Contents
Foreword
Preface and acknowledgements
1.
Rationality in reasoning
The rationality paradox
Two kinds of rationality
The limitations of logical reasoning
Form and objectives of this book
Notes
2.
Personal goals, utility, and probability
Goals and decisions
Problems with normative decision theory
Epistemic goals and utility
Conclusions
3.
Relevance, rationality, and tacit processing
Relevance and rationality
Relevance in reasoning
Relevance in decision making and judgement
4.
Reasoning as decision making: The case of the selection task
The deontic selection task
Indicative selection tasks
Conclusion
5.
Prior belief
Use and neglect of Bayesian priors
Confirmation bias
Belief bias
6.
Deductive competence
Competence and bias in reasoning: The evidence
The mechanism of deduction: Rules or models?
Note
7.
A dual process theory of thinking
Dual processes in reasoning: Sequential, parallel, or interactive?
The nature of tacit thought processes
The nature of explicit thought processes
Conclusions and final thoughts
References
Author index
Subject index