Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms

damnatio: damnation; in the technical theological sense, the consignment of individuals to eternal punishment, which takes place at the final judgment (iudicium extremum, q.v.) and occurs because of the unforgiven sins and unremitted punishment of the individual; thus the destiny of all who, at the judgment, are found to be outside of Christ. Note that the verb damno, damnare can simply be rendered “condemn” when not being used with its specifically theological meaning. See praeteritio; reprobatio.

Damnatio consistit in aeterna separatione a visione Dei: Damnation consists in eternal separation from the vision of God. See damnatio; visio Dei.

de condigno / de congruo: See meritum de condigno; meritum de congruo.

de dicto: concerning the statement. See necessitas consequentiae.

de eventu: as a result; in consequence of an event or action.

de facto: in fact, in actuality; distinguished from de jure (q.v.), by right or by law.

de fide: of the faith; viz., doctrines that are necessary for salvation and that must be believed. See articuli fundamentales.

de jure: by right; by law; distinguished from de facto (q.v.), in fact, i.e., the actual circumstances, not necessarily by right. See iure divino / iure humano.

de nihilo: without cause or reason; literally, from nothing. See nihil.

de novo: new, anew, over again.

de omnibus rebus: concerning everything.

de profundis: from the depths or out of the depths; a reference to Psalm 130.

de re: concerning the thing. See necessitas consequentis.

debitio: a debt, indebtedness, something that is owed; also, similarly, debitum (q.v.).

debitio poenae: an owing of punishment or liability to punishment; i.e., one of the effects of disobedience, specifically, the disobedience of Adam. See reatus.

debitum: debt, obligation, something that is owed; also, similarly, debitio (q.v.). See dignitas operum.

debitum naturae: the debt of nature; namely, death.

Decalogus: Decalogue; the ten words or commandments; viz., the law of Moses (lex Mosaica, q.v.).

declaratio: declaration. See promulgatio.

decretum: decree; specifically, the decretum aeternum, or eternal decree, according to which God wills and orders all things; in a restricted sense, the eternal praedestinatio (q.v.) of God. The decretum aeternum can be distinguished from the counsel of God (consilium Dei) only formally, not essentially, since the essential acts of God belong to the divine essence in its simplicity (simplicitas, q.v.) and are identical with the essence itself; nevertheless, in a formal sense, the consilium is the divine decision, and the decretum is the actual willing or expression of that decision. The decretum, like the consilium Dei (q.v.), is utterly free, absolute, and inalterable, logically antecedent to all things, predicated upon nothing but the nature of the divine essence, which is to say upon the consilium or, essentially speaking, on itself. Against the Arminians, the Reformed scholastics are especially adamant in arguing the absolutely antecedent and unconditional character of the divine decree. They are also adamant in polemicizing against the Socinians, who separate the decree realiter from the divine essence. Following the Jesuits, both the Arminians and Socinians posit a scientia media (q.v.) and ultimately argue that the decretum aeternum does not encompass all things. The Lutheran orthodox also differ from the Reformed concerning the absolutely antecedent character of the decree, but only in its restrictive sense of predestination, with the Reformed insisting that nothing falls outside the will of God. The decree is commonly distinguished into the decretum Dei generale, the general decree of God, according to which all things are ordained, and the decretum Dei speciale, the special decree of God, or predestination of human beings to salvation or damnation; i.e., the general decree of providentia (q.v.) and the special decree, praedestinatio (q.v.), the latter decree often being called pars providentiae, a part of providence.

decretum decretans: the decree decreeing; or, more clearly stated, the act of God decreeing his decree, as sometimes distinguished from the decretum decretatum, or the decree understood as the thing decreed. See decretum.

decretum deserendi: decree of desertion; a term for the first positive act of reprobation. See reprobatio.

decretum ex praescientia: decree upon foreknowledge; a term for the second positive act of reprobation. See reprobatio.

decretum horribile: terrifying decree; a much-abused term from Calvin. It does not translate “horrible decree” and in no way implies that the eternal decree is somehow unjust or horrifying, but only that the decree is awesome and terrifying, particularly to those who are not in Christ. See decretum.

decretum non miserandi: decree not to have mercy; a term for the first negative act of reprobation. See reprobatio.

defectus: defect, deficiency, lack, privation. See causa deficiens; malum; privatio; privatio boni.

definitio: definition; from the Latin verb definire, meaning to set a limit on something, hence to limit or mark out the meaning of something for the sake of clarity in discourse. In scholastic argumentation, clarity was obtained by using a vast series of generally agreed on definitions to parse difficult questions with precision. See differentia; distinctio; genus.

definitivus, -a, -um (adj.): definitive, delimited; incapable of description or circumscription but nonetheless a finite presence filling or acting within limits and not beyond them. See praesentia.

deformitas naturae: deformity of nature; a result of sin. Note that the term directly reflects the Augustinian view of evil as nonsubstantial and as a defect or deficiency in a thing. See macula; privatio.

Dei volente: God willing.

deitas: deity, divinity, godhead, divine nature. See Deus.

dektikos (δεκτικός): having the ability or capacity to receive; specifically, with reference to a person’s capacity to receive divine gifts or blessings.

dēmiourgikos (δημιουργικός): formative, creative, having to do with creation; used by the fathers both with reference to human effort and with reference to the work of God.

Deo adjuvante: with God’s assistance; often in the maxim Deo adjuvante, non timendum: With God’s assistance, nothing is to be feared.

Deo gratias: Thanks be to God.

descensus ad inferos: the descent into hell; viz., that portion of Christ’s work that, in the text of the Apostles’ Creed, is mentioned immediately after the death and burial of Christ and immediately before the proclamation of the resurrection. The concept was a cause of debate between Lutherans and Reformed and subject to various interpretations on both sides. In general, the Reformed view the descensus as the final stage of Christ’s state of humiliation (status humiliationis, q.v.), while the Lutherans view it as the first stage of the state of exaltation (status exaltationis, q.v.), or state of exaltation. Among the Reformed, Martin Bucer and Theodore Beza viewed the descensus as identical with the burial of Christ, while Calvin referred the descensus to the suffering of Christ’s soul coincident with the death and burial of the body. The Reformed scholastics tend to draw these themes together and argue that, loosely, the descensus refers to all the spiritual suffering of Christ’s passion and death and, strictly, to the bondage to death indicated by Christ’s three days in the tomb. The Reformed deny both the idea of a local descent of Christ’s soul into a place called hell or Hades and the teaching (based on 1 Pet. 3:19) that he entered Hades to preach salvation to the patriarchs or to men from the age before Noah. Two sixteenth-century Lutheran theologians, Aepinus and Parsimonius, expressed doctrines similar to the Reformed. Aepinus clearly placed the descensus as the final stage of the status humiliationis and viewed it as the suffering of Christ’s soul in his conquest of hell, parallel to Christ’s bodily suffering in his conquest of death. Like the Reformed, Aepinus denied the relevance of 1 Peter 3:19. Parsimonius denied any physical or spatial descensus and similarly referred the descensus to Christ’s suffering. The Formula of Concord condemned speculative controversy on the descensus and argued that the descensus indicated Christ’s deliverance of believers from the “jaws of hell” in and through his victory over death, Satan, and hell. This positive, redemptive reading of the descensus carried over into Lutheran orthodoxy, where the descensus ad inferos is interpreted as a spiritual (i.e., neither physical nor local) descent to the domain of Satan to announce victory and triumph over the demonic powers. In this interpretation, 1 Peter 3:19 is not an evangelical preaching of salvation to the inhabitants of Hades but a legal preaching of the just damnation of the wicked. This is an act, not of the humiliated and suffering Christ, but of the exalted Christ. According to the Lutheran dogmaticians, the descensus follows the quickening of Christ’s body and is the first stage of the status exaltationis.

desertio a gratia divina: desertion by divine grace.

desideratum: something desired.

desiderium gratiae: the longing or ardent desire for grace; a characteristic of fully actualized faith in the individual. See actus fidei; fides.

designatum: the thing indicated by a sign. See signum.

despoteia (δεσποτεία): lordship or mastery.

determinatio: determination, limitation, the act of arriving at a conclusion or decision, the setting of a term or limit; in argument or debate, the concluding discourse resolving or settling the disputation; in logic or causality, the identification or establishment of a result or effect. In the older language of theology and philosophy, a determinatio, including a causal determination, did not need to indicate a matter of absolute necessity, but only the appointment or ordination of the terminus ad quem. See disputatio; fundamentum; terminus.

Deus: God, the supreme being and ruler of the universe; the exact equivalent in Latin of the Greek Θεός (Theos). As distinct from the various biblical names of God (nomina Dei, q.v.) such as Jehovah or El Shaddai, Deus is not a name but a term of reference, indeed, the most general term of reference to the Deity. The scholastic doctrine of God distinguishes, for the sake of discussion, between the essence of God (essentia Dei, q.v.), the attributes of God (see attributa divina), the Trinity (Trinitas, q.v.) of God, and the works of God (opera Dei, q.v.). In brief, the scholastics can describe God as the infinite, uncreated, self-existent, and necessary Spirit, one in essence and three in person, Father, Son, and Spirit, the eternal Creator, Preserver, and Redeemer of all things.

Deus ab omni compositione vera et reali liber est: God is free from all true (i.e., logical) and real (i.e., as between things) composition. See simplicitas.

Deus absconditus / Deus revelatus: the hidden God / the revealed God; the paradox of God’s unknowability and self-manifestation as stated by Luther. The issue is not that God has been hidden and has now revealed himself, but rather that the revelation that has been given to human beings defies the wisdom of the world because it is the revelation of the hidden God. God is revealed in hiddenness and hidden in his revelation. He reveals himself paradoxically to thwart the proud, sub contrario, under the opposite: omnipotence manifest on the cross.

Deus avertat: God forbid.

Deus ex machina: God or a god from a machine; a reference to the practice in ancient Greek drama of lowering a god onto the stage in order to resolve the plot; hence, an artificial solution to a problem.

Deus otiosus: the idle God; viz., the concept of a God not directly involved with contingent existence. This concept is denied by scholastic theology—both of the Middle Ages and of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, whether Roman Catholic, Lutheran, or Reformed—and is typically used by theologians of the early modern era as a description of the Epicurean notion of deity. See concursus; creatio continuata.

Deus propter Christum absolvens sive iustificans: God absolving or justifying on account of Christ; i.e., God as revealed in the gospel.

Deus propter peccata damnans: God damning on account of sin; i.e., God as manifest in the law.

Deus sive natura: literally, God or nature; indicating the identity of God with nature absolutely considered, perhaps better rendered God as nature; a usage associated with Spinoza and early modern pantheism. See natura; natura naturans / natura naturata.

Deus temporis est expers: God is destitute of time; or more felicitously, God has no share in time. See aeternitas.

Deus vult: God wills it.

deutera gennēsis (δεύτερα γέννησις): second birth, regeneration. See regeneratio.

diabolus (from the Greek διάβολος, diabolos): the devil, Satan.

diakrisis pneumatōn (διάκρισις πνευμάτων): the distinction, differentiation, or discernment of spirits; e.g., 1 Corinthians 12:10; a gift given to the church by the Spirit, together with the gifts of prophecy, miracles, healing, and the like. The Protestant scholastics universally recognize the diminution of the more miraculous gifts in the ages of the church, the apostolic and postapostolic era, but also the Spirit’s maintaining in the church the greatest gifts: faith, hope, and love.

dianoētikos (διανοητικός): dianoetic; i.e., pertaining to the process of reasoning. See discursus.

diathēkē (διαθήκη): covenant, testament, pact. See foedus gratiae; foedus operum; testamentum.

dichotomia (διχοτομία): dichotomy; a division into two parts.

dicta probantia: literally, statements proving [something]; thus, prooftexts; i.e., the texts cited in theological systems as an indication of the biblical foundation of a particular doctrine or doctrinal point; also called dicta classica, standard or classic sayings. See locus; locus classicus; sedes doctrinae.

dictum: something said, a statement; pl., dicta. See dicta probantia; obiter dictum.

Dictum sapienti sat est: A word to the wise is sufficient.

dies Domini: day of the Lord; as in Scripture, the second visible coming of Christ, the final judgment. See adventus Christi; dies novissimus; iudicium extremum.

dies irae: the day of wrath; i.e., the final judgment; a term best known from the hymn in the Latin Requiem Mass that begins with Dies irae, dies illa, solvet saeclum in favilla: “Day of wrath, day when the world is reduced to ashes.” See iudicium extremum.

dies novissimus: the last day; viz., the inauguration of the heavenly kingdom of God, consisting in the second visible coming of Christ (adventus Christi, q.v.), the resurrection of the dead (see resurrectio), the last judgment (iudicium extremum, q.v.), and the ordained ends of the elect in eternal blessedness (beatitudo aeterna) and of the reprobate in eternal damnation (see damnatio). The scholastics also note the signa diei novissimi or signa temporis, signs of the last day or signs of the time. The orthodox decry the attempts of the crass or gross chiliasts (see chiliasmus) to predict the exact date of the end by detecting signs of the last days as revealed in Scripture, yet they do allow the existence of the signs and permit their careful use for the admonition, edification, and hope of the faithful. Many of the Protestant writers, both among the Reformers and among the later orthodox, did teach a literal millennium, whether past or future. They therefore classify the signs into categories of signa remota, or remote signs; signa propinqua, near signs; signa propinquiora, nearer signs; and signa proxima, proximate signs. The signa remota are often identified as the events connected with the opening of the first six of the seven seals (Rev. 6:1–17): wars and conflict, famine and pestilence, persecution and earthquakes. The signa propinqua more clearly mark the approach of the end; chief among them are the great apostasy and the accompanying increase of worldliness and unbelief. These are followed by the signa propinquiora, which include the increased lawlessness and indifference to religion resulting from the great apostasy, great political disturbances, and the beginnings of the gathering together of Israel. The signa proxima, finally, include the completion of the mission to the Gentiles, the further increase of political disruption accompanying the manifestation of the “beast” of Revelation 13 and 17, the so-called “abomination of desolation” and the great tribulation that lead to the full development of the power of antichrist (antichristus, q.v.), and the last battle, Armageddon. These signa proxima immediately precede the adventus Christi and the dies novissimus. See consummatio saeculi; interitus mundi.

differentia: differentia; i.e., characteristics or properties that identify a thing or kind of thing as different from other things or other kinds of things. See genus; principium individuationis.

difformitas naturae. See deformitas naturae.

dignitas: goodness, dignity; i.e., goodness in the sense of merit, as distinct from bonitas (q.v.), or moral goodness. See meritum de condigno.

dignitas operum: dignity or value of works; denied specifically by Protestant theology, particularly when construed as a meritorious human work that places God in the position of debtor and constrains God to reward human beings with grace. Even in the covenant of works (foedus operum, q.v.), the Reformed deny any dignitas operum to human obedience that could cause debitum (q.v.), or debt, to exist on God’s part in an absolute sense. Nevertheless, since God, in covenant, has ordained that he will respond graciously to human obedience and faithfulness, God can ex pacto (q.v.), on the basis of his own covenant, become debitor. This latter qualification is rooted in the late medieval conception of pactum (q.v.), or covenant, in relation to the conception of the potentia ordinata (q.v.), though here it is no longer in any relation to the temporal ordo salutis (q.v.) or to human works. See meritum de condigno; meritum de congruo.

dikaiōma (δικαίωμα): a requirement or commandment; specifically, a requirement or commandment of the law.

dikaiosynē (δικαιοσύνη): righteousness, uprightness, justice; both in the sense of human fulfillment of the law (Phil. 3:6) and in the sense of the absolute righteousness of God himself (Rom. 1:17), which makes or declares the faithful to be righteous. See iustificatio; iustitia.

dilectio: love; especially love in the sense of an attraction, as distinct from caritas (q.v.) and amor (q.v.); the virtual opposite of cupiditas (q.v.).

dimensio: dimension, the size or extension of a thing; i.e., a property of material things only, since spiritual things, e.g., souls and angels, do not have extension.

dipleuron (δίπλευρον): two-sided or bilateral. See foedus dipleuron.

discursus: a discourse or conversation; adj., discursivus, -a, -um: discursive, having the characteristics of a discourse. Note that the classical Latin meaning, digressive or running about (from dis and curro), gave place in later Latin to a sense of more formal discourse in which concepts are conjoined or indeed “run through,” usually analytically, as in a treatise or dissertation. The scholastics contrast knowledge that is innate or implanted and knowledge of immediate apprehension with discursive or dianoetic knowledge, which is gained by ratiocination. See cognitio; dianoētikos.

disparata: disparates, opposites; i.e., terms, ideas, or propositions that are mutually exclusive. See opposita.

dispensatio: arrangement or dispensation; the Latin equivalent of oikonomia; a term applied primarily to the arrangement of God’s works and specifically by the Reformed to the successive dispensations of the one covenant of grace: there is one covenant from Abraham onward, but it can be separated into several patterns of administration, i.e., Abrahamic, Mosaic, Davidic, and the New Testament. In general, dispensatio, oikonomia, or its usual transliteration in the Latin of the scholastics, oeconomia (q.v.), refers to the special saving providence of God.

disputatio: disputation; specifically an academic exercise, usually designed as the final exercise leading to an academic degree. In the early modern era, academic disputations typically took the form of a public oral defense of a series of theses, propositions, or aphorisms. The text of the theses for defense was either prepared by the presiding professor or by the student in cooperation and consultation with the professor. Professorial authorship is attested by the numerous sets of disputations of nearly all topics in theology published under the name of the presiding professor and constituting the framework of a body of Christian doctrine.

distincte: distinctly; also, distincte et aperte: distinctly and openly.

distinctio: a distinction, division, or identification of a difference. In large measure scholastic method is based on making distinctions and on the right application of distinctions to particular issues or arguments. It was an assumption of scholastic method throughout its history that “He who distinguishes well, teaches well” (Qui bene distinguit, bene docet). There are, accordingly, numerous distinctions belonging to all topics in theology and philosophy. These distinctions, moreover, like scholastic method itself, do convey a certain minimal level of content or meaning merely in their statement, but they function primarily to clarify the nature and structure of argument rather than to press a particular conclusion. By way of example, a distinction can be made between logical necessity (necessitas consequentiae, q.v.) and a physical or absolute necessity (necessitas consequentis, q.v.), without prejudging specifically what is being considered as necessary in one or the other sense. Similarly, Christ’s satisfaction (satisfactio Christi or satisfactio vicaria, q.v.) can be distinguished according to its sufficiency (sufficientia, q.v.) for all and efficiency (efficientia, q.v.) for the elect or believers, without specifying the nature of the “all” for whom it is sufficient or the grounds of the limitation of its efficacy. See Bene docet, qui bene distinguit.

In perhaps the most general sense, the scholastics identify five levels of distinction extending from real or substantial to the purely rational or logical: (1) Distinctio realis, a real distinction, such as exists between two independent things or substances, as between the sun and the moon or between a human being and a horse. The real distinction can also be called an absolute distinction (distinctio absoluta) or a distinction between equals (distinctio adaequata). There can be real distinctions within things, but then the things themselves are necessarily composites; more precisely this lesser kind of real distinction can be identified as a distinctio inadaequata, a distinction between unequals, such as can be identified between a whole and its parts. (2) Distinctio modalis, a modal distinction, such as can be identified either between a thing and the various modes of its subsistence or among the various modes or ways in which a thing exists. (3) Distinctio formalis, a formal distinction, such as exists between two (or more) formal aspects of the essence of a thing; as, e.g., between intellect and will, which are not separate things but which are also distinguishable within the thing, in this case, the soul or spirit of which they are predicated. The formal distinction is also called the distinctio formalis a parte rei, the formal distinction on the part of the thing. (4) Distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, a distinction by reason of analysis, sometimes qualified or explicated as distinctio rationis ratiocinatae quae habet fundamentum in re, a distinction by reason of analysis that has its basis or foundation in the thing. Since this distinction is neither between things nor in a thing, it is purely rational; yet it is claimed as a distinction expressive of extramental reality since it is grounded on the thing and therefore preserved from being merely a product of the mind. In other words the distinctio rationis ratiocinatae represents no distinction in the thing but a truth of reason concerning the thing. (5) Distinctio rationis rationans, a distinction by reason reasoning; i.e., a merely rational distinction resting only on the operation of the reason and not on the thing. See adaequate; res; substantia.

In Protestant scholastic theology, as in the theology of the medieval scholastics, the question of distinctions is of paramount importance in the discussion of the divine attributes (attributa divina, q.v.). How can theology make predications of an essentially simple being whose attributes are essentially identical? Most of the Protestant scholastics reject the formal distinction and accept the distinctio rationis ratiocinatae. The distinctio modalis was used by some of the Reformed as part of the vocabulary of trinitarian theology, according to which a person can be described as a mode of subsistence (modus subsistendi, q.v.) in the one divine essence, modally rather than really or absolutely distinct from the other divine persons. See Trinitas.

Distinguenda sunt tempora: The times must be distinguished.

distributio: distribution; in the Lord’s Supper, the distribution of the elements and, in the Lutheran doctrine of the real presence (praesentia realis, q.v.), the distribution of the body and blood of Christ. See coena sacra; communio corporis.

distributio meriti Christi: the distribution of the merits of Christ; a term used by Luther to speak of the breaking of the bread and the outpouring of the wine in the Lord’s Supper, as distinguished from the breaking of Christ’s body and the outpouring of Christ’s blood on the cross (the meritum Christi, q.v.). The Lord’s Supper, then, is not a sacrifice; Christ’s body and blood are truly present, but the receipt of Christ’s grace by faithful participants rests on the merit of Christ’s passion and death once for all on the cross, not on a sacrificial character of the eucharistic presence. The Lutheran orthodox follow Luther’s point, but the term distributio meriti Christi does not appear to have been commonly used. See coena sacra.

divinitas: divinity, deity, divine nature or rank. See Deus.

doctor: teacher; especially the doctores ecclesiae, the teachers of the church or eminent writers of past ages, spiritually called professors of doctrine both past and present. In this traditional usage, the title doctor does not indicate possession of a formal degree of doctor from an institution of higher learning: Ambrose and Augustine are counted doctores ecclesiae, as is Thomas Aquinas, whose final degree was that of regent master (magister). In addition, the name of the highest degree offered in medieval universities varied, some using the term magister, others the term doctor.

doctrina: doctrine, teaching.

doctrina divina: divine teaching or doctrine; i.e., the teaching of Scripture, which is the only norm for Christian doctrine, doctrina Christiana.

doctrina e Scriptura Sacra hausta: doctrine drawn from Holy Scripture; i.e., theology or Christian doctrine as defined by the sola Scriptura of the Reformation.

dogma (δόγμα): requirement, commandment, decree; hence, a doctrine or teaching absolutely necessary to the faith, in the strictest sense a doctrine established by an ecumenical council of the church of the first five centuries: thus the Niceno-Constantinopolitan doctrine of the Trinity and the Chalcedonian doctrine of the person of Christ. See articuli fundamentales.

dokimasia (δοκιμασία): a testing or temptation. See tentatio.

dominium: lordship or dominion; specifically, the dominion given to man over the creation in Genesis 1:26–28, associated with the imago Dei (q.v.).

Dominus vobiscum: The Lord be with you.

dona extraordinaria finita: extraordinary finite gifts; viz., powers and attributes bestowed on Christ’s human nature by the Holy Spirit for the sake of Christ’s mediatorial work. The Reformed scholastics emphasize such gifts in their doctrine of communicatio gratiarum (q.v.), or communication of graces, and of communicatio apotelesmatum (q.v.), or communication of accomplishment. By way of contrast, Lutheran orthodoxy emphasizes the communicatio idiomatum (q.v.) and communio naturarum (q.v.), the real communication of properties and communion of natures as the basis for the extraordinary powers of Christ. The Lutherans, then, deny extraordinary finite gifts and argue for the infinite gifts of the Word in communion with its human nature.

Dona nobis pacem: Grant us peace; the final clause of the liturgical Agnus Dei.

donum concreatum: concreated gift; also donum naturale: natural gift; or donum intrinsecum: intrinsic or inward gift; terms used by Protestant scholastics in opposition to the medieval scholastic concept of a donum superadditum (q.v.). The Protestant argument was that the donum gratuitum, the utterly free gift, of iustitia originalis (q.v.) was part of the original constitution of humanity and therefore a donum concreatum, naturale, or intrinsecum rather than something superadded to the original human constitution. By extension, the loss of the iustitia originalis in the fall was the loss of something fundamental to the human constitution that could be resupplied only by a divine act and was not, as the semi-Pelagian tendency in late medieval Scotism and nominalism indicated, something superadded that could be regained by a minimal act of human obedience. See facere quod in se est; homo; imago Dei; meritum de congruo.

donum diakriseōs (διακρίσεως): the gift of distinguishing or differentiating; specifically, the gift of distinguishing between spirits, the diakrisis pneumatōn of 1 Corinthians 12:10.

donum gratiae: gift of grace. See gratia infusa; gratia inhaerens.

donum superadditum: superadded gift; specifically, the gift of grace superadded to human nature after creation but before the fall, a concept debated in the medieval theory of grace and merit and rejected by the Protestant orthodox. The concept arises out of the problem of explaining the hypothetical ability of Adam and Eve to have retained their original righteousness. Augustine recognized (City of God 14.27) that a finite nature, such as that present in Adam, would of necessity be mutable and liable to fall. Indeed, if Adam were created fully righteous and also mutable (as indeed he was), then any change would constitute a fall. Augustine therefore argued for a gift of resistible grace to Adam, before the fall, that made Adam able to choose the good and preserve his will in its pristine integrity. This grace can be described as an auxilium sine quo non (q.v.), an assistance without which no continuance of righteousness is possible. The medieval scholastics raised the question of the relation of this superadded grace to Adam’s original righteousness. Aquinas maintained that the donum superadditum was part of the original human constitution and that its loss was the loss of the original capacity for righteousness. Since the superadded grace was not merited in the beginning, it cannot be regained by merit after the fall. Franciscan theology, particularly as mediated to the later Middle Ages by Scotus, argued that the donum superadditum was not part of the original constitution or original righteousness of human beings but was to be considered truly as a gift merited by a first act of obedience on the part of Adam performed by Adam according to his purely natural capacities (ex puris naturalibus). Since Adam could, by doing a minimal or finite act, merit the initial gift of God’s grace, his fallen progeny might, by doing a minimal act, also merit the gift of first grace (see meritum de congruo). The Reformers and the Protestant orthodox reject the idea of any remaining ability in human beings to do good and argue for the necessity of an effective gratia praeveniens (q.v.), or prevenient grace. In place of the idea of a donum superadditum, they argue that the original righteousness of Adam and the posse non peccare (q.v.), or ability not to sin, was a donum concreatum (q.v.), a gift given in the original human constitution. See homo; status purorum naturalium.

ductio per contradictoriam propositionem: reckoning or argument by means of the contradictory proposition; an argument that proceeds to prove the truth of the proposition in question negatively, by showing the impossibility of its contradiction, therefore, also called ductio per impossibile, argument by means of the impossible.

dulia (from the Greek δουλεία, douleia): veneration or reverence. See latria.

duplex cognitio Dei: twofold knowledge of God; a distinction emphasized by Calvin in the final edition (1559) of the Institutes and carried over into Reformed orthodoxy as a barrier to including natural theology in a foundational way in the orthodox system of doctrine. Thus the general, nonsaving knowledge of God as Creator and, in some formulations, as the wrathful Judge of sin—a knowledge accessible to pagan and Christian alike—is distinguished from a special, saving knowledge of God as Redeemer. This latter, saving knowledge is available only in the supernatural revelation given in Scripture. Lutherans did not enunciate the principle in the same terms; they nevertheless observe it equally rigorously, to the end that neither of the major forms of Protestant orthodoxy drew on natural theology as a basis or foundation on which to build a body of Christian doctrine.

Still, both the Reformed and the Lutherans recognized that truths concerning God and his work were accessible through rational encounter with natural revelation and both also saw the usefulness of developing natural theology as a form of philosophy, often distinguished from metaphysics. Whereas metaphysics was typically defined as the science of being in general, natural theology was understood as a form of philosophy dealing with particular spiritual beings—namely, God, angels, and the human soul—often also with consideration of the work of God in creating and preserving the natural order. See metaphysica; theologia naturalis; theologia naturalis / theologia revelata sive supernaturalis; theologia naturalis regenitorum.

duplex providentiae schola: the twofold school of providence; a term used by late orthodox writers in the era of rational supernaturalism to distinguish the personal and the general experience of providence in their attempt to prove providence from human experience. See providentia.

duplex veritas: double truth; viz., the theory that a thing can be true in philosophy but false in theology, or be false in philosophy but true in theology. The idea of a duplex veritas rests upon the seeming frequent contradiction between revelation and the results of human reason or experience: e.g., the birth of Jesus from a virgin; the doctrine that God is both one and three; the doctrine of creation ex nihilo (q.v.). The problem was pressed in the era of orthodoxy by Daniel Hoffmann, who not only insisted on the existence of duplex veritas but called theology the vera veritas, true truth, as distinct from philosophy, the damnable falsa veritas, false truth, which is superseded by theology. The orthodox, both Lutheran and Reformed, responded by carefully delimiting the usus philosophiae (q.v.) and by arguing that philosophy or reason and theology, correctly understood, do not contradict each other and do not require a theory of double truth. Thus the virgin birth proposes a miracle, not a claim that virgins in general can bear; the doctrine of the Trinity shows God to be one in one way and three in another and does not violate the law of noncontradiction; the doctrine of creation ex nihilo does not indicate the origin of something from nothing in a general sense, but the active creation of something by the power of absolute being. Protestant scholasticism generally argued, against the duplex veritas, that theology never contradicts reason directly but frequently supplies truths of revelation that transcend the powers of reason.

dynamis (δύναμις): power; in philosophy, the power to accomplish change, i.e., potency (potentia, q.v.); in theology, the power as distinct from the essence, or ousia (q.v.), of God; the classic adoptionist Christology proposes the indwelling of divine dynamic rather than divine ousia in the human Jesus and is referred to as the heresy of dynamic monarchianism. See adynamia.