and order. In both these areas, the BJP has clearly made decisions unique to its interests. Certainly, the strategy of the BJP to attract coalition partners has compelled it to place some of its most contentious issues on the backburner, such as the demand for a uniform civil code and building a grand temple to the god Ram on the site of the demolished mosque. Lall argues that it was in education policy that the NDA government made its most distinctive mark on the Indian polity. However, efforts by Murli Manohar Joshi, Human Resource Development Minister, to promote new textbooks that “saffronized” Indian history while removing the work of prominent historians, were resisted by state-level coalition partners who were opposed to accepting the new textbooks, insisting that education is a state subject.34 Mitra argues that, with regard to minorities, the BJP’s policies represent less of a break with the past than many expected. Policies that the BJP has attempted to implement have, again, been blocked by coalition partners at the state level,35 none of whom, with the exception of the Shiv Sena, supports a Hindutva ideology. Further, many state-level parties are concerned about alienating Muslims or other minorities. The most egregious failings of the BJP governments at both the central and state levels have been in the area of violence against minority groups.
Notes
1 On which, see Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India (Cambridge: University Press, 2004).
2 Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India since Independence, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), p. 125.
3 Yogendra Yadav, “The New Congress Voter,” Seminar 2003, No. 526 (http://www.india-seminar.com/2003/526/526%20yogendra%20yadav.htm).
4 Pradeep Chhibber and John R. Petrocik,“Social Cleavages, Elections, and the Indian Party System,” in Richard Sisson and Ramashray Roy (eds.), Diversity and Dominance in Indian Politics, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Sage, 1990), reprinted in Zoya Hasan (ed.), Parties and Party Politics in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002).
5 Anthony Heath and Yogendra Yadav, “The United Colors of Congress: Social Profile of Congress Voters, 1996 and 1998,” Economic and Political Weekly [EPW], (21–28 August, 1999), reprinted in ibid.
6 This is argued by Eswaran Sridharan, in “Coalitions and Party Strategies in India’s Parliamentary Federation,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Fall 2003), p. 136.
7 Arthur G. Rubinoff,“Conflicting Ambitions in Goa’s Parliamentary Elections,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds.), Indian Politics and the 1998 Election: Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 266.
8 Yogendra Yadav and Oliver Heath, “A Split Verdict in Haryana,” Frontline, Vol. 17, No. 7 (1–14 April, 2000). http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1707/17070490.htm.
9 Brass has defined an institutionalized party system as one that encompasses “parties [that] persist over time, that regularly win a number of seats, and that know their areas of strength.” He argues that the degree of institutionalization of a political party system correlates strongly with stable coalitions; Paul R. Brass, “Party Systems and Government Stability in the Indian States,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 71, No. 4 (December 1977), p. 1,396.
10 Alistair McMillan, “The BJP Coalition: Partisanship and Power-Sharing in Govern-ment,” in Katharine Adeney and Lawrence Saez (eds.), Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 20–21.
11 E. Sridharan, “Principles, Power and Coalition Politics in India: Lessons from Theory, Comparison and Recent History,” in D. D. Khanna and Gert W. Kueck (eds.), Principles, Power and Politics (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1999).
12 Virginia Van Dyke, “‘Jumbo Cabinets,’ Factionalism, and the Impact of Federalism: Comparing Coalition Governments in Kerala, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh,” in Paul Wallace and Ramashroy Roy (eds.), India’s 2004 Elections: Grassroots and National Perspectives (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007).
13 Gregory M. Luebbert, Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 46.
14 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
15 Bangarappa in Karnataka, for example, has been a Congress CM twice, started two of his own parties, and then won a seat in parliament on a BJP ticket. When he left the BJP to join the Samajwadi Party, he resigned his seat in the Lok Sabha and stood for election again in 2005. Once again, he won.
16 Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1999).
17 Steven Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge: University Press, 2004).
18 Sridharan, “Coalitions and Party Strategies.” pp. 150–52.
19 Term borrowed from Harold A. Gould, “The 12th General Election in Karnataka: The BJP Achieves its Southern Beachhead,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds.), Indian Politics and the 1998 Election: Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999).
20 Gould, p.189.
21 Gould, pp. 204–208.
22 The following two paragraphs are based on interviews with politicians and political party workers in Karnataka in 2006. I am grateful to Mohan Kondajji for allowing me access to his extensive private collection of newspaper clippings.
23 Interviews in Karnataka; and “A Clever Ploy by a Humble Farmer?” Indian Express, 18 January, 2006.
24 As predicted by James Manor in 1998, the BJP’s success in Karnataka depended on the Janata Dal self-destructing; James Manor, “Southern Discomfort:The BJP in Karnataka,” in Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds.), The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
25 Ashutosh Kumar,“Electoral Politics in Punjab: Study of Akali Dal”, Economic and Political Weekly (3–10 April, 2004).
26 James Chiriyankandath,“Bounded Nationalism: Kerala and the Social and Regional Limits of Hindutva,” in Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds.), The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 203.
27 Chiriyankandath, p. 216.
28 Chandra, pp. 3–5.
29 Chandra, p.12.
30 Chandra, pp. 57–60.
31 Chandra, p. 13.
32 Yadav and Heath, “The United Colors of Congress,” pp. 136–45.
33 This section draws on Van Dyke, “‘Jumbo Cabinets,’ Factionalism and the Impact of Federalism.”
34 Marie Lall, “Indian Education Policy under the NDA Government,” in Katherine Adeney and Lawrence Saez (eds.), Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).
35 Subrata K. Mitra, “The NDA and the Politics of ‘Minorities’ in India,” in Katherine Adeney and Lawrence Saez (eds.), Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).