Vv

vanitas: vanity. See superbia under septem peccata mortalia.

variae lectiones: variant readings; specifically, variant readings in the several ancient codices of Scripture that led to debate concerning the infallibility of the scriptural Word. The orthodox, Lutheran and Reformed, generally argued that the meaning of the original can be recovered by careful collation of texts. In the second half of the seventeenth century, the argument was developed that inconsistencies occurred only in the copies, or apographa (q.v.), and not in the now-lost originals, or autographa (q.v.), of Scripture.

velle gratiam: to will or to wish for grace; also velle accipere gratiam: to will or wish to accept or receive grace; a characteristic of fully actualized faith in the individual. See actus fidei; fides.

velle malum: willing evil to be done; specifically, in the sense of permitted evil (see non-impeditio peccati; permissio efficax). The scholastics make a distinction between velle malum, willing evil to be done, which can be said of God, particularly in terms of the divine concursus (q.v.), which willingly permits the evil acts of finite agents; and male velle, evil willing, which wills to accomplish what God has forbidden, an activity that cannot be predicated of God.

velleitas (or velle): willingness; thus (1) the condition of having a capability of willing or the ability of a spiritual being to act without exterior compulsion; or (2) a general willingness or nonefficacious openness of will to the occurrence of something, as distinct from an actual or efficacious willing. See arbitrium; voluntas.

veracitas: truthfulness; veracitas Dei: the truthfulness of God, an attribute of God; the divine truthfulness is the ground on which all the promises of God and all the truths of revelation rest. Since God is infinite both in intellect and will, he can lack no knowledge and fail in none of his decrees. His promises are therefore sure, and his truthfulness incapable of fault. See veritas.

verba institutionis: words of institution. See verbum institutionis.

Verbum agraphon (ἄγραφον): the unwritten Word. See Verbum Dei.

Verbum Dei: Word of God; as distinguished by the Protestant orthodox, there are four basic and interrelated meanings of the term Verbum Dei: (1) the eternal Word of God, the Second Person of the Trinity, the Son; (2) the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ, the divine-human Mediator of salvation; (3) the inspired Word of the Holy Scripture, which is the wisdom of God given in a form accessible to human beings but nonetheless grounded in the eternal Word and Wisdom of God, God the Son, and historically focused on Christ the Word incarnate; (4) the internal Word of the Spirit, or testimonium internum Spiritus Sancti (q.v.), the Verbum internum, which testifies to the human heart concerning the truth of the written or external Word (verbum externum). The Protestant scholastics further distinguish the Verbum externum into the Verbum agraphon (q.v.), or unwritten Word, spoken by God to the prophets and apostles, and the Verbum engraphon (q.v.), the written or inscripturated Word produced by the human authors of Scripture under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. This latter distinction is crucial to the Protestant theological argument that the church does not precede and guarantee the Scriptures but rather that ecclesia nata est ex Dei Verbo, the church is born of the Word of God. In historical fact, there has always been a people of God before the written Word, or Verbum engraphon; but the concept of an unwritten Word, or Verbum agraphon, which constitutes both the call of the people and the basis of the written Word, argues for the priority of Word over church. The concept also takes into account the centuries recounted in Genesis before any written Scripture, during which the Word of God called and led the people of God. These sets of distinctions appear throughout the period of orthodoxy in both Lutheran and Reformed systems. See amanuenses; authoritas Scripturae; Scriptura Sacra; traditio; viva vox.

Verbum engraphon (ἔγγραφον): written Word. See Verbum Dei.

Verbum externum: external Word. See Verbum Dei.

verbum institutionis: word of institution; or verba institutionis: words of institution; also verbum consecratorium: word of consecration; i.e., the words recited in the institution or consecration of the sacrament, indicating both the establishment (institutio, q.v.) of the sacrament by Christ and the setting aside of the elements (consecratio, q.v.) from a common to a sacred use. The Protestant orthodox will also speak of the verbum concionale, or word of explanation, and sometimes the verbum sacramentale seu concionale et praedicatum, the sacramental word of explanation and preaching, indicating the clear setting forth of the biblical words of institution for the edification of the congregation. The Reformed, whose doctrine of the Lord’s Supper (see coena Domini) speaks of a spiritual rather than a bodily presence of Christ, sometimes tend away from the language of consecratio and use terms like verbum promissionis, word of promise, and verbum ordinationis, word of ordination. Protestant scholastics often also use the plural, words of institution, verba institutionis, etc. See Nihil habet rationem sacramenti extra usum a Christo institutum.

Verbum internum: internal Word. See Verbum Dei.

verbum mentis: literally, word of the mind; i.e., a concept.

verbum visibile: visible word; a term applied to the sacraments in order to emphasize their direct relationship to the Word of God.

veritas: truth; in the classic epistemological definition common to the medieval and the Protestant scholastics, “Truth is the adequation,” namely, the correspondence or conformity, “of a thing with the intellect” (Veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum, sive conformitas). In this definition, neither the thing as such nor the intellect as such is true or false; rather, the knowledge or judgment of the intellect concerning the thing will be true or false depending on its conformity to the thing. In other words, truth does not stand as an independent reality that can be known or in which the intellect can participate, but truth is lodged in the correct expression of the conformity of the thing with the knowledge of the thing in the intellect. Specifically, truth and falsehood are inseparable from the truth or falsehood of concepts, statements, or propositions. A distinction can be drawn between the truth of representation (veritas representationis, q.v.) concerning a known object and a truth of meaning (veritas sententiae, q.v.) concerning a judgment or opinion.

Truths are known on various grounds: some are known either as ingrafted, or intuitively recognized, common notions (notiones communes, q.v.); others are known by demonstration, whether logical or mathematical; others are known by sensory experience of an object; and still others are known by testimony, whether of living persons or of tradition. Accordingly, evidences and arguments concerning the truth of things or concepts vary in their kind depending on the nature of the things or concepts. This being said, it is also assumed by the scholastic writers that Veritas non recipit magis ac minus, Truth does not admit a greater or a lesser. In other words, truths are equivalent in the sense that one truth is neither more nor less true than another truth.

In metaphysics, truth or transcendental truth (veritas transcendentalis) is one of the transcendental properties of being. Being, as such, is true in the ontological sense that it is what it is and cannot be something else. In an absolute or most generalized sense, being (ens) is true inasmuch as it cannot be nonbeing; in the specific sense of the individual being or thing, its intrinsic truth belongs to the fact that it is what it is and necessarily must be what it is. This latter sense of the truth of the individual being relates directly to the classic epistemological understanding: being presents itself as what it really is, and the intellect receives this presentation as the truth of the thing. See bonitas; proprietates entis; unitas.

In the Protestant scholastic theological systems, theologia vera and theologia falsa, true and false theology, are distinguished in terms of the conformitas of true theology to the proper object of theology (obiectum theologiae, q.v.), which is God as he has revealed himself. It follows also that theologia vera implies the correspondence of finite and derivative knowledge of God (see theologia ectypa) with the infinite and original knowledge of God, which is the divine self-knowledge (see theologia archetypa). The veritas Dei, or truth of God, is ultimately the correspondence and indeed the identity of the understanding (intellectus, q.v.) and will (voluntas, q.v.) of God with the essentia Dei (q.v.), or essence of God. God is truth itself, in an absolute sense.

veritas representationis: the truth of representation; i.e., truth in the sense of the conformity of the intellectual apprehension of an object with the object that is represented or had been presented. See veritas.

veritas sententiae: the truth of the meaning or sense; i.e., truth in the sense of the conformity of the intellectual judgment concerning something with the adjudication or thing being judged. See veritas.

veritas theopneustos (θεόπνευστος): God-breathed truth; inspired truth; a ground of the historical authoritas Scripturae (q.v.) or authentia historiae (q.v.) of Scripture. See theopneustos.

verus, -a, -um (adj.): true.

verus Deus / verus homo: true God / true man; a reference to Christ as fully divine and fully human.

vestigia Trinitatis: vestiges of the Trinity; traces or perceptible signs of the trinitarian nature of God reflected in or imprinted on the created order as an effect of God’s handiwork in creation. The Protestant orthodox, both Reformed and Lutheran, express the need for caution in seeking out vestiges of the Trinity in creation; comparatively few theologians elaborate on the concept, noting that the Augustinian metaphors of (1) the lover, the beloved, and the bond that unites them, and (2) memory, understanding, and will are overly speculative. Keckermann in particular was criticized for making too much of the concept. Still, they do allow that there are triadic imprints of the divine in creation, sometimes making a distinction between imagines Trinitatis as traces of the trinitarian identity found in rational creatures and vestigia Trinitatis as traces identifiable in the nonrational creatures, namely, in the created order in general. In order to avoid a speculative impulse in the elaboration of these reflections or traces, the orthodox writers indicate that they cannot be used as proofs of the trinitarian nature of God, they do not convey knowledge of the inner workings of the Godhead, and they do not arise a priori; at best, they are a posteriori results of human reflection on the order of creation. See Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa; Trinitas.

vestigium: a vestige or trace; a perceptible indication that something was once present.

Vetus Testamentum: Old Testament. See foedus gratiae; Scriptura Sacra; testamentum.

via causalitatis: the way of causality; viz., a method of identifying the divine attributes by means of the relationship of effect to cause. Thus God can be identified as the self-existent and necessary first cause and, by extension, as all-powerful and all-wise. See aseitas; attributa divina; omnipotentia; omnisapientia; via eminentiae; via negativa.

via eminentiae: the way of eminence; as opposed to via negativa (q.v.), via eminentiae is the method for the positive derivation of divine attributes (attributa divina, q.v.) by raising attributes of things in the finite order, particularly spiritual attributes of human beings, to the order of the infinite. Thus, e.g., power becomes omnipotence, and wisdom becomes omniscience. This method rests on the analogia entis (q.v.).

via media: a middle way or middle course; namely, a compromise position or position between two identified extremes.

via negativa: negative way; also termed the via negationis: way of negation; i.e., a method of defining or identifying the divine attributes (attributa divina, q.v.) by negating the attributes of the finite order. Thus creatures are measurable, mutable, and finite; God is immeasurable or immense (see immensitas), immutable (see immutabilitas), and infinite (see infinitas). In addition, creatures are complex and temporal; God is simple and eternal. See attributa divina; via causalitatis; via eminentiae.

via salutis: the way or order of salvation. See ordo salutis.

viator: pilgrim, sojourner; literally, one on the way, or in via. The term particularly arises out of the language and implication of Augustine’s City of God and denotes the sojourner status of the Christian, who is in the world but not of the world. The viator has no abiding city on earth but seeks the heavenly city, which is to come. See homo; in patria; in via; theologia viatorum.

vicarius, -a, -um (adj.): vicarious, substitutionary, standing in the place of another person or thing. Christ’s work of satisfying the price of sin in the place of believers is often described as vicarious. See satisfactio vicaria.

Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor: I see and pronounce good the better things, but I follow the worse; often cited by the Reformed orthodox with reference to Romans 7: the quotation is from the speech of Medea in Ovid, Metamorphoses (7.11.20–21), and has been viewed in the tradition as an adumbration of or preparation for the gospel. See praeparatio evangelica.

vinculum caritatis: bond of love; a term used to identify the Holy Spirit in Augustinian expositions of the Trinity. In Augustine’s trinitarian metaphor of the lover, the beloved, and the bond that unites them, the Spirit is the bond of love uniting the Father and the Son. See Trinitas.

virtualiter: literally, virtually; i.e., with virtus, namely, with strength, virtue, effect, power; powerfully, effectively. Thus the presence of something virtualiter is an effective presence as distinct from one that is physical. See praesentia spiritualis sive virtualis.

virtus: strength or power, in the sense of value, virtue, virtuousness, or worth; similar in usage to vis (q.v.) but lacking the connotation of force that belongs to the range of meaning of vis; also to be distinguished from potestas (q.v.), power, often in a political sense; and potentia (q.v.), indicating power as a potency or capacity. Virtus, understood as virtue in the sense of value or worth, can denote intellectual, moral, or theological attributes; it is to be understood as a habit (habitus, q.v.) or disposition (dispositio, q.v.) ordered toward the good. The intellectual and moral virtues belong to human beings by nature and are often simply identified as natural virtues (virtutes naturales); the theological virtues are bestowed on human beings by grace and are identified as supernatural virtues (virtutes supernaturales). Thus (1) intellectual virtues are dispositions of the mind directed toward intellective good, specifically, toward truth, and can be distinguished into the speculative of contemplative virtues and the practical virtues. The speculative virtues of the intellect are understanding (intelligentia, q.v.), knowledge (scientia, q.v.), and wisdom (sapientia, q.v.); the practical are art or technique (ars, q.v.) and prudence (prudentia, q.v.). (2) The moral virtues are dispositions of will or appetite that operate in accord with right reason (recta ratio, q.v.), are all directed toward finite or created good as their proper object, and regulate the conduct of human beings in their relations with others. There are three principal moral virtues: justice or righteousness (iustitia, q.v.), courage or fortitude (fortitudo), and temperance (temperantia, continentia). Justice is the disposition that aims at perfecting the will in terms of right relationships, including religion, piety, and gratitude. Courage and temperance moderate or regulate passions, desires, and appetites to bring them into accord with right reason (recta ratio, q.v.). Subsumed under courage and temperance are such virtues as modesty, honesty, patience, and perseverance. (3) The theological virtues, as distinct from the moral virtues, are ultimately directed toward God as their proper object. There are three theological virtues: faith (fides, q.v.), hope (spes, q.v.), and love (caritas, q.v.).

In its moral sense, a virtue is a habit or disposition of the will that inclines it toward the good, as opposed to a habitus vitiosus, a corrupt or defective disposition, that inclines toward evil. The Reformed orthodox, citing such texts as Psalm 119:66 and Titus 2:12, argue that the moral virtues operate according to right reason, but qualify the argument in relation to the problem of fallen human nature and pervasive sinfulness by adding that recta ratio is identical with the will of God as revealed for the proper direction of human life. If the theological and moral virtues were strictly distinguished, they would operate in parallel, on the one hand reflecting supernatural goals and on the other reflecting natural goals of humanity. Just as theology, understood as a praxis and defined by the virtues of faith, hope, and love, leads human beings toward their ultimate end and chief good in God, so does morality or ethics, defined by the virtues such as righteousness, temperance, honesty, and courage. Some Reformed writers, notably William Ames, object to this distinction on the ground that it is not as if theology merely looks to a goal beyond this life and ethics is directed simply toward the conduct of this life. Accordingly, the form of virtue ethics developed among the Reformed orthodox is a biblically grounded and specifically theological ethics.

Early modern Reformed virtue ethics respects the identification of four cardinal, or fundamental, virtues (virtutes cardinales), understanding them not so much as separate virtues but as the fundamental conditions requisite to virtuous disposition: righteousness (iustitia), prudence (prudentia), courage (fortitudo), and temperance (temperantia). Iustitia includes truth and purity, given that it is the inclination to right action (inclinatio ad recte agendum); it serves to order and to constitute virtue. Prudentia in the moral sense is the use of the other intellectual virtues, understanding, knowledge, and wisdom, to guide the will in doing what is both right and expedient; it directs virtuous action and preserves it from error. Fortitudo is a strength and persistence in doing what is right and good; it strengthens virtue. Temperantia is the disposition to restrain wrongful and base desires that lead away from the good; it supports the purity of virtuous acts.

virtus operativa: operative power. See ex opere operato; virtus.

virtutes cardinales: cardinal virtues; i.e., the chief, principal, or fundamental virtues. See virtus.

virtutes Dei: powers or virtues of God; i.e., the divine attributes concerned with powers, affections, or moral qualities. See attributa divina; virtus.

virtutes naturales: natural virtues; intellectual and moral dispositions belonging by nature to human beings. See virtus.

virtutes supernaturales: supernatural virtues; dispositions of faith, hope, and love belonging to human beings by grace. See virtus.

vis: force, energy, power, virtue; similar in usage to virtus (q.v.), not including the moral connotation that belongs to the range of meaning of virtus, but tending to denote physical power and sometimes violence. Accordingly, vis is seldom predicated of God and is not one of the divine attributes (attributa divina, q.v.), whereas God is said to have virtutes and potentia (q.v.) or omnipotentia (q.v.).

vis dativa mediorum gratiae: the imparting power of the means of grace; also vis exhibitiva: exhibiting power; vis collativa: conferring power. The means of grace, i.e., Word and sacrament, have vis dativa inasmuch as they are able to convey the offer of forgiveness made possible in Christ. Insofar as the sacraments are visible signs, the vis dativa is also a vis exhibitiva. See organa gratiae et salutis.

vis effectiva sive operativa mediorum gratiae: the effective or operative power of the means of grace; i.e., the gracious working of the Holy Spirit in and through the Word and the sacraments. See organa gratiae et salutis.

visio Dei: the vision of God; the final vision of God’s glory and truth given to the blessed. We now see as through a glass, darkly; then we shall see face to face (1 Cor. 13:12). The visio Dei is thus impossible to the viator (q.v.) and accessible only to the beati (q.v.) in patria (q.v.); thus it is also called visio beatifica, beatific vision. The scholastics note that the visio is not a visio oculi, a vision of the eye, except with reference to the perception of the glorified Christ. With reference to the saints’ new perception of God, the visio is cognitio Dei clara et intuitiva, a clear and intuitive knowledge of God, an inward actus intellectus et voluntatis, or act of intellect and will.

vita aeterna: eternal life; viz., the life enjoyed by the blessed (beati, q.v.) in their glorified bodies after the resurrection and the judgment, in which they will experience the fullness of life and the vision of God (visio Dei, q.v.). The blessings of the vita aeterna are described by the Protestant scholastics as both negative (negativa), or privative (privativa), and positive (positiva). The negative, or privative, blessing is the removal of sin and its consequences, i.e., the suffering and imperfection of earthly existence. The positive blessings are either internal (interna) or external (externa). The internal blessings consist in the complete renewal and perfecting of intellect and will, the spiritual perfecting of the body and the bestowing upon it of incorruptibility and beauty and the capacity of unimpeded local movement, together with the gift of eternal security in salvation. The external blessings consist in fellowship with God, the blessed angels, and the glorious company of believers in the church triumphant (ecclesia triumphans; see ecclesia).

vita Dei: the life of God. As a divine attribute, vita is considered in two ways: (1) essentialiter (q.v.) or in actu primo, in its primary actuality—the vita Dei is the divine essence itself inasmuch as God is αὐτόζωος (autozōos) and self-moved; and (2) efficaciter (q.v.), effectually or ἐνεργητικῶς (energētikōs), which is to say in actu secundo, in its second or secondary actuality, as the immanent activity of the Godhead, the operationes or opera ad intra, which proceed from the divine nature and are the life of the divine essence. See actus; attributa divina; in actu.

vitium: imperfection, defect, blemish; the quality of sinfulness in human beings, particularly considered as a defect in human nature. See causa deficiens; imago Dei; malum; peccatum.

viva voce: by the living voice; namely, by word of mouth.

viva vox: living or spoken word; also viva vox Dei: the living Word or speech of God. The term is applied to the Word of God spoken directly to Israel before the Mosaic inscription of the law and to the Word of God spoken directly to the prophets. In addition, because of the Reformers’ emphasis upon the power and efficacy of Scripture, the term was used by the Reformers and by the Protestant orthodox to indicate the reading aloud of vernacular Scriptures during worship. For all of its emphasis on a strict grammatical reading of the text, Reformation and post-Reformation interpretation of Scripture holds, in common with the earlier exegesis, a sense of the direct address of the text to the present-day church. The preacher is not one who applies an old word to new situations but is rather a servant and an instrument of the living Word, the viva vox Dei, for its effective operation in the world. See quadriga; Verbum agraphon.

vivificatio: vivification, quickening; viz., the spiritual awakening that is described in Scripture as a putting on of the new nature (Col. 3:9–10), which corresponds to contritio activa and conversio activa sive actualis (q.v.) and follows mortification in repentance. See contritio; poenitentia; sanctificatio.

vocatio: calling; specifically, the call of God to be his children, which occurs by the grace of the Holy Spirit, both generally in the government of the world and the manifestation of divine benevolentia (q.v.) toward all creatures, and specially in and through the proclamation of the Word. Both Lutheran and Reformed scholastics make this distinction between the vocatio generalis, or universalis, and the vocatio specialis, or evangelica. General or universal calling is sometimes termed vocatio realis, or real calling, because it occurs in and through the things (res) of the world, whereas special, or evangelical, calling is sometimes termed a vocatio verbalis, since it comes only through the Word (Verbum). The Lutherans, however, argue that the vocatio specialis of the Verbum Dei (q.v.) is sufficient and effective for salvation and is presented equally to all with the divine intention that all be saved. Against the Reformed distinction between an effective (efficax, q.v.) and ineffective (inefficax) vocatio, the Lutherans hold the sufficiency of Scripture and the efficacious character of God’s call in all cases. Failure to heed the call indicates no fault in the Word but rather in the hearer. The Reformed, by contrast, divide vocatio specialis into vocatio externa, which is the universal call of the gospel to all persons without distinction, and vocatio interna, which is the inward calling of the Spirit that creates the communion between a person and God necessary for the vocatio externa also to be vocatio efficax (q.v.). Only the elect are therefore effectively called. The Lutherans will allow no such separation of Word and Spirit and argue for the necessary correspondence of the external Word with the internal testimony of the Spirit. Vocatio can also be divided into vocatio mediata and vocatio immediata (q.v.). The former refers to the call of God through intermediaries, e.g., angels or the church; the latter refers to the call of the Word itself. The Protestant scholastics also distinguish vocatio extraordinaria, which can take place apart from the usual service of Word and sacrament, and vocatio ordinaria, which occurs in and through those means. The result of God’s calling is the reception of believers into the kingdom and their union with Christ and their life in Christ, the unio mystica (q.v.), unio cum Christo (union with Christ), or insitio in Christum (q.v.). Vocatio also refers to the calling of individuals to specific office in the church, as the call to ministry or to the teaching of sacra doctrina. See gratia; ordo salutis; potestas ecclesiae; regimen ecclesiasticum.

vocatio efficax: effectual calling. See vocatio.

vocatio immediata / vocatio mediata: immediate call / mediate call. Vocatio immediata, the immediate call of God’s Word, specifically, the call of God to the prophets and the apostles, is distinguished from the calling of ministers, which is a mediate calling, or vocatio mediata, a call that comes from God but is mediated by the church. The Reformed also refer to the calling of the Word to the elect as vocatio immediata (see vocatio).

vocatio inefficax: ineffectual calling. See vocatio.

Volitum nihil, nisi cognitum: Nothing is willed unless it is known. A maxim illustrative of the interrelationship of the faculties, intellect (intellectus, q.v.) and will (voluntas, q.v.), held equally by intellectualists and voluntarists.

voluntas: will; i.e., the faculty of will resident by nature in all spiritual beings; the appetitive power (potentia appetitiva) of a spiritual being. Will is distinct from intellect (intellectus, q.v.) in scholastic faculty psychology. The intellect is that which knows objects; the will is that which has an appetite or desire for them. Will and intellect are the two highest spiritual powers. The question immediately arises as to which of the faculties stands prior to the other. In the Thomistic model, intellect stands prior as the deliberative faculty; the will does not deliberate but merely inclines toward or desires that which the intellect knows as good or true. The will can thus be called an intellectual appetite (appetitus intellectualis) or a rational appetite (appetitus rationalis). This view was rejected by Scotus in the name of the freedom of the will. Scotus argued that the will is essentially free and therefore self-moved. Although the will always acts on the basis of knowledge, it is also true that we know and remember only because we will to do so. Thus Scotus will argue that, in a limited sense, the will is dependent upon intellect and that will and intellect must act together. In this conjoint activity, however, the will is to the intellect as form is to matter. The will is more perfect, and it determines the use of materials gathered by the intellect. The Protestant orthodox frequently state the problem of priority without solving it definitively; they recognize the interrelationship of intellect and will, but they focus on the problem of fallen humanity. After the fall, the intellect is distorted in its knowing, and the will refuses the good known to the intellect. Indeed, the will follows the lower or sensual appetite (see appetitus).

Will, defined as the appetitive faculty in human beings, must also be distinguished from choice (arbitrium, q.v.). The will is the faculty that operates with the intellect in an act of choosing any particular object. Arbitrium is the function or faculty of making a judgment, choice, or decision and can be identified either as belonging to the intellect or as belonging to both intellect and will. Thus the will can be viewed as essentially free and unconstrained but nonetheless limited by its own nature or natural capacity in choosing particular things and, in view of the restricting and debilitating effects of sin (peccatum, q.v.), in bondage to its own fallen nature. See liberum arbitrium; velleitas.

voluntas antecedens: antecdent will; i.e., an unconditioned will, often paired in distinction with the voluntas consequens (q.v.), a consequent or conditioned will. See voluntas Dei.

voluntas approbans: approving will; i.e, a conditional will of God reflecting divine response to obedience, as distinguished from the voluntas praecipiens (q.v.) or voluntas praecepti (q.v.). See voluntas Dei.

voluntas beneplaciti: will of good pleasure; i.e., the will of divine good pleasure, according to which God ultimately wills what pleases him; it can be used synonymously with the voluntas decreti (q.v.), voluntas decernens (q.v.), or voluntas propositi (q.v.); in cases where the ultimate purpose of God is set prior to the decree, however, the voluntas beneplaciti or voluntas propositi can stand prior to the voluntas decreti or decernens. See voluntas Dei.

voluntas consequens: consequent will. See voluntas antecedens; voluntas Dei.

voluntas decernens: decisive or deciding will; broadly synonymous with voluntas decreti (q.v.) and voluntas propositi (q.v.). See voluntas Dei.

voluntas decreti: the will of the decree; viz., the absolute, hidden will of God according to which God freely wills all things, as distinguished from the voluntas revelata, or revealed will, and the voluntas praecepti (q.v.), or preceptive will. See voluntas Dei.

voluntas Dei: will of God; i.e., the attribute of God according to which God may be said to have a potency or, more precisely, an appetitive potency (potentia appetitiva) ad extra that operates to bring about the good known to and desired by God as the highest end or greatest good (summum bonum, q.v.) of all things; it also operates to defeat all evil in the created order. Since the divine essence is simple and the summum bonum is God himself, it is also correct to say that God is what he wills, in an ultimate sense, and that the divine will is both one (unica) and simple (simplex). Nevertheless, the scholastics do make a series of distinctions in the divine will as it relates either directly or indirectly to creatures and as it can be known or must remain hidden to creatures. The Protestant scholastics here draw directly on the language of the medieval doctors, modifying it to suit the needs of Protestant systems. The Lutherans and the Reformed agree in a primary distinction between God’s voluntas necessaria sive naturalis, necessary or natural will, and God’s voluntas libera, free will. The former term indicates the will that God must have and employ according to his nature and by which God must necessarily will to be himself, to be who and what he eternally is. Thus God wills his own goodness, justice, and holiness, necessarily or naturally so. The voluntas necessaria sive naturalis indicates the precise correspondence of the divine will with the divine essence. The latter term, voluntas libera, indicates the utterly free will according to which God determines all things. Since it is the voluntas libera that is operative ad extra, it is also the subject of further distinction.

A primary distinction in the voluntas libera may be made between the voluntas decreti vel beneplaciti and the voluntas signi vel praecepti. The former, the will of the decree or of (the divine) good pleasure, is the ultimate, effective, and absolutely unsearchable will of God, which underlies the revealed will of God. It may therefore also be called the voluntas arcana, or hidden will, and the voluntas decernens (q.v.), or decisive, deciding will of God. Lutheran orthodoxy uses the term with reference to the work of salvation only in the sense that human beings cannot know the ultimate reason in the mind and will of God for the gracious salvation of some rather than others. The Reformed, by contrast, argue for a hidden will of God to bestow special saving grace irresistibly on the elect, a voluntas decreti sive beneplaciti arcana, more ultimate than the revealed will of God to offer salvation to all by means of a universal grace. This distinction is denied by the Lutherans as endangering the universal grace. The voluntas decreti vel beneplaciti, for orthodox Lutheranism, is not an externally effective will, but rather only a will to limit the extent of revelation. The Reformed make the voluntas decreti vel beneplaciti the ultimate, effective will of God. The voluntas signi vel praecepti, the will of the sign or precept, is God’s voluntas revelata, or revealed will, and his voluntas moralis, or moral will, according to which God reveals in signs and precepts his plan for human obedience and faith both in the law and in the gospel. Here, again, the Lutherans and Reformed differ insofar as the former deny the contrast between a universally offered salvation revealed in the voluntas signi (q.v.) and a secret elective will in the voluntas beneplaciti (q.v.).

The distinction between the voluntas signi and the voluntas beneplaciti can be turned about into a distinction between the signum voluntas and the beneplacitum voluntas. The will of the sign or precept (voluntas signi) is also a revealed sign of the divine will (signum voluntatis), and just so the will of God’s good pleasure (voluntas beneplaciti) is the good pleasure of God’s will (beneplacitum voluntas).

A second set of distinctions can be made between the voluntas Dei absoluta et antecedens, the absolute and antecedent will of God and the voluntas Dei ordinata et consequens. The Lutheran orthodox argue for this distinction as a description of the effective will of God ad extra and juxtapose it with the previous distinction between the revelative will of God and the hidden will. The voluntas absoluta et antecedens, sometimes called voluntas prima, first or primary will, is the eternal divine will in and of itself, according to which the ultimate end or final good is willed by God apart from consideration of conditions, circumstances, and means to be encountered or used proximately in the achievement of the divine purpose. The voluntas ordinata et consequens, sometimes called voluntas secunda, second or secondary will, is the will of God according to which he orders proximate causes and effects both in terms of the universal order and its laws and in terms of the circumstances that arise out of the contingent events and the creaturely free wills resident in the order. The voluntas ordinata therefore corresponds with the potentia ordinata (q.v.), or ordained power of God, whereas the voluntas consequens (q.v.) is a distinct willing that rests on the divine decree and foreknowledge. In the systems of Lutheran orthodoxy, the voluntas consequens is the will of God that elects intuitu fidei (q.v.), in view of faith, a point rejected by the Reformed.

The Reformed also deny the Arminian form of a distinction between voluntas antecedens (q.v.) and voluntas consequens, according to which God antecedently and absolutely wills one thing, such as to save all of humanity in Christ, and then consequently and relatively or conditionally wills another, namely, to save some human beings because they have come to faith in Christ. In this form, the distinction assumes contradictory wills in God, renders God reactive, amounts to a denial of the freedom and independence of the divine will, and implies contingency in God himself. The Reformed thus deny the distinction when the consequent willing responds to the will of the creatures and stands contrary to the antecedent. They allow, however, at least two uses of the antecedent/consequent distinction. It can simply indicate a divine willing that follows as a consequence of the divine antecedent willing, as when God, having willed antecedently to punish unremitted sins, consequently wills the damnation of particular human beings because of their sins. Beyond this, as in the hypothetical universalist (see universalismus hypotheticus) formulation offered by Davenant, the antecedent willing is identified as a conditional willingness (velleitas, q.v.)—i.e., not an effective willing, but an openness related to the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice for all sin—and the consequent will is identified as an absolute and effective will to save the elect. The Reformed accept, moreover, the distinction between an antecedent voluntas absoluta and a consequent voluntas ordinata (in conjunction with that between potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata), inasmuch as the antecedent absolute will is not an operational willing but a will in relation to all possibility, and the consequent ordained will is God’s utterly free willing to actualize certain possibles.

They further argue for the distinction of the voluntas decreti vel beneplaciti or voluntas decernens into the categories of voluntas efficiens, effecting will, and voluntas permittens, permitting will. Under the former category, God is viewed as directly, or indirectly through instrumental causes, effecting his positive will, whereas under the latter category God is understood as permitting both contingent events and acts of free will even when such events and acts go against his revealed will. Since God is not a Deus otiosus, or idle God, the voluntas permittens is typically called voluntas efficaciter permittens, an effectively permitting will (see concursus).

Finally, the Protestant scholastics argue for a series of distinctions in the voluntas signi vel praecepti. This phrase is, first, synonymous with voluntas revelata and voluntas moralis. As such, several of the Lutheran orthodox argue that the voluntas signi is not truly the will of God but an effect of his will or a subsidiary willing resting on the voluntas antecedens and, formally, on the voluntas consequens. In other words, it is an effect or object of the divine will that provides a sign of what is willed in and by God. The voluntas revelata can be distinguished into a voluntas legalis, according to which God demands obedience to his will, and a voluntas evangelica, according to which God wills to save through grace in Christ. Here the Reformed occasionally allow a distinction between voluntas antecedens and voluntas consequens. The former refers to the commands of God, the voluntas legalis, which ordains the conditions of human life absolutely; the latter refers to the voluntas evangelica, which establishes the conditions under which fallen human beings can be saved. See euarestia; eudokia; potentia Dei; scientia Dei; voluntas revelata Dei.

voluntas effectiva: effective will. See voluntas Dei.

voluntas permissiva: permissive will; also voluntas permittens: permitting will. See voluntas Dei.

voluntas praecepti: the will of the precept or commandment, as distinguished from the voluntas propositi (q.v.), the will of God’s ultimate purpose, a distinction parallel to that between the voluntas signi (q.v.) and the voluntas beneplaciti (q.v.). See voluntas Dei.

voluntas praecipiens: the commanding will; viz., the divine will that sets forth commands or precepts; also termed the voluntas praecepti (q.v.). The voluntas praecipiens is distinguished from the voluntas approbans, or approving will of God. The voluntas praecipiens stands prior to the voluntas approbans—the former indicating a divine command of obedience, the latter indicating the divine response to those who obey the command. See voluntas Dei.

voluntas propositi: the will of [God’s] purpose; synonymous with the voluntas beneplaciti (q.v.). See voluntas Dei; voluntas praecepti.

voluntas revelata Dei: the revealed will of God; viz., the will of God concerning human obedience and human salvation that is revealed in the law and the gospel, as distinguished from the voluntas abscondita, the hidden will of God, which is the ultimate divine purpose underlying the voluntas revelata, the unsearchable judgments and ways of God’s infinite mind itself (Rom. 11:33). The distinction is similar to that between the potentia ordinata (q.v.) and potentia absoluta (q.v.), and between theologia ectypa (q.v.) and theologia archetypa (q.v.), insofar as all three distinctions arise out of a theological concern for the divine transcendence and are virtually identical with the distinction between voluntas signi (q.v.) and voluntas beneplaciti (q.v.). See voluntas Dei.

voluntas signi: the will of the sign; viz., the revealed or manifest will of God, as distinguished from the ultimate will of the divine good pleasure, the voluntas beneplaciti (q.v.); similar to voluntas praecepti (q.v.). See voluntas Dei.

vox: voice, spoken sound, word. See Verbum Dei; viva vox.