Black Hawk Down

SOURCES

So many of the men who fought in this battle agreed to tell me their stories that most of the incidents related in this book were described to me by several different soldiers. Where there were discrepancies, one man’s memory generally worked to improve the others’. In some cases, comparing stories was a useful check on embellishment. I found most of the men I interviewed to be extraordinarily candid. Having had this experience, they seemed to feel entrusted with it. Most were forthright to the point of revealing things about themselves they found deeply troubling or embarrassing. Once or twice, having been unable to corroborate a story, when I pressed the soldier who originally related it to me, he backed down and apologized for having repeated something he himself did not witness. I have stayed away from anecdotes told secondhand.

With very few exceptions, the dialogue in the book is either from the radio tapes or from one or more of the men actually speaking. My goal throughout has been to re-create the experience of combat through the eyes of those involved; to attempt that without reporting dialogue would be impossible. Of course, no one’s recollection of what they said is ever perfect. My standard is the best memory of those involved. Where there were discrepancies in dialogue they were usually minor, and I was able to work out the differences by going back and forth between the men involved. In several cases I have reported dialogue or statements heard by others present, even though I was unable to locate the actual speakers. In these cases the words spoken were heard by more than one witness, or recorded in written accounts within days after the battle.

For understandable reasons, very few of the Delta operators who played such an important role in this battle agreed to talk to me about it. Their policy and tradition is silent professionalism. Master Sergeant Paul Howe, who has left the unit, obtained official permission, but risked the opprobrium of his former colleagues for speaking so candidly with me. Several current members of the unit also found ways to communicate with me. I am grateful to them. I also obtained the written accounts of several key members of the Delta assault force. It enabled me to provide a rare picture of these consummate soldiers in action, from their own perspective. All told, this input represents a small fraction of the unit, so the Delta portion of this story is weighted more heavily from Howe’s and the others’ perspectives than I would have liked.

INTERVIEWS

BOOKS

Hazardous Duty, COL David H. Hackworth, U.S. Army, Avon Books, 1997. Hack-worth herein continues his war against the status quo in the U.S. Army, and offers a brief but fairly accurate account of the battle in Chapter Six, “Unfortunate Casualties.” There are inaccuracies (as noted below and in the Epilogue) and some slippery reasoning, but Hackworth’s highly opinionated account is basically correct and makes for spirited reading.

Losing Mogadishu, Jonathan Stevenson, Naval Institute Press, 1995. This is a critique of the overall UN/U.S. effort in Somalia and is a classic exercise in summing up policy mistakes in retrospect, rife with “flagrant misreadings” and “precisely wrong” approaches, which is the easiest of all academic sports. The battle itself gets very short shrift.

Mogadishu, Heroism and Tragedy! Kent Delong and Steven Tuckey, Bergin & Garvey, 1994. A hasty, sincere effort at a re-creation of the battle based on interviews with a few of the participants, most of them pilots. It is full of mistakes, everything from misspelled soldiers’ names to screwed-up time sequences, but it is well-meaning and right out of the old rah-rah school of military reporting.

On the Edge, Elizabeth Drew, Simon & Schuster, 1994. Drew’s book is an account of President Clinton’s first two years in office, and affords the best insights into the decision making (or lack of same) that led to the battle, and the administration’s reaction in its aftermath.

Out of America, Keith Richburg, A New Republic Book, Basic Books, 1997. Richburg is a Washington Post reporter who wrote about the events in Somalia as they happened. His book records his mounting disillusion, as an African-American, with Africa after traveling and reporting there for several years. Some of his insights into Aidid and the situation that led up to the battle are excellent, although understandably much colored by his anger over the brutal deaths of Dan Eldon and Hos Maina on July 12 at the hands of a Somali mob.

The Road to Hell, Michael Maren, The Free Press, 1997. This is a well-written book about the international policies that led to the complete collapse of Somalia, and ultimately to the UN intervention and this battle. Maren offers fresh insights into the sometimes destructive role played by international goodwill.

Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s, Daniel P. Bolger, Presidio, 1995. I found this to be a very impressive and accurate book. Chapter Seven on Somalia, “Down Among the Dead Men,” is the best thing I had read about the battle and the entire intervention from a military point of view. Bolger is fair, thorough, and accurate.

Somalia and Operation Restore Hope, John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995. This is the definitive narrative account of the UN and U.S. intervention in Somalia, much of it through Oakley’s eyes (he is a former U.S. ambassador to Somalia and served as President Clinton’s envoy to Somalia after the battle).

The United Nations and Somalia, 1992–1996, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume III, Department of Public Information, UN, 1996. This is the definitive reference book for the UN interventions in Somalia.

ARTICLES

“Experiences of Executive Officer from Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment and Task Force Ranger during the Battle of the Black Sea on 3–4 October, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia,” Capt. Lee A. Rysewyk (published in-house by the Combined Arms and Tactics Division, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia). A good overview of the battle that includes the official operational time line.

“Fast Rope into Hell,” Dale B. Cooper, Soldier of Fortune, July 1994. A spirited account of part of the fight, in true guts-and-glory style, primarily based on interviews with air force PJs Fales and Wilkinson.

“Heroes at Mogadishu,” Frank Oliveri, Air Force Magazine, June 1994. An account of the actions of air force personnel Wilkinson, Fales, and Bray.

“Mission to Somalia,” Patrick J. Sloyan, Newsday, December 5–9, 1993. A superb analysis of how and why the battle took place, with some good bits from the fight itself.

“Mogadishu, October 1993: A Personal Account of a Rifle Company XO,” Capt. Charles P. Ferry, Infantry, October 1994. A rather dry account of the actions of the 10th Mountain Division.

“The Raid That Went Wrong,” Rick Atkinson, The Washington Post, January 30, 1994. An excellent and amazingly accurate account of the battle from both the American and Somali points of view.

“Rescue of the Rangers,” Ed Perkins, Waterdown Daily Times, October 2, 1994. A very ambitious, readable, and accurate account of the actions of the 10th Mountain Division.

“A Soldier’s Nightmare,” Philip F. Rhodes, Night Flyer, 1st Quarter 1994. Another account of Fales’s experiences, also packaged as “Courage Under Fire” in Airman, May 1994.

“Task Force Ranger Operations in Somalia 3–4 October 1993,” U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Army Special Operations Command History Office, June 1, 1994 (unpublished). The official twelve-page summary of the battle with fifty-six pages of brief accounts of individual heroism.

NOTES

The Assault

1 “At liftoff ... usually amounted to nothing,” Eversmann, Diemer, Sizemore, Nelson, McLaughlin, Galentine. In the early days of air mobile assaults, aircraft loads were noted with a numeral chalked on the side of the fuselage. Hence the term, chalk. One of the unique things about today’s army, especially elite units like the Rangers, is that the men assigned to it live and train together, often for years. Mission statement and overall design is from “Task Force Ranger Operations in Somalia 3–4 October 1993,” prepared by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOC) and the USSOC History Office, dated June 1, 1994 (hereafter called USSOC report). “Waiting for the code word ... on a taut rope,” Details of the armada are from the USSOC report and Matthews, McMahon, Durant, P. Howe, and Jones. “There were signs ... ‘Be careful.’” Dave McKnight, Struecker, Eversmann, Schilling. Description of Garrison also from Ranger snapshots. “The swell ... festering urban rot,” Eversmann, Nelson, Diemer, Lechner, M. Goodale, Stebbins, etc. Description of the city is from my trip to Mogadishu and from videotape and photographs taken by Rangers and by army observation helicopters and the spy plane. (I have seen a total of about an hour and a half of highlights from the approximately fifteen hours of battle video shot from the plane and observation helicopters, extremely high-quality color videotape for the most part.) “In his bird ... was among them,” Eversmann et al. and the USSOC report. The acceptance rate for those soldiers invited to try out for Delta varies from class to class, but 10 percent is a fair average according to Howe and Burruss, who served as Garrison’s second in command when he commanded the unit. Some of the more general insights into Ranger mentality came from conversations with M. Goodale, Nelson, Sizemore, Squeglia, Floyd, Anderson, Waddell, Perino, Othic, and Spalding, who gave me the “all-star football team analogy.” I interviewed the P-3 pilot, Jim McMahon, who was airborne over the city until about dusk, at which point the OH-58Ds took over surveillance and taping.

2 “It was only a three-minute flight ... alerted Eversmann,” Eversmann, Matthews, P. Howe, USSOC report. Quotes in italics set off by the long dash are of radio transmissions and in the text are meant to indicate a voice being heard on the radio. Most are taken directly from transcripts of command-net radio traffic during the fight, which was recorded. Some from the Ranger company net or Delta assault net are based on interviews. References to time here and throughout come from the operational time line constructed by Task Force Ranger’s operations cell, which notes every significant event in the fight from “Oct. 3, 1993, 1350—CISE reports possible Salad/Qeydid mtg at house near VIC olympic Hotel,” to “Oct. 4, 1993, 0916— Ground commanders report all pers accounted for except for the 4 crewmembers and 2 snipers inserted into crash site 2.” “The Little Birds moved ... fired a shot,” radio transcripts, USSOC report, and battle video. “Delta rode in on benches ... assault’s outer perimeter,” P. Howe, USSOC report, battle video, Jones, and various written accounts of the battle prepared in the days after the fight by members of the Delta teams. Descriptions of the actions of Howe and Rierson come from my interviews with Howe, who spoke with Rierson at length about the gunfight immediately afterward. Rierson was killed on October 6 in a mortar attack on the airfield. Hooten’s memories are from his written account of the battle. “As ropes dropped ... one going in,” Thomas. “Hovering high ... something overripe,” Eversmann, Diemer. “Blackburn was bleeding ... behind two parked cars,” Eversmann and an account of Good’s actions prepared by USSOC historians who interviewed dozens of participants in the days after the fight. Eversmann recalls the chopper jerking suddenly just as Blackburn leapt for the rope, but no such movement is visible on the videotape, which clearly shows the young Ranger tumble out the door. Blackburn, who I did not interview, has reportedly made a full physical recovery, but has no memory of his fall or of subsequent events on October 3. “Eversmann shouted ... weren’t being heard,” Eversmann, Moore. “Eversmann tried ... sharpshooting me,” Eversmann, Perino. “The radio call brought ... an IV,” Schmid and an account of Bullock’s actions by a USSOC historian. “Fire was growing ... roll out of here,” Eversmann, Diemer, McLaughlin. Rick Atkinson’s excellent reconstruction of the battle in The Washington Post (January 30, 1994) quotes Somali militia leaders who described efforts to bus fighters to the market area primarily from the north, which would help explain why Chalk Four was so embattled. “Schmid, the Delta medic ... ‘he’s gonna die,’” Schmid, Eversmann. “Eversmann called Perino ... on his own,” Eversmann, Perino, McLaughlin, Schmid.

3 “On the screens ... near that part of town,” Dave McKnight, Marsh. The description of how events in Mogadishu had deteriorated after the Marines withdrew is from J. Howe. “It was the one place ... lose the war,” Garrison’s prescient memo was quoted in Samuel Bolger’s book, Savage Peace, and also in news accounts subsequent to the battle. “The timing was also ... that much more deadly,” Matthews, Goffena, Durant, Jones, Yacone. “Night afforded ... worst possible time,” Dave McKnight, Burruss, Bryden, and my observations in Mogadishu. “Still, the chance ... pressure for success was mounting,” Matthews, Dave McKnight, State Department and Task Force Ranger memos. The line from Smith is from a September 17 letter to his parents. “Just that morning ... go and be stupid,” description of Garrison is from Dave McKnight, Marsh, Burruss, and Rangers. Details of the general’s frustration come from his three-page October 3 memo to General Hoar, entitled “To Keep You Informed.” Gosende’s memo was written September 15. “And just that morning ... rockets on the Little Birds,” USSOC report, Steele, Matthews, Rangers. “Lieutenant Jim Lechner ... ‘Roger,’” Lechner.

4 This section is primarily based on my interview in Mogadishu of Ali Hassan Mohamed. A number of the Somalis I interviewed were clearly making up stories about where they were and what they saw on October 3, but thanks to the detailed accounts I’d gotten from American soldiers it was pretty easy to sort fact from fiction. The “Rangers” Ali saw were most likely men from the Delta command Black Hawk who roped in about a block off target, and initially cleared out a courtyard about a block west of the target building, where they consolidated before moving back out on the street. The shot that killed Ali’s brother probably came from a minigun providing covering fire for their movement.

5 This section is based largely on my interviews with P. Howe, although the overall impressions of Delta were also influenced by interviews with other present and former members of that unit, and with the Rangers who fought with them in Somalia. Friction between Steele and the D-boys started on the first day they trained together at Fort Bragg. Steele’s company had been involved in manuevers at Fort Bliss when they were summoned quickly to Bragg. When they arrived, according to Steele, Delta wanted to throw his men right into a training exercise. Steele said he demanded more time to get his unit organized, and wanted a more precise plan of action for his men than the operators were inclined to present. I have seen a videotape purporting to show the friendly fire incident on top of the target building. It shows Howe and his team crouched defensively behind a low concrete wall as chunks of it fly around them. There is no way from the videotape to tell exactly where the shots were coming from, but several sources in Delta and the Rangers confirmed the shooter was a Ranger with Chalk Two. Sergeant First Class Steven Lycopolus, then a staff sergeant, took the blame for the shooting, which he said was actually done by a junior member of his chalk. According to Lycopolus, he refused to turn over the culprit when Captain Steele demanded to know who the shooter was, so Steele told him, “Then you will have to accept the responsibility.” Other Rangers discount this story and point the finger at Lycopolus, who was unpopular anyway because of another alleged fratricide incident described in Part III. The source of the earlier shooting was not identified.

6 “Specialist John Stebbins ... as they zipped past,” Stebbins, Galentine. “Up the street ... not seen again,” Steele. “Across the alley ... Was this the right thing?” M. Goodale, K. Goodale. Kira Goodale choked up reading the passage from Mike’s letter over the phone. The only photograph I know to have been taken from the ground during the early part of this fight was snapped by Lechner looking west from Chalk One’s southeast blocking position. Through the dusty haze it shows Goodale and Williamson crouched behind the car hulk, and Stebbins prone covering an alley south. In the distance you can see the members of Chalk Three spaced out along the south wall of the target. The target house itself rises above the wall in the background. One of the fast ropes is stretched out across the alley. “At his corner ... woman fell dead,” Perino. Somalis I interviewed vehemently denied that women and children were used as human shields, although they did say women and children helped as spotters. Nearly all the Rangers who roped into the fight told me independently of witnessing women and children spotting for and shielding gunmen, especially early in the fight.

7 “As he roped in ... most of the fire,” Waddell. “Nelson had been ... the top of the wall,” Nelson, Waddell, Yurek. DiTomasso’s concerns and actions were recorded in detail in his extensive written account. “The fire was not ... and enter blasting,” Yurek. “From his position ... Goddamn!” Nelson, Waddell, Yurek, Twombly.

8 Bray’s written account, Hooten’s written account, P. Howe, Dave McKnight.

9 “After the helicopter force ... an assistant gunner,” Streucker, Burns, Othic, Spalding, and Schilling. “Dom Pilla was ... their next skit,” Nelson. Diemer was the soldier Steele questioned about going to church. “Streucker and the rest ... convoy at the hotel,” Struecker, B. Thomas. “Before the convoy ... returning fire,” Gay, who told me of this in an interview and who also wrote a detailed, colorful account of his actions and observations during the battle, entitled “Post-Op Report/Strong Point Assault/10-3-93.” It is also recorded in SEAL Homer Nearpass’s written account. When he returned to the States, Gay hoped to make some money endorsing the Randall knife for the manufacturer. Not many people could say their knife blade stopped a bullet. The manufacturer expressed no interest. “Struecker was assigned ... silence followed,” Struecker, B. Thomas, and the written account of SEAL Richard Kaiser.

10 Ali Hussein.

11 Struecker, B. Thomas.

12 “Private Clay Othic ... ‘tough go cyclic,’” Othic, Spalding, P. Howe. “Othic’s Missouri buddy ... fast and accelerated,” Spalding. “For Sergeant John Burns ... with amazement,” Burns. “One Humvee back ... moving again,” Kallman. “From his turret ... took the gun,” Othic.

13 Galentine, Eversmann, Diemer, Berendsen.

Black Hawk Down

1 “Mohamed Hassan Farah heard ... was too much,” details of the July 12 attack on the Abdi House are drawn from my interview of Mohamed Hassan Farah in Mogadishu and an interview there with Abdullahi Ossoble Barre. Both men were injured inside the house. The surprise missile attack was also witnessed by former Canadian military officer Matthew Bryden, who was working for an international aid organization in Mogadishu at the time. I interviewed Bryden in Nairobi, where he was working for an organization called the Wartorn Societies Project. He heard Cobra helicopters move in low over the city and, stepping outside, watched as they formed a semicircle around the target house and began shooting. An experienced hand in Somalia, Bryden left the city, warned by a Somali friend that there would be trouble. Four Western journalists, Dan Eldon, Hos Maina, and Anthony Macharia of Rueters and Hansi Kraus, a German photographer working for the Associated Press, rushed to the scene after the attack and were set upon and killed by an angry mob. The incident was widely reported around the world after it happened, but the emphasis in the stories was on the deaths of the four journalists. In fact, the Abdi House attack represented an unprecedented step by the UN, what Washington Post reporter Keith Richburg, in his book Out of America, called “the UN’s first-ever officially-authorized assassination” (p. 79). The incident was provoked by Aidid’s escalating violence. The warlord had taken to assassinating Somalis employed by the UN. The July 12th attack did more than any single act to stir up local support for Aidid and the Habr Gidr, and turned many moderate Somalis who had supported the intervention against the international mission. In my interviews with J. Howe, he told me that he believes there was a separate meeting of Habr Gidr elders going on in the neighborhood at the same time, and that propagandists have deliberately confused that with the one under way in the Abdi House. I think he is mistaken. The eyewitness accounts of Farah and Barre agree in every particular, and correspond to the official version of the attack in the UN Blue Book, Volume VIII, The United Nations and Somalia 1992–1996 (The UN Blue Book Series, p. 404). The initial casualty counts differed. UNOSOM acknowledged 20 deaths, all men—while videotape taken at the scene showed women among the dead (Richburg, pp. 79–80). The International Committee of the Red Cross said there were 215 Somali casualties, including 54 dead. Aidid’s supporters distributed a list of 73 dead, including women and children. According to Richburg, American officials in Somalia at the time conceded the Red Cross estimate was probably correct (p. 80), and every eyewitness I interviewed placed the number of dead at 70 or more. Oakley accepts the higher figure. Bryden, Farah, and Barre all said many of the Somalis killed were well-respected moderates opposed to Aidid’s murderous acts against the UN. The attack still stirs up deep anger and bitterness among the Somalis from all walks of life I interviewed in Mogadishu. The deaths of the four journalists prompted most Western news organizations to pull reporters out of Mogadishu. The AP hung on until September, when Aidid started threatening to kidnap American journalists. When the battle happened on October 3, there were no American journalists in Mogadishu. The videotape and most of the still photos seen on TV and in the world press were shot by Somali stringers, with the exception of still photos by Toronto Star photographer Paul Watson. “Bashir Haji Yusuf heard the helicopters ... and harrassed,” Yusuf. I was skeptical of the story about the baby, but Burns confirmed it. He said that on one mission after fast-roping down, he and his men went looking for an infant that had been swept from its mother’s arms as they descended. The flex-cuffed woman screamed hysterically until a translator arrived to explain. Burns said he found the baby unhurt. It had been blown through the wall of a nearby rag hut. The diary of a member of the 160th who asked not to be identified also notes the phenomenon—“the Black Hawk blew the baby right out of her arms and [it] rolled down the street.” “Yusuf was disappointed ... the shooting start,” Yusuf. The September 9 incident is noted in the UN Blue Book (p. 407), which officially notes one Pakistani soldier killed, two Paki soldiers injured, and three U.S. soldiers injured. The official account notes the use of TOW missiles and cannon by QRF Cobra helicopters, but does not estimate the number of Somali dead. It notes, “This incident was followed by media accusations of indiscriminate fire by UNOSOM, on Somali crowds. UNOSOM, admitting ‘numerous’ casualties on the Somali side among the combatants, denied the allegations, which remain unconfirmed.” The diary of the l 60th member records the skirmish and the Paki death and injuries, and goes on to say, obviously secondhand: “Well, it did not take long for the place to [be] considered a free fire zone, and in came the Cobras. They put two TOW missiles into the dozer so the locals could not get it, and the 20 mm cannon took out 30 to 40 of the bad guys.” The next day’s entry notes, “Well, as it turned out the skinnies are real pissed off, the Cobras killed as many as 100, they were shooting into crowds where they were taking fire. Remember, it was a free fire zone, for some reason, these people are strange, or maybe smart depending on how you look at it. They will use women as cover and concealment for when they shoot at us to make it harder to see who is doing the shooting, if we can see them at all. Then they call us killers of women and children when we shoot the very same people who are shooting at us and we kill some of the people that they are using for cover.”

2 Waddell, Nelson, DiTomasso.

3 Dowdy, Frank, J. Yacone, B. Yacone, radio tapes.

4 Nelson, DiTomasso, Diemer, Eversmann, Twombly, and radio tapes.

5 Aden. His account of Super Six One’s downing and subsequent events checked out perfectly with battle video and accounts of men who survived the crash. Few unpaved streets in Mogadishu have official names. I have relied on Aden and on Bushir Sudi, a Mogadishu native who now lives in St. Louis Park, Minnesota, who assured me the streets around the first crash site were widely known as Marehan Road and, one block west of the crash, Wadigley.

6 Battle video. Insights into Garrison’s predicament came from interviews with Dave McKnight, P. Howe, Marsh, and others.

7 Nelson, DiTomasso, Waddell, Steele, Yurek.

8 “Piloting the Little Bird ... up the alley.” Jones, battle video, Goffena, J. Yacone. “Lieutenant DiTomasso ... round the corner,” DiTomasso, Nelson. “As the rest ... coming out,” Jones, radio tapes. The quote from Busch is reported in the May 30, 1994, commemorative issue of The Army Times.

9 Durant, Goffena, Jones, Frank, and B. Yacone. Some of the background on Durant came from reporting at the time of his capture by The Philadelphia Inquirer and The New York Times.

10 “Admiral Jonathan Howe’s first inkling ... slipped away,” J. Howe, Oakley, Lake, Powell. Additional insights into Aidid are from Richburg’s Out of Africa, and from Michael Maren’s The Road to Hell, which argues that the UN and U.S. manhunt for Aidid significantly strengthened the warlord’s standing in Mogadishu. “Legend on the streets ... into a folk hero,” The story of Aidid’s escape from the UN cordon, which may be apocryphal, reflects the warlord’s growing local stature through this ordeal. It was told to me by Mohamed Hassan Farah. “The decision to attack ... Howe relented,” J. Howe, who still believes only about twenty Somalis were killed, and only key military planners for Aidid’s militia. “Howe kept pushing ... America’s white whale,” J. Howe, Lake, Powell, and Elizabeth Drew’s On the Edge, an account of Clinton’s first years in the White House. Drew’s is the best account I’ve read of the Somalia episode from the White House’s perspective. My requests to interview President Clinton were denied. “Task Force Ranger ... out of business,” January 5, 1994, memo from Garrison to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, summarizing the entire Task Force Rangers mission (hereafter “January 5 Garrison memo”). “Howe had initially ... razor wire,” J. Howe, January 5 Garrison memo. “Aidid was feeling ... very tense,” transcript of a September 26 interrogation of a clan “colonel.” This was the day after the 10th Mountain Division Black Hawk was shot down. The colonel told his interrogators, “As a result [of the downing] Aidid has received increased support and encouragement. Up until now the people did not believe he could destroy a helicopter, now they do. They are not as afraid of the helicopters as they were before.” The colonel also warned that Aidid was trying to assemble five hundred men to assault the airport Task Force Ranger base. “In late August ... Garrison’s pressure,” J. Howe, Oakley, Lake, On the Edge. “Peace had been the reason ... once and for all,” J. Howe.

11 Abdi Karim Mohamud, who on several occasions acted as a guide for Peter Tobia and myself in Mogadishu. Abdi Karim and his friend Abdi Tahalil visited us several times and sat up late discussing the story. They brought us eyewitnesses to the fighting. Abdi Tahalil’s wife was shot on one of the earlier Ranger missions. She recovered, but will be unable to bear children. His brother was killed in the fighting around the target house on October 3. According to Abdi Tahalil, his brother was driving a taxi and got caught up in the assault. They found his charred remains inside the burned vehicle. A number of the American soldiers I interviewed expressed surprise at the employment of Somalis to perform work in and around U.S. compounds. Abdi Karim was employed at the old U.S. embassy, but there were Somalis who were contracted to do electrical work at the Task Force Ranger hangar and to service the portable toilets outside. Given that the Ranger base was considered secret enough to confiscate film from those who just snapped pictures of it from the outside, it seems odd that Somali workers were allowed inside. The workers all got a pretty good eyeful of the task force’s numbers, weapons, and locations inside the fences, information that would have been helpful to know—even just for the mortar crews who nightly lobbed rounds into the airport base.

12 Schilling, USSOC report, battle video, radio tapes.

13 Durant, Matthews, radio tapes, battle video, Goffena, J. Yacone.

14 “After they had ... right rear window,” McLaughlin, Carlson. “About a hundred yards ... ‘We’re driving over,’” Eversmann, Steele. In his book To Fight with Intrepidity, Major John D. Lock notes Eversmann’s actions here as a significant lapse: “Eversmann informed his company commander that he was moving out when, in reality, he had no intention of doing so. Only by luck and accident were he and his men discovered by LTC McKnight when he drove by the squad’s position with his convoy. If it weren’t for this fortuitous moment, there would have been an additional twelve Rangers added to the KIA total.” Perhaps. I think Major Lock overstates the point. Eversmann did intend to follow Steele’s order to move his men out on foot, even though he didn’t convey to the captain how difficult this was going to be. Had Chalk Four not been picked up by the convoy and been stranded, it certainly is possible that they would all have been killed. It’s also possible they would have been spotted from the air, or been able to move to the crash site on foot. “Schilling provided ... still, unscathed,” Schilling, Eversmann, Gay. “Nobody in the rear ... fret over it,” Spalding, Gay, Burns, Othic, P. Howe, Schilling, McLaughlin, etc.

15 Goffena, J. Yacone, radio tapes, Durant.

16 “Yousuf Dahir Mo’alim ... ran on ahead.” Mo’alim. The description of the nature of Aidid’s militia comes from Mo’alim and also my interview with militia leader Sharif Ali Mohamed and with Oakley and Bryden. In the September 26 interrogation of the cooperative Habr Gidr “colonel,” he explained, “First you must understand you are dealing with essentially two different groups of people here. The first group are Aidid’s ‘Revengers’ who are given money and khat prior to an operation. If they complete an operation successfully, they receive the remainder of their pay. These people will not lay down their weapons as long as Aidid continues to pay them. The second group are the innocents, the ones who live in the neighborhoods the revengers launch their attacks from. Once the U.S./UNOSOM launch a reactionary or counterattack, innocent people have their homes damaged, and are sometimes killed and/or wounded. These events Aidid follows up with such propaganda as, ‘First they will kill your family, then enslave you, then force you to change your religion.’ Most families don’t understand what is going on, and know if they speak up the revengers will kill them. Aidid has no solid, organized force. His tendency is to use small groups like revengers, of which there are no more than 50 or 60. They hide within the people—because he knows your response will hurt the people, turning them against you.” Radio warnings of approaching Aidid militia conform in time, description, and direction of approach to the movement of Mo’alim and his men. There were other groups moving at the same time and in the same manner and direction. “Ali Hussein ... the running crowd,” Ali Hussein.

17 “In ordinary circumstances ... from those places,” Matthews, battle video, Burns, Schilling, Gay, P. Howe. “There was an added ... situation really was,” McMahon. “Eversmann, still lying ... the hornet’s nest,” Eversmann, Schilling. Schilling went to great lengths to help me with this chapter. His friend and former colleague, Technical Sergeant Tim Wilkinson, had strongly urged me to phone Dan months earlier, but I didn’t get around to contacting him until after the first version of this chapter had already appeared in The Philadelphia Inquirer. My mistake. Dan clarified the meandering course taken by the convoy, and helped me understand how and why the confusion took place (although that’s an issue that deserves even more scrutiny than I’ve been able to give it here). We did several phone interviews, and Dan wrote a compelling sixteen-page narrative that has vastly improved my account, and now forms the backbone of this chapter. He was able to place the events that occurred on this terrible drive in chronological order, and even drew a detailed map of the convoy’s convoluted course. Critics of the battle have focused primarily on the political decisions that dictated what equipment the troops had, and on General Garrison’s decision to commit the force in daylight (although three of the previous six successful missions had been done in daytime). To me, the communications mix-up that left five soldiers dead and dozens badly injured was the single biggest snafu of the battle. “The convoy was bearing south ... pushed on,” radio tapes, Schilling. “Heavy fire ... to shape things up,” Eversmann, P. Howe. Howe spoke at length to Rierson in the days after the fight and recorded his buddy’s angry recollections of the lost convoy in his diary. I walked the streets around crash site one, and found them particularly deceptive because, while they appear to form a neat grid, they in fact often do not. Just when you think you have the pattern fixed in your head, you find a road that strays off at one angle or another. To the eye of a foreigner, every block looks the same. “As they passed ... right over him,” McLaughlin, Carlson, Spalding, and an account of A. Rodriguez’s experience recorded by an army historian. “The convoy stopped ... ‘he’s gonna die!’” Spalding, Hand, Carlson, Gay. “The convoy lurched forward ... shrieked with pain,” Schilling, Burns, Spalding. “The volume of fire ... own pouches,” Schilling.

18 Radio tapes.

19 “In the convoy’s ... Humvee,” Burns. “They were still pointed ... lying down again,” Schilling, Moore. “Not long after ... needed him,” Carlson. “In the second ... he was fine,” Kallman. “Dan Schilling felt ... ‘all fucking dead,’” Schilling, radio tapes, Matthews. It was Schilling’s impression that McKnight seemed “dazed.” Rierson had told Howe the same thing in their conversations after the battle. It was the impression of the men I interviewed, mostly Rangers, that the experienced Delta operators kept the convoy together, moving, and organized under these hellish conditions. The voices of the commanders in these radio transmissions convey their distress and mounting frustration more compellingly than their words alone. One hears confusion, anger, and disbelief.

20 “Specialist Spalding was still ... everything that moved,” Spalding. “To make room ... those still shooting,” Othic, Hand. “Many of the vehicles ... four flat tires,” Schilling, Gay. “When the RPG hit Kowalewski ... out of here ASAP,” Schilling, radio tapes. “They weren’t home yet ... another vicious ambush,” Gay, Spalding, Diemer, Eversmann, Burns, Moore.

Overrun

1 “Too many things ... it would be dark,” USSOC report, Dave McKnight, operational time line, David. “Shortly before ... felt this way,” Wilkinson, Lamb, Barton, Belman, Phipps, Mabry, Marsh. Dr. Marsh told me about the battles fought to lug his trauma kits everywhere. The title PJ, for “parajumpers,” has recently been upgraded by the air force to the more descriptive “pararescuemen,” even though everybody still calls them PJs. Tim asked me if I would consider calling them “pararescuemen” in the book, and I declined. I feel guilty about it, hence this confession. “As Jollata called back ... upright and intact,” Wilkinson, battle video, operational time line, radio tapes, Mogadishu: Heroism and Tragedy! Phipps insisted that he had remembered to kick out the bags, but I went withWilkinson’s account, which explained Super Six Eight’s delay in getting up and out. A videotape of the incident shows Super Six Eight begin to pull up and away, then settle back into a hover.

2 “Wilkinson heard the snap ... bodies to cover,” Wilkinson, Belman, Barton, Lamb, Phipps, Mabry. According to John Burns, Delta sergeant John Macejunas was the only member of that unit who routinely still wore the K-pot. The description of the neighborhood into which Super Six One crashed is from my viewing of the videotape, my visit there, and from intelligence photos taken the morning after, which show pieces of the rotors widely scattered. “Sergeant Fales was at the front end ... bent tail boom,” Mabry, Wilkinson, Air Force Magazine (June 1994), Night Flyer (first quarter, 1994), and Airman (May 1994). “The injury to his partner ... to get him out,” Wilkinson.

3 Abdiaziz Ali Aden.

4 “Sergeant First Class Al Lamb ... Rob Phipps,” Lamb, Gould. “Phipps had roped ... out of the fight,” Phipps, Lamb, Belman, Gould, Lycopolus. Both Phipps and Gould hold Lycopolus responsible for their injuries. Lycopolus feels he has been unfairly blamed. “I threw six grenades in all,” he says. “The first five exploded, so obviously, with all the stress and excitement I was remembering to pull the pin and remove the safety strap correctly. I would have done exactly the same thing with the last one as I did with the first five.” Lycopolus believes Somalis behind the wall threw over an American grenade of their own. He attributes the hard feelings about the grenade to the fact that he was new to the Ranger unit, so it was easy for them to blame him—someone they didn’t know well. Both Phipps and Gould were shipped out with their injuries immediately after the battle, so Lycopolus never had a chance to address their accusations at the time. By the time Bravo Company flew back to the States, the story of how he’d screwed up was so entrenched he couldn’t defend himself against it. That and the friendly fire incident resulted in his being transferred out of the Ranger Regiment. He is still in the army.

5 Goffena, J. Yacone, Matthews, operational event time line, USSOC report, command-net tapes. Colonel David explained that the QRF’s roundabout route was necessitated by mines and ambushes his troops had encountered in driving straight through the city in the past. Given the hammering McKnight’s convoy was taking at the same time (which David knew nothing about), it would appear to have been prudent.

6 The description in this section, presented mostly through the eyes of Dale Sizemore, is based on dozens of interviews with Rangers, Delta operators, and air force personnel. I asked all of the men who lived in the hangar to tell me about it, and the various anecdotes emerged from that. Some of the description is also based on the many photographs men sent me of the hangar. “And even though the ocean had sharks ...”—It seems that a big Somali slaughterhouse was located on the waterfront, and for years the remains of butchered carcasses had been dumped in the ocean, feeding happy herds of voracious sharks. Up the beach, the navy hung a big net offshore to provide a safe swimming area, but at least one U.S. soldier was severely injured in a shark attack. This did not, however, deter Rangers from swimming. The guys on vehicles would drive up the beach and post a lookout (for both sharks and officers) while the others frolicked in the surf. “Right after take-off ... and racked out,” P. Howe. “They taught little tricks ... absolutely fearless,” descriptions of the Delta operators are from my interviews with many Rangers. In my initial interviews with Rangers at Fort Benning, which were conducted with a USSOC press officer in attendance, there was no mention of the Delta soldiers who were at the heart of the mission. The Rangers did their best to tell their own stories without mentioning who was actually raiding the target house, although sometimes their own accounts were forced to mention “a soldier from another unit.” Even when I started tracking down and interviewing Rangers on my own, working on leads given me by the original group, most were reluctant to discuss the D-boys, whose very existence is, at least officially, secret. Eventually I found some who felt comfortable talking about men who were killed, and would discuss the others without mentioning their names. Those who were out of the army generally were more relaxed about this. Macejunas made such an impression that just about every Ranger I talked to had a story to tell about him, “this unbelievable guy with a blond flattop.” I was able to attach a name to the stories when I obtained accounts of the battle written by Delta soldiers and SEALs. “Specialist John Collett ... ‘I was gasping!’” Floyd, Collett. “One of the air force PJs got a blow-up love doll ...”—This was mailed by Schilling’s wife and a girlfriend of one of the other PJs as a joke. The sex doll was placed on a chair outside the air force’s little sector in the hangar with a crude cardboard sign advertising rates. “Across the road, spooked air force personnel ...”—Not to be confused with Schilling, Fales, Wilkinson, Bray, and the other PJs and combat controllers living in the hangar with the task force. These less combat-ready air force folks, male and female, were mostly assigned to medical units. “Guys always crowded in to watch CNN ...”—The Rangers were not the only ones watching CNN. According to Warren Strobel’s book Late Breaking Foreign Policy, Aidid was a regular viewer and used CNN to communicate to his own people and the world, even after the UN manhunt reached full swing. “‘Black time’ ...”—The “quote” from the radio is from Othic’s diary. I encountered no overt racism among the Rangers I interviewed, but I was surprised to learn that Sergeant Dave Wilson and Specialist Mike Kurth were the only black soldiers in the task force. The Ranger Regiment and Delta, at least as of 1993, seem to have been relatively untouched by the much-heralded integration of the army. The Delta soldiers I interviewed, and there were only a few, all blamed swimming requirements. “Relatively few blacks grow up swimming,” one explained. I asked Colin Powell why, and he said he believed the de facto segregation still evident in the army’s two most elite units was “a perfect example of what happens where you don’t have affirmative action.” Given the strenuous qualification requirements for both units—particularly Delta, where fewer than one in ten of those invited to try out successfully complete selection—implementing an affirmative action plan would pose unique difficulties. A few of the Rangers and D-boys I talked to suggested that blacks may not be as inclined as whites to volunteer for dangerous work on behalf of a country and establishment that is primarily white. Still, as Powell pointed out, the relatively high percentage of blacks in other elite army units, like the 82nd Airborne, argues against that. The paucity of blacks suggests to me that there is still something about the culture of the Rangers and Delta that either doesn’t welcome or actively excludes black soldiers. Kurth told me he never had any special problems in Somalia, but that Wilson had been taunted as a “traitor” by Somalis for his skin color. “In the evening they practically wore out the collection of videotapes ...”—One of the favorite movies shown in the hangar was Groundhog Day, the comedy classic starring Bill Murray, where the hero is trapped in Puxatawney, Pennsylvania, forced to keep living the same day over and over again until he gets it right. Many of the men, frustrated by the long delays between raids and the monotonous long sunny Mogadishu days, saw the film as a metaphor for their mission. “Listening to the sounds ... Not now.” Anderson, Sizemore. “The horror hit home ... scraped it from the interior,” Struecker, B. Thomas. “Sizemore saw all this ... showed none of this,” Sizemore, Cash, Anderson. “Not everyone ... rest of the men,” Struecker, Sizemore, Anderson, Cash, B. Thomas. I included the scene with Brad Thomas not to humiliate him, but to illustrate how difficult it was for men who had emerged safely from the intense fighting to drive right back into it. The important part of this anecdote is that Thomas, like Anderson, did his duty despite the terror. There were men in Mogadishu, including Thomas and Anderson, who went back repeatedly.

7 “You’re going to go ... ‘the backseat,’” Struecker. “Other volunteers ... start to move,” Squeglia. “As Struecker steered ... out the back gate,” Struecker, radio tapes. “In a Humvee behind ... a roaring fusillade,” Cash. “In another of the rear ... take a shot,” Anderson. “The lead vehicles ... directly ahead,” Struecker, radio tapes. “Durant would say ... was at hand,” Durant. “Box the roadblock ... hanging by threads,” Struecker, Cash, Anderson, Sizemore. “Squeglia saw ... to get there.” Squeglia, Struecker, Sizemore, Anderson, Cash.

8 “Up in their Black Hawk ... ready to go down,” Goffena, J. Yacone. “Up in the command bird ... the downed crew,” Matthews. Matthews did not tell me Harrell’s name. I learned the Delta commander’s identity from interviews with Rangers and from battle documents. “When Goffena’s crew chief ... thumbs-up,” news accounts quoting Hall. “There was a small opening ... began moving that way,” Goffena, J. Yacone, battle videotape.

9 “More than a mile ... had ever shot,” Yurek, P. Howe, Twombly, DiTomasso. “Specialist Lance Twombly ... such a bad shot,” Twombly. “Yurek could not believe ... until nightfall,” Yurek, Nelson, Barton, Waddell, DiTomasso.

10 Nelson, Barton, Twombly.

11 “Sergeant Paul Howe and the three ... going to be fun,” P. Howe. “Captain Steele saw ... front and rear positions,” Steele. “They hadn’t run more ... ready to roll,” Perino, M. Goodale, P. Howe, Steele. “Specialist Stebbins ... ‘Just keep moving,’” Stebbins. “Steele, who had a radio ... robot-Ranger formality,” Steele. Asked to explain some of the problems he had with Delta soldiers, Steele told me a long story of difficulties he encountered on one the task force’s earlier missions with a veteran soldier he identified as a member of the unit. The soldier had ignored Steele’s orders on several occasions and, in Steele’s opinion, had placed a chalk of Rangers in needless danger before being shipped back to the States. In reality, the soldier in question had been thrown out of Delta long before the Mogadishu mission, and was with the task force as Special Forces medic attached to the Rangers. So at least some of Steele’s feelings about the Delta unit were founded on a misunderstanding. “When Steele cracked down ... Steele’s captaincy,” Nelson, Diemer, Sizemore, Phipps, M. Goodale, Moore, Burns, Lamb, Watson, etc. The account of the arm-wrestling contest is from my interview with Diemer, and general feelings and perceptions about Steele are garnered from my interviews with dozens of Rangers. “The disdain was mutual ... Hoo-ah discipline,” Steele. Paul Howe feels Steele’s characterization of Delta planning sessions is unfair and inaccurate. I suspect it is just a difference in perspective. It points up the culture clash between the Rangers and Delta. It is not surprising that Steele would see the relatively informal give-and-take of a more egalitarian Delta planning session as chaotic. “Like the time ... when it was,” Nelson, P. Howe, Steele. “In short order ... getting pinned down,” P. Howe. “The Rangers followed ... he was worth,” Stebbins. “Sergeant Mike Goodale who had once ... This is for keeps,” Goodale, P. Howe, Perino, Stebbins, Lechner, Watson, radio tapes.

12 Mohamed Sheik Ali.

13 “The odor of spent gunpowder ... out of this alive?” Floyd. “He was against the wall ... other Rangers,” Floyd, Siegler, Ramaglia, Young, Watson, K. Thomas, Kurth, Collett. “Watson led the group ... what-the-fuck!” Floyd, Ramaglia, Young, K. Thomas, Kurth, Collett. “Sergeant Keni Thomas was closer ... like a failure,” K. Thomas, Watson. “Collett was feeling good ... back to the wall,” Collett, Siegler. “Rounds poked through ... resilient men could be,” Floyd, K. Thomas. “Specialist Mike Kurth was helping ... everyone was intact,” Kurth, Collett, Young. “Further down the slope ... pointing at the two Ranger officers,” Steele, Floyd, Hooten.

14 “What Hooten was trying ... in that spot,” Hooten. “Steele motioned ... out of this mess,” Steele. Steele’s gesture is based on my interview with Floyd, and the description of what he was doing is from my interviews with him. Steele did not remember seeing Hooten gesturing in the doorway until after the shots hit close. “Beside Steele, ... miniguns were blazing,” Steele, Floyd, Lechner, C. Atwater, K. Thomas, Collett. “It was just after that ... the street to help,” Steele, Atwater, Lechner, Hooten. The circumstances surrounding Lechner’s injury became controversial after the battle, with Delta soldiers accusing Steele of abandoning Lechner on the street, a very serious charge, especially to a Ranger, whose code is to never leave a fallen comrade. In my opinion the charge is baseless. Lechner, who was the man supposedly left, said Steele reacted correctly and as anyone would to take cover when rounds started hitting close. He said seconds were all that elapsed between his getting hit, Steele and Atwater scrambling for cover, and Bullock running out to pull him to safety, hardly long enough for Steele or anyone else on the street to take cover, figure out what just happened, and retrieve him. Atwater, who was lying beside both men, confirmed Lechner’s and Steele’s accounts of the incident in every particular. None of this takes away from Bullock’s bravery. He left the safety of the courtyard and moved out into fire in order to drag the lieutenant inside. “Steele took the radio mike ... Have more casualties, over,” Steele, radio tapes. Steele’s voice in the recording, a kind of gasping shout, shows the extreme duress of the moment. “Sergeant Goodale ... pouring from a jug,” Goodale. According to Lechner, who is now a captain based in Hawaii, the bullet effectively removed a section of bone several inches long from his shin. Doctors were able to stimulate regrowth of the bone, however, and after a long period of recovery and rehab, Lechner has full use of the leg.

15 “At roughly the same time ... edge of his seat,” Durant. “The Black Hawk had flattened ... face and legs,” Howa and Bint Abraham Hassan. They still live in a shack alongside the remains of Super Six Four. “The dazed pilots ... was no rescue team,” Durant.

16 Mo’alim.

17 Goffena, J. Yacone, radio tapes. Hallings lost the lower part of his leg, but has reportedly made remarkable progress with a prosthesis and is back with his unit.

18 Durant, P. Howe. In Durant’s memory and in the official account (including the Medal of Honor citations) Randy Shughart was killed first and Gary Gordon came back around the helicopter, gave Durant a weapon, tried to radio for help, etc. Paul Howe, who knew both men well, convinced me that it was the opposite. He heard Randy’s distinctive voice radio twice for help (not Gordon’s). Also, Shughart and Gordon carried different customized weapons. The one handed Durant was almost certainly Gordon’s, not Shughart’s. Shughart carried an M-14, and the weapon handed Durant was, he says, most likely a CAR-15, but certainly not an M-14. Gordon would never have handed Durant his own weapon while he was still capable of using it. Lastly, in his witness statement, Durant said he recognized Gordon because he had frequently attended flight briefings. Actually, says Howe, it was Shughart who routinely attended those briefings. Durant told me while he was reluctant to see the official account altered, he could not be certain which man was which. He did not know either of the men by name.

19 “Hassan Yassin Abokoi had been shot ... parts of the Americans’ bodies,” Abokoi, who showed up at the Hotel Sahafi with two friends carrying Durant’s and Cleveland’s helmets (their names were attached with little black stick-strips to the back). They wanted me to buy them for three hundred dollars apiece. I liked the idea of bringing the helmets back and returning them to the 160th, but I was not inclined to reward Abokoi and the others for their war trophies. I told them I wasn’t interested. They protested through an interpreter that it was rude of me not to even bargain with them, so I told them if they wanted to leave the helmets I would pay them twenty-five dollars for returning them. They left disgusted, with the helmets, but not before Peter Tobia took pictures of them posing with the trophies on their heads. “When Mo’alim ... the layers away,” Mo’alim, Durant.

20 Durant.

The Alamo

1 Wilkinson, Mabry, Dowdy.

2 “A grenade came ... body of the helicopter,” Nelson, Barton, Yurek, Twombly, Wilkinson. “The American forces ... he wasn’t heard,” P. Howe, Miller, Lamb, Watson, Steele, Perino, DiTomasso, Nelson, Twombly. The “friendly fire” incident was related to me by both Nelson and Howe. In my interview with Twombly, he was still angry about getting hit with the LAW.

3 “Perino and his men ... between his legs,” Perino. “Across the street, ... ‘I’m hit’!” Nelson, Perino. “The lieutenant could tell ... a doctor, pronto,” Perino, Stebbins, Nelson, Schmid. “Perino radioed Captain Steele ... ‘and defend it,’” Steele, Perino, Schmid, DiTomasso. “Schmid was still ... Schmid pleaded,” Schmid. “The lieutenant radioed ... to hang on,” Perino, Steele, command-net tapes.

4 “Stebbins shook with fear ... waiting for him,” Stebbins, other Rangers. Steele said he never authorized his men to go out on missions without taking their NODs. It was evidently a decision made quickly by the men themselves as they suited up for this mission. The Rangers were most likely imitating the D-boys, who had more flexibility to decide what they did or did not need. It may have been another instance of Steele losing strict control over his men as a result of living in close proximity to Delta. On the other hand, Steele didn’t bring his NODs either. The devices were clumsy to have hanging around your neck when doing things like roping out of helicopters and running around, and they were fragile. Once damaged, it wasn’t easy to get a replacement. “The Little Birds ... unscathed,” Twombly, Barton, Nelson. “An old man ... loves that donkey,” Nelson, Yurek, Floyd, Twombly. “Closer to the wrecked ... on the street,” Belman, Dowdy. It is not mentioned in Captain Coultrop’s written account of the battle. “Then there was ... woman were gone,” Yurek, Stebbins, Twombly, Nelson, P. Howe. “When the sun ... in fire and light,” Stebbins, Nelson, Twombly, Yurek, Barton, P. Howe.

5 Wilkinson, Air Force Magazine, Airman, Night Flyer.

6 Stebbins, Wilkinson.

7 Floyd, Siegler, Collett.

8 “Across the city ... under Kowalewski’s skin,” Marsh, Adams. Adams’s written account suggested that the medical team was surprised and somewhat overwhelmed by the volume and severity of casualties, but Marsh, who headed the team, pointedly differs. He felt the medical response, which he headed, was well-prepared. In Hackworth’s Hazardous Duty, the celebrated former colonel–cum–military gadfly writes of his postbattle visit to wounded Rangers and Delta soldiers at Walter Reed Hospital: “They were terribly shot up. Many were arm and leg amputation cases. Many had been lying on the ground for hours. ‘Why so many amputations?’ I asked one of the medics. ‘Infections,’ he said. Somalia is one of the filthiest places in the world and those guys had been lying out there with bad wounds for hour after hour.” In fact, only one soldier lost a limb in the Battle of Mogadishu, and that was Sergeant Brad Hallings, whose leg was shorn off by the RPG explosion that shot down Super Six Four. Pilots Goffena and Yacone crash-landed that chopper on friendly ground, and Hallings received immediate medical care. None of the men pinned down overnight around crash site one lost a limb. Ray Dowdy, the crew chief who survived the crash of Super Six One, had the tips of two fingers shot off. Medics at crash site one had antibiotics with them and used them throughout the night, a big reason why, according to Marsh, the postwound infection rate was, in fact, “lower than usual.” “While all this ... force in Mogadishu,” Goffena, J. Yacone, Matthews, Jones, Dave McKnight, Marsh, radio tapes, battle videotape, Mo’alim. “Unless they ran out of ammo ... ammo and water,” Radio tapes, Dave McKnight. “Black Hawk Super Six Six ... for the night,” P. Howe, various Rangers, Matthews, radio tapes.

9 “This ungainly distribution ... cornered with Steele,” radio tapes, Steele. “Then, just before dark ... to stay down,” P. Howe.

10 “When Steele and his men ... further confused matters,” Steele, Watson, M. Goodale, Lechner, Floyd, Ramaglia, Collett, Kurth, K. Thomas, Siegler. “At one point ... sigh of relief,” Steele, Collett. “Steele shouted back ... no back doors,” Steele, Watson. “He could talk ... anybody out, over,” Steele, Perino, command-net tapes. “Medic Kurt Schmid ... just barely alive,” Perino, Schmid, Jim Smith, Jamie Smith (letters). “When the moon came up ... to ignore procedure,” Steele. “Still, it had seemed ... ‘your night vision?’” M. Goodale, Young. “Steele was mortified ... no one nodded off,” Steele. “Miller wasn’t sure ... cover the southern intersection,” P. Howe. “The Ranger commander ... ‘all these wounded,’” Steele, Perino, Watson, radio tapes. Steele’s reluctance to move his men up, as Miller wished, became part of the case against him made by some of the Delta soldiers after the battle. To me it seems well advised. The other Rangers with Steele all felt it was the right decision, and all the Delta soldiers I interviewed expressed particular respect for Sergeant Watson, who actually convinced Steele not to make the move. More serious, perhaps, was Steele’s refusal to confer with Miller. Paul Howe explained that it was critically important for the whole force on the ground to be in constant communication, even if only for them to keep track of where shots were being fired in order to better appraise the situation at all points on their L-shaped perimeter. My sense of it is that Steele’s difficulties with the Delta unit over the previous weeks, and the scorn some of the unit had for him, came to a head under the stress of the battle. There was no clear chain of command on the ground because no one had anticipated the Delta assaulters and the Rangers being thrown together as a fighting force. This would seem to be a significant oversight, and might have created bigger problems if the ground fight had gone a different way, but in fact it had little consequence in this battle. The Little Birds kept the Somalis at bay for the most part, and the two units did what they had to do without the two captains working together. “This was frustrating news ... sober satisfaction,” Steele, Collett, Floyd, radio tapes, Hooten. Miller’s determination to move his men north, closer to his position, was to secure the southwestern intersection of the block where most of the force was pinned down. From his position down the block, it was not possible to see what was happening on the east-west alleyway that divided Steele’s force from his. Steele and his men were in a courtyard halfway down that block, so they could not see what was going on in the alley either. “—Hey, Captain, we’ve got ... get his people moving!” Steele, Perino, radio tapes. “From the commanders’ perspective ... were ready to move,” Dave McKnight, David. “Harrell reported ... ready to attempt it,” McKnight, Matthews. “Miller and Steele ... Steele told him,” radio tapes, Steele, P. Howe, Perino. “Not long afterward, ... He was gone,” Schmid, Perino. “Harrell was still ... ‘just been KIA,’” radio tapes, Steele. “Medic Schmid ... gut feeling,” Schmid. “Steele, too ... other guys yet,” Steele, Watson. “Goodale was in high spirits ... Smitty was dead?” Goodale, Ramaglia, Lechner, Atwater, Watson. “Private George Siegler ... meant her no harm,” Siegler. “It got quieter ... beat of his heart,” Kurth.

11 “Sergeant Waddell ... passed around greedily,” Waddell. “When are we gonna ... sips of water,” Phipps. “When it was clear ... at the waist,” Lamb, Yurek, Nelson, Twombly. “Abdiaziz ... was not hit,” Aden. “Tim Wilkinson ... ‘my health, right?’” Wilkinson, Stebbins.

12 Hooten, Floyd, Ramaglia, K. Thomas, Steele, Collett, Watson.

13 “From overhead ... doing his job,” Battle video, P. Howe, J. Yacone, Goodale, Steele. “One block up ... in the world,” Yurek, P. Howe, Bray (from Air Force Magazine), Waddell.

N.S.D.Q.

1 “Michael Durant heard ... with the chain,” Durant. “What Durant didn’t know ... get him back,” Sharif Ali Mohamed, Firimbi. “Mo’alim’s men ... given Durant up,” Mo’alim. “If the Habr Gidr leader ... or pay,” Sharif Ali Mohamed, Firimbi. “Durant’s right leg ... cools down,” Durant.

2 “Word of the big fight ... speaking tour,” Downing, Lake, On the Edge. “Garrison’s move ... if necessary,” USSOC report (p. 10), from Rysewyk’s “Experiences of Executive Officer ...” (p. 12), testimony of Garrison and Montgomery before the Senate Armed Forces Committee (May 12, 1994), Dave McKnight, Matthews, Marsh. “Lieutenant Colonel Bill David ... the two crash sites,” David. “While the commanders ... ‘do it for him,’” Marsh, Eversmann, Size-more, Anderson, Squeglia, B. Thomas. “It was 9:30 P.M. ... had to be the priority,” operational time line, USSOC report, David. “To the Rangers ... it was now 11:23 P.M.” Operational time line, Cash, Ahlfinger, Guelzow, Keller, Lepre, David, Meyerowich.

3 Steele, Perino, radio tapes.

4 “Captain Drew Meyerowich ... mortally wounded,” Meyerowich, Rysewski. “For all his careful planning ... working his radio,” Squeglia, details on Lamb’s wound from Marsh. “All of the way out ... that part of Mogadishu,” Sizemore, Anderson, Kallman, Struecker.

5 “Earlier in the day ... Ismael Ahmed,” Kassim Sheik Mohamed. After spending the morning touring Kassim’s ruined facilities in Mogadishu, Kassim accused me of being an American military officer (I have never served in the military). I denied it, and he rejected my denial, explaining that he had watched how carefully I had placed my feet while touring blasted locations in the city. “It shows you have experience looking for mines,” he said. “How much of an expert do you have to be to watch where you put your feet where there might be mines?” I asked. I reiterated that I had never spent a day in the military, at which Kassim said my comment proved I was lying, because “all Americans must spend two years in the military when they finish school.” I told him there was no use in my arguing further with a man who obviously knew so much about my own country. Kassim and other Somalis eagerly showed me graves, their scars, and damage to their property, evidently hoping that the information I gathered would help document a case for some kind of damage claim to the UN.

6 “Half of the rescue convoy ... returned to the convoy,” USSOC report, Vega, Dave McKnight. “Meyerowich’s northern half ... ‘Americans get out!’ he said,” Meyerowich, Kaiser, Nearpass, Gay. “One of those who emerged ... ‘Sorry, man,’” Lepre.

7 Radio tapes, Steele.

8 USSOC report, Goodale, Rodriguez, Stebbins, Wilkinson, radio tapes, Yurek, P. Howe, Steele, operational time line. Much has been made of how the task force stayed in the city overnight because they would not leave behind Wolcott’s body. It is true that American soldiers will go to great lengths to recover the bodies of their fallen brothers, evidenced by the long wait and strenuous effort here to recover Wolcott’s body, but the ninety-nine men who fought through the night in Mogadishu were there because they had little choice. A number of commanders forthrightly said they would have sadly but certainly left Wolcott’s body if the chance had presented itself to evacuate their wounded and beseiged troops.

9 Steele, Perino, Yurek, Ramaglia, Collett, Nelson, P. Howe, Floyd, Watson.

10 Abdi Mohamed Elmi.

11 Abdi Karim Mohamed, Bashir Haji Yusuf, Hassan Aden Hassan.

12 USSOC report, Marsh, Adams, Dowdy, Young, Siegler, Perino, Nelson, Schilling, Steele, radio tapes, Matthews, Kallman, Goodale, Gould, Rodriguez, Anderson, K. Thomas, Cash, Phipps, Floyd, Stebbins, Watson, Sizemore, Atwater, Ramaglia.

13 P. Howe.

14 Sizemore, Cash, Steele, Floyd, Diemer, Telscher, Nelson, Eversmann, Perino, Watson.

15 “American awakened ... by angry crowd,” The New York Times (Oct. 5, 1993), The Philadelphia Inquirer, CNN. “President Clinton ... he demanded,” Drew, On the Edge, Lake. “The trickle ... One of the guys,” S. Shughart. “In a bedroom ... wasn’t giving up hope,” W. Frank, B. Yacone. “At the hangar ... kind of animals ... ?” J. Yacone. “The D-boys ... a massacre,” P. Howe, Goffena, Matthews, McKnight. “Mace ... courage and cool,” Nelson, Sizemore, Goodale, Floyd.

6 “Mike Durant’s captors ... feed starving people?” Durant, CNN archives. “Willi Frank ... off the frame!” W. Frank. “Durant felt okay ... with Aidid,” Durant, Firimbi, Sharif Ali Mohamed.

17 “Garrison and the ... the fight,” McKnight, P. Howe, J. Howe, Matthews. “Former U.S. Ambassador ... Lake asked,” Oakley, Lake. “Now they were in trouble ... released. Now,” The New York Times, The Philadelphia Inquirer (October 5, 1993), On the Edge, (pp. 325–326), Lake, Oakley.

18 Durant, Firimbi.

19 Jim Smith, U.S. Army Mailgram.

20 Shughart.

21 D. Beck. DeAnna Joyce has remarried. She is now DeAnna Joyce Beck, and with her husband’s blessing actively keeps alive her memories of her first husband.

22 “Durant’s fear ... out the initials,” Durant, Firimbi. Durant’s hastily scribbled note was painstakingly analyzed by army intelligence officers for hidden messages and possible clues to Durant’s whereabouts. The reference to pizza was weighed as a possible hint that the pilot was being held near the Italian compound. The request that prayers be said for him might mean he was being held in or near a mosque. Three references to receiving medical treatment might point to a location near a hospital. It was ultimately decided, correctly, that the note meant nothing more than it said. “After Hofstadter left ... had gotten through,” Durant, Huband. While some have criticized Durant for making these comments, the commanders I interviewed, both on and off the record, unanimously praised the pilot’s performance in captivity. “Mike Durant did everything right,” said General Wayne A. Downing, who was commander of U.S. Special Operations Command at the time.

23 USSOC report, P. Howe, Marsh, Eversmann, Steele, Perino, Schmid, Rodriguez, Sizemore, Anderson, M. Goodale, K. Goodale, Lechner, Stebbins, Othic, Spalding, Galentine, Burns. Marsh has recovered fully enough from his severe injuries to run a thriving private practice in Virginia, supervise a clinic at the University of Virginia Hospital, manage (with his wife) a growing family and a large horse farm, and serve as a volunteer firefighter and chief physician at a nearby maximum security prison. I spent a day trying to keep up with the doctor, whose energy and enthusiasm are inspiring. Galentine’s thumb was reattached in surgery, but he has never regained much use of it. “It’s kind of worthless,” he says.

24 W. Frank.

25 Durant, Firimbi.

26 Oakley, Zinni.

27 Firimbi, Durant, The New York Times (Ocober 15, 1993). Durant met with an emissary from Aidid in a Tennessee hotel lobby in 1996, with Special Forces soldiers staked out nearby to keep an eye on things. It was a perfectly innocuous meeting. The man, who runs an orphanage in Baidoa, brought along various items (among them a T-shirt depicting a white American hand and black Somali hand clasped in friendship) as a goodwill gesture, and delivered a letter from Firimbi, who urged Durant not to harbor bad feelings. The pilot was invited to return to Somalia for a friendly visit. Durant wrote back to Firimbi, but declined the offer of a return trip.