Notes
Introduction
1. Dabiq 1, ‘The return of Khalifah’ (5 July 2014).
2. The Sykes–Picot agreement of 1916 enabled the implantation of borders over the geographical Middle East. It was negotiated by the French diplomat François Georges-Picot and Britain's Sir Mark Sykes, with input from Russia. See James Barr, A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011).
3. ‘ISIS – The End of Sykes–Picot’, presented by spokesperson Abu Saffiya from Chile (29 June 2014), www.youtube.com/watch?v=YyM0_sv5h88.
4. G. Wood, ‘What ISIS really wants’ (14 March 2015), www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.
5. Roula Khalaf, ‘Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Isis leader’, Financial Times (4 July 2014), www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ec63d94c-02b0-11e4-a68d-00144feab7de.html#axzz36WPWiRgC.
6. Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B.Tauris, 2013).
7. It is estimated that Shi‘a account for approximately 10–15 per cent of Saudi Arabia's population. Pew Research (7 October 2009), www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/.
8. ‘Saudi refutes UK media claims of “ISIS support”’, Al-Arabiya News (10 July 2014), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/world/2014/07/09/Saudi-Arabia-refutes-UK-media-allegations-of-supporting-ISIS-.html.
9. Patrick Cockburn, ‘Iraq crisis: how Saudi Arabia helped Isis take over the north of the country’, Independent (21 July 2014), www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/iraq-crisis-how-saudi-arabia-helped-isis-take-over-the-north-of-the-country-9602312.html.
10. Madawi Al-Rasheed, ‘The shared history of Saudi Arabia and Isis’ (20 November 2014), www.hurstpublishers.com/the-shared-history-of-saudi-arabia-and-isis/.
11. Simon Mabon, ‘ISIS: sectarianism, geopolitics and strong/weak horses’ (10 April 2015), www.e-ir.info/2015/04/10/isis-sectarianism-geopolitics-and-strongweak-horses/.
12. ‘Profile: Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)’, BBC News (16 June 2014), www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24179084.
13. David Remnick, ‘Going the distance’, New Yorker (27 January 2014), www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-davidremnick.
14. The term cystISIS was created by The Last Leg, a British television comedy show fronted by Adam Hills, in an attempt to use humour as a counter-narrative against the group. The name was also designed to defetishise the group.
15. Matthew Rosenberg and Eric Schmitt, ‘In ISIS strategy, U.S. weighs risk to civilians’, New York Times (19 December 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/12/20/us/politics/in-isis-strategy-us-weighs-risk-to-civilians.html?_r=0.
16. Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan, 2016).
17. Jason Burke, The New Threat from Islamic Militancy (London: Bodley Head, 2015), pp. 57–8.
18. William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (New York: St Martin's Press, 2015).
19. Graeme Wood, ‘What ISIS really wants’, The Atlantic (March 2005), www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.
20. While the book focuses primarily on human interaction, there is also ground within the theory of complexity to apply other attributing factors such as environmental conditions. After all, the development of the Iraq people would be lesser without the water sources provided by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.
21. David Byrne, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: An Introduction (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 50.
Chapter 1 Sovereignty, Political Organisation and the Rise of ISIS
1. Jarrett Murphy, ‘Text of Bush Speech’, CBS News (1 May 2003), www.cbsnews.com/news/text-of-bush-speech-01-05-2003/.
2. The Peace of Westphalia comprised two peace treaties, signed at Munster, between the Holy Roman Empire and France, and at Osnabruck, between the Holy Roman Empire and Sweden.
3. Stephen Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia’, International Security xx/3 (1995–6), pp. 115–51. Although it is worth noting that the Peace of Westphalia is perhaps not as responsible for the development of sovereignty as many would hold. Derek Croxton unpacks how the Peace of Westphalia should not be considered as the foundation of modern understandings of sovereignty ‘on the basis of having [not] granted sovereignty to the individual German estates, because no one believed that it actually did so’. Derek Croxton, ‘The peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the origins of sovereignty’, International History Review, xxi/3, p. 574.
4. Ibid., p. 115.
5. ‘Charter of the United Nations’, www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml.
6. Stephen Krasner, ‘Sharing sovereignty: new institutions for collapsed and failing states’, International Security, xxix/2, p. 87.
7. Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), trans. F. Kelsey (1925).
8. Max Weber, ‘Politik als Beruf’, Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Muenchen, 1921), http://media.pfeiffer.edu/lridener/dss/Weber/polvoc.html.
9. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1947), p. 154.
10. Lisa Anderson, ‘The state in the Middle East and North Africa’, Comparative Politics, xx/1 (1987), p. 2.
11. James Caporaso, ‘Changes in the Westphalian order: territory, public authority, and sovereignty’, International Studies Review, ii/2 (2000).
12. Stephen Krasner, ‘Compromising Westphalia’, p. 119.
13. This is typically what Migdal refers to as a strong society, but a weak state, although there are counter-arguments to this, where rulers have been successful in state-building processes, despite the challenges posed by strong societies. A prime example of this is Saudi Arabia, where, despite the existence of strong tribal networks, the al-Saud dynasty has been able to create a strong state.
14. James Caporaso, ‘Changes in the Westphalian order’.
15. This is a criticism that can be levied at International Relations theory as a whole.
16. CIA: World Fact Book: Syria (21 July 2014), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html.
17. Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B.Tauris, 2013).
18. ‘CIA: World Fact Book, Iraq’ (20 July 2014), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html.
19. Hussein D. Hassan, ‘Iraq: tribal structure, social, and political activities’, CRS Report for Congress (15 March 2007), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/81928.pdf.
20. Derek Harvey and Michael Pregent, ‘Who's to blame for Iraq crisis?’, CNN News (12 June 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/12/opinion/pregent-harvey-northern-iraq-collapse/?c=&page=0.
21. Suadad Al-Salhy and Tim Arango, ‘Iraq militants, pushing south, aim at capital’, New York Times (11 June 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/world/middleeast/iraq.html?_r=1.
22. According to some Arab sources, al-Batawi's early release was coordinated by Saudi intelligence. For example see http://faceiraq.com/inews.php?id=229533.
23. Quoted in Ruth Sherlock, ‘Islamic Army of Iraq founder: Isis and Sunni Islamists will march on Baghdad’, Telegraph (20 June 2014), www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10914567/Islamic-Army-of-Iraq-founder-Isis-and-Sunni-Islamists-will-march-on-Baghdad.html.
24. Daniel Dombey, ‘Iraq crisis: Turkey's Erdogan warns on air strikes against ISIS’, Financial Times (19 June 2014), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae101292-f7b0-11e3-90fa-00144feabdc0.html#axzz38Yh5ieU7.
25. Osama Al-Sharif, ‘Jordan shaken by threats from ISIS, Iraq, Syria’, Al-Monitor (25 June 2014), www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/jordan-isis-anbar-iraq-salafi-jihadist-maan.html#ixzz36a4HAX2R.
26. For a detailed analysis of this situation see Nir Rosen, Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed of America's Wars in the Muslim World (New York: Perseus Books, 2010).
27. Franklin Lamb, ‘ISIS now recruiting in Palestinian camps in Lebanon’, Foreign Policy Journal (30 June 2014), www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/06/30/isis-now-recruiting-in-palestinian-camps-in-lebanon/.
28. Asmaa al-Ghoul, ‘Gaza Salafists pledge allegiance to ISIS’, Al-Monitor (27 February 2014), www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2014/02/isis-gaza-salafist-jihadist-qaeda-hamas.html#.
29. Ibid.
30. Jack Moore, ‘Gaza crisis: Isis pledge to join the Palestinian fight against “barbaric Jews’, International Business Times (31 July 2014), www.ibtimes.co.uk/gaza-crisis-isis-pledge-join-palestinian-fight-against-barbaric-jews-1459190.
31. It is estimated that 1,000 fighters are on the full payroll of al-Baghdadi's organisation, receiving between US$300 and US$2,000 per month (See Paul Crompton, ‘Can ISIS maintain its self-declared caliphate?’, Al-Arabiya News (16 July 2014), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/analysis/2014/07/16/Can-ISIS-maintain-its-self-declared-caliphate-.html). As it continues to grow, though, it is likely that this number has more than quadrupled.
32. Quoting Channel 2 news in Israel Arutz Sheva, ‘ISIS: fighting “infidels” takes precedence over fighting Israel’ (8 July 2014), www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/182632#.U7uLApSSw00.
Chapter 2 Political Organisation and the State in Iraq
1. Angus McNeice, ‘Police launch investigation into Chilean–Norwegian jihadist in Syria’, Santiago Times (3 February 2014), http://santiagotimes.cl/police-launch-investigation-chilean-norwegian-jihadist-syria/.
2. ‘The End of Sykes–Picot’ (28 June 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i357G1HuFcI.
3. Dabiq 1.
4. Extrapolating from this, many have also rejected the application of universal claims inherent within International Relations theory, arguing that the discipline needs to develop non-Western strands to reflect diversity and subjectivity.
5. Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 13.
6. Toby Dodge, ‘Can Iraq be saved?’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 56:5 (2014), pp. 7–20.
7. Dodge, Inventing Iraq, p. 13.
8. A full exploration of the application of bare life to the case of Iraq is beyond the scope of this work; however, the concept helps to elucidate the marginalisation and persecution experienced by various actors across the history of the Iraqi state. See Georgio Agamben, Homer Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
9. See Dodge, Inventing Iraq, and ‘Can Iraq be saved?’; Charles Tripp, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History from Independence to Occupation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) amongst others.
10. Peter M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent: 1516–1922 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 250–1.
11. See Amal Vinogradov, ‘The 1920 revolt in Iraq reconsidered: the role of tribes in national politics’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 3:2 (1972).
12. Ibid. See also Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 40–5.
13. Kristian Coates-Ulrichsen, ‘The British occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914–1922’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 30:2 (2007), p. 350.
14. Ibid., pp. 351–2.
15. Gertrude Bell, quoted in Vinogradov, The 1920 Revolt in Iraq Reconsidered, p. 135.
16. Vinogradov, The 1920 Revolt.
17. Arnold T. Wilson, Mesopotamia, 1917–1920: A Clash of Loyalties (London: H. Milford, 1931), pp. 273–6.
18. Elie Kedouri, ‘Reflexions sur l'histoire du Royaume d'Irak (1921–1958)’, Orient, 11:3 (1959), pp. 55–79.
19. Fariq al-Mizhar al-Fir'aun, al-Haqa'iq al Nasi'a (Baghdad, 1952).
20. Vinograd, The 1920 Revolt, p. 125.
21. Aylmer Haldane, The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920 (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1922), p. 331.
22. Dodge, Inventing Iraq, pp. 20–1.
23. Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 47.
24. Ibid., p. 48.
25. T.E. Lawrence, ‘Faisal's Table Talk’, report to Colonel Wilson, 8 January 1917, FO 686/6, p. 121. Faisal's remarks are also quoted in Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in Iraq (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 25–6.
26. Adeed Dawisha, ‘National identity and sub-state sectarian loyalties in Iraq’, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 4:3 (2010).
27. Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History, p. 72.
28. The state-building process in Saudi Arabia was facilitated by the Ikhwan, but their power was curtailed by Ibn Saud in 1930 after an ill-fated rebellion.
29. Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 48–50.
30. This strategy of questioning the loyalty of Shi‘a groups across the region has long been a prominent feature of states with sectarian fault lines.
31. See, Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History, p. 245, and Tripp, A History of Iraq.
32. Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 75.
33. Ibid., pp. 81–2.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid., p. 100.
36. Charles Issawi and Muhammed Yeganeh, The Economies of Middle Eastern Oil (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 143–7.
37. Amatzia Baram, ‘Neo-tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's tribal policies 1991–96’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 29:1 (1997) p. 3.
38. Adeed Dawisha, ‘Identity and political survival in Saddam's Iraq’, Middle East Journal, 53:4 (1999), p. 554.
39. Baram, ‘Neo-tribalism in Iraq’, p. 1.
40. Ibid.
41. Dawisha, ‘Identity and political survival’, p. 563.
42. Hanna Batatu, ‘Iraq's underground Shi‘i movements’ (MER102, 1981), www.merip.org/mer/mer102/iraqs-underground-shii-movements.
43. Soren Schmidt, ‘The role of religion in politics: the case of Shia-Islamism in Iraq’, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, xxii/2 (2009), p. 129.
44. L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
45. Soren Schmidt, ‘The role of religion in politics’, p. 137.
46. Judith Yaphe, ‘Tribalism in Iraq, the old and the new’, Middle East Policy vii/3 (2000), p. 54.
47. Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979).
48. James Quinlivan, ‘Coup-proofing: its practice and consequences in the Middle East’, International Security, xxiv/2 (1999), p. 133.
49. Ibid.
50. Simon Mabon, ‘Kingdom in crisis’, Contemporary Security Policy, xxxiii/3 (2012).
51. Quinlivan, ‘Coup-proofing’, pp. 139–40.
52. See Joost R. Hilterman, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
53. In the aftermath of the new constitution and reflecting a pragmatic shift in policy, the group's name would change to ISCI.
54. Other notable groups established at this time with Iranian assistance include Hizballah and the International Front for the Liberation of Bahrain.
55. Schmidt, ‘The role of religion in politics’, p. 128.
56. Amatzia Baram, ‘The radical Shi‘ite opposition movements in Iraq,’ in Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman (eds), Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 108–9.
57. Al Thawra (Baghdad), 18 September 1980, quoted in Dawisha, Iraq: A Political History, p. 554.
58. Although weapons were supplied to Saddam Hussein by Western states in an attempt to contain Iran. See Joost Hilterman, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
59. The name of this conflict is contestable, with others referring to it as, for example, the Persian Gulf War, the Kuwait War and the First Iraq War.
60. Lawrence E. Cline, ‘The prospects of the Shia insurgency movement in Iraq’, Journal of Conflict Studies, xx/1 (2000).
61. Human Rights Watch, ‘Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath’ (1992), www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm.
62. Ibid.
63. ‘Full text: State of the Union address’ (30 January 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1790537.stm.
64. ‘Text of Bush Speech’ (1 May 2003), www.cbsnews.com/news/text-of-bush-speech-01-05-2003/.
65. Mark Thompson, ‘Seeking a legacy, Bush cites security’ (12 January 2009), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1871060,00.html.
66. United Nations Security Council, ‘Resolution 1511’ (2003), https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Invo/resolutions/res1511.pdf.
67. Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 280.
68. Al-Khoei was a member of one of the most prominent Shi‘a families and was a leading figure in the Iraqi exile community. His obituary in the Guardian is here: Michael Wood, Abdul Majud al-Khoei (12 April 2003), www.theguardian.com/news/2003/apr/12/guardianobituaries.iraq.
69. John Chilcot, The Iraq Inquiry, Volume 8 (2016), p. 8.
70. Ibid., p. 14.
71. ‘Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1: De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society’ (2003), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB418/docs/9a%20-%20Coalition%20Provisional%20Authority%20Order%20No%201%20-%205-16-03.pdf.
72. ‘Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities’ (2003), www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf.
73. Ibid.
74. Tripp, A History of Iraq, p. 282.
75. Chilcot, The Iraq Inquiry, Volume 8, p. 23.
76. Christopher M. Blanchard, ‘Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology’ (CRS Report for Congress, 2007), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf, p. 7.
77. Martin Chulov, ‘Isis: the inside story’, Guardian (11 December 2014), www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story.
78. Nicholas Krohley, ‘Opportunity in chaos: how Iraq's Medhi Army almost succeeded – and why it matters’, Foreign Affairs (26 September 2015), accessed 11 December 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2015-08-26/opportunity-chaos.
79. 09RIYADH447_a COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER BRENNAN'S MEETING WITH SAUDI KING ABDULLAH (22.03.14), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RIYADH447_a.html.
80. Triggered by the self immolation of the Tunisian street vendor, Mohammad Bouazizzi, whose frustration at socio-economic conditions across the country, coupled with the perceived corruption of the Ben Ali regime, pushed him to such drastic action. This act proved to be the catalyst for the fragmentation of regime–society relations across the Middle East. Previously embedded autocratic rulers were also overthrown in Egypt and Yemen while protest movements gained momentum in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain. The fragmenting of regime–society relations opened schisms for external actors to manipulate. This is perhaps best seen in Syria, with Saudi Arabia and Iran capitalising on the fragmentation of regime–society relations to pursue their own interests in the state. As noted in Chapter 5, the Saudi–Iranian rivalry is increasingly seen in zero-sum terms, but always at the expense of those caught in the fighting.
81. Anderson and Stansfield, The Future of Iraq, p. 118.
82. Haider Al-Abadi, ‘We have heard the Iraqi people’, Wall Street Journal (8 September 2015), www.wsj.com/articles/we-have-heard-the-iraqi-people-1441754816.
83. Dodge, ‘Can Iraq be saved?’, p. 16.
84. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President and First Lady on the End of the War in Iraq’ (14 December 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/14/remarks-president-and-first-lady-end-war-iraq.
Chapter 3 The Sectarian House of Cards?
1. Some suggest that the Shi‘a comprise around 60 per cent of the Iraqi population.
2. Roy Wallis, Sectarianism: Analyses of Religious and Non-religious Sects (London: Peter Owen, 1975), p. 9.
3. Lawrence Potter, Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2013), p. 2.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
5. Jacqueine Ismael and Tareq Ismael, ‘The sectarian state in Iraq and the new political class’, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, iv/3 (2010), p. 340.
6. Fanar Haddad, ‘Sectarian relations in Arab Iraq: contextualising the civil war of 2006–2007’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, xl/2 (2013), p. 118.
7. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983), pp. 6–7.
8. Darryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2003), p. 64.
9. Khalil Osman, Sectarianism in Iraq: The Making of State and Nation since 1920 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), p. 2.
10. Ismael and Ismael, ‘The sectarian state in Iraq’, p. 341.
11. Justin Gengler, ‘Understanding sectarianism in the Persian Gulf’, in Potter, Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, p. 64.
12. Adham Saouli, ‘Syria's predicament: state (de-) formation and international rivalries’, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (15 December 2014), www.iai.it/pdf/Sharaka/Sharaka_RP_10.pdf and Steve Bruce, Politics and Religion (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).
13. See Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B.Tauris, 2013).
14. Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
15. See Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran.
16. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran–Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order (London: Oxford University Press for IISS, 1996), p. 9.
17. Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran.
18. Ibid.
19. Con Coughlin, Khomeini's Ghost (London: Macmillan, 2009), p. 274.
20. New York Times, ‘Excerpts from Khomeini speeches’ (4 August 1987), www.nytimes.com/1987/08/04/world/excerpts-from-khomeini-speeches.html.
21. Simon Mabon, ‘FPC briefing: constructing sectarianisms’ (2014), http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/1614.pdf.
22. ‘Israel warns Hizbullah war would invite destruction’, Reuters (10 March 2008), www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3604893,00.html.
23. Frederick Wehrey et al., ‘Saudi–Iranian Relations since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy’ (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2009), pp. 81–2.
24. ‘French weapons arrive in Lebanon in $3 billion Saudi-funded deal’, Reuters (20 April 2015), www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/20/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-army-idUSKBN0NB0GI20150420.
25. Simon Mabon, ‘The battle for Bahrain’, Middle East Policy, ix/2 (2012).
26. This was predominantly a legacy of the failed coup d'état in 1981, orchestrated by the International Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB). The IFLB received both ideological and logistical support from actors in Iran. For an in-depth study of this see Hasan T. Alhasan, ‘The role of Iran in the failed coup of 1981: the IFLB in Bahrain’, Middle East Journal, lxv/4 (2011), pp. 603–17.
27. Robert Smith, ‘UK Ambassador Accuses Iran, Gulf Digital News’ (25 March 2013), www.gulf-daily-news.com/NewsDetails.aspx?storyid=350071.
28. 06RIYADH9175_a SAUDI MOI HEAD SAYS IF U.S. LEAVES IRAQ, SAUDI ARABIA WILL STAND WITH SUNNIS (26 December 2006), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06RIYADH9175_a.html.
29. Ibid.
30. As reflected in the abandonment of the Arabian Gulf Games in 2013, over a dispute over the name of the body of water.
31. A misleading assumption that a number of scholars and practitioners adhere to.
32. As noted in Chapter 2, many of these assumptions are inaccurate.
33. Fanar Haddad, ‘Sectarian relations in Arab Iraq: contextualising the civil war of 2006–2007’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, xl/2 (2013), pp. 115–38, p. 2.
34. Dodge, Inventing Iraq.
35. Namely family, tribe and sect.
36. International Crisis Group, ‘The next Iraq War? Sectarianism and civil conflict’, Middle East Report, No. 52 (2006), www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/52_the_next_iraqi_war_sectarianism_and_civil_conflict.pdf.
37. Known as Tandhim al-Qa'ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayan.
38. For a detailed breakdown of this, see International Crisis Group, ‘The next Iraq War?’.
39. Mariam Fam, ‘Militias growing in power in Iraq’ (7 November 2005), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/07/AR2005110700977_pf.html.
40. International Crisis Group, ‘The next Iraq War?’.
41. International Crisis Group interview with a prominent Iraqi human rights activist
42. International Crisis Group interview with a young Sunni.
43. International Crisis Group, ‘Make or Break: Iraq's Sunnis and the State, Middle East Report’, No. 144 (2013), www.crisisgroup.org/∼/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/144-make-or-break-iraq-s-sunnis-and-the-state.pdf.
44. Ibid., p. i.
45. Sabrina Tavernise and Andrew W. Lehren, ‘Detainees fared worse in Iraqi hands, logs say’, New York Times (22 October 2010), www.nytimes.com/2010/10/23/world/middleeast/23detainees.html?_r=0.
46. Andrew Wander, ‘Left to die in jail’, Al Jazeera (24 October 2010), www.aljazeera.com/secretiraqfiles/2010/10/20101022163052530756.html.
47. Perhaps a pseudonym.
48. 05BAGHDAD2547 ISLAMIC HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION ALLEGES IRAQI FORCES DETAINEE ABUSE IN NINEWA (16 June 2005), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05BAGHDAD2547_a.html.
49. Ahmed S. Hashim, ‘Military power and state formation in modern Iraq’, Middle East Policy, x/4 (2003), p. 29.
50. James Quinlivin, ‘Coup-proofing: its practice and consequences in the Middle East’, International Security, xxiv/2 (1999), pp. 131–65.
51. Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2.
52. Thom Shanker and Edward Wong, ‘US troops in Iraq shifting to advisory roles’, New York Times (5 December 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/world/middleeast/05strategy.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0.
53. James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton (co-chairs), Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Vintage Books, 2006).
54. Edward Wong, ‘U.S. faces latest trouble with Iraqi forces: loyalty’, New York Times (6 March 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/03/06/world/americas/06iht-military.html?pagewanted=all.
55. ‘Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 91: Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias within Iraq’ (2004), www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040607_CPAORD91_Regulation_of_Armed_Forces_and_Militias_within_Iraq.pdf.
56. Jeremy M. Sharp, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences’ (Congressional Research Service Report, 2005), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22093.pdf.
57. Walter Pincus, ‘US military urging Iraq to rein in guard force’, Washington Post (25 December 2006), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/24/AR2006122400551.html.
58. Sharp, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: The Challenge of Sectarian and Ethnic Influences’.
59. Iraq Study Group Report, December 2006.
60. Although young, at 29 when the invasion took place, al-Sadr had a great deal of influence across Iraq, in part because his grandfather had been Grand Ayatollah until 1999, when he was assassinated by Saddam Hussein. See Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr and the Fall of Iraq (London: Faber and Faber, 2005).
61. Also known as the Badr Brigades.
62. Greg Bruno, ‘Badr vs. Sadr in Iraq’, council on foreign relations (31 March 2008), www.cfr.org/iraq/badr-vs-sadr-iraq/p15839.
63. 05BAGHDAD3015_a BUILDING A HOUSE ON SHIFTING SANDS – IRAN'S INFLUENCE IN IRAQ'S CENTER-SOUTH (20 July 2005), https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05BAGHDAD3015_a.html.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Veleyat-e Faqih – Regency of the Jurist – is the system of government developed by Ruhollah Khomeini, to rule in the absence of the 12th Imam. See 05BAGHDAD3015_a.
67. 08BAGHDAD239_a “THE STREET IS STRONGER THAN PARLIAMENT:” SADRIST VOWS OPPOSITION TO LTSR (27 January 2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD239_a.html.
68. 08BAGHDAD1105_a SADRIST CONFIDANTE WARNS OF BAD PRESSURE BUILDING WITHIN SADRIST MOVEMENT (9 April 2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD1105_a.html.
69. Ibid.
70. 08BAGHDAD239_a “THE STREET IS STRONGER THAN PARLIAMENT:” SADRIST VOWS OPPOSITION TO LTSR (27 January 2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD239_a.html.
71. 08BAGHDAD1027_a DAWA PARTY OFFICIAL ON BASRAH OPERATION AND UIA-SADR NEGOTIATIONS IN IRAN (3 April 2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD1027_a.html.
72. Ibid.
73. 08BAGHDAD2812_a KARBALA: IRAN EXERTS HEAVY INFLUENCE THROUGH TOURISM INDUSTRY (2 August 2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD2812_a.html.
74. Ibid.
75. 08BAGHDAD239_a.
76. Ibid.
77. 10BAGHDAD22_a IRAQI VIEWS ON EVENTS IN IRAN AND IMPACT ON IRAQ (5 January 2010), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10BAGHDAD22_a.html.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. 06HILLAH54_a FORMER NAJAF GOVERNOR ON AL-SADR, IRANIAN INFLUENCE (5 April 2006), https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06HILLAH54_a.html.
81. Ibid.
82. 08BAGHDAD3994_a (C) PRT SALAH AD DIN: IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN SAMARRA (21 December 2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD3994_a.html.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. 08BAGHADA1416_a SOUTHERN POLITICS AS USUAL: IRAN'S PLAN FOR IRAQI ELECTIONS (6 May 2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD1416_a.html.
86. Iran faces serious (yet differing) challenges to its territorial integrity, from both secessionist and irredentist groups located predominantly on the periphery of the state, including from Arabs, Azeris, Baluchis, Kurds, Lors and Turkmen.
87. 09BAGHDAD289_a IRAQ-IRAN DIPLOMACY A SIGN OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE OR IRAQI RESOLVE? (4 February 2009), https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BAGHDAD289_a.html.
88. Ibid.
89. 08BAGHDAD3655_a KARBALA, IRAN DUEL OVER PILGRIMS (19 November 2008), https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08BAGHDAD3655_a.html.
90. Mohamad Bazzi, ‘The Sistani factor’, Boston Review (12 August 2014), accessed 13 August 2015, http://bostonreview.net/world/mohamad-bazzi-sistani-factor-isis-shiism-iraq.
91. The strict Wahhabist ideology that underpinned the actions of the group held Shi‘a Muslims to be apostates.
92. Ibid.
Chapter 4 Tribalism and the State
1. Ronald J. Brown, Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991: With Marines in Operation (CreateSpace, 1995).
2. Nawzad Mahmoud, ‘Kurdish tribe fights IS alone in disputed area’, Rudaw News (20 September 2014), http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/200920141.
3. Abdulaziz Alheis, ‘The tribe and democracy: the case of monarchist Iraq (1921–1958)’, Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies (July 2011), http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/get/6c1fffaa-1a6a-4602-8ddb-1bbc348a394c.pdf, p.16.
4. Amatzia Baram, ‘Neo-tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's tribal policies 1991–96’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, xxix/1 (1997), p. 4.
5. Following marriage, a female will normally take her husband's family name, thus becoming part of that lineage.
6. See Hussein D. Hassan, ‘Iraq: tribal structure, social, and political activities’, Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress (US) (15 March 2007), p. 2; and Hosham Dawood, ‘The “state-ization” of the tribe and the tribalization of the state: the case of Iraq’, in Faleh Jabar and Hosham Dawood (eds), Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2003), pp. 115–16.
7. For a more detailed breakdown see Hussein, ‘Iraq: tribal structure, social, and political activities’.
8. For a more detailed historical overview of Iraq's Shi‘a tribes see Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi‘is of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
9. Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (Princeton Classics Abridged, April 2015).
10. Faleh A. Jabar, ‘Shaykhs and ideologues: detribalization and retribalization in Iraq, 1968–1998’, Middle East Report, No. 215 (Middle East Research and Information Project, Inc., Summer 2000).
11. Lawrence E. Cline, ‘The prospects of the Shia insurgency movement in Iraq’, Journal of Conflict Studies, xx/2 (2000), https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/4311/4924#a26.
12. Ibid.
13. Judith Yaphe, ‘Tribalism in Iraq, the old and the new’, Middle East Policy, vii/3, pp. 51–8 (June 2000), p. 51.
14. Jabar, ‘Shaykhs and ideologues’, p. 29.
15. Jabar, ‘Shaykhs and ideologues’, referred to this in two main patterns: 1. ‘Statist’ tribalism, where symbols and lineage are integrated into a weaker state to strengthen government; and 2. ‘social’ tribalism, which normally develops following a reduction in the state's capacity to control urban societal restlessness, leading to the devolving of power to tribal areas via tax collection and judicial powers.
16. Baram, ‘Neo-tribalism in Iraq’, p. 4.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 8.
19. Ibid., pp. 20–1.
20. Jabar ‘Shaykhs and ideologues’, p. 48.
21. Austin Long, ‘The Anbar Awakening’, Survival, l/2, pp. 67–94, pp. 82–3.
22. David Ucko, ‘Militias, tribes and insurgents: the challenge of political reintegration in Iraq’, Conflict, Security & Development, viii/3, pp. 341–73 (2008), p. 352, DOI: 10.1080/14678800802358171.
23. Ibid.
24. Long, ‘The Anbar Awakening’, p. 87.
25. For a useful example of this situation, see R. Stewart, The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq (Mariner Books, 2007 reprint). In this book, Stewart lays out his own experience as a governor in the southern province of Maysan.
26. Dahr Jamail and Ali al-Fadhily, ‘Southern tribes add to Iraqi resistance’, Inter Service Press (19 January 2007), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/37369.html.
27. Information obtained from Control Risks Iraq, Liaison and Analysis, 24 September 2015.
28. John A. McCary, ‘The Anbar Awakening: an alliance of incentives’, Washington Quarterly, 32:1 (2009), pp. 43–59, p. 52.
29. Hala Jaber, ‘Sunni leader killed for joining ceasefire talks’, Sunday Times (6 February 2006), www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/article204068.ece.
30. This was taken from an interview with a senior member of the Albu Fahad tribe in Baghdad, during October 2015.
31. The Albu Fahad tribe also had members in Babil and areas north of Baghdad.
32. See Bill Roggio, ‘The Sunni Awakening’, Long War Journal (3 May 2007), www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/05/the_sunni_awakening.php.
33. Joel Wing, ‘Anbar before and after the Awakening Pt. IX: Sheikh Sabah Aziz of the Albu Mahal’ (23 January 2014), http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/01/anbar-before-and-after-awakening-pt-ix.html.
34. The Albu Nimr tribe were supported by former Anbar governor Fasal al-Gaoud of the Albu Nimr tribe.
35. There is some confusion regarding the timeframes for the emergence of Kataib al-Hamza. For Austin Long, ‘The Anbar Awakening’, p. 78, it was in 2006 after the Desert Protectors, while J.A. McCary, ‘The Anbar Awakening’, pp. 48, suggests the Desert Protectors were formed after Kataib al-Hamza.
36. For a useful insight into US dealings with Sheikh Sattar al-Rishawi, see William Doyle, A Soldier's Dream: Captain Travis Patriquin and the Awakening of Iraq (New York: New American Library, 2012).
37. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Sterling Jensen, ‘The role of Iraqi tribes after the Islamic state's ascendance’, Military Review (July–August, 2015), www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/The_Role_of_Iraqi_Tribes_After_the_Islamic_States_Ascendance.pdf.
38. B. Dehghanpisheh and E. Thomas, ‘Scions of the surge’, Newsweek (14 March 2008).
39. This interview was conducted with John Harris in Baghdad on 20 November 2015.
40. Roberto J. González, ‘On “tribes” and bribes: “Iraq tribal study”, al-Anbar's awakening, and social science’, Focaal: European Journal of Anthropology, liii (2009), pp. 105–16.
41. Mark Wilbanks and Efraim Karsh, ‘How the “Sons of Iraq” stabilized Iraq’, Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2010), pp. 57–70, p. 68.
42. This interview was conducted with a private contractor within the security sector in Iraq.
43. Liz Sly, ‘Iraq plans to cut Sunni fighters’ salaries’, Chicago Tribune (3 November 2008), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2008-11-03/news/0811020469_1_awakening-leader-sunni-awakening-awakening-members.
44. Wilbanks and Karsh, ‘How the sons of Iraq stabilized Iraq’, p. 68.
45. Stephen Wicken, ‘Iraq's Sunnis in crisis’, Middle East Security Report 11 (May 2013), www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Wicken-Sunni-In-Iraq.pdf, p. 15.
46. Kirk H. Sowell, ‘Iraq's second Sunni insurgency’ (9 August 2014), www.hudson.org/research/10505-iraq-s-second-sunni-insurgency.
47. Sheikh Ali Hatem al-Suleimeni was evicted from his offices in Baghdad by soldiers, under orders from al-Maliki in 2011. He even coerced Ali Hatem's uncle, Majid, back from Jordan, in an attempt to undermine Ali Hatem. See Ned Parker and Sulieman al-Khalidi, ‘Special Report: The doubt at the heart of Iraq's Sunni revolution’ (4 August 2014), www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/04/us-iraq-security-alisuleiman-specialrepo-idUSKBN0G40OP20140804#VYx8KRGOttjQPHXe.97.
48. Adam Schreck and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, ‘Iraq: new protests break out in Sunni stronghold’, Associated Press (26 December 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/iraq-protests-break-sunni-stronghold-184403534.html.
49. Wicken, ‘Iraq's Sunnis in crisis’, p. 29.
50. ‘Iraqi Sunni protest clashes in Hawija leave many dead’, BBC (23 April 2013), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22261422.
51. Wicken, ‘Iraq's Sunnis in crisis’, p. 31.
52. See ‘Statement No. 35 on the events in Hawija, Ramadi’, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NxXYi3GCjIA.
53. Ammar Karim and Salam Faraj, ‘Maliki's remedy for Iraq sectarian violence: overhaul of security strategy’, Middle East Online (20 May 2013), www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=58868.
54. This was obtained from an interview with a member of the Albu Khalaf tribe, in Baghdad in October 2015.
55. Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel, ‘A marriage of convenience: the many faces of Iraq's Sunni insurgency’, Terrorism Monitor, xii/15 (25 July 2014), p. 5.
56. Kirk H. Sowell, ‘Maliki's Anbar blunder’, Foreign Policy (15 January 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/15/malikis-anbar-blunder/?wp_login_redirect=0.
57. Mohammed Khamis on 30 April 2015 was targeting polling stations set up to support a local political rival to his uncle, the Defence Minister Sadoun al-Dulaymi. See Hawar Berwani, ‘Abu Risha's nephew closes electoral center by force in Ramadi’, Iraqi News (30 April 2014), www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/abu-risha-s-nephew-closes-electoral-center-by-force-in-ramadi/.
58. Ben Hubbard, ‘Sunni tribesmen say ISIS exacts brutal revenge’, New York Times (30 October 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/world/middleeast/sunni-tribesmen-say-isis-exacts-brutal-revenge.html?_r=0.
59. Eli Lake, ‘The rise and fall of America's favorite Iraqi sheik’, Bloomberg (7 June 2011), www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-11/the-rise-and-fall-of-america-s-favorite-iraqi-sheik.
60. Interview conducted in Baghdad, 24 August 2015.
61. Liz Sly, ‘Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq’, Washington Post (3 February 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html.
62. Interview conducted via translator and mobile telephone, 20 July 2015.
63. This interview was carried out with a senior aid worker of a reputable organisation, in Baghdad, in June 2015.
64. This information was obtained via an intermediary translator, and relative of the police officer in Haditha.
65. This information was the result of a conversation with two members of the Albu Khalaf tribe in Baghdad, 28 November 2015.
66. This interview was conducted in Baghdad, 23 November 2015.
Chapter 5 The Roots of Sunni Militancy and its Enduring Threat in Iraq
1. This interview was conducted with a former senior intelligence officer based in Baghdad, 15 September 2015. His name has been changed to protect his identity.
2. Siobhan Gorman, Nour Malas and Matt Bradley, ‘Brutal efficiency: the secret to Islamic State's success’, Wall Street Journal (3 September 2014), www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-to-the-success-of-islamic-state-1409709762.
3. Ahmed Hashim, Iraq's Sunni Insurgency (London: Routledge – Adelphi Paper Series, 2009), pp. 30–1.
4. Denise Natali, ‘The Islamic State's Baathist roots’, Al-Monitor (24 April 2015), www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/baathists-behind-the-islamic-state.html#.
5. See Sonia Alianak, Middle Eastern Leaders and Islam: A Precarious Equilibrium (Bern: Peter Lang Publishers, 2007), pp. 119–21.
6. ‘Saddam Hussein's speech’, Guardian (8 August 2002), www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/08/iraq3.
7. This interview was conducted in Karrada, Baghdad, on 11 November 2015.
8. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, ‘Violence in Iraq’, Rubin Center; Research in International Affairs (14 November 2012), www.rubincenter.org/2012/11/violence-in-iraq/.
9. Anthony Cordesman, ‘Iraq's Sunni insurgents: looking beyond Al Qa'ida’, Center for Strategic and International Studies (16 July 2007), www.social-sciences-and-humanities.com/PDF/sunni_insurgents.pdf, p. 4.
10. Johnathan Schanzer, ‘Ansar al-Islam: back in Iraq’, Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2004), www.meforum.org/579/ansar-al-islam-back-in-iraq, pp. 41–50.
11. This information was gained from an interview with the two former military officers, in Karrada, Baghdad, on 11 November 2015.
12. Michael Howard, ‘Militant Kurds training al-Qaida fighters’, Guardian (23 August 2002), www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/23/alqaida.iraq1.
13. Evan Kohlman, ‘Ansar al-Sunnah acknowledges relationship with Ansar al-Islam, reverts to using Ansar al-Islam name’, Counter Terrorism Blog (16 December 2007), http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/12/ansar_alsunnah_acknowledges_re.php.
14. Kathryn Gregory, ‘Ansar al-Islam (Iraq, Islamists/Kurdish Separatists), Ansar al-Sunnah’, The Council on Foreign Relations (5 November 2008), accessed 9 December 2015, www.cfr.org/iraq/ansar-al-islam-iraq-islamistskurdish-separatists-ansar-al-sunnah/p9237.
15. Cordesman, ‘Iraq's Sunni insurgents’.
16. See Evan F. Kohlmann, ‘State of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq: August 2007’, The NEFA Foundation (August 2007), p. 16.
17. ‘Al Qaeda in Iraq tightening economic grip on Mosul’, Al Bawaba (3 May 2011), www.albawaba.com/main-headlines/al-qaeda-iraq-tightening-economic-grip-mosul.
18. Huthaifa Azzam fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. He fell out with Zarqawi over the latter's targeting of Jordanian civilians.
19. Anne Weaver, ‘The short, violent life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’, The Atlantic (July–August 2006), www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/.
20. Kohlman, ‘Ansar al-Sunnah acknowledges relationship’.
21. Bill Roggio, ‘Islamic Army of Iraq splits from al Qaeda’, Long War Journal (12 April 2007), www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/04/islamic_army_of_iraq.php.
22. Muhammad Rumman, ‘The politics of Sunni armed groups in Iraq’, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (18 August 2008), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=20836.
23. Taken from Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, ‘Violence in Iraq’, MERIA Journal, xvi/03 (14 November 2012), www.rubincenter.org/2012/11/violence-in-iraq/.
24. Anthony Shadid, ‘In Iraq, chaos feared as U.S. closes prison, ex-inmates reanimate Sunni, Shiite militias’, Washington Post Foreign Service (22 March 2009), www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/21/AR2009032102255_pf.html.
25. Siobhan Gorman, Nour Malas and Matt Bradley, ‘Brutal efficiency: the secret to Islamic State's success’, Wall Street Journal (3 September 2014), www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-to-the-success-of-islamic-state-1409709762.
26. This interview was conducted in Erbil in February 2015. The former intelligence officer was one of 60 former security experts selected by the government of Iraq to help re-establish its intelligence network in 2007.
27. Ibid.
28. Andrew Thompson and Jeremi Surioct, ‘How America helped ISIS’, New York Times (2 October 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/opinion/how-america-helped-isis.html?_r=0.
29. Gorman, Malas and Bradley, ‘Brutal efficiency’.
30. Former head of Saudi intelligence Prince Bandar provided support to Jaish al-Islam, a group led by Syrian Salafi Zahran Alloush, the son of a Saudi-based cleric. See I. Black, ‘Syria crisis: Saudi Arabia to spend millions to train new rebel force’, Guardian (7 November 2013), www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/07/syria-crisis-saudi-arabia-spend-millions-new-rebel-force.
31. Hassan Hassan, ‘Isis: a portrait of the menace that is sweeping my homeland’, Guardian (16 August 2014), www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/16/isis-salafi-menace-jihadist-homeland-syria.
32. Liz Sly, ‘Al-Qaeda disavows any ties with radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq’, Washington Post (3 February 2014), accessed 28 November 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/al-qaeda-disavows-any-ties-with-radical-islamist-isis-group-in-syria-iraq/2014/02/03/2c9afc3a-8cef-11e3-98ab-fe5228217bd1_story.html.
33. Haian Dukhan and Sinan Hawat, ‘The Islamic State and the Arab tribes in Eastern Syria’, E-International Relations (31 December 2014), www.e-ir.info/2014/12/31/the-islamic-state-and-the-arab-tribes-in-eastern-syria/.
34. This information was obtained through email correspondence with Stephen McGrory on 29 November 2015.
35. ‘Islamic State oil trade “worth more than $500m”’, BBC News (11 December 2015), www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35070204.
36. Erika Solomon, Robin Kwong and Steven Bernard, ‘Inside Isis Inc: the journey of a barrel of oil’, Financial Times (11 December 2015), http://ig.ft.com/sites/2015/isis-oil/.
37. ‘Islamic State monthly revenue totals $80 million, IHS says’, IHS Press (7 December 2015), http://press.ihs.com/press-release/aerospace-defense-security/islamic-state-monthly-revenue-totals-80-million-ihs-says.
38. As noted in Chapter 3, the killing of unarmed protestors in Hawija triggered a reaction from within the Sunni communities. However, following al-Maliki's loss of seats in the local elections, he leaned even further towards the hard-line Shi‘a bloc in order to reinforce his own position.
39. ‘Bare-faced killer rises to fore of Iraq militancy’, Agence France-Presse – Gulf Times (28 August 2013), www.gulf-times.com/story/364086/Bare-faced-killer-rises-to-fore-of-Iraq-militancy.
40. This interview was carried out in Baghdad in October 2015 with an associate of Shakir Waheeb's family, who had recently fled the al-Madhaiq area following heavy fighting between ISIS-aligned militants and government-aligned security forces.
41. The establishment of local military councils across Iraq, including Mosul (Ninawah), Dhuluiya and Sharqat (Salahaddin), Abu Ghraib (Anbar), Baghdad and in other towns in Kirkuk and Diyala, provided support for the GMCIR. In Jordan, during July 2014, many of these factions also assembled to discuss the direction of the insurgency.
42. Nicolas A. Heras, ‘The tribal component of Iraq's Sunni rebellion: the General Military Council for Iraqi revolutionaries’, Terrorism Monitor, xii/13 (26 June 2014), www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue13_01.pdf, p. 4.
43. Hassan Hassan, ‘Maliki's alienation of Sunni actors is at the heart of ISIS's success in Iraq’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (17 June 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=55930.
44. Bashdar Pusho Ismaeel, ‘A marriage of convenience: the many faces of Iraq's Sunni insurgency’, Terrorism Monitor, xii/15 (25 July 2014), www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TerrorismMonitorVol12Issue15_01.pdf, p. 5.
45. Sinan Adnan and Aaron Reese, ‘Iraq's Sunni insurgency’, Middle East Security Report (24 October 2014), www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Sunni%20Insurgency%20in%20Iraq.pdf, p. 16.
46. Hawar Berwani, ‘Gunmen in Fallujah form Military Council, reject Anbar initiative’, Iraq News (11 February 2014), www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/gunmen-in-fallujah-form-military-council-reject-anbar-initiative/.
47. Ruth Sherlock and Carol Malouf, ‘Islamic Army of Iraq founder: Isis and Sunni Islamists will march on Baghdad’, Telegraph (20 June 2015), www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10914567/Islamic-Army-of-Iraq-founder-Isis-and-Sunni-Islamists-will-march-on-Baghdad.html.
48. Ibid.
49. Heras, ‘The tribal component of Iraq's Sunni rebellion’.
50. Hassan, ‘Maliki's alienation of Sunni actors’.
51. Louisa Loveluck, ‘Isil releases new video of 2014 Speicher massacre of Shi‘a army recruits’, Telegraph (12 July 2015), www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11734606/Isil-releases-new-video-of-2014-Speicher-massacre-of-Shi'a-army-recruits.html.
52. Ben Hubbard, ‘Sunni tribesmen say ISIS exacts brutal revenge’, New York Times (30 October 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/world/middleeast/sunni-tribesmen-say-isis-exacts-brutal-revenge.html?_r=0.
53. Adnan and Reese, ‘Beyond the Islamic State’.
54. Abdallah Suleiman Ali, ‘IS disciplines some emirs to avoid losing base’, Al-Monitor (2 September 2014), www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/09/is-takfiri-caliphate.html#ixzz3xlwgdeNZ.
55. ‘Ansar al-Islam’, Stanford University (2 October 2015), http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/13#note39.
56. ‘35 abducted from Ansar al-Islam and the Naqshbandi southwest of Kirkuk’, Voice of Iraq (1 December 2015), www.sotaliraq.com/newsitem.php?id=308852#ixzz3xh7niWYs.
57. This interview was conducted in Erbil in February 2015.
58. Ned Parker, ‘Divided Iraq has two spy agencies’, Los Angeles Times (15 April 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/15/world/fg-intel15. For more detail on Shahwani, see Global Security, Iraqi National Intelligence Service, www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/inis.htm.
59. Sherwan Waili, a Shi‘a and a former Iraqi army brigadier arrested by Saddam's forces following the 1991 uprising, led the MSNS in the beginning. The network consists mainly of Shi‘a pro-Iranian members.
60. ‘An uncertain future for Iraq's intelligence services’, Stratfor (11 January 2012), https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/uncertain-future-iraqs-intelligence-services.
61. Mustafa Al-Kadhimi, ‘Overhauling Iraq's intelligence services’, Al-Monitor (15 June 2015), www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/iraq-security-intelligence-services-quota-terrorists.html#.
62. Andreas Kreig, ‘ISIS success in Iraq: a testamony to failed security sector reform’, Centre for Security Governance: Security Sector Reform Resource Centre (22 July 2014), www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2014/07/22/isis-success-in-iraq-a-testimony-to-failed-security-sector-reform/.
63. ‘Learning from Iraq: A final report from the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction’, SIGIR (March 2013), www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2013/sigir-learning-from-iraq.pdf, p. 93.
64. SIGIR, Quarterly report to the United States Congress (30 April 2008), p. 99.
65. Interview conducted in Baghdad, 11 December 2015.
66. ‘Abadi to purge Iraq's interior ministry of Maliki supporters’, Al-Araby al-Jadeed (17 November 2014), www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2014/11/17/abadi-to-purge-iraqs-interior-ministry-of-maliki-supporters.
67. Suadad Al-Salhy, ‘How Iraq's “ghost soldiers” helped ISIL: discovering 50,000 ghost soldiers in the army forced Iraq to rebuild their troops to face ISIL’, Al Jazeera (11 December 2014), www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/12/how-iraq-ghost-soldiers-helped-isil-201412107 2749979252.html.
68. Ibid.
69. Interview carried out in Baghdad, 7 November 2015.
70. Benjamin Bahney, Patrick. B. Johnston and Patrick Ryan, ‘The enemy you know and the ally you don't’, Foreign Policy (23 June 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/23/the-enemy-you-know-and-the-ally-you-dont-arm-sunni-militias-iraq/.
71. Al-Nujaifi's political manoeuvrings and accusations of his corruption led to his dismissal as Ninawa governor in May 2015. Exiled, Nujaifi has since sought refuge in the Kurdistan region under the protection of President Masoud Barzani.
72. Ruth Sherlock and Carol Malouf, ‘Mosul governor calls for fragmentation of Iraq’, Telegraph (12 June 2014), accessed 16 November 2015, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10895792/Mosul-governor-calls-for-fragmentation-of-Iraq.html.
73. This information was obtained via a family source of the security force members, in Baghdad on 28 October 2015.
74. AAH split from Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) in 2006.
75. ‘Absolute impunity: militia rule in Iraq’, Amnesty International (2014), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/absolute_impunity_iraq_report.pdf.
76. This became something of a normal process for the families of the fallen, particularly observed in Basra province.
77. Data obtained from Control Risks Group, Iraq, 15 March 2015, information processed by A. Atkinson, S. Royle and J. Harris. The graph indicates the number of incidents in Babil province between July 2014 and February 2015. The thickness of the line denotes the actual number of a particular type of attack relative to the number of incidents in total.
78. It is important to note that since the end of Shi‘a militia activity against the occupation, IEDs have become associated with Sunni militancy and account for the majority of attacks in the country, with civilians being the primary target.
79. Although we cannot ascertain the exact religion of the victims, we do know that a majority of Sunni militant attacks target civilians in Shi‘a, mixed and densely populated areas.
80. Data obtained from Control Risks Group, Iraq, 22 March 2015, information processed by A. Atkinson, S. Royle and J. Harris. Using open sources and Control Risks’ sources, Graph 2 shows the data for attack targets and estimated casualty numbers during the period July 2014 to February 2015. The thickness of the line denotes the number of a particular target casualty relative to the number of attacks in total. Casualty numbers are based on open source reports, and although their accuracy is difficult to verify, it is likely that there are many more casualties and incidents that have not been reported or accounted for. There are also likely to be cases where civilians have been recorded as militants and vice versa. Nevertheless, the data offers an indication of continued violence against civilians in Babil.
81. From the end of 2014, the city was officially renamed Jurf al-Nasr, translated as ‘Victory Banks’, following government-militia security operations. For the purpose of consistency, this book will refer to it as Jurf al-Sakhar (Rocky Bank).
82. Ahmed Rasheed and Ned Parker, ‘Shiʽite militias expand influence, redraw map in central Iraq’, Reuters (31 December 2014), www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/31/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-idUSKBN0K909K20141231.
83. W.G. Dunlop, ‘Iraq area retaken, but destruction and anger remain’, Associated Free Press (9 November 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/iraq-area-retaken-destruction-anger-remain-113132316.html.
84. Kashmira Gander, ‘Isis car bomb kills more than 100 including children during Eid celebrations in the Iraqi town of Khan Bani Saad’, Independent (17 July 2015), www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/car-bomb-kills-at-least-80-including-children-in-iraqi-town-of-khan-bani-saad-10398064.html.
85. Data obtained from Control Risks Group, Iraq, 15 March 2015, information processed by S. Royle. The graph indicates the number of incidents in Babil province between August 2014 and June 2015. The thickness of the line denotes the actual number of a particular type of attack relative to the number of incidents in total.
86. ‘Iraq: militias escalate abuses, possibly war crimes killings, kidnappings, forced evictions’, Human Rights Watch (15 February 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/15/iraq-militias-escalate-abuses-possibly-war-crimes.
87. This interview was conducted on mobile telephone via a translator. The interviewee was with family in Salahaddin province at the time.
88. This information was provided by a local police officer in Diyala, on a mobile telephone via a translator.
89. Erin Cunningham, ‘Sectarian violence besets key province in Iraq after an Islamic State attack’, Washington Post (18 January 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/sectarian-violence-hits-key-iraqi-province-after-islamic-state-attack/2016/01/18/b2e674e6-bd7a-11e5-98c8-7fab78677d51_story.html?tid=ss_tw.
90. This information was obtained from a police officer working in Amiriyat al-Fallujah in Anbar province, via translator and mobile phone on 12 April 2015.
91. This interview was conducted with a journalist of Sunni Arab origin in Baghdad, on 4 December 2015. At the time of publication, the journalist wished to remain anonymous.
92. Kurdish forces are primarily made up of Peshmerga soldiers from both KDP and PUK factions, and other Kurdish militia, which in several cases such as Sinjar included the more extremist PKK.
93. ‘Iraqi Kurdistan: Arabs displaced, cordoned off, detained’, Human Rights Watch (25 February 2015), accessed 6 November 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/25/iraqi-kurdistan-arabs-displaced-cordoned-detained.
94. ‘Iraq: banished and dispossessed: forced displacement and deliberate destruction in Northern Iraq’, Amnesty International (20 January 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/3229/2016/en/.
95. Yazidis are of monotheistic faith and while they have been referred to as Christian in the media, they are of a stand-alone faith particular to the region and Ninawa province.
96. Mohammed A. Salih, ‘With the Islamic State gone from Sinjar, Kurdish groups battle for control’, Al-Monitor (10 December 2015), www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/iraq-kurdistan-sinjar-liberated-isis-hegemony.html#ixzz3yRNmvwGi.
97. Ben Kesling and Ali A. Nabhan, ‘Recaptured Iraqi city of Sinjar offers window on Islamic State's destruction’, Wall Street Journal (15 November 2015), www.wsj.com/articles/recaptured-iraqi-city-of-sinjar-offers-window-on-islamic-states-destruction-1447621010.
98. Amnesty International (20 January 2016), p. 44, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/3229/2016/en/.
99. Kesling and Nabhan, ‘Recaptured Iraqi city of Sinjar offers window on Islamic State's destruction’.
100. Adnan Abu Zeed, ‘Arab–Kurd conflict heats up after Tuz Khormato incidents’, Al-Monitor (8 December 2015), www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/iraq-kurdistan-region-tuz-khormato-arabs-kurds-conflict.html#ixzz3yGHJz18s.
Chapter 6 The Human Tragedy
1. Ibn Khaldoun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 39.
2. This raises serious questions about the extent to which Iraq can be viewed as a functioning sovereign state, a question that this book has been engaging with.
3. The structural theme is holistic in nature, encompassing political, judicial and security. It builds upon a definition of structural violence provided by Johan Galtung, who defines it as the ‘avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs’, ranging across social, economic and political spheres. Victims of structural violence become increasingly marginalised from political life, resulting, in the case of many across Iraq, in what Georgio Agamben has termed ‘bare life’.
4. The names of all interviewees have been changed to protect them.
5. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2004’ (2005), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/wr2005.pdf.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. The use of torture in extracting confessions became a common theme across the following decade.
10. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 November–31 December 2005)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/Nov-Dec05_en.pdf.
11. US Department of State, ‘Iraq: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’ (2006), www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61689.htm.
12. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report 1’.
13. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2005 (2006)’, www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k6/wr2006.pdf.
14. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report’ (1 November–31 December 2005)’.
15. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2005’.
16. Ibid.
17. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 July–31 August 2005)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/Jul-Aug05_en.pdf.
18. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2005’.
19. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 November–31 December 2005)’.
20. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 September–31 October 2005)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/Sep-Oct05_en.pdf.
21. Ibid.
22. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2005’.
23. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2006 (2007)’, www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k7/wr2007master.pdf.
24. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 November–31 December 2006)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/sept-october06.pdf.
25. Ibid.
26. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 September–31 October 2005)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/Sep-Oct05_en.pdf.
27. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2006’.
28. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 January–28 February 2006)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/Jan-Feb06_en.pdf.
29. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 May–30 June 2006)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/May-June06-new_en.pdf.
30. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 March–30 April 2006)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/Mar-Apr06_en.pdf.
31. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 May–30 June 2006)’.
32. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2007 (2008)’, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k8/pdfs/wr2k8_web.pdf.
33. Ibid.
34. For more information see UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 April–30 June 2007)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/HRReportAprJun2007EN.pdf p. 18.
35. For more information on the restrictions see ibid., p. 17.
36. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 January–28 February 2006)’.
37. Which are reported as being increasingly corrupted.
38. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 January–28 February 2006)’.
39. Ibid. Most Shi‘a Arabs fled central governorates such as Baghdad, Anbar and Salah Al-Din towards the southern governorates of Najaf, Qadissya, Wasit and Karbala, while Sunnis moved towards Baghdad, Diyala and Anbar. For more information, UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 May–30 June 2006)’, pp. 12–13.
40. The Sabean-Mandeans community received increasing threats to convert to Islam or be killed, and they decreased from 13,500 people in 2001 to approximately 4,000 people in 2006. For more information, see UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 September–30 October 2006)’, pp. 13–14. Christians were targeted after Pope Benedict XVI's controversial remarks on Islam of 12 September. For more information see ibid., pp. 12–13.
41. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 March–30 April 2006)’.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. According to the Iraqi Penal Code, ‘honour’ constitutes an attenuating factor, and even if men are found guilty of ‘honour killing’ their jail time is restricted to a period of three years. These crimes are infrequently reported and judges often sympathize with the accused. For more information see UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 July–31 August 2006)’, pp. 10–11.
45. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 January–28 February 2006)’.
46. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
47. Ibid. This was done predominantly as a consequence of the rising number of extra-judicial executions targeting people on the basis of their name, stressing the rising sectarian violence across the state and the failure of the state to protect its citizens. For more information, see Edward Wong, ‘To stay alive, Iraqis change their names’, New York Times (6 September 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/world/middleeast/06identity.html?ref=familiesandfamilylife&_r=0 and Peter Beaumont, ‘Sunnis change names to avoid Shia death squads’, Guardian (10 October 2006), www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/10/iraq.peterbeaumont. This will be a recurring theme over the coming years. Examples of this can be found here: Wassim Bassem, ‘From Omar to Hussain: Why Iraqis are changing their names’, Al Monitor (17 June 2015), www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/iraq-sectarian-killing-name-changing.html#; and Amir al-Obaidi, ‘Surrendering to sectarianism: Iraq's Sunnis change their names’, Al-Araby (8 May 2015), www.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/2015/5/8/surrendering-to-sectarianism-iraqs-sunnis-change-their-names.
48. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 April–30 June 2007)’.
49. For the specifics of each attack, see UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 July–31 December 2007)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/double_quarterly_1july-31dec2007_engl.pdf, pp. 8–9.
50. Ibid. UNHCR estimates that 525 houses were destroyed and more than 2,000 houses were damaged, leaving hundreds homeless, 400 orphaned and 100 widowed.
51. Ibid.
52. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 April–30 June 2007)’.
53. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 July–31 December 2006)’.
54. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 January–30 June 2008)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_Human_Rights_Report_January_June_2008_EN.pdf.
55. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2008 (2009)’, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf.
56. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 January–30 June 2008)’.
57. National Legislative Bodies National Authorities, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister's Order 101/S of 2008 (property)’ (3 August 2008), www.refworld.org/docid/49da18482.html.
58. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2008’.
59. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, January–June 2008.
60. Ibid.
61. Eli Lake, ‘The rise and fall of America's favorite Iraqi sheik’, Bloomberg (11 June 2015), www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-11/the-rise-and-fall-of-america-s-favorite-iraqi-sheik.
62. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 July–31 December 2009)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_Human_Rights_Report16_July_December_2009_EN.pdf.
63. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2009 (2010)’, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2010.pdf.
64. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2010 (2011)’, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/wr2011_book_complete.pdf. For more information on the banning of the candidates see: BBC, ‘Iraqi election commission bans 500 candidates’ (15 January 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8461275.stm. An analysis of the elections can be found here: Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraq's 2010 National Elections: A Human Rights Platform for Candidates’ (25 February 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/02/25/iraqs-2010-national-elections.
65. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2010’.
66. Ibid.
67. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, ‘Human Rights Report (1 January–31 December 2010)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_HR%20Report_1Aug11_en.pdf.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid. For more information see: ‘Al Qaeda claims responsibility for Iraq's Tikrit attack’, Reuters (2 September 2011), www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/02/us-iraq-violence-qaeda-idUSTRE7310R520110402.
70. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 January–31 December 2011)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/IraqUNAMI-OHCHR_HR_Report2011_en.pdf. On the same day, 17 armed groups (predominantly Sunni) announced they were resuming their jihad against the Government of Iraq.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid. This included the targeting of individual clerics; see p. 23.
73. Ibid.
74. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 July–31 December 2011)’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/HRO_July-December2013Report_en.pdf.
75. See Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (London: Hurst: 2015).
76. Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report: Events of 2013 (2014)’, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2014_web_0.pdf.
77. Details of the attacks targeting civilians in the last six months of the year can be found at UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 July–31 December 2013)’, pp. 20–1.
78. Ibid.
79. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report (1 January–30 June 2013)’, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/HRO_Human%20Rights%20Report%20January%20-%20June%202013_FINAL_ENG_15Dec2013%20%282%29.pdf.
80. Ibid. The majority of the attacks targeted candidates of the al-Iraqiya bloc or its affiliates, but Shi‘a political parties were targeted as well.
81. Ibid.
82. Martin Chulov, ‘Iraq “doomed” if new prime minister Abadi fails to bridge sectarian divide’, Guardian (15 August 2014), www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/15/iraq-doomed-if-prime-minister-fails-unite-factions-haidar-al-abadi.
83. BBC News, ‘Iraq reforms: parliament backs PM Haider al-Abadi's plan’ (11 August 2015), www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33861080. See also Omar Al-Jawoshy and Tim Arango, ‘Premier Haider al-Abadi, facing protests, proposes Iraqi government overhaul’, New York Times (9 August 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/world/middleeast/iraqs-premier-facing-protests-proposes-government-overhaul.html; and Nour Malas and Safa Majeed, ‘Iraq cabinet approves sweeping overhaul to political system’, Wall Street Journal (9 September 2015), www.wsj.com/articles/iraq-cabinet-approves-sweeping-reforms-to-political-system-1439133137.
84. Dabiq 1.
85. For a month-by-month breakdown of casualty figures, see United Nations Iraq, Civilian Casualties, www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=itemlist&layout=category&task=category&id=159&Itemid=633&lang=en.
86. It is important to note the problems with using the term supporter. Following the declaration of the caliphate, al-Baghdadi sought to portray unity and coherence amongst those living in the territory. Yet while many may agree with – and support – the ISIS ideology and use of violence, in a form of active support, others may be more passive in their support. Moreover, we cannot remove the threat of violence from such calculations. Clearly, gauging the nature of this support is problematic, methodologically, but we need to avoid a homogenised view of those living in ISIS-controlled territory. As Brandon M. Boylan argues, we must consider the interaction of the ‘behavioural (active and passive) and induced (enticed and coerced) continuums of support’. See Brandon M. Boylan, ‘Sponsoring violence: a typology of constituent support for terrorist organisations’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, xxxviii/8 (2015), p. 653.
87. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014–30 April 2015’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_4th_POCReport-11Dec2014-30April2015.pdf.
88. For a comprehensive overview of broken laws, see chapters 1–4 of Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf.
89. Wherein actors are in breach of Rule 83. At the end of active hostilities, a party to the conflict which has used landmines must remove or otherwise render them harmless to civilians, or facilitate their removal (Volume II, Chapter 29, Section C). See International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule83.
90. United Nations Iraq, ‘Iraq displacement passes 3.1 Million’ (21 August 2015), www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=4082:iraq-displacement-passes-3-1-million&Itemid=605&lang=en.
91. Predominantly in rented housing, with host families and in hotels.
92. Unfinished buildings, religious buildings and schools. Of course, much like the above, questions emerge about the financing of such projects.
93. United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Iraq in the light of abuses committed by the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups’, Security Council Report (27 March 2015), www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_hrc_28_18.pdf.
94. Nick Cumming-Bruce, ‘United Nations investigators accuse ISIS of genocide over attacks on Yazidis’, New York Times (19 March 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/world/middleeast/isis-genocide-yazidis-iraq-un-panel.html.
95. UNAMI, ‘Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014–30 April 2015’.
96. Cumming-Bruce, ‘United Nations investigators’.
97. Colum Lynch, ‘Women and children for sale’, Foreign Policy (2 October 2014), http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/02/women-and-children-for-sale/?wp_login_redirect=0.
98. United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council, Security Council Report.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. UNAMI, ‘Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014–30 April 2015’.
102. Ibid.
103. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 September–10 December 2014’, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_Sep_Dec_2014.pdf, p. 6.
104. Ibid.
105. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 September–31 December 2014)’.
106. Patrick Cockburn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (London: Verso, 2014).
107. While evidence has emerged suggesting that ISIS membership includes former Baathists from the military, this desire to capture former party members is both symbolic and an attempt to further destabilise the current government.
108. Here, Omar chose to use the derogatory Arabic slang-term for ISIS.
109. Again, Omar chose his words carefully, reflecting the perceived parallels with the religion of Saudi Arabia and its influence in Iraq.
110. UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, ‘Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 11 December 2014–30 April 2015’. See also Robert Fisk, ‘ISIS profits from destruction of antiquities by selling relics to dealers – and then blowing up the buildings they come from to conceal the evidence of looting’, Independent (20 September 2015), www.independent.co.uk/voices/isis-profits-from-destruction-of-antiquities-by-selling-relics-to-dealers-and-then-blowing-up-the-10483421.html.
111. See Mosul Eye, https://mosuleye.wordpress.com and https://www.facebook.com/Mosul-Eye-552514844870022/?fref=ts.
112. A wilayat is an administrative division or province; in this context, they are areas that have pledged allegiance to ISIS.
113. Aaron Y. Zelin, ‘The Islamic State's Saudi chess match’, Washington Institute (2 June 2015), www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-islamic-states-saudi-chess-match.
114. For instance, the 7/7 bombers in London.
115. Peter R. Neumann, ‘Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s’, ICSR (26 January 2015), http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/.
116. Erin Marie Saltman and Melanie Smith, ‘“Till martyrdom do us part”: gender and the ISIS phenomenon’, The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2015), http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf.
117. Ibid.
118. UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report (1 September–31 December 2014)’.
Conclusions
1. Patrick Wintour and Ewen MacAskill, ‘UK foreign secretary: US decision on Iraqi army led to rise of ISIS’, Guardian (7 July 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/07/uk-foreign-secretary-us-decision-iraqi-army-rise-isis-philip-hammond.
2. Ibid.
3. Nicholas Watt, ‘Tony Blair makes qualified apology for Iraq war ahead of Chilcot report’, Guardian (25 October 2015), www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/oct/25/tony-blair-sorry-iraq-war-mistakes-admits-conflict-role-in-rise-of-isis.
4. Ibid.
5. Wassim Bassem, ‘When conflict arises, these Iraqis go to the madeef’, Al-Monitor (30 October 2015), www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/10/iraq-madeef-tribes-host-disputes-politicans.html#ixzz3q5TJkME8.
6. Dabiq 1.
7. Baiji oil refinery in the north of Salahaddin province (and north of Tikrit) draws oil from the fields in its surrounding areas. However, control of the facility has exchanged hands between ISIS and the government on several occasions, and now it lies in a dilapidated state.
8. The gas field is situated close to Qaim, near the Syrian border, an area of particular insecurity.
9. The World Bank, ‘US$1.2 billion to support Iraq amid challenging economic situation’ (17 December 2015), www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/17/support-iraq-amid-challenging-economic-situation.
10. For further understanding of chaos theory or chaotic systems, see Boris Hasselblatt and Anatole Katok, A First Course in Dynamics: With a Panorama of Recent Developments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
11. Russia Today, ‘Evidence reveals Turkish regime affair with ISIS as global threat – Iraqi militia to RT’ (25 December 2015), https://www.rt.com/news/327052-iraqi-militia-isis-turkey/.
12. Agence France Presse in the Guardian, ‘Turkish troops move out of northern Iraq after Obama appeal for calm’ (20 December 2015), www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/20/turkish-troops-move-out-of-northern-iraq-after-obama-appeal-for-calm.
13. Ahmed Rasheed and Stephen Kalin, ‘Iraq blames Iran after thousands of pilgrims storm border crossing’, Reuters (30 November 2015), www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-iran-pilgrims-idUSKBN0TJ2RQ20151130.
14. See Ali Khedery, ‘Iran's Shiite militias Are running amok in Iraq’, Foreign Policy (19 February 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/19/irans-shiite-militias-are-running-amok-in-iraq/.
15. Guy Taylor, ‘Nouri al-Maliki undermines U.S. interests in Iraq, plots return to power’, Washington Times (15 June 2015), www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/15/nouri-al-maliki-undermines-us-interests-in-iraq-pl/?page=all.
16. See Renad Mansour, ‘The popularity of the Hashd in Iraq’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1 February 2016), http://carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=62638.
17. Militia involvement in criminal activity across Iraq is an ongoing issue that is gaining attention. Both Sunni and Shi'a communities are targeted, particularly in Baghdad where focus on the war with ISIS has reduced local security levels. For example, see Omar al-Jaffal, ‘Who's to blame for recent kidnappings in Iraq?’, Al-Monitor (29 January 2016), www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/01/iraq-wave-abductions-foreigners-accusations.html#ixzz3z6R3KGgZ.
18. For a more detailed understanding of management and complexity theory, see R.J. Stacey, Managing the Unknowable: The Strategic Boundaries Between Order and Chaos (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1992).