The Origins of Isis

Politics is concerned with the administration of home or city in accordance with ethical and philosophical requirements, for the purpose of directing the mass toward a behaviour that will result in the preservation and permanence of the (human) species.¹

As Ibn Khaldun notes, politics is inherently about people. Be that at a domestic, national or international level, politics is about the administration of organisations, by people, for people. The case of Iraq is no different. At the heart of this exploration into the fragmentation of the Iraqi state and the rise of ISIS are people, whose lives have been decimated by the failure of several regimes to fulfil their obligations to citizens and by the ensuing manipulation of a vacuum that has allowed groups to act in their own interests at the expense of others. This chapter considers the impact of these actions on the Iraqi people. As noted in earlier chapters, the responsibility of a sovereign state includes protecting those people defined as citizens. In doing so, it engages in the administration of governance over a particular area in accordance with, as Khaldun notes, ‘ethical and philosophical requirements’. At the heart of this administration are existential questions about the survival of the particular form of political organisation.

A sovereign state also possesses a monopoly on the use of force, demonstrating its power, authority and, technically, legitimacy. Yet the monopoly over the use of force also serves to protect the citizens of the state from others who may seek to exercise force over them. In the case of Iraq, as noted in Chapters 2 and 5, the existence of strong militias challenges the state's monopoly of the use of force, as demonstrated by the rising violence from sectarian militias.² The failure of the state to curb the power and influence of militias has had a serious impact upon the people of Iraq, creating an increasingly violent sectarian schism, driven in part by geopolitical considerations, with Iraqis caught at the heart of it. Clearly, this has not just resulted in large numbers of deaths, it has had an impact upon the displacement of peoples, seeking to find sanctuary free from the threat of violence or discrimination.

Despite the ruminations as to how best to resolve the crisis, find a diplomatic solution to the conflict and prevent the implosion of state infrastructure, this is fundamentally a story of human suffering on a regional level. While the crisis in Syria has affected over half the population, with an estimated 250,000 people dead, 4 million refugees and 7 million people displaced internally, the case of Iraq is equally tragic.

This chapter maps out the extent of the human tragedy in Iraq from the 2003 invasion to the present day. While previous chapters have dealt with the nature of high politics, this chapter focuses upon the impact of these high politics upon people. The chapter begins by outlining human rights violations under the CPA. It then considers the prime ministerships of Nouri al-Maliki and Haider al-Abadi, before unpacking the human cost of the rise of ISIS in Iraq. Across these sections, four themes are explored: deaths, displacements, structure and economy.³ The chapter concludes by considering the ramifications of the Iraq conflict in the Middle East, but also internationally, given ISIS's ambitions and the number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. In doing this, it draws upon personal accounts from Iraqis affected by the crises,⁴ along with official reports from the United Nations, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group.

The chaos that emerged in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion was hardly surprising. Fuelled by the action of insurgents and the ensuing counter-insurgency programme, the situation across Iraq quickly deteriorated. Allegations of war crimes were rife, with reports suggesting that US soldiers had murdered incapacitated Iraqi combatants, forced civilians into battle zones and used unnecessary force against civilians.⁵ The implications of this for quality of life were clear, with a dramatic impact upon women and children as the fabric of the Iraqi state was torn apart.

With the establishment of the CPA, a Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period was introduced, which contained a bill of rights for Iraqi citizens.⁶ The CPA also introduced emergency legislation enabling Prime Minister Ayad Allawi to declare martial law for periods of up to 60 days. It also allowed for the imposition of curfews, limited public gatherings, allowed for surveillance of communications, the closure of roads, sea lanes and air space, along with wide-ranging stop and search powers.⁷ The CPA also reintroduced the death penalty, for ‘certain crimes affecting internal state security, public safety, attacks on means of transportation, premeditated murder, drug trafficking and abduction’.⁸ Yet at the same time, the judicial system was in dire need of reform, with the vast majority of defendants not having access to lawyers before trials, experiencing torture during the detentions (with confessions extracted under torture permissible⁹) and summary trials lasting less than 30 minutes. Perhaps most worryingly, there was no requirement that guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In 2005 violence increased, leading to large numbers of displacements across the state increasingly taking on a sectarian dimension, as noted in Chapter 5.¹⁰ It is alleged that security services were behind hundreds of disappearances, although it is important to note that uniforms were easily available and often obtained by militias.¹¹ Regardless of who was responsible, these actions eroded faith in the security services and state institutions more broadly. The continuation of counter-insurgency operations resulted in damage and disruption to key infrastructure including water and electricity, and the destruction of homes.¹²

Clearly though, ongoing military action impinged on attempts to rebuild this infrastructure and boost the economy.¹³ By 2005, it was estimated that women and children constituted 20 per cent of civilian deaths.¹⁴ The emergence of Al Qaeda-affiliated organisations in Anbar led to an increase in the number of violent incidents, with civilians particularly targeted.¹⁵ Attacks were aimed at a number of different targets, including government officials, politicians, judges, journalists, humanitarian aid workers, doctors, professors, and those believed to be collaborating with the foreign forces in Iraq.¹⁶

On 17 July, over 98 civilians were killed and approximately 150 people were wounded in an insurgent attack in Baghdad.¹⁷ While elections were planned to take place in January, voters faced an environment of insecurity and turmoil, along with a climate of fear,¹⁸ with a marked increase in violence in the run-up to the elections.¹⁹ This would be a recurring theme over the coming decade, as various actors sought to shape the nature of Iraqi politics through a ‘bullet and ballot box’ strategy. Judicial concerns also increased, particularly in light of anti-terrorism legislation and a broad definition of terrorism, along with the extension of the death penalty to new crimes, such as complicity.²⁰

Discrimination also occurred along ethnic lines, with representatives of particular communities experiencing arbitrary detention amidst allegations that they were ‘terrorists’. Furthermore, Sunnis complained about profiling and victimisation by security forces.²¹ While US treatment of detainees has been well documented, detainees in Iraqi custody were also a serious issue, with incidents connected to the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Defence.²²

As the situation in Iraq deteriorated in 2006, taking on an increasingly violent sectarian dimension, civilians began to be targeted by militias.²³ This action was predominantly undertaken out of reciprocity or a failure to engage with grievances, or a sense of impunity for human rights violations.²⁴ The number of IDPs rose dramatically, with the figure in 2006 standing at 470,094.²⁵ Those displaced faced serious problems, namely, lack of shelters, food assistance, personal safety, access to school, health and other social services and economic resources.²⁶

On 6 April 2005, the Iraqi National Assembly elected Jalal Talabani as President and nominated Nouri al-Maliki as prime minister.²⁷ Shortly after taking office, al-Maliki announced a 24-point plan in an attempt to reconcile the Iraqi state, which included provisions for amnesty, compensation for victims, a review of de-Baathification processes, punishment for war criminals and terrorists and the creation of the Supreme Committee for Dialogue and National Reconciliation. Despite this, during al-Maliki's tenure as prime minister, Iraq descended into a cycle of sectarian violence as long-standing grievances resulted in people turning to militias as the state failed to offer them protection.

The new regime also sought to restrict freedom of expression, both through legislation and harassment.²⁸ Academics and students were also affected, resulting in a number of academics leaving Iraq.²⁹ The judicial process continued to be problematic, with issues to do with overcrowding within the system and a limited capacity to investigate acts of violence across the state.³⁰ Human Rights Watch also documented how the judiciary was obstructed through intimidation, particularly when involved in cases of militia activities.³¹

The execution of Saddam Hussein in December 2006 heightened the suspicion with which many Sunnis viewed the Shi‘a government.³² As sectarian violence rose, the number of displaced people reached 4.4 million, with sectarian identity being cited as a key source of threats to their safety.³³ The failure to respond adequately to the displacement problem would be a recurring theme across the next eight years.³⁴ Tragically, a UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report articulates how Syria had admitted 30,000 Iraqis a month, many of whom would flee fighting in Syria four years later.³⁵

In the aftermath of the 22 February attack on the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, reciprocal attacks on Sunni mosques were carried out.³⁶ Allegations that militia elements had joined the security services increased,³⁷ reducing confidence in state institutions and forcing people to turn to militias in order to ensure their security needs were met. These concerns were furthered by allegations of human rights violations including restrictions on freedom of movement, excessive use of force, theft during raids of private homes, and the demolition of houses.³⁸ Furthermore, the redistribution of ethnic groups to redraw the ethnic balance of a community only served to divide communities further, consolidating sectarian division.³⁹

In addition to the sectarian dimension, militia-driven violence also resulted in the targeting of ethnic minorities,⁴⁰ along with public figures. Reflecting this increase in violence, between March and April, the Medico-Legal Institute in Baghdad issued 2,449 death certificates.⁴¹ The precarious situation would also have a serious impact upon non-governmental organisation (NGO) activity,⁴² resulting in several aid groups being threatened for helping people from different ethno-religious backgrounds.⁴³ Women and children were not exempt from the increasing violence, with honour crimes and kidnapping increasing⁴⁴ and many experiencing harassment and intimidation if they didn't conform to traditional dress codes.⁴⁵ The increase in violence against symbolic targets such as mosques and churches only served to fuel grievances between sects, with reciprocal acts of violence carried out across the state, resulting in many civilian casualties.⁴⁶ The deteriorating security situation also resulted in many changing their name in an effort to avoid associations with particular communities.⁴⁷

From a range of sources, it is clear to see that the al-Maliki regime's control over events in Iraq was at its weakest in 2006–7, as noted earlier with the Sunni insurgency. As militias responded to attacks with their own, civilians were disproportionately affected. On 14 and 15 April, attacks in Karbala and Baghdad left hundreds dead.⁴⁸ Between July and September 2007, some of the deadliest since 2003 took place across Iraq. On 7 July an attack was carried out by what would later become known as vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), as a suicide truck bomb was detonated in Amerli, killing 160,⁴⁹ and on 14 August VBIEDs were used to target the Yazidi community, killing 350 and injuring 400.⁵⁰ As groups retreated into their sects and the militias took on more of a role in protecting communities, more hard-line views on the behaviour of actors within these communities were developed. One consequence of this was a marked increase in gender-based violence, which is grossly under-reported and often remains uninvestigated.⁵¹ Since 2003, the number of reported rape cases has increased, but victims are considered of ‘little value’ and are likely to be killed by their families or subjected to reconciliation with their rapists.⁵² A number of female bodies were found with notes accusing women of adultery or ‘un-Islamic’ conduct, signed by groups operating under the banner of al-Amr bil-Ma'ruf wal-Nahi ‘an al-Munkar (The Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice).⁵³

While the security situation improved in 2008 with a significant drop in violent, high-casualty attacks,⁵⁴ human rights violations remained unaddressed. The position of Iraq's displaced peoples was equally dire, with 2.8 million people displaced internally and a further 2 million abroad, predominantly in Syria and Jordan.⁵⁵ The situation was worsened by 11 of the 18 governorates preventing IDPs from accessing public services and aid and many struggling for work.⁵⁶ The introduction of Order 101 improved the situation for IDPs, allowing them to regain control of their occupied houses. This helped to improve the security situation and allowed almost 150,000 to return home.⁵⁷ One of the main reasons for the improved conditions in Iraq was the ceasefire called for by Muqtada al-Sadr.⁵⁸ Despite this ceasefire, suicide bombings continued to plague Iraq. In the first six months of 2008, suicide bombers in Baghdad, Karbala and Dyala perpetrated 13 attacks.⁵⁹ In the second six months, suicide bombings were combined with the widespread use of IEDs and magnetic bombs.

The fragmentation of the Iraqi state and its loss of control over the periphery during this period is perhaps best seen in Anbar province. Since 2003, Anbar has become a stronghold for resistance against both the occupation and the government, with Sunni militancy, including Al Qaeda, thriving in cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi. Much of this violence had subsided by 2011, with the US-sponsored ‘Awakening’ movement and sufficient Iraqi finances directed towards key tribal leaders, buying a modicum of stability. This was, however, only a temporary fix, as the worsening socio-economic conditions across Iraq invigorated protest movements. Militant organisations, including the 1920 Brigades and ISIS were able to take advantage of the situation, increasing their support base amongst disenchanted Sunnis.

The failure of the al-Maliki government to merge the Awakening movement into the national security infrastructure, coupled with a failure to improve economic conditions on the ground, furthered this opposition. The lack of greater political inclusion only served to fuel the grievances of those in Anbar, leading to increased insecurity, with senior figures such as tribal leaders and security personnel targeted.⁶⁰ Without the support of Baghdad, those who had been given authority by al-Maliki fragmented and dispersed, with several prominent tribal leaders seeking safe havens in Baghdad, Kurdistan, the Emirates or Jordan, furthering the power vacuum. One of the best examples of this is the case of Ahmed Abu Risha, the brother of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, one of the founding members of the Awakening movement. Ahmed Abu Risha now spends most of his time in the Emirates, living off money from businesses established following the influx of money during the Awakening, or Sons of Iraq programme.⁶¹ The deterioration of the security situation across Anbar continued in 2009, where 1,100 members of the ISF were killed, with the majority of the attacks occurring in Mosul, Baghdad and Anbar.⁶²

In the six weeks after the US withdrawal of 30 June, a series of coordinated bomb blasts, seemingly carried out by Sunni insurgents, struck Shi‘a targets including refugees, children, pilgrimages, weddings, funerals and hospitals, killing more than 700 Iraqis.⁶³ More elections were held in March 2010, but the Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice disqualified more than 500 candidates over alleged links to the Baath party.⁶⁴ Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition won 89 of the 325 seats, while Ayaad Allawi's al-Iraqiya list won 91,⁶⁵ yet a coalition was not formed until November and, once more, a political stalemate allowed militias to gain support.⁶⁶

Even five years into al-Maliki's rule, civilians still lacked access to basic humanitarian services and were often denied the right of assembly, freedom of expression and religion, and protection from discrimination.⁶⁷ Armed groups continued to use tactics that deliberately targeted civilians, aimed at cultivating fear amongst the population, with religious festivals and processions increasingly targeted. In addition, militias increasingly resorted to criminal activity to fund their activities, further adding to instability. The overarching conclusion of this appears to stress the Iraqi government's failure to meet its obligation to ensure the security of its people.⁶⁸

These problems re-emerged in the following years. In late March 2012, ISI – the Islamic State of Iraq, a precursor to ISIS – claimed responsibility for a number of suicide attacks that killed 71 people and injured more than 100.⁶⁹ The group also claimed responsibility for a number of other VBIED attacks in predominantly Shi‘a public spaces across 2012.⁷⁰ While the motivations for ISI and Sunni militant attacks are, as argued previously, diverse, including the pursuit of a sectarian agenda, attacks were also carried out against other minority religious and ethnic groups.⁷¹ Across the year, Sunni militias attacked Shi‘a religious festivals, pilgrims and funerals.⁷² An additional motivation, however, was to undermine government credibility, achieved through attacking the police and other facets of state infrastructure.⁷³

State infrastructure was also challenged by the need to provide welfare and security to all those in the state. The escalation of the Syrian conflict had a dramatic impact on Iraq in 2013, when 206,137 people had fled the fighting, mostly to the Kurdistan region.⁷⁴ The impact on public services and local infrastructure was undeniable. Emboldened by the gains made by similar groups in the Syrian conflict,⁷⁵ Al Qaeda affiliated organisations in Iraq carried out nearly daily attacks against civilians.⁷⁶ The intensity of the violence is reflected in the number of civilians killed in 2013, which the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) puts at 7,818 people, and a further 17,981 injured,⁷⁷ making it the deadliest year since 2008.⁷⁸ On 20 May, 46 incidents took place across Iraq, resulting in 102 casualties and 350 wounded. Of the 46, 19 took place in Baghdad alone.⁷⁹

The following year saw elections for local councils across Iraq. Much as in previous years, candidates were targeted in the run-up to council elections, held in April, with 17 candidates killed.⁸⁰ In an effort to shape the outcome of elections, polling stations were also targeted in an attempt to intimidate people from voting, resulting in 11 civilian casualties and 90 injuries.⁸¹ Yet the most seismic event in Iraqi politics that year would take place only four months later. On 14 August, 2014, Nouri al-Maliki announced his resignation, paving the way for Haider al-Abadi to become his successor. Frustrated at the al-Maliki regime's policies and the political stalemates that followed, coupled with concerns at the emergence of ISIS only two months earlier, a change was necessary at the head of Iraqi politics.

One of the first successes of the al-Abadi regime was to create a unity government to fight ISIS, drawing on figures from both Shi‘a and Sunni parties. The results were immediately felt, with some tribal leaders falling into line but also followers of Muqtada al-Sadr also seeming to be in favour of the deal, with some suggesting that al-Abadi could bring about serious political reform.⁸² In the summer of 2015, a year into his term, al-Abadi was able to pass reforms that would reduce tensions across Iraq. Facing power shortages that left some areas with only a few hours of electricity each day and allegations of corruption, al-Abadi was also able to eradicate the quota system that entrenched sectarian divisions within the political system.⁸³

Ultimately though, the reforms enacted by al-Abadi occurred too late. The reciprocal attacks across Iraq post 2003 served to fuel and increase the divisions between community groups across Iraq. The implementation of a representative democracy allowed Iraq's Shi‘a majority to gain power for the first time in Iraq's history but the divisive policies embraced by first al-Maliki then al-Abadi, who, despite his best efforts, has largely been unable to end the reciprocal violence. Many Sunnis found themselves stuck between a state that discriminated against them and seemingly did little to protect them and the militias that conducted violence against them.

[T]he spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by allah's permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.

(Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi)⁸⁴

The emergence of ISIS in the summer of 2014 is undoubtedly a consequence of many of the grievances explored in the preceding chapters, and, while al-Zarqawi's spark is an obvious reference to the 2003 invasion, the previously documented events across Iraq could also be taken to be such a spark. While the policies of al-Maliki prioritised Shi‘a over Sunni and failed to offer protection to Sunnis across the state, meaning that the Iraqi state had failed in its basic responsibility over its people, the roots of the emergence of the group are much deeper. The remainder of the chapter explores the continuation of many of the patterns identified earlier in the chapter. The impact upon people is clearly felt across ISIS-held areas, but also across Iraq broadly, as fear of the group spreads.

In the year since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate, it is estimated that ISIS is responsible for the deaths of 11,303 people with a further 18,627 injured.⁸⁵ Anecdotal reports suggest that a number of these deaths came as a result of civilians refusing to support the group, or its own supporters⁸⁶ refusing to fight. In cultivating a climate of fear across Iraq, ISIS was responsible for systematic killings and abductions, predominantly amongst people who opposed the group, or who posed a threat to it, such as members of ISF, the police, government officials, former members of Sawha, figures of authority from religious or tribal backgrounds, journalists, lawyers and doctors.⁸⁷ Military strategy placed fighters amongst civilians or within civilian areas, which is an infringement on several international laws,⁸⁸ often leaving the area mined when retreating.⁸⁹ The UNAMI/OHCHR (Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights) is also aware of a number of mass killings carried out by ISIS, verified by the discovery of a number of mass graves. By 21 July, the IOM totalled the number of Iraqis displaced internally since the beginning of 2014 at 3,112,914, including some 250,000 from Ramadi since April 2015.⁹⁰ This poses severe challenges for providing shelter and welfare to those displaced. The IOM suggests that 67 per cent are sheltered in private locations,⁹¹ 20 per cent are in dangerous shelters⁹² and 8 per cent in temporary camps.

Attacks were carried out against a wide range of people, but predominantly against individuals from other ethnic and religious backgrounds, notably Christians, Yazidis, Turkmen, Shabk, Kurds, Shi‘a and anti-ISIS Sunnis. This process typically involves the denial of fundamental rights and subjugation to abuse that is aimed at suppressing – and ultimately expelling – non-Sunni Muslims from ISIS-held territory, framed as a requirement to expel infidels from the caliphate. Although Christians are known as ‘people of the book’, which offers them a degree of protection in comparison with other religious groups, they have also been victims of forced displacement and the seizure and destruction of property. In addition, they are expected to convert to Islam. Failure to do so will result in them being subject to taxes, being expelled or killed.⁹³ Shi‘a Muslims are expected to repent for their sins – as apostates – or to face penalties, including death. Other faith communities are expected to convert to Islam or be killed.

This systematic campaign against ethnic and religious minorities has led the UN to accuse ISIS of genocide and war crimes, arguing that this behaviour demonstrates an intent to ‘destroy the Yazidi as a group’.⁹⁴ This allegation is given more credence when delving deeper into ISIS treatment of the Yazidis, where it is estimated that between 3,000 and 3,500 women and children, most of Yazidi descent, remain in ISIS captivity. Those who managed to escape reported gross violations of human rights while in captivity, along with calls to convert to Islam. Those who converted were married to ISIS fighters, and those who refused were subjected to sexual slavery; men who refused to convert were killed.⁹⁵ Furthermore, a UN report reveals eyewitness accounts of how hundreds of Yazidi men over the age of 14 were led to ditches and executed.⁹⁶

The plight of women and children who are captured is especially tragic. They are often subjected to sexual violence while in captivity, with numerous testimonials reporting that ISIS fighters raped girls on a daily basis. A market for the sale of abducted women was created in the al-Quds area of Mosul, where women and girls were evaluated according to their age and beauty. After this, women and girls were given as ‘gifts’, or sold to ISIS fighters. Married women who converted were told that previous marriages were not valid under Islamic law and were given as wives.⁹⁷ A UN General Assembly report outlined how ‘Girls would then be prepared for “marriage” (rape), involving, in some cases, full body searches. Mission investigators met with victims as young as 11 years of age.’⁹⁸ It continues:

The mission obtained credible reports about the rape of young girls, including a 9-year-old and 6-year-old. The former was raped for three days by an ISIL fighter in Tel Qaseb, Ninawa governorate. A witness stated that she could clearly hear the girl being assaulted and screaming out her name for help. The girl told the witness that she was blindfolded, handcuffed, beaten and repeatedly raped. Eventually, her ‘owner’ sold her to another ISIL fighter from the Syrian Arab Republic. In the same house, a 6-year-old girl was raped by another ISIL fighter. A witness heard the child screaming. She was reportedly sold to an ISIL fighter in the Syrian Arab Republic.⁹⁹

After experiencing such horrors, the rise in suicides and attempted suicide is hardly surprising, with survivors displaying ‘visible signs of trauma and depression’.¹⁰⁰

What is immediately clear from these testimonials is that sexual violence is a tactic often used by the group to advance strategic priorities, namely: recruitment; fundraising, achieved through the sale of women and girls, along with ransom payments from families; the enforcement of discipline and order by punishment of dissenters or family members; to advance its ideology.¹⁰¹ The al-Khansaa brigade notes how the most important way that women can aid the ISIS cause is by serving as wives and mothers and by introducing the ISIS ideology as early as possible.¹⁰²

Life in ISIS-held territories is run in accordance with a strict interpretation and implementation of the Shari'a. These laws extend into everyday life, regulating speech, dress and travel. One reason for the number of foreign fighters wishing to join ISIS rather than other Islamist groups in the Syrian conflict is their strict adherence to the Qur'an and Shari'a. Punishments for breaking these laws are harshly enforced, including by torture and death sentences. UNAMI has recorded 165 executions carried out under the orders of 14 ISIS established courts.¹⁰³ These death sentences have resulted in public executions, usually by firing squad and conducted at times of day selected to ensure the highest possible turnout. Those executed included lawyers, doctors and parliamentary candidates, who were individuals with social influence.¹⁰⁴

Socially, men are required to grow beards of a particular length and women are expected to wear the abaya when out in public; they are also expected to be in the company of a related male chaperone. Within the confines of Mosul, civilians are free to move, although a bail system is in place for those wishing to leave. The need for a restriction demonstrates the ISIS leadership's concern at people leaving to join the resistance movement established by the governor of Mosul.¹⁰⁵

It is important to note that, however unpalatable, some in ISIS-held territories are thankful for the group's presence. In Mosul, many had experienced persecution and discrimination along sectarian lines, under officials affiliated to Baghdad. The group has also eradicated crime within its territories, under the threat of draconian punishments. As Patrick Cockburn notes in a prescient work that began documenting the rising Sunni insurgency in Iraq, life in ISIS-held territory before the group seized it was tough for Sunnis, who faced discrimination from Baghdad.¹⁰⁶

The extent of ISIS penetration of everyday life in parts of Iraq can be seen in the story of Omar. Omar lives in Baghdad with his family. He is a former senior intelligence officer who spent over 20 years working for the Ministry of Interior. He views himself as an Iraqi national first and foremost, but is also proud of his Anbar roots. He is a Sunni Muslim but his tribe, most of which is present in the west and south of Iraq, has both Sunni and Shi‘a members. In the summer of 2014, Omar and his teenage son, Ahmed, fled Baghdad following an escalation in Shi‘a militia activity in the vicinity of his neighbourhood. Reminiscent of the sectarian conflict that emerged post-Saddam, the militias had taken tens of Sunni men. With obvious sectarian overtones, such actions by the militias were also related to power and control as they sought to remove past influences or challenges to the new status quo. The militias are sought to target current and former security personnel, particularly those associated with the former Baathist regime, something that Omar was all too aware of. In light of these events, Omar and his son travelled to the west of Anbar where he has family, in Hit and Haditha. While Anbar is almost exclusively Sunni, there are a number of political, tribal and family factions, which have ensured that both uncertainty and issues of trust remain.

While sitting on a minibus waiting to leave Abu Ghraib in west Baghdad, the driver asked if anyone on the bus worked for the security forces as he had heard that groups of armed men had set up checkpoints on the main routes and were actively seeking such personnel.¹⁰⁷ Neither wanting to go the long way around, nor to raise suspicions of his background, Omar remained quiet, trusting no one on the grounds of the fluidity and dynamism of local politics in Anbar. The main road that links Anbar to Baghdad travels through a walled-town called Hit and was under ISIS control. Before reaching Hit, the minibus was stopped by men who identified themselves as Daesh.¹⁰⁸ Upon seeing Omar's identification, which identified him as a former employee of the Ministry of Interior, they asked him to come with them for further questioning. Fearing the worst, Ahmed followed his father.

In the following hours, Omar and Ahmed were driven to a house around 20 km from Hit, whereupon they confiscated Omar's phone and began to ask a series of questions, predominantly to ascertain if he still worked for the government. As is standard practice across the region, the men looked through Omar's phone and called several numbers to test the veracity of his story. At the same time, Ahmed was taken into a separate room to be questioned alone. Ahmed was given two options: the first involved him telling them everything, which would allow him to return to his mother; the second was to say nothing and die with his father. Ahmed's response was nothing but courageous: ‘I have nothing to tell you, but even if I did, how could I return to my mother and look her in the face knowing that I had abandoned my father.’

Following several hours of interrogation, Omar and Ahmed were told they could leave; however, Omar refused and asked if he could stay the night, as it was dark outside and he knew that there would be no transport. While this seems a curious decision, Omar later explained that ‘I know these Wahhabis, I know how they think. If we were to leave there and then, they would be suspicious.’¹⁰⁹ Instead, Omar and Ahmed stayed and ate with the ISIS members, who by this point numbered approximately ten. They were all Iraqi and the several that spoke to Omar directly had ‘northern accents’, identified as potentially being from Mosul. The following morning, Omar and Ahmed left for their destination; however, in the following months, the situation in Anbar deteriorated. Omar and his son eventually returned to Baghdad.

Omar's story sheds a great deal of light on the actions of ISIS across Iraq. Concerned both with the decimation of the ancien régime and the consolidation of its territorial gains, the ISIS security apparatus ensures compliance with al-Baghdadi's rule. While news of the treatment of ethnic minorities, people of other religious denominations and faiths, women, homosexuals and prisoners shows the brutality of the group, the governance of territory – and methods used to ensure compliance – demonstrates the impact upon everyday life across Anbar. Dissent from the religious, ideological view of the group is not tolerated, to the point where identities and symbols are destroyed to pave the way for the expansion of the ISIS view. As part of this process of rewriting history to shape the future, places of religious and cultural significance have been destroyed. Places that are considered to be un-Islamic are typically looted, then destroyed, with artifacts often sold on the black market.¹¹⁰

Of course, as Omar's story highlights, not all in ISIS-controlled territory are complicit in the continuation of ISIS rule, and a number of opposition groups have engaged in acts of resistance against the group. The blog Mosul Eye sought to record life under ISIS and the acts of resistance conducted against the group.¹¹¹ It documented the ISIS-directed destruction of Mosul's heritage, along with the brutality of governance, which appears tantamount to criminal enterprise. It regularly noted the punishments handed out by the group for breaking the law while also detailing the problems with uprisings against ISIS, noting the extent of penetration of everyday life and the climate of fear that has been created.

At the international level, it is important to distinguish between security and the welfare of people. In recent months, the number of people fleeing the Middle East to go to Europe has provoked serious debate, with an outpouring of support for those making the harrowing journey across land and sea. Yet security implications are also emerging from the fragmentation of Iraq and the rise of ISIS. Two serious issues concern the international community: the apparent fragmentation of the Middle Eastern states system, and the number of foreign fighters travelling to the region to join ISIS. In the five years following the Arab Uprisings the chaos emerging from the fragmentation of regime–society relations has drawn in actors from across the region, leaving national identities at the whims of sub- and supra-state identities and, ultimately, challenging the states system.

Adding to this complexity, the recent nuclear deal signed by Iran and the P5+1, comprising the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, has added to the growing tensions across the region. While ISIS has few friends, save some ideological ties to the Wahhabist ulemma in Saudi Arabia, the domestic ramifications of the group's ascendance is hard to ignore. The declaration of wilayats across the region¹¹² and attacks across Egypt and in Kuwait have further divided the region along sectarian grounds. The group has been especially clever in Saudi Arabia, where it has forced the al-Saud into a dilemma over whether to protect the Shi‘a targets of the Eastern Province and, in doing so, stressing a collective identity at the expense of the Wahhabi clerics, or to side with the more hard-line clerics against the Shi‘a.¹¹³ For Western states, however, the main concern is the radicalisation of citizens, who either present a ‘home grown threat’,¹¹⁴ or who travel to Iraq and Syria to become ‘foreign fighters’. The number of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is difficult to ascertain accurately; however, estimates from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) put this figure in the region of 20,000 at the turn 2015, from over 100 nations.¹¹⁵ Of this number, a small yet significant percentage are women.¹¹⁶

While it is clear that there are multifarious factors involved in causing an individual to travel to Iraq and Syria, including an interaction of push and pull factors,¹¹⁷ there are a number of common themes. In particular, to explore the drive to join the group there must be a sense of commonality, a sense of belonging, or, as we have previously discussed, a sense of asabiyya. Yet unlike the asabiyya constructed across a region, this is a sense of asabiyya constructed internationally, via contemporary communication technologies.

Over the course of this chapter, the extent of the Iraqi government's failure to uphold its responsibility to protect peoples living within its borders has been documented. Government after government has failed in its responsibility to protect those people residing within the borders of the state. Ultimately, this failure to protect people and pursue policies that are inclusive rather than exclusionary has forced people to turn elsewhere to ensure that their needs – both welfare and security – are met. The inability to curb the influence of militias and uphold a monopoly of the use of force has meant that divisive politics is inherent within the very fabric of the Iraqi state. Since the emergence of ISIS, it has become clear that attempts have been made to create unity; however, the marginalisation of communities and ensuing persecution has created a cycle of violence that created a fertile breeding ground for ISIS to grow.

Recognising the failure of the Iraqi government to adhere to its obligations, in December 2014 Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein, the UNHCR, made an impassioned plea:

Accountability is of paramount importance to address past and prevent future violations of international law. The Iraqi Government should consider accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and as an immediate step, consider accepting the exercise of the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction with respect to the specific situation facing the country pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute.¹¹⁸

What is clear, given both analysis and al-Hussein's remarks, is that the situation in Iraq cannot be resolved by the Iraqi government alone. The involvement of external actors in shaping the nature of political dynamics across Iraq has escalated the situation beyond Baghdad.

Ultimately, though, it is the people of Iraq that are suffering and this suffering has been a direct consequence of the pursuit of power across the state since its inception. The desire to seize – and hold – power has excluded many and has also led to the abuse of positions of authority. To combat ISIS, an inclusive politics must be designed that gives all groups an input into the running of the state, for the good of Iraq, not for one sect above the other. While al-Abadi's reforms have the capacity to bring people together, it is too early to ascertain the success of such strategies. The illusion of an Iraqi nationalism remains in the minds of the Iraqi people, but this illusion must become a reality, or forever be lost.