Uu

ubietas: literally, whereness; the condition of having an ubi, i.e., a “where”; hence, place or position. See alicubitas; praedicamenta; praesentia; sessio Christi.

ubiquitas: ubiquity, presence everywhere, omnipresence; specifically, the illocal, supernatural presence of Christ’s human nature resulting from the communion of natures (communio naturarum, q.v.) and the communication of proper qualities (communicatio idiomatum, q.v.) in the person of Christ. The Lutheran orthodox argue that this ubiquity is not a spatial or local ubiquity such as might characterize (hypothetically) a ubiquitous or infinitely extended material substance. Christ’s human nature is not ubiquitous with reference to its own attributes. Rather, the ubiquity of Christ’s humanity is illocal, supernatural, and grounded in the omnipresence of the Logos. Above all, it is a personal ubiquity that belongs, not to the human nature as such, but to the human nature in its union with the divine person of the Word. The personal union (unio personalis, q.v.) is such that the Logos is never apart from the flesh, and the flesh is never apart from the Logos (Logos non extra carnem, q.v.); and since the person of the Word fills all things, the human nature of Christ must also fill all things. The basic christological implication of ubiquity, then, is the general omnipresence (omnipraesentia generalis, q.v.) and repletive presence (praesentia repletiva) of Christ’s human nature. Although this christological conclusion provides the dogmatic background of Lutheran sacramental theology and explains how, christologically, the real presence of Christ’s body and blood in the Lord’s Supper is possible, this general ubiquity, or omnipresence, of Christ must not be confused with the sacramental presence. The illocal and supernatural presence of Christ’s body and blood in the elements is not repletive but definitive (praesentia definitiva), not general but specific to the sacrament. See praesentia; praesentia illocalis sive definitiva.

ubivolipraesentia: ubivolipresence; viz., a presence everywhere (ubi-) according to the will (voli-) of God; specifically, the presence of Christ’s humanity in and with the Logos. See communicatio idiomatum; multivolipraesentia; omnipraesentia generalis.

ultima tuba: last trumpet. See tuba.

ultimus iudex: the final judge; viz., Christ in his regal office (munus regium) at the end of the age (consummatio saeculi, q.v.), when he returns to judge the living and the dead in the final judgment (iudicium extremum, q.v.). See adventus Christi; munus triplex.

una persona geminae substantiae: one person of two substances; a standard Latin patristic christological formula. See unio personalis.

unio accidentalis: an accidental or incidental union; e.g., the occasional and temporary union of angels with bodily form. The union is accidental as opposed to a substantial or essential union (unio essentialis, q.v.).

unio coessentialis: coessential union; viz., not a union of differing essences (unio essentialis, q.v.) but a union in one essence, as the union of persons in the Trinity.

unio cum Christo: union with Christ. See unio mystica; vocatio.

unio drastikē (δραστική): an efficacious union.

unio essentialis: essential union; i.e., a union of two different essences, such as the union of all things with God according to the divine omnipraesentia (q.v.) and omnipotentia (q.v.) and manifest in the divine concursus. This union of God with all things can also be called the unio generalis, or general union, inasmuch as it belongs to the universal nonsaving work of God as opposed to the unio specialis or unio mystica (q.v.).

unio hypostatikē (ὑποστατική): hypostatic or personal union. See unio personalis.

unio immediata: immediate or unmediated union; viz., the effective union of two things brought about by the action of one or both of them, without the aid of a third thing or power. The term can be used to describe the union of the Word with its human nature (see unio personalis) and is contrasted with unio mediata (q.v.).

unio kata charin (κατὰ χάριν): union according to grace. See unio mystica.

unio mediata: mediate or mediated union; viz., a union made possible in whole or in part by the effective operation of a third thing or power in addition to the immediate subjects of the union. The term is applied to the unio personalis (q.v.), or union of the divine and human natures in Christ, insofar as that union is made possible by the gift of supernatural graces to the human nature by the Holy Spirit (see apotelesma; communicatio gratiarum). The personal union is primarily the effective work of the Word assuming (receiving) a human nature into fellowship with itself in its own person (persona, q.v.), or subsistence (subsistentia, q.v.)—so that the unio personalis is not exhaustively described as an unio mediata but must also be termed unio immediata, an immediate or unmediated union of the divine and the human.

unio mystica: mystical union; or unio mystica sive praesentia gratiae tantum: mystical union or union by the presence of grace alone; i.e., a union made possible and maintained by grace rather than by the interrelation of essences or accidents. It goes beyond the unio essentialis (q.v.) of God, or more precisely the Logos, with all things, since it is of grace and not merely of power and presence. It therefore is a unio specialis. Specifically, the term unio mystica, in orthodox Lutheran and orthodox Reformed dogmatics, refers to the special union, founded on the indwelling grace of God in Christ, that occurs between God and the believer in and through regeneration. The union is mystical because it rests on the mystery of grace and of the unsearchable mercy of God; it can also be called unio spiritualis, spiritual union, since it is not physical or material but of the Spirit. The qualifying phrase, sive praesentia gratiae tantum, is added to the unio mystica in order to mark the difference between this union of believers with God and the hypostatic, or personal, union of the divine and human natures in Christ. See unio personalis.

The orthodox therefore define the unio mystica as the spiritual conjunction (coniunctio spiritualis) of the Triune God with the believer in and following justification. It is a substantial and graciously effective indwelling. In relation to the ordo salutis (q.v.), or order of salvation, the Protestant scholastics distinguish the initial unitio (q.v.), or uniting, of the unio mystica—the basis for the imputation of Christ’s righteousness to the believer, corresponding with the adoption (adoptio) of the believer—and the ongoing unio, or union, of the unio mystica, which continues concurrent with sanctification throughout the life of the believer. See adoptio; iustificatio; sanctificatio.

unio naturalis: natural union. As distinct from the unio personalis (q.v.), unio naturalis is a union of two seeming disparates into one essentia (q.v.) or natura (q.v.), such as the union of form and matter or soul and body. The essence resulting from an unio naturalis is a composite. Such unions occur in the normal order of nature or creation and, unlike the unio personalis, which is a union of two essentiae in one persona, are never between an uncreated and a created being (ens increatum et creatum). See unio essentialis; unio personalis.

unio parastatikē (παραστατική): a helping or assisting union; sometimes unio per meram assistentiam, a union merely for assistance, as, e.g., the union of two people in need, which lasts only as long as the necessity or task that unites them; also referred to as unio sustentativa, a sustaining union.

unio per adoptionem: union by or through adoption; a term used to describe the christological heresy of adoptionism. The classic adoptionist position, as enunciated by the dynamic monarchianists of the early church, argued that the union between Jesus and God occurred only at Jesus’s baptism and was represented by the descent of the divine δύναμις (dynamis) upon Jesus. Thus a divine power, not a divine person, dwelt in Jesus. Quite a different issue was raised at the close of the eighth century by the so-called Spanish adoptionists, Felix of Urgel and Elipandus of Toledo. They had no interest in postponing the union of God and man in Christ until Christ’s baptism or in arguing a divine power rather than a divine person indwelling in Christ’s flesh. Rather, in the interest of stating clearly the fullness of Christ’s humanity, they referred to the human nature as homo adoptatus, the adopted man, and spoke of a dual sonship, a sonship of the Word by nature and a sonship of Jesus’s human nature by gracious adoption. Christ was thus both Filius Dei naturalis and Filius Dei adoptivus, both the natural and adoptive Son of God. The Spanish adoptionists were never accused of being dynamic monarchians or Samosatians (after Paul of Samosata), but rather of being Nestorians. In fact, they were neither; their doctrine ought to be viewed as a denial of the anhypostasis (q.v.) of Christ’s human nature and therefore as not in accord with later christological orthodoxy. The Protestant scholastics reject both forms of adoptionism. See enhypostasis; unio personalis.

unio personalis: personal union; viz., the union of the two natures in the person of Christ; the Lutheran and Reformed orthodox agree on the basic Chalcedonian definition of the unio personalis and disagree only in the further explication of the definition in terms of the communicatio idiomatum (q.v.). The unio is defined as the assumption of a human nature by the preexistent eternal person of the Son of God in such a way as to draw the human nature into the oneness of the divine person without division or separation of natures (ἀδιαιρέτως καὶ ἀχωρίστως, adiairetōs kai achōristōs), but also without change or confusion of natures (ἀτρέπτως καὶ ἀσυγχύτως, atreptōs kai asynchytōs); yet also in such a way that the attributes of both natures belong to the divine-human person and contribute conjointly to the work of salvation. Thus Christ is una persona geminae substantiae sive naturae, one person of two substances or natures. The hypostatic, or personal, union is maintained in orthodox doctrine through the recognition that the persona (q.v.) is not the sum of two natures but rather is the divine person of the Son. The eternal person, or subsistentia (q.v.), of the Second Person of the Trinity is the subsistence or independent, individual existent, Christ. The human nature, which subsists only in and for the union, has no independent subsistence of its own apart from the unio (see anhypostasis; enhypostasis). Thus the union of the divine person (and nature) with the human nature does not result in the creation of a double person, but of one divine person, in whom two natures, the divine and the human, are united. The unio can further be described as the περιχώρησις (perichōrēsis, q.v.), or circumincessio (q.v.), viz., the coinherence of the natures. The two natures coinhere or interpenetrate in perfect union so that the human is never without the divine or the divine without the human (but see extra calvinisticum), yet the natures do not mix or mingle and are never confused one with the other. The results of the unio are described as the communicatio gratiarum (q.v.), the communicatio idiomatum (q.v.), and the communicatio apotelesmatum (q.v.). See actus unionis; adiairetōs kai achōristōs; atreptōs kai asynchytōs; natura; unio mediata.

unio physica: physical or natural union; i.e., the union of matter (materia) and form (forma) in a substance or thing. See forma; materia; substantia.

unio sacramentalis: sacramental union; the union between Christ’s body and blood and the bread and wine of the sacrament, taught by Lutheranism, over against both the Reformed, who accept no union of Christ’s body and blood with the elements, and the Roman Catholics, who argue for the transubstantiation of the bread and wine into body and blood. In the Lutheran doctrine the bread and wine remain and, during the sacramental action (actio sacramentalis, q.v.), are in sacramental union with the true body and blood of Christ. The Reformed scholastics argue against any physical, local, or even spiritual union of the elements with the body and blood of Christ and refer to the union as unio relativa, relative union, or as an unio significativa or unio moralis, a significative or moral union. The union is between the sign and the thing signified only in terms of the significance of the sign and its relation to the thing. The thing (res or res sacramenti, q.v.) is not contained in the sign. Thus the Reformed must ultimately argue that Christ is not received with the signs of bread and wine but rather that participation in the sign (signum, q.v.) in faith is the foundation of a spiritual participation in the thing signified. See Sursum corda.

unio schetikē (σχετική): an incidental or nonessential union; viz., a union of individuals by consensus or disposition (unio habitualis) or a relative (unio relativa) rather than an absolute union. The orthodox use these terms negatively to identify what the union of natures in Christ is not.

unio spiritualis: spiritual union; a term used by the Reformed to indicate the union with Christ that results from the faithful reception of the Lord’s Supper (see coena sacra). This unio is not local (localis), natural (naturalis), or bodily (corporalis), yet it is real (realis) and, since it involves the substance of Christ, essentialis. The Reformed prefer to use the term unio spiritualis in order to indicate the agency of the Spirit, who joins the believer to Christ in faith through the celebration of the sacrament. They reserve unio mystica (q.v.) for the broader, not necessarily sacramental, union with Christ in faith and justification. The Lutherans use unio mystica with reference to the sacrament but clarify the term by defining it as unio spiritualis, both because of the agency of the Spirit and because of the effect of the Spirit’s work on the believer.

unio substantialis: substantial union; a union of two substances; a term sometimes used by the Reformed to indicate the union of the substance of the resurrected Christ with the sacramental elements. Although they deny bodily presence, the Reformed insist that this unio substantialis is an unio realis, or real union, and an unio vera, a true union, accomplished by the power of the Spirit. See coena sacra; praesentia spiritualis sive virtualis; unio sacramentalis.

unio symbolica: symbolic union; used by the Reformed as a synonym of unio significativa, significative union; i.e., the union between the sign and the thing signified in the sacrament. See unio sacramentalis.

unitas: unity, oneness; in metaphysics, unitas or unum is one of the transcendental properties of being; in theology, a divine attribute, unitas Dei, unity of God. In metaphysics, being as such has the property of unity or transcendental unity (unitas transcendentalis) inasmuch as it is individual and neither divided by another nor containing a reality other than itself. Being in general is one in that it stands over against nonbeing; finite beings are one in the sense of having irreducible individuality. Thus the maxim Omne ens in se unum est, All being considered in itself is one.

In theology, God is understood to be one in an absolute sense because there is no other God and because the one God is an absolute unity incapable of division. Unitas therefore indicates that there is no genus God and that the one and only God is simplex, or simple. The scholastics therefore speak of an unitas singularitatis, a unity of singularity, or numerical oneness, and an unitas simplicitatis, a unity of simplicity, or noncomposite nature as both descriptive of the unitas Dei. See bonitas; proprietates entis; simplicitas; veritas.

unitas essentiae: unity of essence. See homoousios; unitas.

unitas operationis: unity of operation or work. See apotelesma; opera Dei ad extra; opera Dei essentialia; unitas.

unitio: unition, a uniting; specifically, the uniting of believers with Christ at the inception of the unio mystica (q.v.). The uniti Christo, those united to Christ, are the recipients, by imputation, of his righteousness, the iustitia Christi. See iustificatio; iustitia; iustitia imputata.

unius substantiae: of one substance. See homoousios.

universalia: universals, forms, ideas; the universalia are either common signs or terms that can be applied descriptively to a number of distinct things, or they are real attributes or predicables that can be found in a number of distinct things. Considered as a predicate (praedicamentum; see praedicamenta), a universal may therefore be further defined as the relation between several things or as the basis in those things for the relation that exists between them. As implied in these definitions, there is a further question to be answered concerning the nature of universals. Are universalia things in their own right, and if so, do they have a subsistence independent of the things of which they are predicated? Three distinct answers to the question are proposed and debated by the scholastics: (1) Universals have a real, extramental existence independent of the things of which they are predicated and therefore may be said to subsist ante rem, before the thing. In this view, the mind knows the universal first and then, by means of the universal, recognizes the thing as an individual instance or embodiment of the universal. This view is called realism because it holds to the independent reality of the universal; it is the Platonic position. (2) Universals have extramental existence, but only in the things of which they are predicated. Universalia are therefore said to subsist in re (q.v.), in the thing, as the inseparable substantial form (forma substantialis; see forma) of the thing. In this view, the mind encounters the thing and from it learns the universal. The relation of the universal to knowledge of the individual can be explained in two ways. The Thomist view is that the senses receive an impression of the thing, and from this as yet unidentified phantasm (phantasma, q.v.), the abstractive powers of the intellect elicit the universal. The universal then becomes the basis for an identification of the individual. In the Scotist view, the intellect first knows the thing as an individual by means of the senses and then abstracts the universal from the thing for the identification of other individuals of the same genus or species. Both the Thomist position and the Scotist critical simplification are called conceptualism and may be identified as Aristotelian in their placement of the universal in the thing. (3) According to various late medieval thinkers, notably William of Ockham, universals have no extramental existence and subsist only in the mind as a result of its abstractive function. Things themselves exist as individuals only, and the universal is merely a term, or name (nomen), used in the identification and classification of individuals by the mind. Universals are therefore said to subsist only in the mind and post rem, after things. Since it views universals as mere names, nomina, this position is called nominalism.

Each of these positions has major implications for the theology of its proponents. The realist view must be qualified theologically by the inclusion of universalia in the mind of God. The existence of universals independent of and outside of the mind of God would render God’s intellect and will powerless over the forms of things and, in the elaboration of the doctrine of divine attributes, would render God a composite and logically derivative being. The conceptualist must similarly take care in the predication of divine attributes not to violate the divine simplicity—not by viewing the attributes as prior to God but rather by explaining them as distinct things in God. In addition, since the conceptualist position allows the reality of universals in re, it must also allow their real existence ante rem in the case of God and God’s knowledge of the created order. The nominalist position has the rather different problem of being unable to argue for the distinction of divine attributes anywhere but in the human mind. The Protestant orthodox tend to follow a conceptualist, or Aristotelian, view of universalia, particularly in their discussion of the divine attributes (attributa divina, q.v.), despite the impact of nominalist theology and its categories of the absolute and ordained power of God (see potentia absoluta; potentia ordinata) on the theology of the Reformers and on Protestant scholastic theology. See causa exemplaris; forma exemplaris; ideae divinae.

universalismus categoricus: categorical universalism, a term used to describe the Arminian form of the doctrine of universal grace. See gratia universalis; universalismus hypotheticus.

universalismus hypotheticus: hypothetical universalism; viz., the teaching, based on the doctrine of the all-sufficient merit of Christ’s obedience (see meritum Christi; obedientia Christi), that Christ’s death is hypothetically universal in its extent, the extent being limited only by the failure of some to believe. Ex hypothesi (q.v.), hypothetically, Christ is said to have died for all, inasmuch as if all human beings would choose to believe, they all would be saved. In actuality, however, no one can come to faith apart from grace, and the application of Christ’s merit is ultimately limited to the elect. This view—that the sufficiency of Christ’s death was such that if all would believe, all would be saved, but that the efficacy or application of his sacrifice is for the elect alone—represents a significant strand in Reformed theology, from the Reformation through the era of orthodoxy.

The issue is complicated by the fact that hypothetical universalism took several forms, particularly in the era of orthodoxy. Thus (1) there was widespread acceptance of the view, from the early Reformation onward through the era of orthodoxy, that since Christ’s satisfaction and merit are infinite and cover the price of all sin, if all would believe, all would be saved. This view could be stated simply, without further speculation concerning either the divine decree or the divine intention in willing salvation. (2) A variety of formulations of this hypothetical universalism among the various delegations to the Synod of Dort not only asserted that all people might be saved if all would believe but also explained the assertion by identifying the universalism strictly with the infinite sufficiency of Christ’s satisfaction, while either linking its efficiency or efficacy with God’s special love for his elect or raising the further distinction between accomplishment (impetratio, q.v.) and application (applicatio) and arguing that although Christ’s satisfaction was such that if all believe all would be saved, the accomplishment of salvation in Christ’s satisfaction was for the elect only. (3) A development of the second view, identifiable in the thought of John Davenant and other British Reformed writers, argued for an ordained sufficiency (sufficientia ordinata) of Christ’s satisfaction as opposed to a mere sufficiency (sufficientia mera), with the implication that the infinite sufficiency of Christ’s death was ordained by God as embodying not an efficacious decree but a divine willingness (velleitas, q.v.) that if all would believe, all would be saved, while nonetheless assuming the effective divine decree that the elect alone will be saved.

(4) Intense debate arose, however, over the particular version of hypothetical universalism that was proposed in the seventeenth century by the French Reformed theologian Moses Amyraut and several of his followers. They argued for an antecedent conditional decree of God to save all who would believe and, given the divine foreknowledge that salvation could not arise from the fallen mass of humanity, a consequent absolute decree to save the elect only. Amyraut’s teaching was rejected by the majority of Reformed scholastics as too close an approach to Arminianism and by various Lutheran scholastics as an essentially synergistic view such as had been rejected in the Formula of Concord. The majority of Reformed orthodox responded to the Amyraldian universalismus hypotheticus by denying an antecedent hypothetical decree in God and arguing both that the divine decree or decrees must be effective and that the effective divine intention to save was limited to the elect. Significantly, although Amyraldianism was strenuously denied by most of the Reformed of the seventeenth century, it was never declared heretical, whether by the French synods that tried Amyraut’s case or by the Formula Consensus Helvetica (1675), which denied it, held it to be theologically mistaken, but refrained from identifying either the doctrine as heresy or its proponents as heretics.

Against both the orthodox Reformed and the Amyraldians, the Lutheran scholastics argue for the all-sufficient value and the universal intention of Christ’s death, without hypothetical qualification. Alternative formulations of the sufficiency of Christ’s death—that if all would believe, all would be saved—were held by various of the Reformers without controversy, and in the seventeenth century by some of the delegates at the Synod of Dort.

Despite the polemical association of Amyraldian hypothetical universalism with Arminian universalism made by some of the disputants in the seventeenth-century debate, the two forms need to be carefully distinguished because the Arminian, or Remonstrant, universalism did not add the qualification that the absolute divine intention was to save only the elect, having given them the gift of faith by grace alone. The Arminian form of universalism was identified as a universalismus categoricus (q.v.), a categorical universalism, as distinct from universalismus hypotheticus. See applicatio salutis; contradictoriae Dei voluntates; intuitu fidei; satisfactio vicaria; sufficientia.

univocatio: univocation; i.e., univocal predication, indicating that a particular predicate or attribute is given in the same way to several things, as the name of a genus (q.v.) is given to each and all of its members. Univocation can be either metaphysical or physical. Univocatio metaphysica refers to generic predications, as “man,” “horse,” or “tree” are predicated of all members of their respective genus. A large number of philosophers and theologians in the early modern era, including a majority of the Reformed, denied the Scotistic concept of the univocity of being—namely, the univocal predication of “being” of all existent things—on the ground that “being,” as lacking differentia, cannot be a genus and on the ground of the absence of proportion between the being of God and the being of finite things. Univocatio physica refers to predications concerning species or individuals, as, e.g., Peter, Paul, and Mary, all human according to genus, are identified as individual by their specific names. See differentia; praedicatio.

univocus: univocal; having a single meaning. See praedicatio.

unum: one; in metaphysics, one of the transcendental properties or universal predicates of being. See bonitas; proprietates entis; unitas; veritas.

unum per se: one thing through or on account of itself; also, similarly, ens per se, a being through or on account of itself; namely, an individual thing or, in Aristotelian terms, a substance in the primary sense. The usage unum per se serves to indicate the nature of an individual substance as an integral or unified thing as opposed to an aggregate or mere gathering of elements, parts, or pieces. See substantia.

unus Deus: the one God.

usus: use, usage, practice; hence, a practice or rite of worship as, e.g., a sacrament. See abusus; Nihil habet rationem sacramenti extra usum a Christo institutum.

usus legis: use of the law. As distinguished by the Protestant scholastics, both Lutheran and Reformed, there are three basic uses of the lex moralis (q.v.). (1) The usus politicus sive civilis, the political or civil use, according to which the law serves the commonwealth, or body politic, as a force for the restraint of sin, as indicated in 1 Timothy 1:9. This first usus stands completely apart from any relation to the work of salvation and functions much as revelatio generalis (q.v.) in bringing some knowledge of God’s will to all human beings. (2) The usus elenchticus sive paedagogicus, the elenctical or pedagogical use; i.e., the use of the law for the confrontation and refutation of sin and for the purpose of pointing the way to Christ, often with reference to Romans 4:7; 7:8; and Galatians 3:21–22, 24. Some of the Lutheran orthodox (e.g., Hollaz) divide this second use into two parts, distinguishing (2a) the purely elenctical use of the law, which merely serves for the peccati manifestatio et redargutio, the manifestation and refutation of sin, from (2b) the usus paedagogicus, according to which the law becomes a guide to Christ in and through the work of the Spirit, a compulsus indirectus ad Christum, an indirect compulsion toward Christ. This division of the second use yields four uses, in which case (3) the usus didacticus sive normativus would become the fourth use. Most frequently, however, the division is threefold, and this latter didactic or normative use is referred to simply as the tertius usus legis (q.v.), the third use of the law. This final use of the law pertains to believers in Christ who have been saved through faith apart from works. In the regenerate life, the law no longer functions to condemn, since it no longer stands elenctically over against humanity as the unreachable basis for salvation, but acts as a norm of conduct, freely accepted by those in whom the grace of God works the good. This normative use is also didactic, inasmuch as the law now teaches, without condemnation, the way of righteousness (cf. Ps. 119:105; Jer. 31:33). In this model, Christ appears as the finis legis, or end of the law, both in the sense that the usus paedagogicus leads to Christ as to a goal and in the sense that the usus normativus has become a possibility for human beings only because Christ has fulfilled the law in himself. There is one major distinction between the Lutherans and the Reformed in the discussion and application of the usus legis: the Reformed lay heavy stress on the tertius usus legis, assuming that faith must spring forth and bear the fruit of good works, as defined by the law in its normative function. The Lutherans, however, see here the danger of works-righteousness and insist that the usus normativus ultimately returns the believer, who remains simul iustus et peccator (q.v.), to the usus paedagogicus and from there again to Christ and his grace as the sole source of salvation. The law, for Lutheranism, can never become the ultimate norm for Christian living but instead must always lead to Christ, who alone is righteous. This difference between the Lutherans and the Reformed arises out of the dialectical relationship of law and gospel in Lutheranism as opposed to the simple distinction of law and gospel within the one foedus gratiae (q.v.) held among the Reformed.

usus loquendi: practice of speaking or experience of speaking usage; i.e., the meaning of words and phrases indicated, not by etymology or philology, but by actual use; also modus loquendi.

usus philosophiae: the uses of philosophy; the Protestant scholastics distinguish three uses of philosophy in theology, all of which conform to the traditional definition of philosophy as the ancilla theologiae (q.v.), or handmaid of theology: (1) usus organicus, the organic use, i.e., the use of philosophy to train the reason, analyze arguments, and serve theology in a purely instrumental manner; (2) usus kataskeuastikōs (κατασκευαστικῶς), the use for argument or for proof, the use of philosophy to adduce ancillary arguments to support theological proof; this use is possible only in the articuli mixti (see articuli puri/mixti), in which both theology and philosophy have a role, e.g., the existence of God; (3) usus anaskeuastikōs (ἀνασκευαστικῶς), the use for demolition (of an argument), the use of philosophy to refute error and find logical gaps in argumentation. See usus rationis.

usus rationis: the use of reason; specifically, the use of reason in theology. In order to avoid what they saw as the abuse of reason in medieval scholasticism, early modern Socinianism, and the new rationalist philosophies of the seventeenth century, the Protestant orthodox distinguished between the legitimate use of reason in theology, variously called usus organicus, usus instrumentalis, or usus ministerialis—and the illegitimate use, the usus magisterialis. The organic, instrumental, or ministerial use of reason recognizes the inherent rationality of human beings and of human discourse, including theology. Reason thus is used organically, according to its place among the natural faculties of soul, and instrumentally or ministerially, as a tool or aid to logical or rational discourse. When, however, reason assumes a magisterial function and presumes to teach theology its contents, it oversteps its limits; the content of theology must rest solely on revelation. In the polemic of seventeenth-century orthodoxy, the Reformed tended to allow a broader use of reason in theology than the Lutherans, arguing, e.g., the irrationality, and therefore the error, of attributing ubiquity to Christ’s body. The Lutherans in return accused the Reformed of allowing an illegitimate usus rationis magisterialis to enter their theology and of arguing, improperly, a normative use of regenerate reason. See theologia naturalis regenitorum; usus philosophiae.

uti: to use; in the Augustinian vocabulary, to love something for the sake of another or to love something for the sake of where it leads or points, i.e., a love suited to means rather than to ends, to things that are less than ultimate. See frui.