Introduction
1. Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (New York: Harper Perennial, 2018), 144.
2. Henry Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986).
4. The replication dataset for this book’s empirical analysis, as well as other material relevant to that analysis, can be found at http://womanstats.org/fpo.html.
5. The original meaning of the ouroboros as used symbolically in cemeteries is to remind a mourner of the eternities, presumably a consoling thought. Given our use of the ouroboros as a metaphor for the Patrilineal/Fraternal Syndrome, we view the grief of the figure as a reaction to the ouroboros-like, and thus seemingly never-ending, nature of that Syndrome.
1. The First Political Order Is the Sexual Political Order
1. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011); Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders (2009; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Service Elman, Origins of the State and Civilization (New York: Norton, 1975); Friedrich Engels, The Origins of Family, Private Property, and the State, Vol. 3, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Selected Works in Three Volumes (Hottingen-Zurich, 1884), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/origin_family.pdf; Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown, 2013); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991); Howard Sherman, How Society Makes Itself: The Evolution of Political and Economic Institutions (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2005); Azar Gat, Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Ethnicity and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Peter Turchin, War and Peace and War: The Rise and Fall of Empires (New York: Plume, 2007); Walter Scheidel, The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).
2. Engels’s The Origins of Family is an exception, of course, and William Tucker’s Marriage and Civilization is a nonacademic attempt. William Tucker, Marriage and Civilization (New York: Regnery, 2014). We might even cite the classic 1976 anthropological study by William T. Divale and Marvin Harris, which examines the relationship between warfare and treatment of women. William T. Divale and Marvin Harris, “Population, Warfare and the Male Supremacist Complex,” American Anthropologist 78 (1976): 521–538.
3. Sylviane Agacinski, The Parity of the Sexes (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Of course, artificial reproduction techniques, such as turning adult cells into pluripotent stem cells, are in the offing. Nevertheless, in a sense, even adult cells are of “mixed” heritage and always will be no matter what technologies are introduced.
4. Karen Offen, European Feminisms: A Political History 1700–1950 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 14.
5. Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (New York: Harper Perennial, 2018), 144.
6. Patricia Adair Gowaty, ed., Feminism and Evolutionary Biology: Boundaries, Intersections, and Frontiers (New York: Springer, 1997), 32; Patricia Adair Gowaty, “Evolutionary Biology and Feminism,” Human Nature 3 (1992): 219.
7. Gowaty, “Evolutionary Biology and Feminism,” 227.
8. Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 111.
9. Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 99.
10. Richard Alexander et al., “Sexual Dimorphisms and Breeding Systems in Pinnipeds, Ungulates, Primates, and Humans,” in Evolutionary Biology and Human Behavior, ed. Napoleon A. Chagnon and Wiliam Irons (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1979), 77.
11. Sylviane Agacinski, The Parity of the Sexes, ix, 63.
12. Agacinski, The Parity of the Sexes, xxxiv.
13. Theodore Kemper, Social Structure and Testosterone: Explorations of the Socio-Bio-Social Chain (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 11, 52.
14. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge (New York: Vintage, 1980), 103.
15. Peggy Reeves Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape: Sex, Brotherhood, and Privilege on Campus (1990; repr., New York: New York University Press, 2007), 89.
16. Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance.
17. Agacinski, The Parity of the Sexes, viii, 24.
18. Offen, European Feminisms, 36.
19. There are quite a few others, of course; see, for example, Joan Wallach Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American Historical Review 91, no. 5 (1986): 1053–1075; Valentine Moghadam, Gender and National Identity (New York: Zed Books, 1996), and Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation (New York: Sage, 1997). The works of several, such as historian Mary Hartman, will be discussed later in this volume.
20. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (1861; repr., Lexington, KY:, 2013), 5. Page references are to the 2013 edition.
21. Mill, The Subjection of Women, 5.
22. Mill, The Subjection of Women, 14.
23. Engels, The Origins of Family, 31.
24. Engels, The Origins of Family, 34.
25. Engels, The Origins of Family, 35.
26. Engels, The Origins of Family, 34–35.
27. Engels, The Origins of Family, 35, 39.
28. Engels, The Origins of Family, 81, 95.
29. Of course, totalitarian political regimes are always interested in the family as either a complement to their efforts to remake society or as a possibly subversive entity. Wilhelm Reich, in The Mass Psychology of Fascism, states, “It is the family that is the factory in which the state’s structure and ideology are molded.” Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 3rd ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1980).
30. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 7.
31. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 99.
32. Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 9.
33. This is Lerner’s argument, which is worth citing in full:
[For slavery] to become institutionalized, people had to be able to form a mental concept of the possibility that such dominance could actually work. The “invention of slavery” consisted in the idea that one group of persons can be marked off as an out-group, branded enslaveable, forced into labor and subordination—and that this stigma of enslaveability combined with the reality of their status would make them accept it as a fact…. The crucial invention, over and above that of brutalizing another human being and forcing him or her to labor against their will, is the possibility of designating the group to be dominated as entirely different from the group exerting dominance…. [M]en must have known that such a designation would indeed work. We know that mental constructs usually derive from some model in reality and consist of a new ordering of past experience. That experience which was available to men prior to the invention of slavery, was the subordination of the women of their own group. The oppression of women antedates slavery and makes it possible. Out of [an unequal division of labor] kinship structured social relations in such a way that women were exchanged in marriage and men had certain rights in women, which women did not have in men. Women’s sexuality and reproductive potential became a commodity to be exchanged or acquired for the service of families; thus women were thought of as a group with less autonomy than men…. While men “belonged in” a household or lineage, women “belonged to” males who had acquired rights in them. In most societies women are more vulnerable to becoming marginal than are men. Once deprived of the protection of male kin, through death, separation, or by no longer being wanted as a sexual partner, women become marginal. At the very beginning of state formation and the establishment of hierarchies and classes, men must have observed this greater vulnerability in women and learned from it that difference can be used to separate and divide one group of humans from another…[There arises] the concept, in the dominant as well as in the dominated, that permanent powerlessness on the one side and total power on the other are acceptable conditions of social interaction…. [T]he process of enslavement was at first developed and perfected upon female war captives; that it was reinforced by already known practices of marital exchange and concubinage…. [E]xperience would show the captors that women would endure enslavement and adapt to it in the hope of saving their children and eventually improving their lot. Most historians dealing with the subject of slavery have noted the fact that the majority of those first enslaved were women…. Physical terror and coercion, which were an essential ingredient in the process of turning free persons into slaves, took, for women, the form of rape. Women were subdued physically by rape; once impregnated, they might become psychologically attached to their masters. From this derived the institutionalization of concubinage, which became the social instrument for integrating captive women into the households of their captors, thus assuring their captors not only their loyal services but those of their offspring…. By experimenting with the enslavement of women and children, men learned to understand that all human beings have the potential for tolerating enslavement, and they developed the techniques and forms of enslavement which would enable them to make of their absolute dominance a social institution. [emphasis added]. Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 77–78, 80, 87.
34. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 3.
35. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 95, 109. Pateman asks, “Where is the story of the true origin of political right? In the stories of political origins, sex-right is incorporated into father-right, and this nicely obscures the fact that the necessary beginning is missing. All the stories lack a political book of genesis…. Sex-right must necessarily precede paternal right; but does the origin of political right lie in a rape?” Although most people believe father-right came into existence when men learned about the concept of paternity, Pateman goes on to say:
Psychoanalyst Gregory Zilboorg said, “Mother-right was overthrown when, one day [a man] became sufficiently conscious and sure of his strength to overpower the women, to rape her.” Zilboorg argues that the original deed was prompted purely by “the need to possess and master.” The subjugation of women provided the example required to enable men to extend their possession and mastery beyond their immediate needs. Economic mastery quickly followed sexual mastery.
Pateman continues, “Even if the story of the primal scene is written to incorporate a woman of unlimited, unbridled sexual appetite, so that she ‘tempts’ the man, the act could not occur at her behest if the man (the father) is to have dominion. His will must prevail. The original deed is his deed, and the passionate woman must be subject to his will if his order is to prevail.” She notes, “The story of the sexual contract explains why a signature, or even a speech act, is insufficient for a valid marriage. The act that is required, the act that seals the contract, is (significantly) called the sex act. Not until a husband has exercised his conjugal right is the marriage contract complete.” Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 104, 107, 149.
36. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 102.
37. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 6.
38. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 25.
39. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 107.
40. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 115.
41. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 149.
42. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 29.
43. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 124.
44. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 53.
45. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 57.
46. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 61.
47. Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 64.
48. Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 66.
49. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 176.
50. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 177.
51. Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 208, 215.
2. The Oldest Security Provision Mechanism
1. Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
3. See Handwerk, “An Ancient, Brutal Massacre May Be the Earliest Evidence of War,” The Smithsonian Magazine, January 20, 2016, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/ancient-brutal-massacre-may-be-earliest-evidence-war-180957884/; and also Charles Q. Choi, “Ancient Human Sacrifice Victims Faced Slavery Before Death,” LiveScience, June 16, 2017, https://www.livescience.com/59513-ancient-china-human-sacrifice-revealed.html.
4. Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (New York: Mariner Books, 1996).
7. Mark S. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan: What an Ancient Form of Social Organization Reveals About the Future of Individual Freedom (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 46–47, 58.
8. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 86, 204–205. Although cohesive, Lois Beck explains, “Tribes were not static entities, however, but were historically and situationally dynamic.” Lois Beck, “Tribes and the State 19th and 20th Century Iran,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 190. As Flagg Miller explains, rather than being “conceptually stable over time,” these affiliations are instead “on-going objects of affiliation” that are “rearticulated” encounter by encounter. Furthermore, “fictive kinship” through the enactment of ritual can be as strong a force as blood kinship. Although we use the term “clan” to explicate our thesis and explain our data, we recognize that we are reducing a great deal of diversity and nuance into a more simplified concept—an analytic—for the purposes of operationalization and empirical testing. Flagg Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media: Audiocassette Poetry and Culture in Yemen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Middle East Monograph Series, 2007), 189.
9. Kathleen Collins notes,
Because there is much conceptual confusion in the literature, I will briefly address what the clan is not (but is sometimes confused with): clientelism, patronage, corruption, blat, mafias, regions, ethnic groups, nations, or tribes. In contrast to the clan, clientelism (often used inter changeably with “patron-client relations”) is an informal institution involving the exchange of goods/services through an asymmetric, dyadic tie between patron and client, based not on ascription or affection but on need. It is explicitly tied to a political/economic inequality that trades political support for public goods; consequently, the relationship dissolves when its economic basis disappears. Corruption is an informal, illegal practice that involves exchanging money to obtain a public good/decision for private use. Similarly, blat refers to obtaining goods through weak, transient ties. None of these necessarily involves a network or identity, much less kinship. These are informal institutions, not organizations. Like clans, mafias are informal organizations with identities. Although some clans exhibit criminal behavior, a mafia is by definition a criminal organization and is not necessarily based on kinship bonds. Regions are sometimes assumed to have an identity, but in fact, regions are amalgamations of other characteristics…. Clans, by contrast, are subethnic groups, within which greater particularism is key and therefore less likely to foster broad ethnonational movements or nation-state identities. Conceptually, the tribe is most closely related to the clan; historically, tribes were larger conglomerations of interrelated clans claiming to be of the same patrilineal descent line. This belief in common descent, mythical or actual, was the source of norms, values, and symbols of kin ship and tribal loyalty. Conglomerations of clans compose a tribe. Tribal groupings form confederations and in some cases ethnic groups (for example, Arabs, Kurds, or Turkmen).
She adds, “Although often regionally based, since localism helps maintain ties, clans depend upon the genealogical relationship, which endures with migration.” Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories,” World Politics 56, no. 2 (2004): 233, 174.
10. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 231.
11. For example, Richard Tapper asserts,
Tribe and state are best thought of as two opposed modes of thought or models of organization that form a single system. As a basis for identity, political allegiance, and behavior, tribe gives primacy to ties of kinship and patrilineal descent, whereas state insists on the loyalty of all persons to a central authority, whatever their relation to each other. Tribe stresses personal, moral, and ascriptive factors in status; state is impersonal and recognizes contract, transaction, and achievement. The tribal mode is socially homogeneous, egalitarian, and segmentary; the state is heterogeneous, stratified, and hierarchical. Tribe is within the individual; state is external.
Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 68.
12. Steven C. Caton, “Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of Power,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 102. Speaking of Iran, Beck explains how tribes and the state experience both cooperation and conflict in their unending relationship in that country:
First, tribal politics fulfilled necessary functions for the state and became part of the state apparatus. They were instruments of state administration. State rulers depended on tribal leaders for local administration and control and for collecting revenue and assembling levies. Second, tribal polities and the state were in opposition. State rulers, aiming at centralization and control and threatened by the political autonomy and military prowess of tribal polities, attempted to eliminate this threat. Some tribal polities were successful in resisting such efforts, often by becoming more centralized themselves or by dissolving the structures that state rulers perceived to be threatening. Third, tribal leaders competed, sometimes successfully, against existing state rulers for state hegemony…. Fourth, tribal polities were fragmented and therefore hard to organize and administer from outside. For lack of military and financial means, and because of territorial distance and the frequent inaccessibility of tribal groups, state rulers were unable or unwilling to exert control or influence over them. Tribal leaders relied predominantly on local sources of legitimacy, power, and authority. Fifth, foreign powers intervened in Iran and substituted their influence for that of the state. The state, weak and decentralized, had little impact on tribal polities, whereas foreign powers, often professing to act on behalf of the state, exploited tribal polities in their own struggles and for their own interests. The presence of foreign powers served to impede the emergence of new, more powerful state rulers who might have threatened tribal autonomy. (Beck, “Tribes and the State,” 214.)
13. Caton, “Anthropological Theories,” 191.
14. Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians,” 48–73. Patricia Crone has a more nuanced view, with which we agree, feeling that tribes and states are not sequential stages but “alternative answers to the problem of security.” Patricia Crone, “The Tribe and the State,” in States in History, ed. John A. Hall (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 48–77. Tapper echoes this when he says that both clan and state are “guides for practical action in crises and disputes.” Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians,” 69.
15. Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 331.
16. Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 165.
17. Bassam Tibi, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-State in the Modern Middle East,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 148.
18. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, xix.
19. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 29.
20. Patrimonialism refers to a type of governance system in which the traditional domination seen in a patriarchal system is expanded to a larger scale and rule is filtered through a specialized bureaucratic administration, as in historical monarchies. See Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), 330–384; and James Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, 5th ed. (New York: Pearson, 2000), 112–130; also Mounira M. Charrad, “Central and Local Patrimonialism: State-Building in Kin-Based Societies,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636, no. 1 (July 2011): 49–68.
21. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 233.
22. As Lucretia Mott put it, “The world has never yet seen a truly great and virtuous nation, because in the degradation of women, the very fountains of life are poisoned at their source.” Lucretia Mott, AZ Quote, http://www.azquotes.com/quote/546799.
23. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 39.
25. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
27. David P. Barash, Out of Eden: The Surprising Consequences of Polygamy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 151.
28. Kristen R. Monroe, ed., The Evils of Polygyny: Rose McDermott (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2018), 98.
29. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 20.
30. Mounira M. Charrad, States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 53.
31. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 128.
32. Beck, “Tribes and the State,” 194.
33. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 232
34. Charrad, States and Women’s Rights, 5.
35. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 13.
36. Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 24–25, 47.
37. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, xxiv, xxii, 95.
38. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, xx, 13.
39. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, xx.
40. Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 77.
41. Barash, Out of Eden, 7.
42. Barbara Smuts, “The Evolutionary Origins of Patriarchy,” Human Nature 6, no. 1 (1995): 1–32.
43. This is not to say that females are essentially peace-loving. They are not. Theodore D. Kemper states, “Across the spectrum of the social sciences, the results show that females are not essentially pacific, retiring, unaggressive, lacking in motives and psychological need for power and dominance. While successful ideological socialization may persuade many women that this is true of themselves, it is not biologically true.” Theodore D. Kemper, Social Structure and Testosterone: Explorations of the Socio-Bio-Social Chain (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 149.
44. Patricia Adair Gowaty, ed., Feminism and Evolutionary Biology: Boundaries, Intersections, and Frontiers (New York: Springer, 1997), 378. Interestingly, Gowaty’s own research demonstrates that in contrast to the typical “coy” behavior of female animals in a typical group setting, when males and females have been reared separately (and thus females have never witnessed male-on-female violence), females do not exhibit “coyness” or choosiness when introduced to males, suggesting that they had not yet learned to fear male aggression. Patricia Adair Gowaty, “Sexual Natures: How Feminism Changed Evolutionary Biology,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28, no. 3 (2003): 901–921. Why do we feel like weeping when reading this?
46. Jean Dreze and Reetika Khera, “Crime, Gender, and Society in India: Insights from Homicide Data.” Population and Development Review 26, no. 2 (June 2000): 346.
47. Wrangham and Peterson, Demonic Males, 125.
48. Gat, War in Human Civilization, 79.
49. Barash, Out of Eden, 9, 27.
50. Wrangham and Peterson, Demonic Males, 159.
51. Barbara Smuts, “Male Aggression Against Women: An Evolutionary Perspective,” Human Nature 3, no. 1 (1992): 6.
52. Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, Sex and War (Dallas, TX: Benbella Books, 2008), 101.
53. Wrangham and Peterson, Demonic Males, 146. The echo of this survivalist choice may be found in rituals handed down from ancient times. For example, among the Hamar of southern Ethiopia, “women willingly submit themselves to be whipped during the ceremony of Ukuli Bula. It indicates their courage and capacity to love, and is a form of insurance policy. Should they fall on hard times in later life, they will look to the boys who whipped them to request help.” Dave Burke, “The Women Who Beg to Be Whipped,” Daily Mail, May 11, 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4494904/The-women-whipped-LOVE.html. The legacy can also be found in norms; for example, an Old Russian proverb reportedly is echoed in other cultures (such as among the Aborigines in Australia), that “If he beats you, it means he loves you.” Daria Litvinova, “If He Beats You, It Means He Loves You,” Moscow Times, August 5, 2016, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/08/05/if-he-beats-you-it-means-he-loves-you-a54866.
54. Smuts, “Male Aggression Against Women: An Evolutionary Perspective.”
55. Smuts, “Male Aggression Against Women: An Evolutionary Perspective,” 26.
56. Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999), 217. See also Manne, Down Girl.
57. Manne, Down Girl, 117, 301.
58. Manne, Down Girl, 113.
59. Maria Mies, “Social Origins of the Sexual Division of Labor;” in Women: The Last Colony, ed. Maria Mies, Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, and Claudia Von Werlhof (London: Zed Books, 1988), 67–95; Alberto Alesina, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn, “On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, no. 2 (2013): 469–530; Jeanet Bentzen, Nicolai Kaarsen, and Asger Wingender, “Irrigation and Autocracy,” Journal of the European Economics Association (June 29, 2016), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jeea.12173.
60. Smuts, “The Evolutionary Origins of Patriarchy.” Brigid Grund argues this subjugation predated agriculture; her argument is that while the atlatl allowed all, including women, to hunt, the development of the bow and arrow made men’s greater upper-body strength a tremendous asset that eventually resulted in the exclusion of women from the role of hunting. Brigid Grund, “Behavioral Ecology, Technology, and the Organization of Labor: How a Shift from Spear Thrower to Self Bow Exacerbates Social Disparities,” American Anthropologist 119, no. 1 (2017):104–119, https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/aman.12820.
61. Barbara Diane Miller, “The Anthropology of Sex and Gender Hierarchies,” in Sex and Gender Hierarchies, ed. Barbara D. Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 22.
62. Peggy Reeves Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance: On the Origins of Sexual Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 46.
63. Robin Morgan, The Demon Lover (New York: Washington Square Press, 2001), 21.
64. Potts and Hayden, Sex and War, 60.
65. John Archer, “Testosterone and Human Aggression: An Evaluation of the Challenge Hypothesis.” Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 30, no. 3 (2006): 319–345. Andrzej Nowak et al. add that the purpose of honor is to signal that force will be used even when the one using force is weaker than those he uses it against; a kind of porcupine strategy for deterrent purposes. An excellent example of this is the Chechenskaya bratva, or “Chechen brotherhood,” who are known as fierce, brutal purveyors of violence-for-hire in post-Soviet lands. Andrzej Nowak et al., “The Evolutionary Basis of Honor Cultures,” Psychological Science (2015): 1–13.
Mark Galeotti quotes one as saying, “you don’t mess with the Chechens. If you challenge them, even if they know they will lose, they will fight, and they’ll summon their brothers and their cousins and their uncles and keep fighting. Even if they are going to lose, they’ll fight just to bring you down, too. They are maniacs.” Notice the confluence of the extended male-bonded kin group and the strong deterrent signal produced. Mark Galeotti, “The Making of a Chechen Hitman,” Foreign Policy, May 24, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/24/the-making-of-a-chechen-hitman/.
66. David Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs: Women and Sexuality in Global Conflict (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 60. Patricio Asfura-Heim notes that in Arab culture, male honor is sharaf, and revolves around pride, dignity, and respect, and the avoidance of shame, disgrace, and humiliation. But male honor also involves ‘ird, which is held by their male relatives but is determined by the chastity of females’ sexual behavior. Patricio Asfura-Heim, “Tribal Customary Law and Legal Pluralism in al Anbar, Iraq,” in Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, ed. Deborah H. Isser (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 248.
67. Stephen Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 87–88.
68. Dominic Johnson and Bradley Thayer, “The Evolution of Offensive Realism,” Politics and the Life Sciences 35, no. 1 (March 2016): 1–26.
69. Smuts, “The Evolutionary Origins of Patriarchy,” 13; Smuts, “Male Aggression Against Women,” 15.
70. Furthermore, as Smuts notes, “men may use their alliances with other men to prevent actions that may benefit the women, but at a cost to the men.” Smuts, “Male Aggression Against Women,” 19.
71. Potts and Hayden, Sex and War, 50. But Julia Adams rightly notes, “The evidence weighs on the side of [kinsmen] having generally (not always) acted in the interests of their lineage…which might easily have involved sacrificing the interests of particular family members, no matter how closely genetically related they might have been.” Julia Adams, “Politics, Patriarchy and Frontiers of Historical Sociological Explanation,” Political Power and Social Theory 19 (2008): 292.
72. Ivan Ermakoff, “Patrimonial Rise and Decline: The Strange Case of the Familial State,” Political Power and Social Theory 19 (2008): 258.
73. Jonathan Gottschall, The Rape of Troy: Evolution, Violence, and the World of Homer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 134.
75. Wrangham and Peterson, Demonic Males, 24, 25. It is not coincidental that alt-rightists have, in the modern day, extolled the virtues of what they call the “Mannerbund.” Although their rhetoric is vile and their aims worse, these reactionaries recognize the power of the fraternity as a historical security provision mechanism—and so they want to bring it back to nations that have largely left it behind. Hear what one of the Mannerbund’s fans, alt-rightist Mark Yuray, has to say in his essay “Mannerbund 101”:
The source of civilization is not the family, the market, the electoral process, or the scientific committee of “experts.” The source of civilization is the Männerbund, hereafter rendered in English as the Mannerbund. The Mannerbund is the source of property rights and sexual morality, as well as the vehicle through which effective group action is performed. For our purposes, we will define a Mannerbund as a group of men organized in an organic hierarchy that springs from the male competitive instinct. The Mannerbund forms quickly and naturally between men in any group because it is predicated on the male competitive instinct. Men, far from being epicene, atomized “individuals” with strictly “rational” tastes and preferences, have an easily roused and conspicuous instinct towards competition and—more importantly—hierarchy realized through competition. In other words, the natural and default state of men among men is hierarchy, because hierarchy is the end-product of competition, and men instinctively compete with each other…. The Ur-form of the Mannerbund is undoubtedly the gang or team of men who act cohesively to defend and expand a perimeter, and the essential facets of civilized masculinity are undoubtedly derived from the behaviors necessary to defend and expand a perimeter in a team of men—courage, honor, discipline, strength, and so forth. When thinking about contemporary Mannerbunds, the “perimeter” may be more metaphorical than physical, but the principles and mechanisms of cooperation remain the same…. The most basic working socio-political arrangement between humans is the Mannerbund. The only unit smaller than the Mannerbund is the man—not the individual, but the man. It could be argued that the family (specifically the nuclear family) is a more basic socio-political unit than the Mannerbund, but this approach is incorrect. To paraphrase Mencius Moldbug, hominids need government and politics because hominids are social and violent. To clarify Moldbug, hominids need government and politics because male hominids are social and violent. A man’s woman and children are extensions of the man and dependent on the man’s capacity for violence on their behalf, i.e. on their man’s capacity to defend them physically from other men. Women and children are social but their capacity for violence—physical, but also psychological—is negligible compared to that of men’s, and for this reason they are de facto property, not political agents themselves. The Mannerbund, not the family, is the basic working socio-political unit. A solid and dependable Mannerbund is a necessity for every man. No man is an island, they say, and a man without a local Mannerbund is going have deeply limited capacities when it comes to securing his property and legacy. Individualistic proponents of neomasculinity are missing the point already: no man is more “alpha” than a Mannerbund. Without a Mannerbund, a man cannot control his women, he cannot ensure his immobile property’s security in the case of state failure (deliberate or not), and without security of his women or property, he cannot secure the futures of his children…. Great risks lead to great rewards and great wealth, and they can only be effectively undertaken by groups of men oathbound to each other, implicitly or explicitly. Effective large-scale cooperation and action must be undertaken by Mannerbunds. Great civilizations require great Mannerbunds to found and lead them.
76. Wrangham and Peterson, Demonic Males, 231.
77. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 59. The Arab Human Development Report of 2004 expresses it eloquently in this fashion:
In Arab custom, the agnate is the principle of cohesion within the tribe. The agnate…is based on al-taraf (paternity, filiation) and al-janib (fraternity, relationship to the paternal uncle). [These are] the closest of his paternal male kin who are capable of fighting, providing reinforcement, conquering, and defending. A man is surrounded and protected by (and also responsible towards) a preceding generation (the father), a succeeding generation (the sons), and a coexisting generation (brothers and paternal male cousins).
United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States, Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2005), 163.
78. Indeed, Potts and Hayden assert, “Young men [have an inherited predisposition] to display intense loyalty and love for one another, and to dehumanize and attack their neighbors for the simple reason that they are neighbors, and so occupy an adjacent territory.” Potts and Hayden, Sex and War, 111, 252. They go on to quote Johannes Hasselbroeck, who was the Nazi commandant of Gross Rosen concentration camp in the Netherlands: “Even the ties of love between a man and a woman are not stronger than that same friendship there was among us [the male Nazis at the camp]. This friendship was all. It gave us strength, and held us together in a covenant of blood. It was worth living for; it was worth dying for. This was what gave us the physical strength and courage to do what others dare not do because they were too weak.” This type of fraternal love is a veritable fountain of bloody destruction and brutality.
79. Weiner notes, “By the rule of the clan I mean the anti-liberal social and legal structures that tend to grow in the absence of state authority or when the state is weak, for instance of petty criminal gangs, the Mafia, and international crime organizations—groups that look a great deal like clans and in many respects act like them.” Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 9. On a related note, Nowak et al. use simulation research to show that honor societies such as we have described wither and fade away when institutions capable of reliably enforcing codes of conduct appear, for then institutions are able to constrain aggressive agents more effectively than what they call “honor agents,” or what we are calling male extended kin groups. We would suggest this is the case because male extended kin groups are usually able to contain, but not to eliminate, aggressors. (Indeed, these groups may sometimes be the aggressors.) Nowak et al. find, “Without the presence of the honor agents, only the aggressive agents survived when the effectiveness of authorities was weak. When the effectiveness of authorities was relatively higher, the aggressive agents are eliminated, and only interest and rational agents remained. In sum, in conditions of low institutional authority, honor agents were critical to stopping the aggressive agents from proliferating.” Nowak et al., “The Evolutionary Basis of Honor Cultures,” 7. This is an interesting perspective on why male-bonded kin groups are “selected for” in human groups—they are absolutely “better than nothing” in the face of aggression by outgroups.
80. Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, 83.
81. Luke Glowacki et al., “Formation of Raiding Parties for Intergroup Violence Is Mediated by Social Network Structure,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113, no. 43 (2016): 12114–12119, www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1610961113.
83. Dominic Johnson and Bradley Thayer, “The Evolution of Offensive Realism,” Politics and the Life Sciences 35, no. 1 (March 2016): 7. Manson et al. note a similar theme for both humans and chimpanzees: “long-term social bonds facilitate the formation of cooperatively attacking subgroups, and variation in subgroup size reduces the cost of damaging aggression to attackers with sufficient numerical superiority.” Joseph H. Manson et al., “Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees and Humans” [and Comments and Replies] by Author(s),” Current Anthropology 32, no. 4 (August–October 1991): 371.
85. Potts and Hayden, Sex and War, 49.
86. Marvin Harris, “The Evolution of Human Gender Hierarchies,” in Sex and Gender Hierarchies, ed. Barbara D. Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 67.
87. Dominic Johnson et al., “Overconfidence in Wargames: Experimental Evidence on Expectations, Aggression, Gender, and Testosterone,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B (June 20, 2006): 2513–2520; Coren Apicella et al., “Testosterone and Financial Risk Performance,” Evolution and Human Behavior 29, no. 6 (208): 384–390, https://www.ehbonline.org/article/S1090-5138(08)00067-6/abstract; Coren Apicella, Justin Carre, and Anna Dreber, “Testosterone and Financial Risk Taking: A Review,” Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology 1, no. 3 (2015): 358–385; S. N. Geniole, M. A. Busseri, and C. M. McCormick, “Testosterone Dynamics and Psychopathic Personality Traits Independently Predict Antagonistic Behavior Towards the Perceived Loser of a Competitive Interaction,” Hormones and Behavior 64 (2013): 790–798; Allan Mazur and Alan Booth, “Testosterone and Dominance in Men,” Behavioral and Brain Science 21, no. 3 (June 1998): 353–397; Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, “Competitiveness, Risk Taking, and Violence: The Young Male Syndrome,” Ethology and Sociobiology 6, no. 1 (1985): 59–73; J. M. Carré, S. K. Putnam, and C. M. McCormick, “Testosterone Responses to Competition Predict Future Aggressive Behaviour at a Cost to Reward in Men,” Psychoneuroendocrinology 343 (2009): 561–570.
88. Stephen Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 74.
89. Johnson and Thayer, “The Evolution of Offensive Realism,” 9.
90. John D. Wagner, Mark V. Flinn, and Barry G. England, “Hormonal Response to Competition Among Male Coalitions,” Evolution and Human Behavior 23, no. 6 (November 2002): 437–442.
92. Johnson and Thayer, “The Evolution of Offensive Realism,” 8–9.
93. Michael Kasumovic and Jeffrey Kuznekoff, “Insights into Sexism: Male Status and Performance Moderates Female-Directed Hostile and Amicable Behavior,” PLOS One 10, no. 9 (2015): e0138399.
94. Kasumovic and Kuznekoff, “Insights into Sexism.” See also Manne, Down Girl.
95. James L. Boone, “Noble Family Structure and Expanisionist Warfare in the Late Middle Ages: A Socioecological Approach,” in Rethinking Human Adaptation: Biological and Cultural Models, ed. Rada Dyson-Hudson and Michael A. Little (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 85.
96. William T. Divale and Marvin Harris, “Population, Warfare, and the Male Supremacist Complex,” American Anthropologist 78 (1976): 521.
97. Divale and Harris, “Population, Warfare,” 523.
99. Patrilineal societies have endogamous predispositions because under endogamy no clan wealth need be alienated from the group in the form of brideprice.
100. Steph Yin, “In South Asian Social Castes, a Living Lab for Genetic Disease,” New York Times, July 17, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/health/india-south-asia-castes-genetics-diseases.html. Of course, serious sex ratio imbalances can force exogamy—consider the rape of the Sabine women. Some, including Engels, have suggested capture marriage customs derive as a legacy from historical experiences with sex ratio problems. Friedrich Engels, The Origins of Family, Private Property, and the State, 1884, Marxist Internet Archive, proofed and corrected 2010, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/origin_family.pdf.
101. Furthermore, there are ancillary benefits to such exogamy, such as the extension of kinship to additional males through marriage ties. As Weiner notes, “segmentary lineage systems and similarly-organized tribal societies derive their strength from the principle of exogamy. Lineage members, that is, are required to marry outside their core lineage group. As a practical matter, the rule of exogamy forges complex links between lineage groups and the bodies of land they inhabit.” Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 59. For this very reason, invaders often insist on marriages to the daughters of powerful kin groups in the lands they invade, whether we speak of the time of the Mughals in India or that of ISIS in Iraq. These kin groups in turn may resist, and force may be used on both sides. Some have even suggested female infanticide first arose in India due to the absolute refusal of native kin groups to give their daughters in marriage to the invading Mughals. A. J. O’Brien, “Female Infanticide in the Punjab,” Folklore 19, no. 3 (1908): 261–275.
102. Divale and Harris, “Population, Warfare,” 521. We can see the importance of postmarital residence in several historical examples. For example, Andrey Korotayev argues that matrilocality may develop in contexts where women’s greater contribution to subsistence is recognized; however, he also asserts that matrilocality is usually undermined by the emergence of nonsororal polygyny under these conditions as males begin to understand that additional wives mean additional production. Andrey Korotayev, “Form of Marriage, Sexual Division of Labor, and Postmarital Residence in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Reconsideration,” Journal of Anthropological Research 59, no. 1 (2003): 69–89. As another example, Mark Dyble and colleagues note a strong relationship between sexual egalitarianism and degree of within-group relatedness; that is, they found that in more egalitarian cultures, there is a reduced level of within-group relatedness, which they attribute to reduced exogamy of women (that is, marriages might be patrilocal, matrilocal, or neolocal, thereby undermining the otherwise strictly patrilineal-fraternal nature of the kin group). Mark Dyble et al., “Sex Equality Can Explain the Unique Social Structure of Hunter-Gatherer Bands,” Science 348, no. 6236 (2015): 796–798. Even so, the more powerful a kin group, the more likely it would continue to practice a class-based endogamy revolving around patrilocal marriage; as Coontz explains:
With the growth of inequality in society, the definition of an acceptable marriage narrowed. Wealthy kin groups refused to marry with poorer ones and disavowed any children born to couples whose marriage they hadn’t authorized. This shift constituted a revolution in marriage that was to shape people’s lives for thousands of years. Whereas marriage had once been a way of expanding the number of cooperating groups, it now became a way for powerful kin groups to accumulate both people and property.
As we have seen, sexual inequality and economic inequality (and all other types of inequality) go hand in hand. Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, A History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 45.
103. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 59.
104. Tanika Chakraborty and Sukkoo Kim, “Kinship Institutions and Sex Ratios in India,” Demography 47, no. 4 (November 2010): 1008.
105. Corina Knipper et al., “Female Exogamy and Gene Pool Diversification at the Transition from the Final Neolithic to the Early Bronze Age in Central Europe,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2017): 1–6.
106. Engels, The Origins of Family, 87.
107. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 22; Dale Eickelman, The Middle East and Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 75; William Lancaster, The Rwala Bedouin Today (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1997), 36–42. Furthermore, even in matrilineal societies, power often devolves to brothers who are the sons of the same mother. That is, power is still held by males in the groups. Lerner notes, “There is not a single society known where women-as-a-group have decision-making power over men or where they define the rules of sexual conduct or control marriage exchanges.” Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 30. In Kerala, for example, in which matrilineal culture was once ascendant, it was the mother’s brother (or Karnavan) who had final say in all matters. Among the matrilineal Mosuo of China, the same can be said. Siobhan Mattison, “Economic Impacts of Tourism and Erosion of the Visiting System Among the Mosuo of Lugu Lake,” Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 11, no. 2 (2010): 159–176. One difference, however, is that there may be a slight daughter preference among matrilineal cultures. Siobhan Mattison et al., “Offspring Sex Preferences Among Patrilineal and Matrilineal Mosuo in Southwest China Revealed by Differences in Parity Progression,” Royal Society Open Science 3, no. 9 (2016): 160526, http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.160526.
108. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 57.
109. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 233. A special pathos is associated with the role of the ruler’s widow. As Coontz notes, “Conquerors routinely married the widow of an ousted king to strengthen their claims to the crown. If a conqueror died, his son and heir would reaffirm his claim by marrying his stepmother.” Coontz, Marriage, A History, 91.
110. Henry Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986), 143.
111. Jack Goody and Stanley J. Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 28.
112. Adrienne Edgar, Tribal Nation (The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 222.
113. Monica Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems, and Asia’s ‘Missing Girls’: The Construction of Son Preference and Its Unraveling” (World Bank, Washington, DC, December 2009), 5.
114. Anne Campbell, “Sex Differences in Direct Aggression: What Are the Psychological Mediators?” Aggression and Violent Behavior 11, no. 3 (2006): 237–264.
115. Smuts, “Male Aggression Against Women,” 8. Very different social systems can emerge in cases where female networks are in place. Rebecca Hannagan supports the theory of the cooperative-forming female, arguing that women made a significant contribution toward the development of cooperative groups in hunter-gatherer societies. Women, she argues, may have been supportive of cooperative behavior to protect their offspring. Pregnant women, in particular, stood to benefit from food sharing in times of scarcity. “Maintaining certainty in their position in the lunch line, so to speak, is of greater concern to females than males due to the fundamental trade-off between somatic effort and reproductive effort.” Female hunter-gatherers are believed to have cooperated among one another for gathering, hunting, and child-rearing, but Hannagan argues that their role as facilitators may have extended to the males and the group as a whole: “In foraging societies women are as likely as men to curb the deviant behavior of ‘upstarts’—those who attempt to disrupt the social balance by violating group norms.” Rebecca J. Hannagan, “Gendered Political Behavior,” Sex Roles 59: 465–475, at 469. The sexual freedom and independence of females, Campbell argues, changed with the onset of agriculture ten thousand years ago when women began to be confined to smaller spaces of home and land, and men, who became the suppliers of food and other resources, were able to exercise greater control over women and achieve parental certainty. Anne Campbell, “Sex Differences in Direct Aggression: What Are the Psychological Mediators?” Aggression and Violent Behavior 11, no. 3 (2006): 237–264. Although male dominance hierarchies may have become entrenched at this time, other scholars believe male aggression and patriarchal practices to have been dominant strategies used in sexual selection even during hunter-gatherer periods of human history. Smuts, “The Evolutionary Origins of Patriarchy.”
116. Divale and Harris, “Population, Warfare.”
117. Divale and Harris, “Population, Warfare,” 526–527.
118. Avraham Ebenstein, “Patrilocality and Missing Women,” Hebrew University of Jerusalem, April 2014, 8–9, http://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Documents/seminars/October%2030-2014.pdf. The type of agriculture practiced may also be relevant. For example, Alesina et al. have suggested that descendants of those who practiced plough agriculture before industrialization have more persistently unequal gender norms than descendants of those who practiced hoe agriculture, because plough agriculture places a value on superior upper-body body strength. Alesina et al., “On the Origins of Gender Roles.”
119. Peggy Reeves Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape: Sex, Brotherhood, and Privilege on Campus (1990; repr. New York: New York University Press, 2007), 35–36.
120. Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance, 205.
121. Charles Lindholm, Generosity and Jealousy: The Swat Pukhtun of Northern Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 148–149.
123. Priya Nanda et al., Study on Masculinity, Intimate Partner Violence and Son Preference in India (New Delhi: International Center for Research on Women, 2014).
124. Jack Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 12–13.
125. Rebecca Solnit, The Mother of All Questions (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017). As Carrie Chapman Catt famously put it in 1902,
The world taught woman nothing skillful and then said her work was valueless. It permitted her no opinions and then said she did not know how to think. It forbade her to speak in public, and said the sex had no orators. It denied her the schools, and said the sex had no genius. It robbed her of every vestige of responsibility, and then called her weak. It taught her that every pleasure must come as a favor from men, and when to gain it she decked herself in paint and fine feathers, as she had been taught to do, it called her vain.
126. Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family, 11.
127. Divale and Harris, “Population, Warfare,” 523. Do not confuse these terms with “dower,” which refers to assets given directly to a bride by either the groom or the bride’s father. However, to make matters even more confusing, dower is typically found in societies where one may also find either brideprice or dowry.
128. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 11.
129. Laura Betzig notes that
in the simplest societies, like the !Kung in Botswana or the Yanomamo in Venezuela, the strongest men typically kept up to ten women; in medium-sized societies that organized above the local level, like the Samoans and other Polynesians, men at the top kept up to a hundred women; and in the biggest societies, including the “pristine” societies in Mesopotamia and Egypt, India and China, Aztec Mexico and Inca Peru, and in many empires that came later, powerful men kept hundreds, or thousands, or even tens of thousands of women—along with one, two, or three at most legitimate wives; lesser men kept progressively fewer women.
Laura Betzig, “Roman Polygyny,” Ethology and Sociology 13, (1992): 310.
130. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 64.
131. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 52.
132. Joseph H. Manson et al., “Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees and Humans” [and Comments and Replies] Author(s),” Current Anthropology 32, no. 4 (August–October 1991): 387.
133. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (1861; repr. Lexington, KY: [publisher unknown], 2013), 58.
134. Valerie M. Hudson and Patricia Leidl, The Hillary Doctrine: How Sex Came to Matter in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). The following discussion follows Hudson and Leidl, The Hillary Doctrine, 88–89.
135. Ann Jones, War Is Not Over When It’s Over: Women Speak Out from the Ruins of War (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010).
136. Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape.
137. Jones, War Is Not Over When It’s Over, 27, 37, 38, 76, 78.
138. John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2003).
3. Assessing the Patrilineal/Fraternal Syndrome Today
1. Mark S. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan: What an Ancient Form of Social Organization Reveals About the Future of Individual Freedom (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 47.
2. Indeed, even in many matrilineal societies, the real power unit may be “sons of the same mother.” In that case, many of the same Syndrome components will be seen even in such a nonpatrilineal context, because that fraternal alliance system is still present.
3. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 8.
4. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 8.
5. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 9, 29.
6. United Nations Development Program, Regional Bureau for Arab States, Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2005), 146.
7. Andrea Den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson Hudson, “Patrilineality, Son Preference, and Sex Selection in South Korea and Vietnam,” Population and Development Review 43, no. 1 (2017): 119–147.
8. Lindsay Benstead, “Why Quotas Are Needed to Achieve, Gender Equality,” in Women and Gender in Middle East Politics, The Project on Middle East Political Science (May 10, 2016b): 55–57.
9. Allison Brysk, The Struggle for Freedom from Fear: Contesting Violence Against Women at the Frontiers of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
10. David Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs: Women and Sexuality in Global Conflict (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013).
11. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan.
12. Sociologist David Jacobson developed the Tribal Patriarchy Index using the following formula:
Jacobson’s Tribal Patriarchy Index = Corruption Perception Index + 0. 5 × (Ethno − Linguistic Fractionalization Index) + 0. 5 × (Indigenous Population as a Percentage of × Total PopulationData + 2 × (World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Data) + Group Grievance Data.
Notice that corruption is a component of Jacobson’s index, whereas it is an outcome variable in our theoretical framework. Notice also the heavy weight given to the Global Gender Gap component, which seems in line with our own approach. However, the Global Gender Gap measure does not include marriage customs or violence against women. Instead, it examines women’s participation in the labor force and the government, the educational attainment of women relative to men, sex ratio, and women’s life expectancy. As mentioned previously in the text, we believe these variables, with the exception of the sex ratio, are epiphenomenal to the subordination of women’s interests to men’s interests in marriage and men’s corresponding use of physical coercion of women. It is female subordination in marriage, specifically, that allows male-bonded kin groups to reproduce in exclusive fashion. We believe our index will correlate fairly strongly with Jacobson’s, but at the same time captures the most theoretically pertinent bases of patrilineal/fraternal strength. Legal scholar Mark Weiner’s book does not contain his scale; Weiner was gracious enough to send us his scale by personal communication. Weiner rated 160 countries according to the prevalence of clan rule, concentrating on the salience of consanguineous relations; government functions; education levels and the extent of personal freedom for women; and tendencies toward intergroup violence, although political instability per se did not factor into the rankings. With regard to the concept of personal freedom for women, Weiner examines “the ability to own and devise property, the ability to enter the workforce and to have a professional career, the ease of divorce, the extent of allowed sexual freedom, the extent to which female family roles restrict their life opportunities, and the relative strength of socio-cultural pressures to conform to mainstream expectations regarding a woman’s proper role.” Weiner, email to authors, February 22, 2014. As with Jacobson’s scaling, there are some similarities between the Syndrome scale and Weiner’s rankings, particularly in the areas of cousin marriage, property rights, and divorce. Nevertheless, like Jacobson, Weiner includes nongender-related dimensions in determining the degree of clan governance and excludes other important gendered variables, such as patrilocality. Because Weiner is not working from a dataset as much as from impressions regarding women’s status, his rankings are thus not replicable. See Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, and Weiner, The Rule of the Clan.
13. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 2.
14. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs.
15. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs.
16. Some of the material in this subsection is adapted from Valerie M. Hudson and Hilary Matfess, “In Plain Sight: The Neglected Linkage Between Brideprice, Raiding, and Rebellion,” International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 7–40.
17. Quanbao Jiang and Jesus Sanchez-Barricarte, “Brideprice in China: The Obstacle to ‘Bare Branches’ Seeking Marriage,” The History of the Family 17, no. 1 (2012): 2–15.
18. David Barash, Out of Eden: The Surprising Consequences of Polygamy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 95. As noted previously, there is also “dower,” which is the practice of the bride herself receiving assets from either the groom or her own father. Dower is typically found in societies where either brideprice or dowry are also present.
19. Jack Goody and Stanley J. Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 51.
20. Alice Schlegel and Rohn Eloul, “Marriage Transactions: Labor, Property, Status.” American Anthropologist 90, no. 2 (1988): 290–309.
21. Andrew E. Barnes, Making Headway: The Introduction of Western Civilization in Colonial Northern Nigeria (Rochester, NY: University Rochester Press, 2009).
23. India, and countries surrounding India, may wind up with a mixture of dowry and brideprice. Thus, for example, even though in Islam a brideprice is typically paid, there may be a dowry exchange as well among Muslims in India and Pakistan. Shaikh Azizur Rahman, “ ‘We Decide to Take a Stand’: Why Some Indian Families are Returning Dowries.” The Guardian, June 5, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jun/05/take-a-stand-indian-families-returning-dowries-dahez-roko-abhiyan-campaign. The Brideprice/Dowry scaling rubric would code these mixed countries as having higher scores because of the presence of dowry. In other words, please note that brideprice may be present as well in countries having those higher scores.
26. Susan Rees et al. “Associations Between Brideprice Obligations and Women’s Anger, Symptoms of Mental Distress, Poverty, Spouse and Family Conflict, and Preoccupations with Injustice in Conflict-Affected Timor-Leste,” British Medical Journal-Global Health, May 26, 2016, http://gh.bmj.com/content/1/1/e000025.info; and Susan Rees et al., “Associations Between Brideprice Stress and Intimate Partner Violence Amongst Pregnant Women in Timor-Leste,” Globalization and Health 13, no. 66 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-017-0291-z.
27. “Human Rights Study Links Payment.” Also, as a note, indeed, Uganda made the news when its Supreme Court ruled in 2015 that brideprices were not subject to refund if the couple split up. Unfortunately, the practice of brideprice itself was not ruled as unconstitutional. “Uganda Brideprice Refund Outlawed by Top Judges,” BBC, August 6, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33800840.
28. Akese, “Reduce Dowry and Let’s Marry.”
30. Schlegel and Eloul, “Marriage Transactions.”
31. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 50.
32. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 52.
33. John L. McCreery, “Women’s Property Rights and Dowry in China and South Asia.” Ethnology 15, no. 2 (1976): 173.
34. P. N. Mari Bhat and Shiva S. Halli, “Demography of Brideprice and Dowry: Causes and Consequences of the Indian Marriage Squeeze,” Population Studies 53, no. 2 (1999): 130.
35. Bhat and Halli, “Demography of Brideprice,” 130.
38. Valentine Moghadam also notes,
By the way, in Iran the exorbitant “mehrieh” seems to have originated with young women and their families, as a sort of financial protection and social insurance in the face of highly discriminatory laws (and easy divorce for men) as well as gender bias in the labor market. (Before the revolution, it was becoming unfashionable.) Rising mehrieh has been accompanied by both increasing female educational attainment and fertility rates that are now at replacement level.
Personal communication with Valentine Moghadam, August 2, 2017.
40. Hudson and Matfess, “In Plain Sight.”
42. Monica Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems, and Asia’s ‘Missing Girls’: The Construction of Son Preference and Its Unraveling” (World Bank, Washington, DC, December 2009), 11.
43. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 18
44. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 10.
45. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 5.
47. Jiang and Sanchez-Barricarte, “Brideprice in China.”
50. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 10.
51. Siwan Anderson, “The Economics of Dowry and Brideprice,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 151–174.
52. Rose McDermott and Jonathan Cowden, “Polygyny and Violence Against Women,” Emory Law Journal 64 (2015): 1772.
54. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 64.
55. Jacobson notes that Osama bin Laden would urge his lieutenants to marry sisters, to tamp down incipient rivalries through the creation of a blood tie between the rivals. Marriage can establish horizontal bonds of fraternal alliance, which is why ISIS and al-Qaeda (AQ) strategically attempt to marry within groups whose support they would like to claim, such as among Sunnis in Iraq. See Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 122. David Kilcullen writes of the Anbar uprising against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) that
one key difference is marriage custom, the tribes only giving their women within the tribe or (on rare occasions to cement a bond or resolve a grievance, as part of a process known as sulha) to other tribes or clans in their confederation (qabila). Marrying women to strangers, let alone foreigners, is just not done. AQ, with their hyper-reductionist version of “Islam” stripped of cultural content, discounted the tribes’ view as ignorant, stupid and sinful. This led to violence, as these things do: AQI killed a sheikh over his refusal to give daughters of his tribe to them in marriage, which created a revenge obligation (tha’r) on his people, who attacked AQI. The terrorists retaliated with immense brutality, killing the children of a prominent sheikh in a particularly gruesome manner, witnesses told us. This was the last straw, they said, and the tribes rose up. Neighboring clans joined the fight, which escalated as AQI (who had generally worn out their welcome through high-handedness) tried to crush the revolt through more atrocities. Soon the uprising took off, spreading along kinship lines through Anbar and into neighboring provinces.
David Kilcullen, “Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,” Small Wars Journal, 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt. (As a footnote to a footnote, Ahram asserts these foreign fighters were each given a $10,000 brideprice by AQI.) Ariel I. Ahram, “Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS,” Survival 57, no. 3 (2015): 57–78.
56. Thomas Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 163.
57. Madawi Al‐Rasheed and Loulouwa Al‐Rasheed. “The Politics of Encapsulation: Saudi Policy Towards Tribal and Religious Opposition,” Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 1 (1996): 96–119. As a note, even in societies without polygyny, marriage may be viewed first and foremost as a means of cementing male fraternal alliances. Vladimir Putin, for example, purportedly helps arrange marriages between the sons and daughters of the men he wishes to retain as allies, and apparently can also insist on strategic divorces, as well. Elizabeth Piper, “Putin’s Daughter and Russia’s Second-Generation Elite,” Japan Times, November 12, 2015, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/11/12/world/putins-daughter-russias-second-generation-elite/#.WvB9IiOZNZo. In societies encoding the Syndrome more explicitly, such as Yemen, marriage is politics. Al-Muslimi notes, “Marriage in Yemen is also an unofficial means for political and tribal alliances. The intermarriage between the offspring of Gen. Ali Mohsen—presidential adviser for defense and security and the leader of the Southern Movement—and former al-Qaeda figure Tariq al-Fadhli affected the latter’s political affiliation, and he became a leader in the General People’s Congress Party, which used to be in power.” Al-Muslimi, “The Social Politics of Weddings.”
58. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 13.
59. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 13.
60. Kristen R. Monroe, ed., The Evils of Polygyny: Rose McDermott (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2018).
61. Richard D. Alexander, “Evolution, Culture, and Human Behavior: Some General Considerations,” in Natural Selection and Social Behavior, ed. Richard D. Alexander and Donald W Tinkle (Chiron Press, New York, 1981), 509–520.
62. McDermott and Cowden “Polygyny and Violence Against Women,” 1767.
63. Satoshi Kanazawa, “Evolutionary Psychological Foundations of Civil Wars,” Journal of Politics 71, no. 1 (January 2009): 25–34.
65. Barash, Out of Eden, 97.
66. McDermott and Cowden, “Polygyny and Violence Against Women,” 1767–1814.
67. Barash, Out of Eden, 103.
68. Supreme Court of British Columbia, “Reference Re: Section 293,” para 499.
69. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, and Peter J. Richerson, “The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 367 (2012): 666.
70. Barash, Out of Eden, 88–90.
73. Some of these effects are mediated by the socioeconomic status of the family, and thus what we are presenting here are generalizations. For example, Goody and Tambiah quote Nur Yalman as saying,
Rich and poor families do not act in the same way…. The most important difference between them concerned the position of women, with regard both to their inheritances and to the freedom of choice they were allowed. The rich, however, actively controlled the property rights of the daughters and used this as a tool in the arrangement of marriage. In contrast, labourers did not control the property rights of daughters and all siblings shared alike. There was no emphasis of unilineal descent along them…[among the poor] it was largely a matter of indifference exactly where the young couple chose to live.
Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 132. Anthropologists have noted that in poor families girls may actually be treated better than sons, especially in hypergynous cultures where very poor young men may not be able to marry. Lee Cronk, “Low Socio-economic Status and Female-Biased Parental Investment: The Mukogodo Example,” American Anthropologist 91, no. 2 (June 1989): 414–429, https://anthrosource.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1525/aa.1989.91.2.02a00090.
74. Louise Grogan, “Patrilocality and Human Capital Formation: Evidence from Central Asia,” Economics of Transition 15, no. 4 (2007): 685–705.
76. Grogan, “Patrilocality and Human Capital Formation.”
78. Grogan, “Patrilocality and Human Capital Formation,” 1167.
79. Grogan, “Patrilocality and Human Capital Formation,” 1167.
81. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 2.
82. One sees underinvestment in daughters whether brideprice or dowry is the custom. Even though sons’ marriages cost more in brideprice societies, you still see almost universal preference for and preferential treatment of sons because the basic kin unit is still the corporation of related males. It may be that, as Das Gupta asserts, “the costs of raising a girl were resented as encroaching on the sons’ inheritance.” Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 6. One hypothesis we have not yet tested is that in dowry societies, one sees frank culling of girls, but in brideprice societies, one sees neglect and underinvestment rather than outright culling, for these girls will one day fetch a brideprice and hence offer more value to the natal family.
83. Ebenstein, “Patrilocality and Missing Women,” 3.
84. Ebenstein, “Patrilocality and Missing Women.”
85. Ebenstein, “Patrilocality and Missing Women,” 7, 21–23.
86. Ebenstein, “Patrilocality and Missing Women,” 23.
87. Geraldine Duthe et al., “High Sex Ratios at Birth in the Caucasus: Modern Technology to Satisfy Old Desires,” Population and Development Review 38, no. 3 (2012): 487–501.
88. Andrea Den Boer, “Son Preference, Sex Ratios, and Security in the South Caucasus” (unpublished paper, May 2017).
89. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 10.
90. Andrew M. Francis, “Sex Ratios and the Red Dragon: Using the Chinese Communist Revolution to Explore the Effect of the Sex Ratio on Women and Children in Taiwan,” Journal of Population Economics 24, no. 3 (2011): 815.
92. Francis, “Sex Ratios and the Red Dragon.”
93. He Linlin, Yang Hai, and Lan Tianming, “Deeper Investigation: How Difficult Is It for Rural Men to Get Married?” China Youth Daily, February 25, 2016.
94. He et al., “Deeper Investigation.”
95. He et al., “Deeper Investigation.”
99. John T. Dalton and Tin Cheuk Leung, “Why Is Polygyny More Prevalent in Western Africa? An African Slave Trade Perspective,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 62, no. 4 (July 2014): 599–632.
100. Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 251 (note 8). See also Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).
102. Rachel Vogelstein, Ending Child Marriage: How Elevating the Status of Girls Advances U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 14, 2013), 1.
105. Nour Youssef, “Two Paths for Yemen’s War-Scarred Children Combat, or Marriage,” New York Times, October 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/world/middleeast/yemen-war-children.html; Sara Malm, “Girls as Young as Three Are Being Married Off in Yemen as Starving Families Try to Ensure They Have One Less Mouth to Feed and Use Dowry Payments to Buy Themselves Food,” Daily Mail, March 4, 2019, https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6768425/Girls-young-THREE-married-Yemen-Oxfam-claims.html. Youssef notes that boys are being forced into becoming soldiers, because families need the small salary the boys receive for their service.
106. Personal Communication with Louisa Chiang, October 24, 2016.
107. He et al., “Deeper Investigation.”
109. Vogelstein, Ending Child Marriage, 1.
112. Vogelstein, Ending Child Marriage, 18.
114. Note that it is not just child marriage that is the issue, but also initiation of girl children into a sexual relationship based on asymmetrical power. In Latin America, for example, older “boyfriends” may establish sexual relationships with girls as young as twelve or thirteen, usually deserting them once they get pregnant. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports that girls are having a first sexual experience at an equally early age and that in a large majority of cases the girl has been coerced into having sex. CDC, “Sexual Violence: Risk and Protective Factors,” https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/sexualviolence/riskprotectivefactors.html.
117. In Latin America, note that cohabitation with a young girl may take place in the absence of formal marriage, as well. Prensa Latina, “Child Marriage, Growing Phenomenon in Latin America and the Caribbean,” April 9, 2018, http://www.plenglish.com/index.php?o=rn&id=26907&SEO=child-marriage-growing-phenomenon-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean. Also, forms of child prostitution take cover under the term “marriage.” For example, in Egypt there is a form of marriage called zawaj al-misyar, or summer marriage, in which wealthy businessmen (many from Saudi Arabia) travel to Egypt to marry a girl for a few months, paying a “brideprice” to her family to do so. One report notes Egyptian girls that have been thus sold by their families as many as sixty times by the time they turn eighteen—they are married only for a few days or weeks. International Center for Missing and Exploited Children. “Child Marriage in the Middle East and North Africa,” white paper, 2013, https://www.icmec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Child_Marriage_in_the_MENA_Region.pdf. Under Egyptian law, children of these unions are not considered Egyptian, and thus such children may be left stateless.
118. Sabbe, “Determinants of Child and Forced Marriage.”
119. Vogelstein, Ending Child Marriage, 12.
120. Another form of endogamy is the marriage of sisters to create a fraternal bond between unrelated men. As noted previously, Jacobson observes that Osama bin Laden would urge his lieutenants to marry sisters, to tamp down incipient rivalries through the creation of a blood tie between the rivals. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 122.
121. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 23; see also Bernard Chapais, Primeval Kinship (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).
122. Chapais, Primeval Kinship.
125. Bernard Strauss, “Genetic Counseling for Thalassemia in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 364–76.
127. Abdul Al Lily, The Bro Code of Saudi Culture (San Bernardino, CA: Al Lily, 2016), 25.
128. Al Lily, The Bro Code of Saudi Culture, 25–26. The family may also feel the bride may be treated better if she marries within her agnatic line; at other times, the demand she marry her cousin may result in violence if she refuses, even though she is kin to her bridegroom.
129. Hanan G. Jacoby and Ghazala Mansuri, “Watta Satta: Bride Exchange and Women’s Welfare in Rural Pakistan” (World Bank Development Research working paper no. 4126, World Bank, Washington DC, 2007).
130. Al-Muslimi, “The Social Politics of Weddings in Yemen.”
131. Akbar Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013).
132. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 19.
133. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 11.
134. Tanika Chakraborty and Sukkoo Kim, “Kinship Institutions and Sex Ratios in India,” Demography 47, no. 4 (November 2010): 993.
135. Alberto Alesina, Benedetta Brioschi, and Eliana La Ferrara, “Violence Against Women: A Cross-Cultural Analysis for Africa” (NBER working paper no. 21901, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, January 2016), 21.
136. Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 46–47.
137. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “The True Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Policy 135 (March-April 2003): 66.
138. Norris and Inglehart, “The True Clash of Civilizations,” 64–65.
139. This discussion is adapted from Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen “What Is the Relationship Between Inequity in Family Law and Violence Against Women? Approaching the Issue of Legal Enclaves,” Politics and Gender 7, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 453–492.
140. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 12.
141. Donna Lee Bowen, Valerie M. Hudson, and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen, “State Fragility and Structural Gender Inequality in Family Law: An Empirical Investigation,” Laws 4, no. 4 (2015): 654–672.
142. Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 106. For example, Lerner notes that the Code of Hammurabi says,
“The father shall give his daughter who has been ravished as a spouse to her ravisher.” The rapist must pay brideprice to the father whether or not the father gives him his daughter as a wife. If she is given to the rapist as a wife, the rapist can never divorce her. The Code of Hammurabi also says that men can punish their wives by violence, including tearing out their breasts, cutting off nose or ears, whipping her, plucking out her hair; “There is no liability therefore.” If a man hits and kills someone’s daughter, the punishment is the death of the daughter of the man who struck the blow; the same if a man causes another man’s wife to miscarry—his wife will be treated the same. A man who kills a pregnant woman will be killed.
Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 116, 119.
143. Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 266, note 28.
144. Al Lily, The Bro Code of Saudi Culture, 38.
145. Some scholars believe that intense control of females by males only arose after agriculture and animal husbandry developed. See, for example, Maria Mies, “Social Origins of the Sexual Division of Labor,” in Women: The Last Colony, ed. Maria Mies, Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, and Claudia Von Werlhof (London: Zed Books, 1988), 67–95. Other scholars, such as Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, believe such control stretched unbroken from prehistoric times. Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (New York: Mariner Books, 1996).
147. This discussion is adapted from Hudson et al., “What Is the Relationship.”
149. Gowan, “An Indian Teen Was Raped.”
150. It may also trump religious law. Goody notes that the Catholic Church promulgated a family law code that was obligatory for both men and women. Even so, he notes,
The jus occidendi (law of homicide) in jus commune (common law) was an unequal affair, applying to women’s adultery but not to men’s, as was its extension to other killings for the sake of honor…it ran quite against the law of the church which insisted that husband and wife must be judged by the same standards…. [T]he notion of an honourable killing allowed to men and not women, continued in Italian law until 1981, linking female sexuality to largely male family honour.
Jack Goody, The European Family (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 67.
154. Suad Joseph, “Political Familism in Lebanon,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636, no. 1 (2011): 159; Deniz Kandiyoti, “Bargaining with Patriarchy,” Gender and Society 2, no. 3 (1988): 274–290.
157. Human Rights Watch, “Unequal and Unprotected,” 357.
158. Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Reform of Personal Status Laws in North Africa: A Problem of Islamic or Mediterranean Laws?” Middle East Journal 49, no. 3 (1995): 432–446.
159. Htun and Weldon, “Sex Equality in Family Law.”
160. Htun and Weldon operationalize a family law index (0–13) examining issues of minimum age of marriage, consent in marriage, name, marital property, divorce, custody, and inheritance, but there was only an N of 70. They found that being a current or former communist country was associated with a significant increase in family law equity, whereas former colonies of Britain saw significant decreases. Having an established state religion was strongly associated with great inequity in family law for women, while having an autonomous women’s movement was significantly associated with increases in equity for women. Htun and Weldon. “Sex Equality in Family Law.”
With reference to their finding about Britain, Adrienne Edgar notes:
In British-ruled Egypt and Palestine and French-ruled North Africa and Syria in the interwar period, the discourse of female oppression was primarily aimed at justifying European rule, rather than bringing about real change in women’s lives. This was evident in colonial policies on veiling and seclusion, as well as in British and French policies on Islamic and customary personal status law—the codes that regulated marriage and family life among Muslims and that were roundly condemned by Europeans for their presumed degradation of women. While British and French colonizers imposed European-style criminal and commercial legal codes on their Muslim subjects, they refrained from changing indigenous family law.
Adrienne Edgar, “Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet ‘Emancipation’ of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective,” Slavic Review 65, no. 2(2006): 257.
161. Rawi Abdelal et al., “Identity as a Variable,” Perspectives on Politics 4 no. 4 (2006): 695–711.
162. Sophia Wilson, “Human Rights and Law Enforcement in the Post-Soviet World: Or How and Why Judges and Police Bend the Law,” lecture, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, November 12, 2010.
163. Aisuluu Kamchybekova, Project Component Coordinator, Promotion of Women to Civil Service and Politics, United Nations Development Program, interview date August 25, 2009, interviewed by Carl Brinton, Original Language English, recorded in the WomanStats Database.
164. Becky Schulthies, personal communication with author Bowen, 2009.
165. For example, a Muslim woman in India seeking a divorce must appeal to an Islamic religious court, whereas a Hindu woman in the same position would petition a government court, and the outcome for each of these women may differ dramatically as a result. U.S. Department of State, “India: International Religious Freedom Report,” 2007, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90228.htm. As we go to press, “triple talaq” for Muslim women has been officially deemed unconstitutional in India.
166. Although legal pluralism assumes homogeneity within the community, with Muslim groups, this can produce controversy. Personal status law differs not only by whether one is Sunni, Shi‘a, or Ibadi, but also by schools of law—that is, Maliki, Hanifi, Shafi‘i, or Hanbali.
170. Susanne H. Rudolph and Lloyd Rudolph, “Living with Difference in India,” Political Quarterly 71, (Supplement 1 2000): 20–38.
171. Katherine Young, “Introduction,” in Today’s Woman in World Religions, ed. Arvind Sharma (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 35.
173. Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 194.
174. This is no doubt the reason that ECOSOC has opined, “With regard to women’s rights in the light of religion, beliefs and traditions, universality must be clearly understood; it is not the expression of the ideological or cultural domination of one group of States over the rest of the world.” ECOSOC, “Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Religious Intolerance,” point 33:11.
175. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge, 194–195.
176. Robin Fretwell Wilson quoted in Adam Liptak, “When God and the Law Don’t Square,” New York Times, February 17, 2008, 3. As a note, states, such as Canada, which value multiculturalism have experimented with arbitration courts for religious minorities. Ontario’s Arbitration Act sets up a separate area for resolution of family issues outside of the traditional court system. Arbitration as experienced in Ontario may be deemed as positive in that it allows individuals to resolve issues tied to religion that may not be decided by the judicial system, as one judge puts it, “issues that ‘bind the conscience’ as opposed to matters of ‘enforceable civil law.’” However, certain cases, such as divorce, show that arbitration councils may be less successful in guaranteeing women’s rights than the rights of minority communities. Natasha Bakht, “Family Arbitration Using Sharia Law: Examining Ontario’s Arbitration Act and Its Impact on Women,” Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 1, no. 7 (2004): 1, 11.
177. Hudson et al., “What Is the Relationship,” and Bowen et al., “State Fragility.”
178. Center for Reproductive Rights, Legal Grounds: Reproductive and Sexual Rights in African Commonwealth Courts (New York: Center for Reproductive Rights, 2005).
179. Htun and Weldon, “Sex Equality in Family Law.”
180. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 233.
181. In this regard, Al Lily’s observation about Saudi Arabia is quite interesting: according to Al Lily, a Saudi family tree “normally includes only male members. Family pictures include only male family members.” Al Lily, The Bro Code of Saudi Culture, 39.
182. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 31.
184. “Consanguineous Marriage: Keeping It All in the Family.”
185. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 6.
186. Rosenberg, “Letting (Some of) India’s Women Own Land.”
188. Rosenberg, “Letting (Some of) India’s Women Own Land.”
190. Siwan Anderson, “Legal Origins and Female HIV,” American Economic Review 108 no. 6 (2018): 1407–1439.
193. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 134.
194. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 37.
195. Goody observes, “In polygynous societies, ‘love,’ in the sense of a preference of one above another, is often a dangerous thing.” Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 37.
196. Hilde Jakobsen, “How Violence Constitutes Order: Consent, Coercion, and Censure in Tanzania,” Violence Against Women 24, no. 1 (2018): 47.
197. Jakobsen, “How Violence Constitutes Order,” 53.
198. Jakobsen, “How Violence Constitutes Order,” 54.
199. Jakobsen, “How Violence Constitutes Order,” 58.
200. Jakobsen, “How Violence Constitutes Order,” 60.
201. Jakobsen, “How Violence Constitutes Order,” 61.
202. Peggy Reeves Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance: On the Origins of Sexual Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Peggy Reeves Sanday, Women at the Center: Life in a Modern Matriarchy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). For example, Sanday states,
Abusive behavior toward women is not necessary to male development. Viewed cross-culturally, it can be demonstrated that many societies are free of sexual assault while others are rape-prone. Social ideologies, not human nature, prepare men to abuse women…. It is interesting to note that my informants in West Sumatra were as adamant about the role of culture in establishing a rape-free society as comparable informants in the US were adamant about the role of biology in establishing a rape-prone society.
She also states,
A sexist mentality cannot be explained in terms of universal unconscious processes in men. In many societies, demeaning women and negating the feminine in boys are not evident in the larger social ideology, nor are they strategies for male bonding…. [For example], silencing the feminine is not necessary for becoming a proud and independent male in Minangkabau society. Indeed, the main feature that defines adult male and female behavior is expressed in terms of “good deeds and kindheartedness.”…[Men] do not kill vulnerability in themselves by flexing their muscles vis-à-vis women. There is no theory of the mother-child bond as being oppressive to masculine development. There is no symbol system by which males define their gender identity as the antithesis of the feminine. For the Minangkabau the dominant social image is not the exclusively male social group, but the family of mother and children and the bond among siblings. Not surprisingly, the Minangkabau do not exhibit the sexual abuse and aggression seen in societies where the fraternal patriarchy is synonymous with the public domain.
Peggy Reeves Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape: Sex, Brotherhood, and Privilege on Campus (1990; repr. New York: New York University Press, 2007), 183, 192.
In more recent times, however, things may have changed for the Minangkabau. Hussin notes, “The matriarchal laws of the Minangkabau of West Sumatra began to be replaced by more patriarchal adat temenggong, and British interpretations of Islamic law from India came to be accepted legal practice for some areas of Malay religion and custom: marriage and divorce, for example.” Iza Hussin, “The Pursuit of the Perak Regalia: Islam, Law and the Politics of Authority in the Colonial State,” Law and Social Inquiry 32, no. 3 (2007): 759–788.
203. Enrique Gracia and Juan Merlo, “Intimate Partner Violence Against Women and the Nordic Paradox,” Social Science and Medicine 157 (2016): 27–30. DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.03.040.
204. Brysk, The Struggle for Freedom from Fear.
207. Shima Baradaran, “Eyinyani and Rape Among the Xhosa in South Africa” (honors thesis, Department of Sociology, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, February 2001), 5.
208. Baradaran, “Eyinyani and Rape Among the Xhosa,” 13.
209. Baradaran, “Eyinyani and Rape Among the Xhosa,” 16.
210. Baradaran, “Eyinyani and Rape Among the Xhosa,” 30.
211. Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape, 18.
212. Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape, 8–9.
214. Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape, 151.
215. Theodore D. Kemper, Social Structure and Testosterone: Explorations of the Socio-Bio-Social Chain (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990). Interestingly, Kemper suggests that the chronic subjugation and abuse of women lead to an altered and seriously suboptimal uterine environment for the sons and daughters who are born to them. It is interesting to think that Mother Nature might be responding in this physiological way to the encoding of the Patrilineal/Fraternal Syndrome by a society.
216. Kemper, Social Structure and Testosterone, 109.
217. Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape, 133.
218. Ariel Ahram, “Sexual Violence, Competitive State Building, and the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq” (unpublished manuscript, 2015).
221. Rizvi et al., “Gender: Shaping Personality.”
222. Rizvi et al., “Gender: Shaping Personality.”
224. Jill Schnoebelen, “Witchcraft Allegations, Refugee Protection, and Human Rights: A Review of the Evidence” (UNHCR research paper no. 169, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, January 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/afr/4981ca712.pdf.
225. Rachel Jewkes et al., “Prevalence of and Factors Associated with Non-Partner Rape Perpetration: Findings from the UN Multi-Country Cross-Sectional Study on Men and Violence in Asia and the Pacific,” The Lancet 1, no. 4 (October 2013): e208–e218; and Chris Niles, “UNICEF Strives to Help Papua New Guinea Break Cycle of Violence,” UNICEF, August 14, 2008, https://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/papuang_45211.html.
226. Margo Wilson, Martin Daly, and Joanna Scheib, “Femicide: An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective,” in Feminism and Evolutionary Biology: Boundaries, Intersections, and Frontiers, ed. Patricia Adair Gowaty (New York: Chapman and Hall, 1997), 431–465.
227. Al Lily, The Bro Code of Saudi Culture, 126.
228. Melissa Paredes, personal communication with Valerie Hudson, January 12, 2007.
235. Yuval Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (New York: Harper Perennial, 2018), 145.
236. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 34–35. Ahram notes that the idea that women’s bodies belong to the patriline means that war between fraternal groups can be, in a very real sense, “fought” on the battleground of women’s bodies. He writes, “Sexual violence, then, offers a means to replace the old order and build the (quasi) familial ties and masculine identities that form the core of the nascent state…. Sexual stratification is closely related ethno-sectarian hierarchy.” Thus, Ahram views the egregious sexual violence undertaken by ISIS (such as enslavement of Yazidi women) as an attempt to build state hegemony, noting that “sexual violence rends the pre-existing fabric of family life while tightening the binding strictures of the nascent familial state. The control of sexuality, then, stands as the material and symbolic fulcrum on which the structure of statehood itself is hoisted—or demolished.” Ahram, “Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS.”
237. LRW-SCALE-9, WomanStats, 2015 scaling.
4. The Effects of the Syndrome, Part One: Governance and National Security
2. Mark S. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan: What an Ancient Form of Social Organization Reveals About the Future of Individual Freedom (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 35.
3. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 61–62.
4. Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 111.
6. Clare Castillejo, “Gender Inequality and State Fragility in the Sahel” (FRIDE policy brief no. 204, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, June 2015), 1.
7. Patricia Gowaty, ed., Feminism and Evolutionary Biology, 112.
8. Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, Sex and War (Dallas, TX: Benbella Books, 2008), 96.
9. Charles S. Maier, “Peace and Security for the 1990s” (unpublished paper for the MacArthur Fellowship Program, Social Science Research Council, Washington, DC, June 12, 1990); Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects, Pew Project on America’s Task in a Changed World, Pew Project Series, (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 5.
10. This discussion is adapted from Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen, “Clan Governance and State Stability: The Relationship Between Female Subordination and Political Order.” American Political Science Review 109, no. 3 (August 2015): 535–555.
14. Ira Lapidus, “Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 28.
15. Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories,” World Politics 56, no. 2 (2004): 244–245; Kathleen Collins, “The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia,” Comparative Politics 35, no. 2 (2003): 187. Observing the case of Kyrgyzstan, Collins notes,
clans have to a large degree subverted or replaced the formal institutions that link state and society. The presidential and parliamentary electoral results and the widespread failure of parties to gain power are particularly interesting in this respect. In Kyrgyzstan, where the first set of post-Soviet elections was considered free and fair, and where the legal and actual conditions of party competition were open and competitive, the results show that it is not election-rigging or corruption as such that undermines the most basic process of democracy, but the practice of clan-based voting.
Kathleen Collins, “Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 3 (2002): 143.
16. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 244–245; Collins, “The Political Role of Clans,” 187.
17. Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 51–52.
18. Elin Bjarnegard, Karen Brouneus, and Erik Melander, “Honor and Political Violence: Micro-Level Findings from a Survey in Thailand,” Journal of Peace Research 546, no. 6 (2017): 748–761; Elin Bjarnegard and Erik Melander, “Pacific Men: How the Feminist Gap Explains Hostility,” The Pacific Review 30, no. 4 (2017): 478–493; Victor Asal et al., “Gender Ideologies and Forms of Contentious Mobilization in the Middle East,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (2013): 305–318; Victor Asal, Marcus Schulzke, and Amy Pate, “Why Do Some Organizations Kill While Others Do Not: An Examination of Middle Eastern Organizations,” Foreign Policy Analysis 13, no. 4 (October 2017): 811–831.
19. Peggy Reeves Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape: Sex, Brotherhood, and Privilege on Campus (1990; repr. New York: New York University Press, 2007), 7–8. Such fraternal ties can also be created among non-kin: “Working closely with a small band of men of roughly the same age seems to spark deep impressions of kinship, even when the men around you are not in fact your blood relatives.” Potts and Hayden, Sex and War, 79. This is the principle militaries use to create combat teams.
20. Valerie M. Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
21. Gerald R. Patterson, “A Comparison of Models for Interstate War and for Individual Violence,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 3, no. 3 (2008): 203–223.
22. Theodore Kemper, Social Structure and Testosterone: Explorations of the Socio-Bio-Social Chain (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 21.
23. Priya Nanda et al., Study on Masculinity, Intimate Partner Violence and Son Preference in India (New Delhi: International Center for Research on Women, 2014), 447.
24. Charles L. Whitfield et al., “Violent Childhood Experiences and the Risk of Intimate Partner Violence in Adults,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 18, no. 2 (2003): 166–185.
26. Kristen R. Monroe, ed., The Evils of Polygyny: Rose McDermott (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2018), 31.
28. Dara Kay Cohen, Rape During Civil War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 40.
29. Kari Hill and Harvey Langholtz, “Rehabilitation Programs for African Child Soldiers,” Peace Review 15, no. 3(2003): 280.
31. Potts and Hayden, Sex and War, 191.
32. Bjarnegard and Melander, “Pacific Men.”
34. Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence. New York: Mariner Books, 1996), 233.
35. Aaron Sell et al., “Formidability and the Logic of Human Anger,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 106, no. 35 (Sep. 1, 2009): 15073–15078.
36. Dominic Johnson et al., “Overconfidence in Wargames: Experimental Evidence on Expectations, Aggression, Gender, and Testosterone,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B (June 20, 2006): 2513–2520.
37. Bjarnegard et al., “Honor and Political Violence”; Anna Velitchkova, “World Culture, Uncoupling, Institutional Logics, and Recoupling: Practices and Self-identification as Institutional Microfoundations of Political Violence,” Sociological Forum 30, no. 3 (2015): 698–720.
38. Bjarnegard et al., “Honor and Political Violence,” 749.
39. Sebastian Maisel, “The Resurgent Tribal Agenda in Saudi Arabia” (issue paper no. 5, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 2015), 8.
40. Sanday, Fraternity Gang Rape, 48.
41. Marvin Harris, “The Evolution of Human Gender Hierarchies,” in Sex and Gender Hierarchies, ed. Barbara D. Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 62–64.
42. Potts and Hayden, Sex and War, 60, 267.
43. William T. Divale and Marvin Harris, “Population, Warfare, and the Male Supremacist Complex,” American Anthropologist 78 (1976): 521–538.
44. Dan Reiter, “The Positivist Study of Gender and International Relations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 7 (2015): 1301–1326.
45. Monty G. Marshall and Donna Ramsey, “Gender Empowerment and the Willingness of States to Use Force” (unpublished research paper, Center for Systemic Peace, 1999), http://www.members.aol.com/CSPmgm/.
46. Mary Caprioli, “Gendered Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 37, (2000): 51–68; Mary Caprioli, “Gender Equality and State Aggression: The Impact of Domestic Gender Equality on State First Use of Force,” International Interactions 29, no. 3 (2003): 195–214; Mary Caprioli, “Democracy and Human Rights Versus Women’s Security: A Contradiction?” Security Dialogue: Special Issue Gender and Security 35, no. 4 (2004): 411–428.
47. Mary Caprioli and Mark A. Boyer, “Gender, Violence, and International Crisis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, (2001): 503–518.
48. Patrick M. Regan and Aida Paskeviciute, “Women’s Access to Politics and Peaceful States,” Journal of Peace Research 40, (2003): 287–302.
49. Mary Caprioli and Peter F. Trumbore, “Human Rights Rogues in Interstate Disputes, 1980–2001,” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 2 (2006): 131–148; David Sobek, M. Rodwan Abouharb, and Christopher G. Ingram, “The Human Rights Peace: How the Respect for Human Rights at Home Leads to Peace Abroad,” Journal of Politics 68, no. 3 (2006): 519–529.
50. Caprioli and Trumbore, “Human Rights Rogues”; Erik Melander, “Gender Equality and Interstate Armed Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2005): 695–714.
51. Cameron Harris and Daniel James Milton, “Is Standing for Women a Stand Against Terrorism? Exploring the Connection Between Women’s Rights and Terrorism,” Journal of Human Rights 15, no. 1 (2016): 60–78.
52. Victor Asal et al., “Gender Ideologies.”
53. Mary Caprioli et al., “The WomanStats Project Database: Advancing an Empirical Research Agenda,” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 6 (November 2009): 1–13.
54. Erik Melander, “The Masculine Peace,” in Debating the East Asian Peace, ed. Elin Bjarnegard and Joakim Kreutz (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2017), 208–209.
55. Reed Wood and Mark Ramirez, “Exploring the Microfoundations of the Gender Equality Peace Hypothesis,” International Studies Review 20, no. 3 (2018): 345–367. In their conclusion, Wood and Ramirez note: “This finding uncovers a potentially important mechanism by which gender equality may lead states to consider alternative means to conflict. It is through the changing beliefs of men regarding gender equality that we might observe an overall reduction in state-level conflict given that men among the masses often support men in control of government and military organizations.”
56. Anthony Lopez, Rose McDermott, and Michael Petersen, “States in Mind: Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and International Politics,” International Security 36, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 79. Richard Cincotta concludes that a broader definition of demographically at-risk states would acknowledge that the youthful age structure of a politically organized minority is a significant risk factor for intrastate conflict. See Richard Cincotta, “Minority Youth Bulges and the Future of Intrastate Conflict,” New Security Beat, October 13, 2011, https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2011/10/minority-youth-bulges-and-the-future-of-intrastate-conflict/, 9.
57. Lopez et al., “States in Mind,” 81–82.
58. Divale and Harris, “Population, Warfare”; see also Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
59. Richard D. Alexander et al., “Sexual Dimorphisms and Breeding Systems in Pinnipeds, Ungulates, Primates, and Humans,” in Evolutionary Biology and Human Behavior, ed. Napoleon A. Chagnon and Wiliam Irons (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1979), 423, 432–433.
60. Harris, “The Evolution of Human Gender Hierarchies”; Satoshi Kanazawa, “Evolutionary Psychological Foundations of Civil Wars,” Journal of Politics 71, no. 1 (January 2009): 25–34; Kristian Gleditsch et al., “Polygyny or Misogyny? Reexamining the ‘First Law on Intergroup Conflict,’” Journal of Politics 73, no. 1 (January 2011): 265–270.
61. Kanazawa, “Evolutionary Psychological Foundations of Civil Wars,” 32.
62. James L. Boone, “Noble Family Structure and Expanisionist Warfare in the Late Middle Ages: A Socioecological Approach,” in Rethinking Human Adaptation: Biological and Cultural Models, ed. Rada Dyson-Hudson and Michael A. Little (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 79–96.
64. Azar Gat, “So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War,” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 4 (December 2009): 586.
65. Wrangham and Peterson, Demonic Males, 165, 167, 168, 231, 233.
66. Wrangham and Peterson, Demonic Males, 233.
67. Potts and Hayden, Sex and War, 96.
68. Gat, “So Why Do People Fight?” 591.
69. Stephen Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 89–90, 95.
70. Rosen, War and Human Nature, 96.
71. Dominic Johnson and Bradley Thayer, “The Evolution of Offensive Realism,” Politics and the Life Sciences 35, no. 1 (March 2016): 14.
72. Rose McDermott, personal communication, July 2017.
73. Potts and Hayden, Sex and War, 25–26, 197, 301.
74. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (1861; repr. Lexington, KY: [publisher unknown], 2013), 7.
75. Mill, The Subjection of Women, 23, 31.
76. Marilyn Waring, Counting for Nothing: What Men Value and What Women Are Worth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), xiv.
77. Helen Moffett, “Sexual Violence, Civil Society and the New Constitution,” in Women’s Activism in South Africa: Working Across Divides, ed. Hannah Evelyn Britton, Jennifer Natalie Fish, and Sheila Meintjes (Scottsville, South Africa University of KwaZulu–Natal Press, 2007), 172.
79. Steven C. Caton, “Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of Power,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 82.
80. M. Steven Fish, “Islam and Authoritarianism,” World Politics 55, no. 1 (2002): 30.
81. Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 140.
82. Ariel I. Ahram, “Sexual and Ethnic Violence and the Making of ISIS,” Survival 57, no. 3 (2015): 57–78.
83. Julia Adams, “The Rule of the Father: Patriarchy and Patrimonialism in Early Modern Europe,” in Max Weber’s Economy and Society: A Critical Companion, ed. C. Camic, P. S. Gorski and D. M. Trubek (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 5, http://sociology.yale.edu/sites/default/files/adams_rulefather.pdf. Page citations are from the pdf.
84. Quoted in Adams, “The Rule of the Father: Patriarchy and Patrimonialism in Early Modern Europe,” 5.
85. Barbara Smuts, “Male Aggression Against Women: An Evolutionary Perspective,” Human Nature 3, no. 1 (1992): 1–44.
86. Barbara Smuts, “The Evolutionary Origins of Patriarchy,” Human Nature 6, no. 1 (1995): 18.
87. N. Pound, Martin Daly, and Margo Wilson, “There’s No Contest: Human Sex Differences Are Sexually Selected,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32, no. 3/4 (2009): 286–287.
88. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 256.
89. David Hart, “Clan, Lineage and the Feud in a Rifian Tribe [Aith Waryaghar, Morocco],” in Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, ed. Louise Sweet (Garden City, NY: Natural History Press, 1970), 74.
90. David Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs: Women and Sexuality in Global Conflict (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 60.
91. Monica Das Gupta tells the same tale about Korea:
The process of Korea’s Confucianization has been studied closely. During the Choson dynasty (1392–1910), a process of rigorous social engineering was carried out, borrowing heavily from readings of the Chinese texts. The existing bilateral family system was replaced with a rigidly patrilineal system, abolishing girls’ rights to parental property and the possibility of couples living with either the man’s or the woman’s family. Ancestor worship was strenuously promoted, to strengthen corporate bonds within the lineage and to the rulers. A Department of Rites refined the details of this patriarchal authoritarian regime, and fought relentlessly over centuries against the survival of traces of the old bilateral system of kinship. Social organization was tied together by a threefold mechanism: the domestic sphere, represented by the wife, was subordinated to the public sphere, represented by the father and son, they in turn were the sovereign’s subjects.
Monica Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems, and Asia’s ‘Missing Girls’: The Construction of Son Preference and Its Unraveling” (World Bank, Washington, DC, December 2009), 10.
92. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 6–7.
93. Jack Goody and Stanley J. Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 146.
94. Robert Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Vintage, 1995), 98.
95. Laura Betzig, Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Darwinian View of History (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1986).
96. Fish, “Islam and Authoritarianism,” 31.
97. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 226, 244–245.
98. Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 243.
99. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 8.
101. Jack Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 16.
102. Elissa Braunstein, “The Feminist Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society: An Investigation of Gender Inequality and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Issues 42, no. 4, December 2008): 967.
103. Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
104. Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family in Europe.
105. James M. Warner and D. A. Campbell, “Supply Response in an Agrarian Economy with Nonsymmetric Gender Relations,” World Development 28, no. 7 (2000): 1330. It may be argued the first rents are those produced by Mother Nature in the form of food and water, which sustain the lives of human beings.
106. Maria Mies, “Social Origins of the Sexual Division of Labor,” in Women: The Last Colony, ed. Maria Mies, Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, and Claudia Von Werlhof (London: Zed Books, 1988), 67–95.
107. Joseph Manson et al., “Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees and Humans,” Current Anthropology 32, no. 4 (1991): 369–390, p. 374. They add that “where crucial material resources are alienable the accumulation of wealth will be associated with polygyny” (374).
108. William Tucker, Marriage and Civilization (New York: Regnery, 2014), 170.
109. Thomas Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 153–184.
110. Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations,” 171.
111. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 233.
112. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics.
113. J. E. Peterson, “Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia,” Middle East Journal 31, no. 3 (Summer 1977): 306.
115. Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians,” 58.
116. Joseph Kostiner, “Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State Formation in Saudi Arabia,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 230. Joseph Kostiner comments about Saudi Arabia,
Patron-client networks drew on tribal cooperation and familiarity for political support and for help in coping with the administration. In their ultimate form such networks created a large clientele dependent on the royal family. In Aziz al-Azmeh’s words, “The Saudi polity tributarises other clan groups, no longer nomadic, and ties them…to the redistribution of Saudi wealth; for plunder is substituted by subsidy and the privilege of citizenship, such as the legal sponsorship of foreign business (kafala) is akin in many ways to the exaction of protection money (khuwwa). Thus tribalism becomes ascendant, not merely a modus vivendi or an additional structure of society.” (Kostiner, “Transforming Dualities,” 245.)
117. Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, 233.
118. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 8.
119. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 97.
120. You-Ming Liou and Paul Musgrave, “Oil, Autocratic Survival, and the Gendered Resource Curse: When Inefficient Policy Is Politically Expedient,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2016): 440–456.
121. Valentine Moghadam notes that other countries have oil rents but do not subordinate women—such as Norway—but these countries had significantly dismantled the components of the Syndrome before they began to extract these resources. Moghadam, personal communication, July 18, 2016.
122. Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 216.
123. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 260.
124. Braunstein, “The Feminist Political Economy,” 969.
125. Braunstein, “The Feminist Political Economy,” 974.
127. Christopher Butler, Tali Gluch, and Neil J. Mitchell, “Security Forces and Sexual Violence,” Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 6 (2007): 678.
128. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 81. Sometimes government positions are “marked” as belonging to particular lineages (such as we see in some Gulf states today). Indeed, in the past, this parceling out of government positions along family lines might even be codified. Adams gives an example from European history:
For example, the Contracts of Correspondence in the eighteenth-century Netherlands—which could, without too much of a stretch, be termed a cartel of fifty-some cities—formalized the distribution of city offices in written succession rules, laying out systems by which all eligible elite families would take turns getting mayoralties, East Indies Company directorships, and other top corporate privileges. The contracts regulated the membership in and control over corporate bodies, which were the conditions for capital accumulation, political power, and family honor. The settlements, which were ratified by the Stadholder and States-General, protected specific families’ stake in an office and guaranteed that regent families’ collective office genealogies would continue unbroken. They also tightened the political vise on each family head accordingly, so that he could do nothing without the permission of his fellows. (Adams, “The Rule of the Father: Patriarchy and Patrimonialism in Early Modern Europe, 249.”)
129. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 249.
130. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 245, 249.
131. Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition, 349, 350.
132. Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition, 340.
134. Michela Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower (New York: Harper Perennial, 2010).
135. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 166.
136. Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition, 339.
137. Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999), 241.
138. Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders (2009; repr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), xii.
139. North et al., Violence and Social Orders, 18.
140. Ernest Gellner, “Tribalism and the State in the Middle East,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 116.
141. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 81.
143. Kostiner, “Transforming Dualities,” 240.
144. David Skidmore, “Understanding Chinese President’s Xi’s Anti-Corruption Campaign,” The Conversation, October 27, 2017, https://theconversation.com/understanding-chinese-president-xis-anti-corruption-campaign-86396; see also David Kirkpatrick, “Saudi Arabia Arrests 11 Princes,” New York Times, November 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-waleed-bin-talal.html.
145. Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition, 339.
147. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 78. Although phrased a bit obscurely, Dresch’s observation is also worth reflection: “If tribes somehow lead to states, then states lead as often to tribes.” Paul Dresch, “Imams and Tribes: The Writing and Acting of History in Upper Yemen,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, edited by Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, 253 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).
148. Collins, “Clans, Pacts, and Politics in Central Asia,” 5.
149. Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, 201–202.
150. United Nations Development Program, Regional Bureau for Arab States, Arab Human Development Report 2004: Towards Freedom in the Arab World (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2005), 145.
151. Ivan Ermakoff, “Patrimony and Collective Capacity: An Analytical Outline,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636, no. 1 (2011): 182.
152. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 104.
153. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” and Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition.
154. Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State (New York: Norton, 2016), 6, 7, 69, 75, 77.
155. Chayes, Thieves of State, 62, 67.
156. Chayes, Thieves of State, 148.
157. Chayes, Thieves of State, 71, 77, 88.
158. Chayes, Thieves of State, 96.
159. Chayes, Thieves of State, 86.
161. Bassam Tibi, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-State in the Modern Middle East,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 115. Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney discuss the role of the mamluks—alien elite military slaves—in the emergence of a strong bureaucracy in Islamic lands. These mamluks were forbidden from marrying local women, to prevent their cooptation by the clans. Unfortunately, in several cases, they became a praetorian guard that overthrew the ruler and established their own sultanate. Lisa Blaydes and Eric Chaney, “The Feudal Revolution and Europe’s Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World Before 1500 CE,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (February 2013): doi:10.1017/S0003055412000561. Fukuyama suggests that the creation of the mamluk social category solved a consistent problem for larger states at this pre-modern period of time:
Early social organization in China, India, and the Middle East was based on agnatic lineages…. In each case, state builders had to figure out how to make individuals loyal to the state rather than to their local kin group. Institutions based on territory and centralized legal authority had to be layered on top of strong segmentary societies. The most extreme response to this problem was that of the Arabs and Ottomans, who literally kidnapped children and raised them in artificial households so they would be loyal to the state and not to their kin. (Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order).
One could argue that another extreme example was the imposed celibacy of the Catholic Church on its priests, which prevented these men from having any heirs at all, and thus was designed to focus the mind on the good of the Church rather than personal benefit. Church bureaucracy in this sense may have been the first truly professional, modern bureaucracy.
162. Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, 17.
163. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 61.
164. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, xix.
165. Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace.
166. North et al., Violence and Social Orders, 63.
167. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 9.
168. Patricio Asfura-Heim, “Tribal Customary Law and Legal Pluralism in al Anbar, Iraq,” in Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies, ed. Deborah H. Isser (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 247.
169. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 97.
170. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan.
171. Laura Betzig, “Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Cross-Cultural Correlation of Conflict Asymmetry, Hierarchy, and Degree of Polygyny,” Ethology and Sociobiology 3 (1982): 213–214.
172. Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, 37. Indeed, Fukuyama is of the opinion that rule of law cannot emerge unless a transcendent vision of universal kinship—rooted in a belief in deity—is present. According to Fukuyama, it was China’s lack of transcendent religion that resulted in its being the only major civilization that did not develop rule of law.
173. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 124.
174. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 37.
175. North et al., Violence and Social Orders, 173.
177. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 113–114.
178. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 114.
179. Gellner, “Tribalism and the State,” and Akbar Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013).
180. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 36, 38.
181. Caton, “Anthropological Theories,” and Noah Coburn, Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 5.
182. Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians,” 91.
183. Asfura-Heim, “Tribal Customary Law,” 244–245.
184. Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone.
186. Tapper “Anthropologists, Historians,” 94.
187. Collins, “The Political Role of Clans,” 187.
188. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 9.
189. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 36.
190. Weiner notes that King Alfred of England introduced the crime of disturbing the “King’s Peace” to do just this. Would-be fighters had to ride to the king and notify him before beginning a fight, and fighting within the King’s hall was prohibited. Eventually, “the requirement that peace be kept in the King’s personal residence eventually grew into the principle that there ought to be peace over the King’s entire realm—the King’s peace, which the King had the responsibility to maintain.” Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 146.
191. Allan Dafoe and Devin Caughey find that U.S. presidents who were Southerners raised in a culture of rigid male honor were far more likely to go to war for reputational reasons than those not raised in that culture. Honor becomes operationalized as resolve to act, and thus what is important is that reputation for resolve is bolstered through such forceful action. They note that in practice this means, “any issue, no matter how trivial, can become a test of resolve.” Allan Dafoe and Devin Caughey, “Honor and War: Southern US Presidents and the Effects of Concern for Reputation,” World Politics 68, no. 2 (April 2016): 348. See also Barbara Walter, Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
192. Bjarnegard et al., “Honor and Political Violence.”
193. Ahram, “Sexual and Ethnic Violence and the Construction of the Islamic State.”
194. Divale and Harris, “Population, Warfare,” 532.
195. Mounira M. Charrad, “Central and Local Patrimonialism: State-Building in Kin-Based Societies,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636, no. 1 (July 2011): 49–68; see also Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone.
196. Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone.
197. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 146. See also Tim Krieger and Laura Renner, “A Cautionary Tale on Polygyny, Conflict, and Gender Inequality,” (University of Freiburg discussion paper 2018–02, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessor fur Ordnungs-und Wettbewerbspolitik, April 2018).
198. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 147.
199. Peggy Reeves Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance: On the Origins of Sexual Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 47.
200. Jonathan Gottschall, The Rape of Troy: Evolution, Violence, and the World of Homer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 4.
201. Ben Raffield and Mark Collard, “Male-Biased Operational Sex Ratios and the Viking Phenomenon: An Evolutionary Anthropological Perspective on Late Iron Age Scandinavian Raiding,” Evolution and Human Behavior 38, no. 3 (2016): 315–324.
202. Divale and Harris, “Population, Warfare,” 526. In another interesting observation, Tanika Chakraborty and Sukkoo Kim, in their study of regional, caste, and tribal variation in Indian sex ratios, note that both dowry-practicing groups as well as brideprice-practicing groups (such as tribes) in India both had abnormal sex ratios. Tanika Chakraborty and Sukkoo Kim, “Kinship Institutions and Sex Ratios in India,” Demography 47, no. 4 (November 2010): 997. This suggests that the mechanism matters less than the overall aim of subordinating women.
203. Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 46.
204. United Nations Development Program, Arab Human Development Report 2004, 166.
207. Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance, 136.
208. Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance, 146–147.
209. Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance, 158, 201.
210. Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay, and Meredeth Turshen, “There Is No Aftermath for Women,” in The Aftermath: Women in Post-Conflict Transformation, ed. Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pullay, and Meredeth Turshen (New York: Zed Books 2001), 13.
212. Chandran, “Hunger, Child Marriage, Prostitution.”
213. Peggy Reeves Sanday, “The Socio-Cultural Context of Rape: A Cross-Cultural Study,” Journal of Social Issues 37, no. 4 (1981): 25.
5. The Tremors Caused by Obstructed Marriage Markets: A Closer Look
3. Laura Betzig, “Despotism and Differential Reproduction: A Cross-Cultural Correlation of Conflict Asymmetry, Hierarchy, and Degree of Polygyny,” Ethology and Sociobiology 3, (1982): 218.
4. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 233.
5. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 76.
6. Mounira M. Charrad, States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 55.
7. David Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs: Women and Sexuality in Global Conflict (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 115–116. Clans differ according to the level and intensity of female subordination. For example, Barth notes among the Basseri tribe of Iran, women are given a meaningful measure of authority, but only in family matters. Fredrik Barth, Nomads of South Persia: The Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh Confederacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961).
8. Valerie Hudson and Andrea Den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male Population (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).
9. Hudson and Den Boer, Bare Branches.
10. Hudson and Den Boer, Bare Branches.
11. William Graham Sumner, Folkways (New York: Dover, 1959), 309–310
12. Monica Das Gupta “Family Systems, Political Systems, and Asia’s ‘Missing Girls’: The Construction of Son Preference and Its Unraveling” (World Bank, Washington, DC, December 2009), 20.
14. Andrea Den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, “Patrilineality, Son Preference, and Sex Selection in South Korea and Vietnam,” Population and Development Review 43, no. 1 (2017): 119–147.
15. Betzig, “Despotism and Differential Reproduction,” 216.
16. Hudson and Den Boer, Bare Branches.
17. Lena Edlund et al., “Sex Ratios and Crime: Evidence from China’s One-Child Policy,” Review of Economics and Statistics 95, no. 5 (December 2013): 1520–1534.”
18. Jean Dreze and Reetika Khera, “Crime, Gender, and Society in India: Insights from Homicide Data,” Population and Development Review 26, no. 2 (June 2000): 335–352; see also Cheng Lu, “Excess of Marriageable Males and Violent Crime in China and South Korea, 1970–2008” (paper presented at the 2012 annual meeting of the Population Association of America, San Francisco, CA, May 3–5, 2012), http://paa2012.princeton.edu/abstracts/121243; see also Lisa Cameron, Xin Meng, and Dandan Zhang, “China’s Sex Ratio and Crime: Behavioral Change or Financial Necessity?” IZA discussion paper no. 9747, Institute for the Study of Labor, February 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp9747.pdf.
19. Jonathan Gottschall, The Rape of Troy: Evolution, Violence, and the World of Homer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 151; William T. Divale and Marvin Harris note that “demographic analysis of 160 band and village populations, censused prior to modern contact and while they still practiced warfare, shows an average sex ratio in the age group 14 and under of 128 boys per 100 girls.” William T. Divale and Marvin Harris, “Population, Warfare, and the Male Supremacist Complex,” American Anthropologist 78 (1976): 525.
21. Kevin O’Brien and Li Lianjiang, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
23. Allan Mazur and Alan Booth, “Testosterone and Dominance in Men,” Behavioral and Brain Science 21, no. 3 (June 1998): 353–397. Furthermore, these characteristics may persist even after sex ratios have subsequently normalized. For example, Victoria Baranov, Ralph De Haas, and Pauline Grosjean have shown that areas in Australia that historically had the worst male-biased sex ratios in the early days of British colonization still to this day (when sex ratios are normal) experience greater violence, excessive alcohol consumption, and greater sex segregation by occupation. Victoria Baranov, Ralph De Haas, and Pauline Grosjean “Men: Roots and Consequences of Masculinity Norms,” SSRN, June 12, 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3185694.
25. Hudson and Den Boer, Bare Branches, 208.
26. Daniel Little, Understanding Peasant China (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 209.
27. James L. Boone, “Parental Investment and Elite Family Structure in Preindustrial States: A Case Study of Late Medieval-Early Modern Portuguese Genealogies,” American Anthropologist 88, no. 4 (December 1986): 859–878; 862, 868.
28. William Tucker, Marriage and Civilization (New York: Regnery, 2014), 83.
29. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, and Peter J. Richerson, “The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 367 (2012): 660.
30. Henrich et al., “The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” 660.
31. David Barash, Out of Eden: The Surprising Consequences of Polygamy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 29.
32. Gerda Lerner has something interesting to say about Sparta: “[Sparta] expressed the concept that the bearing of children was as important a service to the state as the service of the warrior in a war, which allowed the inscription of the name of the deceased on a tomb only of a man who had died at war and of a woman who had died in childbirth.” Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 203.
33. Tucker, Marriage and Civilization, 111.
34. Barash, Out of Eden, 112–113.
35. Tucker notes that while Western slavery emphasized capturing males who could perform hard labor, Islamic slavery emphasized female slavery, with female slaves outnumbering male slaves two-to-one, to provide access to women for lower class men who had been edged out of the marriage market by the elite’s practice of polygyny. Tucker, Marriage and Civilization, 174.
36. Barash, Out of Eden, 38.
37. Barash, Out of Eden, 40.
38. Barash, Out of Eden, 45.
39. Esther Mokuwa et al., “Peasant Grievance and Insurgency in Sierra Leone: Judicial Serfdom as a Driver of Conflict,” African Affairs 110, no. 440 (2011): 339–366.
40. Marvin Harris, “The Evolution of Human Gender Hierarchies,” in Sex and Gender Hierarchies, ed. Barbara D. Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 57–79; Satoshi Kanazawa, “Evolutionary Psychological Foundations of Civil Wars,” Journal of Politics 71, no. 1 (January 2009): 25–34; Kristian Gleditsch et al., “Polygyny or Misogyny? Reexamining the ‘First Law on Intergroup Conflict,’ ” Journal of Politics 73, no. 1 (January 2011): 265–270; Tim Krieger and Laura Renner, “A Cautionary Tale on Polygyny, Conflict, and Gender Inequality” (University of Freiburg discussion paper 2018–02, Wilfried-Guth-Stiftungsprofessor fur Ordnungs-und Wettbewerbspolitik, April 2018).
41. James L. Boone, “Noble Family Structure and Expanisionist Warfare in the Late Middle Ages: A Socioecological Approach,” in Rethinking Human Adaptation: Biological and Cultural Models, ed. Rada Dyson-Hudson and Michael A. Little (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 79–96.
42. Rebecca Nielsen, “Presentation on Sierra Leone Research” (WomanStats co-PI meeting, Provo, UT, July 10, 2017).
43. Ben Raffield and Mark Collard, “Male-Biased Operational Sex Ratios and the Viking Phenomenon: An Evolutionary Anthropological Perspective on Late Iron Age Scandinavian Raiding,” Evolution and Human Behavior 38, no. 3 (2016): 315–324.
44. Gottschall, The Rape of Troy.
45. Jack Goody and Stanley J. Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 7.
46. Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, A History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 92, 94.
47. Krieger and Renner, “A Cautionary Tale on Polygyny, Conflict, and Gender Inequality.”
48. Betzig, Despotism and Differential Reproduction.
49. Andrey Korotayev and Dmitri Bondarenko, “Polygyny and Democracy: A Cross-Cultural Comparison,” Cross-Cultural Research 34, no. 1 (2000): 190–208.
50. Robert Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Vintage, 1995), 98.
51. Rose McDermott and Jonathan Cowden, “Polygyny and Violence Against Women,” Emory Law Journal 64, (2015): 1767–1814.
52. Richard D. Alexander et al., “Sexual Dimorphisms and Breeding Systems in Pinnipeds, Ungulates, Primates, and Humans,” in Evolutionary Biology and Human Behavior, ed. Napoleon A. Chagnon and Wiliam Irons (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1979), 423, 432–433.
53. Henrich et al., “The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” 657, 659–660.
55. Henrich et al., “The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” 657, 659–660.
57. Peter Turchin, Ultra Society: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Greatest Cooperators on Earth (Chaplin, CT: Beresta Books, 2016), 228.
58. McDermott and Cowden, “Polygyny and Violence Against Women,” 1767–1814.
59. Betzig, “Despotism and Differential Reproduction,” 310.
61. McDermott and Cowden, “Polygyny and Violence Against Women,” 1810–1814.
62. Peggy Reeves Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance: On the Origins of Sexual Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 209.
63. This subsection’s discussion was adapted from Valerie M. Hudson and Hilary Matfess, “In Plain Sight: The Neglected Linkage Between Brideprice, Raiding, and Rebellion,” International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 7–40, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00289.
69. Alexandra Tenny, personal communication, August 3, 2017.
70. Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 3 (September 2006): 607–629; and Noah Bricker and Mark Foley, “The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence: The Importance of the Labor Market,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 7, no. 1 (2013): 179–194; and Richard Cincotta, “Minority Youth Bulges and the Future of Intrastate Conflict,” New Security Beat, October 13, 2011, https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/32162413/NSB_Cincotta_Minority_YB.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1521143853&Signature=3Z4Q5vYsNZKFiR6%2BOZD1ReHWGME%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DMinority_Youth_Bulges_and_the_Future_of.pdf.
72. Weber, “Demography and Democracy,” 344.
73. Weber, “Demography and Democracy,” 348.
74. Murdock, “ ‘Delayed’ Marriage Frustrates Middle East Youth.”
75. Interestingly, a report by Nava Ashraf, Natalie Bau, Nathan Nunn, and Alessandra Voena found that increasing girls’ education may raise brideprice in the community as the girls’ value is perceived to have increased due to this extra investment. The observation of this unintended side-effect is not meant to discredit girls’ education as a development objective, but it serves to highlight a situation in which girls’ gains may actually feed other sources of female oppression, as well as marriage market obstruction. Nava Ashraf et al., “Brideprice and the Returns to Education for Women” (NBER working paper no. 22417, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, July 21, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22417.
76. It is interesting that rebel and terrorist groups are eager to recruit men on the basis of increased marriage prospects, but that these married recruits then tend to become problematic for the group. For example, during the Huk Rebellion of the 1950s in the Philippines, Goodwin notes that married cadres suffered from what was called “await-ism,” meaning they were less likely to put themselves forward in a fight because of loyalty to wives. Jeff Goodwin, “The Libidinal Constitution of a High-Risk Social Movement: Affectual Ties and Solidarity in the Huk Rebellion, 1946–1954,” American Sociological Review 62, no. 1 (February 1997): 53–69. The Palestine Liberation Organization actually used this tendency to their advantage, offering payment of brideprice and marriage as a way to get its troublesome Black September subgroup out of action; once these men were married, and especially if they had young sons, they no longer wanted to be actively involved in terrorist activities. Bruce Hofman,”Gaza City: All You Need is Love,” The Atlantic, December 2001. https://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2001/12/hoffman.htm.
ISIS learned from this incident: it recruited foreign fighters by offering them marriage, but then to prevent what happened with Black September, they immediately forced the wives to go on Depo-Provera so that they would not get pregnant. Rukmini Callimachi, “To Maintain Supply of Sex Slaves, ISIS Pushes Birth Control,” New York Times, March 12, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/13/world/middleeast/to-maintain-supply-of-sex-slaves-isis-pushes-birth-control.html. As soon as their husbands were killed in action, ISIS did not allow these women the religiously mandated three months of grieving, but rather married them off immediately to another foreign fighter. Alexis Henshaw of Duke University has also done some interesting work on “conjugal order” in rebel groups, noting how the employment of means such as forced abortions in the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army) were designed to simultaneously exploit male sexual interest while minimizing the threat to revolutionary zeal that might otherwise follow. Alexis Henshaw, “Conjugal Order in the Rebel Family: A Comparative View” (unpublished manuscript, January 17, 2018).
77. Diane Singerman, The Economic Imperatives of Marriage: Emerging Practices and Identities among Youth in the Middle East (Dubai: Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Dubai School of Government, 2007).
78. T. El-Khodary, “For War Widows, Hamas Recruits Army of Husbands,” New York Times, October 31, 2008.
81. Ariel I. Ahram, “Sexual Violence and the Making of ISIS,” Survival 57, no. 3 (2015): 57–78. Interestingly, as ISIS fell in 2017, women who had joined the group to marry began to tell some interesting tales about the foreign fighters. For example, in one interview, one Indonesian young woman named Rahma noted of her time with ISIS, “They [the foreign fighters] say they want to jihad for the sake of Allah, but what they want is only about women and sex.” And another ISIS wife, named May, said the women in Raqqa “has been left shocked after being divorced by foreign fighters only three to four days or one month after marrying.” Jillian Robinson, “Jihadi Speed-Dating,” Daily Mail, July 17, 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4703426/ISIS-brides-reveal-reality-married-jihadi.html.
82. Hudson and Matfess, “In Plain Sight.”
84. Matfess, “Boko Haram is Enslaving Women, Making Them Join the War,” Newsweek, February 8, 2016.
89. Al-Muslimi, “The Social Politics of Weddings in Yemen.”
90. Agence France Presse, “Poor Celebrate at Mass Weddings in Algeria,” Gulf Times, January 2, 2017, http://www.gulf-times.com/story/526653/Poor-celebrate-at-mass-weddings-in-Algeria; Majd Al-Waheidi, “Gaza Dating Site Matches Widows to Men Seeing Second (or Third) Wife,” New York Times, June 4, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/04/world/middleeast/gaza-palestinians-hamas-wesal-polygamy.html; Kelly McLaughlin, “Hundreds of Fatherless Brides in India Tie the Knot as Diamond Tycoon Funds Their Weddings in a Mass Celebration,” Daily Mail, December 24, 2017, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5210547/Hundreds-fatherless-brides-India-tie-knot.html.
91. Robert Lacey, Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi Arabia (New York: Penguin, 2010), 258.
92. Hudson and Matfess, “In Plain Sight.”
93. Corry Elida, “Indonesia: Mass Wedding Provides Marriage and Birth Registration for Low Income Families,” Jakarta Post, January 29, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/29/mass-wedding-delivers-birth-certificates.html; “Taiwan Ministry Turns Matchmaker to Boost Birth Rate,” BBC, June 21, 2010, http://www.bbc.com/news/10364381;” Elahe Izadi, “The Potential Spouse Is Brought to You by the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Washington Post, June 16, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soloish/wp/2015/06/16/this-potential-spouse-is-brought-to-you-by-the-islamic-republic-of-iran/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.31a564271628.
95. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 9.
96. Julia Adams, “Politics, Patriarchy and Frontiers of Historical Sociological Explanation,” in Political Power and Social Theory 19 (2008): 289–294.
97. Boone, “Noble Family Structure and Expanisionist Warfare,” and Boone, “Parental Investment and Elite Family Structure.”
98. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 8–9.
99. Anthony Lopez, Rose McDermott, and Michael Bang Petersen. “States in Mind: Evolution, Coalitional Psychology, and International Politics,” International Security 36, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 81, 82.
100. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 10.
101. Singerman, The Economic Imperatives of Marriage.
102. Kirk Semple, “Big Weddings Bring Afghans Joy, and Debt,” New York Times, January 14, 2008.
103. Semple, “Big Weddings Bring Afghans Joy, and Debt.”
104. Michael Slackman, “Stifled, Egypt’s Young Turn to Islamic Fervor,” New York Times, February 17, 2008.
105. Sommers and Schwartz, “Dowry and Division.”
106. Singerman, The Economic Imperatives of Marriage, 34.
107. Singerman, The Economic Imperatives of Marriage, 34.
108. Slackman, “Stifled, Egypt’s Young Turn to Islamic Fervor.”
109. Singerman, The Economic Imperatives of Marriage, 12.
110. Richmond and Krause-Jackson, “Cows-for-Brides Inflation.”
6. The Effects of the Syndrome, Part Two: Human, Economic, and Environmental Security
1. Jack Goldstone et al., “A Global Model for Predicting Political Instability,” American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (January 2010): 190–208.
2. Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 30.
3. Abdul Al Lily, The Bro Code of Saudi Culture (San Bernardino, CA: Al Lily, 2016), 117.
6. Alberto Alesina, Benedetta Brioschi, and Eliana La Ferrara, “Violence Against Women: A Cross-Cultural Analysis for Africa” (NBER working paper no. 21901, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, January 2016), 16, http://www.nber.org/papers/w21901.
7. Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, Sex and War (Dallas, TX: Benbella Books, 2008), 91.
8. Richard Cincotta, “Africa’s Reluctant Fertility Transition,” Current History (May 2011), 188–189.
9. Noah Bricker and Mark Foley, “The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence,” 190–191.
10. Noah Bricker and Mark Foley, “The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence: The Importance of the Labor Market,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 7, no. 1 (2013): 181.
13. Rachel Vogelstein, Ending Child Marriage: How Elevating the Status of Girls Advances U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 14, 2013), 13–15.
15. Vogelstein, Ending Child Marriage, 16.
16. Vogelstein, Ending Child Marriage, 16.
19. Isaiah Esipisu, “Men and Women, Farming Together, Can Eradicate Hunger,” Inter Press Service, September 1, 2012, http://www.nationofchange.org/men-and-women-farming-together-can-eradicate-hunger-1346512517; see also “Eat Better? Let Women Do the Work…,” The Economist, July 11, 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/07/global-food-security.
23. Landesa, “Women’s Land Rights,” Resources: Infographics, December 21, 2015, https://www.landesa.org/resources/womens-land-rights-and-the-sustainable-development-goals/; Yacob A. Zereyesus, “Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture and Household-Level Health in Northern Ghana: A Capability Approach,” Journal of International Development 29 (2017): 899–918; Yacob A. Zereyesus et al., “Does Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Matter for Children’s Health Status? Insights from Northern Ghana,” Social Indicators Research 132, no. 3 (2017): 1265–1280.
24. Stanley Sharaunga, Maxwell Mudhara, and Ayalneh Bogale, “The Impact of ‘Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture’ On Household Vulnerability to Food Insecurity in the KwaZulu-Natal Province,” Forum for Development Studies 42, no. 2 (2015): 218.
27. Wodon and de la Briere, “Unrealized Potential,” 2.
29. United Nations Population Fund, “Motherhood in Childhood.”
30. Alesina et al., “Violence Against Women,” 1.
32. Vogelstein, Ending Child Marriage, 18.
33. Jack Goody and Stanley J. Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 10.
34. James Foreman-Peck and Peng Zhou, “Late Marriage as a Contributor to the Industrial Revolution in England,” Economic History Review 71, no. 4 (2018): 1073–1099.
35. Stephan Klasen, “Low Schooling for Girls, Slower Growth for All? Cross-Country Evidence on the Effect of Gender Inequality in Education on Economic Development,” World Bank Economic Review 16, no. 3 (2002): 345–373.
36. Vogelstein, Ending Child Marriage, 17.
38. Elizabeth M. King, Educating Girls and Women: Investing in Development (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1990).
41. Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); see also Schatz, Modern Clan Politics.
42. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, and Peter J. Richerson, “The Puzzle of Monogamous Marriage,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 367, (2012): 657–669.
43. Clare Castillejo, “Gender Inequality and State Fragility in the Sahel” (FRIDE policy brief no. 204, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, June 2015), 3.
45. Rachel Vogelstein, Ending Child Marriage: How Elevating the Status of Girls Advances US Foreign Policy Objectives, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 14, 2013, 1, 21–22.
7. The Effects by the Numbers: The Empirical Relationship Between the Syndrome and National Outcomes
1. Kristen R. Monroe, ed., The Evils of Polygyny: Rose McDermott (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2018), 23.
2. We note that as we finished the editing of this volume in June 2019, Canada appointed its first ever ambassador for women, peace, and security: Jacqueline O’Neill. Perhaps countries such as Canada will be prepared to utilize these findings.
3. Unfortunately, there is no such variable on whether women’s agricultural labor is considered important; perhaps there is too much subnational variation to successfully operationalize this concept, but we hope others will take up the challenge.
4. Andrea Den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, “Patrilineality, Son Preference, and Sex Selection in South Korea and Vietnam,” Population and Development Review 43, no. 1 (2017): 119–147.
5. Monica Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems, and Asia’s ‘Missing Girls’: The Construction of Son Preference and Its Unraveling” (World Bank, Washington, DC, December 2009), 15–16.
6. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 18–19.
7. Mary Hartman, The Household and the Making of History: A Subversive View of the Western Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
8. Louisa Chiang, personal communication with Valerie Hudson, October 24, 2016.
9. Den Boer and Hudson, “Patrilineality, Son Preference.”
10. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 19.
12. Valerie Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
13. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 17.
14. Peggy Reeves Sanday, Female Power and Male Dominance: On the Origins of Sexual Inequality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
16. Andrea Den Boer, Valerie M. Hudson, and Jenny Russell, “China’s Mismatched Bookends: A Tale of Birth Sex Ratios in South Korea and Vietnam” (paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference. New Orleans, LA, February 2015), 18–21.
17. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 6.
19. Erlanger, “In Unruly Gaza.”
20. Erlanger, “In Unruly Gaza.”
22. Variables that we considered but that had to be dropped because of this stipulation included number of unique land borders, and two of the component parts of the aggregated fractionalization score (i.e., racial and linguistic fractionalization).
23. Syndrome/Urbanization 2015 (−.496, significance .000), Syndrome/Number of Land Neighbors (−.163, significance .031), Syndrome/Terrain 2014 (−.167, significance .028), Syndrome/Religious Fractionalization 2003 (−.016, significance .839), and Syndrome/Ethnic Fractionalization 2003 (.520, significance .000). The Syndrome is positively and significantly associated with Ethnic Fractionalization, and negatively and significantly associated with Urbanization, both of which findings are in harmony with our theoretical framework.
25. Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).
26. It was necessary to collapse these three categories of Huntington’s because of their very low N sizes, but we recognize the conceptual difficulties in doing so.
27. Donna Lee Bowen and Valerie M. Hudson, “Colonial Heritage Status Coding, 2017” Spreadsheet reproduced in appendix II of this volume.
28. Ikechi Mbeoji, “The Civilised Self and the Barbaric Other: Imperial Delusions of Order and the Challenges of Human Security,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 5 (2007): 855–869.
30. Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,” International Security 16, no. 1 (Fall 1991): 76–116; Steve Pickering, “Determinism in the Mountains: The Ongoing Belief in the Bellicosity of ‘Mountain People,’ ” The Economics of Peace and Security 6, no. 2 (2011): 20–25; Stephen A. Emerson, “Desert Insurgency: Lessons from the Third Tuareg Rebellion.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 22, no. 4 (2011): 669–687; Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2014).
32. Harvey Starr and Benjamin Most, “Contagion and Border Effects on Contemporary African Conflict,” Comparative Political Studies 16, no. 1 (1983): 92–117.
33. Alberto Alesina et al., “Fractionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth 8, no. 2 (June 2013): 155–194.
34. James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75–90; Randall Blimes, “The Indirect Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on the Likelihood of Civil War Onset,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (2006): 536–547.
35. Alesina, “Fractionalization,” 155–194.
36. Jonathan Fox, “The Ride of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945–2001,” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 6 (2004): 715–731; Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 4th ed. (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017).
37. These nations are Central African Republic, Libya, Syria, and Vanuatu. Syria’s imputation was actually 12.5, which was rounded up to 13 for input into the database to allow mapping to be possible.
38. We chose to use Freedom House rather than the Polity dataset because of its larger sample size.
40. Daniela Donno and Bruce Russett, “Islam, Authoritarianism, and Female Empowerment: What Are the Linkages?” World Politics 56 (July 2004): 582–607.
41. As mentioned earlier, the bivariate correlation between urbanization and GDP per capita PPP when that latter variable is not log transformed is .662 (p <.000).
42. Yu-Ming Liou and Paul Musgrave, “Oil, Autocratic Survival, and the Gendered Resource Curse: When Inefficient Policy Is Politically Expedient,” International Studies Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2016): 440–456.
43. We also analyzed the variable Total Dependency Ratio. This ratio gives the ratio of the population between birth and ten years old plus those over sixty five, per one hundred population ages twenty to sixty-four. We excluded this variable from further analysis because it was too closely correlated with Total Fertility Rate.
44. Richard Cincotta, “Africa’s Reluctant Fertility Transition,” Current History (May 2011): 184–190.
45. Noah Bricker and Mark Foley, “The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence: The Importance of the Labor Market,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 7, no. 1 (2013): 179–194.
46. Kate Manne, Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
47. Monroe, The Evils of Polygyny, 23. McDermott is making this comment with reference to her empirical results concerning polygyny, which is a subcomponent of the Syndrome.
48. Christine E. Bose, “Patterns of Global Gender Inequalities and Regional Gender Regimes,” Gender and Society 29, no. 6 (December 2015): 767–791.
49. Khandis Blake, personal communication with Valerie Hudson, October 21, 2018.
8. Change: Historical Successes and Failures
1. Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, Sex and War (Dallas, TX: Benbella Books, 2008), 25–26, 97, 301.
3. We believe a second reservoir is the legacy of inequitable law disfavoring women, which teaches members of the society that women may be treated worse with justification. Notice, for example, how even in the Russia of 2019, a woman can be a sailor, but she is forbidden by law from being the captain of a commercial sea vessel.
4. Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (New York: Mariner Books, 1996), 125, 198–199.
5. Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Crown, 2004), 52–53.
7. Edward Schatz, Modern Clan Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004); Bassam Tibi, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-State in the Modern Middle East,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 127–152.
8. Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories,” World Politics 56, no. 2 (2004): 260.
9. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics,” 245.
10. Mark S. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan: What an Ancient Form of Social Organization Reveals About the Future of Individual Freedom (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 129.
11. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 13.
12. David Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs: Women and Sexuality in Global Conflict (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 198.
13. Jack Goody, The European Family (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 10.
14. Goody, The European Family, 28–29.
15. Goody, The European Family, 51.
16. Goody, The European Family, 52.
17. Goody, The European Family, 44.
18. Potts and Hayden, Sex and War, 309. Note how crucial and how effective the role of Christianity proved, as noted by Korotayev and Bondarenko:
The total absence of the polygyny in the Christian part of the Circum-Mediterranean region (but not in its Moslem part) could be hardly explained by anything else but by the strict prohibition of the polygyny by the Christian Church…pre-Christian Germans, Celts, and Slavs were quite polygynous in the pre-Christian period. Hence, the formation of the zone of uninterrupted monogamy in Europe could be hardly attributed to anything but the Christianization.
Andrey Korotayev and Dmitri Bondarenko, “Polygyny and Democracy: A Cross-Cultural Comparison,” Cross-Cultural Research 34, no. 1 (2000): 204.
20. Greif, “Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth,” 311.
21. Weiner points out that Muhammad attempted the same:
After he arrived in Medina, Muhammad brought the clans together for a historic agreement known as the Constitution of Medina, which united fractured elements of the political community under a common set of principles. In this respect, the shahadah also contains an ideal of political organization that transcends tribalism. It imagines the early Islamic state that Muhammad and the first caliphs would forge amidst the Arabian tribes and that would enforce the new principles of Islamic law.
Once Muhammad had united the tribes (through the riddah, or wars of apostasy), this “channeled the power that the tribes of Arabia had previously used to fight amongst themselves,” enabling expansion. But Weiner notes that some tribal elements remained essential to Islamic rule:
In constructing the new Islamic state, Muhammad and his successors did more than simply honor particular tribal leaders whose alliances they sought. They used the tribal form itself for Islamic purposes. Lineage heads were actively incorporated into the apparatus of the new state. Military payroll was not distributed centrally but instead through clan elders, thus making duty to the Islamic state and duty to the clan one and the same. Tax agents were drawn from tribal ranks. (Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 154, 155, 157).
22. Jack Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 42.
23. The Church “rectified” the asymmetrical right to divorce by men and women by forbidding everyone—men and women—from divorcing. By the twelfth century, even nonconsummation of a marriage was no longer acceptable grounds for divorce.
24. Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family in Europe, 45–46.
25. Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family in Europe, 59, 67.
26. Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family in Europe, 155. The Church endeavored to prevent these lineages from arising among its own ranks through mandatory celibacy, and enforcing that rule was quite a struggle as well. Coontz notes that “not until 1139 did canon law completely forbid clerical marriage,” and that before that time most clerics were married. Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, A History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 106.
27. Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 209.
28. Coontz, Marriage, A History, 101.
29. Coontz, Marriage, A History.
30. Goody, The European Family, 38.
31. Goody, The European Family, 52.
32. Also important to Goody is that in northwest Europe one often found “retirement contracts for the senior generation and public provision for the poor.” Goody, The European Family, 106. This is important for diluting the need for sons to provide for elderly parents in a context in which sons are expected to amass greater wealth than daughters.
33. Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family in Europe, 95.
34. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 255.
35. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 253.
36. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 245.
37. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 231.
38. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 248, xiii.
39. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 247.
40. See also James Foreman-Peck and Peng Zhou, “Late Marriage as a Contributor to the Industrial Revolution in England,” Economic History Review 71, no. 4 (2018): 1073–1099.
41. John Hajnal, “Two Kinds of Preindustrial Household Formation Systems,” Population and Development Review 8 (1982): 476.
42. Mary Hartman dates later marriage in northwestern Europe at least as far back as the 1200s. She notes that in the 1600–1700s in England and France, the average age of marriage for women was twenty-five or twenty-six, and average age of marriage for men was twenty-seven or twenty-eight. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History.
43. John Hajnal, “European Marriage Patterns in Perspective: The Uniqueness of the European Pattern,” in Population in History, ed. D. V. Glass and D. Eversley (London: Edward Arnold, 1965), 101–143.
44. Jack Goody and Stanley J. Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, Cambridge Papers in Social Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 37–38.
45. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 54.
46. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History.
47. Goody and Tambiah, Bridewealth and Dowry, 10.
48. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 41, 43.
49. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 233.
50. Charlotte Stanford, “Women and the Building Trades in Henry VIII’s England” (presentation to the Women’s Studies Program, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, September 14, 2017).
51. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History, 179, 192, 206, 215.
52. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 234.
53. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 235.
54. Greif, “Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth,” 308.
55. Foreman-Peck and Zhou, “Late Marriage as a Contributor,” 1073–1099.
56. Coontz, Marriage, A History, 114, 128.
57. Mark Dyble et al., “Sex Equality Can Explain the Unique Social Structure of Hunter-Gatherer Bands,” Science 348, no. 6236 (2015): 796–798.
58. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History, 229.
59. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History, 229.
60. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History, 20.
61. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History, 221.
62. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History, 221, 222, 224, 227.
63. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History, 221.
64. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History, 194.
65. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History, 194.
66. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History 209, 210.
67. Hartman, The Household and the Making of History 270.
68. Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family in Europe, 155.
69. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 236.
70. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 239.
71. A less materially based variant of the idea that women are crucial postulates that romantic love between men and women is the key to dismantling the system and the Syndrome, or as Mark Weiner puts it, “love is the emblem of freedom.” Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 93. One can trace this from Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice all the way to modern fiction, such as Derek Miller’s The Girl in Green. His main character, Arwood Hobbes, explains in the middle of the Iraqi desert,
The most significant of [Western] ideas? Romantic love. It is the most disruptive and transformative power in the history of the world. Terrorists are powerless against it. We support it, and they will lose…. Think of Romeo and Juliet. “Two houses, both alike in dignity,” we are first told. Why? Because the houses are the power, and dignity is the currency of that realm. We need to know this so we can understand that what keeps the lovers apart is not a higher justice but a higher power. And then here come these two children who defy and disrupt the underlying social order, and who die for their efforts because their humanity cannot survive in concert with that world. The moment Shakespeare makes our sympathies go to them, the system is overturned. Personal love is very disruptive to tribal thinking. And what of Juliet? A young woman? Romantic love empowered her to be equal to a man, to choose her own destiny, to make her own choices, to be in absolute control over her own body and her own heart. It is the first truly feminist story. It validated love, and fueled a revolution. These people, this ISIL, we should fight them, yes. We can bomb them, yes. But that’s not a strategy for victory. This is a guerra fria. Victory lies in replacing their social order, which is why they are afraid, and they should be. And our secret weapon? It is not drones. Quite the opposite. It is women. We should free them, educate them, give them power—put a Juliet in every village. They will change the world. This is why Boko Haram is so afraid of the girls and abducts them, why the Taliban will not educate them, why ISIL murders those in Western clothes and who think freely. Women. They are how the West will win. They are how love will prevail.
Derek Miller, The Girl in Green (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 246–247. We would say instead that it’s not how “the West will win”—after all, Romeo and Juliet was set in the West. Rather, it is how the Syndrome is overthrown and the whole world wins.
72. Goody, The European Family, 62.
73. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 11, 12.
74. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 48.
75. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 241.
76. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 229, 21.
77. Adrienne Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 221.
78. Even universal health care made no difference. See discussion in Schatz, Modern Clan Politics, 53ff.
79. Edgar, Tribal Nation, 248.
80. Edgar, Tribal Nation, 248.
81. Edgar, Tribal Nation, 248.
82. Edgar, Tribal Nation, 249, 256.
83. Edgar, Tribal Nation; see also Adrienne Edgar, “Emancipation of the Unveiled: Turkmen Women Under Soviet Rule, 1924–29,” The Russian Review 62 (January 2003): 132–49; Adrienne Edgar, “Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet ‘Emancipation’ of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective,” Slavic Review 65, no. 2(2006): 252–272; Adrienne Edgar, “Marriage, Modernity, and the ‘Friendship of Nations’: Interethnic Intimacy in Post-war Central Asia in Comparative Perspective,” Central Asian Survey 26, no. 4 (2007): 581–599.
84. Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 201.
85. Sophia Wilson, “Human Rights and Law Enforcement in the Post-Soviet World: Or How and Why Judges and Police Bend the Law” (lecture, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, November 12, 2010).
86. Elizabeth A. Constantine, “Practical Consequences of Soviet Policy and Ideology for Gender in Central Asia and Contemporary Reversal,” in Everyday Life in Central Asia: Past and Present, ed. Jeff Shadeo and Russell Zanca (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 115–126.
87. Edgar, “Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation,” 255, 256.
89. Monica Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems, and Asia’s ‘Missing Girls’: The Construction of Son Preference and Its Unraveling” (World Bank, Washington, DC, December 2009), 16.
90. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 18.
91. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 18.
92. Jie Fan, Thomas Heberer, and Wolfgang Taubmann, Rural China: Economic and Social Change in the Late Twentieth Century (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2006), 258.
93. Geoffrey Murray, China: The Next Superpower, Dilemmas in Change and Continuity (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998), 146.
94. Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order, 61.
95. Katherine Young, “Introduction,” in Today’s Woman in World Religions, ed. by Arvind Sharma (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 35.
96. Again, this is one of the reasons we focus not on patriarchy but on the Syndrome’s components, which are the roots of patriarchy.
97. Das Gupta, “Family Systems, Political Systems,” 17.
98. Andrea Den Boer and Valerie M. Hudson, “Patrilineality, Son Preference, and Sex Selection in South Korea and Vietnam,” Population and Development Review 43, no. 1 (2017): 119–147.
99. Den Boer and Hudson, “Patrilineality, Son Preference”; the South Korean case study was adapted from this article.
100. Seung Gwon Kim et al., The 2012 National Survey on Fertility, Family Health and Welfare [in Korean] (Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, 2012).
101. Sang-Hun Choe, “South Koreans Rethink Preference for Sons,” New York Times, November 28, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/world/asia/28iht-sex.1.8509372.html?_r=1&; also Sang-Hun Choe, “As Families Change, Korea’s Elderly Are Turning to Suicide,” New York Times, February 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/world/asia/in-korea-changes-in-societyand-family-dynamics-drive-rise-in-elderly-suicides.html?pagewanted=all.
102. Daniel Goodkind, “Do Parents Prefer Sons in North Korea?” Studies in Family Planning 30, no.3 (September 1999): 212.
103. Youngsook Cho. 2000. “South Korea,” in The First CEDAW Impact Study, ed. Marilou McPhedran, Susan Bazilli, Moana Erickson, and Andrew Byrnes, 187–202 (Toronto: York University Centre for Feminist Studies).
104. Uhn Cho, “Gender Inequality and Patriarchal Order Recontexualized,” in Contemporary South Korean Society: A Critical Perspective, ed. Hee-Yeon Cho, Lawrence Surendra, and Hyo-Je Cho (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 18–27.
105. Sanghui Nam, “The Women’s Movement and the Transformation of the Family Law in South Korea. Interactions Between Local, National and Global Structures,” European Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 1 (2010): 77.
106. Nam, “The Women’s Movement.”
109. Pil-Wha Chang and Eun-shil Kim, Women’s Experiences and Feminist Practices in South Korea (Seoul, South Korea: Ewha Womans University Press, 2005).
110. Nam, “The Women’s Movement,” 77.
111. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, “Consideration of Reports Submitted Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,” Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties: Republic of Korea, CEDAW/C/KOR/6, March 5, 2007.
112. Seung Gwon Kim et al., The 2003 National Survey on Fertility and Family Health [in Korean] (Seoul: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, 2004), Table 8–8. [김승권, 조애저, 김유경, 박세경, 이건우 (2003) 2003년 전국 출산력 및 가족보건 실태조사연구 보고서. 서울:한국보건사회연구원.]
113. Nam, “The Women’s Movement,” 77.
114. CEDAW, “Consideration of Reports Submitted Under Article 18.”
115. CEDAW, “Consideration of Reports Submitted Under Article 18.”
117. Erin Hye-Won Kim and Philip J. Cook, “The Continuing Importance of Children in Relieving Elder Poverty: Evidence from Korea,” Ageing and Society 31, no. 6 (2011): 953–976.
119. KOSTAT, Statistics Korea, 2012 Statistics on the Aged, September 27, 2012, www.kostat.go.kr. Evidence of shifting attitudes toward elder care can be found in the recent phenomenon of a ballooning elderly suicide rate in South Korea. Newspapers carry harrowing tales of elderly South Koreans who drained savings to facilitate children’s success, expecting that the children would in turn care for their parents—only for the parents to find themselves abandoned. Choe, “South Koreans Rethink Preference for Sons.”
120. KOSTAT, Statistics Korea, Summary Results of 2014 Social Survey. November 27, 2014, www.kostat.go.kr.
121. Woojin Chung and Monica Das Gupta, “The Decline of Son Preference in South Korea: The Roles of Development and Public Policy,” Population and Development Review 33, no. 4 (2007): 757–783.
122. In 2006, 67 percent of those age sixty-five and over believed that it was the responsibility of family members to take care of the elderly, but that figure had dropped to 38 percent in 2010—the majority of elderly parents are now working to higher ages and have plans in place to ensure their economic well-being after retirement. KOSTAT, Statistics Korea, 2011 Statistics on the Aged.
123. Sung Yong Lee, “How did Son-Preference Disappear in Korea? Based on the Perspective of the Value of Children” (paper presented at the Sociology of Population Side Meeting Program, Busan, South Korea, 2013).
124. Lee, “How Did Son-Preference Disappear in Korea?”
125. Goody, The Development of Marriage and Family in Europe, 142.
127. Theodore D. Kemper, Social Structure and Testosterone: Explorations of the Socio-Bio-Social Chain (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 4. Indeed, Kemper asserts this may happen not just socially, but physiologically. He states, “Women who are subordinated in their marriages, rarely winning victories in their familiar interactions and frequently defeated, will ordinarily have very low levels of T and when pregnant, will contribute very little placental T by which to affect female offspring. Hence, male dominance in marriage is likely to be associated with relatively less dominant [female] offspring” (164). He suggests that when women are no longer subordinated in marriage, they will produce more dominant female offspring than their foremothers; daughters who will be far less likely to acquiesce to the Syndrome. We find that a very interesting thought.
9. Conclusion: Contemporary Applications
1. William R. Rice, “Sexually Antagonistic Male Adaptation Triggered by Experimental Arrest of Female Evolution,” Nature 381, (1996): 232–234.
2. Patricia Adair Gowaty, “Sexual Natures: How Feminism Changed Evolutionary Biology,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 28, no. 3 (2003): 63.
3. Gowaty, “Sexual Natures.”
4. William R. Rice, “Dangerous Liaisons,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 97 (2000): 12953–12955.
5. Richard Petts, Kevin Shafer, and Lee Essig, “Does Adherence to Masculine Norms Shape Fathering Behavior?” Journal of Marriage and Family 80, no. 3 (June 2018): 704–720.
6. Steven C. Caton, “Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of Power,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 82.
7. Allison Brysk, The Struggle for Freedom from Fear: Contesting Violence Against Women at the Frontiers of Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
8. David Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs: Women and Sexuality in Global Conflict. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 115. Note also that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has been ratified by 189 nation-states. It’s hard to see, then, how its principles concerning basic human rights for women could constitute cultural imperialism.
9. Kristen R. Monroe, ed., The Evils of Polygyny: Rose McDermott (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2018), 93, 94.
10. Mark Weiner, The Rule of the Clan: What an Ancient Form of Social Organization Reveals about the Future of Individual Freedom (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), 159.
11. Adrienne Edgar, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 260.
14. Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Chad, Chile, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, India, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Korea, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
15. Bangladesh, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Honduras, Norway, and Panama.
16. Hannah McNeish, “Malawi’s Fearsome Chief, Terminator of Child Marriages,” Al-Jazeera, May 16, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/03/malawi-fearsome-chief-terminator-child-marriages-160316081809603.html; UNWomen, “Malawi Chief Annuls 330 Child Marriages,” September 17, 2015, http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2015/9/malawi-chief-annuls-330-child-marriages; Sarah Ruiz-Grossman, “How This Female Chief Broke Up 850 Child Marriages in Malawi,” HuffPost, April 1, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/woman-chief-breaks-up-850-child-marriages-in-malawi_us_56fd51c2e4b0a06d580510da?ir=Good+News&).
20. McDermott et al., “Attitudes Toward Polygyny: Experimental Evidence from Six Countries,” in The Evils of Polygyny: Rose McDermott, ed. Kristen R. Monroe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2018), 97–122.
21. Monroe, The Evils of Polygyny.
23. Monroe, The Evils of Polygyny, 22.
28. Ogbonna, “Law to Ban Polygamy.”
31. Punch, “Inheritance Sharing.”
33. “The Link Between Polygamy and War.”
34. Oh et al., “The Decline of Polygyny”; Michèle Tertilt “Polygyny, Fertility, and Savings,” Journal of Political Economy 113, no. 6 (2005): 1341–1371; Lena Edlund and Nils-Petter Lagerlöf, ”Polygyny and Its Discontents: Paternal Age and Human Capital Accumulation,” Columbia University Academic Commons, 2012, https://doi.org/10.7916/D8988GCB, https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:155593.
35. United Nations Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women,” Article 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/gencomm/hrcom28.htm.
42. Hajanirina Arson et al., Women, Land, and Corruption (Berlin: Transparency International, 2018), 8–9.
46. Habitat for Humanity, “Level the Field: Ending Gender Inequality in Land Rights,” 2016, https://www.habitat.org/multimedia/shelter-report-2016/; Giovarelli, Renee, and Elise Scalise, “Women’s Land Tenure Framework for Analysis: Land Rights,” Landesa, March 21, 2013, https://s24756.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Land_Rights_Framework_2013March.pdf.
47. Arson et al., Women, Land, and Corruption.
48. Lesley Newson and Peter J. Richerson. “Why Do People Become Modern? A Darwinian Explanation,” Population and Development Review 35, no. 1 (2009): 117–58, doi:10.1111/j.1728-4457.2009.00263.x.
49. Valerie M. Hudson and Hilary Matfess, “In Plain Sight: The Neglected Linkage Between Brideprice, Raiding, and Rebellion,” International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 7–40, doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00289.
50. Sara Sharratt, “Voices of Court Members,” in Sexual Violence as an International Crime: Interdisciplinary Approaches, ed. Anne-Marie deBrouwer, Charlotte Ku, Renee G. Romkens, and L. J. van der Herik (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2013), 353–369.
55. For example, the idea that one would ever draft mothers of young children for military service is ludicrously inhumane, we believe.
56. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 159.
57. Weiner, The Rule of the Clan, 38–39.
62. Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen, “What Is the Relationship Between Inequity in Family Law and Violence Against Women? Approaching the Issue of Legal Enclaves,” Politics and Gender 7, no. 4 (Winter 2012b): 453–492.
63. Monroe, The Evils of Polygyny.
66. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 107–108.
67. Hudson et al., “What Is the Relationship?”
68. Mounira M. Charrad, “Central and Local Patrimonialism: State-Building in Kin-Based Societies,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636, no. 1 (July 2011): 49–68.
69. Interestingly, Tapper and Ahmed, respectively, make similar arguments, using the examples of the Safavids and Pahlavis in Iran, and Ataturk in Turkey, and also noting that a tribe may try to become the state, such as with the Ottomans, the Qajars, and the Durrani. Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East,” in Tribes and States Formation in the Middle East, ed. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 48–73; and Akbar Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013).
70. Charrad, “Central and Local Patrimonialism,” 56.
72. Richard Cincotta, “Africa’s Reluctant Fertility Transition,” Current History (May 2011): 190.
73. Andrzej Nowak et al., “The Evolutionary Basis of Honor Cultures,” Psychological Science (2015): 10.
74. Valerie M. Hudson and Patricia Leidl, The Hillary Doctrine: How Sex Came to Matter in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
76. As we have seen throughout the volume, improving the situation of women can also make a long-term dictator vulnerable to overthrow, as the “bargain” of subordinating men to the leader while allowing all men to subordinate women is undone at that point.
77. Hudson and Leidl, The Hillary Doctrine.
78. Gloria Steinem, e-mail correspondence to Valerie M. Hudson, February 5, 2013.
79. This might, for example, have important consequences for U.S. support of the Kurdish PKK, who, in places such as Rojava, have insisted on a version of Sanday’s diarchy. Male and female mayors must make decisions together, any decisions regarding women can only be made by women, and family/personal status law has changed drastically: “Women were immediately given the right to divorce, previously a right reserved to men; to inherit property on an equal basis with men; and to keep their children and their homes in a marital breakup. Gone were long-observed Shariah law provisions that gave a woman’s testimony in court only half the weight of a man’s.” Rod Nordland, “Crackdown in Turkey Threatens a Haven of Gender Equality Built by Kurds,” New York Times, December 7, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/world/middleeast/turkey-kurds-womens-rights.html,” and Rod Nordland, “Women Are Free, and Armed, in Kurdish-Controlled Northern Syria,” New York Times, February 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/world/middleeast/syria-kurds-womens-rights-gender-equality.html.
80. Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
81. David Barash, Out of Eden: The Surprising Consequences of Polygamy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 173.
82. Masud (Masud is listed as the “summarizer,” not the author on the Sisters in Islam website) “Prophet Muhammad’s Wife Aisha.” We are also intrigued by the work of Noor, who argues that being raped is not a confession of zina. Azman Mohd Noor, “A Victim’s Claim of Being Raped Is Neither a Confession to Zina Nor Committing Qadhf (Making False Accusation of Zina),” Muslim World Journal of Human Rights 8, no. 1 (2011): 1–20.
84. Quoted in Rose McDermott and Jonathan Cowden, “Polygyny and Violence Against Women,” Emory Law Journal 64, (2015): 1767–1814, 1777.
85. Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy, 229.
87. We were thrilled to discover, while doing the final edits on this book, that Promundo was awarded the Luxembourg Peace Prize in June 2019.
88. Monroe, The Evils of Polygyny, 31.
89. Monroe, The Evils of Polygyny, 31.
90. Stephanie Coontz, Marriage, A History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 131.
91. Khandis Blake, Maleke Fourati, and Robert C. Brooks, “Who Suppresses Female Sexuality? An Examination of Support for Islamic Veiling in a Secular Muslim Democracy as a Function of Sex and Offspring Sex,” Evolution and Human Behavior 39, no. 6 (2018): 632–638.
93. James Fenske, “African Polygamy: Past and Present,” Journal of Development Economics 117 (2015): 58–73.
95. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 232.
98. We cannot help but remember what Andrew Natsios, USAID administrator during the George W. Bush administration, said to Hudson in an interview in 2013: “How is it a national security threat to the United States for women to be at a low status or whatever term you want to use? How is that a threat to American national security interests? I don’t see how you can make that argument…National security is what’s the threat of attack on the United States, during the Cold War or now because of terrorism. I don’t see how the two are connected.” This attitude is still quite prevalent in government circles even now, though most holding such views avoid the type of explicit disclosure Natsios offers here.
99. Monroe, The Evils of Polygyny, 102.
100. Jacobson, Of Virgins and Martyrs, 11.
101. Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 1999), 220.
102. Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, Sex and War (Dallas, TX: Benbella, 2008), 367.
Appendix I. Syndrome Scores for 176 Countries
1. Roger L. Worthington and Tiffany A. Whittaker, “Scale Development Research: A Content Analysis and Recommendations for Best Practices,” Counseling Psychologist 34 (2006): 806–838.
2. Note that the Inequity in Family Law/Practice (IFL) scale has many subcomponents, some of which include Age of Marriage for Girls, Polygyny, and Inheritance as Wife. However, the IFL scale is much broader than those subcomponents and also includes information on laws and practices concerning Abortion, Marital Rape, Forced Marriage, and Divorce, which are not operationalized as being part of the Syndrome. This broader IFL scale is thus a good starting point for the Syndrome scale. Because we wish to accentuate the actual components of the Syndrome, we then look separately in the Syndrome scale algorithm at the scores for Age of Marriage for Girls and Polygyny as well as at the scale of Women’s Property Rights in Law and Practice (of which Inheritance as a Wife is a subcomponent).
Appendix III. Testing the Effects: Methods and Extended Results Methodology
1. Christopher Achen, “Toward a New Political Methodology: Microfoundations and Art,” Annual Review of Political Science 5 (June 2002): 423–450.
3. The five variables excluded for N size reasons from the Political Stability and Governance dimension analysis were “Rule of Law 2016” from the World Justice Project, “Procedural Justice” from the Human Freedom Index, “Civil Justice” from the Human Freedom Index, “Criminal Justice” from the Human Freedom Index, and “Freedom of Associations” from the Human Freedom Index. Additionally, the variables “Index of Democracy” from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Electoral Process and Pluralism” from EIU’s Index of Democracy, and “Electoral Democracy Index” from the V-Dem 2017 Annual Report, were excluded because they were too highly correlated with the variable “Freedom House Index Political Rights 2016.”
4. The five variables excluded for N size reasons from the Security and Conflict dimension were “Riots and Protests after Election” from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy from The Quality of Government Institute, “Military Expenditure Percentage of Central Government Expenditure” from the World Bank, “Crime Is Effectively Controlled” from World Justice Project, “Civil Conflict Is Effectively Limited” from the World Justice Project, and “People Do Not Resort to Violence to Redress Grievances” from the World Justice Project. The “International Organized Conflict” variable from Human Freedom Index was excluded because it correlated too highly (>.9) with the “Intensity of Internal Conflicts” variable from Vision of Humanity.
5. The nine variables excluded for N size reasons from the Economic Performance dimension were “Poverty Ratio at $1.90 per Day” from the World Bank, “Economic Output Strength” from Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index, “Unemployment Rate 2016–2017” from Global Economy, “Research and Development Expenditure” from the World Bank, “Prevalence of Undernourishment” from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Depth of Food Deficit” from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Human Capital Index Economy” from the World Economic Forum, “Population Living in Slums” from the World Bank, and “Global Innovation Index” from the Global Innovation Index. “Real Interest Rate” from the World Bank was excluded because of operationalization issues. “Economic Performance” from Bertelsmann was excluded because it was highly correlated with the “Economic Output Strength” variable from the Global Peace Index and also had the same N size as that variable. The “Unemployment Rate Male 2016” variable from the World Bank was excluded because it correlated too highly (>.9) with the “Unemployment Rate” variable from the World Bank.
6. Five factors were formed, but two of the factors combined variables that did not make sense to combine and so these were analyzed separately. These included a factor with (1) Final Consumption (log transformed) and (2) High Technology Exports as well as a factor with (1) Government Expenditure as Percentage of GDP and (2) Unemployment.
7. No variables were excluded for N size reasons from the Economic Rentierism dimension.
8. The variable excluded for N size reasons from the Health and Well-Being dimension was “Use of Modern Contraception by Married Women” from the Population Reference Bureau. “Mortality Rate for Communicable Disease” from the United Nations World Health Statistics was excluded because it was from 2008. “Percentage of Adults Ages Fifteen to Forty-Nine with HIV/AIDS” from the CIA World Factbook was excluded because it was highly correlated with the “Percentage of Population Between Fifteen and Forty-Nine with HIV” variable from the World Bank. “Life Expectancy at Birth for Males” from the World Health Organization was excluded because it was highly correlated with the “Life Expectancy” variable from the CIA World Factbook. “Mortality Under Five per One Thousand Live Births” from the World Bank was excluded because it was too highly correlated with the “Life Expectancy” variable from the CIA World Factbook and the “Infant Mortality Rate” variable from the World Bank. The “Percentage of Women Ages Fifteen to Nineteen Who Have Had Children or Are Currently Pregnant” variable from the World Bank was excluded because other variables already cover this data.
9. “Total Dependency Ratio” from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), “Birth Rate Scale” from The WomanStats Project, and “Fertility Rates Ages Twenty to Twenty-Four” from UNDP were all excluded because they were each too highly correlated with “Total Fertility Rate” from the World Bank. In addition, the correlation between “Mother’s Mean Age at First Birth” from the CIA World Factbook and “Median Age of Population” from the United Nations was also very high. Because “Mother’s Mean Age at First Birth” is more in line with our theoretical framework, we excluded Median Age of Population. We also excluded “Mean Age of Childbearing” in favor of “Mother’s Mean Age at First Birth” because we are more interested in the prevalence of child brides.
10. Noah Bricker and Mark Foley, “The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence: The Importance of the Labor Market,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 7, no. 1 (2013): 179–194.
11. No variables were excluded for N size reasons from the Education of the Population dimension. The “Male Literacy Rate” and the “Female Literacy Rate” from the CIA World Factbook were excluded because they were too highly correlated with the World Bank literacy variables. The “Male Literacy Rate Ages Fifteen to Twenty-Four” from the World Bank was excluded because it was too highly correlated with the “Female Literacy Rate Ages Fifteen to Twenty-Four” variable from the World Bank. The “Gender Parity Index for Primary and Secondary Schools” variable from the World Bank was excluded because it was too highly correlated with the “Gender Parity Index for Secondary School” variable from the World Bank. The “Access to Advanced Education” variable from the Social Progress Index was excluded because it was too highly correlated with the “Average Years of Schooling” variable from the United Nations Development Program Human Development Reports. The “Overall Literacy Rate Difference Between Males and Females” variable, calculated as the difference between the CIA values for Male and Female literacy rates was excluded because it was too close conceptually with the “Male/Female Difference in Literacy Rates” variable from the World Bank and the “Discrepancy in Educational Attainment Between Males and Females” variable from The WomanStats Project.
12. We chose the indicator for secondary school rather than primary school because the N size for secondary school was larger.
13. The one variable excluded for N size reasons from the Social Progress dimension was “Population Living in Slums” from Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index. “Social Progress Index 2016” from the Social Progress Index (SPI) was excluded because it was correlated highly with “Human Development Index” and because we included subcomponents of SPI in the analysis.
14. No variables were excluded for N size reasons from the Environmental Protection dimension. “Environmental Health” from the Environmental Performance Index was excluded because it correlated too highly with the “Water and Sanitation” variable from the Environmental Performance Index.